

**ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY**

**INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**The Economic and Political impact of “Socialism” on  
Somali Republic (1969-1991)**

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**THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF  
“SOCIALISM” ON SOMALI REPUBLIC (1969-1991)**

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**FOR**

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**IN ECONOMICS**

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## **DECLARATION**

I hereby confirm that this thesis is my original work of study and has been studied and presented in accordance with the university academic standard, regulations and ethical rules. I also declare that as per the university and International academic standard, I have fully cited and referenced all materials, results, data, maps and ideas that are not original to this thesis.

Mohamed Omer Osman

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis, would essentially focus on the emergence of “Somali Scientific Socialism” and its major impact on the economy and politics of the ‘Somali Republic’ at the time. The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the existing literature of the Somali state conflict, and mainly focuses on the economic and political impact of “socialism” on Post-independent Somali Republic. Deductive Research approach with case study method is employed. A secondary data in the form of journals, books, academic papers, dissertations, reports and online publications is used as data sources and is consulted in the form of qualitative manner. In this thesis, theories on state conflict is reviewed in order to justify the main objectives of doing this research; the two major theoretical approaches on Somali state conflict is studied i.e. instrumentalists and traditionalists approaches. Accordingly, the major findings of this study shows that, the country’s economy was deeply devastated by the ‘socialist system’. The Somali economy experienced serious macroeconomic crisis, including economic stagnation, poor economic growth, higher deficit ratio and higher unemployment. The trade deficit has increased to millions of dollars and food import was drastically high. The Thesis concludes that ‘socialism’ had profound impact on the economy of the country, the economic performance of Somalia was very disappointing. In the first years of its rule, production of almost all major food crops declined, this created that the country have to rely on food aid and large loans. Somalia’s economy during this period was disastrous in comparison with the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, and Kenya. Barre and his socialist style system created clan division and augmented ethnic clashes due to nepotism, disparity, treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare organizations which later ousted the regime in 1991.

**Key Words:** Somalia, Somaliland, Socialism, Scientific Socialism, State Collapse, Economic Collapse, Civil War, Statelessness.

## ÖZET

Tezde öncelikli olarak Sosyalizmin ortaya çıkışı ve “Somali Cumhuriyeti” üzerindeki önemli ekonomik ve siyasi etkileri üzerine odaklanıldı. Tezin temel hedefi Somali devlet çatışmaları üzerine yazılan literatürün daha iyi anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmak ve “Sosyalizmin” Somali Cumhuriyeti’nin bağımsızlık sonrasındaki sürecinde ekonomik ve siyasi etkilerini incelemektir. Çalışmada tümdengelim metodu kullanılarak temellendirmeler yapıldı. Gazeteler, kitaplar, akademik metinler, tezler, raporlar ve online yayınlar ikincil veri kaynakları olarak kullanılarak niteliksel düzeyde bir çalışma ortaya çıktı. Bu tezde devlet çatışmaları üzerine ortaya konan teoriler araştırmanın temel hedeflerini kanıtlamak için tekrar gözden geçirildi. Bunlar araçsal ve klasik yaklaşımlar olarak iki temel bakış açısını kapsıyor. Bu bakış açısıyla, çalışmanın temel bulguları gösteriyor ki ülke ekonomisi “sosyalist politikalar” yoluyla ciddi bir şekilde harap edilmiştir. Somali ekonomisi ekonomik durgunluk, düşük ekonomik büyüme, yüksek bütçe açığı oranları ve yüksek işsizlik oranları ile birlikte çok ciddi makro krizler yaşamıştır. Bu süreçte ticaret açığı milyon dolarlara çıkarken, gıda ithalatı da ciddi oranlarda yükseldi. Tezde “sosyalizmin” ülke ekonomisi üzerindeki derin etkileri ve Somali’nin ekonomik performansına tarif edilemez tahribatları analiz edilmeye çalışıldı. “Sosyalist” yönetimin ilk beş senesinde neredeyse tüm gıda ürünleri üretimi azaldı ve ülke gıda yardımlarına bağımlı hale geldi ve de büyük borçlanmalar oluştu. Bu süreçte Somali ekonomisi komşu ülkeler olan Etiyopya ve Kenya’ya oranla feci durumdaydı. Barre ve onun sosyalist modeli klanların ayrışmasına neden oldu ve iltimas, eşitsizlik, ihanet, etnik soykırımlar yüzünden de etnik çatışmalar baş gösterdi ayrıca rejimi 1991’de yıkan gerilla tipi örgütlenmeler ortaya çıktı.

**Anahtar Kavramlar:** Somali, Somaliland, Sosyalizm, Bilimsel Sosyalizm, Devletin Çöküşü, Ekonomik Çöküş, İç Savaş, Vatansızlık

## APPROVAL

### APPROVAL

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- 1) Somali
- 2) Somaliland
- 3) "Socialism"
- 4) Scientific "Socialism"
- 5) Civil War
- 6) State Collapse

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Mohamed Osman

Istanbul, Turkey

## **DEDICATION**

**I have dedicated this thesis to my Mom**

**Ugaaso Hussein**

*For her nurturing and profound affection in a difficult circumstances and for stoically waited me for so long.*

## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

|               |                                             |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <b>AU</b>     | African Union                               |
| <b>ICG</b>    | International Crisis Group                  |
| <b>ICU</b>    | Islamic Courts Union                        |
| <b>IGAD</b>   | Inter-Governmental Authority on Development |
| <b>NFD</b>    | Northern Frontier District                  |
| <b>NGO</b>    | Non-Governmental Organization               |
| <b>OAU</b>    | Organization of African Unity               |
| <b>SNL</b>    | Somali National League                      |
| <b>SNM</b>    | Somali National Movements                   |
| <b>SRC</b>    | Supreme Revolutionary Council               |
| <b>SRSP</b>   | Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party        |
| <b>SSDF</b>   | Somali Salvation Democratic Front           |
| <b>SYL</b>    | Somali Youth League                         |
| <b>TFG</b>    | Transitional Federal Government             |
| <b>UN</b>     | United Nations                              |
| <b>UNDP</b>   | United Nations Development Program          |
| <b>UNITAF</b> | Unified Task Force                          |
| <b>UNOSOM</b> | United Nations Office of Somalia            |
| <b>USSR</b>   | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics         |
| <b>WSLF</b>   | Western Somali Liberation Front             |

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|                                                                       |      |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
| DECLARATION .....                                                     | i    |
| ABSTRACT.....                                                         | ii   |
| ÖZET .....                                                            | iii  |
| APPROVAL .....                                                        | iv   |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....                                                 | v    |
| DEDICATION .....                                                      | vi   |
| ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .....                                      | vii  |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....                                                | viii |
| CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION.....                                          | 1    |
| 1.1    The Definition of “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” .....         | 1    |
| 1.2    Background of the Study.....                                   | 6    |
| 1.3    Scope and objectives of the Study.....                         | 8    |
| 1.4    Research Questions and Hypotheses.....                         | 10   |
| 1.5    Significance of the study .....                                | 13   |
| 1.6    The main argument of the Thesis.....                           | 14   |
| 1.7    Research Methods and Type of Data .....                        | 17   |
| 1.8    Research Strategy .....                                        | 17   |
| 1.9    Organization of the Thesis .....                               | 18   |
| CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAME WORK.....                               | 21   |
| 2.1    Introduction .....                                             | 21   |
| 2.2    Two major theoretical approaches on Somali State Conflict..... | 21   |
| 2.2.1    Traditionalists approach of Somali Studies .....             | 23   |
| 2.2.2    Instrumentalists approach of Somali Studies.....             | 25   |
| 2.2.3    The Soviet’s instrumentalist Foreign Policy on Somalia.....  | 28   |
| 2.3    Collier and the theory of State Building.....                  | 31   |

|                                                      |                                                                              |    |
|------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 2.4                                                  | Background of the Somali State conflict.....                                 | 33 |
| 2.4.1                                                | Phase I: Pre-colonial period (pre- 1897) .....                               | 33 |
| 2.4.2                                                | Phase II: Colonialism period (1897-1960) .....                               | 34 |
| 2.4.3                                                | Phase III: Socialist State period (1969- 1991).....                          | 36 |
| CHAPTER III: CASE STUDY: SOMALI STATE CONFLICT ..... |                                                                              | 50 |
| 3.1                                                  | Introduction .....                                                           | 50 |
| 3.1.1                                                | The impact of “Barre’s Socialism” on the Economy.....                        | 52 |
| 3.1.1.1                                              | Agriculture and Production .....                                             | 53 |
| 3.1.1.2                                              | Export and Import .....                                                      | 56 |
| 3.1.1.3                                              | Financial and Public Administration.....                                     | 63 |
| 3.2                                                  | The impact on major non-economic Institutions.....                           | 70 |
| 3.2.1                                                | Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP).....                             | 71 |
| 3.2.2                                                | Somali-Ethiopian War: the turning point of the Somali Socialist Regime ..... | 73 |
| 3.2.3                                                | Socialist Military Regime and the genocide in the North (Somaliland).....    | 76 |
| CHAPTER IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.....              |                                                                              | 79 |
| CITED REFERENCES.....                                |                                                                              | 88 |
| APPENDICES .....                                     |                                                                              | 97 |

## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

### LIST OF TABLES

|                                                                                                                        |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Table 1: Foreign aid to Somalia 1960-1970 .....                                                                        | 30 |
| Table 2: Elite Structure, Legitimacy and State building in Somalia 1960-90 .....                                       | 42 |
| Table 3 : Somalia: Percentage GDP allocated for Military, Health, Education and<br>respective ratios (1969-1978) ..... | 48 |
| Table 4: Investment in three-year Development Program 1971-73 by sector (Millions of<br>Somali Shillings).....         | 54 |
| Table 5: Investment in the five year Development program, 1974-78 by sector (Millions<br>Somali Shillings).....        | 55 |
| Table 6: Growth and Production.....                                                                                    | 56 |
| Table 7: Structure of production .....                                                                                 | 56 |
| Table 8: Food Imports (Millions of Somali Shillings).....                                                              | 57 |
| Table 9: Foreign dependency and trade deficit (Millions of Somali Shillings).....                                      | 57 |
| Table 10: Estimates of GDP at Factor Cost, 1972-1978 (1978 constant prices) .....                                      | 59 |
| Table 11: Domestic production and Imports as percent of the total grain availability (1979-<br>1983) .....             | 61 |
| Table 12: Selected items as percentage of ordinary state expenditure (1981-1984) .....                                 | 62 |
| Table 13: Somalia: Balance of Payments (Millions of US dollars).....                                                   | 62 |
| Table 14: Somalia: Industrial output of selected Products .....                                                        | 63 |
| Table 15: Central Government's Current Budget.....                                                                     | 64 |
| Table 16: Central Government non-defense Expenditure (per Employee, Somalia, selected<br>years, 1975-89) .....         | 66 |
| Table 17: Somalia's Export before revolution (1960-1968) .....                                                         | 68 |
| Table 18: Somalia's Export after 1969 revolution .....                                                                 | 68 |
| Table 19: Somalia Ordinary Expenditure 1984-1988.....                                                                  | 69 |

## LIST OF FIGURES

|                                                                          |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Figure 1: Deductive Research Strategy.....                               | 18 |
| Figure 2: Somalia: GDP, Import and Export Growth rate % (1971-1990)..... | 57 |
| Figure 3: Somalia: External Debt (in Millions of USD) 1971-1990 .....    | 58 |
| Figure 4: Somalia Percapita GNP 1973 -1990.....                          | 65 |
| Figure 5: Ordinary Budget: Foreign Affairs and Finance & Services .....  | 67 |
| Figure 6: Somalia: Formal Authority Structure (1976) .....               | 73 |
| Figure 7: Somalia Army Imports 1971-1988.....                            | 74 |
| Figure 8 : Somalia FDI Net inflows (Current USD) 1971-1990 .....         | 76 |

## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 The Definition of “Barre’s Scientific Socialism”

In this section of the thesis, I would like to define, what does “Somali Scientific Socialism” meant to Siad Barre and for the Somali society in general. According to Payton (1980), although there is no clear evidence which supports the idea that soviets secretly planned the regime’s October coup, it assured that there was a “coincidence of interests” existed between Siad Barre and soviet strategic objectives in the horn of Africa (Payton, 1980).

In a public ceremony, on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1971, Mohamed Siad Barre declared that “ in order to realize the interest of the Somali people....the full of development of their potentialities ... we solemnly declare Somalia as socialist state” (David Laitin, 1976).

For Pestalozza (1974), the assumption of the power, most of the coup leaders were very much convinced of the supremacy of “Barre’s scientific socialism”.

However, for General Siad Barre, he himself declared to the Somalis that “[f]or us, “Socialism” is simply defined; it is a system in which the state takes the primacy responsibility for the political, social and economic development of the nation” (Castagno, 1971). He also explained that, their choice of “[Somali] scientific socialism” (*hereafter, the term “Somali Scientific Socialism” refers to the Barre’s version of “Socialism” in the Somali Republic*) is to mobilize the people to achieve their major goals: reducing poverty, illiteracy and diseases.

Pestalozza (1974), noted “*Scientific Socialism*” for Barre and his supporters in the SRC was the following: a method to overcome nationalism without principles, which may give a role to the conservative elements; a way to reject deficient forms of “Socialism” such as Islamic socialism, African socialism, Arab socialism; a method of class struggle that

*can be used to eliminate economic dependency for exploited societies; and a strategic method for economic development” (Pestalozza, 1974:34).*

The Somali coup leaders to achieve their revolutionary goals firm theoretical guidelines are needed and they have believed that “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” could provide the necessary organizational skills. He noted that, “[Somali] Scientific Socialism” meant a method of organizing the Somali society to:

1. Bring the most important parts of the economy into realm.
2. Improve capacity of resources ;
3. Reduce inequality;
4. Encourage participation in democratic process;
5. Establish official script of the Somali language;
6. Reduce the trade deficit;
7. Reduce foreign dependency such as the west.

However, some scholars argues that, the military leaders pursued “Somali Scientific Socialism” just to legitimize their rule (Lewis, 1982; Samatar, 1988).

In December 1971, General Siad Barre gave long speech, saying that “we [Somali] people believe that, there is no such “African”, “Western” or “Soviet” Socialism. There is only “Scientific socialism” (Castagno, 1971).

So, for Barre it was not only bringing “scientific socialism” to his people, there was a secondary objective, which was giving back the Promised Land occupied by Ethiopia to Somalis. According to David Laitin (1976), Barre seemed “to be offering his people the promised land rather than scientific socialism”.

## **How Barre Legitimized the “Somali Scientific Socialism”**

In this part of the thesis, I am going to briefly explain, how Barre legitimized his rule and how he implemented his “Scientific Socialism” as different tools. As mentioned, the Somali military regime tried to legitimize their seizure of power and implementation of their version of “Somali Scientific Socialism” in every aspect. The SRC pressured to legitimize their rule in Somali Republic soon after the coup. Their first step was to create a relentless stream of propagandas against the civilian administration that they have replaced.

So, justifying his actions, Siad Barre had listed all the weakness regarding the civilian administration which he said “[t]he civilian government proved their inability to move the nation in to the direction of prosperity...the political leaders exploited tribal feelings”<sup>1</sup>.

The second move of Barre to legitimize his rule was to create a system of power mentioned as “Somali nationhood”. He claimed that his move was to save the country from anarchy. He noted in a long speech “[w]e soldiers are not good politicians, but there was absolutely no choice”.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, he established a system, an ideology of “Somali Scientific Socialism” that he vowed it as a participatory approach of creating a prosperous and respected Somali nation. Barre mentioned “[w]e are devoting all our energies toward destroying all forms of national disunity, including *tribalism and elitism*”.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Castagno (1971)

<sup>2</sup> *ibid*

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*

However, Siad Barre conveyed the regime's decision of implementing his "Scientific Socialism" to the public in October 1970. For him, the ideology was preserving Somalis needs. In his first year anniversary speech he said "[Socialism] is the most humane ideology in keeping with man's needs" (Pestalozza, 1974).

So, the main message of Barre to legitimize his ideology was pointing out to the Somalis that this is the only way they can achieve rapid economic and social startups.

### **How Barre implemented his "Somali Scientific Socialism" ideology.**

After legitimizing both his coup and his version of "scientific socialism" in Somali Republic, he laid down different approaches to implement his rule. I would like to summarize the main frameworks mentioned in the following paragraphs.

**As nationalism principle:** Barre used his "Scientific socialism" as replacement of *tribalism and clan segmentation*, not only the urban people but also the nomads had been reached. He justified this move by removing all the constraints to participation and at the same time ending the dependency to foreign products and outlays. He mentioned in an interview "...this is a system of nationalism built on participation and social mobilization" (Lewis, 2002: 44).

**As a system compatible with Islam:** Barre's controversial move was comparing his "Somali Scientific socialism" with the religion of Islam. Previously, Islam has offered considerable resistance to even nationalism and modernization of education. Barre, at that time intimidated the most reluctant of conservative doctrine, he rather suggested a new approach towards the Islamic faith. Before the announcement of Somali script, many members of the SRC went to religious schools and told the teachers that resistance would be costly (Laitin, 1976). In 1975, ten religious scholars were executed in public for preaching against the revolution and "socialism".

Finally, Barre articulated the faith in a new way. Most of his speeches were constantly referring to the Kor'an. In a speech during Eid-Aldha in 1970, Barre said "our Islamic faith teaches us that its inherent values are perennial and continually evolving as people progress". Barre rejected the idea of 'religion is the opium of the people'. He noted "Kor'an is the foundation of our moral and ethical system and the government has the responsibility of supporting it". He insisted to the religious leaders to address his ideology as "non-contradiction" approach (ibid).

According to Barre "there is no conflict between Islam and socialism" (Castagno, 1971). He was quoted as saying that "if we decide to regulate our national wealth, it is not against the essence of Islam" (Patman, 1990).

**As reduction of foreign dependency and development framework:** The other aspect of his new nationalism ideology was to reduce the dependency on foreign countries. He was especially very concerned over the import of food while many parts of the country's land had not been cultivated. Said Barre's only achieved goal during this process was writing the Somali script (Laitin, 1976).

In 1971-75 Barre developed two important development programs, the idea was to create an independent viable economy. In addition to this, many government institutions such as banks and industries has been nationalized. For example, the Italian Banco di Roma and Banco di Napoli, the British National and Grindlays Bank and the Egyptian Bank were tookeover by the state; oil distributing companies, Agip and Shell were nationalized; the Italian-Somali sugar industry (SNAI) and Italian-Somali Electric Society (SEIS) were among those affected by the nationalization act (Ismail, 2010:103).

## 1.2 Background of the Study

In Somali Republic, the years of 1970s, 80s and 1990s, serious economic crisis and a period of political upheavals emerged. The Somali economy suffered from long and harsh civil wars, major political crisis, severe periodic droughts, and years of chaos and instability. In those years, particularly at the end of 1971, Somali Republic experimented “Somali Scientific Socialism” few years later, macroeconomic crises had emerged, and those are included, huge internal and external economic imbalances, high inflation, and serious economic stagnation (Mubarak, 1996).

Barre and his socialist style system created clan division and augmented ethnic clashes due to nepotism, disparity, treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare organizations which later ousted the regime in 1991.

In the African “Socialism” literature, it has been critically discussed that the “Socialism” had spread in Africa in early 1970s. According to Metrowich (1967), few African states adopted “Socialism” in 60s and 70s and those were, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Algeria, Burundi, Sudan, Egypt, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tanzania (Metrowich, 1967).

In this regard, Thompson agrees "in twentieth century Africa, were majority of its population are rural pastoralists with subsistence cultivators, were not likely a topography for “Socialism” that targeted the urban working class as their main impetus for socio-political endeavor" (Thomson A, 2013). This thesis, would essentially concentrate on the emergence of “Socialism” and its major impact on the Somali Republic<sup>4</sup> at the time.

In this regard, in contending with the arguments about how the ideology of “socialism” had spread in Somalia for the first time, it has been noted in the literature that Mohamed

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<sup>4</sup> Somali Democratic Republic was formed after the unification of the two Somali colonies in July 1<sup>st</sup> 1960.

Siad Barre<sup>5</sup>, a military dictator came in power in a bloodless military coup and renamed the country “*The Somali Democratic Republic*” based on what some scholars noted as ‘Somali Scientific Socialism’ ideology<sup>6</sup>. Besides, the idea was to align the Somali state with the USSR in the cold War. He disqualified all clan structures, however, he had concentrated the political power within his inner circle, Marehan sub-clan<sup>7</sup>.

According to Abdi Ismail (2010), as soon as they came in power, the military suspended all formal political institutions of the country; the constitution; the Supreme Court; the national assembly and political parties were suspended, their activities were banned. The democratically elected civilian regime was replaced by the SRC<sup>8</sup> and they started monopolizing all government main institutions. Although people were not satisfied the civilian leaders, but the military regime was worse, their economic performance was poor. Dr. Abdi Ismail, an Economist at the University of Helsinki wrote that:

*“....People felt that the state betrayed the confidence they had put in it, expressing that discouragement by comparing the Somali state leaders [elite] with colonial authorities”.*

(Abdi Ismail, 2010: 85)

In the contrary, people were not that much satisfied, there were grievances against the two previous civilian administrations before the military come to power, he further

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<sup>5</sup> Mohamed Siad Barre was the military dictator and President of the Somali Democratic Republic from 1969 to 1991.

<sup>6</sup> See the definition of “Somali Scientific Socialism” in Page 1

<sup>7</sup> To understand the Somali Clans and their sub clans see Appendix A.

<sup>8</sup> SRC: Supreme Revolutionary Council (the highest Supreme council of the military regime), they clearly prohibited the gathering or formation of any political association. The Soviets put a pressure on SRC and ordered them to create a Socialist party to replace the military council. Siad Barre (The Dictator) announced in 1971 that the SRC's intention was to create a single-party government. The SRC begun to organize what has been described as a "vanguard of the revolution", these “Party-men” was composed of a socialist elite mainly from the military and few from the civilians. The National Public Relations Office (NPRO) was designated to make propagandas for Scientific Socialism.

discussed “...Somalis wished for a reversal of the situation and vowed that a system like this will soon come to an end, but the situation of the military regime was far worse than” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 86).

On the other hand, the military regime assassinated the president of the civilian regime *Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke*, who was visiting Las’anod, a region in the north, he has been killed by one of his body guards. It has been reported that there was an aborted attempt of killing the president one year before, that was 1968. My thesis at this point, agrees that this was the starting point of the State conflict, in the sense that, overthrowing the first civilian regime of Somali state created a political vacuum that still shapes the contemporary political debate of Somalia (Lewis, 1972; Samatar, 1994).

As Makhubela (2010: 41) mentioned, General Siad Barre promised to the Somali people for two things, first, economic development and national unity through the ideology of “scientific socialism”, second, abolishing clanism and political Islam. He rather started militarization of the Somali society and imposed secularism,<sup>9</sup> but later all his actions and activities proofed the opposite, such as disunity, injustices, clan nepotism and economic failure.

### **1.3 Scope and objectives of the Study**

It is important to note that, this thesis neither appreciates nor criticizes the “Socialism” as a doctrine. The main purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the existing literature of the Somali state conflict, and mainly focuses on the economic and political impact of ‘Socialism’ on Somali Republic at the time.

In order to understand the main theoretical arguments of the topic, one should research the main arguments in the existing literature and critically analyze them within a

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<sup>9</sup> For details see Tadesse (2002: 16; Bradbury 1994: 9; Lewis 2005: 210)

theoretical framework. For that reason, this thesis mainly focuses on the ‘Socialist Somalia’ that existed in the years of 1969 to 1991.

The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the major impact of “Socialism”<sup>10</sup> on the economy and politics of Somali Republic. This thesis also aims to descriptively analyze the relationship between “Socialism” and the economic and political problems in the country.

This study also intends to fill the gap and create modest contribution in the existing literature by seeking an answer to the research questions raised in the subsequent part. To answer these research questions outlined in this study, subsequent answers is mentioned in the conclusion.

My approach of this thesis is to survey the literature available in the field of political economy of “Socialism” in the field of Somali studies, and to highlight the economic and political impact of “Socialism” on post-independent Somalia. A special research focus is given to the ‘Socialist’ state era.

As discussed previously, the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Based on the fact that, what mostly the Somali Scholars described as an era of chaos in the political economy dynamics of the Somali state. Many paradigms were mentioned on the causes and consequences of the state conflict of Somalia (Samatar, 1988; Lewis, 1972).

According to literature of Somali state conflict, it has been highlighted many significant contributions of different problems including clanism, long colonization, lack of democratically elected civilian regime, and Socialism. To understand these problems, special attention is given the role of “Somali Scientific Socialism” on the economic disintegration and latter political crisis. Thus, this thesis then investigates, what was the major impact of “Socialism” on the economy and politics of the Somali Republic.

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<sup>10</sup> See the definition of so called “Somali Socialism” in page 1

Another objective of the Thesis is to contribute to the literature by analyzing the “Socialism” and its impact on the economy and politics of Somali Republic, one of Africa’s prime example and worst case of State collapse. It is worse than Rwanda, Congo and Liberia. (Lewis, 1994)<sup>11</sup>.

## **1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses**

In 1960, after almost a 100 years rule by European colonialists, the Somali Republic was shaped by a merger of Italian Somaliland in the south and British Somaliland in the north, two out of the five colonies existed in the Somali peninsula. However, the other three parts, Ogaaden<sup>12</sup>, French-Somaliland (present day Djibouti), and Northern Frontier District NFD (Northeastern Kenya), remained under alien rule. Since then, “socio-political unification and socioeconomic development have turned into the focal issues to be tended by every Somali state” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:58).

According to Abdi Ismail (2010), in 1960 the Somali Republic gained its independence with less expectations. At that time, Somalia was once described as Africa’s first democratic country (Samatar and Samatar, 2001). However, after almost 10 years, Somalia unrestrained its democracy and adopted an authoritarian one man rule, and at the same time autocrat manifestation of governance. The major objective of Siad Barre was to unite and bring all the Somali colonial territories under one flag, the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology and self-reliance (Samatar, 1994).

For Ahmed Samatar (1994), regarding the consequences of the civil war in 1988; “almost 5 million Somalis are being kept alive through emergency centers, 60% of Somalia’s basic infrastructure has been destroyed, 80 percent of all social services (e.g., schools and

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<sup>11</sup> See also the report of Fund for Peace (2011) ‘*Failed States index*’

<sup>12</sup> The term Ogaadeen refers to the Present day Somali Region of Ethiopia

hospitals) have been rendered non-operational; social and political institutions have been shattered” (Ahmed Samatar, 1994: 32). Moreover, Said Samatar noted, “a range of different answers has been suggested for the causes of the Somali agony, clanism, militaristic despotism, and super power strategic competition, has been mentioned” (Said Samatar, 2001). The reasons behind the state conflict were not limited to the aforementioned ones, my thesis at this point agrees with Abdi Ismail (2010), who believes that, the relevance of the Siad Barre’s adoption of “Scientific socialism”<sup>13</sup> was proposed to legitimize his rule and answer to those who put him in power, more than it was directed towards Somali society (Abdi Ismail, 2010).

This Thesis, while it is not disregarding the existence of those arguments, it concentrates more on finding the impact of “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” on the Somali economy and politics, especially during the military rule between 1969-1991, it tries to answer two major research questions:-

- 1) How does “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” impact on the economy of the Somali Republic?
- 2) How far does this ‘system’ also impact on other institutions, such as political institutions, social institutions and the military?

***How does “Barre’s Scientific Socialism” impact on the Economy of the Somali Republic?***

There has been a serious impact of “Barre’s Socialism” on the economy of the Somali republic soon after its inception in 1971<sup>14</sup> (see chapter 3 for details). The major impact will be analyzed on the subsequent chapter.

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<sup>13</sup> See the definition of ‘Barre’s Socialism’ in page 1

<sup>14</sup> This part of the analysis will be thoroughly discussed in the third chapter of the thesis which is the case study of Somali State conflict.

However, the USSR intervention was the most significant intervention of the history of Somalia, therefore, majority of the data used in this thesis is mostly related to the period when the military regime of Somalia was in power with the explicit support of the Soviet Union.

The first research question consist of two parts, the first one is the ‘Somali Scientific Socialism’<sup>15</sup> and the last part is about its major impact on the economy of the Somali state.

To answer these two research questions, I have developed two hypotheses, which are subsequently represent different theoretical approaches.<sup>16</sup>

The first approach is traditionalist approach <sup>17</sup> the oldest paradigm. The traditionalists like I. M. Lewis of the LSE argues “*The ‘traditionalists’ argument which is a segmented clan system- remains the foundation of pastoral Somali society, and that ‘clannishness’ -the primacy of clan interests -has its natural divisive reflection on the political level*”. (Lewis, 1961; Doornbos and Markakis, 1994)<sup>18</sup>.

The second approach is the Instrumentalist approach, which I have used the definition of Brass (1985) which is “ethnicity as an instrument used by actors, groups or the ruling class (elite) in order to gain power and rule over others” (Brass, Paul 1985).

In the Somali Case, Ahmed Samatar an Instrumentalist who had extensively studied the Somali military regime noted that “the Somali problem is not the clan reality and its

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<sup>15</sup> See the definition of “Somali Socialism” in page 1

<sup>16</sup> These two main theoretical approaches will be further discussed in the second chapter of the thesis.

<sup>17</sup> The Traditionalist Thesis comes from three important sources, which are, Historical Writings of the British travelers such as Richard Burton, the anthropological recordings such as Eran Prit-chard and the Ioan M. Lewis’s extensive writings of the Somali culture and tradition. Apart from Richard Burton , the writings of the other colonial explorers include Ralph E., Drake Brokman, British Somaliland (London, 1900), F. Adam, Hand Book of Somaliland (London , 1923). All of these contains narrations and personal recordings of the Somali Society and culture and they can be easily find in British Archives in London.

<sup>18</sup> For details, see Lewis, I.M. (1961), *A Pastoral Democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa*, Oxford University Press, London; and Doornbos and Markakis,(1994)

culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class<sup>19</sup> is the real ‘virus’ of the Somali case” (Ahmed Samatar, 1994:20).

### **Hypothesis I:**

*For the Somali state, the major economic and political institution problems, should be rooted from the implementation of the “Somali Scientific Socialism” ” experiment*

### **Hypothesis II:**

*Soviet interventionists used Somali state as an instrument and this could be contributed to the Somali economic collapse and latter political crisis.*

To answer these research questions a case study approach has been developed using Somalia as case study subject. The “Barre’s Socialism” experiment in Somalia in early 1970s, its consequences in Somalia, the 1969 military coup and the formation of “socialist state”, the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977, post-Socialist civil wars 1980-1991 is also further analyzed. Consequently, the main arguments from different sources is analyzed in accordance with the theoretical background of the paper.

## **1.5 Significance of the study**

As base of understanding the Somali state conflict, this thesis can assist as a useful resource for the Somali government, AU, UN and other members of development organizations who have a special interest of understanding the Somali state conflict, and who want to assess further by analyzing the causes of it.

This Thesis can also contribute to government policy formulation on understanding the sociopolitical impact of a failed state. Given a special attention to the “socialist state” era, this research would help filling modestly the gap in the existing literature about the post-independent conflicts of Somalia.

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<sup>19</sup> In the Somali case, ruling class were mentioned as the ‘political leaders’ mainly from the clans who dominated leadership during the civilian and military regime.

It is also a fundamental part of the consolidation of the Somali issue, which is a critical pillar of the AU foreign policy framework. This work as master thesis will modestly contribute to the body of knowledge on political economy of “Socialism” in Somalia. In addition, recommendations and suggestions given would be an important contribution to the Somali political, social and economic system, and will be discussed in a future study.

## **1.6 The main argument of the Thesis**

As announced above, this thesis aims to contribute to a better understanding of the existing literature about the analysis of political economy of “Barre’ Scientific Socialism” in Somalia, and mainly focuses its impact on the economy and politics of the Somali state during the military rule. Recent literature suggests a multidimensional approaches of understanding the causes of state conflict in Somalia. In order to understand the dynamics and the influences of “Socialism” in Somalia, one to look the literature. Patman (1990) postulates that "pre-emptive measure to thwart endeavors by Somali reactionaries is to take power and capture dynamic reformers" (Patman, 1990: 42).

Firstly, in August 1968 there was an economic agreement between Moscow and the Somali government that allowed the Somali government to repay its superseded debts, he added by confirming that there was an incredible assistance towards the Somali Military regime by the Soviet union.

As mentioned earlier, there are multidimensional approaches of understanding the causes of Somali State conflict, one of the most important argument is that, clanism, or inter-clan politics initiated by misunderstanding and misinterpretation of “scientific socialism”

applied by the military regime is the real cause of the economic and political failure of the Somali state.<sup>20</sup>

As Mukhubela (2010) noted “there are a number of additional reasons why mediation has become problematic since 1991: The colonial legacy, Barre’s repression, running for wealth and resources, clan rivalries, injustice and inequality, exclusion from power and wealth sharing, the economic decline under the Barre rule, the hyper-militarization of the Somali nation due to the abundance of weapons acquired during the years of conflict”<sup>21</sup> (Makhubela, 2010:25). In this proposition, I argue to the point that, the issues were not just the previously mentioned ones, but bringing “Socialism” to a predominantly Muslim country were also a major factor.

However, he assumes that Russia supplied a huge amount of economic and military aid to Somalia and directly encourages the execution of the military coup. After several year of a good relationship with the regime, the USSR reconsidered its position in the region and changed their mind.

Nevertheless, Abdi Ismail (2010) argues, in the sense that USSR was unable to continue its direct support to Somali military junta due to certain reasons. Firstly, Somalis are predominantly Muslim, he noted “firstly, the deep presence of Islam in the Somali social fabric and the regime’s reluctance to aggressively address this issue was the main source of Soviet disappointment” (Abdi Ismail, 2010). However, it is argued in this thesis that, this was the main reasons behind the late disintegration of the Somali state, because, Islam and the “Scientific Socialism” of Siad Barre were NOT compatible.

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<sup>20</sup> See for example Patman, R.G. (1990), *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

<sup>21</sup> See also Osman, A. (2007). *Cultural Diversity and Somali Conflict*, Myth or Reality? *Africa Journal on Conflict Resolution*, 7.2: 93 – 134.

According to Lewis (2005) “When Siad Barre came in power in 1969, he pronounced that his “Scientific Socialism” is completely compatible with the Somali Islamic value system, even though his deeds soon proved the opposite” (Lewis 2005: 16). On the other hand, other sects such as Wahhabism were also began to compete for their followers among the Somalis, who had suffered from the consequences of the civil war in the 1990s (Lewis 2008: 20).

In this regard, Lewis (2008) mentioned, while discussing that religion and “Socialism” can’t be inclusive, according to him Soviet Union hypothesized two things:-

By choosing “Barre’ Scientific Socialism” as a way of life for Somali people, the military regime put itself into unreliable position as far as religion was concerned: First of all, Moscow wanted to see a new Somalia based on Marxist-Leninist principles, which is free from religion. Secondly, the Somali people, on the other hand, believed that Islam had an indispensable role on their social and economic spheres of life and could not be excluded from it. Lewis (2008) argues “Somalis with the leadership of their religious leaders were resisted the modernization of the educational system (Lewis, 2008:23).

My thesis argues that, since Siad Barre himself does not have the basic knowledge of socialist principles, never understood Marxism-Leninism, it was a bad choice to implement those policies blindly on a newly born state which was only 9 years old after its independence.

## **1.7 Research Methods and Type of Data**


This part of the thesis presents the methods used to collect, present and analyse the data. The research approach used in this Thesis is deductive research approach with case study method, since most of the data I used in this Thesis is like the form of journals, books, academic papers, reports and online publications consulted in the form of qualitative manner. Descriptive analytical approach mainly discusses on the course of the project results. It stands applicable in all stages of research problems, starting from the beginning of the thesis to the construction of arguments on the issues in the research. Moreover, in this thesis uses secondary data to clearly understand the theory and practice of the political economy of “Socialism” in Somalia, and its impact on the Economy and politics of the Somali regime.

## **1.8 Research Strategy**

A case study is defined as “...the mode of generalization...that is previously studied theory is tested to compare the empirical results of the case study” (Yin, 2009: 28). Therefore the main research strategy of this thesis is Case study method to deeply investigate the impact of ‘socialism’ on the Somali economy and political institutions. The reason behind this approach is that, case study “extracts detailed information of the contemporary issues and situation on the ground by using varieties of ways of information” (Berg, 2001: 222). Case study approach also tries to understand the contextual conditions of the [state] within the regional structure. The logic behind the case study is helping to demonstrate an argument and how to shape and produce results, it is a way of addressing the research objectives (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 5).

The Instrumentalist theory of the state is tested based on the data collected for the case study of the paper. The following figure outlines the research strategy:

**Figure 1: Deductive Research Strategy**



## 1.9 Organization of the Thesis

Following on the introductory chapter which is covered, introduction, scope and objectives, the main argument, significance of the thesis, the research methods, hypothesis of the study, and organization of the thesis, is chapter two, a theoretical framework that is developed for the purpose of analyzing the political economy of “Socialism” in Somalia, especially during the rise of the military regime in 1969 to its collapse in 1991. The two major theoretical approaches on Somali studies as well as other theories of state building will be discussed.

The study of the political economy analysis of the cause of the Somali state conflict has generated a considerable body of literature in the academic disciplines. More importantly, this body of knowledge will be a resource base to analyze the causes of the Somali state conflict and the role of the “socialism” in post independent Somalia conceptually.

According to Ahmed Samatar (1988), *“in spite of the fact that, the available evidence does not support the idea that Moscow orchestrated the October coup, it assures that a “coincidence of interest” existed between Siad Barre and Soviet Union’s strategic objectives”*(Samatar, 1988:32).

Chapter three is a case study presentation which is focused on mainly the impact of “Socialism” on Somali economy and politics. A short background of the Somali State is given based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two.

In this regard, special attention is given to the “birth” of a “Socialist state” and the 1969 coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre and its impact on the economy and politics of Somalia at the time, which continues to ravage the country for almost quarter of a century. Mostly in this chapter, the major economic data analysis is carried out.

Furthermore, the 1977 Ogaaden war or the war with Ethiopia (a turning point of Somalia’s military regime) and one of the main post-socialist wars is studied conceptually. It is also argued that the conflict of the Somali state was triggered by the irredentist pan-Somali nationalism of Siad Barre’s regime as well as by what Somalis viewed as capitulation in the 1977 war over the Ogaaden with Ethiopia (Makhubela, 2010). Chapter four and the last chapter of the thesis is suggested as summary and conclusion of the thesis, it follows critical evaluation of preceding chapters’ findings , it focuses more on highlighting the main theories studied, and looking whether the research questions of the thesis has been answered.

The conclusion part focuses on the recommendations concerning the theoretical approach to the understanding of the political economy of “socialism” by the Somali military regime and how it has legitimized and implemented.

Based on the overall findings as well as recommendations about the political economy of Somali military regime and the role of the “Socialism” on the state conflict, the hypothesis will be tested whether it is supported by the findings of the data analyzed. This thesis seeks to deconstruct the main purpose of understanding the Somali conflict in post-independent era. Particular attention is paid to the consequences of it on the economy and internal politics of the Somali State.

## **CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAME WORK**

### **2.1 Introduction**

The major objective of this thesis is to understand the Somali state conflict, particularly the major impact of “socialism” on the economy and politics of the Somali Republic existed from 1969 to 1991. In this part of the thesis, theories on state conflict is reviewed in order to justify the main objectives of doing this research paper. First, the two major theoretical approaches on Somali state conflict is studied i.e. instrumentalists and traditionalists paradigm. Secondly, the most crucial and important part of instrumentalists theory of the state is explained and the hypotheses is developed based on this theory. Thirdly, the background causes of the Somali state conflict is explained in three phases; the first phase: pre-colonial period; the second phase: colonialism period and the third phase socialist state era.

### **2.2 Two major theoretical approaches on Somali State Conflict**

In this section of the thesis, I will explain the two major theoretical arguments on the Somali state conflict. According to Abdi Ismail (2010), there are always two major prototype for the Somali conflict, these are classified as traditionalists and instrumentalists school. The first view, the traditionalist view, is led by Ioan M. Lewis, a British anthropologist who extensively studied the Somali nomads during the colonial period in 1940 and 50s. The Scholars of the traditionalist thesis argue that, “the continuity of clan politics had destroyed the state” (Lewis, 1993, 1994; Said Samatar, 1991; and Simons, 1995). As mentioned, the traditionalists’ paradigm is that “the segmented clanism among the Somali societies remains their foundation of pastoralist culture, and that ‘clannishness’ – the primacy of the clan interest- is its natural divisive reflection on the political level” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 19).

The other school, the instrumentalist thesis, Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar are the forth runners of this school. Ahmed Samatar argues that, “the Somali problem is not the clan reality and its culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the real ‘virus’ of the Somali case” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:19).

As mentioned, in this part of the thesis, I will review the two major debates about the Somali state conflict, the traditionalist and the instrumentalist schools of Somali studies. Theoretically, the two schools deeply analyze the political economy explanations of the state collapse.

The post-colonial Somalia has been a subject of academic treatise like their peers in Africa for the last fifty years (Mohamoud, 2006)<sup>22</sup>. In this background, Ellis argues that “the body of literature on the state in Africa is derived from political theory rather than from close observation of African history or society” (Ellis, 1996:2).

According to Mohamoud (2006), the instrumentalist writers emphasized more on the impact of external actors rather than internal dynamics while addressing the problems of the Somali state. In addition to that, they have also focused on the state class which they have blamed for internal disintegration of Somalia.

In the following section of the theory part of the thesis, I will discuss the traditionalist approach of the Somali studies.

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<sup>22</sup> For details of this account, see Doorknobs (1990) The African State in Academic Debate: Retrospect and Prospect, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 no. 2179-198; and Goran H. (1996) , Rethinking Theories of the State: An Africanist Perspective, *Africa Insight* 26 no. 1 26-35.

### 2.2.1 Traditionalists approach of Somali Studies

The traditionalist debate of the Somali studies is generated from three important writings. First, the historical writings of the British explorers, such as Richard Burton,<sup>23</sup> secondly, the anthropological recordings of I.M Lewis and Evans- Pritchard, thirdly, the modernization theories noted earlier.

Richard Burton an English explorer who had extensively written about the cultural, social and political institutions of the Somali people at the time. Apart from Richard Burton, there were also few Arab travelers/explores<sup>24</sup>. However, I.M Lewis, an English anthropologist comprehensively studied the Somali people and their culture. He himself justified his study and noted “my romantic ambition to go and study [the] Somali nomads” (Mohamoud, 2006: 38; Lewis, 1994:2)

Lewis published numerous works on Somali traditional system, such as kinship and clanism structure.<sup>25</sup> Lewis lied down the traditional foundation of the Somali studies.

According to Lewis (1961), the Somali social structure is a pastoral nomadism, and I quoted long, he argues:

*“ ..the Somali pastoral nomads has the following key characteristics. First, the Somalis are highly egalitarian because off the absence of exploitation and domination in their power relations. Second, the Somali society is stateless, lacking centralized institutions and formalized authority. Third, the primary*

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<sup>23</sup> See Richard Burton (1856)

<sup>24</sup> For details of other writings see Ralph E and Drake Brockman (1912), see also Collings (1975) *Ibn Batuta in Black Africa: Selections*, by Said Hamdun and Noel King, London UK.

<sup>25</sup> This publications of I. M Lewis include, see I.M Lewis, *People of the Horn Africa: Somali Afar and Saho* (London ,International African Institute , 1955/1969) ; *Sufism in Somaliland : A study on tribal Islam* (Bulletin of the SOAS XVII 581- 602; XVIII, 146-60 (1955-6); ;*Modern Political Movements in Somaliland*, (International African Institute, Memorandum xxx, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958); *A General Introduction to basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions* (Somaliland: Hargeisa, 1957); *The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa*", *Journal of African History*. I (1960:213-30); "clanship and Contract in Northern Somaliland", *Africa*, xxix (1959:274-293). As we can see most of this studies were about the Somali nomadic system.

*social networks of the Somali people is regulated by a web of lineage segmentation, which provides the fundamental basis for identity-formation”* (Lewis, 1961: *ibid*)<sup>26</sup>.

Even in contemporary era, this clan fragmentation shapes the political system of the Somali society. Therefore, lineage and clan segmentation became the central thesis of the traditionalist paradigm of the Somali Studies.<sup>27</sup> Since then, after Lewis’s treatise, many studies had been fit to his thesis. In this case, David Laitin and Said Samatar wrote:

*"For years the eminent European anthropologists Enrico Cerulli and I. M. Lewis have been telling us that to understand Somali politics, it is necessary to understand Somali clanship and kinship ties... The political history of independent clear. One can scarcely think of a significant domestic or foreign development in Somali politics since independence that was not influenced to a large degree by an underlying clan consideration”* (David Laitin and Samatar, S., 1987: 155).

For the traditionalist school, clanism is the central point of the Somali political economy discourse. They therefore noted that the clan is the major source of economic and political problem of the Somali society. After the state collapsed in 1991, their ‘oriented socio cultural thesis’ was proclaimed (Mohamoud, 2006).

According to Lewis (1994), the collapse of the state is the reaffirmation of the high influence of the segmentary clanism and lineage system in the Somali Politics. However, Lewis summarizes:

*“.....Given then, that like nationalism, clanship is a human invention, is it in the 1990s basically the same phenomenon that it was in the 1890s? Linguistically the answer must be "yes", since the same terminology has been employed throughout*

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<sup>26</sup> See also Mohamoud (2006)

<sup>27</sup> See also Said Samatar, (1991) *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil* (London: Minority Rights Group, UK

*the recorded history of the Somalis. Sociologically, the evidence also supports this view. Indeed, the argument of this book is that clanship is and was essentially a multipurpose, culturally constructed resource of compelling power because of its ostensibly inherent character "bred in the bone" and running "in the blood", as Somalis conceptualize it" (Lewis,1994: 233).*

Many scholars followed the footsteps of Lewis, and many studies had been published based on the traditionalist endorsement.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the traditionalist scholarship of Somali Studies is a 'nutshell' (Mohamoud, 2006). In the following section, I would also like to review the other school i.e. the instrumentalist school of Somali studies.

### **2.2.2 Instrumentalists approach of Somali Studies**

The instrumentalist paradigm of Somali Studies became a major challenge to traditionalist scholarship in 1980s onwards. This school is pioneered by the two prominent Somali Scholars, Ahmed and Abdi Samatar. According to Mohamoud (2006), the instrumentalist scholars were influenced by "the dependency discourse". In several research publication they argue:

*"We suggest that the materialist literature more accurately depicts both the general global milieu within which Africa's submerged classes continue to struggle,, and the nature and role of the post-colonial state" (Samatar and Samatar 1987:673).*

Ahmed Samatar explained the tools which are critical to the Somali political economy and emphasized more on historical changes and the material production as well as transformation of the Somali people both socially and economically. In his Book, *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia*, he further explained:

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<sup>28</sup> See for example the work of Virginia Luling "Come Back Somalia? Questioning a Collapsed State", in *Third World Quarterly* 18, no.2 (1997): 287-300.

*"This paradigm concerns itself with the production and accumulation, distribution off economic surplus, social reproduction, political arrangements and the impingement of the global order" (Ahmed Samatar 1989:8).*

The Instrumentalist scholars mostly focus on external actors in the contemporary economic and political making of the Somali people. Therefore, the researchers of this school further go in too deep discussion on the global market economy and imposition of colonial administrators. So before they start challenging the major content and outline of their paradigm, they tried to challenge the epistemological outline of the traditionalist approach. They claim, their analysis of the Somali case is outdated. In this case, Abdi Samatar postulates his argument:

*"The first task in this effort is to deconstruct the ghettoization of Somali studies as a backwater area in African studies. In spite of the revolutionary theoretical advances in the latter field in the last twenty years, which was stimulated by the crisis of peripheral capitalist development in the continent, Somali studies seem marooned to the earlier phases of modernization theory. It is therefore high time that the theoretical and methodological innovation in the study of African underdevelopment penetrate and inform the Somali condition" (Abdi Samatar 1989:4).*

In addition, the instrumentalist scholars attacked the traditionalist scholars claiming they don't have the specificity and by confusing the concepts of tribalism, nomadism and the state in the process of social formation of the Somali people. Abdi Samatar (1992) argues that "the instrumentalist proponents of their thesis is guided by history and specificity" (Abdi Samatar, 1992). In their analysis they argue that, the social and political transformation of the Somali did not remain static, it has been changing over time.

However, they have mentioned there are important analyses on this case. First, the imperial invasion, second, the commercialization of its pastoral production, and thirdly, the creation of a centralized state.

Ahmed Samatar himself argues that traditionalist scholars confuse the kinship with clanism. He further noted:

*"Kinship denotes a central relationship buttressed by both blood-ties and deeply revered tradition and custom (xeer) - one which mediates among individuals or groups. This is part of the dominant ideology in some pre-capitalist social formations. Clanism on the other hand, is the transformation of kinship by detaching blood-ties from tradition and custom. This bifurcation results from the forceful intrusion of an alien type of social and economic organization and its concomitant norms and values"* (Ahmed Samatar, 1989:8).

Finally, the instrumentalist scholars argue that, the political transformation of the Somali people for over hundred years, has the major result of Somali disintegration. They have classified Somalis as different strata i.e. pastoral producers, merchants, bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. The instrumentalist scholars reaffirm that like their peers in traditionalist school, in Somalia there are social rivalry between the social strata that hampered the development of the country.

To be more specific, they argue that “[the] internal tussles of the ruling state class, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, over power and appropriation of the surplus produced by peasants and pastoral nomads which is the core of the problem in Somalia” (Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar 1987: 63-65).<sup>29</sup>

The instrumentalist scholars further argue that, the dominant class fraction are the one who perverse clan politics as an instrument for their personal interest.

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<sup>29</sup> For details of this, see Samatar, Ahmed I. (1987), “*Somalia’s Impasse: State Power and Dissident Politics*”, *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 871-890.

Although they don't usually put Somalia under classification of Classical Marxism, they propose that the class conflict is the major reason behind the state collapse.<sup>30</sup>

### **2.2.3 The Soviet's instrumentalist Foreign Strategy on Somalia**

The Soviets and Somalians changed reciprocal visits since President Sharmake's visit to Moscow. It has been reported that Soviet defense Minister Marshal Gherchko visited Somalia on February 13, 1972 with an invitation from the Somali Officials. He left Mogadishu after a week of official visit. Somali Vice president and the defense minister Gen. Mohamed Ali Samatar arrived Moscow on July the same year. There were no official statements released after these two meetings<sup>31</sup>.

Gorodnov et al (1972), contended that by rationalizing the Soviet Assistance to Somalia. They wrote "Kismayo<sup>32</sup> was built by the Americans ... who left behind an ill memory of themselves ... to this day rusting metals and smashed trestles stand as a mute reproach of American aid" (Gordonov et al, 1972).<sup>33</sup>

In the eyes of the soviets, Somalia prior 1969 was the land of corruption. As E. Sherr argued that "before the events of October 1969, power was in the hand of the rich elite, and corruption among government officials was a characteristic feature of political life in that period"<sup>34</sup>. After 1969, the transformation of Somali polity has been welcomed by the Kremlin. However, Sherr (1974) contends that "Somalia's Policy of non-alignment and neutrality became more principled and consistent after the revolution".

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<sup>30</sup> See Abdi Samatar, (1999) *An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development*, Portsmouth: Heinemann,

<sup>31</sup> Pravda, July 12, 1972 ; Pravda , July 18, 1972

<sup>32</sup> A port in Southern Somalia

<sup>33</sup> See details, Gordonov et al (1972), "*In the Somali Democratic Republic*", international Affairs, Moscow, no 5, pp 105.

<sup>34</sup> E. Sherr (1974), Somalia : *Socialist orientation* , International Affairs , Moscow , no.2 , p.84

***Had the Soviet Union used Somalia as an instrument to maintain its presence in the region? What was the major agenda of Soviet Union in Somalia?***

To answer this questions, I would like to look the historical importance and the Somalia's geostrategic position. Throughout its history, Somalia had been a geostrategic place for foreign powers. During the European Colonialism, Britain and Italy relied on military force to consolidate their respective positions in Somalia. Likewise, in 1962 the Soviet Russia started got interested the Somali intervention and granted US\$32 million loan to modernize and equip the Somali army, it also increase its military presence to 14,000 personnel. Moscow later increased the amount to US\$55 million. There was always a geostrategic interest for the Soviet Union's cold war objectives, seeking to counter United States influence in the Horn of Africa. In my thesis, I argue that, Soviet Union used Somalia not as "socialist apparatus" in the horn of Africa, but also a geostrategic location to advance their presence and influence in the region.

In late 1960s, the Soviet Union provided Somalia with T-34 tanks, armored personnel carriers, MiG-15 and 17 aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. It has been estimated around 300 Soviet military advisers deployed to Somalia to train Somali army, and about 500 Somali pilots, officers, and technicians received training in the Soviet Russia. Therefore, there was an argument mentioned that, Soviet Union orchestrated both the military coup and the assassination of Civilian President, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. After the coup, however, Siad Barre embraced "Scientific Socialism" and the Soviet Union became Somalia's major supplier of military materiel.

For almost eight years, the military relationship between Somalia and USSR prospered. In early, 1972. As mentioned, the Defense Minister Andrei Grechko visited Somalia and signed an agreement to modernize and build the port of Berbera in return for Soviet access to the facility.

They eventually built Berbera into a military base that included a missile storage facility for the Soviet navy, an airfield with runways nearly 5,000 meters long and capable of handling large bombers, and extensive radar and communications facilities. This constant access to Berbera port gave the Soviet Union a presence in the strategically important Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region to counter United States military activities in the Horn Africa.

**Table 1: Foreign aid to Somalia 1960-1970**

| <b>Source</b>         | <b>Financial Grants<br/>(Millions of SoSh)</b> | <b>Financial Loans<br/>(Millions of SoSh)</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------|
| <b>Italy</b>          | 171                                            | 150.5                                         | 321.5        |
| <b>U.S.S.R</b>        | 4.3                                            | 316.4                                         | 320.7        |
| <b>U.S.A</b>          | 109.4                                          | 12                                            | 121.4        |
| <b>U.N</b>            | 85.5                                           | -                                             | 85.5         |
| <b>E.E.C</b>          | 18                                             | -                                             | 18           |
| <b>Czechoslovakia</b> | -                                              | 25.7                                          | 25.7         |
| <b>Others</b>         | 7.5                                            | -                                             | 7.5          |
| <b>Total</b>          | 395.7                                          | 504.6                                         | 900.3        |

Source: Lewis (1967)

In addition, Sofinsky (1974) argues that “the decision to take socialist orientation logically led the adoption of scientific “socialism” as the ideological basis of the SRC of Somalia ...Somalia “has become an outpost in the struggle for the national liberation of social emancipation on the African continent, and one of the most progressive states in Africa.”<sup>35</sup>

The Soviets has increased their aid and investment in Somalia after October 1969 coup. In 1974, Soviets built several factories in Somalia, including meat factory in Mogadishu, a deep sea port in Berbera and Fish Plant in Lasqorey. Moscow used Somali state as instruments to develop their regional political objectives, they claimed that they developed Somalia as young Socialist state in the Horn of Africa.

In the eyes of Soviets, the October socialist revolution was to build Somalia as free from the “exploitation of man by man.”<sup>36</sup>

With this background, the first hypothesis is stated:

***Soviet interventionists used Somali state as an instrument and this could be contributed to the Somali state conflict.***

## **2.3 Collier and the theory of State Building**

In this section of this the thesis, I will review the Collier’s theory of state conflict. State failure is wide concept for political scientists. It created a fast range of academic discussions for the last decades. However, there is no consensus among scholars on the definition of state failure.

For Rotberg (2004), he classified human and non-human factors as causes of the state failure. He argues that some researchers even highlighted accidental factors as the major

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<sup>35</sup> See Sofinsky (1974)

<sup>36</sup> V. Shemrov (1974), “New Stage in Soviet Somali Relations : New Times, Moscow , no. 29 , pp 23-24

causes of state failure. In his analysis, he concluded that “human agency” should be blamed for the problem.

Paul Collier mostly studied the academic field of state building. In his Book *Bottom Billion Countries*, he did a rich quantitative analysis on some least developed countries. He had described one billion people in poor countries where no economic development is imaginable. He noted “*The real challenge of development is that there is a group of countries at the bottom that are falling behind, and often falling apart*” (Collier, 2008:3).

Collier (2008) further analyzed and advocated for international intervention to stabilize state, he wrote:

*“... an intervention which this year permanently alleviates the poverty of one thousand people in China is simply less valuable than an intervention with the same effect in the Democratic Republic of Congo, not because Chinese people should be less valued than the Congolese but because the prospects for the Chinese are manifestly more promising.”* (Collier et al., 2008:10).

In my thesis, I disagree with Collier (2009) claiming that “the involvement of international community is crucial for function states to emerge in the bottom billion countries”. He also justifies a military intervention as a state stabilization. In contrast to Collier’s thesis, Robert Jackson argued that “in post-colonial period, all African states were quasi states” not fully functioning states for that matter (Jackson, 1990).

Collier (2009) argues that “in the bottom billion countries” where there is no mechanism of accountability in place, the losing party should accept defeat.

Therefore, Collier (ibid) stipulates those countries that their governments became too corrupt to give basic goods such as water, shelter and education, and he defined this as poverty trap with conflict trap. In a report published with other scholars *Braking the conflict trap* (2003). They have summarized:

*“War retards development, but conversely, development retards war. This double causation gives rise to virtuous and vicious circles... When development fails, countries are at a high risk of becoming caught in a conflict trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of further war.”* (Collier et al, 2003:1).

## **2.4 Background of the Somali State conflict**

In this section of theory part of the thesis, I will very briefly review the major background of the Somali state conflict from pre-colonial period to state collapse in 1991.

### **2.4.1 Phase I: Pre-colonial period (pre- 1897)**

Pre-colonial Somalis were under ‘stateless’ situation (Mohamoud, 2006). No formal institutions or polity existed, but the social order was maintained through moral and social cohesion among the Somali nomads at the time. I hereby used the definition of statelessness as “a society of rules without rulers or order without government” (Hussein Adam and A. Mazrui, 1997). Pre-colonial Somalis like other societies in Africa, tried to create a viable and stable social and political system, but there was no any formal government (Ellis, 1999).

The literature on Somali politics and economic studies is mainly dominated by both Somali-born and non-Somali scholars, such as Lewis (1961, 1965, 1964, 1972, 1967, 1982, 1994, 1999, 2002, & 2008), Samatar and Abdi, I (1989, 1987, 1988, 1994, 1997), Menkhaus (2004 and 2003), Adam (2008; 1997, 1998), Bradbury, M (1994), Samatar, S.S (1993, 1997).

According to Osman (2008), the literature about the causes of the Somali State conflict is indeterminate, he argues “despite this human catastrophe and suffering, the literature on the causes of Somalia’s conflict remains inconclusive”. The conflict has been explained as lack of governance and bad leadership (Samatar 1993; Samatar 1994; Hashim 1997), from the problems of running for wealth and power (Kusow 1994; Mukhtar & Kusow 1993; Besteman 1999; Lee Casanelli and Besteman 1996) or from bad economic policy and lack of sound developmental policies (Osman, 2007; Mubarak, 1996). Other studies postulated the Somali conflict as “continuing from stone age ancestral clan rivalries, but using ‘Star wars military’ violence” (Besteman 1999:4).

#### **2.4.2 Phase II: Colonialism period (1897-1960)**

The last quarter of the nineteenth century there has been different systems which shown political developments that transformed the Somali peninsula. During this period, the Somalis became under a number of “state systems” with the flags of France, Italy, Egypt, Britain, and Ethiopia. The new colonial rulers in the Somali peninsula had different motives for their colonization. Britain wan to gain control of the northern Somali coast as a strategic source of beef supplies or other products for its naval port in Aden (present day Yemen). Some authors noted, the British occupation of the northern Somali region began in February 1884, when a British military major by the name Hunter arrived at Berbera in Somaliland to negotiate and sign treaties of friendship with some Somaliland clan elders. He has arranged to have British vice representatives installed in Bulahar, Berbera and Sayla’ in the North of Somalia (present day unrecognized state Somaliland)<sup>37</sup>.

Similarly, Bradbury M. (1997), argues that, foreign strategic interest was also a major motive since Somali has always been in good commercial space, due to its location. In 1839 the British colony established a battalion of its troops in Aden to safeguard and

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<sup>37</sup> for details, see Somalia : Country Studies, US Library of Congress

control its trade route with far India. In the 1880s three European colonies Britain, France and Italy signed different treaties with Somali elders for their influence in the region.

In addition to that, Bradbury argues that, the Somali partition by the European colonizers has been widely consolidated, he wrote “by the year of 1900 the Somali territory was under the division in treaties between France, Italy, Britain and Abyssinia<sup>38</sup> (Bradbury, 1997).

These colonial intrusions left a legacy of a system of a centralized government mixed onto an un-centralized political system of a pastoral society. My thesis at this points argues that, the colonial system of Somalia created a complex division among clans, same as Socialism. In this regard, Bradbury (1997) also argues that, the colonial treaties which divided the land of the Somali people created borders which did not respect clan territories, for example the Haud grazing lands<sup>39</sup> surrendered to Ethiopia by Britain in 1954 (Bradbury, M. 1997)<sup>40</sup>.

Somali people are pastoralist society in nature, so this division of their land and isolation of pastoral lands restricted the mobility of pastoralists during the seasonal movements, leaving the more vulnerable ones to the whims of inhospitable climate. The allocation of pasture and water rights to certain lineages created problems of clan and territorial identity, and upset others for the inequality between clans. Then, State development changed the way people would like to participate in the local management of resources such as pasture and water for their animals.

Bradbury Mark (1997) argues that:

*“...as new forms of wealth accumulated in the state, the mandate of political leadership altered from regulating kin relations and entitlements to pastoral resources, to regulating access to the political and economic benefits of the*

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<sup>38</sup> Abyssinia: the term refers to present day Ethiopia

<sup>39</sup> Haud: refers to present day Somali region of Ethiopia

<sup>40</sup> See also Lewis (1988)

*state, thus sowing seeds of disunity and conflict. One response of the colonial government to such conflicts was to invest more in state security. Hence, colonial state formation established an urban bias in development that marginalized the rural pastoral and agro-pastoral populations” (Mark Bradbury, 1997:5).*

### **2.4.3 Phase III: Socialist State period (1969- 1991).**

In this section I will review the general situation of the Somali state during the socialist regime. Most of the economic analyses will be further discussed in the third chapter of the thesis. I argue from this point that, Somalia’s economic system was drifted from mixed economy (colonial system) to centralized (Socialist System) under the military dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power in October 1969.

The first charter of the Somali regime empathized more on the central role of the state in society, it assured to every Somali person has the right to work, to get social justice, good participation in national development and an it should end to clan nepotism under the supervision of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). In 1976 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) has mobilized a national program, such as a 1972-74 campaign to eradicate illiteracy, a program which is participated by the high school students to teach their fellow nomads.

Barre vowed that, the intention was to turn the Somali nomads into a modern and developed socialist state, to which he claimed people could prosper and look for development and leadership, and welfare instead of clan. He embodied to the nation that he was the president and ‘*aabaha Qaranka*’ (father of the Somali nation), Barre. (Bradbury, M. 1997; Ahmed Samatar, 1985).

According to Abdi Samatar (1985), Scientific Socialism's attack on the culture of the Somali people was directly linked with authoritarian and state control of the whole economy.

Although the government's so called policy was to decentralize state authority, and to enable participation for all in development, all state structures were controlled by the state authority. In this case, Barre controlled all formal government institutions.

Ahmed Samatar (1988) noted that Barre vowed, it is their duty as talented leaders to work for their fellowmen with justice and dignity. Barre said in his speech:

*“One of the major principles in “Socialism” says that, under the socialistic regime it is the privilege and duty of the strong and talented leaders to use their superior force and richer endowments in the service of their fellow-men without distinction of class, nation, or greed”* (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: 148).

Unfortunately, what happened in the Somali Republic at the time, was completely the opposite. Therefore, my thesis argues that, both colonialism and “socialism” were not a good experiments in Somalia. Moreover, “Socialism” aggravated many social, political and economic crisis in Somalia right from dictatorship to disintegration. In this matter, I argue perhaps another way e.g. Arab-style “Socialism” would have been suitable.

When the Horn of Africa became an important geostrategic location during the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the colonial powers started coming in and secured along territory in the long coasts of Somalia. British colony established their protectorate of British Somaliland in 1887 in the north (British Somaliland), then paralleled by the establishment of the protectorate of French Somaliland later in 1885, and finally Italian colony settled in the southern shores in 1889 (Samatar and David Laitin, 1987).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> For details see Samatar, S. *etal* (1987) *Somalia: Nations in search of a state*, See also Dominik Balthasar (2012)

All the Somali inhabited territories has been divided among European powers, the Ethiopian empire at the time also took over the Somali-inhabited Ogaaden <sup>42</sup> , while Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya became British colonial mosaic, the Somali people found themselves in a five different powers at the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century (Balthasar, D. 2012; Samatar, S. 1993).

According to Ismail, Ahmed *et al* (1999), the nomadic pastoralism was the major livelihood of the Somali people in the Somali peninsula. Before the European invasion in the middle of the 19th century, there were massive migration of Somali people into different areas, where non Somalis were originally populated.

My analysis at this point tries to forward different arguments about the root cause of the Somali State Conflict, special study is given the political and economic impact of “socialism” on Somali Republic.

The Somali political and social structure mostly consist of clan families, subdivided into sub-clans<sup>43</sup>. The family members of each sub clan, which is basically called ‘dia’ paying group<sup>44</sup> have their internal tradition agreement to support each other and share certain payments of blood compensation. They have their own traditional leader called ‘elders’ and each sub clan has their own council of elders who have certain responsibilities.

During the colonial period, all elders were under the payroll of the colonial office, they were the legitimate representatives of respective groups. During the emergency situation, each member of the ‘dia paying group’ act as an active member who have an obligation to help to each one undergoing in a hardship circumstances during the crises. In the crisis

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<sup>42</sup> In this Thesis the word ‘Ogaadeen’ refers to the present day of the Somali Region of Ethiopia

<sup>43</sup> See Appendix Page

<sup>44</sup> In this thesis, the term ‘*dia-paying*’ related to clan members who have collective responsibilities such as blood compensation and the like.

period, every member must be observed in a good character and must be helpful. According to Mubarak (1996), clan “is a ‘myth’ invented by outsiders” (Mubarak, 1996). According to Ismail Ahmed *et al* (1999), majority of the current studies or examinations of the socio-political crisis of the Somali people are based on as noted a misconceptions and theoretical generalizations which is supposed that Somalis are socially unique at the same time culturally and linguistically homogenous society. Therefore, my thesis agrees to the point that, many analysts had failed to analyze properly by ignoring the complexities of the political reality of the Somalis, while mostly focusing on one- exploration of state conflict based on clanism and segmentation’. Ahmed Samatar (1999) argues that on the topic of clans and lineage structures, many scholars have raised clanship as the most dominant factor in the Somali contemporary political and social system. Therefore, understanding clan and lineage in the contemporary Somali politics, is not sufficient to understand their political and social structure. Many NGOs show charts as an illustration of Somali clan genealogy, thus this concept is superimposed on many factions, and this shows the disorder of the literature on Somali society when it comes to clan.

While not rejecting the cases mentioned, my thesis argues, in order to understand the State conflict of Somalia, it is important to look beyond the clan issue.

Agreeing to Adam, H.M (1994), the unification of the two Somali territories of the North (British Somaliland) and South (Italian Somaliland) was a major problem and this could be the root cause of the Somali Conflict. In his argument, he further noted:

*“ the rapid union of the two Somali territories to form the ‘United’ Somali state in 1960 was a great challenge to the new government, because soon after independence, the Somalilanders (Northern Clans) became disillusioned with the*

*way the union was proceeding and indeed voted 'No' in the unification referendum”*<sup>45</sup> (Adam, 1994: *ibid*).

But I disagree with him at this point, because the main dream after independence was the unification of all Somali territories, not only South and North, but also the other regions which were under colonial rulers, including the Somali Region (Ethiopia) and NFD (Kenya) and French Somaliland (present day Djibouti).

Adam (1994) also noted that the interest of unionization of the two Somali colonies while Somaliland initially (independent) accepted conditions demanded by southerners, moreover Mogadishu became the capital city and the center for the Somali parliament.

In addition, the Southerners held all the major important posts of the government, plus a majority of the parliament seats. Therefore, because of the increasing discontent, southern leaders started to further marginalize their northern colleagues.

From Socioeconomic point of view, the civilian government's development program also failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socioeconomic problems in the north with the problems inherited from the colonial administration.

Despite the integration of the two colonial systems, a serious corruption has been accredited to the public sector. However, the Somalilanders (clans in the north) were not the only group suffered with the union. The Rehanwein clans from the two river region in Somalia, who had the same number of seats with Hawiye and Darod (the two other major clan families) in the south before unification of the Somali north and south, also became marginalized (Mukhtar, 1996)

Abdi Ismail (2010) posits in the case of tribalism of Barre and noted “little success was gained on this front. By the mid-1970s, the resilience on tribalism in Somali politics was

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<sup>45</sup> For details see Adam (1994) *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?* In *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and the Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Zartman (ed). Lynne Rienner Publishers, London UK

observable....one suggestion is that Barre, though he had formally denounced tribalism, was carefully using clan balance as a mechanism for control” (Abdi Ismail, 2010:147).

In addition to that argument, clan control was Barre’s political game after the military coup.

I agree with Laitin and Samatar’s (1987) proposition that “from the early period of the revolution Siad [Barre] exhibited what some would call paranoia of the *Majeerten* clan<sup>46</sup>. Barre re-legitimated the language of tribe in Somali Politics” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: ibid). As I have mentioned above, the traditionalist approach lies on the Somali clan support and its reflections of the Political Economy of the Somali conflict.

Makhubela (2010) surmises that Somalia has been a disintegrated country in terms of clans and sub clans since 1897 (Lewis, 1994 and 2003). Adam (2008) also has a point, in that during the post-colonial period, from 1960, (when Italian colony of Somalia and British Somaliland united and Somali Republic was formed), the issues of clan lineage and fragmentation “were further compounded.”

Osman (2007) argues that “the Barre military regime became more clannish in character, dominated by the Darod sub-clans of Mareehan, Ogaaden and Dhulbahante” (Osman, 2007: 37). Agreeing to Lewis, Makhubela (2010) conjectures:

*“Somalis have a common ancestry, a single language and belong to the Islamic faith (Sunni), yet they are one of the most divided people along clan lineage and patronage<sup>47</sup>. They are divided into six clan families – Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq, Digil, and Mirifle/Rahanweyne, which are further divided, according to agnatic descent into subsidiary clans of lineage groups”* (Makhubela, 2010:37)

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<sup>46</sup> The *Majeertens* were the clan that held all the key positions of power during the civilian administrations.

<sup>47</sup> To understand Somali clans and sub clans, see the *Clan Genealogy of the Somali people* in the Appendix page.

At this Point, I agree with Bradbury M (1994), in that clan structure is therefore a fundamental political unit essential for individual and group survival, particularly during conflict times. Menkhus (1995) discusses that most analyses of the prolonged civil conflict and state collapse of Somalia focuses on “flawed political leadership as the cause of Somalia's woes”.

Many scholars blame the divisive tactics of Barre regime, he left a deep legacy of clan animosity on current political and social system in Somalia, which became the main obstacle to national reconciliation of the Somali people. Other analyses portrayed that “the Somali conflict as ‘continuing from Stone Age ancestral clan rivalries’, but using ‘Star wars military violence’” (Besteman 1999:4).

Although many studies suggest that, clan conflicts or ethnicity based politics somehow affected the Somali State failure over decades, however, some scholars have questioned the validity of this paradigm. In those scholars, Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar wrote:

*“.....in general, the primary motive of a political leader is to keep themselves in power and consequently in doing so has to answer to those that keep them in power. For the Somali civilian leaders to win the conflict over influential positions, the state and leadership survival gradually became the most important tasks for the majority of the Somali elite. There were, however, some notable exceptions”*

(Abdi Ismail, 2010: ibid).

**Table 2: Elite Structure, Legitimacy and State building in Somalia 1960-90**

| <b>Regime</b>  | <b>Elite unity</b> | <b>Conscious leaders</b> | <b>Legitimacy</b> | <b>Clarity strategy</b> | <b>of Institution building</b> |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>1960-64</b> | High               | Low                      | High              | No                      | No                             |
| <b>1964-67</b> | Low                | High /low                | High              | Yes/no                  | Yes                            |
| <b>1967-69</b> | low                | Low                      | High/low          | No                      | No                             |
| <b>1969-77</b> | high               | Low                      | High              | Yes/no                  | No                             |
| <b>1977-90</b> | Low                | Low                      | Low               | No                      | No                             |

Source: Abdi Samatar (1997)

As Abdi Samatar (1984) noted, there was only one short period that the Somali government encouraged to build formal institutions. As Table 2 shows, all post-colonial Somali governments, except for the civil regime 1964-1967 never intend to build any formal institutions.

Post-colonial Somali administrations, were hysterical about encouraging efficient formal institutions. They have realized that building any efficient institutions does not serve their own personal interests, therefore, they have formulated alternative strategies for their own survival. Their shortsightedness and bad strategies undermined the state formal institutions, and their poor leadership put the Somali state in to conflict trap.

As I noted earlier, in 1969 a military junta assassinated the president and closed down the parliament. The constitution was abolished, and General Siad Barre became dictator.

Shortly after taking power, Barre announced that his system would eliminate tribalism, corruption, nepotism, misrule, and injustice, he vowed all this goals would be sustained through the application of “Socialism” principles in the country, however “socialism” was abandoned in 1980 after the Russians halted the military assistance of Somalia.

### **The Neoliberalist policies after Socialist system failure : from Socialism to IMF-ISM**

During the 1980s liberalization had started in Somalia, the country was promised as Somalia was intervened by IMF with US aid. In 1970s and 80s, with the regardless of the former declared economic system, Barre focused on resource extraction for the benefit of his allies. Besteman (1996) confirmed that “although Barre had outlawed the use of any terminology referring to the clans, he illegally gave land and water rights to specific clans that supported his rule” (Besteman, 1996a: 126).

The first constitution of 1960 guaranteed both the unity of the two Somali former colonies and democracy, it also sanctioned form of ‘multipartyism’ with freedom of expression.

There were some significant political differences that encouraged a creation of parties to the point where Somalia became a country having more parties than “any other democratic country” except the state of Israel (Besteman, 1996).

According Laitin and Samatar, S. (1987), the country’s last elections held in March 1969, almost 60 parties competed, but little civil governance existed and service delivery was very poor. Because of that background that the military coup became successful, and Barre took power in 1969.

Lewis (1994), also comparing the situation mentioned by Laitin and Samatar, he noted:

*“Taking his place among Africa’s ‘big men’, Barre immediately suspended the country’s constitution and banned all forms of political and professional association, ‘promising to cure all of the country’s ills’. He also decreed in the following year the adoption of Scientific Socialism, an ideology that was (he claimed) ‘fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society’”* (Lewis 1994: 221).

With the famous slogan of “socialism” unites, tribalism divides”, clan was officially prohibited and the regime promised to eliminate any written or verbal of clan or clanship form. They have outlawed the tradition of blood compensation between clans, Barre introduced the death penalty for those convicted murder. My thesis, at this point argues, bringing a “socialism” to a society which are predominantly nomadic was a bigger mistake, however, sweeping political and legal changes were also introduced in the first years of the military rule. They have established a repressive security apparatus who report directly to Siad Barre himself. Countless propaganda campaigns were launched such as songs poems of praise, posters and speeches. He proclaimed himself as the nations’ hero, ‘father’ of a nation whose ‘mother’ was the revolution’ (Lewis, 1994:152).

Barre's political propaganda machinery was misleading the international community.

Some international observers confused his rhetoric with reality on the ground.

In the first years of his rule, almost all the sectors of the economy were brought under state ownership.

A wave of nationalization programs were launched to all medium and large scale businesses, such as banks, schools, and insurance companies. Many new state-owned institutions were became pure monopolies absolute monopolies which also became the foundation for the socialist economy.

A law has been passed that prohibits private traders to import, store or supply any food items. In this regard, Ismail Ahmed *etal* (1999) noted "It became increasingly clear that nomads and agro pastoralists, including wealthy nomads and farmers who owned large herds, were to be treated as 'lumpen proletariat' .....the government found nomads largely uncooperative" (Ismail, Ahmed *etal* 1999:36).

For Bradbury M. (1997), while emphasizing more on the economic impact of "Socialism" on Somali Republic, he wrote:

*"The centralization of political and economic power in the Somali state reached its zenith under the military dictatorship of General Mohamed Siad Barre, who seized power in October 1969. Within a year the military coup was turned into a 'bloodless revolution'. 'Scientific Socialism' was adopted as the ideological framework for the country's future development* (Mark Bradbury, 1997:6)

Bradbury continues, that "Siad Barre believed weary of the debilitating effects of 'clanism',.....with the shift from a pastoral society to a modern nation state, the urban intelligentsia and technocrats initially was backed in this programme" (Mark Bradbury, 1997: *ibid*).

My thesis at this point briefs that, Mohamed Siad Barre seized power through the armed military. He build a strange security structures to stay in power, rather than investing the socioeconomic institutions of the country. In this process, Barre neglected the social services sector like Education and health, and a few budget was allocated to this sectors.<sup>48</sup>

Samatar (1985) argues, Somalia became highly militarized, he mentioned the Somali military was one of the highly invested institution.

In 1980 the security sector absorbed nearly 75% of government budget, it also consumed half what is earned from the country's export (Samatar, 1988). In 1974-75: a prolonged famine called (*Abaartii Dabadheere*) in the local language hit the North West regions.

The socialist experiment, the political hostility of the clan in that area, turned the 1974-75 drought into one of Africa's worst droughts which resulted the death of over 20,000 people in the north. 10-15% of the pastoralists were settled in the refugee camps.<sup>49</sup>

Food shortages was severe in the northern regions. The nationalization program and government monopoly with the introduction of price controls seriously interrupted food markets. The Arabian-Somaliland- Ethiopian trade corridor, has been closed down and tight control of Berbera port was implemented.<sup>50</sup>

When the laissez-faire system was replaced by centralized Socialist system, failure of the food system had emerged. Hundreds of government owned shops were opened in the towns. Residents in the areas were given special ID Cards to buy food, but few people managed to buy the sufficient food needed in these shops. In rural areas, those who don't have IDs mostly relied on food purchased on the black market with excessive prices (Mukhtar, 1999).

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<sup>48</sup> For details of this stage, see Chapter three: Case study presentation

<sup>49</sup> See for example Hussein et al (1987), *Agricultural and non-agricultural settlements for drought-afflicted pastoralists in Somalia*, *Disasters*, 11(1), pp 30-39; and G Haaland & W Keddeman (1984), *Poverty analysis: the case of rural Somalia*, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 32(4), pp 843-860.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid*

Because of an extensive crop failure and wide spread food shortage in Ethiopia also contributed to the problem in the region. The level of the drought was severe, almost five million animals died in Somalia/Somaliland which resulted serious consequences on the economy in both Somaliland and the neighboring Haud of the Somali region of Ethiopia<sup>51</sup>. Although the problem of the drought reached every corner throughout Somalia, the rural nomads had never recovered from this natural disaster. The Socialist government pursued and objective of converting nomadic pastoralists to farmers without proper training, it started a resettlement experiment and transferred over 100,000 nomadic pastoralists from refugee camps in Somaliland (North) arable lands of southern Somalia.<sup>52</sup>

Although pastoralists denied for the first place, but they were forcibly coerced to their new host environment.<sup>53</sup> In 1960 Somali government started its militarization programs during border clashes with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, thus this increased further in 1970s and 80s with the interest of superpowers in the Horn of Africa such as USSR and USA. With the Soviet's finance, Somali Republic established the highest powerful army in sub-Saharan Africa (Samatar, 1988). In this regard, my thesis argues, considering himself as powerful and highly militarized state, with this force,

Barre took Somalia into a war with neighboring Ethiopia to capture the Somali inhabited region of Ogaadeen. Somalia badly defeated in this war soon after USSR aligned with Ethiopia. However, Somalia secured US\$ 100 million a year in military aid from US, to use Berbera port policing the Gulf (Bradbury, 1997).

According to Zegeye *et al* (1997), Somalia got the highest military support from USSR, in their analysis they wrote:

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<sup>51</sup> The term refers to Somali region of Ethiopia.

<sup>52</sup> I argue at this point, this was a major drawback and consistent failure from the regime.

<sup>53</sup> *ibid*

*“The regime was highly successful in obtaining military support. Somalia was one of the most heavily militarized states in Africa and one of the top recipients of US and Soviet military aid during the Cold War. Moreover, more than 80% of refugee aid, which in 1986 together with other non-military aid accounted for 25% of GNP, was diverted to the army”<sup>54</sup> (See table 3).*

**Table 3 : Somalia: Percentage GDP allocated for Military, Health, Education and respective ratios (1969-1978)**

| Year | % GDP    |        |           | Ratio per thousand population |            |          |
|------|----------|--------|-----------|-------------------------------|------------|----------|
|      | Military | Health | Education | Armed forces                  | Physicians | Teachers |
| 1969 | 5.1      | 1.9    | 1.7       | 6.7                           | 0          | 0.7      |
| 1970 | 5.9      | 1.8    | 1.8       | 7.1                           | 0          | 0.7      |
| 1971 | 5.7      | 1.5    | 1.7       | 6.9                           | 0.1        | 0.7      |
| 1972 | 6.2      | 1.8    | 2.4       | 8.6                           | -          | 1        |
| 1973 | 6.3      | -      | 2.6       | 8.3                           | 0.1        | 1.3      |
| 1974 | 7.5      | 2      | 3.5       | 9.7                           | 0.1        | 1.6      |
| 1975 | 6.6      | 1.9    | 4.2       | 9.4                           | -          | 1.6      |
| 1976 | 6.5      | 1.8    | 4.6       | 9.7                           | 0.1        | 2.5      |
| 1977 | 7.3      | 2.2    | 5.4       | 16.1                          | -          | 3        |
| 1978 | 13.8     | 2      | 5.7       | 16                            | 0.2        | -        |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

In contrast to Zegeye et al (1997), Professor Ahmed Samatar, in his book, *Socialist Somalia*<sup>55</sup>: Rhetoric or reality, agrees the level of soviet militarization of the Somali regime. In 1969 after the revolution USSR-Somali relation had come to a new stage.

The USSR has been supporting the Somali Republic with military and development support (Abdi Ismail, 2010; Sofinsky, 1974).

<sup>54</sup> For details see Zegeye et al (1997), *‘State disintegration and human rights in Africa’*, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 38(1/2) pp 64-86.

<sup>55</sup> In this paper, the term “Socialist Somalia” is used only during the period when the communist party was ruling Somalia 1969-1991.

As shown in table 2, Samatar (1988), argues that any significance dimension of human rights is the level of militarization of political life, in given society genuine self-reliance demands a conscious effort to reduce militarism, a requirement that is especially relevant in poor country like Somalia. The question arises as discussed by Samatar, whether the SRC which is later was named SRSP <sup>56</sup> has ever exposed an intention to demilitarize the political economy at some point.

According to him, he noted “the Somali military regime absorbed a large segment of country’s revenue, a less favor has been given to the crucial areas such as education and health sector”. In this thesis, I argue that, their major purpose was to show the level or the degree of militarism in the country. In this matter, I argue with that, Somalia, a poor country which had the lowest per capita income of the World had spent such huge amount of money for armament and defense.

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<sup>56</sup> Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP): the only party created in June 1976 and voted to establish the Supreme Council as the new party's central committee.

## **CHAPTER III: CASE STUDY: SOMALI STATE CONFLICT**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter intends to give a brief background information about the creation of the military regime and the birth of a ‘socialist state’ in Somalia. In this study it mainly focuses on the implications of the “Socialism” on the country. In this part of the thesis, I would mainly focus on analyzing some of the economic data of the Somali Republic from different sources to test the hypotheses raised in preceding chapter. There are three parts in this chapter. First, political economy of “socialism” in Somalia, in this, it mainly focuses on the impact of “socialism” on the economy such as agriculture and production, export and import sector, public and financial administration, and income distribution and social welfare. Second, the impact of “Socialism” on major institutions, it focuses on how “socialism” affects the country’s main institutions such as social institutions, political institutions, like SRSP, military and security forces. Third, the last part of the chapter emphasizes on “Socialism” and beyond, for example Somalia from ‘socialist state’ to failed state.

To those people who might not know about Somalia, one Somali analyst put it as “prehistoric Somalia was the land of punt ... a fable source of prosperous and luxury ...where postmodern Somalia can be seen as “a prime example of collapsed state” and becoming another Somalia is the fate to be avoided by every African state” (Abdi Ismail, 2010; Virginia Luling, 1997).

As Mubarak (1996), surmises, when Somalia’s military coup leaders decided for “socialism” in 1970, the soviets had increased their military assistance to Somalia considerably.

Many Somalis believe that their military leaders chose “socialism” just only to lobby for military and financial support from USSR to move forward on their famous Pan-Somalist<sup>57</sup> objective.

It has been argued, no nation was willing to train the Somali military and provide modern weapons and armaments. Therefore, Somali military junta choose “socialist style economy” just to keep pursuing their major regional and long-term political objectives (Mubarak, 1996).

As discussed in the previous chapter, chapter two, Somali military junta had come to power in 1969, overthrow the civilian regime and created a socialist state. As Abdi Ismail (2010) noted, the regime suspended all formal political institutions of democracy; the parliament, the constitution, the political parties and the Supreme Court were suspended. The Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC) has been announced as the single party responsible for all these institutions. Abdi added that “Barre with his wing in the SRC consolidated all power in his hands” (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 88).

After the SRC monopolized all formal democratic institutions, the major civilian politicians, Mohammed Hajji Ibrahim Egal (the prime minister) Abdirizak Hajji Hussein (Main rival of Egal) and Adam Abdullah Osman (the former President of the civilian regime), including some officers from the army were either imprisoned or put them under house arrest. Nearly all formal political institutions were suspended and political activities banned. All the activities and responsibilities of these institutions were put under SRC<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> Pan-Somalism was the ‘Greater Somalia’ ideology based on uniting all the Somali territories under one flag. This dream has never been achieved.

<sup>58</sup> SRC: Somali Revolutionary Council, the supreme council of the military regime.

As Abdi Ismail (2010) wrote: *“The council transformed the Somali Republic into the Somali Democratic Republic and promoted the military coup as a political revolution undertaken by an angry society led by its armed forces (Abdi Ismail, 2010: 88).*

I agree with an argument saying that, post-colonial Somalia had had only nine years of civilian rule. The 1969 *coup* by General Siad Barre and his counterparts as noted “is a factor which most scholars associate with the modern day chaos in Somalia” (Tadesse 2002: 19; Lewis 2008: 36; Makhubela, 2010: 20).

Makhubela (2010) argues, “When Siad Barre seized in a military *coup*, he renamed the country the Somalia Democratic Republic, based on Scientific Socialism. This effectively affiliated the country with the Soviet Union in the Cold War” (Makhubela, 2010: 48).

Siad Barre promised three things for his society: economic independency; unity ; and eliminating clan and its structures through the adoption of “Scientific Socialism” ideology, rather he suppressed the people, militarize them and imposed secularism (Tadesse 2002: 16; Bradbury 1994: 9; Lewis 2005; Makhubela, 2010:50).

### **3.1.1 The impact of “Barre’s Socialism” on the Economy**

Somalia has been one of the poorest countries in the world since its independence in 1960. The Somali economy has three important distinct sectors: first, agriculture, which the main parts are livestock herding and agriculture<sup>59</sup>. This sector has the largest share in GDP and export, and it provides the means of support for millions of the Somali population; secondly, an urban sector mostly operated by the commercial class; and lastly, the service sector where mostly run by civil servants, ministries and parliamentarians (Laitin and Said Samatar, 1984; Abdi Ismail, 2010).

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<sup>59</sup> Mainly Livestock and Banana

My thesis at this point, argues whether the military regime inherited some kind of economic weakness from the civilian predecessor, this created considerable questions among the scholars in the Somali literature, but it has been obvious, starting from the unification of the two Somali colonies<sup>60</sup>, both of them had different economic administrations. However, there are two different arguments, some scholars have argued that the country's economy was devastated by the socialist regime, while others argued the Somali economy had experienced some improvements. Majority of them supported the first argument (Samatar 1993; Samatar 1994; Hashim 1997; Kusow 1994; Mukhtar & Kusow 1993; Besteman 1999; Lee Casanelli and Besteman 1996; Osman, 2007; Mubarak, 1996). In my thesis, especially in this chapter, I would like to compare these two arguments and provide solid theoretical arguments by using some macroeconomic data studied by those scholars.

First let us see the major distinctive sector, i.e. agriculture which shares the highest contribution to the GDP and export, and it also provides the basic livelihood for millions of Somalis living in rural areas.

#### **3.1.1.1 Agriculture and Production**

As I noted before, there are two different arguments between scholars, regarding the economic Development during the socialist regime. Some have argued that the country's economy was devastated, and few of them said the economy had experienced some improvements. In this regard, Abdi Ismail (2010), noted, "by adopting scientific "socialism" to build new socialist Somalia and granting required military facilities from the soviets, Barre secured Soviet's economic and military support" (Abdi Ismail, 2010:117).

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<sup>60</sup> British Somaliland in the North and Italian Somalia in the South

As discussed, SRC<sup>61</sup> somehow persuaded to Somali people that the adoption of Scientific “Socialism” is the best and the only way they can prosper and became an advanced state.

First of all, to understand the discussion, it has been noted that, there is an argument among scholars for analyzing the status of the economy during the military and socialist regime. According to Abdi Ismail (2010) a Somali Scholar and Economist at the University of Helsinki, “there is a consensus among the existing studies that in the first years of the revolution until 1975, for the first three years of the coup, the government established a development plan” (see table 4 below).

**Table 4: Investment in three-year Development Program 1971-73 by sector (Millions of Somali Shillings)<sup>62</sup>**

| <b>Sector</b>              | <b>Investment</b> | <b>% of Total</b> |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Rural</b>               |                   |                   |
| Livestock                  | 51                | 7.8               |
| Forestry and ranges        | 5                 | 0.8               |
| Agriculture and Irrigation | 83.2              | 12.7              |
| Fishery                    | 4.5               | 0.7               |
| Rural Water Supply         | 64.2              | 9.7               |
| <b>Subtotal</b>            | 207.9             | 31.7              |
| Industry                   | 117.5             | 17.8              |
| Government Services        | 331.4             | 50.5              |
| <b>Total</b>               | 656.8             | 100               |

Source: Abdi Ismail (2010)

As noted before, although the Somali regime inherited some economic problems from its civilian predecessor, then to overcome those problems, they had implemented a sound plan to smooth the economy, priority was given to the main sectors like agriculture and livestock.

<sup>61</sup>Supreme Revolutionary Council: Somali leaders were never tested or studied the principles of socialism. According to Abdi Ismail (2010), General Siad Barre himself knew nothing about Marxism-Leninism before the coup (David Laitin and Samatar, S., 19; Abdi Ismail, 2010). Barre and his Junta members, for them state ideology has three main components: - Barre’s ideas of community Development, Scientific Socialism, and Islam (Abdi Ismail, 2010)

<sup>62</sup> 1971 constant prices

As shown in Table 4 the priority has not been given the productive sector of the economy which constitutes the largest share of the country's GDP. A small amount of investment has been designed for Livestock (7.8%), Agriculture (12.7%), while the government services sector has been given almost 50% of the investment. The socialist regime spend more investment on government services including military. In my argument, I would say that it has been deviated from its own plan.

Another Development Program has been established for the following years. As shown in Table 4 the agricultural sector investment has increased to almost 30% when you compare to the previous plan in Table 3 which was only 12.7%, but this doesn't guaranteed any sectoral development, at the same time , it has not guaranteed the sufficiency and independent economy that was promised by the socialist state, see (table 5).

**Table 5: Investment in the five year Development program, 1974-78 by sector (Millions Somali Shillings)**

| <b>Sector</b>                      | <b>Investment</b> | <b>% of Total</b> |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Livestock</b>                   | 162.1             | 4.2               |
| <b>Agriculture and Irrigation</b>  | 1124.5            | 29.1              |
| <b>Forestry</b>                    | 51.1              | 1.3               |
| <b>Fishery</b>                     | 78                | 2                 |
| <b>Water resources</b>             | 139.5             | 3.6               |
| <b>Mining</b>                      | 45.7              | 1.2               |
| <b>Electricity</b>                 | 136.5             | 3.5               |
| <b>Industry</b>                    | 588.3             | 15.2              |
| <b>Transport and communication</b> | 944.7             | 24.5              |
| <b>Education</b>                   | 191.1             | 4.9               |
| <b>Health</b>                      | 77.7              | 2                 |
| <b>Housing</b>                     | 158               | 4.1               |
| <b>Labor</b>                       | 11.3              | 0.3               |
| <b>Statistics</b>                  | 106.1             | 2.8               |
| <b>Tourism</b>                     | 12.6              | 0.3               |
| <b>information</b>                 | 37.1              | 1                 |
| <b>Total</b>                       | 3702.2            | 100               |

Source: Abdi Ismail (2010), see also Samatar (1988)

If we closely look the economic performance of the Socialist military of Somalia in its first phase period 1969-1975, it has been said that the economy was performing well. But

I disagree, as shown in Table 5, the agriculture including the livestock (the most important sector in the Somali economy) has been neglected and the situation was devastating. Of course, figures shows that agriculture has grown by less than 0%, it experienced negative growth, and the services sector including defense, became the dominant sector in the Somali economy. Table 6 and 7 summarizes the country's economic situation in this period.

**Table 6: Growth and Production**

| <b>Average annual growth rate (%)</b> |           |                    |           |                 |           |                      |           |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------|----------------------|-----------|
| <b>GDP</b>                            |           | <b>Agriculture</b> |           | <b>Industry</b> |           | <b>Gvt. Services</b> |           |
| 1960-1970                             | 1970-1976 | 1960-1970          | 1970-1976 | 1960-1970       | 1970-1976 | 1960-1970            | 1970-1976 |
| 1.0                                   | 2.1       | -1.5               | -1.2      | 3.3             | -10.3     | 2.1                  | 8.0       |

Source: World Bank Development Report (1978)

**Table 7: Structure of production**

| <b>Distribution of Growth Domestic Product (%)</b> |      |                 |      |                                   |      |
|----------------------------------------------------|------|-----------------|------|-----------------------------------|------|
| <b>Agriculture</b>                                 |      | <b>Industry</b> |      | <b>Gov. Services<sup>63</sup></b> |      |
| 1960                                               | 1976 | 1960            | 1976 | 1960                              | 1976 |
| 41                                                 | 31   | 17              | 8    | 38                                | 61   |

Source: World Bank Development Report (1978)

### 3.1.1.2 Export and Import

Although some scholars argue that the economy under Barre improved when you compare to its predecessor, in this Study, I argue that Siad Barre did not succeeded in his Socialist based economy in Somalia. As shown in Table 7, the military coup cannot be said professional, and the revolutionary goal of making Somalia self-sufficient in food has not been achieved, plus Siad Barre failed to reduce the foreign dependency in trade which the trade deficit has increased from Sshl 87.9 million in 1967 to Sshl 352 million in 1973 (see table 8 and 9).

<sup>63</sup> Government services (mainly defense and administration)

**Table 8: Food Imports (Millions of Somali Shillings)**

|                   | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971                | 1972 | 1973 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|---------------------|------|------|
| <b>Imports of</b> |      |      |      |      |                     |      |      |
| <b>Rice</b>       | 20.6 | 19.9 | 26.3 | 26.5 | 104.8 <sup>64</sup> | 24.3 | 57.5 |
| <b>Cereals</b>    | 14.7 | 15.3 | 22.5 | 24   | 15.6                | 10.1 | 13.3 |
| <b>Total</b>      | 35.3 | 35.2 | 26.3 | 50.5 | 120.4               | 64.4 | 70.8 |

Source: Laitin D. (1976)

**Table 9: Foreign dependency and trade deficit (Millions of Somali Shillings)<sup>65</sup>**


|                      | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  | 1971  | 1972  | 1973  |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <b>Imports</b>       | 286.4 | 339.8 | 369.8 | 322.2 | 447.6 | 523.9 | 646.2 |
| <b>Exports</b>       | 198.5 | 212   | 231.9 | 223.9 | 264.4 | 298.4 | 294.2 |
| <b>Trade deficit</b> | 87.9  | 127.8 | 137.9 | 98.3  | 183.2 | 225.5 | 352   |

Source: Laitin D. (1976)

As table 8 and 9 depicts, little success has been made in attaining economic independence, even during the worst year of 1971 season, the worst year of the drought, Somali people relied on foreign food.

**Figure 2: Somalia: GDP, Import and Export Growth rate % (1971-1990)**

Somalia :GDP Growth Rate and Import and Export Annual Growth % (1971-1990)




Note: All prices are in 1971 Current prices  
Country : Somalia  
Source: World Development Indicators  
Created on: 12/16/2015

<sup>64</sup> Due to prolonged drought, the import of Rice has increased.

<sup>65</sup> See also UN Economic for Africa, Summaries of Economic Data : Somalia (Addis Ababa), compiled 1975, pp 10-16

Moreover, trade deficits have been increasing at a level considerable greater than inflation. According to Laitin (1976), Barre has not succeeded in his socialist based economy, he noted “Siad Barre has not reduced dependency on foreign aid, rather he has changed the country on whom Somalis are dependent to foreign aid and debt” (Laitin, 1976:25).

**Figure 3: Somalia: External Debt (in Millions of USD) 1971-1990**



According to Samatar (1988), in the first years most of the studies were affirmative and confirmatory. From 1969-1979, the literature falls on of two categories; either inline which continues to affirm the righteousness of the endeavor, or a less enthusiastic, more critical trend.<sup>66</sup> However, my thesis at this point agrees with Samatar (1988), that the regime’s record was very poor and falls short of the goals initially planned.

The performance of the Somali economy was disastrous. As I said earlier, the rural sector, the largest part of the economy was neglected. Production of almost all major food crops

<sup>66</sup>In details see the works of David Laitin (1976), p. 468 and I.M. Lewis (1979), pp.14-43

declined, this created that the country have to rely on food aid with extremely heavy loans.

As noted, although the number of state enterprises has increased but the production was negative, this contributed to the declining the value added per worker, due to lack of skilled labor, a low capacity utilization, a high tax burden ( almost 80% of net profit) and rising prices of imported inputs. (See table 10)

**Table 10: Estimates of GDP at Factor Cost, 1972-1978 (1978 constant prices)**

| <b>Item</b>                       | <b>Million<br/>1972</b> | <b>Million<br/>1978</b> | <b>% of<br/>Total 1978</b> | <b>Average % of<br/>Annual<br/>Growth</b> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| <b>Production Services</b>        | 4405                    | 4675                    | 72.0                       | +1.0                                      |
| <b>Rural Sector</b>               | 3775                    | 4675                    | 62.5                       | +1.2                                      |
| <b>Livestock</b>                  | 2820                    | 3265                    | 50.3                       | -2.5                                      |
| <b>Agriculture</b>                | 670                     | 490                     | 7.5                        | -5.0                                      |
| <b>Other</b>                      | 285                     | 305                     | 4.7                        | +1.0                                      |
| <b>Industrial</b>                 | 630                     | 615                     | 9.5                        | -0.5                                      |
| <b>Services Sector</b>            | 1225                    | 1820                    | 28.0                       | +6.5                                      |
| <b>Govt. services</b>             | 350                     | 570                     | 8.8                        | +8.5                                      |
| <b>Other</b>                      | 905                     | 1250                    | 19.2                       | +5.5                                      |
| <b>Total GDP( at factor cost)</b> | 5660                    | 6495                    | 100.0                      | +2.5                                      |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

Table 10 depicts, how devastating the economy was, there was such low and mostly negative growth, another important implication shown in this table is that the great expansion of the government services sector, particularly defense. The country's economy during this period was extremely weak and poor in comparison with the neighboring countries, such as Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Rwanda. As discussed by Ahmed Samatar (1988) quoting London's Overseas Development Council. He noted:

*“Somalia had the lowest GNP, the lowest physical quality of life index, the lowest per capita public education expenditure, the highest infant mortality per 1,000 live births and the highest per capita military expenditure”* (Ahmed Samatar. 1988:148)

It has been argued by Samatar (1988), that the other crucial spheres of internal reconstruction, i.e. politics and human rights, the overall results have also been at variance with self-reliance.

For example, despite the nationalization of some important segments of the Somali Economy, especially the modern sector, there was very few evidences of a genuine democratization of the workplace. The military government prohibited strikes and death penalty was implemented against offenders.

Somali Revolutionary Council (SRC) were appointed as the decision unit of all executive decision, in that case, he added “when Siad Barre eliminated all his rivalries, he became the supreme authority–law giver, judge and executor” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: *ibid*). In this regard, my thesis at this point agrees with Samatar that the regime’s political position was less democratic, there were no constitutional limitations on the power of central government and the president.

Another important discussion about the Economy of Somalia in 1970s lies on the production stagnation of the pastoral sub-sector (livestock and agriculture).

As already mentioned, the situation of the production and livestock export was effected drastically. In 1983 livestock exports declined by 30% from those in 1971-72, moreover, there have been no improvements in the marketing of pastoral production (Samatar, 1988).

Although there was no complete data available at the time, Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues that, a measure of this condition can be seen from the huge food imports and aid delivered to Somalia in 1984-1985. In 1984 only, 70,000 tons of food were bought and 230,000 tons were given as food aid; in 1985, the import figure was 92,000 tons with another 270,000 in aid.

Table 11 shows both the languidness and of domestic production and the continuing dependence on imports for food grains, especially in the face of an alarming rate of production growth, nearly 30% per year.

**Table 11: Domestic production and Imports as percent of the total grain availability (1979-1983)**

| <b>Year</b> | <b>Domestic Production<br/>(000 tons)</b> | <b>Imports<br/>(000 tons)</b> | <b>Import as % of marketed grain supply</b> |
|-------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| <b>1979</b> | 262                                       | 150                           | 37                                          |
| <b>1980</b> | 168                                       | 241                           | 47                                          |
| <b>1981</b> | 383                                       | 271                           | 41                                          |
| <b>1982</b> | 405                                       | 155                           | 28                                          |
| <b>1983</b> | 358                                       | 168                           | 32                                          |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

Here the analysis goes to discussion about the chronic stagnation of Somali agriculture. This table summarizes how the rural economy due to the acute of shortage of crucial technical ingredients, inputs and investment funds had created an absolute failure of the Somali economy. Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues that, the rural production has remained far from healthy. Somali industrial performance in the mid-1980s was even more regrettable.

He further noted “for example real output per capita despite an investment allocation of about 15% in the 1982-1986 plan, did not improve”. My thesis argues that, even though the regime’s adopted socialist economy failed, the regime continued to pour large amount national resources in to the most unproductive sphere, defense and general administration. Table 12 shows the disadvantages of the economic and social services.

**Table 12: Selected items as percentage of ordinary state expenditure (1981-1984)<sup>67</sup>**

| <b>Item</b>                    | <b>1981-82</b> | <b>1983</b> | <b>1984</b> |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>General Public Services</b> | 51.2           | 47.3        | 45.2        |
| <b>Defense and Security</b>    | 30.5           | 32.6        | 36.3        |
| <b>Social Services</b>         | 11.7           | 11.7        | 10.5        |
| <b>Economic Services</b>       | 6.7            | 8.3         | 8.0         |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

The contraction of country's production, excessive unwise spending by the socialist regime, "and acute of deficiencies in implementation and management have contributed to create a harrowing economic condition on the Somali society. In addition, the cost of imports has [quadrupled], Somalia's Balance of payment has worsened" (Ahmed Samatar, 1987) (See table 13).

**Table 13: Somalia: Balance of Payments (Millions of US dollars)**

| <b>Items</b>         | <b>1980</b> | <b>1981</b> | <b>1982</b> | <b>1983</b> | <b>1984</b> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| <b>Exports</b>       | 133         | 144         | 137         | 100         | 58          |
| <b>Imports</b>       | -461        | -442        | -484        | -450        | -408        |
| <b>Trade Balance</b> | -328        | -298        | -347        | -350        | -350        |

Source: World Bank (1985), p 17.

As shown above in table 5, the regime established a development program aimed to create financial independency, self-sufficient and increased production, but by the end of the plan period most objectives were unattained. In the industrial sector; the consolidation and maximization of efficiency and productivity; creation of new industrial units in fields vital to the national economy; and the encouragement of the private sector to play a secondary role in industrial growth were the main targets.

As Ahmed Samatar (1988) argues, in 1978 a number of significant projects (70% financed by foreign companies) had been established in Somali Republic.

<sup>67</sup> For details see also World Bank Confidential Report (1985), p. 85

These factories included the Match and Cigarette factories, fruit and vegetable canning plants, a wheat flour and pasta factory. Table 14 shows the downward trend and the stagnation in key industrial products in 1971-72.

**Table 14: Somalia: Industrial output of selected Products<sup>68</sup>**

| Item                                | Unit of Measure    | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| <b>Sugar</b>                        | thousands of tons  | 30   | 33   | 30   | 24   | 21   | 20.9 |
| <b>Canned Milk</b>                  | millions of tins   | 14   | 10   | 9    | -    | 1.5  | 1.2  |
| <b>Milk</b>                         | millions of liters | 2    | 4    | 4    | 3.31 | 2.7  | 2    |
| <b>Pasta and Flour</b>              | millions of tons   | 8    | 8    | 8    | 8.1  | 5.8  | 4.3  |
| <b>Canned Fruits and Vegetables</b> | thousands of tons  | 1    | 2    | 1    | 0.9  | 1    | 0.9  |
| <b>Textiles</b>                     | millions of yards  | 6    | 7    | 13   | 13.8 | 9.93 | 9    |
| <b>Boxes and Bags</b>               | thousands of tons  | 5    | 7    | 5    | 4.75 | 5.2  | 4.5  |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

It has been argued that the problems of industrial sector were not limited to that fall of productivity. There was a massive decline of the value add (-12.5 % per year 1970-1980) and the profitability was affected too especially per employment.

Among the serious problems of the Industrial sector were:

1. Underutilization of industrial capacity
2. In adequate financial incentives for employees, where the average salary per employees declined 50%.
3. Lack of Managerial Staff and skilled workers.
4. High taxes, interest burden, and non-payment by the state for goods and services.

### **3.1.1.3 Financial and Public Administration**

As I have noted, during the socialist regime the country's export severely affected. The revenue from the export was less and cost of import was over 8 times higher than the revenue from export.

<sup>68</sup> For details see also Somalia: Central Bank of Somalia (1979). pp. 12-19

This further effected, the ordinary budget of the government, this caused the budget balance to deteriorate over time, from a surplus equivalent to an average of 1.2 percent of the GDP in the early 1970s to deficit equal 6.5 percent of the GDP in late 1987.

**Table 15: Central Government's Current Budget**


|                                       | <b>Average<br/>1970-75</b> | <b>Average<br/>1981-83</b> | <b>1984</b> | <b>1985</b> | <b>1986</b> | <b>1987</b>           |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| <b>(Millions of Somali Shillings)</b> |                            |                            |             |             |             |                       |
| <b>Revenue</b>                        | 521                        | 2,994                      | 3,774       | 5,220       | 9595        | 10,018                |
| <b>Expenditure</b>                    | -476                       | -4,086                     | -6,663      | -7,910      | -12,765     | -21,021               |
| <b>Balance</b>                        | 45                         | -1,092                     | -2,889      | -2,690      | -3,170      | -11,003 <sup>69</sup> |
| <b>(% of GDP)</b>                     |                            |                            |             |             |             |                       |
| <b>Revenue</b>                        | 16.1                       | 10.4                       | 6.1         | 6.0         | 8.0         | 5.9                   |
| <b>Expenditure</b>                    | -14.9                      | -14.2                      | -10.7       | -9.1        | -10.7       | -12.4                 |
| <b>Balance</b>                        | 1.2                        | -3.8                       | -4.6        | -3.1        | -2.7        | -6.4                  |

Source: Ahmed Samatar (1988)

As table 15 shows, in 1987 the revenue was half of the government's expenditure, the deficit was larger than the government revenue. High inflation rate, the severe devaluations of the Somali Shilling and rise of consumer price index were the main problems faced by the Somali economy in 1980s.

<sup>69</sup> The deficit larger than the government revenue

**Figure 4: Somalia Percapita GNP 1973 -1990**



Source: adopted from Abdi Ismail (2010)

In 1970, Siad Barre mobilized all means of power under his command to centralize state power in his hands. However, this creates mess both in the economy and politics of the country. Barre promised to develop the economy; reduce in equality and establish self-sufficient economy, but none of these objectives had never attained.

Barre created strategies to ensure the survival of his military regime. First, he formulated a “patrimonial system to recruited and promote his clansmen in to the public offices” (Abdi Ismail, 2010). The government institutions were converted to clan institutions, therefore, all government high ranking officials (the ministers and vice ministers) was appointed by Barre with his clansmen. (Abdi Ismail, 2010).

According to Abdi Ismail (2010), the government ministries became under the property of certain clan property, even some of them didn't know the address of the ministry unless they are collecting diplomatic Passports or their tickets.

The other major drawback of the public employment was that, Barre's regime ignored the worsening situation of the public employment sector. In 1975, expenditure per

employee decreased from over 23 thousand shillings to only a little over 5.5 thousand shillings almost 76% decline in 1989. Table (16) shows the misery situation of the public employment sector.


**Table 16: Central Government non-defense Expenditure (per Employee, Somalia, selected years, 1975-89)**

| <b>Year</b> | <b>Expenditure<br/>(Millions)</b> | <b>Employment</b> | <b>Expenditure per<br/>employee</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|
| <b>1975</b> | 476.0                             | 20,600.0          | 23,107.0                            |
| <b>1979</b> | 700.0                             | 35,000.0          | 19,971.0                            |
| <b>1981</b> | 269.0                             | 40,000.0          | 6,721.0                             |
| <b>1989</b> | 314.0                             | 56,500.0          | 5,558.0                             |

Source: Abdi Ismail (2010)

Another deficiency was the major mismanagement of the government expenditure targets. Table 17 shows the periodic budget of 1984 to 1988, the table summarizes that almost all of the government budget was absorbed by the General Services including army. In 1988, 94.4% of the government budget was absorbed by the General services. 50% of the budget expenditure was allocated to finance central services including Barres's palace, the Villa Somalia. It was tragic that the economic sector received only 2.39 % of the total government expenditure. Social services such as Education, health and Labor received just 3.12%.

**Figure 5: Ordinary Budget: Foreign Affairs and Finance & Services**




Source: Adopted from Mubarak (1996)

Somalia in its early year of independence at least by theory was dependent on Italy. Laitin (1976) wrote “ in 1961, that country accounted for 43.1% of Somalia’s aggregate trade, but a diversification happened throughout the civilian era , and by 1969 that percentage had dropped to 29.3% . Somalia’s export had dropped to 5.4%<sup>70</sup>. Moreover, Table 17 and 18 shows how the country’s export suffered after 1969 revolution.

**Table 17: Somalia's Export before revolution (1960-1968)**



**Table 18: Somalia's Export after 1969 revolutions**



**Source: World Bank (1980)**

<sup>70</sup> See also UN statistical year book for international trade, 1960 and 1970-1971, New York.

**Table 19: Somalia Ordinary Expenditure 1984-1988**

| <b>Expenditure</b>                  | <b>1984</b> | <b>1985</b> | <b>1986</b> | <b>1987</b> | <b>1988</b> | <b>% of the Total<br/>1988</b> |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Finance and Central Services</b> | 2,102.40    | 4,118.30    | 7,631.80    | 14,127.10   | 12,515.60   | 49.80                          |
| <b>Defense</b>                      | 1,785.80    | 1,750.90    | 2,511.00    | 2,999.70    | 7,917.60    | 31.50                          |
| <b>Interior and Police</b>          | 223.60      | 307.80      | 443.40      | 560.70      | 715.40      | 2.85                           |
| <b>Foreign Affairs</b>              | 219.90      | 427.20      | 632.20      | 1,413.90    | 2,153.10    | 8.57                           |
| <b>Justice and Religion Affairs</b> | 141.20      | 158.40      | 244.60      | 290.20      | 446.90      | 1.78                           |
| <b>Total General Services</b>       | 4,472.90    | 6,762.60    | 11,463.00   | 19,391.60   | 23,748.60   | 94.50                          |
| <b>Transportations</b>              | 53.10       | 55.90       | 60.70       | 87.50       | 94.50       | 0.38                           |
| <b>Post and Telecommunications</b>  | 54.10       | 65.70       | 58.70       | 76.70       | 75.60       | 0.30                           |
| <b>Public works</b>                 | 38.80       | 47.60       | 48.90       | 57.50       | 69.80       | 0.28                           |
| <b>Agriculture</b>                  | 96.20       | 56.30       | 45.40       | 59.50       | 55.30       | 0.22                           |
| <b>Livestock and Forestry</b>       | 56.40       | 74.80       | 83.20       | 89.50       | 109.90      | 0.44                           |
| <b>Minerals and Water resources</b> | 53.40       | 75.40       | 60.60       | 85.20       | 93.10       | 0.37                           |
| <b>Industry</b>                     | 7.10        | 7.00        | 10.90       | 45.10       | 43.90       | 0.17                           |
| <b>Commerce</b>                     | 4.40        | 5.80        | 11.00       | na          | na          | na                             |
| <b>Fisheries</b>                    | 28.20       | 30.00       | 33.90       | 45.40       | 58.20       | 0.23                           |
| <b>Tourism</b>                      | 3.80        | 4.30        | 4.30        | 10.20       | na          | na                             |
| <b>Total Economic Services</b>      | 395.50      | 422.80      | 417.60      | 556.60      | 600.30      | 2.39                           |
| <b>Education</b>                    | 327.30      | 314.40      | 330.40      | 403.00      | 478.10      | 1.90                           |
| <b>Health</b>                       | 138.40      | 153.90      | 165.60      | 203.50      | 255.10      | 1.01                           |
| <b>Labor</b>                        | 22.70       | 21.30       | 17.10       | 21.10       | 51.80       | 0.21                           |
| <b>Total Social Services</b>        | 488.40      | 489.60      | 513.10      | 627.60      | 785.00      | 3.12                           |
| <b>Total Expenditure</b>            | 5,356.80    | 7,675.00    | 12,393.70   | 20,575.80   | 25,133.90   | 100.01                         |

Source: Abdi Ismail (2010)

### 3.2 The impact on major non-economic Institutions

As Samatar (1988) surmises, all the issue of religion, clanism and political participation had to dealt with in the context of newly developed system of “socialism”. Abolition of clan was first addressed by Barre. All his speeches were marked clanism as an ‘evil’. As Samatar (1988), observe, “a general ‘Campaign against Tribalism’ was launched from February to March of 1971” (Samatar, 1988: 149). As I have mentioned earlier the Blood compensation locally called ‘diya payment’ was abolished, the weddings and burials were to be held in municipalities.

In this part, my thesis would focus on the socialist impact on major institutions of the Somali state at the time, including political institutions, culture and religious institutions. In this section, I will look into the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977, which was once said “the most turning point of the socialist regime of Somalia”.

Somalis are 100% Muslim, therefore, “Socialism” confronted the national religion. In a long speech Barre, while mentioning the lack of any contradiction between Islam and “Socialism” he declared that:

*“.... Ours is the religion of common man. It stands for equality and justice, consequently, “Socialism” as applied to our particular condition cannot identify religion as the obstacles to the working class and therefore cannot negate it”<sup>71</sup>*  
(Samatar, 1988: 156).

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<sup>71</sup> For details see David Laitin (1976)

Samatar (1988) noted, “the most explosives confrontations was that over 1974 Family Act”, the law states that women and men should have the same inheritance. Somali religious leaders rejected the law.

They have declared that their religious values had been attacked, and this act was imposing of secularism and bureaucratic invasion. Finally, many religious leaders were arrested, and in 1975 ten Somali Sheikhs (Religious Scholars) were executed in Mogadishu in a bright daylight after accusing them a counter revolutionary ideas. In a speech Siad Barre said:

*“If both Islam and “Socialism” advocate, justice, equality and improvements people’s lives, who can tell me where they differ? Where do they contradict one another? What harm is there in having the faith of Islam, and at the same time applying “Socialism” as an economic and political system through which our country can make progress ? I would say none”* (Ahmed Samatar, 1988: ibid).

According to Samatar, not only the religious leaders were confronted, two Military generals<sup>72</sup> from SRC were accused anti-revolution, as far as 200 other individuals were arrested with security sweep. The two generals were convicted in military tribunal and shot in public in July 1972.

### **3.2.1 Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)<sup>73</sup>**

In the literature of “Somali Socialism”, scholars had noted that, in order to promote the concept of “Socialism” in Somalia, Moscow established a Marxist party, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), the higher council of the military regime became the most effective institution in the country to create a socialist state. In 1971, the major agenda of

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<sup>72</sup> Gen. Aynanshe (Vice president) and Gen. Gabyare (Defense minister and member of SRC)

<sup>73</sup> Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was Marxist-Leninist party in theory, but their ideology was also included Islam and Pan-Somalism.

the Russian government is to create a Marxist party for the Somalis to govern themselves with socialist values.

Soviets believed that General Siad Barre was their man in the Somali peninsula, they have trusted him, and they knew that only military support will not be enough.

As Abdi Ismail (2010) noted, before the coup, several other socialist parties existed in Somalia: *Hawl and Hanti wadaag (Labor and Socialism)*; The Greater Somali League; and Somali Democratic Union (SDU). All of these parties were created with the help of Italian communists. Soon after the coup, almost all of them became advocates of “Socialism” (Abdi Ismail, 2010).

According to Pestalozza (1974), General Gabyarre’s <sup>74</sup> group, were accused of seeking Islamic Socialism, and perhaps that is why USSR sought their execution. However, when Russians failed to convince to the Somali regime that their system will work with the Islamic religion. In 1973, Somali regime admitted that there is some pragmatism in the Somali socialism, and they have concluded the Islamic religion would be upheld in their daily life (Abdi Ismail, 2010). It has been argued, although the main agenda of SRSP was to decentralize the Somali politics, the working guideline of the party was just an ideal. Figure 4 shows the formal structure of the authority in Somalia in 1976.

As shown in figure 6, the leadership, military administration, budgets and program, and highest profile positions were all under the president control and were subject upon his approval. During those years, many scholars concluded that Somalia was one of the highest military dominated states in Africa.

Ahmed Samatar (1988), in his study *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric or reality*, argues that, there were four criteria was mentioned in the literature of Somali Military studies: prevalence of


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<sup>74</sup> The Defense Minister and member of SRC

martial law; monopolization of key power positions by the military; legal system based on military courts; and tight relations between military and police forces (Ahmed Samatar, 1988).

He further noted “Somalia should be classified as a highly repressive state, including [the usage of] torture and brutality” (Sivard, 1982: 17)<sup>75</sup>. Most of its revenue has been absorbed by the military and less has been diverted to the basic social services like education and health services (See table 2).

**Figure 6: Somalia: Formal Authority Structure (1976)**



Source: Adopted from Ahmed Samatar (1988)

### 3.2.2 Somali-Ethiopian War: the turning point of the Somali Socialist Regime

In the literature of the Somali studies, it has been argued that, in 1977 the ruling *Class* of Somalia and Ethiopia plunged into what one scholar called “the most ferocious [conflict] in Africa since World War II” (Ahmed Samatar, 1988). In this thesis, I would also like to give a brief overview about the effect of this war on Somali Republic. Although my study does


<sup>75</sup> For details see , Ruth Leger Sivard (1982) , p.17 or Ahmed Samatar (1988) ,p. 113

not contradict the existing facts about the war, I argue that, the war had very serious consequences on Somali political economy.

Mubarak (1996) argues, when the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was ousted in 1974, Ethiopia fell into tragic civil war and political turmoil was started.

Ethiopian Military leaders were trying to establish ties with the east, in that case the Somali regime wanted get advantage of the weakness and confusion existed in Ethiopia, and therefore they claimed to free the occupied land in the Ogaadeen (Haud Region). The Somali government started war with neighboring Ethiopia in 1977, as Mubarak noted “when the Somali armed force upheld the Somali separatist groups battling in the Ogaaden” (Mubarak, 1996). The war had also increased the expenditure on armament (See figure 7).

**Figure 7: Somalia Army Imports 1971-1988**



Source: Adopted from Mubarak (1996)

The Ogaaden war has been interpreted by some as the single most important turning point for the regime (Lewis, 1994).<sup>76</sup> At the beginning of the conflict, many people ethnically Somalis were fled to Somaliland (North). In 1979 almost 1.3 million refugees were present in Somalia.<sup>77</sup> Half of them have been settled in Somaliland (North).

This has increased the tension between locals and refugees, hatred and animosity started as Isaaq (the major clan in the north) became the second class citizens in their own localities. Tension were spurred as government started enrolling refugees in to the armed forces. As noted, the failed war with Ethiopia obviously undermined the credibility of the Somali military, Lewis (1992) wrote “the failed war in the Ogaaden completely dissolved the integrity of the military and police, the two major guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism” (Lewis, 1992; Samatar, 1994).

After Somalis was badly defeated in the Ogaaden war, in 1978 an abortive coup was carried out by Abdullahi Yusuf (a military official from Majeerteen clan). Finally the government crushed the plot, officials were escaped and later started an opposition movement, called Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), headquartered in Ethiopia. Several attacks were carried out by this militias across the border with Ethiopia. Barre regime retaliated the Majeerteen clan for the coup and formation of SSDF.

In my thesis, I argue that the effect of the war was savage. I agree with Ahmed Samatar (1994) to the point that, “the war destroyed businesses and the major market while mining of transport routes virtually shut down trade”. The port of Berbera was closed for exporting livestock. Between the years of 1988 – 1991 around 1.2 million animals exported to the Gulf states through Berbera port”<sup>78</sup> (Samatar, 1994).

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
<sup>76</sup> Lewis (1994) *Blood and Bones*, A Samatar, ‘Introduction and overview’, in Samatar (ed), *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienne.

<sup>77</sup> K Cahill, (1986) ‘The clinical face of famine in Somalia’, in K Cahill

<sup>78</sup> See for details, Ahmed (1994) ‘*Understanding Household Food Insecurity and Famine Conditions in Rural Somaliland*’, mimeo, Wye College, University of London, p 401.

The other major effect of war was that Somalia's FDI was dropped intensely after the war. (See Figure 8).

**Figure 8 : Somalia FDI Net inflows (Current USD) 1971-1990**



### 3.2.3 Socialist Military Regime and the genocide in the North (Somaliland)

In 1980, another opposition frontline emerged, SNM (Somali National Movement) was announced in London by intellectuals and businessmen from the Issaq clan. It has been noted the main reason that Issaq<sup>79</sup> clan was dissatisfied with the regime and SNM was created comes from different sources: political and democratic under-representation, unequal distribution of government resources, and how movement regulated and managed the trade and business, especially livestock and Qaat. (Lewis, 1994).

<sup>79</sup> To understand the Somali Clan Families see Appendix Page: Somali ethnic groups and major Sub clans.

In British Somaliland where the Isaaq is the dominant clan, when the two Somali colonies united in 1960, the Isaacs had an important influence in government, the last two civilian governments were headed by a premier from Isaaq (Mohamed Haaji Ibraahim Egaal). In Siad Barre's cabinet, several Isaacs held posts. Nevertheless, but there was a feeling that political representation in Somalia was dominated by clans at the south.<sup>80</sup>

The Northern clans' decision to unite with their southern brothers in 1960 was what some scholars called controversial. The tension of the Somali nationalism was high at the time. It was surmised that the unity and putting the dream of 'Greater Somalia' into reality was the major idea on people's minds. Even the Isaacs with their brothers in the south supported the war with Ethiopia, to further support the government claim of freeing the occupied land in the Ogaadeen. When Somalia was defeated in the war with Ethiopia in 1977, thousands of refugees fled to the north of Somalia from Ethiopia, this further created tension between local clans and the Ogaadeeni refugees in the north. When government armed the refugees also driven the fear. In 1988, Ethiopia and Somalia signed an agreement that Ethiopia will control the Ogaadeen land.

Throughout the 1980s, the regime started a repressive policy against Isaaq. According to Africa Watch Committee (1990), a 'leaked' letter, supposedly from the military governor in the north to Siad Barre, created a fear among Isaaq clan that the government started a genocidal program against themselves. In May 1988 SNM captured the northern cities of Hargeisa and Burco when they lost their bases in Ethiopia due to the agreement between Ethiopia and the Somali government.

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<sup>80</sup> ibid p.59

In response to that, Barre with the support of his military and other armed forces launched a repressive attack on Isaaq clan that resulted hundreds of thousands killed and other thousands fled to neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, and Djibouti. According to Africa Watch committee (1990), between May 1988 and March 1989 some 50,000 to 60,000 people were killed (Africa Watch, 1990).

Up to this point the SNM had not been widely supported by civilians. These brutal attacks finally united the Isaaq behind the SNM for an all-out war against the regime.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> *ibid*

## CHAPTER IV: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis was to contribute to a better understanding of the existing literature about the analysis of the legitimacy, implementation of the “Somali Scientific socialism” in Somali republic, it also mainly focused on the economic and political impact of this ‘system’ on the Somali state. As discussed in the introductory chapter, during the cold war, “Socialism “had become an active promotion in Africa. Some African countries including Somalia had pursued an internal policies that have led to totalitarianism and single party rule. In the case of Somalia, Mohamed Siad Barre, seized the power in a military coup in 1969 and renamed the country the ‘*Somalia Democratic Republic*’ that he claimed , it was based on “Scientific Socialism”, a principle that he himself did not understand.

It was argued in this thesis that, Siad Barre who did not have a formal education, did not have the basic knowledge of socialist principles, never understood Marxism-Leninism, just to please USSR, adopted “Somali Scientific Socialism”, an ideology that [he had claimed] ‘fully compatible with Islam and the reality of the nomadic society’, but later proofed his endeavors the opposite, such as disunity, nepotism, economic failure and political disintegration in Somalia.

During the cold war, Siad Barre aligned Somalia with the Soviets. He mentioned that the clan has been outlawed, but at the same time gave a great share to his sub clan. Not only clans, but all formal political institutions existed during the civilian regime has been suspended. Moreover, all formal government institutions such as, parliament, Supreme Court, and political parties were adjourned. Political associations and gathering were prohibited, and ‘the death penalty’ for offenders was implemented by the military.

When the president of the civilian and the democratically elected regime has been assassinated by one of his body guards with the complicity of the military junta, and they overthrow the civilian regime, this had created a political vacuum which shapes the central political chaos of Somalia till today.

As discussed in the literature of the Somali state conflict, Siad Barre promised to the Somali nation that, his “Socialism” will bring three important prospects, unity and justice; economic independency and sufficiency; and development. However, these has been proofed to the opposite. The country had experienced disunity and inequality among clans; an economy depending on foreign aid; and food import due to the failure of local agriculture and production.

Moreover, it has been highlighted in the introductory chapter, there are multilateral approached of understanding the Somali state conflict. As Makhubela (2010) noted, there were many additional problems to the Somali case, the colonial legacy; Siad Barre’s repression; competition for land and food resources; clan rivalries; clan inequality; exclusion from power and wealth sharing; the economic decline under Barre; the hyper-militarization of the Somali nation due to the abundance of weapons acquired during the years of conflict. However, his analysis is missing the impact of “Somali Socialism “and how the economy failed under Barre regime. I argue in this thesis that, “Barre’s Socialism” was a major factor of both economic catastrophe and political upheavals in post-independent Somalia.

Abdi Ismail (2010) himself described the presence of Soviet Union in Somalia as “unhappy principle”. Although there is no clear evidence which shows that Moscow orchestrated both the assassination of the civilian president and support of the military takeover, there was obvious coincided interests.

As discussed in chapter one, the deep presence of Islam in the Somali social fabric and the regime's reluctance to constructively address this issue was the main source of serious confrontation between regime and Islam. As far as religion was concerned, Moscow wanted to see Somali state based on Marxist-Leninist principles, free from religious influence. In contrast, the Somali people, on the other hand, believed that Islam had an indispensable role in their political, social and economic spheres of life and could not be excluded from it.

Accordingly, chapter two, the second chapter of the thesis, theories on state conflict was explained in order to justify the main objectives of doing this research paper. First of all, the two major theoretical approaches on Somali state conflict is studied, i.e the instrumentalists and traditionalist schools. Secondly, the most crucial and important part of instrumentalist theory of the state was explained and the first hypothesis is developed based on this theory.

In Somali Republic, according to the findings of the data in chapter three, the first hypothesis has been supported, that the country's economy was deeply devastated by the 'socialist policies'. The Somali economy experienced serious macroeconomic crisis, including stagnation, poor economic growth, higher deficit ratio and higher unemployment. Moreover, the background causes of the Somali state conflict was explained in three different periods: pre-colonial period; colonialism period and the socialist state era. .

As discussed in chapter two, the first view, the traditionalist view, is led by Ioan M. Lewis, a British anthropologist who had extensively studied the Somali nomads during the colonial period of 1940 and 50s. The Scholars of the traditionalist thesis argue that, "the continuity of clan politics had destroyed the state" (Lewis, 1993, 1994; Said Samatar, 1991; and Simons, 1995).

Previously, Somalia has been colonized by three European countries, such as Britain, France and Italy and in that period, the Somali people has been divided under different state systems with the flags of European countries, and some African countries such as Ethiopia which took over the Somali Haud Land.<sup>82</sup>

In this thesis, it is argued that, the foreign strategic interests of Somalia has always been commercial, because of its location. Soviet Russia used Somalia as a geostrategic place to influence the region and to forward its cold war objectives. Historically, Britain started its strong hold in Yemen 1839 to protect its trade route to India. France and Italy had also signed treaties with some Somali clan leader to express their interest in the region. These European colonial powers had left a deep legacy of a system of centralized government grafted into an un-centralized political system of a pastoral people. I argue that, the colonial system of Somalia had created a complex division among clans (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

The other school of thought, instrumentalist argues that, clan is not the problem, it is like an institution or ideology used by the elite or ruling class, and outsiders who had a foreign interests in Somalia also used it too. As mentioned in chapter two , Ahmed I. Samatar a prominent Somali Scholar, argues that the “Somali problem is not the clan reality and its culture, but the elite manipulation of the ruling class is the real virus of the Somali case”.

Furthermore, the ‘socialist regime’ of Somalia with the help of soviets used ‘the clan system’ as an instrument to control the Somali people. He even used as a political game after the coup and according to many scholars, he was the one who re-legitimated the language of tribe in Somali Politics (Lewis, 1994; Samatar and Samatar, 2001).

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<sup>82</sup> Present day Somali region of Ethiopia (kilil 5)

Somalia was one among the African countries that adopted “Scientific Socialism “as a tool for their own economic and political development. A military junta came in power in a bloodless coup in 1969; they have closed down the parliament; suspended the constitutions and abolished all formal institution.

Mohamed Siad Barre became a totalitarian dictator. Later, he vowed that the regime’s goal was to put an end to tribalism, clan nepotism, corruption in the public sector, and that those objectives can be achieved through the adoption of his ‘Scientific Socialism.’ In this background the second hypothesis of thesis has been supported by the findings of the thesis, but it is challenged.

As discussed, although Barre vowed that clanism will be replaced by “Somali Scientific Socialism” as blue print for democracy, equality and justice, he illegally gave land and water rights to specific clans that supported his rule (Bestamen, 1993).

The final attempt of this thesis was the examination of the impact of “Somali Scientific Socialism” on the economy and politics of Somalia with the analytical concepts of instrumentalists’ theory. The argument states that conflict based on ethnicity is by the aims of the political leaders and this is the central point to “the theory” of Instrumentalism.

A Brass (1985) argues, “Instrumentalism is an idea which is based upon the concept that ethnic conflict is driven by economic wants, greed and grievance or it can be the active manipulation of ethnic identities by political leaders for their political gain” (Brass, 1985:120). Therefore, Soviet Union was the one took all the decisions to implement and use it as political tool, for them “Somali Scientific Socialism” was to govern Somalia as geostrategic position and advance their regional objectives. They had built military bases, they trained thousands of military officers in the Somali Republic, they also gave millions of dollars of military aid.

As discussed above, Instrumentalism argues that ethnic conflict arises from thoughtful manipulation by elites [in the case of Somalia, political leaders with clan leaders] on the basis of the rationality decision to encourage ethnic conflict.

According to his explanation of Instrumentalism, Fenton (2010) noted that *“if the conducts happening as of ethnic attachments could be seen to be serving a collective political or economic ends, then the ethnic action “could be said as instrumental”* (Fenton, 2010:74).

This thesis aim was also to highlight the element of ‘elite’ manipulation by Siad Barre as authoritarian leader in the Somali political economy, this system later resulted deep economic and social disintegration in Somalia.

In consequence, the third chapter was prepared as a case study which analyzed mainly the impact of “Somali Socialism” on the Somali economy and politics. A short background of the political economy of Somali State was given based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two. When Somalia’s military leaders decided for “Socialism” in 1970, Soviets had tripled the military aid to Somalia (Lewis, 1967).<sup>83</sup>

For that matter, Lewis (2002) believed that, Somali leaders chose “Scientific Socialism” just to lobby their military aid, which has a motive to push forward what they called Somali irredentism (Pan-Somalism) objective. Pansomalism was a strategy to unite all Somalis in the horn of Africa and to invade Ethiopia claiming it occupies a Somali ‘Huad land’. In this thesis it has been argued that, the major objective of the coup leaders was to choose ‘socialist style’ economy to further their regional political objectives, such as Pan-somalism<sup>84</sup> and bringing back the Promised Land in Ethiopia.

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<sup>83</sup> See also Table 1 , Foreign aid to Somalia 1960-170

<sup>84</sup> Pan-Somalism: the Post-World War II ideology favoring a single state for all Somalis. They idea believes that, Somalis have common culture and language justifying to create one Somali state.

Undoubtedly, there were serious impact of “Somali Scientific Socialism” on the economy and politics of Somalia. Economically, Somalia has been very poor, agriculture was the major sector of their economy, it contributes highest share to the GDP and export earnings, and it also provided the livelihood for the majority of the population. Another important sector is an urban private sector (mainly small enterprises and other Businesses) which is run by a small commercial class<sup>85</sup>. The third sector, mainly service sector was dominated by the public employees like, military, police, employee of ministries, parliamentarians, and other public servants.

The major arguments of my thesis was that the country’s economy was devastated by the “socialist regime”, in the sense that its policies were later diverted and mislead. For the regime, “Scientific Socialism” was to build new ‘socialist Somalia’ and grant required military facilities from the soviets. Siad Barre secured Soviet’s economic and military support. Although the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) convinced to the Somali people that, “Socialism” is the only way for the rapid transformation of their country into developed and advanced one, but their performances were proofed to the opposite, such as clan animosity, foreign aid increment and economic failure.

The regime created two consecutive development plans in 1971-73 and 1974-1978. As shown in the Data used in chapter three, the productive sector of the economy, such as Agriculture which constitutes the largest share of the country’s GDP had been neglected. In this regard, a small amount of investment were allocated to agriculture and the livestock sector, while the unproductive sectors such as government administration has been given almost 50% of the investment, such as security and other government administration<sup>86</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup> Such as “Urban Intelligentsia” and merchants supported by the regime.

<sup>86</sup> See table 17 for details

As some scholars argued, Somalia became one of the highest militarized states in Africa (Samatar, 1988; Sofinsky, 1974). If you closely look the status of the economy in this period, agriculture, and major industrial productions were devastated.

Another major economic catastrophe was that, the revolutionary goal of making Somalia self-sufficient in food has not been achieved, and Barre failed to decrease the foreign dependency in trade, in the meantime, the trade deficit has increased to millions of dollars and food import was drastically became high. Although food import existed before military regime, it had been increased substantially after the regime's policy of self-sufficiency and economic independency failed. During the worst drought of 1971, Somalia had had to rely on food aid. Barre and his coup leaders promised that "Socialism" will reduce the foreign dependency and encourage the economic sufficiency, but the regime's record was very poor and falls short of the goals initially vocalized. The economic performance was very disappointing. In the first years of its rule production of almost all major food crops declined, due to lack of investment and lack of proper training of farmers, severe drought also contributed to the problem. This created that the country have to rely on food aid and large loans. Somalia's economy during this period was extremely weak and poor in comparison with the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Politically, the military government prohibited strikes and death penalty was implemented against offenders. SRC which was the supreme council and majority of the members were from the military has been appointed to have all the executive decisions. During this period, Siad Barre became the judge, executor, law-giver and the supreme authority. The 'Socialist regime' became authoritarian, there were no constitutional limitations on the power of central government and the president. The contraction of country's economy, excessive unwise spending by the socialist regime, such as pouring money on unproductive sectors of the (mainly defense and administration) and acute of deficiencies in implementation and

management have contributed to create a harrowing economic condition on the Somali society.

The major drawback of the public employment was that, the regime ignored the deteriorating situation of the public employment sector, the investment in the employment sector has dramatically decreased. Moreover, there was a great mismanagement in the public expenditure, the economic productive sectors gained few share, and unproductive sectors like general services gained almost 90 percent of the public expenditure.

More importantly, the social services sector like education and health has been totally neglected and gained less than 3 percent. Somali military regime invested more on military to pursue its regional objectives.

There were contradictions between the Islamic values and “socialism” in Somalia, in this regard, the family act which states that men and women should have the same inheritance was not welcomed among the religious scholars, and therefore ten theologians were executed in public in 1975. Not only the religious leaders, two major generals from the military senior officials were that they were working against the revolutions, later the two generals were executed in public. Although the formations of SRSP was to decentralize the political structure of Somalia, but General Siad Barre controlled in every aspect of the state (see figure 6).

The thesis concludes that, “Somali Scientific socialism” in Somali Republic had an intense negative impact on both the economy and politics of the Somali state, from economic catastrophe, for example, failure of agriculture and industrial production, huge trade deficit, extensive food import, and complete collapse of the economy to political chaos and tyranny. As to, it has made clan division and augmented ethnic clashes due to nepotism, disparity, treachery, ethnic genocide and creation of guerrilla warfare organizations which later ousted the regime in 1991.

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
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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: The Clan Genealogy of the Somali People



**Source:** Lyon and Samatar (1996)\*, \*With some modifications

## Appendix B: Map of 'Greater Somalia'



Source: Wikipedia