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DOES DEMOCRATIZATION LEAD TO HIGHER GENDER INCLUSIVENESS?
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL PARTY DEMOCRACY AND GENDER
INDICIES IN TURKEY

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Does Democratization Lead to Higher Gender Inclusiveness?

An analysis of Internal Political Party Democracy and Gender Inclusive Indices in Turkey

Demokratikleşme Daha Fazla Cinsiyet Katılımı Sağlar mı?

Türkiye’de Siyasi Parti İçi Demokrasi ve Cinsiyet Katılımı Göstergelerinin Tahlili

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Abstract

Throughout the world, women's inclusion in politics has remained at very low levels. Despite many inquiries into the absence of women, it is only a recent trend that researchers have begun examining political parties as potential roots of the problem. This research aims to fill a gap in research concerning women's representation within politics and its connection to political parties. The thesis uses a three-dimensional analysis; *Autonomy*, *Inclusion* and *Gender Inclusion*. The former two indicators were first developed by Goran Cular (2004) but have been further developed by the researcher. The latter, gender inclusion dimension, has been developed by the researcher as an extension of Cular's original work, in order to best suit this study. Through the examination of political party by-laws, programs and through the conducting of interviews, this research collected data for the three main categories. The analysis of intra-party democracy and gender inclusion indicators seeks to determine the correlation between them within four Turkish political parties; the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the People's Republican Party (CHP), the People's Democratic Party (HDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The research argues that with increased democracy within parties, there can be an expected increase in gender inclusion within a given party. The study has found, however, that within the Turkish context there is no correlation between increased intra-party democracy and gender inclusion. This may be the result of the lack of checks and balances within the political system, which allows for parties to promote promises theoretically, yet ignore their practice.

Özet

Kadınların politikadaki rolü dünya üzerinde hep düşük seviyelerde kalmıştır. Kadınların politikada bulunamayışı üzerine yapılan sorguların dışında, araştırmacıların söz konusu problemin temelini politik partileri inceleyerek anlamaya çalışması yeni bir eğilimdir. Bu araştırma kadınların politika içerisindeki temsilini ve bunun siyasi partilerle olan ilişkisini konu eden araştırmalar noktasında oluşan boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez 3 boyutlu bir analiz kullanmaktadır; özerklik, dahil olma ve cinsiyet katılımı. İlk 2 gösterge Goran Cular (2004) tarafından geliştirilmiştir fakat araştırmacı tarafından bir ileri noktaya taşınmıştır. Sonda yer almakta olan gösterge, cinsiyet katılımı, araştırmanın amacına uygun olması amacı ile araştırmacı Cular'ın çalışmasına ek olarak geliştirilmiştir. Bu çalışma parti tüzüklerinin ve programlarının incelenmesi ve parti üyeleriyle yapılan görüşmeler sonucunda 3 farklı ana kategori altında şekillenmiştir. Parti içi demokrasi ve cinsiyet katılımı, birbirleri arasında meydana gelen çakışmaları 4 Türk siyasi partiyi inceleyerek ortaya koyar. Söz konusu partiler; Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP), Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)'dir. Bu 2 gösterge arasındaki bağlantı, parti içi demokrasinin artışıyla cinsiyet katılımının doğru orantılı olduğunu savunur. Fakat araştırmanın ortaya koyduğu üzere Türk siyasi yapısında ikisi arasında bir bağlantı gözlenmemiştir. Bu sonuç, Türk politik sistemi içerisindeki yasama, yürütme ve yargı ayrımının eksikliğinden kaynaklanıyor olabilir. Ayrıca bu eksiklik partilerin vaatlerini uygulamaktan ziyade teorik düzeyde bırakmalarına yol açmaktadır.

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Abbreviations

AKP – Justice and Development Party

ANAP- Motherland Party

BDP- Peace and Democracy Party

CHP - Republican People's Party

DYP- True Path Party

EU- European Union

FP- Virtue Party

HDP - People's Democracy Party

IPD – Intra-party democracy

KA-DER- Association to Support & Educate Women Candidates

MHP - National Action Party

NDI- National Democratic Institute

NIMD- the Netherland's Institute for Multi-party Democracy

ODIHR- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OSCE- Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe

RP- Welfare Party

SCF- Free Republican Party

TCF- Progressive Republican Party

TGNA- Turkish Grand National Assembly

TPPL- Turkish Political Party Law

UN- United Nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Program

WPP- Women's political participation

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Introduction

Turkey is an anomaly amongst its regional neighbors when it comes to women's political participation. Despite women's early suffrage, 1934, women's political participation in Parliament remains lower than most all of its neighbors, excluding only Syria and Iran (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). Women's participation in formal political positions have remained so low throughout the last 80 years that several individuals have attempted to reconcile the problem, or at least discover the underlying issues surrounding it. Several of the first attempts to reconcile this issue looked only to the Parliamentary level, others to women's experience and cultural factors. Yet, there are areas that remain unexplored. One major area that remains untouched is that of the local level, and/or more localized exploration. The role of Turkish political parties has not yet been investigated. It, therefore, offers an open field for exploring reasons why women's formal political participation remains below average for the region.

Despite the openness of such an area, Turkish political parties, themselves, have not been sufficiently examined in regards to their democratic structuring, and/or participatory structures (for all members). Moreover, the question of democracy or democratic consolidation within Turkish politics, as a whole, remains insufficiently answered.

Although, on the international front, Turkey has been regarded as an up and coming country both economically and, throughout the early 2000s, democratically; recent trends show an underlying ailment within Turkish Politics, a lack of democracy within Turkish parties. In his research on Turkish political parties, Ali Türkmen (2016) states that:

[T]he absence of intra-party democracy (IPD) is not a characteristic of one party or period, but has been a fundamental aspect of Turkish Politics since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and can even be tracked back to the Ottoman Period (p. 10).

Thus, it is highly possible that the lack of democratic structures within political parties, throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, has had an adverse affect on the number of women participating within the parties and, subsequently, their attainment of political leadership positions at both the local and Parliamentary levels. The lack of inquiry into both areas needs to be dealt with. Consequently, a holistic based research, which includes inquiries into both women's political participation and parties' intra-party democracy needs to be conducted. Exploring the overlap of these two problems may offer a perspective that is much needed in both political science research and women's political participation (WPP) research.

1. Purpose of this research

In light of recent trends to explore democratic tendencies within the Turkish case, questions concerning IPD, and full representation of the public find a place within the dialogue. Despite their importance, the tendency of current research has been to explore the democratic system as a whole, whilst generally abandoning the question of women's representation. Given the realization that democracy stems from the public and their participation in politics, vis-à-vis political parties, this study seeks to examine the connection between IPD, and women's participation/attainment of leadership roles within political bodies.

It seeks to answer the question; does increased party democracy produce increased women's participation? In addition to that, the research also aims to give an overall image of IPD within four political parties along with a depiction of gender inclusiveness within those parties. The outcome of the research will provide later researchers with insight into the internal structures

of political parties and how they affect the participation of women within politics. In addition to the gender aspect of the research, it will display the differences between parties' internal structures, offering a comparative outline for later research. What will be made clear by this research, is that the current standards for measuring IPD and WPP, or gender inclusiveness, need to be more deeply assessed, as there is a lack of gender within current IPD theory and methodology.

In short, this research will pave the way for later research in the areas of IPD, women's political participation, and political parties in Turkey by examining current levels of IPD and women's inclusion within four political parties. Moreover, it critiques current IPD methodologies hoping to open a space for later inquiries that delve into the formation of new methods for assessing IPD via a gendered, or feminist, lens.

2. Methodology

This research seeks to examine the correlation between IPD and WPP within four (main) Turkish political parties via the adoption of a mixed-methods approach. Utilizing current IPD scaling methodologies, and more recent inquiries into the overlap of IPD and WPP, the research was able to determine the overlap between the two subjects. Additionally, with the implementation of such methods, the research also displayed the lack of gendered perspectives within modern internal-party democracy research.

Despite the overall lack of a gender awareness in IPD methodologies, this research used a scaling method for assessing IPD within each of the four Turkish political parties. This method was adopted from Goran Cular (2004), who used a two-dimensional approach to assess IPD. The two dimensions consisted of *Autonomy* and *Inclusion*. The overarching categories included

several sub-indicators and micro-indicators which allowed for an in-depth analysis of each party's unique weight. The more detailed indicators were added to Cular's original work, aiding in the overall assessment. Such micro-indicators were adopted from several well-known IPD theorists (Hazan & Rahat 2010; Scarrow 2005; Mersel 2006). In addition to giving depth to the categories, the supplemental indicators allowed for cultural adjustments and detailing to fit the Turkish case. Once data was collected each party was ranked in terms of their internal democracy using the weights taken from their level of autonomy and inclusion.

Given the gender-blindness of current IPD scaling methodologies, this research developed a separate category of assessment titled, *Gender Inclusion*. This allowed the researcher to gain a better understanding of women's inclusion within political parties. Due to the unique nature of the category, several theorists' works were consulted in order to create a justified category (Norris & Krook 2014; Krook 2009; Bagratia & Badashvili 2012; Childs & Kittilson 2016). Following the original IPD methodology, the *Gender Inclusion* category, was divided into sub-indicators. However, it is ultimately unique in that it aims to exclusively examine women members of the parties. It assesses questions concerning women's auxiliaries, positive action measures, and gender-equality awareness within a given party. Due to its novice nature, this model and framework may, later, need to be adjusted. However for the necessities of this research, the indicators were holistic.

In a similar way with the *Autonomy* and *Inclusion* categories, first party programs and party by-laws were examined to determine the appearance of certain indicators. The former two categories were relatively easy to determine via these documents. However, the latter, presented a bigger challenge. Due to the significant ignorance of gender within politics in Turkey, and more largely, the world, indicators of gender inclusion were much more difficult to locate within

party programs and by-laws. As a result, the researcher included qualitative interviews into the methodology of this research. By doing so, all indicators of *Gender Inclusion* were able to be assessed as accurately as possible given the determinants of this new model.

In the final step, each party's level of IPD was compared with that of its level of *Gender Inclusion* to assess their overlap. In order to do so, each category was ranked out of 100, and the indicators equally distributed. After data collection and calculation, each party was ranked in terms of *Autonomy*, *Inclusion*, and *Gender Inclusion*, out of 100 points. It follows that higher values corresponded to greater IPD and greater gender inclusivity within the parties. Correspondingly, lower numbers indicated lesser IPD and *Gender Inclusion* within a party.

It is for these reasons that the research may be considered as having used a mixed-method. By utilizing both quantitative and qualitative approaches in the research, the researcher was able to bring multiple perspectives to the research, whilst answering the lines of inquiry.

3. Organization of the Study

In the first chapter of this study, the Turkish context will be explained. Beginning with the historical outline of Turkish political parties and the historical context of government within the country allows for a deeper understanding of long-rooted fractions within the society whilst also painting a clearer picture of the reasons for the current political situations. This chapter aims to show the historical context of Turkish political parties, women's political participation, and also the foundations of the four political parties to be examined. The exploration of such topics is imperative to gain a better understanding of the research at hand.

The second chapter looks at the theoretical underpinnings of the study. It aims to define concepts in relation to this research; political parties, IPD, political participation, and WPP. In

addition to these theoretical definitions, the chapter also introduces and discusses the current and previous work that has been conducted concerning the overlap between IPD and gender or women's representation. It is the purpose of this chapter to be a theoretical guide to the reader as they conceptualize each of the parts of the analysis.

Moving forward, the third chapter discusses the methodology used in the research. It is here that the outline of the framework and indices may be found along with the discussion of each point of data collection and weighting. Moreover, all categories, *Autonomy*, *Inclusion*, and *Gender Inclusion* are defined. This section paves the way for the following, 'Analysis' section, wherein the results of the study are displayed and discussed.

The final chapter consists of recommendations that the researcher has in light of policy and the extremely low representation of women in Turkish political parties. In addition, the limitations of this research are therein discussed.

Chapter

Understanding the Turkish Context

1. Historical Outline of Turkish Political Parties

Early Years of the Republic

What is currently known as the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the ending of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922). In the early years of the Republic, the country operated under a one party system, the Republican People's Party (CHP), whose formation was the result of post-war struggles concerning government and the way to rule the new Turkey. Despite Mustafa Kemal's efforts and the

founding of this party, there were still many within the country that sought to maintain the monarchy and the caliphate. It was at that time that a major oppositional party was created, known as the Progressive Republican Party (PRP). Notwithstanding, at that time, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had felt as though the country was not ready for more than one party and efforts were made to disband the opposition. In 1925, those efforts were realized and the PRP was disbanded and Turkey became a one-party government (Ahmad 2008, p. 229-230). From 1925 through 1946, Turkey remained under the lead of the CHP and a single-party government.

The only interruption to the single-party regime was that of a permitted opposition party, the Free Republican Party, founded in 1930. Yet, due to nervosity amongst the CHP, reasons to close the party were found and the FRP dissolved itself (Ahmad 2008, p. 230). The dissention that occurred in the wake of this experiment into a multi-party system encouraged the changing of the ideals of the CHP and those of Turkish politics. At that time, Turkey was revolutionized into a mono-party, or *party-state system* wherein party became state and state became party.

Giovanni Sartori (1976) discussed this type of party organization in his work, *Parties and Party Systems: a framework for analysis*. He therein considers the mono-party not as a party, rather as a system. From this logic, the early years of the Turkish public may be considered as a *party-state system* as “a party-state system does not allow subsystem autonomy” (p. 45). Moreover, the reason for a party-state system is to disallow the creation and pursuit of subsystem autonomy and is therefore a closed system. Within this type of system, dissent is disavowed, extraction over expression is favored, and the society as a whole is shaped by the party-state system (p. 42-47).

Despite the undemocratic nature of such a party-state system, some believe that Atatürk was merely following such a structure parallel to those in neighboring countries. Throughout that era state intervention was more favourable to that of a 'chaotic' democratic nation. Notwithstanding, the choices that were made, and the style of government that prevailed in Turkey throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and even into the 1940s, has had a major impact on the perpetuity of more traditional notions of democracy within the country and political parties.

Following Atatürk's death, the release of Republican opponents from exile, the changing view of party-state systems globally, and World War II, Turkey's politics shifted in many ways. In 1946 Turkey's government, now under the leadership of İsmet İnönü, became a multi-party system. He had felt that the thing most lacking within the Turkish government was that of an opposition party (Ahmad 2008, p. 232). Following the shift from a party-state system to a party system, the re-emergence of Islam began because, "the center of political life [also] shifted from the cities to the provinces largely untouched by Kemalist reforms or modern secular culture" (p. 232). For the first time since the revolution, an Islamic movement to take hold within the country's politics and society.

The shift from a single-party to a multi-party system, can be said to have reshaped Turkish politics into a more inclusive and democratic system. Given the lessened hold of a singular party on the government, the party system encouraged greater pluralism within political parties and government, i.e. an Islamic movement. Moreover, it gave room for the society to express its opinions concerning their governing. Unlike party-state systems, party systems (multi-party systems) encourage dissent and opposition, and are instruments of expression. The outcome of such a system is a government shaped by the society, or a party shaped by societal wishes (Sartori 1976, p. 27). Due to the remnant party-state mindset still fresh in citizens'

minds, it is difficult to definitively say that early Turkish parties were able to foster greater public opinion and in turn alter their ideals in comparison to the previous party-state system. However, the transition to a party system opened a new road for those residing in the country to express themselves.

Multi-party system

Following the transition to a multi-party system, many parties were created, some dissolved yet, overall, a new system of government was created. Despite this change, the sentiment of an all and powerful government remain(ed/s) in the society. Moreover, like most changes, this transition left the country in a time of confusion. Pre-existing factions, that had been previously suppressed, began to find their place within the political system. In turn, this led to an increase in the number of parties, and the number of chances for factions to occur within the society. Sartori (1976) discusses the danger in this form of multi-partyism, stating that,

“parties—especially extreme multipartism—are portrayed as exasperating conflicts and divisions, as creating ‘artificial issues’...from this angle competition overheats the market, breeds overpromising and polarization, and creates unmanageable problems, problems beyond solution” (p. 50).

This situation occurred in Turkey, leading to a standstill in politics. With the inability of any particular party to gain a strong foothold, politics throughout the 1950s and 1960s in Turkey was riddled with discord, turmoil, and dissolution. This in turn led to the stagnation in democratic developments within the country. Political parties, the party system, and politics more generally became predominated by corruption, finger pointing, and suspicion. In 1960, the backlash against a government in turmoil was a coup wherein the Turkish military overtook the government.

In this period, under the military rule, a new constitution was written for Turkey. This constitution differed greatly from that of 1924. For the first time, it seemed that Turkey was becoming a more democratically oriented society. Written by Professor Sıddık Sami Onar, who was the rector of Istanbul University at that time, the new constitution was heralded as a 'revolution of the intellectuals' (Ahmad 2008, p. 240). It sought to protect the government from becoming dominated by majoritarian rule. With regulations such as the electoral law in place, the constitution promoted proportional representation. A major addition provided by the new constitution, was the right of all citizens to openly participate in politics. Unlike its predecessor, of which had been created under the party-state regime, the constitution, now awarded citizens the right to free speech, association and press—therefore promoting dissent, expression, and participation (p. 242).

Although new freedoms were created at this time, the 1960s were also befouled with political unrest. With increased civil liberties, citizens began to speak outright, expressing their ideas. With the advantages of pluralism and freedom of speech there also come disadvantages. Due to the underlying factions the decade saw extreme political unrest, which exploded nearing the end of the decade. Throughout the 1970s chaos ran rampant throughout Turkey, causing the military to reinforce another military intervention. This military intervention, however, was less liberating than the previous. Its main aim was to return law and order to the country and it did so by clamping down on the leftist political parties. The new 'above government' was made up of technocrats and the country was ruled by repression (Ahmad 2008, p. 250-251). In addition, the existing constitution was again amended. This time, however, removing many of the civil liberties, which had been granted in the former constitution. This military government lasted for

two years, following it another round of elections which were riddled with lawlessness. Following another tumultuous decade, in 1980, Turkey faced yet another military intervention.

Immediately following the coup, the political parties were shut down and political leaders were banned from participating in politics. Following suit, this military intervention altered the constitution. More than the constitution, the coup of 1980 redefined electoral law, universities, and very importantly, political parties. It was not until 1983 that political parties were allowed to participate in politics again. Additionally, parties had to be formed by 'new politicians', i.e. those who had not been disbanded from participating in politics via the coup government.

From 1983 through the late 1990s, Turkish politics saw the coming and going of many political leaders, parties, and governments. Many of the parties that had been created in the 1980s remained on the scene, howbeit, forming coalitions and changing their party names throughout the process. Moreover, many of the previous political leaders (from the 60s-80s), including; Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, and Türkeş remained in the picture of Turkish politics albeit behind the scenes until their rights were restored in 1987, with the 6th September referendum (Ahmad 2008, p. 254-260). The 1990s in Turkey may be called the 'age of coalition government', as no one party was able to win enough seats to be considered as the head of government. Rather, from 1993, following the death of Turgut Özal, until 2002, Turkey was governed by a series of coalition governments.

It is from the 1990s that today's political structure and political leaders were born. Throughout this time, parties such as the Virtue Party (WP), the People's Democratic Party (HDP), and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), truly began to take strongholds within politics. Although, their real emergence would not become pronounced until the early 2000s,

whereby the disbandment of the Welfare Party's (RP) led to the creation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

2000-present

In November of 2002, the years of coalition government seemed to come to an end. The remnant party of the RP, the AKP, obtained a colossal thirty-four percent of votes in the election, solidifying the party 363 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). The only party to gain oppositional positioning was that of the CHP with nineteen percent of the votes. Under the new leadership, Turkey saw many reforms, most of which were required by the European Union (EU). The momentum of the early 2000s was one of modernization and the hope for a brighter future under the leadership of a new and different politician.

Since 2002, the Turkish constitution has seen a number of amendments, many of which have allowed the AKP's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to remain in power. That is not to say that other parties have not emerged with political leaders, however, since 2002, the AKP has remained as the leading party in the Turkish government. Since 2002 several other parties have gained seats within Parliament. Such parties include, the CHP, the MHP, and the HDP. The most recent elections, held in 2015 resulted in a four party parliament with the four previously mentioned parties obtaining seats.

What is for certain is that the history of political participation and political parties in Turkey is rather sporadic. Moreover, following the introduction of the multi-party system, or party system, Turkish politics went through nearly forty years of political unrest. Political coups occurred nearly once every ten years from 1960 through 1980. As a result, the Turkish political system, whilst being fully politicized, has lacked a sense of continuity. These rifts, factions, and

instability have caused many to believe that democracy, as a representative democracy, has yet to occur within the country. Ergun Özbudun, for example believes that there are several reasons why Turkey is far from reaching an ultimately democratic state, one of his reasons is the lack of unified party structures. More clearly, he believes that the fragmented political parties within the country, along with the lack of internally democratic structures within the parties themselves have led to the crippling of representative democracy. Özbudun noticed the relationship between Guillermo O'Donnell's "delegative democracy" and the Turkish form of democracy. Delegative democracy is often noted as having a very personalistic style of leadership. In addition the leader and other technocratic advisors often make choices that will affect the country without consulting political parties, let alone the public. A final characteristic of a delegative democracy is that it "does not favor the development of strong political institutions" (Özbudun 1996, p. 136). In relation to Turkey, Özbudun states,

[N]ormally, a parliamentary system provides far more effectively for horizontal accountability. A prime minister, no matter how popular, cannot afford to ignore the parliament and political parties the way an elected president can. The Turkish experience with democracy, however, suggests that even in a parliamentary regime is not entirely immune to delegative democracy...Turkey today seems to occupy a secure place among the delegative democracies of the world (p. 136).

It goes without saying then, that political parties today, like in the past, will continue to follow along the path of delegative democracy. They have continued to follow the model of personalismo, or the act of presenting the political leader as the 'savior of the country'. (Özbudun 1996, p. 137).

2. Women and Politics in Turkey

It is of common belief that women in Turkey, whilst emancipated, have yet to be liberated. Having received suffrage in 1934, women's participation in the public realm was

awarded. Nonetheless, equal access and/or participation within the political sphere has remained extremely low. There are several factors that may contribute to the decreased role of women in the public, and therefore, political world.

The idea that women have been emancipated but not yet liberated is a remnant belief of the 1980s when, for the first time in a span of forty years, women's rights and 'liberation' became a topic of discussion. In the years prior, and after 1934, women throughout Turkey felt a sense of contentment with the status quo and with their position in the society. This position, that of an educated mother, arose with the granting of women's suffrage, a triumph which was awarded to the father of the nation, Atatürk (Abadan-Unat 1991; Arat 2008; Çakır 1994).

Despite his role in granting women equal access to the public sphere, several women had been in its pursuit before the Republic was founded. Such women included Nimet Cemil, Halide Edip Adıvar, and Nezihe Muhittin, who had defined feminism in Turkey before the War of Independence. These women, among others, were the firsts to encourage women's rights via education, entrance into the workforce, and women's work with political parties of the time (Arat 2008, p. 389-391). Although these women's efforts were valiant, moreover successful, the War of Independence and the Republican era that followed left no room for their successes on the standard history pages. As with many other aspects of the revolution, credit was passed on to Atatürk and his daughters.

Although women had gained emancipation, at that time, women's rights, in the sense of feminism, were a secondary concern to that of the nation. What was more important was a unified nation under the Turkish identity. Granting women suffrage was merely a way to keep

the nation in tact, under one identity. As quoted by Yeşim Arat (2008), Mümtaz Faik Fenik, a noted Turkish journalist in the early Republican years stated,

“In Turkey, there is no place for feminist or anti-feminist ideas that only differentiate men and women physically without taking into consideration differences in intelligence, discretion and capabilities any more. Turkey has not acted with these ideas (i.e. feminist) when it accepted the law (suffrage). We do not recognize a distinction of feminism. We want to have the whole nation benefit from and we will benefit from the capabilities, abilities, intelligence and discretion of all citizens whether they be women or men. In Turkey, the 18 million-strong Turkish nation is moving with only one thought and that is Turkishness” (p. 393).

It was always women’s role as a mother of the Turks that was emphasized. Rather than women’s attainment of equality, Turkishness and unification and what they represented dominated. “The suffrage was granted to serve the Turkish nation-state, not the interests of women. When those interests ceased to overlap, those of the nation-state would prevail” (Arat 2008, p. 393). Today, like in the past, the interests of the state continue to trump those of women’s rights and equal access to the political sphere.

Whilst the passing of women’s suffrage occurred, its undercurrents were heavily influenced by political ambitions. Nermin Abadan-Unat (1991) often mentions the role that men with political ambitions, including Atatürk, played in the gaining of suffrage (p. 178-179). This did not differ after 1934, rather, in 1935, eighteen women entered into Parliamentary positions, however, their success was not the outcome of a newfound equal footing in the public domain. Rather, these women were appointed to their positions by Mustafa Kemal (Abadan-Unat 1991; Arat 2008). The eighteen women granted seats in Parliament in 1935, would hold the record number until 1999, when 22 women campaigned and won seats. In addition, in a sixty-seven year period (1935-2002), most of the provinces did not elect any women to parliamentary seats, rather provinces that had a history of electing women, continued to do so.

Throughout the 1990s women's relationship with the state and with politics in general began to flourish. The 1990s saw an increase in women representatives throughout the country. Moreover, with the help of groups such as the Association to Support and Educate Women Candidates (KA-DER), founded in 1997, women have begun to take more interest in entering politics as a profession. Although the organization is in favor of quotas, which have not yet been approved by the Turkish government, the organization has made strides towards a more inclusive politic. In 2002, the work of such an organization paid off and the future of women's political participation in Parliament began to brighten. Since 2002, women's share of seats has been on the rise. In addition, women's share of leadership positions at the local level, too, has been rising. Prior to 2009, the percentage of women mayors, Turkey-wide, was less than 1%. However, over the last eight years, this number has been, albeit slowly rising (Union of Municipalities of Turkey, 2014).

In addition to low numbers in leadership positions throughout the country, women's participation in political parties' leadership, has been even less visible. The realm of political party leadership appears to be very limited to males; only ten women party leaders have risen through the ranks over the last 94 years. Furthermore, most of those women came into power only in the last thirty-five years. The stark number of women in leadership positions within parties is alarming, considering women have been working towards equal representation for nearly forty years. Moreover, although women's branches of political parties are in place, they do not have a long history of promoting women's entrance into politics. Rather, these branches are rather a mobilization method for obtaining votes and supporting the party ideals as a whole (Arat 1989). Therefore, many of the attempts to increase women's appearance in leadership

positions, moreover, the introduction of women's branches, have ceased to heavily impact the number of women participating in formal politics.

Although women's entrance into the public sphere came rather early in the Republic's history, women in Turkey do not find themselves equally represented in politics, a reoccurring theme of nearly 94 years. This situation has been a point of interest since the 1980s. Before that time, a hiatus in women's concern with their placement kept their involvement to a minimum. What the last three decades have shown is every step forward may be proceeded by three steps backward. Therefore, the push for women's equality in politics and the public sphere remains a challenge.

3. The Four Political Parties: Foundations, Ideologies, and Women

Justice and Development Party (AKP)

The AKP was established in 2001 by the remnant political leaders and followers of the RP, which had been closed due accusations of its adherence and pursuit of "Islamic politics," within the secular Turkish Republic. As a result of its closure, remaining partisans looked to build a new future with the founding of the AKP. Two well-known founders of the party are Abdullah Gül and Bulent Arinç. In the years leading up to the founding of the AKP, Abduallah Gul had been working within the TGNA for several years. In 2000 he was the leader of the Reformist movement and was also a Presidential candidate within the RP. However, despite his candidacy, the party was closed. In 2001, he became one of the leading founders of the Justice and Development Party (Gül). Similarly to Abdullah Gul, Bulent Arinc was also a member of the RP, and had been a member of the TGNA since 1995, having first entered as a Representative of Manisa from the RP in 1995. He too, was a member of the Reformist movement and when the

RP was closed in 2001, he joined Abdullah Gul in supporting Recep Tayyip Erdogan to found the AKP (Haberler 2017). In 2002, Erdogan became the speaker of parliament, winning an absolute majority, 363 seats. In 2009, the party increased its votes. This was followed by a slight decrease in 2011. Overall, 2015 was a bad year for the party, wherein it lost substantial votes and seats (to 40.5 percent from 49.8 percent in 2011) (Canyas, et al. 2015).

Without these two men, the AKP may not have been what it is today, however, in addition to these men, a second, more pluralist group of men also joined in the construction of the first AKP administration. Several of these individuals had previously been partisan to the Motherland Party (ANAP), the MHP, and the Truth Path Party (DYP) they included; Ali Babacan, Cemil Çiçek, and Abdullah Aksu (The Washington Institute 2002). In addition to these individuals a diverse range of Turks joined in to create what is/has been one of the longest-standing majority parties in Turkish Republican history.

Conservative Democratic Party and the AKP Political Identity

The AKP identifies itself as a conservative democrat political party. In the party ideals, present through 2023, the party states that it follows a conservative democratic model wherein politics is based on several pillars; compromise, reformation, realism, unity based politics, pro-change mentality, and high-politics (macro-based as well as micro-based party goals) (AK Parti 2015). In the grander scheme of the political spectrum, the party aligns in the center-right. This means that while it maintains “openness” to the left, its political ideals align more closely with those on the right. More concretely, this means that the AKP leans more closely to a conservative and social hierarchal understanding of social order.

On the whole, the AKP argues for protection of citizens and government against authoritarianism, a government that promotes compromise amongst parties and party members, as well as a system that validates differences in opinions whilst encouraging openness and tolerance (AK Parti 2015). In addition, it holds itself as a role model for other budding Islamic democracies in the region. For within the ideology of the party, it has been expressed that there is space for Islam within Democracy. Put simply, democracy and Islam are compatible and the AKP hopes to present a good example for countries within the region maintaining similar identities (Tepe 2005).

Success

Although there continues to be heated debates as to the intentions of the AKP, it can be clearly stated that the AKP has run one of the most successful campaigns and has won the majority of Parliamentary seats for the last 15 years. Boasting nearly ten million (9 million, 399 thousand, 633) registered members, it holds the largest membership among the four leading parties (Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığının 2016).

Women and the Party

The AKP has often utilized its large membership, and furthermore its large membership of women, in order to extend its voter outreach. However, the party maintains a precarious relationship between women's public participation and their roles as Muslim mothers. While women's party membership is greater than any other party (4 million, 308 thousand), women maintain just ten percent of AKP's seats in parliament (Milliyet Haberi 2017; Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 2015). Furthermore, their recognition within local administrations (provinces and large cities) remains at a mere 8 provincial leaders, and 7 city mayors (AK Parti 2015).

In concerns towards women's inclusion within political roles, the party has not been outspoken about their avoidance, rather, the ideology of family and Islamic culture gives women in the party a different role. Like its predecessor, the RP, AKP realized the success that women could bring to the party organization and its proliferation throughout the country (Ayata & Tütüncü 2008, p. 368). They are the workers of the party who visit with women, allowing them to enter into the private sphere as a "sister." AKP women auxiliary members, having adopted the tactics of RP women

"promised them [women voters in poorer areas] that they would be with them in good as well as in bad days by participating in the organization of weddings and circumcision ceremonies, as well as visiting the sick and elderly" (p. 369).

The party therefore blurs the line between public and private action of women, femininity allowing political access to the private. "AKP leadership, in line with the larger experience of Islamist parties has made the home-setting 'political', and mobilized the women into politics through a seemingly 'apolitical' process" (Ayata & Tütüncü 2008, p. 374).

Despite these acts of participation, women do not maintain direct participation in the higher levels of politics within the party. Moreover, when women do hold higher positions they, often times, heed to the overarching patriarchal views of the party. Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011) argue that the AKP utilizes a form of neoliberal-conservative patriarchy (p. 560). More clearly, the party's stance towards gender and women's rights is based on the "combination of conservatism, nationalism, and civil societal activism in domestic politics" (p. 563). Therefore, in the early years of its administration, the AKP was viewed as an administration that was taking the rights of women seriously, one that would make strides to help increase women's rights in both the public and private spheres (see Ayata & Tütüncü 2008; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu 2011; Arat 2017). This notion was the product of early achievements made by the government and its

coordination with women's civil organizations (i.e. Penal Code changes (2004), the Parliamentary Commission for the Equality of Opportunity for Women and Men (2009), etc.) Albeit successful, in more recent times, many of these early achievements have been reversed or have lacked application, failing their upholding. As a result, AKP's once promising start has come to be viewed as, practically, ignorant of women's issues and women's rights. Many oppositional groups see the party and the women officials within it as overtly patriarchal.

Evidence for the dismissive behavior can be seen in the reactions given by women officials concerning several key issues. One of these key issues is women's participation in party politics. The party, in general, sees women's low participation as inherent in the nature of women. Erdogan, as quoted in Ayata and Tütüncü (2008), stated, "[T]hey [Turkish women] do not participate in politics; they are shy... Turkish women could not grasp the meaning of political participation" (p. 374). This statement, made by one male official was later echoed by Nükhet Hotar, the vice-chair and deputy of Izmir, who stated, "[I]t seems that women voluntarily leave politics to men, because their identification with the home and mothering becomes more significant than their political identity" (p. 374). Therefore, it is often that both women and men in the party associate women's role in politics as unnatural to their more natural roles in the home and as mothers. Women's low representation is often, in AKP's understanding, a direct result of women's personal lives as mothers and wives, more specifically, their predilection to the home (Ayata & Tütüncü 2008, p. 374).

Overall, the AKP's approach towards women in politics is somewhat paradoxical. Whilst women should be encouraged to engage in politics, and within the public sphere, they also need to be aware that their roles as mothers and wives should come first. As a result, it is important to

bear in mind the question, whilst the party has 4.5 million women members, how many of them truly believe in women's emancipation from the home and equality in the public sphere?

To sum up, the AKP is a party which claims it is a conservative-democratic party, located at the center-right of the political spectrum. This ideology, whilst ardent on the maintenance of representative democracy and the power of the voter, is also speckled with an approach to women's representation that is more neoliberally-conservative. As a result, it has been noted that the party sometimes finds itself in difficult situations trying to uphold its party ideals in practice. Moreover, many have stated the party is based on paradoxical ideas, which raises issues with its policies and practices. In spite of these comments, and the dual nature of the party, it has successfully maintained its stronghold position within Turkish politics for fifteen years.

The People's Republican Party (CHP)

The People's Republican Party was the first political party in Turkey within the newly formed Republic. Founded in 1919 by Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, the political party was the first and only political party within the Republican administration from 1923 until 1946. It was not until after the death of Atatürk, and the subsequent Inonu administration that the country began to see party pluralism.

At its core, the CHP was founded on nationalist ideals that promoted the westernization and growth of the Turkish nation. Mustafa Kemal's ideas for the country were unity, development, and a secular society, where religion and politics remained separate endeavors and facets of social life. The party was based on a notion of Republicanism that was based in the defense of the Republic against any threat, via any instrument necessary. In addition to its description of 'Republican', the party also defined secularism within the state as a separation

between religious ideas and state issues (CHP Program cited in Kiriş 2012, p. 399). However, given the instability in the country following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it was also up to the party to maintain an eclectic policy, allowing for the reconciliation of religious ideals with those of the newly created Republic. In order to build stability within the country, the party and in direct relation, the state, promoted secularism, democracy, and unity within the country.

Following its closure in 1980 and Bülent Ecevit's disassociation with the party, in 1992 the party re-opened under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. Despite its ambitions, and Baykal's understanding of politics and voter preferences, the party has since been unable to gain the support it bolstered throughout the 1970s (Kiriş 2012). Although Baykal maintained the leadership position throughout the 1990s and until 2010, his position was compromised and in 2010 he was replaced by Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu.

Social Democracy and Today's CHP

Today, whilst it remains Atatürk's party, it has re-established its ideology and political positioning several times. However, despite minor changes in approach, the party has, generally remained "socially democratic" falling at the center-left (Aydoğan & Slapin 2015). Despite this positioning, the CHP is different than most socially democratic parties, moreover is different from parties at the center or center-right. According to an article published by Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (2010), an expert on the CHP, the party is still heavily influenced "by the intellectual circles of the country and many of the intellectual discussions are carried over to the party by the politicians linked to these groups (p. 110). Aydoğan and Slapin (2010) have pointed to the uniqueness of this situation stating that, unlike Western democracies, in Turkey, the left, more specifically, the CHP, has maintained close ties to the military whilst also finding its support

base from amongst the middle and upper classes of the country (p. 617). The influence of intellectuals on the party, along with its attraction of middle and upper classes make the party and Turkey's political spectrum unique amongst their western counterparts. It has been noted that in addition to these irregularities, the party's discourses also lack a sense of egalitarianism, which is often present in a Social Democratic party (Güneş-Ayata 2010, p. 113).

Although the party stands out as an anomaly amongst other Social Democratic parties, CHP does maintain an approach that is generally associated with welfare states. Among their program values, the party mentions universal education, universal healthcare, and reforms within social security (Güneş-Ayata 2010, p. 113). In the year following the change in leadership, 2011, the party committed itself to a new party constitution that had a greater focus on the population and its diversity. In hopes of reaching a larger electorate, and increasing its competitive edge, the party made arrangements to provide gender equality, reorganize the compulsory military service, target full democracy in the East and Southeast, commit to form a strong social state, decrease the election threshold, and decrease the age of candidacy (Kiriş 2012, p. 402). Canyas et. al. (2016) discuss the party's movement away from its traditional secularist discourse, in the 2015 election cycle, towards a more focused discussion of the economic situation (p. 82). The party focused on increasing education and technology within the country in order to develop its infrastructure for continued economic growth (p. 82).

Despite these values, the party has had difficulty in increasing its voter base, resulting in a loss of seats between the 2011 (135 seats/25.9 percent) and 2015 (132seats/24.9 percent) elections (Canyas, et al. 2015). In addition to the competition brought forward by the People's Democratic Party (HDP) in the 2015 elections, some of CHP's loss can be contributed to the well-known inconsistency of the party (see Güneş-Ayata 2010; Aydoğan & Slapin 2015; Kiriş

2012). Overall, however, while the party may suffer internal inconsistency, it is the largest opposition party within the current administration. This speaks volumes to the party's ability to connect to certain masses within the country and to its abilities, as it had come back from severe losses at the end of the 1990s.

Women and CHP

As mentioned previously, the CHP adopted more inclusive structures in its most recent (2015) party constitution, program, and promises. Along with greater inclusivity, the party also adopted a 10 percent internal party quota for women candidates. While these newer adoptions have given the party a greater sense of equality, women's advancement (in theory) had held a place within CHP party politics since the early years of the party. According to Cansun (2014), the party first adopted women's auxiliaries in the 1950s and was, therefore, one of the first parties to do so (p. 293). Although women's auxiliaries have contested value in concern to their aid in the advancement of women in politics (see Childs & Kittilson 2016; Krook & Norris 2014), in the Turkish case, they have come to be one of the leading ways for women to gain entrance into politics. Thus, the longstanding presence of a women's auxiliary, within the CHP shows its early stance towards women's inclusion in political life. In addition to the women's auxiliaries, the first women politicians in Turkey had come as a result of Atatürk and his political ambitions at that time. Whilst this has long been critiqued for its patriarchal underpinnings, it remains the historical suffrage of Turkish women (see Cakır 2013).

Although the party has long-established relationship with women's involvement in the public sphere, this does not contest to the number of women representatives within the party, nor to the role women take within party politics. Rather, for many years, the women of the party

played a similar role to that of many Turkish parties, the vote gaining mechanism. What is different about the CHP from other parties, however, is the women's stressing of secular values and the defense of Atatürk's values (Cansun 2014). In the early 2000s the women of the CHP were overtly outspoken against the rising AKP government and the, in their view, attack on the secular values of the country. However, like all Turkish political parties, the overwhelming presence of religion in politics has softened CHP's approach in recent years. Despite the less harsh critique of the current government by the CHP (as a party), several women, including Selin Sayek Böke, one of the, female, high-ranking officials of the party, have taken qualms to the relaxed reactions of what they consider, attacks on democracy and secularism within the country. Her, and other women's feelings towards their party's lenient behaviors display the tough and strict adherence that many CHP women feel towards Atatürk's principles of secularism, moreover towards his overall leadership and values.

Comprehensively, the CHP can be seen as a party that supports women's entrance into the public sphere, yet with reservation. The party maintains a membership of 369 thousand 522, 31 percent of which are women (~255 thousand). In terms of women's representation, at the parliamentary level women maintain 15.04 percent of the 133 seats held by the party. Moving to the local branches, there are eleven provincial leaders and thirty-eight county commissioners (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2014; Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi 2015). While these numbers hold a higher standard than some other Turkish parties, they still remain low. Moreover, due to a lack of candidates, the party has filled women's seats (within the party) with men, thereby disregarding their ten-percent quota. This is an issue that has raised concern amongst several of the women within the party (CHP 2017, pers. comm., 31 May).

In sum, the CHP is Turkey's longest standing political party, and has become the main oppositional party within the country over the last 15 years. While it has encountered internal strife and a discord in its ideology, it remains a social democratic party, located at the center-left on the political scale. Furthermore, the party still maintains its ties to secularism and Atatürk's values. In fact, several members state the reason for their membership to the party as an outcome of it being Atatürk's party (CHP 2017 pers. comm., 31 May). While the party has a history of promoting women's entrance into and participation within politics, it too remains a patsy of the patriarchal system. Moreover, in spite of its ten percent quota, in the recent elections women's seats have been filled by men. It is therefore difficult to say that the party meets its own standards with regards to women's political representation. Additionally, it is difficult to know whether or not the party will again adjust its ideology within the new political system of Turkey.

The People's Democratic Party (HDP)

Founded in 2012, the People's Democratic Party (HDP) is the youngest oppositional party within the current government. It is the most recent pro-Kurdish party to gain a stronghold in Turkish politics. In the 2015 elections, the party was able to pass the ten-percent threshold enabling its entrance as the fourth major party in parliament. In terms of political ideology, the party falls at the far-left of the political spectrum, representing the most leftist party among those holding parliamentary seats. In an analysis by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2015), the HDP is said to be "the last in a long series of left-wing political parties that aimed to represent Turkey's Kurdish minority (p. 40).

While the party may be the "last in a long series", it has pluralized its identity in comparison with its predecessor, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). According to several

news sources, the party's pluralism, pronounced adherence to women's rights and the rights of LGBTQ community members, and its charismatic leader, Selahattin Demirtaş enabled the pro-Kurdish party to pass the ten percent threshold (Scott 2015; Margaronis 2015; Uraş 2015). Maintaining an ideology closer to that of Radical Democracy, the party claims to bring true democracy to the Turkish state, whilst allowing for the equal representation of all minority groups, and an observation of the diverse nature of the country (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014). Adhering to such ideals and promises, the party has refreshed its identity, opening itself to a larger voter base including more liberal and urban (non-Kurdish) voters (Uraş 2015). In addition to its enlarged ideology, the party also has, since its enfranchisement, stood as one of the only outspoken opponents of the AKP governments push for a Presidential system within the country. This particular stance was an additional aid in winning over many of the intellectual-urban voters (Grigoriadis 2016).

All of the HDP's policies, in its party by-laws and programs, indicate the promise of an increased prevalence of minority groups. While other parties may reference minority groups, none have taken major, practical, steps towards their inclusion in party politics in the same capacity as the HDP. This has given the party an upper-hand, and has benefitted those among minority groups throughout the country.

HDP and Women

As said above, the HDP is the only party to have taken multiple, practical steps towards the inclusion of minority groups within both party and national politics. The application of this to women is no different. Although the party maintains the lowest number of members of the four Parliamentary parties, with a mere 30 thousand 295 members, it has the highest number of

women representatives at all levels of the party. This is a direct outcome of the deep roots of women's involvement throughout Kurdish political history.

Placing importance on women's role in politics, the party was the first to introduce a co-chair policy. This means that at each level of government, the party must elect both a male and female chair, essentially giving the party a 50 percent quota. It is the only party, among the major four, to enact such a high percentage quota. Moreover, and more importantly, it is the only party to have enacted such a quota and upheld it. In addition to the party quota, or co-chair regulation, the party also maintains specific gender mechanisms that allow women members of the party to undergo disciplinary review by women. More simply, it is the only party where women, under disciplinary review, are judged by women (without men's input). This mechanism allows for more fitting judgements, moreover, keeps the women of the party secure (HDP 2017, pers. comm., 24 May).

Another important feature of the party is its women's assembly (auxiliary). Unlike other parties within the Turkish political system, the HDP's "women's branch" does not function within that title. Rather, the women's organization of the party is a separate, autonomous entity, known as the women's council. The organization focuses on women's political education as well as helping victims of domestic violence (HDP 2017, pers. comm., 24 May). Rather than continually focusing on charity work, although it does partake, the women's assembly works towards awareness building and protection of women. Therefore, it plays a rather different function than those within the other three parties. This is also clear from its title. Rather than delineating the women's organization as that of an auxiliary, or branch of the larger party, it has a more autonomous title as a women's assembly.

Overall, in comparison to the other three parties, the HDP has taken a fresh approach towards women's representation in politics. It has ensured their representation via a 50 percent quota, has ensured their security via a gender-sensitive disciplinary structure, and has granted autonomy to its women's organization via the recognition of it as not a sub-branch of the party, rather a women's assembly. On the whole, the gender ideology of the HDP can be seen as revolutionary in the case of Turkish politics, it is truly something that had not previously existed within Turkish government.

To sum up, although the HDP is the latest in a long line of pro-Kurdish parties, it has seen the success that its predecessors had hoped for. Moreover it has added a new face to Turkish politics, definitively standing for the rights of minority groups within the country, both theoretically and practically. Yet, despite initial wins of the party and its revolutionary approach to Turkish politics, the HDP, in recent times, has experienced a decrease in its support. Following an increase in terror attacks in the country, linked to PKK, the party has (as a pro-Kurdish party) come under increased fire. This is telling of the thin line that the party walks within the eyes of the Turkish people. Offering a new perspective on democracy in the Turkish case, and having displayed the practice of its promises, the party remains pro-Kurdish, a title not taken lightly within Turkey. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether or not the party will be able to maintain a significant oppositional role within the Turkish government.

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)

The nationalist movement party falls on the far-right, extreme right end of the political scale, and is therefore, in direct opposition to that of the HDP. It is considered to follow the ideals of ultra-nationalism and Euroscepticism (Canefe & Bora 2003; Avcı 2011). The party was

founded under the leadership of Alpaslan Türkeş in 1969, however, the formation of the party was the outcome of previous nationalist efforts and organizations that had been founded in the early 1960s (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2014). Today, the party follows the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli, and it maintains the third largest membership among parliamentary parties (440 thousand 169 members). It also holds the third largest proportion of seats.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the party participated heavily in political violence, parliamentary insurgencies, and state-centric totalitarian scenarios (Canefe & Bora 2003, p. 129). These acts were, for the most part, carried out by the party's youth branch, the "openly fascist" 'Gray Wolves' (Canefe & Bora 2003). According to Heper and İnce (2006), the excuse for such violence was to "ward off the communist threat" in the country at the time (p. 873). At that time, "youth organizations with Turkist leanings, which had the self-designated mission of elevating the nation morally and making it stronger, proliferated and were engaged in armed conflict with the leftists" (p. 873).

In more detail of the party's ultra-nationalist ideology, the party maintains "intertwined traditions of Turkish, Islamism, cultural pluralism, defensive nationalism, and reverse Orientalism in Turkish political culture" (Canefe & Bora 2003, p. 128). This has become especially apparent since Türkeş' death in 1999, under the new leadership of Devlet Bahçeli. Heper and İnci (2006) point to the relatively dependent nature that the party has had on its two leaders, as they are the only two to have led the party in its 48 year history (p. 874), moreover to Bahçeli's difficult position to keep the violent nationalist, within the party, "at bay" (p. 874). While the party still maintains its attachment to ultranationalist ideals, under the leadership of Bahçeli, it has taken a step away from the center-stage. Moreover, the party has had to adjust its approach towards nationalism over time. This was a direct result of the party's loss of its

foundational leader, along with its increase in power and attainment of a new role in politics in the early 2000s (Canefe & Bora 2003).

What has been seen more recently within the party is a softer focus on nationalism, with an adoption of more “democratic” speech. “Bahçeli sees MHP as a centrist party, representing the whole nation and acting in its service,” furthermore, he states, “MHP is a product of the Turkish nation’s authentic and well-rooted values and preferences...it endeavors to safeguard the nation’s moral and cultural values...it embraces the whole nation” (Devlet Bahçeli as quoted in Heper & Ince 2006, p. 875). Upon analysis, it is easy to read a toned-down form of nationalism. The blatant and ultra-nationalistic, or violent outcry is less evident in Bahçeli’s speech. It is therefore clear to see that the party has succumbed to the pressures of being an oppositional party within parliament, and has recognized the value of more inclusive language.

MHP and Women

Although there is evidence of a softening tone within the party’s programs and by-laws, what is lacking is any reference towards women within the party. Unlike other parties, the MHP lacks any, real, ties towards women’s representation within their party. Moreover, whilst the party maintains a women’s branch, the group has had a hard time of seeing its wants and needs fulfilled on the ground, within party politics (MHP 2017, pers. comm., 31 May). As a result, the only women oriented organization within the party, the women’s auxiliary, has focused its efforts on raising awareness of the historic and heroic women of Turkic history. This, while important, leaves women’s political representation at a standstill within the party, and renders the women’s organization a subsidiary that remains disassociated with women’s political representation.

In short, the MHP remains among the least friendly towards women's political representation in terms of party ideology. Although one party member reported that there is a strong woman force within the party, they are often too shy to come forward, moreover, that, unfortunately, their yearly insistence on women's advancement within the party is, consistently, met with inaction (MHP 2017, per. comm., 31 May).

Overall, the MHP maintains its adherence to nationalistic ideals, whilst adopting a softer tone in order to maintain its place within Turkish politics. Unlike the past, it does not condone acts of political violence, rather seeks to secure the nation and serve the nation against international, non-Turkish threats. In terms of its association with women's representation, the party can be described as inactive. While it is not exclusionary; the gap between women's representation and that of men remains very wide. There are a mere three women holding seats within parliament, and just eleven provincial leaders. These numbers are lower than any other party and display the substantial amount of work that needs to be done within this party to increase women's representation.

Theoretical Underpinnings

1. Political Parties

Political parties, in their contemporary sense, took their root in the mid-nineteenth century. That is not to say that political parties were non-existent prior to the mid-nineteenth century, it is only to say that they had not their contemporary form. Rather, according to Susan Scarrow (2002), in their earliest models, political parties were relatively weak organizations wherein individuals congregated and associated in order to support a leader, a belief, or a specific cause (p. 5-7). The favorability of these groups was long debated amongst early political

theorists and politicians. On one hand these loosely organized groups incited feelings of contempt among many, and were often considered not as political parties, rather as factions. Despite the negative connotations elicited by factions, there were those who were in support, these individuals were often those who considered themselves as members of a party and/or faction (Scarow 2002, p. 4-5).

Following many years of strong debate, several early and contemporary theorists began to clearly depict the differences between political parties and factions. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century onwards, throughout the mid-twentieth century, works such as Giovanni Sartori's *Parties and Party Systems* (1976) began to analyze and discuss political parties and their place within politics, moreover, their internal structures (Sartori 1976; Bluntschli 2002). Among these works, factions are often noted as an 'evil twin' of political parties, having less developed structures, Voltaire even referred to them as feeble and in disassociation with the state (Sartori 1976, p. 3). Yet, he too despised political parties often raising the question, what is the difference between the two? This question and their distinction still find relevance today and therefore, warrant exploration.

Whilst both deriving from Latin and often mistaken to have identical definitions, faction and party actually maintain slightly disparate definitions. Faction, derived from *factio* and *facere* in Latin, has often represented actions performed with negative intentions, or negative consequences and therefore often conjures negative connotations. In ancient Rome, the word was first used to describe chariots in races, however later became known as "oligarchy, usurping faction, party seeking by irregular means to bring about changes in government" (Harper 2017). In addition, authors who wrote in Latin often meant to imply, "a political group bent on a disruptive and harmful *facere* (acts), on 'dire doings'" (Sartori 1976, p. 4). It is therefore not

surprising to find that many writers before the mid-nineteenth century found the idea of factions, or divisions in the state, as repulsive. For example, in his essay, *Of Parties in General*, Hume (as cited in Scarrow 2002) states that,

“[A]s much as legislators and founders of states ought to be honored and respected among men, as much ought the founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; because the influence of faction is directly contrary to that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other” (p. 33).

Despite this pointed view of factions, Hume later discussed the evil but necessary side to political factions. This notion predominated many of the texts produced throughout the mid-nineteenth century. Several theorists opinioned about the dilemma; while it is of utmost importance that people form their own opinions, encouraging them to make decisions for their livelihood, it is also important that there be limitations upon such opinions—they must be opinions that remain in contact with the greater good of the society (Henry Peter 2002). As a result, the decision “to faction, or not to faction” continued on.

In contrast, whilst also derived from Latin, *partir* (divide), party in relation to politics and a political person was not derived until the thirteenth century, whereupon it still had not found a definition similar to what is known as political party today. In the thirteenth century, party meant “taking a side in a contest or dispute” (Harper 2017). It was not until the late seventeenth century that the word ‘party’ held any value in the political world. Therefore, unlike faction, which was directly associated with politics (negatively), it was not until much later that the idea of party was introduced to politics. Furthermore, when it was introduced, it had less adverse undertones. In his 1770 work, *Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents*, Edmund Burke paved the way for political parties to take stronghold over the following century. Burke felt that connection was the most important thing for politics to move forward and to function as they should; political

parties were, in his opinion “essentially necessary for the full performance of our public duty” (Burke as quoted in Sartori 1976 p. 9). Burke’s argument was that parties are not only essential, however that they are a concrete organization (unlike factions) that allow for men to carry out their joint aims (p. 10). In addition to the work of Burke, somewhat building upon his foundations, Frederick Grimke too felt the necessity and importance of political parties to the democratic institution. Published in 1848, Grimke’s piece titled, *Parties—the Office they Fulfill in a Republic*, demonstrated more than just the necessary evils of political parties. He, too, makes the argument that without parties, men are unable to voice their ideas and opinions; the system is not functioning as it should. Rather, he argues that,

“[I]t is a great mistake, with our knowledge of the constitution of human nature, to suppose that society would be better ordered if its surface were perfectly calm...[P]arty spirit at bottom is but the conflict of different opinions to each of which some portion of truth almost invariably adheres; and what has ever been the effect of this mutual action of mind upon mind, but to sharpen men’s wits, to extend the circle of their knowledge; and to raise the mind above its former level” (Grimke as cited in Scarrow 2002, p. 58).

It is therefore the main difference between party and faction, that parties are necessary for the democratic system, whereas factions are detrimental to its foundations. Parties find their place as the representer of opinions, whereas factions are heavily reliant on expressing the passions of individuals. In Grimke’s view political parties advance the knowledge of individuals, without them complete unanimity of society can be assumed. However, Grimke emphasizes that without conflict in opinion the development of knowledge stagnates (Sarrow 2002, p. 58-59). Political parties, in their purest form, represent the opinions of whole populations and therefore are important to the maintenance of elective government. Moreover, their opinionated nature allows them to take an important role of ‘auditor’ in a representative government. In free institutions then, where individuals are assumed to take an active involvement in government, parties

regulate the conduct of both the government and the actors—they are the maintaining principle of free, democratic institutions (p. 60).

With the changing face of democratic systems, ideas like those of Burke and Grimke began to take a stronger hold amongst political theorists and politicians. The developments that took place in the mid-nineteenth century had a profound effect on the growing value placed on political parties. According to Scarrow (2002), in her compilation, *Perspectives on Political Parties: Classical Readings*, two developments changed the course of political parties; “the transfer of political power to legislatures and the expansion of the electorate” (p. 6). These two developments went hand in hand. As the legislature gained more value and power, it became more important for groups to form to voice their opinions and to form alliances with the legislative assemblies. In addition to the newfound need of alliances, the positions within the legislation too became dependent upon the electorate, thereby bonding the people and the government and necessitating political parties (p. 6-7).

No matter the early struggles, the revolutionary development of legislation and the electorate led political parties to become an essential part of modern government and democracies. In addition, the role of political parties in government has remained a topic of discussion within political science and has paved the way for multiple lines of inquiry. Fields such as electorate behavior, party systems, civil involvement, political participation, and intra-party democracy have all developed out of these seminal investigations.

2. Intra-party Democracy

Despite earlier works concerning political parties, the foundational contributions did not emphasize the internal workings of political parties and their relation to the greater system.

Unlike later descendants, the works of Hume, Jefferson, Burke, Grimke, and many others were occupied with arguments for and against political parties. It was not until the late nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century that theorists began deeper explorations into political parties and their internal structures. The works of three men have provided more detailed accounts of political parties and their importance for democracy. Furthermore, these works laid the foundations for studies which question the democratic underpinnings within political parties themselves.

Moisey Ostrogorsky, Robert Michels and Maurice Duverger, have often been regarded as the foundational researchers into political parties and their internal structures. Duverger is considered to be one of the first to merge political party theory with a notion of intra-party democracy, taking a closer look at how parties' structures may affect the greater democratic system. However, he was preceded by two other, just as important men. First to publish a notable work concerning political parties and democracy, Ostrogorsky (1902) brought political parties and political sociology to light within the larger field of political science. The work, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, sought to introduce the notion of mass suffrage in the United States and the United Kingdom. Ostrogorsky realized that whilst parties are necessary to suit the needs of the mass, they are inherently destructive to democracy (Lipset 1968). Taking off from Ostrogorsky's work, Robert Michels (1911) published *Political Parties: a Sociological Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. In a similar vein to that of his predecessor, he too believed that political parties were problematic, stressing that they often maintained an "iron-law of oligarchy," in which he states, "[A]ll power thus proceeds in a natural cycle: issuing from the people, it ends by raising itself above the people" (Michels 1962, p. 75). Merging these two foundational works whilst adding to them, Maurice Duverger's (1951) work,

Political Parties (Les Partis Politiques), aimed to examine the typology of political parties. He devised a two-part typology, distinguishing between elitist-parties and mass-parties (Duverger 1963). These two distinctions led the foundations for understanding differences in how parties approach democracy and the political structure of government.

What these foundational attempts have led to is an immense field of discussion of the role of democracy within political parties, without political parties and the connections (if any) between intra-party democracy and democracy as a larger goal of the state. Moreover, in their attempt to understand the function of democracy and political parties in combination, these theorists gave birth to a largely debatable subject.

Despite the ease of thinking that democracy within a party will lead to democracy within a state, several contemporary political theorists have been begging the question of the role and possibility of intra-party democracy (Cross & Katz 2013). In 1942 Schattschneider had so clearly shown that democracy within political parties breeds democracy within a state throughout his years of research. However, what many more recent scholars have come to question is, how? According to William Cross and Richard Katz's (2013) piece, *Problematizing Intra-Party Democracy*,

“[W]hile parties and the democracy promotion community may espouse general agreement that IPD is a good thing, any survey of parties' internal structures makes it clear that there is no single, agreed upon definition of what it means to be internally democratic. Parties claiming to practice IPD organize and operate in dramatically different ways” (p. 2).

Other scholars such as Gideon Rahat and Reuven Y. Hazan too have come to question what constitutes a democratic political party in several pieces of literature including, *Which Candidate Selection Method is More Democratic, Candidate Selection Methods and their Political*

Consequence and Democracy and Political Parties: on the uneasy relationship between Participation, Competition, and Representation, just to name a few.

Yet, while it may have begun to seem as though the value of IPD has been completely lost, scholars have continued to implement its determinants in order to place parties on a scale, rather than definitively typifying them. For example, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) published a handbook and conducted research considering the role that IPD plays in implementation throughout several European political parties. The handbook entitled, *Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Implementing Intra-Party Democracy*, written by Susan Scarrow (2005), outlines the ways in which parties may be typified, however it stresses the importance of variation and that “what works in one party, or one country, may not work in all” (Scharrow 2005, p. 3-7). Following in a similar vein, Goran Cular (2004) of the University of Zagreb explored the development of political parties in Croatia through the lens of intra-party democracy. His work, titled, *Organizational Development of Parties and Intra-Party Democracy*, seeks to analyze the organizational development of the Croatian parties via the differentiation of degrees of intra-party democracy and the type of party structures presented. In a path similar to Scarrow, Cular expresses the need for a scaled measurement of internal party democracy.

3. Political Participation

In the greater scheme of political science Political participation has only recently been studied; however, discussions and definitions have existed since the times of Plato and Aristotle. In light of such a long theoretical history, the definition and application of its study to real situations has seen a multitude of changes over time. It is therefore, much more difficult to

narrow down a *sui generis* definition of political participation, even harder yet to definitively assess political participation within a democracy. Notwithstanding, many political scientists believe that understanding political participation is at the center of assessing democracies and democratic functions (see Dalton, 2000; Nie & Verba, 1972; Norris, 2002). Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley have even conferred that, “the task of understanding why some people participate in politics while others do not is perhaps *the* central concern of political science” (Seyd & Whiteley 2002, p. 1). Similarly, Verba and Nie claim, “[W]here few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is” (as cited in van Deth 2016, p. 2). As a result of its necessity and weightiness, several definitions of participation are in use today; these definitions and models are tailored towards a multitude of approaches and questions and are continually changing with the changing of people’s activities towards government.

The earliest discussion of political participation, in a proliferate sense, began in the early 1950s. At that time it was an outgrowth from the field of election studies and was heavily based in survey studies (Teorell 2006). A consensus that has emerged from these early investigations into political participation is that of action. However, today those actions have come to encompass many areas including, but not limited to; voting, demonstrating, contacting public officials, boycotting, attending party rallies, guerrilla gardening, posting blogs, volunteering, joining flash mobs, signing petitions, buying fair-trade products, and even suicide protests (van Deth 2016, p. 2). This long list of activities, whilst enlarging the political realm, also causes issues for understanding who and what truly constitutes participation. The direct result of such variations is the creation of definitions to be applied to certain types of participatory actions.

One definition, presented by Seyd and Witeley (2002), examines participation that takes longer amounts of time, or extended participation periods. This participation method is known as high-intensity participation and is defined more restrictively. High-intensity participation holds that political participation is “activities performed by individuals that are aimed at influencing the politics or personnel of the state and government” and that “highly active participants are much more important to democratic politics than is often recognized” (p. 1). Actions that are termed high-intensity include running a campaign, undertaking voluntary activities in multiple political organizations, and standing for elected office (Seyd & Whiteley 2002, p. 1-2). No matter the form of high-intensity participation, a participant must be involved with an organization (i.e. political party, local government, or interest groups) that is institutionalized. Without this inclusion, the individual cannot change the state policies, which in this definition, is the foundation for political participation (Seyd & Whiteley 2002, p.1-2).

It is therefore, this form of political participation that the research at hand uses to classify participation. Institutionalized participation within political parties is the spotlight of this research and therefore definitions that hold political participation to a broader definition are unsuited. In addition, high-intensity participation was introduced by Whiteley and Seyd (2002) who emphasize the role of political parties within democracies and their optimality for understanding political participation.

“Political parties are the most important non-state institution in democratic politics, since, unlike other types of organizations, such as interest groups, they aim to capture control of the state by running candidates for elective office. For this reason political parties are one of the best vehicles for studying high-intensity participation” (p. 2).

Political parties and the high-intensity participation that occurs within them, is therefore, the most appropriate avenue for understanding more specific group participation in politics as well.

Understanding why some groups may participate more than others turns the discussion of participation theories in yet another direction. However, gaining a clearer picture of why the face of politics is often white and male is crucial for changing the situation. How political participation occurs and via what channels, has been long debated and several models have been put forward; the *Civic Voluntarist Model* (see Nie & Verba 1972), the *Rational Choice Model* (see Downs 1957; Tsebelis 1990; Aldrich 1993; Jackman 1993), the *Social Psychological Model* (see Muller 1979; Muller & Opp 1986; Muller et al., 1991), the *Mobilization Model* (see Cutright 1963; Verba et al., 1995), and the *General Incentives Model* (see Seyd & Whiteley 1992; Seyd & Whiteley 1995). Each model has positives and negatives when it comes to assessing participation, moreover whilst some ideas overlap, the only model that presents a clear middle line between most of the models is the *General Incentives Model*.

Overall, there are many ways to understand political participation. Furthermore, within the various approaches, several models may be applied to understand, more deeply, why some participate and others do not. Despite this variety, and the ever-growing liberalization of the term political participation, it is important that restricted versions of the definition not lose their value. Often, a more restricted understanding of political participation can be used to better understand the democratic principles within institutions (Seyd & Whiteley 2002; van Deth 2016).

4. Women and Politics/Political Representation

Democracy and democratic debate was, for a long time, dismissive of women and their role within government, moreover, their role within the public sphere. As can be seen in the previous discussion of political parties, theorists most often referred to men when speaking of

political agents. It is therefore not surprising that it took much longer for women to enter the pages of political theory. Whilst democratic debates had been carried on for hundreds of years its prior, the French Revolution invoked a sense of determination in one woman, who would be among the first to openly state the inequality within the democratic system towards women (Held 2006). Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97), was the first woman to openly write a statement to the people discussing the relationship between the public and private spheres of life. Her work, *The Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), although similarly based to the arguments of Rousseau, was critical of the “powerful strand in political thinking which subsumed the interests of women and children under those of ‘the individual,’ that is, the male citizen” (Held p. 50-51). Wollstonecraft was among the first women to raise the question why women took subservient roles to those of men and why they were often disregarded as citizens. Throughout her arguments, she pushed back against the traditional concepts of women as naturally weaker and a lesser sex than that of men. She also argued that, if women did take on a weaker persona it was, in fact, due to the way they were raised. It was Wollstonecraft (1792) who first suggested that democratic theorist re-think the relationship between the home and the public. Moreover, she was among the first to suggest, that women begin making larger contributions in the public sphere. She encouraged for women to obtain “a direct share in the deliberation of government...,” later going on to say, “she [woman] must not, if she discharge her civil duties, want individually the protection of civil laws; she must not be dependent on her husband’s bounty for her subsistence during his life, or support after his death; for how can a being be generous who has nothing of his own? or virtuous who is not free?” (p. 259).

Wollstonecraft’s political ambition, whilst quite conservative on today’s scale, was a shock to the conservatives at the time, however amongst radical circles her work was applauded.

Despite a hiatus in reference to her work, Wollstonecraft paved the way for other women to follow. Furthermore, she entrenched a new sense of “democracy” in theory, thus allowing for greater pluralism within its understandings. It follows that she can be considered one of the first to call for women’s active engagement in the public sphere. However, despite her early success, women in most parts of the world would not gain legal participation rights until the early 20th century, after long struggles against social norms and hegemonic governments.

Today in nearly every country of the world, women have received suffrage. Despite such achievements, they still suffer inequality within the public sphere. Throughout the early twentieth century, most women, while having fought for and won their rights to participate in “man’s world” remained tied to the home and to their position as mother. Although women could leave their role as housewife, by entering into labor positions, for the most part, women were entitled only to positions of care. Such positions included nursing, teaching, and secretarial positions. It was not until the feminist revolution, or the women’s liberation movement began that women, on a mass scale, began to see that they had a definite choice.

With the rise in human rights movements throughout the United States, women found their place. Furthermore, in 1960, the world’s first contraceptive pill was introduced. It was the start of what would later be known as the “sexual revolution.” It was within this atmosphere that women, worldwide, began to see various issues as pertinent to their lives. In 1962, Betty Friedan wrote *The Feminine Mystique*, bringing salvation to thousands of women who had been being treated for hysteria. For once, they realized that someone understood them, she was able to appeal to their frustrations. What would later be known as the ‘Women’s Lib Movement’ was, at that time, a fight for equality in the public sphere, something the earlier feminists had fought so

hard for and won. Yet, it became clear that what had been won in the early twentieth century was just a sliver of a much larger pie.

Since the 1960s things have changed, and women have begun to achieve more rights in the public sphere. However, women's representation in politics globally, has remained rather low. While the numbers remain at unsatisfactory levels, it is crucial to remember that not so long ago, women did not dream of entering politics, let alone becoming political leaders. Therefore, as numbers of women being elected are on the rise, albeit slowly and at a minimum, understanding the nuances of their positions is critical.

Hanna Pitkin, Anne Phillips, Carole Pateman, Pippa Norris, and other British and American political scientists have spent their careers studying the finer details of women's participation in politics. Some, Carole Pateman included, focus on theory, examining the role that traditional democratic theory plays on women's positioning within democracies, and politics as a whole. Others, like Pippa Norris and Mona Lena Krook examine positive action measures, or quotas, which help guarantee women's numbers in political arenas. No matter the style or approach towards understanding women and politics, theorists, such as those mentioned, have laid the basic groundwork necessary for understanding political representation of women.

One such principle is that of substantive and descriptive representation. First discussed by Hanna Pitkin in her book, *Political Representation* (1967), these two forms of representation have become a pillar in Women and Politics research. They are just two of her discussed forms of political representation, and when first introduced, were not written in a gendered perspective (Dovi 2017). In Pitkin's terms, descriptive representation is "where the representative stands for a group by virtue of sharing similar characteristics such as race, sex, ethnicity, or residence" and

substantive representation is “where the representative seeks to advance a group's policy preferences and interests” (Dovi 2017). Put simply, descriptive representation is the placement of “women” into positions because they are women and therefore, descriptively, represent half of the population. Conversely, substantive representation is when women represent women as a group, ensuring that policies reflect the group’s interests and preferences (on the basis of womanhood). It is often, thus, more favorable to have substantive representation, as women who do not represent women’s needs and interests are no different than men making decisions within the same mindset.

Throughout the early years of women and politics research, more specifically, women’s representational research, the focus was primarily women’s descriptive representation. This was a result of the lack of women in positions within politics, therefore, the focus could only, at that time, be to understand why very few women held public office. In addition, research at that time aimed to get more women involved (Carroll 2001, p. xi-xii). However, as research, time, and women’s increased presence within politics has continued, focus has begun shifting towards women’s substantive representation. This shift in focus is the result of a) more women in politics, and b) the realization that women have gained footing and can now begin pushing for more gender-sensitive policies (Carroll 2001, p.xi-xii).

Despite the necessity to engage in substantive research, the United States and other European countries have achieved higher numbers of women’s descriptive representation than other areas of the world. One such case is Turkey, where women’s place in politics is still developing as it lags behind global levels and standards. In cases such as Turkey, it is therefore necessary to engage in deeper and more thorough research into descriptive politics in order to a) increase the number of women in politics, and b) understand the political culture that inhibits

their entrance. When there are less than twenty percent of women representatives in parliament, and less than five percent of local seats held by women, a focus on the barriers is crucial. As a result, over the last two decades, research concerning the subject has focused heavily on women in parliament, their roles, and their motivation for entering. Moreover, the research has engaged in understanding public opinion, more specifically women's opinions towards politics. It is hopeful that as time moves forward, Turkey, like its western counterparts will, too, increase the number of women representatives.

Until then, women's representation, both descriptively and substantively will continue to be important throughout Turkey. Moreover, until women's parity in office, and in policy is achieved, the study of women and politics, more specifically, women's representation will not end.

Literature Review

This research continues within the frameworks of Cular (2004), Scarrow (2005), Rahat and Hazan (2010), yet has a definite departure in that it seeks to add a new gendered category to their analyses to examine the correlation between women's political participation and substantive representation and IPD.

Building upon the foundational work of IPD scholars, more recent attempts have been made to examine the overlap of gender and IPD. Feminist scholars including Sarah Childs, Mona Lena Krook, Diana O'Brien, Miki Caul Kittilson, and many others have begun examining political parties as avenues for and against women's ability to obtain substantive representation in politics. Their work, while diversified, seeks to find the underlying obstacles that political parties may place that hinder women's entrance and/or success in politics. The plethora of

research examines subjects such as women's branches and substantive representation (Childs and Kittilson 2016), gender and party leadership (O'Brien 2015), and the role that quotas play in women's political participation along with their varied implementation strategies (Krook 2011). A common thread among these pieces is the emphasis they place on further research into the obstacles that women face. More specifically, both the work of Childs and Kittilson, and O'Brien, critically state that research into political parties and its overlap with gender are new and crucial areas of exploration (Childs and Kittilson 2016, p.607; O'Brien 2015, p. 1036).

In addition to these more recent and broad-reaching inquiries, a few of these scholars have focused more directly on the link between IPD and WPP. Projects coordinated by the NDI, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have begun to emphasize the importance of political parties as gateways for the development of women's political participation. These organizations in turn have produced three important works. The NIMD's publication, *Developing Intra-Party Democracy from a Gendered Perspective*, takes an important look at Georgian political parties and examines the importance that they place on women's political participation. In this report Bagratia and Badashvili (2012) present an overview of the political environment constructed by political parties in Georgia along with the preexisting mechanisms and tools promoting gender parity within the Georgian political parties. The report presents new ideas and provides recommendations for achieving gender parity within the Georgian political parties. The OSCE too has produced a similar research examining women's political participation within the OSCE member states. They conducted survey research among four pilot countries, Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova and "aimed to identify common challenges to women's political advancement within political parties within these [pilot] countries" (Norris & Krook

2014, p.14). In addition the research was heavily based in desk-research and interview, providing an optimum level of inquiry and insight into the situation throughout the OSCE member states. The outcome of their research was published as a handbook entitled, *the ODIHR Handbook on Promoting Women's Participation in Political Parties*. Thirdly, the NDI's work, *Empowering Women for Stronger Political Parties: Good Practices Guide to Promote Women's Political Participation*, was produced in coordination with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). This work examined twenty case studies concerning political parties' activities to promote women's political participation. The guide provides political parties concrete steps that may be taken in order to increase women's political participation and for creating political party reform. These three handbooks, or guides, have laid a foundation for understanding the overlap of political parties and women's advancement within political arenas. They offer cogent arguments for women's political participation and also clear and concise measurements for further advancing their role in political leadership.

Despite the vast research that has been conducted on IPD, WPP, and the overlap of them, gaps still remain in terms of their application to specific regions and countries. The Turkish case is of this manner. While the field of inquiries into women's political participation in Turkey has been deep and wide, it has often remained at the level of national politics, rather than delving deeper into the cases closer to the local level. Although with gaps, the withstanding literature has laid a wonderful backdrop for understanding the obstacles that women face in Turkey and within Turkish politics. Interest in WPP research in Turkey first gained momentum in the late 1970s and the 1980s with the influential and foundational works of Şirin Tekeli and Yeşim Arat. Şirin Tekeli's publication, *Women in Social and Political Life (Kadınlar Siyasal Toplumsal Hayat)* published in 1982 was the first to bring women's political participation into the subject of

modern Turkish politics (Cakır 2013). Following this initial work, Yeşim Arat later published, *The Patriarchal Paradox Women Politicians in Turkey*, in 1989. This work took particular focus on the role that hegemony and patriarchy play in the disabling of women to fully participate in politics within Turkey (Cakır 2013). These foundational works and their successors continued to delve into the subject of women's political participation; however, they often remained at higher levels of analysis (see Arat 1987; Yaraman 1999; Kovanlıkaya 1999 as cited in Cakır 2013). It was not until the 2000s that women's participation in local politics and political parties became an area of interest. In 2005, Ayten Alkan approached the subject of the low representation of women in local politics. Her research, *Local Government and Gender: Women are Invisible in the City (Yerel Yönetimler ve Cinsiyet: Kadınlar Kentte Görünmez Varlığı)*, examined party policies, and the fact that many activities of the party went on without notice of women. Her research showed that the women cannot attach themselves to the masculine identity of politics; moreover they do not have tangible thoughts and suggests increasing women's political representation (Cakır 2013). Following this research, others too began to examine both local politics and political parties. The years of 2011-2013 were especially rich with research into these areas including work by; Nihal Şirin Pınarcıoğlu, Şebnem Cansu, and Derya Kaylı (Cakır 2013). These women's work began to take notice of the role that political parties play in shaping women's political advancement. It would be wrong to discount the efforts and successes that scholars have made in light of understanding women's political participation in Turkey; however, it must also be realized that there is always room for improving knowledge until gender parity is reached.

In contrast to the vast research conducted about women's political participation, studies discussing IPD in the Turkish case are fewer and farer between. Despite some interest into the

subject by scholars such as Caroline Lancaster, Ergun Özbudun, Murat Yanık, and others, these lines of inquiry have been rather new to surface (Türkmen 2016). A more recently published dissertation, *The Institutional Design of Intra-Party Democracy through Legal Instruments: Turkish Case*, written by Ali Türkmen (2016) of the University of Westminster, takes a hard look at Turkish Political Party Law, the Turkish Constitution and compares the Turkish IPD system to that of British IPD systems. His conclusions and research enlightened the new politics of Turkey and what needs to be done in order to increase the practical implementation of Turkey's theoretical adherence to IPD (Türkmen 2016). In addition to this piece, *Is Intra-Party Democracy Possible in Turkey?*, written by Mehmet Akinci, Ozgur Onder and Bilge Kagan Sakaci (2013) examines the AKP and the CHP's adherence to IPD. They performed a close reading of the Constitution, Political Parties' Law and the two parties' bylaws. They concluded, in a similar fashion to Türkmen, that "Political Parties' Law does not include imperatives to encourage intra-party democracy; therefore, the law itself is a major obstacle before democracy" (Akinci, Onder, Sakaci 2013, p. 47-48). Despite these inquiries, there has not been a substantial research conducted to inquiry the level of intra-party democracy within the current parliamentary parties. Rather, the main objective of all previous research was to judge IPD's possibility and the legal arrangements associated with it. In light of the varied forms that IPD can take within a system, it is crucial that a survey be taken to delineate the level of IPD within each of the Turkish parties.

Therefore, this research seeks to fill in the gap of both Turkish WPP studies and that of WPP studies more holistically. Moreover, it aims to bridge both political party/IPD studies with that of WPP, building a solid foundation for later research to continue upon in the both the Turkish case and global assessments. Moreover, given the more recent lack of interest into

women's political participation studies, this research hopes to re-ignite interest into the multifaceted approaches that can be used to study WPP whilst adding critical perspectives to the area of Turkish political party IPD.

Methodology

This research examined four Turkish political parties in the year 2016, prior to the introduction of a “state of emergency” within the country. Furthermore it examined the parties within the context of the 2015 election cycle. The four parties examined include the AKP, the CHP, the HDP, and the MHP. These four political parties, at the time of research, held seats in parliament, and therefore offered the clearest line of inquiry for this study.

Framework

Intra-party Democracy

The foundational framework for the study was grounded within IPD and found its organizational structure from Goran Cular's (2004) study in Croatia among Croatian political parties titled, *Organizational Development of Parties and Internal Party Democracy in Croatia*. The research aimed to assess parties' structures and to compare them based on their adherence to criteria of IPD. In order to assess this, the research used a two-dimensional approach for determining the level of IPD within each party; *Inclusion* and *Autonomy*. By delineating two dimensions, Cular made it possible to examine parties on an axis, with the vertical dimension representing *Autonomy* and the horizontal dimension representing *Inclusion* (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Two Dimensions of internal party democracy and IPD types from Goran Cular: *Organizational Development of...*: 2004 p. 43.

The *Inclusion* dimension of the research focuses on the participatory measures within a given party, and can also be referred to as the ‘participatory’ dimension. “It measures how many members the decision-making process includes and compares the prerogatives allocated to the wider party bodies with those given to the narrower circle of leadership” (Cular 2004, p. 35). In order to determine this axis, Cular divided inclusion into three sub-categories; a) direct participation of the members, b) prerogatives of conventions versus executive bodies, and c) prerogatives of the party president. These too were sub-divided into greater indices for determining each party’s rank in the overall sub-heading (see appendices p. 130).

The vertical dimension, *Autonomy*, refers to power-sharing within parties. This dimension looks at, “whether members or local branches...can freely act and influence decision-making processes at different party levels” (Cular 2004, p. 35). This category, like its horizontal counterpart was too sub-divided into the categories; a) member’s rights, b) autonomy of local

organizations, and c) direct influence of local bodies on central level decision-making. For the purposes of Cular's research, these categories were then sub-divided creating definitive indicators (see appendices p. 131).

Despite the development and systematized sub-divisions, Cular's approach lacked further division of indicators. Therefore, this methodology was supplemented with other researchers definitions of democratically sound political parties (Scarrow 2005; Mersel 2006; Hazan & Rahat 2010; Katz, et al. 2008; Pettitt 2012) (see appendices p. 131). This allowed for each division within Cular's method to be definitively determined and ranked. The final framework, therefore, created deeper sub-dimensions in order to definitively see where the four Turkish political parties lay on the autonomy/inclusion dimensional scale (Table 1; Table 2).

Table 1. Dimension of Autonomy

DIMENSION OF AUTONOMY

1.1 Member's Rights

- 1.1.1 General rights**
 - Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability)
 - Right to be elected in open and free elections to any post within the party
- 1.1.2 Rights to form factions**
 - Freedom of Speech and Association within the Party
 - Ability to establish a faction/power bloc
- 1.1.3 Protection of members against disciplinary measures**
 - Right not to be expelled without a fair proceeding

1.2 Autonomy of Local Organization

- 1.2.1 Autonomy in decision-making**
 - about local structure
 1. Local structure determined by the local level
 - in disciplinary procedures
 1. Local disciplinary committee board is able to make final decisions
 2. Local body has the ability to call for a review of internal party democracy
 - in selection procedure for local elections
 1. Candidate selection done in accordance with each election area.
 2. In-Person Ballot
 3. Secret Elections
 - about local coalitions
- 1.2.2 Prerogatives of higher level in local affairs**
 - in the procedure of disclosure of local organization
 - in electing and replacing local leadership
 1. Choices are limited by party leaders
 2. Party leaders must select nominees
 - in calling local conventions
 1. Central party organizes local level meetings
 2. Central party plans the local agenda
 - in local decision making
 - in coordination of local activities
 1. Local activities are organized by central body
 2. Funding for all local branches is equal

1.3 Direct influence of local bodies on the central level decision making:

- through election of representatives for party conventions
- through election of members of central political and executive bodies
- through role in the selection procedure for national elections
- through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute

Table 1: Dimension of Autonomy, sub-dimensions and indicators: This graphic is an updated version of Goran Cular's original dimension "Organizational Development of Parties and Internal Party Democracy in Croatia" (2004).

Table 2. Dimension of Inclusion

DIMENSION OF INCLUSION

2.1 Direct participation of members

- in direct decision-making and elections
 1. Ability to influence the party platform and agenda
 2. Ability to elect the leadership and recall it
 3. Right to participate in all internal elections
- in selection procedures
 1. Right to choose party nominees/eliminate undesirable candidates from lists
 2. Right to demand equal representation of interparty minorities and majority rule voting
- in initiatives towards central level

2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies

2.2.1 at the central level:

- in passing statute and political program
- in election of members of central political and executive bodies
- in selection procedures

2.2.2 at the local level:

- in election of members of local executive bodies
- in election of representatives for conventions at higher level
- in selection procedures

2.3 Prerogatives of the party president

2.3.1 in personal matters:

- right to propose/appoint vice president
- right to propose/appoint other member of the central bodies
- rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member

2.3.2 in selection procedure:

- at the central level
- at the local level

Table 2: Dimension of Inclusion, sub-dimensions and indicators: This graphic is an updated version of Goran Cular's original dimension "Organizational Development of Parties and Internal Party Democracy in Croatia" (2004).

Within the original research categories, Cular ranked each party in relation to other parties and utilized the categories as a way of determining weights. Parties with higher numbers, therefore, correlate with greater internal democracy. Within the chart (Figure 1), parties who fall above the full line are considered to be above average with regards to internal democracy, correspondingly, those that fall below the dotted line are considered as below average (Cular 2004, p. 42). Taking the ranking of each party one step further, Cular also delineated a typology of party democracy with regards to the two-dimensions (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Two Dimensions of internal party democracy and IPD types from Goran Cular: *Organizational Development of...: (2004, p. 35).*

As shown in figure 2, parties may fall within one of four “party types”. Parties with both low inclusion and autonomy rankings are classified as “*low democracy*” type parties. Low democracy parties therefore can be considered as the most centralized parties. They do not place importance on the autonomy of local organizations, nor do they allow for member participation in most decisions. The next type of party, the “*democratic centralism*” party, maintains high levels of inclusion and low levels of autonomy. It follows that this type of party, while democratic in the sense that members’ inclusion is favored, the autonomy of local organization is

limited, causing the party to maintain centralist structures. Moving up the autonomy scale, “*individualist-elitist*” parties have higher levels of autonomy, yet remain low with regards to inclusion. Therefore, as a result of a more decentralized party, the elites of the party maintain control over most major decisions, limiting the role of members in its overall functions. Elitists in this sense can refer to local level leaders and also those within the central party. The final type of party is the “*full democracy*” parties. These parties are the most democratic of all in that they maintain high levels of member participation in decisions, whilst also granting great autonomy to the local organizations (Cular 2004, p. 35).

Similarly to Cular’s work, this research utilized this scale to typify the four Turkish political parties. Each indicator was equally weighted in this research’s analysis. The end result showed the ranking of each Turkish political party within both the overall ranking along with its type.

Gender Inclusion

For the purposes of IPD, Cular’s categories were generally suitable. However, the second variable of this research, gender, was not able to be determined from his categories. Therefore, Cular’s framework was adjusted by adding another dimension, *Gender Inclusion*, in order to determine how inclusive each party is towards women. Drawing from the OSCE’s gender and IPD pilot program and handbook, *Handbook on Promoting Women’s Participation in Political Parties* (Norris & Krook 2014) along with research conducted in Georgia, *Intra-party Democracy and local governance* (Bagratia & Badashvili 2012) this research determined factors that indicate gender-inclusion within a political party. Categories included; a) a gender-equality organization (women’s auxiliary), b) positive action measures, and c) gender equality awareness.

Similarly to Cular's categories, these sub-headings were then further defined via more specific indicators of each sub-heading. Within the 'gender-equality organization' indicator, the researcher examined; firstly, whether the party had a women's auxiliary, secondly, if the women's organization was autonomous, and thirdly, the activeness of the women's organization. In order to gain a better understanding of substantive representation, the category also maintained sub-indicators concerned with women's political training. 'Positive action' sub-indicators examined the extent to which the party has taken legal steps towards the direct inclusion of women in the party. Lastly, the sub-indicators that examined party statutes and recording procedures was titled, 'gender-equality awareness' (Table 3).

Table 3. Dimension of Gender Inclusion

DIMENSION OF GENDER INCLUSION

3.1 Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)

3.1.1 Establishment/Actions

- Autonomous (has the ability to determine branch activities/initiatives)
- Active (Holding meetings and events regularly)
- Publically-visible (Is well known for participating in community activities, etc.)

3.1.2 Role in Intra-Party Democracy

- Meets regularly to discuss party matters/organization matters
- Holds discussions, open to the public to discuss engagement in politics

3.1.3 Extra-Party Relations

- with NGOs
- with other party women's branches

3.2 Positive Action Measures

3.2.1 The party has developed a gender quota

- Larger Proportions (20-30%)
- Mid-Level Action (15-20%)
- Low-Level Action (10-15%)

3.2.2 Election/Candidate Selection Procedures

- Clearly stated/transparent selection procedures are in place within the party
- Ensure balanced participation in all decision-making bodies, electoral lists, and nominated/appointed positions

3.2.3 Adoption of gender sensitive modes of party operation

- Working hours
- Dates/Times of Meetings
- Amount of time required for social service
- Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism
- Day care services, child care centers, etc.

3.2.4 Distribution of Party Resources

- including equal distribution of funds for the women's branch
- equal distribution of funds and brochures for women candidates

3.3 Gender Equality Awareness

3.3.1 Party Statutes

- Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value
- Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party

3.3.2 Party Records

- Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated
- Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women

Table 3: Dimension of Gender Inclusion an adaptation of Cular's model supplemented by indicators as suggested in Bagratia & Badashvili (2012) and Norris & Krook (2014).

Data Collection

Following the format and indicators given, the research created an index of party ranking. The index ranked party inclusion, autonomy, and gender inclusion out of 100 (100 being the highest any party could obtain). Additionally, given the fresh nature of such an inquiry, each indicator was given equal weight (Table 4; Table 5; Table 6). Although some categories hold a higher democratic value than others, as has been thoroughly discussed by several IPD theorists (Scarrow 2005; Katz, et al. 2008; Rahat 2008; Pettitt 2012), there has not been a standard value placed upon such indicators. As a result, this research placed equal weight on all indicators.

The only indicator that presented a distributed weighting was that pertaining to the positive action measure of quotas. This was done so because different parties maintain different levels of quotas. Moreover, higher percentage quotas deserve higher weights as they encourage the representation of more women within the party (Table 6).

Table 5. Inclusion Ranking and Indices

AUTONOMY = 100	Overarching Indicator	Overall Obtainable Contribution of Sub-Indicator	# of micro-Indicators	CONTRIBUTION OF EACH QUESTIONS IF YES
Overall Obtainable Contribution of Indicator				
33.3	<i>I. Member Rights</i>			
	<i>I.I</i>	11.1	2	5.6
	<i>I.II</i>	11.1	2	5.6
	<i>I.III</i>	11.1	1	11.1
33.3	<i>II. Autonomy of Local Organizations</i>			
	<i>II.I</i>	16.7	7	2.4
	<i>II.II</i>	16.7	8	2.1
33.3	<i>III. Direct Influence of local bodies on central level decision-making</i>			
	<i>III.I</i>	33.3	4	8.3

Table 4: Autonomy Index, equal weights/100
Source: researcher

Table 5. Inclusion Ranking and Indices

INCLUSION = 100	Overarching Indicator	Overall Obtainable Contribution of Sub-Indicator	# of micro-Indicators	CONTRIBUTION OF EACH QUESTIONS IF YES
Overall Obtainable Contribution of Indicator				
33.3	<i>I. Direct Participation of the Members</i>			
	<i>I.I</i>	11.1	3	3.7
	<i>I.II</i>	11.1	2	5.6
	<i>I.III</i>	11.1	1	11.1
33.3	<i>II. Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies</i>			
	<i>II.I</i>	16.7	3	5.6
	<i>II.II</i>	16.7	3	5.6
33.3	<i>III. Prerogatives of the party president</i>			
	<i>III.I</i>	16.7	2	8.3
	<i>III.II</i>	16.7	3	5.6

Table 5: Inclusion Index, equal weights/100
Source: researcher

Table 6. Gender Inclusion Ranking and Indices

GENDER INCLUSION = 100	Overarching Indicator	Overall Obtainable Contribution of Sub-Indicator	# of micro-Indicators	CONTRIBUTION OF EACH QUESTIONS IF YES
Overall Obtainable Contribution of Indicator				
33.3	<i>I. Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)</i>			
	<i>I.I</i>	11.1	3	3.7
	<i>I.II</i>	11.1	2	5.6
	<i>I.III</i>	11.1	2	5.6
33.3	<i>II. Positive Action Measures</i>			
	<i>II.I</i>	15.0	3	***QUOTA*** 7 5 3
	<i>II.II</i>	6.1	2	3.1
	<i>II.III</i>	6.1	5	1.2
	<i>II.IV</i>	6.1	2	3.1
	<i>III. Gender-Equality Awareness</i>			
	<i>III.I</i>	16.7	2	8.3
33.3	<i>III.II</i>	16.7	2	8.3

QUOTA

Larger Proportions (21-30%)	7
Mid-Level Action (16-20%)	5
Low-Level Action (10-15%)	3

Table 6: Gender Inclusion Index, equal weights/100: quota weights given
Source: researcher

In order to rank parties within each of the three overarching categories (*autonomy*, *inclusion*, and *gender inclusion*) each of the four parties' program (parti program) and by-laws (parti tuzuk) were analyzed in order to determine whether an indicator was present. Despite the ability to find most of the data from within political party documents, the categories included within *Gender Inclusion* required more specific questioning as gender indicators are not often clearly stated in party documents.

In order to obtain sufficient data to complete the *Gender Inclusion* category, the researcher adopted a qualitative method of inquiry, interviews. Female members of each party were interviewed over the course of one month, totaling in six interviews (AKP, 2; HDP, 2; CHP, 1; MHP, 1). Participants of these interviews varied from women in parliament and women auxiliary leaders to basic members. Those who volunteered were asked specific questions in relation to the indicators present in the gender inclusion dimension in order to determine each of the parties' *Gender Inclusion* value (see Appendices p. 132). Upon completion of the interviews they were assessed and the answers to specific indicator questions were used to determine the value given for the corresponding indicator. As a result, each party's levels of *Autonomy*, *Inclusion* and *Gender Inclusion* were able to be completed via the use of mixed-methods.

In addition to specific data collection, the interviews also targeted more subjective information about women's perceptions of female political solidarity in the country and within their parties. These questions were asked in order to create a deeper social story about women's positions and experiences within political parties and political life in Turkey.

Necessity of Mixed-Methods

It is due to this departure from a purely quantitative analysis that this research can be considered to have taken a mixed method approach. Hanson, et. al. (2005) defines mixed-method research as, “the collection, analysis and integration of quantitative and qualitative data in a single or multiphase study” (quoted in Hesse-Biber 2010, p. 3). By overlapping quantitative and qualitative lines of inquiry in order to collect the necessary data, this adheres to the basic definition of mixed-methods research. In addition, in comparison with Hesse-Biber’s (2010) reasons for conducting mixed methods analysis, this research ticks off four out of five boxes; *complementarity*, or the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods for permitting the researcher to gain a deeper social story of the underlying questions, *development*, when one or more methods helps to inform another method, *expansion*, the use of mixed methods in order to expand the knowledge related to a specific inquiry, and lastly, *initiation*, the use of mixed methods that hopes to lead to new questions or contradictions to be studied at a later time (p. 3-5).

By adopting a mixed method this research was able to determine quantitative values for qualitative indicators and was able to produce a magnified look at women’s experiences within political parties. It is because of the feminist nature, or women-centered focus of the research, that it was crucial that qualitative measures be introduced in order to understand the power struggles that cannot merely be seen in numbers.

Additionally, the qualitative aspect weighted heavily in informing the quantitative aspect of the third, *Gender Inclusion*, dimension. Formal documents rarely state the more nuanced obstacles that women may face when entering political life. Therefore, in this case mixed methods were used as a way to develop the primary method of quantitative comparative analysis.

The implementation of mixed methods also opened up new avenues for inquiry, something that is necessary in Turkish political party research. The newfound data produced by this study may allow for later researchers to examine new public policy initiatives, or probe deeper into the underlying issues among political parties further encouraging democratic initiation in regards to minority groups, or members as a whole.

Limitations

Although this research sought to be as holistically inclusive and as enveloping as possible, there is always room for error in this type of research. Several minimal obstacles that this research faced had to do with determining a democratic structure for evaluation of political parties, finding willing interview participants, and ensuring rapport.

Due to the circumspect nature of politics in Turkey, many women were hesitant to participate in interviews. Despite having been given the questions ahead of time, and with the guarantee that their anonymity would remain intact, many women did not respond to inquiries, or they directly refused. In order to navigate in the sensitive realm of Turkish politics it was imperative to establish connections and a name amongst the women members of parties. This was difficult, however, enabled the research to move forward and gain the perspectives of several women, at least one from each party.

In addition understanding how socio-cultural rules impact what is determined as democratic was among the biggest obstacles of this research. As previously discussed, democracy is fickle and has been interpreted many ways over time. Therefore, determining strict boundaries for comparison and rating a particular party was difficult. However, in response to the difficulties presented by the variant nature of democracy, this research altered the

foundational framework to host several more detailed indicators of democracy as derived from other researchers. More simply stated this research aimed to evaluate an exhaustive number of features representative of intra-party democracy.

Notwithstanding, this research faced a much greater obstacle, that of developing a new methodology to assess the overlap between IPD and gender. As there have not been many concrete studies conducted in this area, this presented a challenge. In addition to the lack of previous trials in this subject, the current methods put forward for assessing IPD wholly lack a gendered perspective. While this presented a major obstacle, it also has allowed this study to make headway in an argument for adapting current understandings of IPD to include a gender perspective.

Analysis

While Turkish political parties show variance in their ideology, foundations, socialization, etc., one thing they all share is the necessity to follow the outlined laws of the Turkish Constitution. The Turkish Political Party Law (TPPL), statute 2820, within the constitution mandates the organizational structures of Turkish political parties, and explains at which level and how they should uphold a form of internal party democracy. Therefore, the implications of the regulations are easily noticed within the results of several categories (Turkmen 2016).

Although the TPPL regulates such things as organization and some indicators of democracy, the parties still have room to make decisions. These areas present the largest gap between parties' approaches towards autonomy, inclusion, and gender inclusion. Areas concerning autonomy within the parties present less variation; however, the TPPL has left some

indicators more arbitrary than others. Such indicators include ‘member rights’ and ‘autonomy of local organizations’. Similarly, the *Inclusion* category presents a similar pattern, yet it leaves just one indicator with greater flexibility. ‘Direct participation of members in decision-making’ presented more varied scores among the parties than the other sub-categories assessed. The final category, *Gender Inclusion*, is where the parties show the most variance; this is due to the absent nature of gender from the TPPL. Moreover, it is a result of differing ideologies and approaches towards women’s inclusion in politics. Therefore, this category presents a deeper look at the differences in party ideology, whilst also reflecting the possible reasons for women’s greater or lesser descriptive and substantive representation within these four particular parties.

Subsequently, it is important that each of the parties and their level of *Autonomy*, *Inclusion*, and *Gender Inclusion* be assessed in order to draw clearer conclusions as to the relationship between internal democracy and gender inclusion within political parties in Turkey. The results of each party will be discussed below, moreover a comparison will be made in order to display the more finite nuances between parties, and how each of these indicators may negatively affect both the members of the party and women who are trying to gain stronger substantive and descriptive representation.

Finally, and very importantly, these results of this inquiry show the disparate nature between current methods of measuring IPD and gender inclusions categories. As a result, the need to adopt/form a gendered IPD measurement cannot be stressed enough.

1. Intra-party Democracy Analysis

1.1 Autonomy

Following the model of Goran Cular (2004), autonomy in this case represents the “extent to which the ‘party on the ground’,” the local organizations and, in the Turkish case, what would be considered the neighborhood organizational level, “can freely act and influence decision-making processes at different party levels” (p. 35). The level of influence and IPD associated with this level can vary from largely decentralized structures, which allow the party floor to be open to discussions, wherein the decisions of the party are heavily dependent on the local level, to very centralized structures where the decision-making is done wholly by the central party, or at the national level (p. 35).

Turkish parties, for the most part, are heavily centralized. This stems from the centralized nature that has been in place since the founding of the Turkish Republic. A more detailed examination of each party shows the centralized nature of the Turkish political system.

In terms of overall ranking of *Autonomy* within the four political parties, the CHP shows the greatest level of local autonomy with a score of 84 (83.92). This is followed by the HDP, who holds a positioning of 80 (79.81)¹. As a result, these two parties can be said to hold relatively decentralized positioning. Slightly more centralized is that of the MHP, 75 (75.22). The least autonomous party of the four is the AKP which presents a descent, placing the party at 62 (62.31) (Figure 3).

¹ As discussed previously in the methodology, parties that maintain higher scores show greater degrees of intra-party democracy. See p. 68




Figure 3: Party Weights in Reference to Autonomy
Source: Party by-laws and author's calculations

The CHP and the HDP show a greater level of local level autonomy than the more conservative parties amid the group. These two parties' identities and ideologies lean more towards the left. Both parties consider themselves socialist in some form; the CHP defines itself as a socially-democratic party. In recent years however, the HDP has suffered a moderate identity crisis, moving more towards the center than the left. Conversely, the HDP is a leftist party with ideological roots in radical democracy (People's Democratic Party 2016).² It is possible that the less conservative nature of the two parties has encouraged them to delineate greater autonomy towards their local branches.

Despite the decentralized tendencies of these parties, it was surprising to see that the CHP scored higher than the HDP, who prides itself of bringing the government to the local level in its promises and programs. With commitments to decentralization and the enfranchisement of minority groups, the party aims to increase rights from within the central government. Having spent years under the threshold of Parliament, the party has publically expressed its promises of using its newfound positioning (within Parliament) to bring forth increased rights for minority groups. Additionally, the party openly states that localized governing and the autonomy of those

² For more detailed party descriptions please see p. 17 where each party's ideology and history is discussed.

branches is crucial to democracy, however, party by-laws and organizational structure do not support this (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014). On the other hand, the CHP has not professed such demands, nor has made public statements about greater local autonomy. Its platform focused more on economic and educational improvements. Therefore, the aggregate weight scored by the CHP presents moderate surprise. One of the main reasons for this difference is that within the CHP party leaders do not have to be consulted when local nominees are being selected. However, within HDP, stated on page 46, clause 21, local government candidates must be selected by the party leadership (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014).

The greatest areas of difference within *Autonomy*, more specifically, were related to ‘member rights’ and in the ‘autonomy of local organizations’³. The AKP presented the most significant difference amongst the four parties. Whereas the other three parties maintained the similar values, the AKP presented a near ten-point weaker score (Figure 4). Conversely, the CHP presents a higher value in terms of the autonomy it grants to its local organizations. The CHP and the HDP’s local organizations have more autonomy, while the MHP and the AKP remain at a much lower level (Figure 5). These results can be even further specified by examining the sub-categories within ‘member rights’ and the ‘local organizational autonomy’.

³ ‘Member rights’ and ‘autonomy of local organizations’ has been discussed previously within the Methodology section. For a detailed look at the indicator and micro-indicators please see p. 53




Figure 4: Party Weights in Reference to Autonomy: Member Rights
Source Party by-laws and researcher's calculations




Figure 5: Party Weights in Reference to Autonomy: Autonomy of Local Organizations
Source Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

What causes the AKP to fall short of the other parties by ten or twenty points is in direct relation to ‘freedom of speech’, ‘the right to information and transparency of party management’, and the inability of members to establish factions or power blocs. The AKP does not defend its members’ rights to information and transparency within its by-laws. Unlike the AKP, the three remaining parties show direct reflection of these rights within their by-laws. For example, the MHP, states, “[P]arty members have the right to, in all forms, participate in all party activities, to state their ideas about these activities, and to petition against the party” (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2014, p. 26). In addition, the by-laws also state that “[P]arty members are the owners of

the rights to, either written or spoken, state their views concerning the party by-laws and party program to the party organization and its authorities” (p. 27). The CHP and HDP, too, show references to these particular member rights within their party by-laws (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2014, p. 17; (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014, p.35-36).

Despite the AKP’s lack of member’s rights to form faction and power-blocs, this is a trend that all four parties follow. In Turkey, establishing a power bloc or a faction within the party can be seen as a threat to the party cohesion as a whole. This is not to say that, in reality, faction and power blocs remain null, rather, that the party by-laws do not grant open permission for members to conduct such behavior. Nevertheless, all parties were assessed as ‘negative’ in this category due to the overall consensus among IPD theorists that factions allow for open discussion of opinions and can influence a party’s internal structure to change. Therefore, it is significant to note that all Turkish political parties lack this ability, which may be one of the barriers preventing greater internal change within the parties. It also reflects a systemic silencing of different views that may be presented within each party. Whilst informally present, party by-laws do not condone such behavior. As a result, members may be less inclined to voice differences in opinion, moreover, to form a power bloc that may bolster the development of internal structures.

It is important to examine the overall results of *Autonomy* within each party. Below the full indices and results of each party are displayed.

Table 7. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Autonomy Index and Results

		Autonomy	
1.1 Member Rights			
<i>1.1.1 General Rights</i>		5.6	
Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability)	0		
Right to be elected in open and free elections to any post within the party	5.6		
<i>1.1.2 Right to Form Factions</i>		0	
Freedom of Speech and Association within the Party	0		16.71
Ability to establish a faction/power bloc	0		
<i>1.1.3 Protection of Members Against Disciplinary Measures</i>		11.11	
Right not to be expelled without a fair proceeding	11.11		
1.2 Autonomy of Local Organizations			
<i>1.2.1 Autonomy in Decision-making</i>		14.4	
Concerning Local Structure	0		
Local structure determined by the local level			
Disciplinary Procedures	4.8		
Local disciplinary committee board is able to make final decisions			
Local body has the ability to call for a review of internal party democracy			
Local Election Selection Procedures	7.2		
Candidate selection done in accordance with each election area			
In-Person Ballot			
Secret Elections			
Local Coalitions	2.4		
<i>1.2.2 Prerogatives of Higher Levels in Local Affairs</i>		6.3	
in the procedure of disclosure of local organization	0		
in election and replacing local leadership	0		
Choices are limited by party leaders			
Party leaders must select nominees			
in calling local conventions	2.1		
central party organizes local level meetings			

20.7

central party plans the local agenda		
in local decision-making	0	
in coordinating local activities	4.2	
Local activities are organized by central body		
Funding for all local branches is equal		
1.3 Direct Influence of Local Bodies on Central-Level Decision-making		
through election of representatives for party conventions	8.3	
through election of members of central political and executive bodies	8.3	
through role in the selection procedure for national elections	0	24.9
through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute	8.3	
<i>AUTONOMY TOTAL</i>		62.3

Table 7: The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Autonomy Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 8. The People's Republican Party (CHP) Autonomy Index and Results

Autonomy		
1.1 Member Rights		
<i>1.1.1 General Rights</i>		11.11
Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability)	5.6	
Right to be elected in open and free elections to any post within the party	5.6	
<i>1.1.2 Right to Form Factions</i>		5.6
Freedom of Speech and Association within the Party	5.6	27.82
Ability to establish a faction/power bloc	0	
<i>1.1.3 Protection of Members Against Disciplinary Measures</i>		11.11
Right not to be expelled without a fair proceeding	11.11	
1.2 Autonomy of Local Organizations		
<i>1.2.1 Autonomy in Decision-making</i>		14.40
Concerning Local Structure	0	
Local structure determined by the local level		
Disciplinary Procedures	4.8	
Local disciplinary committee board is able to make final decisions		
Local body has the ability to call for a review of internal party democracy		
Local Election Selection Procedures	7.2	
Candidate selection done in accordance with each election area.		
In-Person Ballot		
Secret Elections		31.20
Local Coalitions	2.4	
<i>1.2.2 Prerogatives of Higher Levels in Local Affairs</i>		16.80
in the procedure of disclosure of local organization	2.1	
in election and replacing local leadership	4.2	
Choices are limited by party leaders		
Party leaders must select nominees		
in calling local conventions	4.2	
central party organizes local level meetings		
central party plans the local agenda		

in local decision-making	2.1
in coordinating local activities	4.2

Local activities are organized by central body

Funding for all local branches is equal

1.3 Direct Influence of Local Bodies on Central-Level Decision-making

through election of representatives for party conventions	8.3	
through election of members of central political and executive bodies	8.3	
through role in the selection procedure for national elections	0	24.90
through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute	8.3	

AUTONOMY TOTAL **83.92**

Table 8: The People's Republican Party (CHP) Autonomy Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 9. The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Autonomy Index and Results

Autonomy		
1.1 Member Rights		
<i>1.1.1 General Rights</i>		11.2
Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability)	5.6	
Right to be elected in open and free elections to any post within the party	5.6	
<i>1.1.2 Right to Form Factions</i>		5.6
Freedom of Speech and Association within the Party	5.6	27.91
Ability to establish a faction/power bloc	0	
<i>1.1.3 Protection of Members Against Disciplinary Measures</i>		11.11
Right not to be expelled without a fair proceeding	11.11	
1.2 Autonomy of Local Organizations		
<i>1.2.1 Autonomy in Decision-making</i>		14.4
Concerning Local Structure	0	
Local structure determined by the local level		
Disciplinary Procedures	4.8	
Local disciplinary committee board is able to make final decisions		
Local body has the ability to call for a review of internal party democracy		
Local Election Selection Procedures	7.2	
Candidate selection done in accordance with each election area.		
In-Person Ballot		27
Secret Elections		
Local Coalitions	2.4	
<i>1.2.2 Prerogatives of Higher Levels in Local Affairs</i>		12.6
in the procedure of disclosure of local organization	0	
in election and replacing local leadership	2.1	
Choices are limited by party leaders		
Party leaders must select nominees		
in calling local conventions	4.2	
central party organizes local level meetings		

central party plans the local agenda	
in local decision-making	2.1
in coordinating local activities	4.2

Local activities are organized by
central body

Funding for all local branches is equal

1.3 Direct Influence of Local Bodies on Central-Level Decision-making

through election of representatives for party conventions	8.3	
through election of members of central political and executive bodies	8.3	
through role in the selection procedure for national elections	0	24.9
through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute	8.3	
<i>AUTONOMY TOTAL</i>		79.81

Table 9 The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Autonomy Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 10. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Autonomy Index and Results

Autonomy			
1.1 Member Rights			
<i>1.1.1 General Rights.....</i>		11.11	
Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability)	5.6		
Right to be elected in open and free elections to any post within the party	5.6		
<i>1.1.2 Right to Form Factions.....</i>		5.6	
Freedom of Speech and Association within the Party	5.6		27.82
Ability to establish a faction/power bloc	0		
<i>1.1.3 Protection of Members Against Disciplinary Measures.....</i>		11.11	
Right not to be expelled without a fair proceeding	11.11		
1.2 Autonomy of Local Organizations			
<i>1.2.1 Autonomy in Decision-making.....</i>		12	
Concerning Local Structure	0		
Local structure determined by the local level			
Disciplinary Procedures	2.4		
Local disciplinary committee board is able to make final decisions			
Local body has the ability to call for a review of internal party democracy			
Local Election Selection Procedures	7.2		
Candidate selection done in accordance with each election area.			22.5
In-Person Ballot			
Secret Elections			
Local Coalitions	2.4		
<i>1.2.2 Prerogatives of Higher Levels in Local Affairs.....</i>		10.5	
in the procedure of disclosure of local organization	0		
in election and replacing local leadership	0		
Choices are limited by party leaders			
Party leaders must select nominees			
in calling local conventions	4.2		
central party organizes local level meetings			

central party plans the local agenda		
in local decision-making	2.1	
in coordinating local activities	4.2	
Local activities are organized by central body		
Funding for all local branches is equal		
1.3 Direct Influence of Local Bodies on Central-Level Decision-making		
through election of representatives for party conventions	8.3	
through election of members of central political and executive bodies	8.3	
through role in the selection procedure for national elections	0	24.9
through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute	8.3	
<i>AUTONOMY TOTAL</i>		75.22

Table 10 The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Autonomy Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

1.2 Inclusion

Inclusion is concerned with the assessment of participation measures taken by parties. In other words, this dimension investigates the inclusion of members within the decision-making processes. It evaluates the extent of participation of members specifically. It also aims to examine the influence of the more narrow-circles of leadership within the decision-making processes (Cular 2004). Susan Scarrow (1996) states that inclusion

“[I]ndicates the height of barriers separating party members from other supporters. The height of these barriers is partly determined by the extent of duties and privileges attached to party membership...the most inclusive parties are those which blur all distinctions between members and supporters” (p. 30).

It is therefore the inclusion category that indicates how and in what capacity members may participate within a party. Moreover, it is inclusion that shows the barriers that party members or supporters may face when trying to influence and participate in party politics.

In the Turkish case, parties have often come short of representing their members and in allowing for members to engage in decision-making and the internal politics of the party. Rather, on a larger scale, Turkish political parties have, as Türkmen (2016) states, “often fallen short of meeting these [IPD standards put forward in the 1962 and 1982 military constitutions] criteria” (p. 12). It is therefore interesting to see the results from the parties in the area of inclusion. Overall, the parties scored rather high and almost equal in terms of inclusion, obtaining around 85 points (Figure 6).




Figure 6: Party Weights in Reference to Inclusion
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

The party scoring the highest remains the HDP, a reoccurring trend throughout the analysis of IPD. Despite the expectation that parties would differ much more greatly in terms of inclusion of members, each of the scores remains relatively equal. The highest ranking party, the HDP, trumps by a mere point. An interesting perspective here is the subtle difference presented in HDP party inclusion. All sub-dimensions are equally valued within the Inclusion category besides the direct participation of members in decision-making (Figure 7).

While it is stated in all party by-laws that majority rule voting is prescribed in all internal elections, decisions, etc. only the HDP allows for members to demand the representation of interparty minorities. Within the party by-laws minority member rights and participation structures are supported. Among the party's stated purposes, there are continual references to minority groups both within the party and without. In three specific areas, clause 2 sections f, g, and h, the party by-laws refer to women's equality, LGBTQ rights, and the equality of citizens within the country (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014, p. 1-2). Following these stated beliefs of the party, the party by-laws, in reference to member rights state that members

“can request meetings to inform and discuss party policies, they may request to re-examine and take back provisions within the party by-laws, and inform/request for response from each of the party organizational levels concerning their opinions and criticisms of the party” (p. 6, clause 8).

In addition, the HDP’s by-laws support the following of prescriptions set forward in the party by-laws, any disobedience thereof can be reported to the disciplinary or reconciliation board (p. 13, clause 19/20). In comparison with the remaining three parties, the HDP presents fair and inclusionary measures, in its party by-laws, for minority groups within and without the party itself.




Figure 7: Direct Participation of Members in Selection Procedures
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Although the HDP has gained a one-point advantage concerning inclusion, the party by-laws, overall, remain largely democratic. The slight difference between the parties can be seen in the data results. Below the overall *Inclusion* indices and results of each party are displayed.

Table 11. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Inclusion Index and Results

*INCLUSION***2.1 Direct Participation of Members**

<i>2.1.1 in direct decision-making and elections.....</i>		11.1	
ability to influence the party platform and agenda	3.7		
ability to elect the leadership and recall it	3.7		
right to participate in all internal elections	3.7		
<i>2.1.2 in selection procedures.....</i>		5.6	27.8
right to choose party nominees/eliminate undesirable candidates from lists	5.6		
right to demand equal representation of interparty minorities and majority rule voting	0		
<i>2.1.3 in initiatives towards central level.....</i>	<i>11.11</i>	11.1	
2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies			
<i>2.2.1 At the central level.....</i>		11.2	
in passing statute and political program	5.6		
in election of members of central political and executive bodies	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
<i>2.2.2 At the local level.....</i>		11.2	22.4
in election of members of local executive bodies	5.6		
in election of representatives for conventions at higher level	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.3 Prerogatives of the party president			
<i>2.3.1 in personal matters.....</i>		11.2	
right to propose/appoint vice-president	5.6		
right to propose/appoint other member of central bodies	5.6		
rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member	0		27.8
<i>2.3.2 in selection procedure.....</i>		16.6	
at the central level	8.3		
at the local level	8.3		

INCLUSION TOTAL**78**

Table 11 The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 12. The People's Republican Party (CHP) Inclusion Index and Results

<i>INCLUSION</i>			
2.1 Direct Participation of Members			
<i>2.1.1 in direct decision-making and elections.....</i>		11.1	
ability to influence the party platform and agenda	3.7		
ability to elect the leadership and recall it	3.7		
right to participate in all internal elections	3.7		
<i>2.1.2 in selection procedures.....</i>		5.6	27.8
right to choose party nominees/eliminate undesirable candidates from lists	5.6		
right to demand equal representation of interparty minorities and majority rule voting	0		
<i>2.1.3 in initiatives towards central level.....</i>	11.11	11.1	
2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies			
<i>2.2.1 At the central level.....</i>		11.2	
in passing statute and political program	5.6		
in election of members of central political and executive bodies	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
<i>2.2.2 At the local level.....</i>		11.2	22.4
in election of members of local executive bodies	5.6		
in election of representatives for conventions at higher level	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.3 Prerogatives of the party president			
<i>2.3.1 in personal matters.....</i>		16.8	
right to propose/appoint vice-president	5.6		
right to propose/appoint other member of central bodies	5.6		
rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member	5.6		33.4
<i>2.3.2 in selection procedure.....</i>		16.6	
at the central level	8.3		
at the local level	8.3		
INCLUSION TOTAL			83.6

Table 12 The People's Republican Party (CHP) Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 13. The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Inclusion Index and Results

<i>INCLUSION</i>			
2.1 Direct Participation of Members			
2.1.1 in direct decision-making and elections.....		7.4	
ability to influence the party platform and agenda	0		
ability to elect the leadership and recall it	3.7		
right to participate in all internal elections	3.7		
2.1.2 in selection procedures.....		11.11	29.62
right to choose party nominees/eliminate undesirable candidates from lists	5.6		
right to demand equal representation of interparty minorities and majority rule voting	5.6		
2.1.3 in initiatives towards central level.....	11.11	11.11	
2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies			
2.2.1 At the central level.....		11.2	
in passing statute and political program	5.6		
in election of members of central political and executive bodies	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.2.2 At the local level.....		11.2	22.4
in election of members of local executive bodies	5.6		
in election of representatives for conventions at higher level	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.3 Prerogatives of the party president			
2.3.1 in personal matters.....		16.6	
right to propose/appoint vice-president	5.6		
right to propose/appoint other member of central bodies	5.6		
rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member	5.6		33.3
2.3.2 in selection procedure.....		16.6	
at the central level	8.3		
at the local level	8.3		
INCLUSION TOTAL			85.42

Table 13 The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

Table 14. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Inclusion Index and Results

<i>INCLUSION</i>			
2.1 Direct Participation of Members			
2.1.1 in direct decision-making and elections.....		7.4	
ability to influence the party platform and agenda	0		
ability to elect the leadership and recall it	3.7		
right to participate in all internal elections	3.7		
2.1.2 in selection procedures.....		5.6	24.1
right to choose party nominees/eliminate undesirable candidates from lists	5.6		
right to demand equal representation of interparty minorities and majority rule voting	0		
2.1.3 in initiatives towards central level.....	11.11	11.1	
2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies			
2.2.1 At the central level.....		11.2	
in passing statute and political program	5.6		
in election of members of central political and executive bodies	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.2.2 At the local level.....		11.2	22.4
in election of members of local executive bodies	5.6		
in election of representatives for conventions at higher level	5.6		
in selection procedures	0		
2.3 Prerogatives of the party president			
2.3.1 in personal matters.....		16.8	
right to propose/appoint vice-president	5.6		
right to propose/appoint other member of central bodies	5.6		
rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member	5.6		33.4
2.3.2 in selection procedure.....		16.6	
at the central level	8.3		
at the local level	8.3		
INCLUSION TOTAL			79.9

Table 14 The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

1.3 Concluding Remarks: Intra-party Democracy and the Typology of Turkish Parties

According to Cular's (2004) principles, the results have been assessed on a two-dimensional scale; *Autonomy* and *Inclusion*⁴. These two categories are dependent on one another in that they present the ability to determine party typology based on two-dimensions. This dependency presents four party types; 'low democracy', 'democratic centralism', 'individual elitist', and 'full democracy'⁵

Given that the parties maintain high levels of autonomy, according to Cular's methodology, which has been adopted here; these parties may fall into two types. The parties may either be an "individual-elitist" or "full democracy" party⁶, the determinant of which is inclusion. The greater the level of inclusion the more democratic the party will become. If a party maintains a high level of inclusion (greater than 50), it will be considered a "full democracy" party, if it, however, scores less in terms of inclusion the party will (with these high levels of autonomy) be considered an "individual-elitist" party (p. 35).

Additionally, with reference to the two-dimensional scale, in terms of inclusion, the Turkish political parties may fall within the category of 'democratic centralization', or 'full democracy'. This is possible when parties score 50 or higher in the inclusion category, the determinant of which category, overall, the party will be placed in is dependent upon the level of autonomy within that party.

As a result of the parties' high ranking among both categories (Figure 8), it is clear that Turkish political parties fall within the 'full democracy' type (Figure 9). As seen in the figure, parties maintain, within their party by-laws, to a greater or lesser extent, democratic structures. It

⁴ Please see the methodology section for greater detail concerning *Autonomy* and *Inclusion* see p. 53

⁵ Detailed descriptions of each typology are presented within the methodology section. Please reference p. 58 for more details.

follows that each of the Turkish political parties, place relatively similar values on their members' rights, decision-making abilities, and their direct participation in internal affairs within their party by-laws and programs.




Figure 8 Party Weights in Reference to Autonomy and Inclusion (Displayed as Aggregates)
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations




Figure 9: Two-Dimensional Assessments of IPD: Four Turkish Political Parties
Source: Party by-laws and researcher's calculations

The overarching similarities between the parties could be the outcome of contagion; the idea that as one party changes its stance towards a more inclusive structure, it often gains greater support and other parties begin to follow suit. Often used in relation to women's political representation (Matland & Studlar 1996), this social-behavioral reflection can also be applied to

other parts of IPD, such as inclusion. Although contagion may be a factor, these scores are much more likely the outcomes of the organizational structures determined by the TPPL. Turkish political parties maintain homogeneity as a result of the centralized forces controlling their organization, in addition to the cultural norms within Turkish politics. The overarching political cultures of Turkey, including the TPPL, play a significant role in how political parties arrange themselves, moreover, how inclusive their party may be (Turkmen 2016). Bülent Tanör (cited in Turkmen 2016) argues that this is also a result of the cultural, educational, and overall understanding of democracy in Turkey (p. 13). Thus, the results of the inclusion category represent an overarching socio-cultural model for membership and member inclusion in decision-making processes.

Although the results are satisfying, they are limited in that they do not tell the on-the-ground values that can be seen in daily politics within the country. These results are based on promises and goals, not actual impact or realization. The assessment of the realizations requires further research.

For many years Turkish political parties have, continually, been regarded as rather undemocratic. Why is it then that the parties present such high scores? One possible answer for such despondence may be the lack of structures to regulate, monitor, and supervise parties in light of their adherence to their stated practices. More clearly, although the 1962 and 1982 military constitutions gave special reference to IPD, the country has continually failed to increase the level of democracy in real life. Rather, the coerced organizational structures and internal procedures have yet to produce on-the-ground results of greater democracy. Cular (2004), Tanör (1997), and Önal (2007), have all argued that there are underlying factors as to why the level of practiced democracy within each party remains low. One of the given reasons is the lack of

respect shown towards democratic procedure and internal democracy by Turkish politicians. The other assumed factor is that the laws associated with political parties and IPD have been poorly written, further “lacking any real institutional design for working IPD” (Cular 2004, p. 12). Thus, it comes as no surprise that many of the regulations that have been set forward go on disregarded.

As a result of the rather theoretical basis for democracy within the country, it is undeniable that members’ rights and access to political decisions are often times handicapped. What is unknown is how these ‘democratic structures’ affect women’s entrance and representation within political parties, and largely politics in Turkey. It is therefore, suiting to examine how gender structures align within the overall image of IPD to gain a sharper image of membership participation and the obstacles that women, as members and as a minority group, may face.

2. Missing Link in the Analysis of Intra-party Democracy: Gender Perspective

2.1 Gender Inclusion Dimension

The category of *gender inclusion* seeks to examine the level of inclusive structures that each of the four political parties maintain in order to advance both women’s substantive and descriptive representation within political parties.

In terms of gender, the four political parties showed wider variations than within the *Autonomy* or *Inclusion* categories. *Gender Inclusion* points range from forty-two to eighty-four. The highest scoring party is the HDP (84). It is, not closely, followed by the CHP (69), the MHP (50), and the AKP (42) (Figure 10).




Figure 10: Party Weights in Reference to Gender Inclusion
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

The areas affecting such differences in positioning have to do with positive action measures and gender equality awareness. Considering that each party maintains a women's branch, it is not surprising to see little difference between the active functioning of these groups. Rather, the women's branches of the parties are the only areas where the political parties showed similarities.

In light of positive action measures, there are only two parties among the four that have taken action. The HDP and the CHP both employ positive action measures in the form of party quotas. Yet, these two parties differ in their application of such quota measures. The HDP has the highest gender quota among the parties; in all leadership positions throughout the party (local and national) a fifty-percent quota has been employed. This quota system takes equal participation to a new level within Turkish political parties and, as was stated by one of the HDP interviewees,

"[T]his is something new among political parties, we as a party had to fight to ensure that our co-chairmanship could be applied at the local levels. Within the TPPL and Turkish governmental system, this is new; we received a lot of push-back" (HDP 2017, pers.comm., 24 May).

The CHP, on the other hand, has implemented a ten percent quota to ensure women's participation within politics and within the CHP. Unlike the HDP, the CHP values women's contributions to politics, yet has not made the leap towards higher, more substantial quota percentages. In addition, the implementation of such quotas has been spoken ill-off within the party. During an interview, one CHP representative stated that she personally does not favor quotas, as they have been corrupted within her party (CHP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May). Despite her negative attitude towards quotas, many studies have found that by introducing quotas into parties, those parties begin to adopt more gender-aware structures and policies, leading to not only substantive but also descriptive representation (Krook 2009). Therefore, quotas have often been depicted as the temporary solution of discrepancy in women's representation within political parties.

Subsequently, the parties who lack gender quotas leave little space for women to gain strongholds within their parties. Moreover, they have scored lower in terms of gender inclusiveness and gender equality awareness within their political parties. In terms of positive action measures, the parties differ by upwards of twenty points (Figure 11). These numbers are a direct result of quotas, and the insurance that candidate lists represent women and men equally. When gender becomes an important factor among parties, it often follows that the candidate selection and listing mechanism changes, enhancing women's ability to be elected. What the Turkish parties present, however, is a mixed approach towards positive action measures. Notwithstanding, these outcomes were to be expected, as the debate surrounding the adoption of gender quotas and positive action measures has presented many oppositional views from women within Turkish political parties.




Figure 11: Party Weights in Reference to Gender Inclusion: Positive Action Measures
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

It is not only positive action measures in the form of gender quotas and gender sensitive election procedures that reflect a party's gender inclusivity. Rather, there are precautions that can also be taken to encourage greater inclusion. These include gender sensitive modes of operation. One of the greatest possible barriers for women to become active politicians who take on greater leadership is their second job, being a wife and/or mother. The responsibilities of the home, which, in Turkish culture remain the place of the woman, can present large obstacles for women with political ambitions. It was therefore important to examine how each of the four political parties operates from within a gendered perspective (Table 15).

Table 15. Gender Sensitive Modes of Party Operation

<i>Party</i>	<i>Working hours</i>	<i>Dates/Times of Meetings</i>	<i>Amount of time required for social service</i>	<i>Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism</i>	<i>Day care services, child care centers, etc.</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Total Obtainable Value from the indicator</i>
Justice and Development Party (AKP)	0	1.2	1.2	0	0	2.4	6.1
Republican People's Party (CHP)	0	1.2	1.2	1.2	0	3.6	6.1
People's Democratic Party (HDP)	0	1.2	1.2	1.2	0	3.6	6.1
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)	0	1.2	1.2	0	0	2.4	6.1

Table 15: Gender Sensitive Modes of Party Operation
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

The table depicts little variation between the parties in terms of overall score in relation to the party operation. None of the parties present completely gender-sensitive operating structures as they all lack gender sensitive working hours. They additionally all lack a formal daycare facility wherein women members and leaders may bring their children whilst working for the party. When asked, all women, from each party, stated that there are no formal working hours within the political party. Most stated that working hours were seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day (HDP 2017, pers.comm., 24 May; CHP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May; MHP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May; AKP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May). These demanding hours, while possibly rewarding, present a barrier to the average woman who maintains her role as mother and wife.

Although none of the women present in the interviews showed contempt towards these working hours, when combined with the lack of daycare facilities within the party, the long hours may prevent some women, with political ambitions from taking on the demanding hours of political parties.

Despite the sense of reward and pride that the women interviewed felt for being active within their parties, the majority of them showed disappointment with the lack of daycare facilities within their party. All parties, besides the AKP stated that they knew the benefits that daycare could provide the women in the parties, however, for the time being extenuating circumstances eliminated the possibility of such facilities. Two women from the AKP expressed that women with children participate in their party and that the party itself is like one big family. Therefore, there is not a need for daycare facilities, other women members of the party will look after the children while the mother is working (AKP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May). This is an informal system, and it relies, again, on a women's network where women "pass" their children off on other women so that they may participate in the party. Adversely, an interviewee from the HDP expressed her desire for such a system, however, she stated, "at the moment, with all of the things going on and with the lack of money, we do not have the resources, nor the security for such an organization...that is not to say we have not discussed it, rather that it is not feasible currently" (HDP 2017, pers.comm., 24 May). One member from the MHP stated something similar,

"we are certainly allowed to bring our children to the party headquarters, to expose them to the ideology of the party and to raise them within the party, however, we lack a formal structure that may allow for mothers to bring their children, it is something that I think we should consider" (MHP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May).

As a result it is possible to say that the long working hours and the lack of a formal daycare structure may present definite barriers to women's participation within political parties. The lack of such organizations does not make women's participation impossible, what it stresses is that women may have to sacrifice other things to be able to juggle family, and work life.

In addition to gender sensitive party operation, the parties also show variance concerning gender equality awareness (Figure 12). Leading the parties in gender equity awareness is that of the HDP (33.2). With nearly a perfect score, the HDP holds gender equality as one of its main party purposes; moreover it clearly elaborates reaching gender equality within its party and externally, throughout the nation, as one of its main promises. Within its purpose statement, within the party by-laws, the HDP states, "[O]ne of our party's goals is to counter gender inequality, the patriarchal system, and the prevalence of violence against women in every area of economic, political, and social life" (Halkların Demokratik Partisi 2014, p. 2). Throughout the party's policies and promises, the call for equality is continually reiterated.




Figure 12: Party Weights in Reference to Gender Inclusion: Gender Equality Awareness
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

Following, the CHP holds gender as an important part of the party, while also promising gender equality in its promises. Notwithstanding the discussion of equality within the CHP is

reflective of its center-left ideology. Rather than making bold, radical statements concerning gender equality, the CHP often refers to women's equality in a less determinant way "[O]ne of the purposes of the Republican People's Party is make gender equality applicable in all areas of social life and to prevent all types of violence against women" (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 2014, p. 9). In comparison with the more radical and area specific statement by the HDP, the CHP, while still supporting gender equality, less often reiterates its stance towards gender equality. When it does, it often approaches with a less direct linguistic style.

Although the CHP and HDP share similar amounts of gender equality awareness in their parties, they differ on one aspect in particular, gender audits⁷. Unlike the HDP, no other party undertakes regular gender audits ensuring the most up-to-date analyses of the party's developments towards gender equality (Table 16). This makes the HDP an anomaly amongst these four parties and results in the party having greater gender inclusivity.

⁷ According to Norris & Krook 2014, "a political party gender audit, or 'self-assessment', is a methodology for assessing party processes, procedures, structures, culture and activities from a gendered perspective, with the aim of identifying discriminatory practices—whether direct or indirect, formal or informal—that can perpetuate gender inequality and hinder women from advancing in their political careers" (p. 50).

Table 16. Gender Equality Awareness

Party Statutes		Party Records				
<i>Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value</i>	<i>Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party</i>	<i>Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated</i>	<i>Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women</i>			
Party			Total	Total Obtainable Value		
Justice and Development Party (AKP)	0	0	8.3	0	8.3	33.3
Republican People's Party (CHP)	8.3	8.3	8.3	0	24.9	33.3
People's Democratic Party (HDP)	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3	33.2	33.3
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)	0	8.3	8.3	0	16.6	33.3

Table 16: Gender Equality Awareness

Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

The least successful of the parties in the area of gender equality awareness are both the AKP and the MHP. Both parties held scores that were nearly ten points lower than their socialist counterparts. The AKP scored less than ten points out of a possible 33.3. Similarly, but to a lesser extreme, the MHP scored just 16.6. In neither party is gender equality listed as a basic party value or promise. Rather, the MHP refers more generally to human rights (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi 2014, p. 18). While this is amiable, it leaves space for the determinant of who deserves rights. While human rights mean all humans, it is often just a coverall that does not

necessarily constitute the direct rights of women, or women's rights. More drastically, the AKP does not refer to gender or human rights within its values. Rather, the by-laws continually discuss society as one large family, and relationships between individuals. The only time that it comes close to an acknowledgement of women is when it discusses the family,

“AK Party acknowledges family as the fundamental unit of Turkish society, and believes that the family, acting as a bridge between the past and the future, is the most fundamental and indispensable social unit in terms of transferring our national values, emotions, thoughts, and our unique customs and traditions to new generations” (AK Parti 2015, p. 14).

Rather than discussing the equal role of women in society, or placing value on their participation within the economic and social world, the closest reference the party gives towards women's roles has to do with the family, and the obvious role that women play in bridging the past and future generations of Turks.

What is clear, then, is that the parties, who have placed more emphasis on gender equality awareness, are also those who have adopted gender quotas and positive action measures. Moreover, the data collected and the variance displayed relates to the ideologies and approaches towards gender that each party has adopted. Overall, these scores show greater insight into the barriers that women face when engaging with political parties. Moreover, they indicate starting points for reform and development.

For a closer examination of indices and results, the index and results tables, for each party, have been displayed below.

Table 17. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results

GENDER INCLUSION

3.1 Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)			
<i>3.1.1 Establishment/Actions</i>		11.1	
Autonomous (has the ability to determine auxiliary activities/initiatives)	3.7		
Active (Holding meetings and events regularly)	3.7		
Publicly-visible (Is well known for participating in community activities, etc.)	3.7		
<i>3.1.2 Role in Intra-Party Democracy</i>		11.2	27.9
Meets regularly to discuss party matters/organization matters	5.6		
Holds discussions, open to the public to discuss engagement in politics	5.6		
<i>3.1.3 Extra-Party Relations</i>		5.6	
with NGOs	5.6		
with other party women's auxiliaries	0		
3.2 Positive Action Measures			
<i>3.2.1 The party has developed a gender quota</i>		0	
Larger Proportions (20-30%)			
Mid-Level Action (15-20%)			
Low-Level Action (10-15%)			
<i>3.2.2 Election/Candidate Selection Procedures</i>		3.1	
Clearly stated/transparent selection procedures are in place within the party	3.1		
Ensure balanced participation in all decision-making bodies, electoral lists, and nominated/appointed positions	0		
<i>3.2.3 Adoption of gender sensitive modes of party operation</i>		2.4	5.5
Working hours	0		
Dates/Times of Meetings	1.2		
Amount of time required for social service	1.2		
Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism	0		
Day care services, child care centers, etc.	0		
<i>3.2.4 Distribution of Party Resources</i>		0	
including equal distribution of funds for the women's auxiliary	0		
equal distribution of funds and brochures for women candidates	0		
3.3 Gender Equality Awareness			
<i>3.3.1 Party Statutes</i>		0	8.3
Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value	0		

Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party	0	
3.3.2 Party Records.....		8.3
Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated	8.3	
Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women	0	
GENDER INCLUSION TOTAL		41.7

Table 17 The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

Table 18. The People's Republican Party (CHP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results

GENDER INCLUSION

3.1 Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)			
<i>3.1.1 Establishment/Actions.....</i>		11.1	
Autonomous (has the ability to determine auxiliary activities/initiatives)	3.7		
Active (Holding meetings and events regularly)	3.7		
Publically-visible (Is well known for participating in community activities, etc.)	3.7		
<i>3.1.2 Role in Intra-Party Democracy.....</i>		11.2	27.9
Meets regularly to discuss party matters/organization matters	5.6		
Holds discussions, open to the public to discuss engagement in politics	5.6		
<i>3.1.3 Extra-Party Relations.....</i>		5.6	
with NGOs	5.6		
with other party women's auxiliaries	0		
3.2 Positive Action Measures			
<i>3.2.1 The party has developed a gender quota.....</i>		3	
Larger Proportions (20-30%)			
Mid-Level Action (15-20%)			
Low-Level Action (10-15%)	3		
<i>3.2.2 Election/Candidate Selection Procedures.....</i>		6.2	
Clearly stated/transparent selection procedures are in place within the party	3.1		
Ensure balanced participation in all decision-making bodies, electoral lists, and nominated/appointed positions	3.1		
<i>3.2.3 Adoption of gender sensitive modes of party operation.....</i>		3.6	15.9
Working hours	0		
Dates/Times of Meetings	1.2		
Amount of time required for social service	1.2		
Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism	1.2		
Day care services, child care centers, etc.	0		
<i>3.2.4 Distribution of Party Resources.....</i>		3.1	
including equal distribution of funds for the women's auxiliary	3.1		
equal distribution of funds and brochures for women candidates	0		
3.3 Gender Equality Awareness			
<i>3.3.1 Party Statutes.....</i>		16.6	
Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value	8.3		
Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party	8.3		
			24.9

3.3.2 Party Records.....		8.3
Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated	8.3	
Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women	0	
GENDER INCLUSION TOTAL		68.7

Table 18 The People's Republican Party (CHP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

Table 19. The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results

GENDER INCLUSION

3.1 Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)

<i>3.1.1 Establishment/Actions.....</i>		11.1	
Autonomous (has the ability to determine auxiliary activities/initiatives)	3.7		
Active (Holding meetings and events regularly)	3.7		
Publically-visible (Is well known for participating in community activities, etc.)	3.7		
			27.9
<i>3.1.2 Role in Intra-Party Democracy.....</i>		11.2	
Meets regularly to discuss party matters/organization matters	5.6		
Holds discussions, open to the public to discuss engagement in politics	5.6		
<i>3.1.3 Extra-Party Relations.....</i>		5.6	
with NGOs	5.6		
with other party women's auxiliaries	0		
3.2 Positive Action Measures			
<i>3.2.1 The party has developed a gender quota.....</i>		7	
Larger Proportions (20-30%)	7		
Mid-Level Action (15-20%)			
Low-Level Action (10-15%)			
<i>3.2.2 Election/Candidate Selection Procedures.....</i>		6.2	
Clearly stated/transparent selection procedures are in place within the party	3.1		
Ensure balanced participation in all decision-making bodies, electoral lists, and nominated/appointed positions	3.1		
			23
<i>3.2.3 Adoption of gender sensitive modes of party operation.....</i>		3.6	
Working hours	0		
Dates/Times of Meetings	1.2		
Amount of time required for social service	1.2		
Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism	1.2		
Day care services, child care centers, etc.	0		
<i>3.2.4 Distribution of Party Resources.....</i>		6.2	
including equal distribution of funds for the women's auxiliary	3.1		
equal distribution of funds and brochures for women candidates	3.1		
3.3 Gender Equality Awareness			
<i>3.3.1 Party Statutes.....</i>		16.6	
Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value	8.3		
Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party	8.3		
			33.2
<i>3.3.2 Party Records.....</i>		16.6	
Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated	8.3		

Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women

8.3

GENDER INCLUSION TOTAL

84.1

Table 19 The People's Democratic Party (HDP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

Table 20. The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results

GENDER INCLUSION			
3.1 Gender Equity Organization (Women's Auxiliary)			
3.1.1 Establishment/Actions.....		11.1	
Autonomous (has the ability to determine auxiliary activities/initiatives)	3.7		
Active (Holding meetings and events regularly)	3.7		
Publically-visible (Is well known for participating in community activities, etc.)	3.7		
3.1.2 Role in Intra-Party Democracy.....		11.2	27.9
Meets regularly to discuss party matters/organization matters	5.6		
Holds discussions, open to the public to discuss engagement in politics	5.6		
3.1.3 Extra-Party Relations.....		5.6	
with NGOs	5.6		
with other party women's auxiliaries	0		
3.2 Positive Action Measures			
3.2.1 The party has developed a gender quota.....		0	
Larger Proportions (20-30%)			
Mid-Level Action (15-20%)			
Low-Level Action (10-15%)			
3.2.2 Election/Candidate Selection Procedures.....		3.1	
Clearly stated/transparent selection procedures are in place within the party	3.1		
Ensure balanced participation in all decision-making bodies, electoral lists, and nominated/appointed positions	0		
3.2.3 Adoption of gender sensitive modes of party operation.....		2.4	5.5
Working hours	0		
Dates/Times of Meetings	1.2		
Amount of time required for social service	1.2		
Gender-Discrimination and misconduct complaint mechanism	0		
Day care services, child care centers, etc.	0		
3.2.4 Distribution of Party Resources.....		0	
including equal distribution of funds for the women's auxiliary	0		
equal distribution of funds and brochures for women candidates	0		
3.3 Gender Equality Awareness			
3.3.1 Party Statutes.....		8.3	
Gender equality is mentioned as a basic party value	0		
Gender-equality priorities are elaborated- promises of the party	8.3		16.6
3.3.2 Party Records.....		8.3	
Keeps updated records of all party members that are gender segregated	8.3		
Undertakes regular gender audits to identify processes and practices that may discriminate against women	0		
GENDER INCLUSION TOTAL			50

Table 20 The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Gender Inclusion Index and Results
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

2.2 Concluding Remarks: The overlap between gender and Intra-party Democracy

This research aimed to determine the relationship between IPD and gender inclusion. It asked the question of whether as a party became more internally more democratic, if gender inclusivity would also increase. What the data has shown is that there is, in the Turkish case, no correlation between increased IPD and gender inclusion (Figure 13 & Figure 14). Rather, the results of *Gender Inclusion* were much more varied than those presented by the *Autonomy* and *Inclusion* categories. This was a result of the more arbitrary nature of gender inclusion. Due to the fact that the TPPL does not specify gender regulation, each party may approach the matter in accordance with their ideologies and foundational principles. A benefit of the arbitrate quality of gender inclusion is that it may be a better indicator of democratic principles within political parties.




Figure 13: Party Weights Displayed as Overall Aggregates
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations




Figure 14: Relationship between Gender Inclusion and IPD (Autonomy and Inclusion)
Source: Interviews, party by-laws and the researcher's calculations

What is apparent from the data is that parties who have adopted positive action measures, have fared better within the *Gender Inclusion* category. Parties such as the AKP and MHP showed the lowest levels of *Gender Inclusion*. An explanation for these low results may have to do with the parties' outlook towards gender and gender quotas. For example, in the early 2000s, at the start of the AKP's political success, the debate concerning women's representation in politics took center stage. Many organizations had called for a nation-wide implementation of gender quotas. Ayata and Tütüncü (2008) have extensively discussed the argument put forward by women's organizations such as KA-DER. They show that the organizations argued that the male dominated sphere of politics was their obstacle, not a lack of ambition. Moreover, that in order to break the patriarchal domination of politics, especially within Turkey, a 30% quota was necessary (p. 375). What had initially seemed like positive discussions and debates soon turned to disappointment. Unfortunately, the law never passed and the constitutional statutes were not changed.

This was the direct result of women's voices from among the leading AKP who had stated that women's quotas were unnecessary and that if women wanted to gain seats in

parliament, or within parties, they could do so on their own (Ayata & Tütüncü 2008, p. 375). In fact, one party member, Fatma Şahin, who was a great public figure for women of the AKP at the time, believed that ready-made positions were detrimental to women's status within politics and that the women should be engaged via the women's branches, a place of women's political education (p. 375). It is therefore rather expected that the AKP would not have adopted gender quotas, and also refrained from implementing zippered lists for equal candidate selection procedures. In addition, their stance towards positive action measures, in the form of quotas, helps to explain their low level of gender inclusivity.

Similarly, the MHP refrains from introducing positive action measures; something that one member says she wishes would change. Her comment was that, every year the women of the party go forward seeking more representation and more equality. They are often given the response that the upcoming year will be different and women will begin to see more equality and positioning within the party, however, in her opinion, it remains a statement of promise rather than a practical experience (MHP 2017, pers.comm., 31 May). It again, does not present a surprise that the MHP, too, remains a party without gender quotas or representative selection procedures.

Another surprising aspect is the overall lack of correlation between IPD and *Gender Inclusion*. One possibility to explain the lack of correlation may be caused by the lack of realistic assessments of *Autonomy* and *Inclusion* within the political parties. The research examined the party programs, and by-laws to establish their level of autonomy and inclusion, while the category of gender inclusion utilized both formal documentation and interviews to establish the parties' rankings. Therefore, what the data displays, in terms of IPD, is heavily dependent upon the written promises and theoretical approaches towards party organization. Moreover, the IPD

results present each party as fully democratic. Yet, when considering the very low levels of gender inclusivity within these parties, it is clear to see that, in practice there is room for improvement and may not be considered as fully democratic in terms of the practical autonomy and inclusion.

Conclusion

Women's representation in politics, throughout the world, remains a problem. Despite women as making-up half of the world population, they are still considered a minority group whose rights have yet to be fully achieved. Although there have been many inquiries into the subject and many initiatives, worldwide, to increase the number of women working in politics, there remains a gap.

This research examined the Turkish case where women's political representation at both the national and local levels remains disproportionately low. Although the subject of Turkish women's political representation has been discussed, the existing research fails to examine the role that political parties may play. Most existing research has examined women's feelings towards their positions, parliamentary issues, and the more socio-political role of religion within politics (namely the headscarf issue). Even though the previous work has detailed many important factors for women's low representation within the country, a more pointed inquiry into political parties and their structures was, and continues to be, needed.

Political parties are the foundation of politics within a given country; they are the place where leaders are educated in political experience. Furthermore, they are the gateway to positions to parliament and higher leadership positions within the government. As a result of their importance, it is odd that inquiring into their impact on women's representation has not

played a more significant role within WPP research. It was in this gap that the research found a stronghold.

Although women's representation and role within political parties has been left on the backburner in the Turkish context, several researchers, mainly from law backgrounds, have examined political parties in Turkey in terms of their democratic value. What they have discussed however, does not rank parties in terms of their level of IPD, rather they have discussed the feasibility and reality thereof within Turkish political parties. Moreover, in the overall discussion of IPD an assessment of women's placement, or how IPD affects women has yet to be addressed. Despite the efforts of some researchers, this has left room for further inquiry. It is the direct result of the lack of women within IPD analysis that this research aimed to take-off.

This research aimed to overlap current theories of IPD with those of women's representation in politics, with the more specific question concerning the relationship between party democracy and women's inclusivity within parties. Due to the non-existent nature of such a methodology, this research aimed to show that current IPD analyses need to be supplemented with a gendered lens. Moreover, because of this gap in methods, this research used an existing methodology and supplemented it with a third, less integrated categorizations system. The process began with the overall assessment of IPD within four Turkish political parties. Through the examination of party programs and by-laws, the research established the level of IPD within the parties. IPD was examined by two categories, autonomy and inclusion. These two categories had further sub-categories and indices which allowed for a more comprehensive analysis. Following the estimation of IPD and typifying the parties, the gender analysis began.

In order to assess gender inclusiveness, the research developed a categorization similar to those of autonomy and inclusion. This category, having not existed in the original work, was created using a model first introduced by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) within the OSCE. The overarching project, titled, *Women in Political Parties* aimed to produce handbooks of which would help to increase women's representation and attainment of leadership positions throughout Europe (OSCE/ODIHR 2014). In accordance with indicators put forward by the program and the *Handbook on Promoting Women's Participation in Political Parties*, and the research put forward by one of its pilot programs in Georgia, this research was able to create a category of gender inclusion (Bagratia & Badashvili 2012). The category coincided with those of autonomy and inclusion. The overall aim of this category was to try to display a clear portrait of the obstacles that women may be facing within political parties in Turkey. Moreover, it was developed to show that without taking a more gender holistic approach to IPD, there may be factors that are left unconsidered.

Following the determinants of gender inclusion, the research examined party programs, by-laws, and held interviews with women politicians from within each of the four parties. The interviews were used to help determine indicators within the gender inclusiveness category. In addition to their purpose as informants for or against certain indicators, the interviews also allowed the research to gain a deeper background into the party. This was and is important because, what is written in party programs and by-laws are not always indicative of the on-the-ground practices. Moreover, most party programs and by-laws do not reference gender, or women's inclusion or representation. Therefore, while interviews were absolutely necessary, they have also added a new dimension to the research and emphasized the need to seek out gendered understandings of party politics.

Upon reading the party documents, following their social presence, and collecting interview data, the research denoted points to each of the three categories' indicators. These points were equal weighted to ensure the quality of the research. Therefore, if the party presented or defended one of the indicators, it was noted as positive and assigned a value. The result allowed each category to be assessed on a 100-point scale. Parties were then categorized, for their level of IPD, based on Goran Cular's (2004) model. This model, however, did not include gender within its judgement of total IPD. Rather, IPD was assessed and the gender assessment followed as a comparative/supplemental measure.

This research is one of the first to examine four political parties and scale them in terms of their IPD. For this purpose, a three-dimensional analysis was conducted through the development of indices for autonomy, inclusion, and gender inclusion within party politics and practices. In this respect, it is the first to examine IPD and gender inclusion in a quantitative, comparative way. As a result, it is an indicator of the gender-biased nature of current IPD methodologies and considerations. This research, therefore, presents a new approach. Given that each party has been detailed and scaled it has enabled for a more comparative approach to internal structures and decision-making processes. Moreover, by adding the gender inclusion category to the existent IPD measurements, this research has moved towards uncharted waters in both political party researches as a whole and that within the Turkish context. It has adopted a model that has not yet been applied to the question of political party democracy, moreover to women's representation. Thus, the research has provided a jumping off ground for later inquiries into IPD and its overlap with gender sensitivity and inclusion.

This inquiry has provided results that, while not surprising, have allowed for a more scrupulous look into political parties and how they operate. Its outcomes show, in terms of IPD,

that there is no correlation between the democratic tendencies of a party and its level of gender inclusion, including gender sensitivity. One of the greatest suggestions to arise from this research is the re-assessment of IPD indicators. According to the model followed in this research, Turkish parties are fully democratic yet they often lack gender inclusion within their parties. As a result, it is difficult to say, confidently, that these parties operate in a way that is democratic. Moreover, the research demonstrated that without a gendered perspective inherent in the conception of IPD, any attempt to demonstrate their correlation may be skewed. It is therefore, the main purpose of this research to suggest a revamping of IPD studies and methodologies to include an inherent assessment of gender inclusion within current models. The lack of such considerations perpetuates an ingrained masculine/patriarchal understanding of politics and political parties. A gendered perspective, whilst added as a supplemental category, showed that there are many aspects of IPD that must be considered from a gendered perspective in order to clearly demonstrate a party's propensity for internal democracy.

Overall, the research has shown that gender sensitivity within parties may present tremendous obstacles to those who wish to gain a position within the higher ranks, moreover to the overall level of democracy within a political party. Save the People's Democratic Party, of the four major parties in Turkey, none take clear measures to ensure women's representation within their parties, let alone Turkish politics. As a result, from a feminist perspective, the parties cannot be ranked highly in terms of their internally democratic structures. Moreover, only two of the parties, the Republican People's Party and the People's Democratic Party, have operational party quotas, which ensure the substantive representation of women in leadership positions within their party. In terms of women's substantive representation, these two parties also rank among the two highest in terms of women who currently hold positions within parliament and

local governments (Union of Municipalities of Turkey 2014). The CHP and HDP have also ranked among the highest in terms of gender inclusion, not only due to their gender quotas, but also as a result of their overall gender sensitivity and gender equality measures. As a result, the research indicates that parties who maintain a more gender sensitive approach to the parties have also implemented quotas to ensure women's representation.

Whilst some may argue against quotas, they have, in many cases led to the enhancement of women's chances within politics. They are a worldwide phenomenon with many models and implementation styles. Throughout Europe, and Turkey, governments have often left these decisions up to the parties themselves, choosing party quotas over the legislative and reserved seat models. In her extensive research Mona L. Krook (2009) states that

“party quotas are measures adopted voluntarily by parties that commit the party to aim for a certain proportion of women among its candidates to political office...they alter party practices by setting out new criteria for candidate selection that require elites to recognize existing biases and consider alternative spheres of political recruitment” (p. 7).

These quotas were initially adopted by left-wing parties, a resonance with the Turkish case, and often ensure 25 to 50% of all party candidates must be women (p. 7). Given the lack of women in party leadership and representative positions throughout most Turkish parties and within the government overall, this research argues that the adoption of party quotas, as have been adopted within the CHP and HDP, would help to ensure the greater representation of women in Turkish politics. As discussed by Krook, party quotas change the way that elites within parties must think about their internal structures. Therefore, it is advisable that parties adopt such measures. This recommendation comes with one further suggestion, that these quotas be introduced at a reasonably higher percentage. Party quotas are one of the counter measures protecting women's representation against the larger hegemonic cultural tendencies of society and politics. As such,

it is important that all parties, within the Turkish context re-think introducing gender quotas within their parties to ensure the substantial representation of women sharing their ideology and as representatives of half of the population of the country.

Although party quotas may help women gain a descriptive representational footing within the political parties, it is not enough. Women's quotas have been included in two of the four main parties, and yet, we still see a significant gap between men's and women's representation in Turkish politics. This is a result of gender insensitivity in party operational structures. What this means is, women who participate in politics continually operate within two primary spheres, the public and the private. Within the private sphere they are the head caretaker and within the public sphere, party members, or representatives. In any case, they take on double workloads. Some women interviewed expressed the difficulty of this situation for them. They had previously been employed, working for the party on the side, while also maintaining roles as a mother (2017 pers.comm., 24/31 May). Many women, as a result, gave up their salary positions in order to become more active in politics. Yet, this sacrifice is not often one that men within the party have to consider. It follows that time commitment and party operation should adopt more gender sensitive policies. This is not only beneficial for women in the party, but for families as a whole. More sensitive modes of operation would, inherently also allow men more time at home to spend with their families whilst also lessening the burden on women. As suggested in the OSCE's (2014) *Handbook on Promoting Women's Participation in Political Parties*,

“party leaders can consider how to provide child care facilities and services during party conferences or congresses, create financial incentives and allowances for party members on parental leave or allow for flexible work arrangements for parents” (p. 75).

What this implies is that parties can consider making parental leave pertinent to their party. This would therefore, encourage both men and women to take greater responsibility for the family,

rather than leaving the heavy lifting to the women. In the Turkish case, this may also mean giving women a more specific set of working hours, rather than giving and working as much as possible. All women interviewed in this research stated that they had no working hours rather than they worked as much as possible, 7/24. As a result, without set working hours for those within the party, it may be difficult to women feel as though they are doing enough to get ahead in the party. Due to double standards, women often have to work twice as hard to gain the same positioning as men within politics. It follows that often, when women say they work as much as possible, they work longer and more strenuous hours than men in order to achieve similar recognition. In short, the introduction of gender sensitive working hours and operations would begin to break down several of the double-standards placed on women, whilst encouraging men and women to share in their duties as parents and partners. Furthermore, it would begin deteriorating some of the barriers preventing women from entering politics, and/or obtaining higher positions within the party.

Quotas and gender sensitive operations would definitely change the masculine face of Turkish political parties, however, the adoption of such policies will not help unless there is a checks and balances system in place. This has been substantiated by the recent ineffectiveness of the Republican People's Party's ten percent gender quota being filled by men. What is therefore necessary is a gender audit system, in which parties undergo internal audits examining their progress and maintenance of gender sensitive operations, quotas, and overall gender inclusion. According to the OSCE's handbook, not only are gender audits the first step to seeing where the party is lacking in gender equality, they can also be used later on, after steps have been taken to ensure the continued adherence to such practices (OSCE/ODIHR 2014, p. 50).

“Self-assessment activities ensure that both the strengths and shortcomings of a party’s gender-equality approach are identified and that a strategy addressing the shortcomings, in particular, can be devised. The picture that emerges from a gender assessment can indicate whether a political party is gender-friendly or not. It [a gender audit] may also point to activities that a party can undertake in order to strengthen its commitment to gender equality” (p. 51).

It is therefore suggestable that Turkish political parties, first, begin with gender audits to see where they stand, and after adjusting their policies, continue with yearly or quarterly gender audits. These audits could be performed by a committee made up of equal proportions of men and women, to ensure the greatest objectiveness. Moreover, to further aid in audit, outside interest groups, such as KA-DER could develop gender audit teams to ensure that Turkish political parties, as a whole, are adhering to their commitments.

On the whole, Turkish politics lack checks and balances. This research has identified the presence of policies and promises, yet a lack of practical application of such policies. This argument is corroborated by Türkmen (2016), wherein he expresses the forced nature of IPD and its absolute lack in reality (p. 12). In his opinion it is important that regulations put in place theoretically must be backed up and implemented by parties. To ensure such practice, he suggests greater legal reform to ensure the practical application. It goes without repeating that Turkish democracy and politics, overall, need an increased presence of checks and balances.

This data present in this research then, while telling, remains superficial in concerns with the true level of IPD within the four parties discussed. Through the examination of party documents and promises, the research aimed to gain as clear picture as possible, however, in Turkey, what is written on paper, is often not followed in practice. It therefore follows that in order to draw more definite rankings of the Turkish parties it is imperative that more in-depth, mixed-method research be conducted. In addition to the reassessment of IPD categories and

indicators to include a built-in gender perspective, the research could benefit from a deeper analysis, something that the current research was unable to accomplish. Overall, the priority of reassessing IPD models to better suit WPP research cannot be overstated.

Future research and future models of IPD assessment should weight each indicator in terms of its relevance to increased autonomy, inclusion, gender, etc. Additionally, the indices chosen to represent autonomy, inclusion, and gender inclusion could be enhanced and formatted to better suit other factors. The equal-weighting of indicators, used in this assessment, was a precaution measure, as some indicators are more arbitrary than others and previous research has not identified a holistic scaling measurement for indicators. In short, it was an outcome of the lack of prior models. Given the uniqueness of this inquiry, equal weighting provided a safe route allowing for a calculation, however, later research, with adjusted weights, may present different results. Moreover, the integration of gender inclusion into the current IPD categories/model would also present different results. Overall, these improvements would allow for more detailed and clearer results.

This research has been the first step in the direction of research aimed at quantifying and typifying Turkish political parties' level of IPD. Moreover, it has been the first to take such an approach whilst adopting a gender category. Therefore, it is a foundational piece of work that needs to be built upon. Further studies would benefit not only Turkish democracy, as whole, but IPD/WPP studies as well.

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Appendices

Goran Cular's Dimensions of Autonomy and Inclusion

DIMENSION OF AUTONOMY

1.1 Member's Rights

- 1.1.1 *General rights*
- 1.1.2 *Rights to form factions*
- 1.1.3 *Protection of members against disciplinary measures*

1.2 Autonomy of Local Organization

- 1.2.1 *Autonomy in decision-making*
 - about local structure
 - in disciplinary procedures
 - in selection procedure for local elections
 - about local coalitions
- 1.2.2 *Prerogatives of higher level in local affairs*
 - in the procedure of disclosure of local organization
 - in electing and replacing local leadership
 - in calling local conventions
 - in local decision making
 - in coordination of local activities
 - party officials from higher levels *ex officio* members of local bodies

1.3 Direct influence of local bodies on the central level decision making:

- through election of representatives for party conventions
- through election of members of central political and executive bodies
- through role in the selection procedure for national elections
- through initiatives in calling national conventions and amending the statute

Source: (Cular, 2004)

DIMENSION OF INCLUSION

2.1 Direct participation of members

- in direct decision-making and elections
- in selection procedures
- in initiatives towards central level

2.2 Prerogatives of conventions vs. executive bodies

- 2.2.1 *at the central level:*
 - in passing statute and political program
 - in election of members of central political and executive bodies
 - in selection procedures
- 2.2.2 *at the local level:*
 - in election of members of local executive bodies
 - in election of representatives for conventions at higher level
 - in selection procedures

2.3 Prerogatives of the party president

- 2.3.1 *in personal matters:*
 - right to propose/appoint vice president

- right to propose/appoint other member of the central bodies
- rights to suspend/replace/exclude a member

2.3.2 in selection procedure:

- at the central level
- at the local level

2.3.3 Other prerogatives

Source: (Cular, 2004)

IPD Additional References

AUTONOMY/1.1	AUTONOMY 1.2	AUTONOMY 1.3	INCLUSION 2.1	INCLUSION 2.2
(Mersel 2006)	(Scarrow 2005)	(Scarrow 2005)	(Scarrow 2005)	(Hazan & Rahat 2010)
Basic Rights including the right to not be expelled without a fair proceeding Freedom of speech and association within the party (especially in the form of forming factions) Ability to establish a party faction Right to information and transparency of party management (fiscal accountability) Ability of all members have the right to be elected in free and open elections to any post within the party	Provision for independent judicial review of internal party democracy Selection Device: Primary: in-person, postal ballot Selection Device: Meeting : local, regional, national Party Dispute Resolution	Are choices limited by party leaders? Must Party leaders pre-select nominees? Who determines Candidate Eligibility? Who determines membership eligibility? Selection Device: Party Assembly, Membership Ballot, Combination Process Party Arena determining the party leader: Parliamentary Congress, Party Congress, Entire Membership Rules of Succession (limitation of potential leaders) Elected Leaders or Appointed Leaders	Ability of party members to elect the leadership and recall it/elect the party nominees to public positions Ability to influence the party platform and agenda Equal and proportional representation or interparty minorities and majority rule voting Right to regular interval, open elections for electing party leadership	What role do members play? : Participation in debate and forum, consultation meetings, selecting party platform writers, internal party plebiscites

Interview Questions

English

Questions about time contribution

1. What is the typical working hours of the party (in your particular area)?
2. How many hours per day do you spend formally working for the party (this may include any work that is formally required of you to complete)?
3. How many hours per day do you spend informally working for the party (this may include luncheons or tea events within the community, more social based activities that continue to be representative of the party)?
4. Outside of the formal meetings and requirements of working within the party, must you participate in social service projects/party promotion activities?
 - a. If yes, how often do you participate (weekly, monthly, yearly)
 - b. If yes, approximately how many hours do you contribute (this answer will be framed according to the previous answer)?
5. How often does the party hold formal (required attendance) meetings?
 - a. When these meetings are held, generally what time are the meetings held?
 - b. When meetings are held, on what day are most formal meetings typically held?
6. Do you have children?
 - a. Does the party offer/maintain a child care center, or parent-sensitive policies for allowing children to come to the branch office or meetings (i.e. a caregiver, or aunt to help look after the children during the meetings)?

Formal Disciplinary Measurements

7. If you or anyone else in the party has a complaint concerning gender discrimination or misconduct, is there a formal complaint mechanism for such things within the party's organization?
 - a. If not, how are the complaints handled? (i.e. what is the typical way of voicing this within your organization?)

Financial Distribution/Resource Distribution Questions

8. Do you know about the distribution of resources and finances within your party?
- If yes, how are the resources distributed amongst the party's sub-organizations such as the women's branch, the youth branch, and other sub-organizations?
(indicate shares if possible)
 - How would you assess this allocation? Please indicate your opinion about the fairness among other sub-organizations.

Not fair at all
fair

Totally

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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9. Do you know about the distribution of party resources and finances to candidates participating in election cycles?
- If yes then, throughout the campaign season, do candidates receive any amount of financial support from the party?
 - If yes, to your knowledge do women receive a higher or lower share of the resources when compared with their male counterparts?

Questions Concerning the Women's Branch

10. Does the women's branch meet regularly (weekly/monthly) to discuss party matters/matters of the party's organization?
11. Does the women's branch of the party often coordinate events/campaigns?
- In what matters or for what causes does the women's branch most often coordinate?
 - Does the women's branch coordinate with local and international NGOs? If yes, how?
 - Does the women's branch coordinate activities that promote gender equality within the party? Such events may include but are not limited to-
 - Leadership training seminars for women
 - Sexual harassment awareness training for all party members
 - Youth engagement projects aimed at increasing girls' interest in politics

- d. If events are coordinate within the party to promote gender equality within the party structure/culture, could you please list a few of such events?

12. Does the women's branch work with other parties' women's branches?

- a. If the women's branch does coordinate with other parties, which subject areas are often focused on?
- b. In what circumstances does coordination occur, meaning what types of events are coordinated?
- c. Do you find this coordination (with other parties)successful in achieving their aims? Please indicate your opinions about the collaboration.

Unsuccessful

Successful

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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- d. Do the women's branches coordinate events that promote stronger bonds between women in Turkish politics?

- i. If yes, what types of events are most successful at promoting stronger bonds between women in Turkish politics?
- ii. If they do not promote stronger bonds, in your opinion what is the reason why?

1. Do you feel there needs to be more emphasis placed on this topic?
Why/Why not?

2. If yes, what solutions might you offer to create more solidarity?

13. Does the women's branch have the ability to determine their own activities and initiatives?

14. When decisions have been made, must the women's branch gain the approval of the central body of the party?

- a. Do you think this is good or bad, why?
- b. Do you feel good/restricted/constrained/empowered because of this?

Fill in/Open Ended Questions

Participant History and Roles

1. Please describe your role within the party.
2. Could you please explain what led you to participate in politics and with your party?
 - a. Are there people within your family who are affiliated with politics?
 - b. Did you participate in community-based/"grass-roots" volunteer activities and do you think such encounters affected your interest/engagement in politics?
 - c. Did you have an experience in high school or university that led you to become involved in politics?
 - d. Had you previously thought about becoming active in politics throughout your life?

These questions, a-d will be asked based on the respondents answer to the main question, if more details are needed, they will be asked and modified according to the respondent's answer. In-the case of question c. the respondent's educational level will be taken into consideration.

Questions concerning the participant's conceptualization of women in politics in Turkey and within parties

3. On a scale of one to ten, one being completely disagree and ten being completely agree, please tell to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements;

"Within Turkey, there is support for women in politics."

Completely disagree					Completely agree				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

"Within my party (as a whole), there is support for women in politics."

Completely disagree					Completely agree				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

"Amongst women in my party there is a great sense of support and solidarity."

Completely disagree
agree

Completely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“Amongst women in Turkey there is a great sense of support and solidarity.”

Completely disagree
agree

Completely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“Collaboration amongst women in politics is important.”

Completely disagree
agree

Completely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“Collaboration amongst women in Turkish politics is a good thing.”

Completely disagree
agree

Completely

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“The women’s branch of the party is active in the local community”

Not active at all
active

Very

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“The women’s branch of the party active throughout Turkey”

Not active at all
active

Very

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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Turkish

Zaman Katkısıyla İlgili Sorular

15. Partinin (sizin alanınızda) normal çalışma saatleri nedir?
16. Günün kaç saatini resmi olarak parti için çalışmaya ayırıyorsunuz? (Sizin yapmanız beklenen resmi her iş dâhil.)
17. Günün kaç saatini parti için resmi olmayan çalışmaya ayırıyorsunuz? (Parti üyeleriyle birlikte yemek veya çay buluşmaları ve parti etkinliklerinin devamı niteliğindeki sosyal etkinlikler dâhil)
18. Resmi toplantılar ve partide çalışmanın gerektirdiği gereklilikler dışında sosyal hizmet projelerine veya partinin tanıtım etkinliklerine katılmanız gerekiyor mu?
 - a. Cevabınız evetse, (haftada, ayda, yılda) ne sıklıkla katılıyorsunuz?
 - b. Cevabınız evetse, ortalama kaç saat katkıda bulunuyorsunuz? (Bu cevap bir önceki cevabınıza bağlı olacak).
19. Parti ne sıklıkla resmi (katılım gerektiren) toplantılar yapıyor?
 - a. Bu toplantılar yapıldığında, genellikle saat kaçta yapılıyor?
 - b. Toplantılar yapıldığında, resmi toplantılar genellikle hangi gün yapılıyor?
20. Çocuğunuz var mı?
 - a. Parti, kreş hizmeti sunuyor mu, veya partinin çocukların binalarına veya toplantılara gelmesine izin veren, ebeveynlere yardımcı olmaya yönelik bir politikası var mı? (Örn. çocuklara toplantılar sırasında bakmaya yardım edecek bakıcı veya teyze)

Resmi Disiplin Önlemleri

21. Eğer sizin ya da partinin bir başka üyesinin cinsiyet ayrımcılığı veya kötü muameleye ilişkin şikayeti olursa, parti teşkilatında bu tür şeyler için resmi bir şikayet mekanizması var mı?
 - a. Eğer yoksa, şikayetler nasıl halloluyor? (Örn. sizin teşkilatınızda bunu ifade etmenin yolu nedir?)

Mali Dağıtım/Kaynak Dağıtım Soruları

22. Üye olduğunuz partideki kaynakların dağıtım hakkında bilgi sahibi misiniz?

- a. Cevabınız evetse, kaynaklar partinin kadın kolları, gençlik kollları gibi alt kollarına nasıl dağıtılıyor? (Mümkünse oranları belirtiniz)
- b. Bu paylaşım oranını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Lütfen alt kollara dağıtımın ne kadar adil olduğuna ilişkin fikrinizi belirtiniz.

Hiç adil değil
adil

Kesinlikle

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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23. Parti kaynaklarının seçime katılan adaylara nasıl dağıtıldığı hakkında bilginiz var mı?

- a. Varsa, kampanya dönemi süresince katılımcılar partilerinden herhangi bir maddi destek alıyor mı?
- b. Varsa, bilginiz dahilinde kadınlar erkek adaylara kıyasla daha az mı yoksa çok mu pay alıyor?

Kadın Kollarıyla İlgili Sorular

24. Kadın kolları partiye veya parti teşkilatına dair sorunları tartışmak için (haftalık/aylık) toplantılar yapıyor mu?

25. Partinin kadın kolları sıklıkla kampanya/etkinlik düzenliyor mu?

- a. Kadın kolları genellikle hangi konularda ve ne amaçla etkinlik/kampanya düzenliyor?
- b. Kadın kolları yerel ve uluslararası STK'lar ile birlikte hareket ediyor mu? Evetse, nasıl?
- c. Kadın kolları parti içinde cinsiyet eşitliğini teşvik etmek amacıyla etkinlikler düzenliyor mu? Bunlarla sınırlı olmamakla birlikte örnekler:
- Kadınlara yönelik liderlik eğitimi seminerleri
 - Tüm parti üyelerine yönelik cinsel taciz farkındalık eğitimi
 - Genç kızların siyasete ilgilerini arttırmaya yönelik gençlik projeleri
- d. Parti yapısında/kültüründe cinsiyet eşitliğini teşvik etmeye yönelik etkinlikler düzenleniyorsa bunlara birkaç örnek verebilir misiniz?

26. Partinin kadın kolları başka partilerin kadın kollarıyla işbirliği yapıyor mu?

- a. Kadın kolları başka partilerle işbirliği yapıyorsa, genellikle hangi alanlara odaklanıyorlar?

- b. İşbirliği nasıl oluyor, yani hangi tip etkinliklerde işbirliği yapıyor?
- c. Başka partilerle yapılan bu işbirliğinin hedeflerine ulaşmada başarılı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? Lütfen ortak çalışmalar hakkında fikirlerinizi belirtiniz.

Başarısız

Başarılı

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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- d. Kadın kolları Türkiye siyasetinde kadın siyasetçilerin aralarındaki bağı güçlendirme amacıyla etkinlik düzenliyor mu?
- i. Düzenliyorsa, hangi tip etkinlikler kadın siyasetçiler arasındaki bağları güçlendirmede daha etkili oldu?
- ii. Bağları güçlendirmek amaçlanmıyorsa, sizce nedeni nedir?
1. Sizce bu konunun üzerinde daha çok durulmalı mı?
- Neden?
2. Evetse, daha fazla dayanışma için ne gibi öneriler sunulabilir?
27. Kadın kolları kendi etkinlikleri ve girişimlerini kendi mi belirliyor?
28. Kararlar alınırken kadın kollarının parti merkezinden onay alma zorunluluğu var mı?
- a. Sizce bu iyi mi/kötü mü, neden?
- b. Bu nedenle kendinizi rahat/kısıtlanmış/rahatsız/desteklenmiş hissediyor musunuz?

Açık Uçlu Sorular/Ölçekler

Katılımcı Geçmişi ve Roller

4. Lütfen partideki rolünüzü anlatınız.
5. Sizi genel olarak siyasete, özel olarak da partinize katılmaya yönlendiren şey nedir?
- a. Ailenizde siyasetle ilgilenen bireyler var mı?
- b. Daha önce siyasi partilerin düzenlediği gönüllü etkinliklerine katılmış mıydınız ve bu etkinliklerin siyasete olan ilginizi etkilediğini düşünüyor musunuz?
- c. Lisede veya üniversitede siyasete ilginizi arttıracak etkinliklere katılmış mıydınız?
- d. Daha önce hayatınızın geri kalanında siyasete aktif katılım konusunda düşünmüş müydünüz?

a-d arasındaki bu sorular kişinin ana soruya verdiği cevaba göre sorulacaktır; daha fazla bilgi istenirse ve kişinin verdiği cevaba göre değiştirilerek sorulacaktır. c sorusunda kişinin eğitim düzeyi göz önünde bulundurulacaktır.

Kişinin Türkiye Siyasetinde ve Üye Oldukları Partide Kadınlara Dair Görüşleriyle İlgili Sorular

6. Aşağıdaki her bir ifadeye, 1- Hiç Katılmıyorum, 10-Tamamen Katılıyorum arasında puan verin.

“Türkiye’de siyasette kadınlara destek veriliyor.”

Hiç Katılmıyorum									Tamamen
Katılıyorum									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Üyesi olduğum parti genelinde siyasette kadınlara destek veriliyor.”

Hiç Katılmıyorum									Tamamen
Katılıyorum									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Partimdeki kadınlar arasında büyük bir işbirliği ve dayanışma var.”

Hiç Katılmıyorum									Tamamen
Katılıyorum									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Türkiye’deki kadınlar arasında büyük bir işbirliği ve dayanışma var.”

Hiç Katılmıyorum									Tamamen
Katılıyorum									
	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Siyasette kadınlar arası işbirliği önemli.”

Hiç Katılmıyorum									Tamamen Katılıyorum
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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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“Türkiye’de siyaset alanında kadınlar arası işbirliği olumlu bir özellik”

Hiç Katılmıyorum					Tamamen				
Katılıyorum									
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Partinin kadın kolları yaşadığım bölgede aktif”

Hiç Aktif değil					Çok Aktif				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

“Partinin kadın kolları tüm Türkiye’de aktif”

Hiç Aktif değil					Çok Aktif				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Consent Form

English

Consent for Participation in Interview Research

I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Brittany Rae Smutek from Istanbul Bilgi University. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about intra-party democracy and women's political participation within Turkish political parties. I will be one of approximately 10 people being interviewed for this research.

1. My participation in this project is voluntary. I understand that I will not be paid for my participation. I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty. If I decline to participate or withdraw from the study, no one will be informed.
2. I understand that most interviewees will find the discussion interesting and thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.
3. Participation involves being interviewed by Brittany Rae Smutek from Istanbul Bilgi University. The interview will last approximately 30-45 minutes. Notes will be written during the interview. An audio tape of the interview and subsequent dialogue will be made. Due to the native language of the researcher, this is necessary. If I don't want to be taped, I will not be able to participate in the study.
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions.
5. Faculty and administrators from my party/state will neither be present at the interview nor have access to raw notes or transcripts. This precaution will prevent my individual comments from having any negative repercussions.
6. I understand that this research study has been reviewed and approved by Istanbul Bilgi University's Ethics Committee and Institutional Review Board. For research problems or questions regarding subjects, the Institutional Review Board may be contacted through Itir Erhart.
7. I have read and understand the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

8. I have been given a copy of this consent form.

Printed Name

Signature

Date

Printed Name of Investigator

Signature

Date

Turkish

Mülakata Katılım Onayı

Bilgi Üniversitesi'nde araştırma yapan Brittany Rae Smutek'in yürüttüğü projeye gönüllü olarak katılıyorum. Projenin Türkiye'deki siyasi partilerde demokrasi ve kadınların siyasi partilere katılımı konularında bilgi toplamak için tasarlanmış olduğunu biliyorum. Bu araştırmaya yönelik görüşme yapılacak yaklaşık 10 kişiden biri olacağım.

1) Projeye tamamen kendi isteğimle katılıyorum, katılımım karşılığında herhangi bir ücret almayacağım. Projeye katılmaktan her an vazgeçebilirim ve bunun sonucunda bir cezaya tabi tutulmayacağım. Katılmak istemezsem veya proje sürecinde geri çekilmeyi arzu edersem kimseyi bilgilendirmeme gerek olmayacak.

2) Görüşme yapılacak kişilerin çoğunun soruları ilgi çekici ve düşündürücü bulacağımı biliyorum. Eğer görüşme esnasında herhangi bir şeyden rahatsızlık duyarsam, herhangi bir soruya cevap vermeyi reddetme ya da görüşmeyi yarıda kesme hakkım var.

3) Katılım kapsamında İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi'nde araştırma yapan Brittany Rae Smutek ile 30 ilâ 45 dakikalık bir görüşme yapılacak, görüşme esnasında not tutulacak. Görüşmenin ve arkasından yapılacak diyalogun ses kaydı alınacak. Ses kaydı, araştırmacının ana dili Türkçe olmadığı gerekli. Sesimin kaydedilmesini istemezsem araştırmaya katılamam.

4) Kimliğimin, araştırmacının benimle yaptığı görüşmeden elde ettiği bilgilerle yazacağı hiçbir raporda belirtilmeyeceğini, katılımcı olarak gizliliğim korunacağını biliyorum. Kayıtların ve verinin daha sonra her daim birey ve kurumların gizliliğini korumaya yönelik standart veri kullanım ilkelerine tabi olacak.

5) Parti üyeleri ve hükümet yetkilileri görüşmeye katılmayacak ve görüşmemle ilgili herhangi bir bilgiye ulaşamayacak. Bu önlem, kişisel yorumlarımın benim açımdan olumsuz sonuçlara yol açmasına engel olacak.

6) Bu araştırma projesinin İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Etik Kurulu ve Kurumsal İnceleme Kurulu tarafından gözden geçirilip onaylandığının farkındayım. Araştırma kapsamında görüşülecek kişilerle ilgili araştırma sorunları ya da soruları için Kurumsal İnceleme Kurulu'na buradan ulaşılabilir Itir Erhart.

7) Yapılan açıklamaları okudum ve anladım. Tüm sorularıma tatminkar cevaplar aldım ve bu çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katılmayı kabul ettim.

8) Bu onay formunun bir kopyası bana verildi.

Ad, Soyad

İmza

Tarih

Araştırmacının Adı, Soyadı

İmza

Tarih