

**REPRODUCTION OF MODERN TURKISH IDENTITY
IN PETIT ENTREPRENEUR'S DIASPORIC MILIEU**

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation aims to examine how modernity affects the formation of national and globalized identity. I believe modern Turkish identity is the product of and includes multiple levels of hybridities. The relation between tradition and nationalism and the relation between nationalism and globalization are all interrelated with modernity. Traditional, national and global values and their changing meanings in time with political circumstances all affect identity. Moreover, with the help of modernity this relation led identities to hybridize. In diaspora environment, this process of hybridization gains paradoxical characteristics, in which openness and resistance to new values occur at the same time. Nevertheless, the indepthness of hybridization changes according to the characteristic of the community. I take petit entrepreneur group in London, which has transitional and transnational characteristics, to justify my theoretical arguments about modern Turkish identity. I find out that petit entrepreneur group has two reference points in the reconstruction of their identity: Globalization and nationalism, which both are affected by modernity.

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I. Introduction

"The migrant existentiality that is determining this specific aesthetics without making itself a lasting essence is faced with two centers: The external colonial or modernist, and the internal or national filtering into a personal identity. The chief feature of the poetics of exile is the trial during which it deals with these centers sometimes rejecting, sometimes accepting them."

(Singh, 1998:22)

The transformation of traditional, national and global values and their meanings throughout fluctuating political circumstances all affect the meaning attributed to identity. Especially, the relation between modernization and nationalism by structuring tradition has a tremendous effect in the last century. Obviously, identities have been affected by this relation's influence as well. Globalization has always been the meeting point of the identity with the 'other' in the late modern era. The continuous meeting of the 'other', which leads to avenues of identification and exclusion, has led to a greater need of components of belongingness that can situate the individual in a community. Therefore, the individual creates belonging strategies in her/his daily life practices. Traditional, national and global values shaped by modernity play a vital role for the individuals' journey in developing these belonging strategies. As much as modernity offers a reference point for these belonging strategies, it also functions as an agent that transforms these values, thus, forcing the individual to reinterpret these values and to incorporate them into their identity. The individual that has been removed from her/his original habitat, vividly demonstrates the dynamic between holding onto belonging strategies and being forced to adopt the new, the strange that is the accepted code in the new country. The self, living in diaspora with transnational practices adopts globalization and nationalism as the reference points for reshaping her/his identity. Modernity is the main denominator of these reference points.

Modern Turkish nationalist identity, created by the Turkish Republic, has reproduced itself in the Western diaspora by strengthening its components like its myths, symbols, secular approach, and so on. Paradoxically, while strengthening those on the one hand, on the other hand it accepts new values. The bare meeting of cultures in diaspora is like

the battle of at least two different identities. In this battle, nationalism and globalization, which are converged by modernity, have become reciprocal reference points in the identity formation. This battle lets the differences and similarities appear clearer. At this point I believe the dynamic character of the petit entrepreneur group that I have chosen to analyze, shows me how this identity is flexible in its reconstruction process. Besides, I believe that this (already hybridized) identity is always in the process of hybridizing¹ itself.

Turkish identity that was born as a modern nation-state project is one of these influenced identities. Several meanings and approaches have been attributed to the term 'Turk'. The term 'Turk' resonates different meanings to a European than it does to a person living in Turkey. Even in Turkey, different groups emphasize different values and components, which represent different sides of the hybridized Turkish identity.

The Turkish identity's nationalist characteristics were developed and determined throughout the formation of the Turkish Republic. This led to the emergence of confusing definitions and values about being a Turk. "Ataturk attributed at least three different meanings to the term 'Turk' and 'Turkish Nation'" (Nişanyan 2001: 216, Uğur 2003:8), which are religious (Islamic), political (republican) and ethnic (racial) definitions. Although these definitions are different in their characteristics, it should be kept in mind that the notion of 'modernity' is hidden in all of them in a way, since 'the term modernity' is the basic characteristic adopted by the Turkish Republic. Under the light of this confusing terminology, it is not an exaggeration to claim that the concepts of 'modern' and 'Turk' used in Turkey are hybrid in themselves. At this point, I believe diaspora allowed the immigrant to hybridize this identity as well. The immigrant produces new values and norms that are no longer belonging to the former or latter territory. The immigrant preserves her/his nationalistic feelings. However, these feelings may be different from the ones in the motherland. The living standards of the immigrant residing in the diaspora are important indicators for her/his level of hybridization. The level of hybridization of the identity in diaspora depends on the identity's transnational relation both with her/his homeland and with her/his new country in the global era. Consequently, it is meaningful to analyze the modernity

¹ There are several debates about the term 'hybridity', 'hybridization' and its derivatives. In this study I will use the term in its verbal meaning in social daily life.

notion and practice of the middle class, modern Turkish ethnic group living in London in order to find out the level of hybridization, if there is any.

As entrepreneurship has the characteristics of showing the relation between innovation and cultural values; and also has a dynamic character in the global world order, I decide to base the analysis in their social space. However, as the subjects of this study, entrepreneurs do not fulfill the characteristics of the entrepreneurs described in the Western theoretical frame; I prefer to use the concept 'petit entrepreneur', which is derived from some scholars' theories (Buğra 1994, Çakmakçı 1997, Öniş 1996, Castells 1992 in 2002 Süerdem – Çakmakçı 2002) to understand entrepreneurship in developing societies. That is why I prefer to use petit entrepreneur instead of entrepreneur. Additionally, as entrepreneurs are a semi-open or in other words semi-closed group, it is uncomplicated to analyze their tactics and strategies to preserve and/or reconstruct their (already constructed) identity both in their transitional and globalized neo-liberal world. Thus it is easy to analyze their 'belonging strategies'².

The aim of this dissertation paper is to examine how modernity affects the formation of national and global identity. I chose a petit entrepreneur middle class, modern Turkish group's social space in London. This study has three main objectives. Firstly, the discussion will embark upon how modernity affects the relation between tradition, nationalism and globalization in identity construction and enables the emergence of 'multiple level of hybridities'. Secondly, it aims to discuss how modernity and nationality forms the modern Turkish identity and how this identity behaves according to the state ideology. Thirdly, as analyzing identity through a semi-open/semi-close immigrant group, I try to understand how diaspora has affected this transnational group who is open to many cultures. I discuss whether diaspora enables the emergence of radical changes in the values of the modern Turkish (middle class, petit entrepreneur) community. If so, I pose the question of how these values emerge, hybridize and under which conditions the cultural conservative notions protect the very own core culture.

² Uğur, Aydın (December 12th, 2003): from the "Alterity and the Experience of Limits" seminar notes of Uğur at Boğaziçi University. Uğur used the word for the 'identification strategies' that individual develops in her/his meeting with the 'other' in the society. This will be discussed in Chapter II.1.

In Chapter II, I clarify the notion of the 'modern Turkish identity' by firstly discussing the theoretical veins of identity, nationalism in the modern and post-modern era. Through this I aim to form the basis for understanding nationalistic identity in modern and post-modern times. I also want to analyze the relation between traditional – national – global values that initially seems to be independent from each other. The common denominator that affects and alters traditional-national-global is 'modernism'. Thus, I want to analyze their transition gates and how they are reproduced as different categories of the new (hybrid) identity. I try to understand the Turkish identity formation and discuss the levels of 'hybridity' in that sense. As my informants, petit entrepreneurs, lives in London diaspora, in Chapter II.4, I discuss how globalization affects the identities in general, in diaspora and in their transnational community. Globalization, that builds the economic and communicative relations, is vital for the understanding of 'today's identity formation. In that sense, here I also discuss the term diaspora as well as the term transnationalism, whose terminology are products of globalization.

In Chapter III, I mention the term 'petit entrepreneur'. Here, I discuss what makes it possible to use the term for examining 'modern Turkish identity' construction. In this part, I also briefly summarized the modernization and nationalism journey of late Ottoman and Turkish Republic. Starting from the modernization attempts in the Ottoman Empire, I discuss how modern Turkish national, '*milli*' identity has been constructed throughout the years. Finally, I analyze the outcomes of this dissertation's field study, which is 'the modern Turkish identity in the London diaspora using transnational practice'. Now, I proceed with information about the methodology and Turkish petit Entrepreneurs in London.

I.1. Methodology

The newly established NGO (non-governmental organization)³, which offers a meeting point for the middle class Turkish community in London, has allowed an arena to carry out the research for understanding 'modern national identity'. I worked for 9 months with the members of the NGO and 'modern', 'Turkish' people around them, who form the informant group of this study.

In this study multiple techniques, which are participatory observation, in-depth interviews and critical discourse analysis, are used to conduct the research. During my participatory observation, I have been influenced from Alan Touraine's sociological intervention method. I made in-depth interviews with 12 interviewees. And finally I analyze my outcomes by using critical discourse analysis methodology.

The keyword of this study's research is 'interaction'. Both in in-depth interviews and in my participatory observation methodology, I try to interact with the informants of this study to understand the meanings they attributed to their expressions and comprehend their daily life experiences. Therefore, the discourse analysis I apply to both of my methodology is the result of nine months field study.

I take petit entrepreneur group as my unit of analysis to justify my theoretical arguments and analyze my unit of analysis's behaviors in their social relations context. Through out my research, I took field notes to follow up my research questions (Goffman 1989, Lofland&Lonland 1971, Strauss & Corbin 1990; in Ezzy 2002) in the in-depth interviews that I made and also to follow up my thesis and theories.

The interviews in the discourse analysis are different from the ones that are done to gain general information. As Ezzy, "the aim of the good interview is to obtain the story or interpretation of the person being interviewed" (2002: 68). Under the light of this perspective it is important to listen to the underlined messages of the person being interviewed. In my in depth interviews I have also been inspired by Douglas's 'creative interviewing' (1985:53). Like Potter and Wetherell's interventionist method, creative interviewing also tries to open way for interviewee to express freely her/himself.

According to Douglas, in order to catch 'friendly disclosure', interviewer starts with self-understanding and continues talking about the research issues in general. Then researcher starts doing in depth interviews with the informants. Researcher continues to do interviews with other interviewee whose views contradict with the former informant. The process of interviewing goes on until the researcher finds no new data. (Douglas 1985, Ezzy 2002) This level is called 'saturation': gathering information.

I have mentioned that, in my participatory observation I was inspired by Touraine's sociological intervention method. I let all informants know that I am conducting a research while I provide only one informant and no other with the detailed thesis that the research has been shaped by. However, I have diverged from the participatory observation method in the sense that I chose to intervene in the informants' reactions. I let an argument emerge, then without being part of this argument, I start taking notes. Regarding these characteristics, Touraine also defines researcher as interpreter and analyst (Touraine 1981: 142-5). At that point, in order to keep the balance between intervention and objectivity, I, as a researcher act as an agitator and function as a secretary.

I use critical discourse analysis in giving meaning to my in-depth interviews and my sociological intervention. As discourse analysis gives an opportunity to analyze daily practices in their own context, it is one of the most crucial tools of cultural studies. Discourse analysis tries to ask customized questions to the given practice. In this method analyst tries to understand the context of the practice by having a skeptical reading. In addition, discourse analysis is an important tool for giving meaning to identities, which can be related to gender, race, age, etc.

Finally, I want to mention one last and crucial point, the role of the researcher. Modernity has highly affected today's concepts. Thus, although I started my dissertation with an example from 'non-modern' words as mentioned above, frankly as an individual of today I could not go further without using any concept free from modern and/or post-modern⁴ period. Although the institutions that I have brought up are more or

³ Name of the NGO will not be mentioned in this study.

⁴ I discuss post-modernism in the Chapter II, while discussing modernity. I use post-modern era free from the meaning attributed to its own theoreticians, but as a period.

less critical, I have started everything by accepting the point that even these critics are part of the institutions. In spite of this factor, I try to be as critical and as objective I can be.

In order to avoid the informants assumptions about my political affiliations as a researcher, I refrained myself from posing assertive political questions during the in-depth interviews. Thus, the political discussions, which form the base of this study, are derived from the field notes that I took during the time I worked with them. Seeing these people not only in the interviews but also during the NGO meetings positioned me in a safe ground where I could voice new arguments. Thus, in my discourse analysis besides utilizing the text of my in-depth interviews, I find the opportunity to use the outcomes of my participatory observations.

I. 2. Turkish Petit Entrepreneurs in London

The numbers about the population of Turkish immigrant group is doubtful. Although several studies were done about the Turkish immigrants, there are debates about the number of the Turks or Turkish Republic oriented people living in the United Kingdom. Even the Turkish Embassy in London does not have clear information about the Turkish population. Turkish immigrants in London are approximately 200.000 people; 80.000 of them are Turkish Republic originated and 120.000 are Turkish Cypriots (Yılmaz 2001, Önal 2002). Yılmaz finds out that 60.000 Turks are believed⁵ to live in London and he also argues that 60.000 Kurdish immigrants are living in London as well (Yılmaz 2001:149). However, most people claiming to be Kurdish are believed to be Turks who have sought asylum rights in the United Kingdom.

Lately journalist Ayşe Önal held a research on the Turkish immigrants in London. Though her categorization of immigrant population does not cover my field in detail, some of her research data and evaluation could be useful in my analysis. Önal has two main categories about the Turkish population in London. One of the groups consists of workers and small business owners like '*dönerci*'⁶ restaurant owners; on the other hand

⁵ Regarding to the numbers about the Turkish oriented people in London, I keep on using the words like 'believe to' and 'said so' since there are no reliable and certain data and research about them.

⁶ The person who prepares traditional Turkish meatdish served as long thin slices carved out of big chunk of meat.

academicians, doctors and lawyers form the other group. Her categorization does not cover or even mention the small and middle range entrepreneurs, but they are a powerful and comparatively crowded group in London, which I believe, should not be ignored. There are several non-governmental organizations like TBCCI (Turkish – British Chamber of Commerce and Industry), TFUK (Turkish Forum UK), whose members are small and medium range entrepreneurs. TFUK's legitimate member number is 150. Nevertheless more than 400 Turkish entrepreneurs attended to its meetings and seminars. TBCCI's member number is 233. Both reach at least 1000 – 2000 or more people in each of their activities only in London. These types of NGO's keep the entrepreneurs together in a network. Their role and the role of their members shape the 'modern' Turkish –entrepreneur – identity. Therefore, their representative and dynamic role should not be ignored.

The petit entrepreneur group around the newly established NGO, who forms the base of this study, believes that it represents the modern Turkish identity in London. I will not mention the name of the NGO because I believe they do not feel safe, if I do. However, mentioning their mission and foundation reasons will be helpful in understanding their positioning. This NGO was founded to be a bridge between Turkey and the United Kingdom. At the moment, the NGO has 150 members, who own small and medium range businesses. It focuses on developing a network between Turkish entrepreneurs both in Turkey and in the United Kingdom as well as Turkish and English entrepreneurs worldwide. Its social aim is to represent Turkish values in the United Kingdom and also to provide the solidarity in the Turkish immigrant community. Its foundation provides a social space where the Turkish community meets and discusses their main issues and needs and also reforms their values.

This group's business life provided me with the social space of my research and their working culture let me understand their identity. Furthermore, up to extent this relation has opened a way to their private sphere. My main study area is formed mostly of the members of a newly established foundation that was founded by small - medium range entrepreneurs, who called themselves 'modern', 'secular' and 'following the principles of Ataturk'. In the following pages, I will call small – medium range Turkish entrepreneurs 'petit entrepreneur'. I will explain its reasons in the following chapters as well. Some of my interviews and interactions are with the nonmembers of the NGO,

who have the similar characteristics like being 'modern', 'Turk' and 'entrepreneur'. Most of them have derivative discourse of state ideology towards notions like 'Kurdish', 'headscarf', and so on. Working with this NGO, by using participatory observation under the influence of sociological intervention methodology, helped me to determine the limits of my observation area. I find the opportunity to do in-depth interviews with the ones who both support Fettullah Gülen and Atatürk as well as the Turkish Cypriots. The main dynamic that I was looking for was their relation between modernity and Turkish national identity. This relation's details will be discussed in the following chapters, especially in III.2.

I found the chance to conduct in-depth interviews with Englishmen. I decided to include four of my interviews with Turkish Cypriots as part of this study, since they identify themselves with modern Turks rather than Turkish Cypriots. Most of the interviewees of this study have been living in London about 25 to 30 years. Their business areas can be summarized as follows: Food and beverage, textile, property, finance, tourism, fair organization and art trade. They are mostly traders. Only one of them is producer in textiles with a production site based in Turkey.

Through these interviews and interactions I was exposed to a variety of opinions that enabled me to conduct my observations and analysis. I will discuss why I chose entrepreneurs as a sample and why I call them 'petit entrepreneur' in details in part III.1.

II. Conceptual Framework

II.1. Formation of the Identity in Modern and Post-modern World

"All the world's a stage; and all the men and women merely players. They have their exits and their entrances. And one man in his time plays many parts. His acts being seven ages."

(W. Shakespeare)

When Shakespeare wrote these lines in his famous play 'As You Like It', I am sure he did not mean to attach metaphors to the concept 'identity' as it is perceived in its contemporary sense. Nevertheless, the sociologist who is interested in everyday life practices; Erving Goffman, was highly aware of what he said when he mentioned the everyday role of the individual. According to Goffman, we represent ourselves in everyday interaction, which is like a part of a play that is already written (2000:14). Between Shakespeare's and Goffman's period, the biological existence of humankind has not changed, whereas the meaning attributed to person's subjectivity has highly varied.

Various disciplines such as sociology, psychology and anthropology, have been concerned with the concept of identity. As identity's dynamic role in relation with the society formulates the main subject of this study, it is meaningful to concentrate on the concept identity mostly from a sociological perspective⁷. Nevertheless, I will use the arguments of the thinkers as well as the concepts of psychology like 'identification' when needed. Similar studies like Levi-Straus's binary oppositions in kinship theory are borrowed from anthropology as well.

As Hall points out, identity as subject, has shifted from being the Enlightenment subject to a sociological one and from a sociological subject to a post-modern one (2001: 275). In the Enlightenment period identity plays the role of the humanbeing who is at the

⁷ Here I would like to point out Foucault's argument. According to him modern anthropology is sociology. As one of the main components of this study is modernity, it is meaningful to examine this

center and fulfilled with rationality. In this environment the link between a rational individual and her/his society gains importance. Because the link between an individual and others is not only indicated by the connection of how an individual sees her/himself and how others see her/himself, but also by the connection between what s/he wants to be and the influences, pressures and opportunities which are present and available. The meanings attributed to identity gain importance.

When identity becomes the subject of sociology, it starts to reflect the characteristics and complexity of modern life. William James and George Herbert Mead discussed the concept of self: "The self is distinctively human capacity which enables people to reflect on their nature and the social world through communication and language" (Marshall 1998: 294). The self as a sociological subject has inner and outer role. It provides a link between individuals and the world, in which they live. According to Mead, the interaction between self and society formed identity (Hall 2001: 276). At this point identification is positioning self in socially structured categories⁸.

Although scholars like Marx, Althusser, and Foucault discussed the institutions in modern era, they were not concentrated on individual's identity in detail. They are interested in how individuals as subjects are constituted. Marx and Engels defined modernity as;

...constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation... All fixed, fast-frozen relationships, with their train of venerable ideas and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air... (1973:7 in Hall 2001:277)

The aim of this study is not to discuss theoretical approaches to the terms modernism and post-modernism in detail. Nevertheless, when the concern is the identity concept, unavoidably I have to discuss the concept of identity in reference with modern and post-modern era. Therefore, the main reason for understanding modernity and post-modernity or in other words the modern and post-modern era is to understand today and today's identity.

study from sociological point of view and concentrate on the terminology of sociology with including approaches and terminology from anthropology as well as psychology.

⁸ James and Mead mentioned the role sharing of 'I' and 'me'. 'I' refers to the inner part of the self, which is subjective, creative, determining and unknowable whereas 'me' refers to the outer part of self, which is a social phase that is more known and determined.

Approaches related to the individual have become part of the theoretical framework of modernization. Modernization accepts every single individual as its basic rational unit in its production. Nevertheless, when these individual units start living a crisis in the post-modern era, as Mercer (Woodward 2000:24) and Kellner (Baumann1996: 18) points out, 'identity' becomes an issue. The identity crisis occurs when the identity meets with the 'other', which is its binary opposition. In his kinship theory, structuralist Levi-Strauss argued the need for understanding binary oppositions in the society. According to him, society and culture could only be explored through the oppositions in the society (Smith 2001: 103). On the other hand, Derrida criticized Levi-Strauss's binary oppositions approach. Due to Derrida, binary oppositions could not include the absent parts in reproducing the meanings. Some parts are always left absent. Derrida, who was interested in linguistic theories, explains this in his *differance* theory. Derrida developed his theory to mention the double meanings of the words like the French word 'differer', which means both, differ and defer (postpone). With his *differance* approach Derrida tried to mention the opposite and the second meaning (Smith 2001: 130). Thus, it does not cover the whole meaning environment including the writer and the reader, in other words individual and society or vice versa. When we consider the notion of identity, the binary oppositions are important in discovering and understanding identity's meeting with the other. However, it is also crucial to be aware of the parts that these oppositions could not be covered.

According to Anthony Giddens, 'self is a reflexive project', (1991: 75). Giddens puts the difference between modern societies and traditional societies with their relation to change, speed, and stability. He argues that modern societies are fast, stable and in everlasting change. On the other hand in traditional societies the past and symbols are honored, and gain value since they carry the past experiences. Tradition symbolizes and holds the past, present and the future of the society whereas modernity is defined in relation between present and future. The received practices shape the daily life. Therefore, self is reflexive in the sense that it reflects the dynamics in the society. The main characteristic of this dynamics is its discontinuity.

Harvey mentions the dynamic character of modernity by emphasizing the never-ending production of cracks and divisions in the society. Likewise Giddens and Harvey, Laclau

argues the de-centered character of modernity. In modern society there are several power centers. Thus he criticizes classical sociologists who believe society is a unified whole. In contrast he believes society is de-centered and dislocated. (Hall 2001: 278)

Douglas Kellner believes that identity is a problematic concept throughout modernity. On the other hand, although Baumann admits the problematic characteristics of the identity⁹, he thinks the crucial difference in the process of modernism and post-modernism creates this problem. Baumann argues the aim of modernity is to construct and preserve the constructed identity, whereas the aim of the post-modernism is to avoid fixations and be open to all options. Modernity is the creation while post-modernity is recycling (Hall 2001: 18-37, McCrone 1998:31).

One of the main critiques towards modernity and modern identity comes from Alain Touraine. The two main components of modernity that affect the individual and formulate her/ his identity are 'rationalization' and 'subjectivation'. According to Touraine, like Renaissance and Reformation these two components appear at the same time (1995:201-7). Thus, they did not contradict but complement each other. In the modern world the subject who is 'primarily the creation of a world governed by rational laws which could be understood by human thought' (1995:206), is created by reason alone. There is no place for traditions and human desires. Science is one of the main drivers of modern thought. It shapes modern institutions and consequently is held responsible for the depersonalization of the individual. Modernity also forces the individual to perform self-sacrifice through controlling all his/her actions. Thus, 'the subject is an individual's will to act and to be recognized as an actor' (1995:207) in modern world as pointed out by Touraine. In the post-modern era, as Foucault mentioned 'subjectivation' and 'rationalization' have separated. Nevertheless the way they have separated does not leave a space for modernity. In other words, as they start to contradict each other, they become something else rather than being the components of modernity. This enables the 'other' to stand strongly against identity. This reminds us of the argument between Levi-Strauss and Derrida. There are several variables in the construction of identity whether opposite or complementary. Every individual has 'multiple identities' (Hall 1990 in McCrone 1998:138) which is constructed by the

⁹ Especially, when the identity meets with the other as pointed out by Douglas Kellner (Baumann 1996: 18), Kobena Mercer Woodward 2000:24), Aydın Uğur (2001).

idiosyncrasies of an individual. Individuals' past experience, the oppositions s/he has to face, and the other elements s/he meets other than oppositions', the environment s/he lives in all help the construction of the identity.

According to Uğur, in her/his each meeting with the (binary) opposition, individual reproduces new identities. In modern societies regarding with the concept identity, it is more significant to state 'belonging strategies' and individuals in the society are the part of her/his society's collective identity (Uğur 2003: 5). In a similar way, Giddens mentioned the role of identity in collective atmosphere. Modern institutions determine the role - s of the individual (Giddens 1991). The institutions construct the dependant role of identity in modern society (Giddens 1991, Touraine 1995, Uğur 2003). In a general sense modernity refers to all institutions and modes of behaviors established after post-feudal Europe. However after the 20th century, the term industrialization became a major point of reference where modernity started to be identified with. Nevertheless, Giddens (as well as Touraine) believes industrialism is the one institutional dimension of modernity. Moreover, whether they are industrialized or not, the institutions of the modernity determine and categorize the rights and the duties of the individuals through these identities (Baumann 1998:149). Sennet believes 'modern man was tempted by wilderness, by a place of emptiness which made no seductive demands of its own upon him' (Baumann 1996:21). Giddens thinks that the link between modernity and globalization affects the identity formation of today's individual. According to Giddens "self and society for the first time are interrelated in global milieu" (1991:32).

In the late modern world there are new kinds of identities in which new ways of being someone has gained importance. In the modern world people are thought to enter a productive, free and happy atmosphere (Touraine 1995:185), where cultural pluralism thrives. However, "...cultural pluralism implies a certain defensive closure of individual cultures (Claude Levi-Strauss (1971 "Race and Culture" in *The View from Afar*, Neugroschel J. and Ross P.,Harmondworth: Penguin 1987) in Touraine 1995: 189). Without that closure, all cultures will sooner or later be destroyed by either one dominant culture or by the actions of purely technical and bureaucratic apparatuses which are alien to the world of culture" (Touraine 1995: 189). While criticizing how modern is against traditional values and why post-modernism emerges, Touraine goes

through the intellectual bases of post-modernity. He argues that the opposition between modernism to tradition and the excess of rationalization leaves no space for an individual to express her/himself in the way s/he wants to (1995:186). In addition, the developments in communication technologies have created a medium for identities to meet with the other. At this point post-modernism emerges. Although Baudrillard (1983) himself opposes post-modernist culture, he admits the fact that the mass media produces a culture that shapes a new era. The images and copies (simulations), which are now impossible to distinguish from the real, give way and power to 'hyperreal' values. In this hyperreal world it is normal to be influenced by different values and to have multiple identities.

Today, modern policies are attributed to the theories, approaches and the practices of identity. This gives identity its final main role in shaping the individuals function in his/her society. Moreover, this determines his/her standing point in the global context as well. As Hall (McCrone 1998:138) points out, we have seen different identity characteristics attributed to the same individual: Multiple identities. This is something against the statue-quo, but it may be the main characteristics of post-modern era. In that sense, I believe whether it is in nationalistic form, globalized or hybrid one, identity policies itself is the main area of clashing cultures.

When I consider the arguments above, I could summarize the notions that I choose to use as follows: Today individual identity is multiple and due to change. In modern societies institutions determine the roles of the identity. However this has started to change in the post-modern era. Because individual identity meets others and creates its own world of meanings, which is composed of the opposite components as well as the components that are not included in the self and in the opposite one. Therefore, in the post-modern era identity starts to stand firm against the values that modernity tries to impose. However, s/he cannot abstain her/himself from differentiating from the others, since her/his reference points are still determined by the institutions owned by the new powers. This enabled me to raise a discussion about whether the post-modern era is something new or whether it is the modern era in a new form, termed as 'late-modernity'. Scholars like Giddens also mention the close link between modernity and globalization and furthermore defines it as one of the "consequences of modernity"

(1990). In this study, under the light of the above-mentioned knowledge, I will keep on using the term 'post-modern era'.

I think there is a paradoxical relationship in the formation of identities in the modern and post-modern era. In the modern era, modern institutions homogenize the characteristics of identities and make them similar to one another. In the post-modern era although identity tries to free her/himself from the institutions, s/he cannot. Under the influence of the 'ready-mades' in the media and the global economic order, s/he comes closer with other identities. One way or another, characteristics of identities look similar.

Identity is derived from the Latin word 'idem' which implies sameness and continuity (Marshall 1998: 293). Under the light of the above-mentioned arguments and as being a part of today's order, my definition of identity is concerned with the 'sameness' of identities that brings the sameness and difference together in its construction process, which is carried out under the influence of her/his belonging strategies.

I believe that the reproduction of identities of an individual is more related with her/his socialization process or the 'belonging strategies' s/he develops to survive. As Maurice Godelier points out in its basic form people interact to survive:

To the fact is this. Humanbeing, in contrast to the other social animals, do not just live in relationships, they produce (relationships) in order to live. In their course of existence, they invent new ways of thinking and of acting both upon each other and upon the nature surround them. They therefore produce culture and create history (Carrithers 1992).

II.2. Nationalism and Nation-State in Globalization

"A nation is a group of persons unified by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbors"

(Karl Deutsch 1969 in Delanty & O'Mahony, 2002)

"Myth is a depoliticized speech"

(Barthes, 1957 in 2000)

One of the main components of the concept identity is national identity. National identity and its relation with modernity form the base of this study. In the above-mentioned part, the concept identity and its changing roles in modern and post-modern eras have been discussed. Now, I would like to concentrate on nationalism and its on going relation with modernity and how the constructed national values affect identity.

Tracing the short history of nationalism is necessary in order to understand the dynamic relation between nationalism and modernity. Although there are controversial debates about the roots of nationalism, it is not an exaggeration to claim that it was one of the leading forces of the 19th century. Only after the First World War, it became an academic subject as a part of social science. According to some scholars including Kedourie, the roots of nationalism can be traced back to the ideas of German intellectuals. It is also believed that nationalism was invented for providing a sense of collective belongingness and is system of cultural representation (Kedourie 1960 in 1998, Giddens 1991, Hall 2001). On the other hand, Durkheimian scholars believe that nationalism was a modern replacement of religion in the transition period to modernity. Moreover, as Baycroft pointed out "the history of Europe from 1789 to 1945 is synonymous with the history of the growth and development of modern nations" (Özkırımlı 2000:12-4). Like nationalism's history there also are debates about the consistency that runs through the arguments of nationalism's thinkers. As Gellner pointed out "we shall not learn too much about nationalism from the study of its own prophets"(1983:124-125). Someone can easily argue that one of the social and political forms produced by modernity is nation-state. Nevertheless the nation is a broad generalization that has not been theorized yet (Giddens, 1991:15). Under the light of

these doubtful arguments, I try to discuss the leading thinkers of the doctrine of nationalism and aim to create my own approach.

Most of the time people think that national characteristics are natural parts of their self¹⁰. Nevertheless, national identities are not literally imprinted in our genes (Hall 2001:291). National culture is the collection of symbols, values, and discourses; simply the tools of representation. The tools of representation have been created according to the strategy of authority, which in modern world is called nation-state.

According to Ernest Gellner modernity and nationalism are linked from the beginning and nationalism is not the product of the state but the product of modernity. Nationalism plays the central dynamic role in the identification process of the modern individual (McCrone 1998:67-8). Gellner believes that the modern subject feels a 'deep sense of subjective losses without a sense of national identification' (1983:6). The individuals' awareness of her/his ethnic classification plays a crucial role in her/his socialization process. Gellner says that 'the root of nationalism is not ideological, but concrete daily experience' (1996: 123). Nation does not simply have a political meaning but also represents the collection of symbols that give the idea of belongingness to a community.

Gellner believes the connection between structure and culture is crucial in nationalism. He claims that in primitive societies culture strengthens the structure, whereas in modern societies culture replaces the structure. That is why, as he argued, in modern societies 'citizenship is something that we carry actively and directly' (McCrone 1998:67). As pointed above, Gellner refuses the direct connection between state and nationalism. Nationalism is not only connected to modernity but is a product of modernity. The industrialization process, which creates more or less sophisticated modernities mark different levels of nationalism practiced within a given community/region that in return contribute to the development of statehood. In that sense, Gellner points the deep-seated correlation between industrialism and nationalism. He criticizes nation-centered societies, while he argues nationalism is the outcome of the limits of self-determination in a society and determined by industrialization and

¹⁰ The basic analysis of the idioms like "*Bir Türk dünyaya bedeldir*" (A single Turk is equivocal to the whole world); "*Türk misafirperverdir*" (Turk is hospitable), "*Türk çalışkandır*" (Turk is a hardworker) etc gives us examples about this thinking.

cultural standardization (Delanty & O'Mahony 2002: 102-118). One of the main problems with Gellner's argument is his tendency to ignore historical developments, which has also attracted Anderson's attention and led to his criticism. Anderson criticizes Gellner specifically for his 'self-determination of nations is nationalism' (McCrone 1998:83) notion.

Gellner also believes that nationalism is fuelled by industrialization, which in return increases the self-determination and expansion of culture in society. However, when building his argument on the formation of nationalism he excluded the role of played by influential groups. He argues

...nationalism is the homogenizing culture of modernity but the very premise of homogeneity built into this culture in an unequal world creates the conditions for the expression of difference. On this basis, Gellner constructs typologies of the spread of nationalism based on different experiences of the rewards of modernity (Delanty & O'Mahony 2002: 73).

On this point, as Breuilly supports Anderson's 'transformation of consciousness' approach, he criticizes Gellner's 'self-determination of nations' notion, which will be discussed later.

Benedict Anderson's definition of nation as 'imagined community' plays a crucial role in the theories of nationalism. According to him, nation is an "imagined political community – and imagined as inherently limited and sovereign" (Poole 1999: 10). Nationalism creates and feeds the imagination of nations by its symbols like literature, music and so on. Anderson emphasizes the usage of language. His print-language idea shows in which three ways nation-states develop unity through language. Firstly, Anderson argues that the print-language builds up a unified environment for communication that enables mobility 'beyond and below elite' (McCrone 1998:53). Secondly, his argument follows, through doctrines and official language print-capitalism fixates the messages of communication. Lastly, he adds that print-capitalism raises political and cultural distinctions in the society through standardizing language.

Symbols of nationalism in a nation create self-consciousness in its community. The members of the community understand and recognize each other through the nation. Therefore, it provides a representation, which is a "constitutive presence in the relations" (Poole 1999: 11). Anderson believes culture is created by the symbols of

nationalism that are subject to change. With the process of transformation nation produces and reproduces itself. National identity provides the self-formation of nation, which gives the feeling of belonging to a social environment.

Likewise Gellner, Micheal Mann believes that nationalism is only possible under the influence of modernism. In that sense, he is a modernist. However, contrary to Gellner Mann does not believe that nationalism is the product of industrialization. He dates the emergence of nationalism in the 16th century, long before industrialization. In addition, contrary to Gellner, Mann talks about the need of state as the communicator of the society. Mann finds theories that unite the state and the nation deeply problematic. He argues that two major factors that have affected the formation of nationalism are: 'the emergence of commercial capitalism and the emergence of the modern state with the armies of soldiers and administrators' (McCrone 2002: 92). Nevertheless, Mann's correlation between nationalism and capitalism should not lead to the interpretation that the sole reason of the emergence of nationalism is due to capitalism. Since, his historical approach leaves him to another direction where he finds out that capitalism which is a trans-national process, could not play a role in the formation of nationalism. In that sense he rejects the materialist approaches towards nationalism. According to Mann, developments in military and literacy have given rise to nationalism. His idea of literacy can be regarded similar to Anderson's print-capitalism. In the 18th century with the help of the emergence of modern states and industrialism, nationalism fulfilled its three main phases that are 'militarist, industrial and modernist' (McCrone 2002: 93)

Likewise Gellner and Mann, John Breuilly too is a modernist but one who places greater emphasis on the political aspects of nationalism. According to Breuilly modern nationalism is the product of institutionalized legal, political and economical identities. In addition, he believes that in modern nationalism, myths and symbols are mobile and discontinuous elements. Breuilly believes in political modernization. In that sense it is normal for political modernization to be related with doctrines like nationalism. Citizen is important as well as the state. Breuilly believes that the inner structure of nations is made up from two main components, which are 'a body of citizens and cultural collectivity' (1996: 166)

Contrary to Mann, Breuilly is a materialist. Breuilly supports Anderson's idea of transformation of consciousness in a society while criticizing Gellner's self-determination, which is strictly dependent on the industrialization process. According to Breuilly Gellner's approach is available only in chronological sense. Otherwise it fails. Also contrary to Gellner, Breuilly argues about the influence of the dominant class in the formation of nationalism. According to him, liberal elites or culturally dominant groups lead the nationalization process. He also adds that nationalism assumes different forms in different regions or cultural groups.

Partha Chatterjee is the one who distinguishes Western and Eastern nationalisms and analyzes the Eastern one. In his book *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse*, he mentions John Plamentz's regional classification of nationalism. According to Plamenatz, there are two types of nationalism: Western and Eastern ones. Western nationalism emerged in the West and is culturally equipped, while Eastern nationalism emerged in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In Eastern nationalism

... people's recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them and whose ancestral cultures are not adopted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards (Chatterjee 1986: 2).

Like Anderson, Chatterjee believes both forms of nationalism, Western and Eastern, are grounded in their own cultural basis, although they assume political forms. Both have standards for the development of the national culture. According to Kohn, both have their roots in liberalism. Liberalism has led to the emergence of a massive movement. Kohn believes liberalism achieves this by categorizing nationalism into 'normal' and 'special type'. The 'normal' nationalisms are classical orthodox nationalisms that emerge in the west under the light of the Enlightenment thought, in relation with industrialism and modern democracy. On the other hand, the 'Special' type has different historical background; it is complex, impure and often deviant. Liberal-rationalists claim that the 'Special type' is illiberal (Chatterjee 1986: 3-5). According to Chatterjee, East's discourse is highly influenced by its condition of being the 'special' type. Therefore, the East does not have the original discourse, but it creates its own discourse, which Chatterjee terms as 'derivate'.

Anderson (1983) and Chatterjee (1986) also started to criticize nationalism's international role. They argue that nationalism is a historically specific construction, which is also linked to the colonial approach. At that point, it is worth mentioning the role of globalization. Although different peoples, societies and cultures have always been in relation throughout history, the beginning of 'globalization'¹¹ has attracted different historical positioning across various disciplines. Basically, globalism is the result of human history. Pieterse analyzes the historical perspective of globalization and categorizes three facets of globalization, which are ancient, modern and contemporary.

Today's globalization process differs from that of earlier times in three ways: the volume of the materials moved larger; the speed with which they move are faster; the diversity of materials (matter, nergy, information) moved is greater (Clark 1997:16 in Pieterse 2003:26)

When the notion of globalization is considered in the contemporary conjuncture, it cannot be considered apart from neo-liberal political economy that dominates the international arena. Liberal economy and modernity have come to the world scene simultaneously. The process of industrial revolution that has developed in relation to modernity has formed the roots of the neo-liberal political economy. I believe that the nation-state is a product of globalization in the neo-liberal world order. Because, the security that neo-liberalism needed could only be provided by the new international world system, which placed the nation-state as its predominant actor. Simply put, the formation of nation-state and the efforts that originated from Europe to form independent states were part of the globalization.

¹¹ According to historians and anthropologists, it has started since 5000 BCE with the cross-cultural trade, the early developments in technologies and the emerging of the world religions. Due to political economy, it has started since 1500s with capitalism. Philosophy discipline claims that it has started with the global reflexivity since 1700s. According to sociologists modernity that has emerged in 1800s, is the starting point of globalization. The discipline of political science and international relation believe that it has started with the social movements, establishment of NGOs, and internationalization of states in 1980s. Cultural studies believe it has started with the developments in the mass media, consumption in 1970s (Pieterse:2003). According to Bayart 1853 land revotion has started globalization (1999)

II. 3. The Dance of the Traditional and National Identities in Global Context

Traditional, national and global values, their transforming meanings through time and their dependency on political circumstances affect identity. I believe that the theoretical bases of this study, which is composed of the concepts identity, nationalism, and globalization, are inseparable from each other since their common denominator is modernity. In the above-mentioned parts I have discussed how the concept of identity has become a sociological concept and how it has gained various meanings through out time. I have also discussed how nationalism and nation-states and their relation with modernity have developed. Here I would like to focus more on to the meeting points of identity and national identity with other identities and national identities in global post-modern era and in diaspora. Before proceeding with my discussion, it is worth shortly mentioning the role of tradition in our lives, which I believe to play an important role in the formation of modern Turkish identity. Because both *Gemeinschaft* and *Gessellschaft* (Tönnies 1887 in Kennedy P., Roudometof, V. 2002:6) play an important role in the formation of values that dominate the modern Turkish Republic.

Tradition plays an important role in the identity formation of the individual. The term tradition refers to “a set of practices, a constellation of beliefs, or mode of thinking that exists in the present, but was inherited from the past” (Gross1992: 8). It simply is a set of doctrines, a particular type of behavior and way of thinking about the world and oneself. It has a basic function of keeping collectivity. In the 19th century the rise of modernity and nationalism started to shape the power of tradition. Tradition has become one of the components of the nation-state. It is one of the basic tools of maintaining the feeling of belongingness at a collective level and thus becoming a political tool. The idea of tradition itself is the creation of modernity (Giddens 2002: 39). As Castells (1996) pointed out the information revolution that has paved a way to contemporary globalization, has created new spaces for cultures to meet across or in the nations (Kennedy and Roudometof 2002: 10). Thus this revolution leads societies to take the ‘ready-made’ symbols where ‘real-world’ is erased (Baudrilliard 1983). People do not need physical contact to send messages to each other. ‘But more importantly they make possible the self-conscious’ construction of the world as ‘one single field of persistent interaction and exchange’ (Hangers 1996 in Kennedy and Roudometof 2002: 25).

In the post-modern era; late modern era, some say that tradition dies. But, does it really die? Or is it just the new costume of the tradition that gives us the feeling that it does not exist in our lives any longer? It does not matter which costume it wears, one way or another, there has always been some sort of tradition in our lives. In this new era, tradition has been reshaped as the representative of the local values. Especially societies and individuals need it. Henri Lefebvre argues that we are experiencing a 'decline in our referential' in modern life (1970:111-42). However, as Walter Benjamin mentions in his book *Illuminations* (1969) the aura of tradition still exists in the everyday life of people and they use this aura as a reference point. Thus, though we live in modern societies, we still live in reference to our traditions that are part of our culture. In the global era, people still go on romanticizing the local (Kennedy and Roudometof 2002: 12). Moreover in people's imagination tradition strengthens itself while the global 'shallows', however, this too is a part of people's imagination (Hannerz 1996: 28 in Kennedy and Roudometof 2002: 12). In reality the values of the global highly affect identities. Nevertheless, traditions are still important since they are the products of belonging strategies as well. Many scholars agree about the problems of modernity. The excess of rationalization did not solve any problems since it categorized the very own product of human; culture. The aim of discussing tradition is neither to solve the problems that modernity brings, nor to position tradition as a solution for all the problems around us. However, understanding the value of traditions and beliefs is important to understand the society we live in and the identity strategies that an individual develops especially when it meets with the 'other' in the post-modern era.

After considering the discussion about the role of tradition in the globalization context, I would like to continue with the interaction that takes place between different groups of 'other's. The accumulated knowledge and the rapid improvement of capitalism allowed Westerners to enlarge their area of influence and to easily become at the center. Steam power made vehicles faster allowed Westerners to travel throughout the world and created an imagination about the primitive life style of the 'others'. They published their thoughts and the published thoughts became legitimized, known facts. First they created enemies out of 'other', than they transformed them into 'poor primitives' establishing their victory and power over them. As an artifact of domination Western traders, soldiers and politicians successively conquered the 'other's habitat and

consumed the 'other's' resources, establishing a structure that maintained their socio-economic power which enabled them to influence the economy and politics. Finally, as a creator the dominant culture, as the owner of wealth and as the representative of an ideal of future possibilities the West becomes idealized by the 'others'. Consequently, the 'other's' try to incorporate and adopt the admired ones values into their own value systems leading to the formation of what Chatterjee called the 'Special type' (1986).

When we shift our attention to global politics we can say that, the main binary opposition that has affected identities is the 'West and the rest' approach, which was developed after 1750s. Here 'the rest' mostly represents the 'East' that is geographically the eastern part of Europe. The main characteristic of being a Western is represented by modernity. With time an individuals' level of modernity started to be attributed to the individual's / society's identification with the West which is considered to be the center of civilization. As it is discussed above, modernity and nationalism are closely related. Nationalism as a political doctrine has developed at the same time with modernity. Nation-state's institutions have highly been affected by the rational approach of modernity. This has affected the formation of the nation-states in the West as well as in the East. This cause effect relationship between modernity and nationalism has led to the establishment of different discourses of nationalism in both regions as argued by Chatterjee (1986). Furthermore, I believe this relationship cause multiple levels of hybridization.

Firstly, I would like to discuss how identities have been affected in Western nation-states. The main denominator of nationalism is the unity in the components of belongingness, generally can be considered to be culture, ethnic background, language, history, myths, symbols and so on. When we look at the nation-states in Europe, we have observed that most of them have different characteristics in their societies. Although institutions of nation-states (by redesigning or rejecting some traditions) try to develop national histories, myths, symbols, and unified language and so on in a foundational way, the differences become apparent especially in the post-modern era. As a result of unifying after violent wars, some nation-states have developed different cultures from each other, while others have inherited, thus maintained, the different cultures adopted from their colonial past. Moreover, as differences in class, gender and ethnicity have gained importance in the last four- five decades, it becomes clear that

even the nation-states in the West were not unified. Thus, I believe Hall was right when he pointed out 'modern nations are all cultural hybrids' (2001:297). Trying to unify societies within a given nation-state through same symbols could not cover the differences in the society anymore. Therefore, there still is a struggle between unity (power) and diversity (hybridity).

Secondly, the main parting points from the West can be observed when the formation of nation-state in the East is examined. In the traditional societies where modernity becomes an ideology of the state, the culture hybridizes with traditional and modern values. State is always the dominator of the modernization process in countries like Turkey (Touraine 1995:203, Çetin 2003:14). Geogory Jusdanis also highlighted the different modernization processes in the West and in periphery countries like Greece and Turkey. (1998:11). In these countries the state determines the national discourse by combining the values of tradition and modernity. In the institutions of these nation-states, national discourse is thought to their citizens. Most of the time traditional values strengthen themselves as a defense mechanism (Çetin 2003). Especially under the influence of globalization this becomes apparent (which will be discussed later). However, it is not easy for traditional values to become the real opposition, since as mentioned in the identity part, in the post-modern era they are neither traditional nor modern. They are something new. In that sense they cannot build up a real opposition in the way they used to.

Western gaze has played the crucial role in the nation-state formation of Eastern countries. Edward Said (1978) named the Western perception of the East 'orientalism'. With time Easterners who have accepted the dress code of the West and adopted other qualities of the West that made them modern, have created the notion of the 'other' in their own society, which has contributed to the development of a 'self-orientalist' approach to their own others. In the Eastern nation-states, the ones who identified themselves especially as modern unavoidably have this self-orientalist gaze¹². Daryush Shayegan called this self-orientalist view as the schizoid disorder of the traditional societies. This identity is schizoid especially at the time when it meets with the modern (2002). I prefer to regard this as a new hybrid identity. Moreover, at this point, I believe

¹² Naturally, the level of this 'self-orientalism', that affects discourse of the individual, changes due to the level of the consciousness.

there is 'multiple levels of hybridities'. The first group of hybridities arises from the Western modernity, whereas the second group arises through the amalgamation of the Eastern with modern values.

II. 4. Diaspora as Geography; Transnationalism as Practice

People living in new countries have been appropriated many names like 'ethnic minority', 'expatriate', 'refugee', 'guest worker', 'immigrant', 'diaspora', 'transnational community' and so on.

There are several different meanings attributed to the term diaspora and transnationalism. Some researchers, especially the US based ones use the term transnationalism to refer to the post 1945 new immigrants; whereas some scholars use the term diaspora to refer to all immigrants (Kennedy P., Roudometof, V. 2002: 2). Lately the concepts of diaspora and transnational community have started to be used interchangeably, at times to indicate different diasporic communities. In order to avoid this confusion, I try to explain why and how I use both. Therefore, first I would like to discuss the term diaspora. Then I would like to continue with the concept of transnationalism that has started to be used in the globalized world order.

The classical diaspora is considered as the immigrant community that is forced to leave its homeland and has to live in a new country for political reasons. The classical notion of diaspora is limited to Jewish, Palestinian, Armenian migration experiences. However, the contemporary notion of diaspora is not limited to this description. It describes a "large group including immigrants, expatriate, refugee, guest workers, exile community, ethnic, community" (Tölölian 1991:5 in Ostergaard –Nielsen 2003:14). Khachig Tölölian defines diasporas as "... exemplary communities of the transnational moment" (1991 in Clifford 1994 in Vertovec Cohen 1999). The will to turn back to the homeland determines the difference between the old and the modern diasporas (Kaya 2001:73). The old ones always have a stronger will and discourse to turn back to homeland.

In his article '*Rethinking 'Babylon': Iconoclastic Conceptions of the Diasporic Experience*' (1995 in Vertovec and Cohen 1999), Cohen classifies premodern and modern diasporas. In both classification there are forceful 'victim diaspora's. Pre-

modern diasporas were composed of 'victim diasporas' like Jewish, Armenia ones as well as 'colonizing ones' like the Greek and the British ones. On the other hand, modern diasporas are composed of 'victim diasporas' as a result of the establishment of the modern nation-states; 'trading diasporas' like Jewish, Lebanese or 'business diasporas' like British; and the 'labor diasporas' like Turkish, Irish, Indian, Chinese (1995 in Vertovec and Cohen 1999 and Kaya 2001: 73). Cohen also adds that global economics needs are the driving force of the modern diaspora. Armstrong defines diasporas in two categories; firstly as mobilized ones which are political; and secondly the proletariat which are ones that immigrate to another country for economic reasons (1976 in Vertovec and Cohen 1999).

Being influenced by the Jewish diaspora, Safran defines the ideal characteristics of the diasporic communities that he terms expatriate minority communities. According to Safran members of the expatriate minority communities share the following characteristics:

- 1) They or ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original "center" to two or more "peripheral" or foreign regions.
- 2) They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland – its physical location, history and achievements,
- 3) They believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and therefore feel partly alienated insulated from it
- 4) They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate,
- 5) They believe that they should collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their original homeland and to its safety and prosperity
- 6) They continue to relate, personally or vicariously to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocomunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship (Safran 1991 in Vertovec and Cohen 1999: 364-5).

Safran also points out that none of the modern diasporas including Turkish, Armenian, Palestinian, Cuban, and Greek have the characteristics of the ideal type diasporas.

As the term transnationalism gained ground in the global capitalistic system or in other words as it is the product of world capitalism, it is meaningful to examine it in relation with globalism. The term transnationalism has started to be used by the corporations who have operations in more than one country. It has been used in social sciences since

1986, as The American Academy of Political and Social Science employed the term (Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 27).

Transnationalism is a product of the global capitalist system. The labor transformation and the third world's peripheral position, which is linked to the global economic system, have changed the perspectives and approaches towards migration. Although many scholars agree on the concept of new migration, there is no consensus about the character of this migration¹³. Some say migration is related with the changes in the world economy (Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 34), whereas some others believe that rather than economic reasons rapid transformation and the developments within communication systems caused this new trend in migration (Wakeman 1938 in Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 34). Some think it is the product of different types of migration in the homeland and in the new country. While some others think transmigrants ongoing relatedness with their homeland determines the type of their migration scheme (Vassady 1982 in Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen 999: 34-5). Many social scientists like Smith, Guarnizo, Portes, Vertovec and Cohen argue that new forms of communication technology and mass transport allow immigrant communities to establish and maintain a link with their homeland and the new county (Kennedy P., Roudometof, V. 2002:13). These technologies that can be used in any time by the immigrant gives her/him the feeling of freedom (Smith 1998:213 in Kennedy P., Roudometof, V. 2002:13) Like Benedict Anderson's 'imagined communities', transmigrants create an imagined transnational space where they can transfer culture.

Different from the classical migrant relations, a new kind of migrant population have emerged whose lives are comprised of the characteristics of both home and new societies (Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 26-49). This kind of migrating population is called 'transmigrants' and their experience and consciousness is called 'transnationalism' (Schiller, Basch, Blanc-Szanton 1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 26). Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton define transnationalism, transnational community and transmigrants as follows:

¹³ Regarding to the deep analysis of transnational communities, Kaya argues that anthropology based new social science methodologies should be developed to analyze transnational communities. Since he

... as a process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who built social fields are designated to transmigrants (1992 in Vertovec and Cohen (ed.) 1999: 26)

Gold defines transnational immigrants as transmigrants through emphasizing “networks, links such as demographic, political, economic, cultural, familial that exists between two or more locations” (Gold 2000: 73). In that sense transmigrants can develop relations between two or more societies and locations simultaneously. One way or another new transnationalism has a close link with global perspective.

When transmigrants start taking actions, developing identities and making decisions by establishing relations that connect them with two or more locations and/or nation-states, the migrant community stops acting solely on the impetus of economics and transforms into a socially constructed community. Migrants are socially constructed communities with their own agenda.

One of the main distinguishing definitions between diaspora and transnational communities come from Levitt:

Transnational communities are the building blocks of potential diaspora that may or may not take shape. Diasporas form out of the transitional communities spanning, sending, receiving countries and out of the real or imagined connections between migrants from a particular homeland who are scattered throughout the world. If a fiction of congregation takes hold then the a diaspora emerges (2001:203 in Ostergaard –Nielsen 2003:14)

Some scholars who think diaspora loses its strength and gives way to the transnationalism argue that at this point immigrant communities grow closer to their nation-state. Diaspora is searching for nationhood. It is worship for ethnic and national unity. Thus, Anderson’s ‘long distance nationalism’, that refers to the immigrant’s nation-building process from a far, gains new meaning. As Soysal points out this brings new dimensions to immigrants like practicing citizenship from a far and mobilizing the identity (Ostergaard –Nielsen 2003:15).

believes culturalist and nationalist paradigms could not be enough (2003: 9). Under the light of this argument I try to develop my definitions from the ones that have already been discussed.

Transnational community is a broader form of diaspora. I follow the path of the social scientists Van Amersfoort and Doornik, who use the term 'transnational community' for referring to the 'modern diaspora' (Van Amersfoort, H. and Doornik J. in Kennedy P., Roudometof, V. 2002: 55). By 'modern diaspora', I am referring to those immigrants who have migrated for economic reason and keep in touch with their home country by utilizing transnational communications in the transnational space. Therefore, in this study I use the term 'diaspora' to refer to the geographical location where my informants live; whereas I use the term 'transnational' to the communication strategies that the research group has developed at least with two cultures; their homeland and their new country. In diaspora this transnational identity hybridizes itself one more time by strengthening its traditional values, which are differently positioned in their homeland. The identity is open to gaining the new 'modern' values and to incorporate them into the traditional values that it holds on to. I will try to mention those details in my analysis.

III. Modern Turkish Identity in London Diaspora

III.1. How Petit Entrepreneurship forms the Milieu of Modern Turkish Identity in London

"Need satisfaction in its broadest sense is the organism's survival and well-being"

(Locke in Earley 1993:97)

John Locke's above-mentioned idea simply explains the real motive of the informants of this study, who are petit entrepreneurs conducting business in London. As far as I have observed the factors that have affected this need satisfaction motive, is not something very different from the components that construct and reconstruct their identity. In other words, the 'modern Turkish identity's characteristics is with correlation of its petit entrepreneur characteristics. Before proceeding with the analysis of the term petit entrepreneurs and identity, it will be meaningful to discuss the term entrepreneur.

The term entrepreneurship in its contemporary sense was first established in the Enlightenment period. Therefore it is a new concept and theories related to it have recently been developed. The first economic approach towards the term entrepreneurship comes from the French writer Bernard F. Belidor. In the 18th century, he defines entrepreneurship as "...buying labor and materials at uncertain prices and selling the resultant output at contracted prices" (Kanungo, Balakrishnan, Gopakumar in Kanungo1998: 21). The classical and neo-classical economists consider the entrepreneur as the non-operative part of the economy. On the other hand, some scholars like J.B. Say emphasize the role of the entrepreneur as coordination. J.B. Say makes a distinction between an entrepreneur and a capitalist. Nevertheless his theories do not offer further theoretical bases for my analysis.

The modern and the dynamic explanation of the term entrepreneurship are derived from Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter defines enterprise as "the carrying out for new combinations" and he explains entrepreneurs as the individuals who operate the enterprise (Swedberg, 1991: 34). Schumpeter was the first scholar who mentioned the

difference between innovation and invention. According to him, the entrepreneur innovates however never invents;

...someone is an entrepreneur when s/he is putting together a new combination. Entrepreneur must be someone special because he has to be able to break through the resistance to change that exists in any society. Most people are unable to do this; they can only handle what is familiar to them (Swedberg, 1991: 34, 35).

Schumpeter differs from J.B. Say who underlines the distinction between the capitalist and the entrepreneur. Schumpeter believes that the entrepreneur is not a risk-taker. It is the capitalist who takes the risk by investing the capital. While the entrepreneur is always creative, the capitalist's work becomes routine, s/he never acts as an entrepreneur but always as a manager. (Swedberg, 1991: 173). For him entrepreneur does not belong to one class, but can be from any class, as long as s/he is innovative. According to him "bourgeois family had to be innovative or they would automatically decline" (Swedberg, 1991:105)¹⁴.

Schumpeter believes the main reason for the economic instability in capitalism is the replacement of entrepreneurs with teams of researchers working for huge corporations. Schumpeter thinks the decline of the feudal elements have affected the decline of the innovators who had previously survived in this feudal mode. Huge corporations prevent the emergence of new innovators (Swedberg, 1991:158). Modernity and modern management takes place in a totally different world. Although he has lots of critics, the explanations that Schumpeter offers forms the bases of the modern entrepreneurship theories.

Although there are different approaches to the term entrepreneurship, this basic summary shows that only after Schumpeter entrepreneurs have been regarded as innovators who take an active role in the economy. In general, after these explanations

¹⁴ In the early studies of Schumpeter, he emphasizes 3 motives for entrepreneurship (Swedberg, 1991: 35): "First of there is a dream and will about finding out private kingdom and dynasty... Secondly there is the will of conquer, having the success itself, feeling better than the others... Finally, there is the joy of getting things done. In his later studies he mentioned the fact that entrepreneur could be more than one person" (173).

the term entrepreneur could be defined as follows: The entrepreneur is someone who is a risk taker, decision maker, organizer and coordinator, innovator, employer of factors of production, analyzer of the economic and other environmental developments.

At this point, before initiating the discussion about the entrepreneurs in Turkey, it is worth discussing the relation between globalization and the entrepreneur in the contemporary world context. Mentioning the relation between capitalism and modernity gains importance once again, since the entrepreneur becomes one of the major actors in the context of globalization. Pieterse believes "modernity is also a polite, sociological way of saying capitalism" (2003:113). In order to understand the concept of globalization, it is essential to consider the role of modernity (as a process and as a time) and its relation with the capitalist world order. Today's post-modern era is the continuation of modernity, which is extensively related with the neo-liberal politics of capitalism. Major developments in the post-modern era due to the progress in mass media have influenced individual identities and cultures. Besides this, the post-modern global era cannot be disassociated from capitalism and the neo-liberal politics of modernity. As Jameson (1984) also points out, post-modernism is the 'cultural logic of late capitalism'. Wallerstein's idea of 'two modernities' refers to technology and liberation (1995). He defines the crisis we live in as follows: '...the central cultural contradiction of our modern world-system, the system of historical capitalism ... leading to moral as well as to institutional crisis' (1995: 471-4). One of the actors in this system is the entrepreneur, who is always in relation at least with two cultures and their several classes.

Naturally, socio-cultural factors and cultural values affect the level and the character of innovativeness that forms the basis of entrepreneurship. When cultural values are kept in mind, Turkish entrepreneurs are observed to have different characteristics from entrepreneurs defined by western economic thinkers.

In this study I use the term 'petit entrepreneur' (Buğra 1994, Çakmakçı 1997, Öniş 1996, Castells 1992 in Süerdem - Çakmakçı 2002). The level of entrepreneurship is determined by cultural values and innovativeness. As innovation is the main accepted characteristic of capitalism, the level of innovation is in relation with the level of entrepreneurship as well.

In other words, when we consider the above-mentioned definition of entrepreneurship without innovation, someone cannot talk about entrepreneurship. Moreover, innovation and entrepreneurship produces the 'working culture of its habitat' (Süerdem and Çakmakçı 2002). Therefore it can be said that the working discourse of the individual reflects the cultural value of the individual. On the other hand, cultural values affect the level of innovativeness as well. Süerdem and Çakmakçı think society's cultural values formulate the characteristics of the Turkish entrepreneur. They claim, "Turkish entrepreneurs live the dilemma between social commitment and blatant opportunism" (2002:1). In addition, the state's support in business increases business activity of the 'petit entrepreneurs', while it decreases the level of innovativeness. As the level of innovativeness of the informants of this study is different from the Western level and as they are highly under the influence of their own society, I have decided to call them 'petit entrepreneur'. Süerdem and Çakmakçı's definition also highlights the reasons why I choose to analyze petit entrepreneurs in order to understand identity. According to them entrepreneurship in Turkey took an adaptive meaning with seeking ends in the short-run disregarding calculated risk-taking with lack of social commitment (2002: 5).

As discussed above, the working culture of the individual shows her/his cultural values; I have decided to take Turkish petit entrepreneurs living in London to understand their own cultural value. At this point I believe it is meaningful to mention that I am not going to analyze the working culture of my study group. Instead I analyze their discourse through examining the social space they occupy when working, which I regard to be their existential place.

In this study, three main reasons motivated me to select the petit entrepreneurs who are the small and medium businesses owners living in London to be the informants of this study. Firstly, the selected individuals from the petit entrepreneur group in London are part of the middle class both in their homeland and their new country. This characteristics sets them apart from the first generation migrant groups known as the working class immigrants who migrated on the basis of economic reasons and generally constituted a population from the lower segments of the economic-social ladder. Thus, on the one hand, they carry characteristics of the Turkish small – middle range entrepreneur, bourgeoisie middle-class; on the other hand, they act as a player in the

globalized world stemming from the nature of trading. As they are a semi-open middle class community, they have relations with the members of surrounding communities and classes. This gives them the opportunity to be transitional. Pieterse (2003:30) considers the middle class both in developing and in developed countries as a vital part of the consumption process, naturally with one main distinction. The middle classes in developing countries generally become subjects in the hierarchy of developed economies.

Secondly, as well as being transitional, all entrepreneurs included in this study are transnational. They have managed to take place in at least two different cultures, which are the cultures of their homeland; Turkey and the culture of the new country; the United Kingdom. Additionally they are creating another culture and a way of being through their experience of being part of two countries and cultures. Some are in relation with other cultures not only through social acquaintances but also through their business relations. The British culture absorbs multiculturalism as its basic characteristic. On contrary, 'modern Turkish national identity' was formed and reformed by Turkish Republic's state discourse. Modern Turkish identity as a project, which will be discussed in Chapter III in details, produces a derivative discourse (Chatterjee 1986) since it was established on the heritage of the Ottoman Empire's multicultural identity. The informants of this study are the products of this modernization project and carry multiple levels of hybridities in their identities. Although the informants of this study live in the London diaspora, the way they communicate with their homeland and with other communities carries both economical and social relations. This allows traditional-national-global components of their identities to be reproduced in the London diaspora in a transnational way.

Thirdly, the entrepreneur functions as a social and economic dominator of the society. That is why creating a national bourgeoisie is important (Buğra 1997). In that sense most of the bourgeoisie and state relations are feudal based, established upon 'clientalistic' relations. In the cases that this clientalistic relation between the state and the bourgeoisie in Turkey has been broken, they have nevertheless maintained a close relationship, since creating a *milli* - national bourgeoisie has been the state strategy. In this study, the interpretation of the entrepreneur as a dominator of society provides the

informant group of this study with the social space to be both transitional and transnational.

As I will mention in Chapter III.2 in details, in Özal's period the ideal Turk was defined as an entrepreneur. Furthermore the entrepreneurs were supported by large substitutions in economic policies. Although many 'entrepreneurs' misused these political and economic tools, their abusements were accepted in order to support the growth of a local bourgeoisie. Özal tried to create a liberal economy through state intervention in economic policies. While this process changed the Turkish state's perception as the father it did not eradicate due to ongoing intervention. In the informants' discourse criticism was raised about the lack of genuine state support for business. Generally the informants perceive these supports as their basic right, since, they regard themselves as the agents of economic development in their homeland and the representatives of the civilized face of modernity.

III.2. Nationalizing Modern Identity

"Only the gaze that is turned backward can bring us forward, for the gaze that is turned forward leads us backward."

(Novalis in Gross 1992)

Before going into further analysis, I would like to mention the historical background of the construction of the 'modern Turkish national identity'. In the above-mentioned parts, I discussed the theoretical frame of the belonging strategies of the (hybrid) constructed national identity in the modern and post-modern era. This identity was formed through the experience of the self when meeting with the 'other's binary oppositional values, and with the values that both had not experienced before. Under the light of this theoretical base, I would like to examine the construction process of the modern Turkish national identity.

Turkish nationalism emerged as one of the last nationalist movements in the fragmentation period of the Ottoman Empire. Turk's sense of being the owners/ancestors of the Ottoman Empire led to the late determination of their national separateness and characteristics (Zurcher 2003). Attempts of modernization dating back to Selim III can only be interpreted as an act of survival rather than a display of genuine

interest in building a modern national unity. After continuous failures of modernization projects, Turks in the Ottoman Empire started to create new formations for their survival. In other words, they tried to create belonging strategies such as Ottomanism, Islamism, modernism, etc. It should be kept in mind that these ideologies are not totally independent from each other. They have some similarities as well as differences. In that sense, Turanism¹⁵ endows the Turk, by glorying its national characteristics, the role of leadership in the multicultural Ottoman Empire.

Ziya Gökalp, who is known as the father of Turkish nationalism, practicing as a thinker in the Ottoman era, did not argue for the formation of a separate Turkish nation-state based on the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. Especially in his critiques about the Tanzimat Period, Gökalp replaces the Turkish nationalism with cosmopolitanism of Ottomanism. According to Ziya Gökalp Turks had a historical capability to constitute and rule states, which justified a Turks' leadership of the multinational Ottoman Empire. Gökalp argues that initially the Ottoman Empire founded itself on the base of 'original' Turkish institutions and values. However, with time Ottoman elites replaced these characteristics with Arabic and Iranian ones. Additionally, in Tanzimat Period Westernist bureaucrats incorporated values from the West, especially from the French; leading to the creation of a serious tension between traditional elites in the Ottoman Palace, Westernist bureaucrats and 'original Turks' (Parla 2001:62-3). While the goal of all these were identical, namely saving the Ottoman Empire from its demise, their methods varied drastically and led to an unfruitful competition. Gökalp's explanations about 'original' Turkish identity should be criticized. Because Gökalp himself was an intellectual, educated in Europe, who accepted Western values, and thus became one of the actors of this tension. Gökalp's main sources were Durkheim and Kant, who were two of the biggest thinkers of the Enlightenment period. Nonetheless, I am including his views for they have deeply formulated Kemalism, which has become the pillars of Turkish national identity and the Turkish nation-state which can be regarded as the transformed, thus saved part of the Ottoman Empire (Parla 2001).

Dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the transforming definitions of Turkish nationalism can be rooted in binary oppositions. Firstly, creating nationalism itself is a preference

¹⁵ Turanism is Turkish nationalism during Ottoman Empire's modern era.

about belonging strategies and in Turkey's case the preference is belonging to the West. The preference was almost obligatory since power was centralized in the West, which is also the homeland of nationalism. For Gökalp and Kemalists opting for the West was a rescue project for the Turkish nation, where it would find the continuation of its existence. The historical background and notions defining the original Turk remained linked to the East. A dichotomy was raised in the Turkish nation's new national identity; choosing the West, but belonging to the East. Thus, a geographical binary opposition in the definition of the Turkish nation becomes apparent. As Shayegun pointed out this dichotomy of the traditional transforming into the modern becomes a natural inner conflict in the process of building nationalism as a project. In addition, Gellner's idea of 'sense of subjective loss' and Kedourie's 'collective belongingness' are helpful in understanding the first modernization and nationalism attempts for providing a unity in the Ottoman society that had already started to fall apart in its declining period.

After the War of Independence and the foundation of Turkish Republic, I start categorizing Turkish nationalism in 3 periodic phases. The first phase constitutes the period until the end of Second World War. The second phase constitutes the period between the end of Second World War and 1980s' last 'modern' coup d'état. The third phase starts from 1980s' last 'modern' coup d'état and extends today.

In Turkey nation-state formation began with the one-party administration. Zurcher calls the first years of this administration dictatorship (2003:257). After 1930, there was an attempt to create an obedient opposition party but it was not until the end of the Second World War, when a real opposition party against CHP (Republican People's Party) was formed. Thus, in this period we should define official Turkish nationalism based on CHP's definition of nationalism. The first aim of CHP's nationalism was erasing Ottoman influences on the people living in the borders of *Misak-ı Milli* and the raw material of Turkish nation. For this, CHP secularized education, the legal system and social order (Zurcher 2003). The reflexive character of the new administration was mostly due to the experience related to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the nationalism of this period can be identified with the process of collective forgetting strategies that would legitimize the new secular administration, which followed fast, detailed and oppressive transformations in the functioning of the state in order to

position the new Turkish Republic in the progressive frame of modern European statehood. Same binary opposition about belonging strategy of Turkey and Turkish nation can be observed under the cover of this 'dictatorial' domestic politics. The elites were trying to create and build the nation according to their ideal imagination of their imagination, which reminds Anderson. Moreover, domestic strategies covered during this period remind Chatterjee's derivative approach towards nationalism in the East. It should be added that foreign policy of the Turkish Republic was very close even to the West, which wants to be belonged to because of the fear of sense of subjective loss that feeds the obsession of self-determination.

After the Second World War, the tendency of political-economic liberalism appeared strongly in the West because of the forceful preference between capitalism and socialism. In this era, Turkey's geographical and strategical location positioned it in the path of a new liberal political and economical policy. In 1946, DP (Democrat Party) was established as a real opposition party against CHP's political monopoly. Because of the dictatorial politics of CHP, there was a big popular opposition against it which DP utilized in its own propaganda against CHP. However, this oppositional emphasis, which determined DP's position within politics, soon changed and DP's political discourse started circling around redefining the components that characterized the Turkish nation.

DP's definition of the ideal Turk was more traditional and respectful of religious values. On the economics aspect, DP changed economic priorities and carried out different policies towards the bourgeoisie. In respect to the bourgeoisie, CHP had created and supported a bourgeoisie that identified itself with the state ideology while DP started to transform the elitists composure of this socio-economic class by supporting landowners and farmers. Thus, DP changed the understanding of secularist politics. In addition, by supporting the liberal economy-politics in the international arena, DP opened the *Misak-ı Milli* borders mainly to the West and to the Middle East via regional cooperations¹⁶. In this period Kemalism's imagined clothes transformed into a new perspective with the patchwork of DP. In this phase, the binary opposition of Turkish identity was more complex than the period of CHP's political and social monopoly. Because DP was

¹⁶ Zurher (2003), Bugra (1994), Koker (1993), Kadioğlu (1996) mentioned this period in details.

liberal and liberalism was from the West; likewise CHP's nationalism and republicanism. The era of the 1950's, under the influence of this confused Turkish identity can be seen as the 'reeasternization of imagined Western Turkish identity' facilitated by the application of liberal economy-politics. Liberalism had a double-faced effect on Turkish identity. Economically, it opened the Turkish economy to the West; while socially it re-exposed the Turkish identity to its traditions that dated back to its prerepublican eras, which are rooted in its Eastern past stemming from its geography, like Islam. As Zurcher argues that the awakening of Islam, in fact, is the continuing traditional culture of people; the old dependant classes (rural people) were defending their self-explanation rights (2003:340-1). In that sense it reminds the argument of Giddens about the re-definition of tradition by modernism. There is no doubt that DP was as modernist as CHP.

The period after this is the struggle period between these main two approaches on the notion of 'what a Turk should be?' with many variations. These variations are colored by more or less Islam and the West due to the spreading ideological influence of Socialism. Coup d'etats were the attacks of Kemalist dynamics of the Republic, which were enabled by a strong military presence and anti-democratic elections. After each coup d'etat, the opposition against Kemalist dynamics placed another Turkish movement into the power, which we today we still observe to be governing. In order to analyze the discourse of the informants, it is crucial to examine the political period that they experienced, which shaped their political national identity.

Between 1960 and 1980, the clash between different social and political groups in Turkey have widened and deepened. The Kemalist dynamics of the Republic present in army used this clash in order to legitimate the coup d'etat of 1980. It was the most conservative and most effective coup d'etat in Turkey's history and the leader officers who carried out the coup d'etat prepared the strictest constitution in the Republics history. It was the longest military administration in Turkey's history, which took approximately three years. The so-called 1982 constitution is still active. Thus, we can say that its effect is continuing formally and spiritually; in other words they are active *de facto* and *de jure*.

Under this strict constitution only 3 parties were founded: HP (People's Party), ANAP (Motherland Party), MDP (Nationalist Democratic Party). HP was the continuation of the tradition of CHP. MDP was the party directly related to the army because its leader was retired Full General Turgut Sunalp. ANAP was the only original creation of the coup d'état for the electorates. The founder and the leader of ANAP, Turgut Özal claimed that converging the four political tendencies formed in mainly 1970s; which were central-right, central-left, the right of central-right and the left of central-left. Although initially it seems very humorous, in fact it was an effort to push the limits of politics in Turkey. Since the politicians of the radical left and radical right were blamed for being the responsables of the chaotic environment of 1970s, army officers and their cooperators in politics excluded them from the political. Between 1983 and 1987 Ozal was the only political leader of Turkey, so his politics became highly influential in the period and carried their effects into today. Closing the borders of politics to radicals can be read as another effort to define 'what is a Turk?' In these limits Turk is redefined in the center of political preferences. S/he was not too Islamist, not too nationalist, not too leftist, not too rightist. In that sense, s/he has lost its political colors. Economically, 'Turk' was entrepreneur, because of Özal's gradual liberalization of economy policies (Zurcher 2003: 413).

Basically, in Özal's period economic and political liberalization went hand in hand. Özal's understanding of political liberalization as the infrastructure of economic liberalization materialized the concept of democracy. Additionally, after this period entering the EU (European Union) became the main goal of Turkish foreign policy again as a step to economic development. The liberalization in politics was useful for Islamist parties. In 1990s Turkey witnessed the biggest rise of Islamist movement under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan's RP (Welfare Party). For the first time a party which opposed Turkish Republic's main preferences to be Westernized gained widespread support. This party also had a kind of developmental and liberal discourse. But it drew a clear difference between progression and Westernization. When in power domestically and foreign policy wise, it gave priority to Islamic groups and capital owners and Islamic countries as well. It was the last struggle of radicalized Islam. In 1997, the so-called 'post-modern' coup d'état replaced RP and DYP (Right Way Party), which was the coalition party that claimed itself to be the continuation of DP (Democrat Party). The RP and DYP coalition was replaced by a three party coalition that combined

three parties from different strata's; DSP (Democratic Left Party), MHP ((Nationalist Movement Party) that is said to be the representative of Turkish fascism) and ANAP. This solution was the only one possible way to re-check the reminded definition of Kemalist imagination of 'Turk'.

A group who left Erbakan's RP began an interesting right wing political movement. This young generation of Islamic politicians declared that they have changed. They withdrew the anti-western approach of RP (even Erbakan himself withdraw this) and they became the most Westernist political movement of Turkey regarding foreign affairs. They even started to struggle against Kemalism not only to strengthen traditional or Islamic values but also to promote democratic and liberal politics, which are mainly shaped by the European Union's politics. In domestic politics they still support the traditional values, especially religious ones not because of being radical Islamist, but basically for gaining votes from the traditional vein.

In this short reading the Turkish Republic's history, chronologically (and step-by-step) I tried to summarize the binary oppositions of modern Turkish identity, which is constructed by political struggles. Now, I claim that the Turkish identity is not formed by one or another politics of this period. It is formed into and by these struggles¹⁷. Thus, it can be said that the Turkish identity is a platform of struggle as well as it is a product of these struggles.

In the last period, all of the binary oppositions of this identity can be observed in the components of modern Turkish identity, which are secularism, Kemalism, 'following Ataturk's principles', 'civilization', etc. And there is no one definition for each of them; even Kemalism has various definitions as well as owners. In daily life, you can hear such idioms like 'Muslim Democrat', 'Republican Conservative', 'Atatürkçü Muslim', 'National Leftist' and so on. These are the products of the long-lived struggle for gaining priority to define Turkish identity in between different political attitudes and traditions of Turkey.

¹⁷ Uğur claims that this struggle can be defined in 5 categories (2003:7). 1) Culture is the meeting of the social identities. 2) Social identity is realization of these struggles/ meetings 3) Our identities are due to change 4) We do not have only one identity, everytime we develop identical strategies as choosing some of many identities 5) As the natural consequences of this, culture is defined several times. Its definition is changeable.

III.3. The Modern Turkish Identity in London Diaspora

Under the light of Chatterjee's nationalism theory, Turkish nationalism can be considered as 'Special type', which has a derivative discourse. In the Western nationalism, the individual opposes the level of self's categorization as Touraine argues (1995). Individual's reference points are influenced by the outcomes of ready-mades of media, or fast economical developments of the globalized world. As a 'rational individual', who is the sole decision maker and determiner of her/his own actions, her/his relation to change is historically more predictable than the Eastern one. However, in this study it can be observed that in the Eastern case self needs an authority as a reference point to change. The petit entrepreneur group in London has two main reference points. These are globalization and nationalism, both of which have the same denominator: modernism.

Transnational practice in diaspora naturally influences the daily life discourse of the research area as well. This influence clearly reforms the usage of globalization and nationalism in transmigrants life. In their 'modern' daily life which is composed of their economical and business relations and practices, they are under the influence of globalization. As chasing the Western (or in contemporary words global) trends and values are part of being 'modern Turk', it is natural for the informants to adopt these values to their practices. Therefore, in their economical and business relations they acquire the middle class globalized values, which deeply affect the consumption behaviors, life-style and discourse of the informants.

Regarding the political issues, which play a crucial role in shaping the informants' traditional values and their role in public sphere, they choose the Turkish Republic as a reference point. Since they were brought up in the institutions of the nation-state, they are highly under the influence of its discourse, which is also in relation with modernity. Like most of the nationalism theoreticians, Anderson also argues the vital role of language in nation building process. Through language, the symbols that form the soul of a nation can easily be spread and most significantly determine the values that citizens should obtain. These values define the role of tradition as well as modern. Tradition, which is influential in keeping private and public order in the society, is suddenly

reshaped by state ideology. In that sense, tradition is redefined by modernity (Giddens 2002) as well as nationalism. This definition determines the playground and role sharing of the citizen in the nation-state. Therefore, the informants have 'nostalgic' and 'schizoid' relation with Turkish Republic. Their relation is nostalgic in the way they idealize the establishment of Turkish Republic. This idealization has been nourished by the myths that were created about the formation of the nation-state. Nevertheless in their daily life practices they have to face the reality, which is contrary to the content of the myths. This has led to the creation of their 'schizoid' discourse and gaze towards the Turkish Republic. Moreover, as they identify themselves with the ideal of modernity, they believe they represent the real modern Turkish values.

Both nationalism and globalization as a pair has an ongoing and ever changing relation with modernity. In other words, modernity is the main dynamic of both of them. Therefore, the values created by this relation shape the belonging strategies of my informant group in their community. The outcomes of these belonging strategies led to different interpretations of modernity. Consequently, in their daily interpretations the multiple levels of hybridities can be observed.

The research area can be accepted as a laboratory for observing the steps and levels of identity construction of Turkish nation by modernizing it. Since they have an emphasis on their representative role, as a transnational community in diaspora, they show the basic characteristic of modern Turkish identity in a framed small community. Firstly as they accept their modern values to be the representatives of the Turkish values in diaspora, they see themselves as the elite class of the Turkish immigrant society in London. Therefore, they think they are the leader of the community. Thus, they preserve their modern Turkish national identity in their own imagined (Anderson 1983) discourse, which is open to reconstruction. In that sense, as they are conservative in their national values, all the oppositions witnessed in Turkey's political arena can be observed here. We can also define social space of the NGO as the struggle arena of different ways for modernizing national identity.

Additionally, as they are petit entrepreneurs who are in relation with more than one class and more than two cultures in the globalized world order, they are both transitional and transnational. In that sense, their modern national identity is highly affected by

globalization. This led them to reevaluate and relocate their modern national values as well as traditional ones.

I shortly want to mention one more time that the NGO that I worked on, has 150 members. Moreover, the study included other people related to the NGO, but who were not official members. I conducted 12 in-depth interviews with members and nonmembers of the NGO. As informants of this study are the members of the NGO or the entrepreneurs around them, I believe they have a representative role in understanding 'modern Turkish identity' in the London diaspora.

III.3.a. Transnational Practice in Diaspora

Under the light of the above mentioned arguments, it is meaningful to discuss the areas in which the informants utilized the discourse of nationalism and globalization and its relation with modernity to reconstruct their already reconstructed (hybrid) identities. To achieve this it is meaningful to start analysis from exploring the role of woman and the socialization process of informants. Because their daily practices both in home and in business reflect their values and their different interpretations of modernity.

Woman

Woman has a significant role in the formation of a nation. Alterations are carried and symbolized through woman. Woman is the symbol of the revolution whereas man is the border showing culture, ethical codes, ambition, pain, nation, geography, gender, race and class (Pile 1996: 207). In bourgeois civil society, institutions are not only masculine, but also the understanding of universality in the institutions has been set by man for the use of man (Landes 1988 in Baker 1996: 198-199). Therefore under the criticisms of feminist theories, in order to survive in public sphere woman has to own male discourse. Liberal political-economy feeds this approach as well. As a woman researcher I believe I was lucky not only to observe but also to intervene in the informants' field. This led me experience the way they apply their liberal masculine gaze towards the role of the woman in community. The role of the woman is also crucial for examining how traditional, national, global and modern values are carried and reproduced both in home and in community.

When I first met with the members of the NGO, they were a group of men, who got together every Thursday for drinking *raki*¹⁸. I have observed that at the beginning I was regarded as a 'hardworking girl' (*çalışkan kız*). In a month, my professional approach about the formation of an NGO, made me become one of them, and I was invited to their *raki* dinners. When I accepted their invitation, they tried to find other women to come to the dinner. In this dinner, I have totally observed how their 'girl' discourse promoted into 'woman'. Although they use the liberal values to identify me, I have to mention that their 'woman' equalizes me with them. After this month, it was easier for me to make them listen to me. Frankly speaking in my promotion from being regarded as a 'girl' to a 'woman', they did not feel threatened to include me in their male dominated society. They were very open and welcoming. This allowed me to use some sociological intervention techniques in my participatory observations and to pretend both as an interpreter by agitating some points, and as an analyst by taking field notes and making observations (Touraine 1995).

My example of becoming an equal member is also symbolic for understanding the altering dynamics in modern Turkish family. Likewise the approval of my equality in the NGOs' managerial decisions, woman (wives) have to get an 'unofficial' approval from their man (husband) in their family context. Nevertheless, this approval comes only through the intervention of the woman. She has to prove that the change is necessary.

Comprehending the informants' family relations enables us to understand their multiple levels of hybridization in their modernity discourse. While creating belonging strategies related with family, s/he chooses to use one of the values from her/his traditional and national baggage that is surrounded by modernity. As the Turkish Republic ideologically determines the role of a modern Turkish citizen by shaping tradition with nationalism in its formation, informants apply the discourse and the values of their nation-state most of the time, which was created under the light of Western and Eastern values. In Chapter II.3, it was mentioned that in nation-state practice both Western and Eastern nationalities led to the emergence of modern hybrid identities. In relation to this approach, Hall argues that all nations are culturally hybrid. Western nationalism

¹⁸ Traditional Turkish alcoholic drink.

hybridizes the identity in its institutions, while the Eastern identity hybridizes its values with the values that it acquires from the West. As Chatterjee argues this gives Eastern nation-states a derivative discourse (1986). Thus, the daily practices of modern Turks leave us a space where multiple levels of modern hybridities can be observed. When the globalized world order is concerned, it is also meaningful to mention Giddens's reflexivity approach (1991). Self is reflexive in the sense that it reflects the dynamics in the society.

The informants of this study have different approaches towards the family and children. Actually, their different understanding about modernism creates the differences in their daily life practices in family relations. Especially, this becomes clear when I talk to the male informants about their wives and family relations. Two of the informants who consider themselves as modern, totally have different approach towards the role of the woman in the public and private sphere. Both of these informants' wives are working with them. One of them accepts the fact that there are times when his wife may be more active than him in the company, whereas the other one directly categorizes the role sharing between him and his wife. According to the second informant, 'wife' as a 'woman' should be responsible from the inner space of the company. Therefore she is working on basic daily accounting and organization, which are controlled by her 'boss' who is her 'husband'. Although he needs to control woman's performance, at the same time, he also mentions how he respects the workingwomen.

Other different levels of modernities can be observed with another case as well. This time both of my informants' wives are housewife. One supports the idea that his wife should not have lots of friends a part from their core Turkish friends in London. He also has a skeptical approach towards woman NGOs. Nevertheless he supports his wife in going to the gym and for following the changes in fashion. He believes that through this way, his wife both keeps traditional values and at the same time follows the 'modern' developments in daily life (like gym and fashion). This would let their prospective modern children to preserve their traditional values. On the other hand, the other informant highly supports his wife's socialization. For this he invited her to this newly established NGO, also support her activities in woman NGOs. He believes it is better for their children to keep the balance between homeland and the new country.

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When I consider informants' working atmosphere I realize that the first one mentioned in the above example is closer to the conditional economical diaspora, which was discussed in Chapter III.4. Economically, it is better for him to stay in London. I believe being in the conditional place allows him to be more protective about his traditional values. His discourse is highly under the influence of traditional values of the motherland. Nevertheless, he wants his wife to be modern and tires to achieve this by supporting her to go to gym and to follow fashion. On the other hand, the other informant has more international business relations and goes to Turkey frequently with his family. His relations in the neo-liberal world order enable him to try everything he is curious about. Both informants preserve their modern discourse with different interpretations. Besides, the position of living in the diaspora and the frequency of their relations with their motherland affect their discourse. This makes them live 'in between modernities', the one that comes from their modern Turkish identity and the one that comes from the modernity in London.

Women's other socialization arena is the woman NGO that they have formed. Woman NGOs in London have more local targets such as easing the adaptation process of children into the British community, to teach Turkish to the children and to make them preserve their Turkish values. Sometimes those NGOs conduct charity activities to get funds in order to support the Turkish people in Turkey. This clearly shows, like their spouses they also have transnational practices with the homeland; Turkey. Regarding their family relations it can be said that the role of the woman is mostly to organize private life while preserving the national and traditional values. In the general activities of the NGOs, few of the male members come with their wives, while most of the woman members come with their husbands. Women have a habit or most of the times are in the need of representing their family. Therefore, they can provide social order in the community. It is more or less same in the homeland.

Finally, I also want to mention that I could only reach two women entrepreneurs for my in-depth interviews and frankly speaking, it took time to find them. Other women that I met were mostly the wives of the NGO members. All these analysis and examples could not prevent me from analyzing the environment from a woman's perspective. For the women informants of this study can still be said to live under the traditional (although these values are differently affected by modernity) male dominant values. Naturally, the

discourse of the woman is determined by it. If she is interested in more political, economical and business issues, she will become the member of the man's discourse. Nevertheless, it is not something directly related with the informants of this study, this is same all over the world.

Socialization

Before analyzing socialization process deeply, it is worth to mention the educational background of the informants of this study to have a broad perspective. Most of petit entrepreneurs graduated from the high schools in Turkey. There is a balance between the locations of their universities. Most of the nationalism theories mention the importance of the education in the ideological formation of an individual. At that point, the place of the high school plays an important role in the development of their national identity. In the light of this information, it is not a big surprise to find out that they follow the changing discourse of Turkish Republic, when there is something directly related with their characteristics. It is because petit entrepreneurs' ideological imagination was generally set up in their homeland.

The petit entrepreneur Turkish group's socialization process is mostly analyzed through the outcomes of my participatory observation. I made several main outcomes about their family, friendship and their networking relations. As Carrithers argues mutual responsiveness in the community is important:

...the most general way of talking about sociality is as intersubjectivity, an innate human propensity for mutual engagement and mutual responsiveness. Some of this propensity is cognitive or intellectual. Some are emotional. But in any case human relation exists only in and through people's relations with each other (1992:54).

In their discourses some of the informants mention that they try to keep traditional Turkish values at home. Moreover, they underline the fact that they speak Turkish at home as well. I9 adds "...to make sure that children are not forgetting mother tongue, we speak Turkish at home and frequently visit our relatives in Turkey. When they go to Turkey, they feel at home." They try to protect their traditional – national values as much as they can both by keeping their relation with motherland and through language.

As Anderson argues literacy is one of the crucial arguments (McCrone 1998). Language provides unity in the society and in the family. Moreover, language keeps the memory, which helps the reproduction of national identity.

In my in-depth interviews I find out, when I ask anything about socialization to the informants, most of them mention their golf clubs. However, in my observations I realize, most of the time they socialize through the activities related with Turkey such as football games. This shows how their discourse changes according to the expectations of their audience. When I asked this question to them, they knew that I tried to understand their working environment as a social space. Therefore, they rearranged their discourse according to the accepted values of an ideal entrepreneur. They believe mostly, in Europe Entrepreneurs socializes through golf. They come together to watch Turkish games in the 'modern coffeehouse' (kahve), where they can also go there with their families. Moreover, they follow all the news in the Turkish media through the satellite TV channels. Most of them have satellite TV channels in their homes. This let them actively argue about the latest developments in Turkey both face to face and through Internet. In that way, they create their transnational imaginary space.

As Giddens pointed out, "modernity is a risk culture" (1991:3). This does not mean that modernity makes the social life risky. According to him risk and trust have become the notions to be applied in social life. Moreover, both become the main tools of social order. Trust is achieving the early sense of security thus; it is the medium of the interactions. Modernity determines and regulates the risk factors. As John Haviland mentions people gossip about the things out of schemata. Nevertheless, gossip

...the nonparticular is irrelevant the actual; the contingencies determine the general principles for they are all there is. In gossip the world becomes more than ideal schemata and codes it rests on the Who's Who, much expanded on history, on reputations, on idiosyncrasies, on exceptions and accidents. Gossip exalts the particular (Haviland in Carrithers 1992:108-9).

Trust and gossip play an important role in their relations. Although people are searching for security by gaining trust, in diaspora somehow they keep their trust to community even they are aware of the fact that other community members are gossiping against them. One of the members of the NGO catches the gossiping about the others about his projects. At the beginning, although s/he looks frustrated about the situation, in a short

time s/he forgets it. And s/he says, "...we are very small here. The best thing is to forget about the bad experiences and try to be positive".

S/he adds, "...here we need each other". Additionally it can be said that by materializing these values and habits, like trust and gossip, they change the environment of business as tools of creating and protecting networking. Since, the informants of this study define trust and gossip as the tools of forming and surviving their networks. It can be said that these values and habits are capitalized and reformed in their daily practices.

One more important point about creating and keeping the network and gaining status is directly related with the people who they know. In any conversation, they try to mention the upper-middle and upper class people whom they know and how they know them. This somehow gives them a kind of self-confidence. Besides, they also respect and try to use the upper class values and consumption behavior.

III.3.b. Diaspora Preference as a Transnational Community

While trying to understand the way they explore diaspora in London, we should keep in mind that all the members of my diaspora prefer living here. Most of them have the chance to live in Turkey more or less with the same economical conditions. But they prefer to be in the United Kingdom. They were standing in the 'trading diaspora' ladder of Cohen (1995). In that sense they were economic diaspora. Global economic needs are their driving force. They act as transnational community in London diaspora. As a word transnationalism has a close link with globalization. New forms of communication, mass transportation and fast economy let them have link with the motherland. Between Turkey and the United Kingdom, they create an imagined transnational space.

As neo-liberals, they need stable economic conditions and trust, which is provided by the system. This makes the United Kingdom a charming place for business for them. I2's one sentence summarizes this situation: "Here in the United Kingdom, they have very well constituted system, there are lot of things that do not exist in Turkey." And s/he adds how this system provides trust, which is crucial for their business. Under the light of this idea, I try to deepen the comparison between Turkey and the United Kingdom from the eyes of my interviewees.

Turkish modern petit entrepreneurs living in London have several reasons to prefer being a diaspora in London. It is known that capital does not have a country. The main condition for capital to survive and to expand is to have stable economic conditions and a system that has rules that everyone knows and agrees on them. It seems that this study's petit entrepreneurs prefer living in London because of the conditions that provide stable and predictable environment for them. Simply, as Giddens argues as well the neo-liberal economic system of globalized world needs trust and its modern institutions provide this trust (1991). There are regulated procedures for providing the trust between the system and entrepreneur; the trust relation in liberal economic system and the way system defines everyone's roles. Besides, trust needs rationality, which is the main instrument of modernity as well. In that sense most of the time they do not find the system in Turkey rational. In a general comparison it can be said that Turkey could not fulfill these conditions for entrepreneurs. Thus, there is not a healthy environment for a liberal trade. There are some reasons for the instable environment of Turkey. One of them is the unknown role sharing in the economy, business ethics, governmental decisions especially for economy, and the corruption of bureaucracy in relations with entrepreneurs and procedures and misuse of the system in their sectors. This mistrust affects their discourse and allows globalized values of liberal system to become their reference point.

The informants of this study think that there are two main reasons for the mistrust in the relation with Turkey, which are the Turkish bureaucratic system and the Turkish businessmen. I1 says

There is a very rotten bureaucracy in Turkey. The law system is full of Arabic statements. You have to live with this no matter which university you graduate. Nobody really understands the real details of the tax law, that's why I brought up this example. You cannot see that kind of thing here (UK). The guy would phone you and come on an agreed day to discuss. S/he would come to some place else and investigate your books (accounting notebooks) if that is your choice. The tax system is very established so doing business is much easier.

Furthermore, I1 adds, "Turkish bureaucracy does not trust to its citizens". When I6 talks about her/his long unresolved trial in Turkey, I6 says, "the best thing is not to work with Turkey".

I2's experience with the customs officer in Turkey shows how bureaucracy held subjectively in Turkey. I2 wanted to import porcelain cups to Turkey. The customer officer asked if they were porcelain or ceramic, because of the one old and invalid law about protecting Turkish ceramic producers. At that point I2 reminded customs officer about the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and EU and about the new law. However, the customs officer insisted on sending the cups to laboratory for analysis. S/he sent them. So, suddenly the new law has become invalid practically. S/he explains this as the failure of the bureaucratic system. Her/his anger in the story telling is very remarkable. S/he insists on calling the customs officer as '*adam*'¹⁹ and there is a stress whenever s/he says '*adam*'.

The other problem related with the bureaucracy is the bribery in the Turkish system. I4 naturally generalizes the level of the bribery as follow:

I do not want to be involved with high-ranking, senior people. Because this is a matter of connections, a matter of a second guy manipulating the real decision maker. Let's say you are a big catalogue company. They would still put you out unless you are an old friend of that guy! This is everywhere in Turkey. It may be a bit more open and obvious in Turkey because people are cheap. Unfortunately this is the case, you need to bribe them most of the time, and even the smallest guy wants some kind of bribe.

There is a double meaning, when s/he calls people in Turkey 'cheap'. Firstly, s/he refers to the price for bribery that is lower. Secondly, s/he mentions that the mentalities of people in Turkey are backwards. In that sense, it can be said that s/he stands from globalized gaze and has an orientalist view towards the people in Turkey. Simply, their modernity approach is the re-use or in other words reproduction of Kemalist values.

At that point it is meaningful to define how petit entrepreneurs define trust. Trust is not a social value that determines the relationships between individuals, but also a commercial value, which should have been constructed between system and entrepreneurs and between entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs. Simply reciprocal trust between all components of commercial life is a must. I3 says,

Verbal communication is important but mutual trust is a must. Trust emerges from an on-going necessity. The system works no matter what. You do not expect anyone you work with, to try to fool you, you trust yourself he would not do that. But sometimes that is not enough, especially if the mentality of

¹⁹ Not a polite way of mentioning someone. Depending on the stress on the word and the context it can be regarded as slang as well.

whomever you are dealing with is "*alaturka*". If this is the case he would try to find a way around and most of the time he will think he does, even when he is not even to close to doing so.

I3 defines trust basically "...as keeping promises and transparency is very important. If you are in the position of not keeping your promise, you should be frank to your client and tell them your reasons."

Another entrepreneur who defines trust as keeping your promises is I2. I2 says "They will be inconsistent in what they tell to other people, simply because they have not been able to keep their promises. This creates a general mistrust for the Turkish people."

The representative role makes her/his feel shame at the point s/he mentions to 'mistrust' to Turkish people. Besides, s/he also keeps her/his self-orientalist gaze to Turkish people who cause this feeling of shame.

I9 mentions the mistrust of Turkish government towards the entrepreneurs and the problems in the bureaucratic system with the following words. I9 says

Every year we take 40 thousand pounds to Turkey on average that makes half a million in 6 months. The Ministry of Commerce takes a considerable percentage of that from you, even though that Ministry does you no good at all. Maybe they provide something to some people, but not to me, and I try to explain this to them! I try to understand whom they are providing all those credit. They never came and asked me what I need to improve my business (even though I am a taxpayer in Turkey). They should be asking how I could increase the 40 thousand to 50, so that we both win. They do not do that but on the other hand open up credit lines to people who do not even have a proven track record here.

Because of this mistrusted environment, petit entrepreneurs do not prefer to work with Turkish businessmen. If they have to make business with them, they always make contracts, even though they do not find these contracts safe as well. At this point it is meaningful to add that for entrepreneurs' trust depends on other parties' (Turkish businessmen in Turkey) business ability. I3 says,

The middle sized companies should lay out their structures strongly. They would usually get credit and build their business on this alone. This is a big mistake. The Turkish tradesman does not want to build a business on his/her own resource. They would usually get credit and cannot pay back the interest, going bankrupt. This is the main problem. They have an important resource issue.

At that point, regarding to Turkish businessmen or clients I5 adds that

...they just think that without doing enough research they can just come here and get things the way they hear about it They learn things from their neighbors, friends. They can't believe in getting proper advice or paying for consultancy fees. So they are doing things in a very opposite way.

Here it is worth mentioning that I5 preferred to make the interview in English. I5 says Turkish people believe that if there is a trust relation, there should not be any business relation:

Trust is very important. And to them, the trust is very important. They fear that if they trust somebody, some of them, they will let you; they will either negotiate their lives. Because they trusted you, they don't have to pay. This is the mentality. "I trust you so you must not charge me." Thank you very much but that's the beginning. Or "You should do half-price because I trusted you." And I say well, your trust is the first thing before we'll take you as a client. It is fatal.

According to him Turkish people do not differentiate the role of the trust in business. At that point, as the subject is related with the business, his identity strategy is shaped related with it.

When we talk about the business relations I1 says that s/he wants to make business in Turkey, but he could not because of unreliable costs and quality problems about the product. I1 adds many English businessmen cut their relations because of same problems. Moreover, they also mention the lack of procedures in Turkey. I3 says "...Although we have the technology in Turkey, as we do not obey the production standards of Europe, they do not want to make business with us. They want to guarantee business."

I9 is also suspicious about the Turkish production and also the treatment of the failures in the production. Related with that point I3 gives an example:

The most important aspect of improving trade between Turkey and the United Kingdom is business mentality. They should understand each other as a first step. Some of the problems typical to Turkey are not even known in the United Kingdom. It is still a far-reaching objective for most Turkish corporations who have been in a closed environment for so long to understand the international mentality. We need to get them understand each other. Let me give you an example: Companies like Marks & Spencers accredited the companies they work with. They look at the technology level, manufacturing capabilities, product range, but that's not all. They also pay attention to levels of hygiene in production, health perspective, employment under age of 16 etc. For example they wanted to see where the employees ate their lunch and how clean it was.

Their trust has broken with the state at the level when somehow state ignores and rejects the privilege they want when they need it. This is one of the reasons they are called petit entrepreneur in this study. They want state and bureaucracy to backup them. For instance I10 gives an example

And unfortunately we lost the textile industry here. We used to have, especially on women clothing, close to 40% share but we lost it. We could not draw them to Turkey either. Most of the business went to Bulgaria. We tried to prevent this happening, even went to Ankara to speak to officials to encourage their business to move to Turkey but that was not possible because of lots of unnecessary regulations such as the age of manufacturing equipment. They would not allow equipment older than 8 years old, but why? These equipments were all working and good enough for anywhere else but Turkey. They went to other places such as Bulgaria. They are very happy being there and possibly will export their products to Turkey!

Here, when I10 says 'we', s/he mentions Turkish Republic. At that point, s/he develops an identity strategy with Turkish Republic through the economy. On the one hand, s/he keeps her/his nationalistic feelings; on the other hand s/he takes her/his references from globalization.

Özal period is significant to mention when the notion entrepreneur is considered. In his period, Ozal redefine the ideal Turk as an entrepreneur. Moreover Ozal's nationalism is the ideal type nationalism composed of traditional values. The informants who are entrepreneurs are highly affected from Ozal period. They accept period between 1983 and 1992 as the period that brings general prosperity to the Turkish environment. Because of Özal's liberal policies Turkish foreign expand with government subsidizing. I2 mentions:

After freeing imports to Turkey in 1990's, we brought in a lot of new products. Turkey suddenly faced latest technology in production. It has been very beneficial for Turkey that Özal started this those days and this was a big step in the right direction.

I13 one of the members of my participants observation group always mentions the flexibility that Özal has brought to Turkish economy. As both of their referential, in global and in national one, are fulfilled in a parallel way, they accept Özal period as the prosperity period. Most of the NGO members as well as the interviewees believe that Özal open Turkey both economically and democratically. From their liberal ideological standing, it can be said that Özal's period bring them the most liberal economical

policies as well as the 'modern' ones that are decorated with traditional values; though I keep my critics on it.

In some cases, they also have a prejudice even against the ones who preserve Turkish way of making business in diaspora. I7 compares Turkish and Turkish Cypriot immigrants in London and says, Turkish Cypriots have been living in London longer than the Turkish immigrants. As Turkish immigrants came after 1990s, they are still trying to get used to living in the United Kingdom standards. S/he gives examples from her Turkish clients who want to have credit from her. S/he says

For example, a foreign employee would understand easily when you tell how he should do something. When you do the same thing to a Turk, he would say 'can't we do it like this and that? Can you help me with that?' You can try to explain the extent you can help him with but usually he would not accept that. You offer certain solutions, but they would not accept. Then it becomes extremely exhaustive to work with them (Turks).

Through her/his working discourse and experiences s/he categorizes the people living in the United Kingdom according to their relationship with the system.

Basically, as being the main actors of the globalized economic system, they produced a businessmen identity and then look back to Turkish bureaucracy, business system and businessmen in that sense. They create their identity related with their role in the transnational community. They also have a nostalgic relation with Turkish Republic nation-state. In the following parts how their nationalist identity is influenced by the ideological state discourse will be discussed. Actually, related with this part, I would like to mention how they differentiate the Turkish governments from the Turkish Republic, especially about the foundation period of the Republic. They have an imagined Turkish Republic as if it is something totally different from its governments.

III.3.c. Self-perception of Turkish Republic Oriented or Related Immigrants in London

I believe the self-perception of the Turkish Republic oriented or related immigrants are very valuable for this study's further analysis. In Chapter III.1, I discussed that Turkish petit entrepreneur group's positioning as 'trading diaspora' and how they develop transnational practice. In this part, I prefer to focus more on to their classification of Turkish Republic oriented groups.

First of all, they seem to agree on the fragmented characteristic of Turkish diaspora in London. According to I1, there is a big disintegration between the Turks living in London. One of the components of this disintegrated fragmentation is the relation between ethnic belonging and their class. First of all, they see themselves as middle or high class of Turks living in London. Besides they think they represent the modern Turkish identity. However, they categorize the Turkish Republic related lower groups as Turks, Kurds and Turkish Cypriots who live a ghetto life. They preserve and reproduce their cultural values and traditions in this ghetto. My sample believes that well educated and sophisticated people are more related with each other in diaspora. Especially, they do not generate social relations with the lower groups. They only have business relations with them. I think it represents their transitional characteristics between classes. They also make differentiation between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. For instance, I2 says "Turkish Cypriots have isolated themselves from us; Turks... These men do not think to make businesses with Turkish people". In this case, s/he calls them 'adam' with a less stress on the word.

It can easily be observed that contrary situation is valid as well. Not all the Turkish entrepreneurs make business with Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore I3 thinks that lower groups are very preserved communities. I3 says "they have some criteria like bringing our traditions and social rules to here. They practice them here as well". I3 mentions this point as if it is a mission for these groups to bring and reproduce their culture in London. Nevertheless, on the other hand s/he ignores 'modern' Turks including her/him bring her/his tradition as well. All my interviewees differ the London Turkish diaspora from other Turkish diasporas in continental Europe. They mention some characteristic about this difference of Turkish diaspora in London. For instance I10 numerates this as follow:

... here (London) is more different than countries like Germany and Holland... Since the characteristic of the Turkish diaspora in Germany is more homogeneous... It is not like this in England. If there are 200 or 225 thousand Turks in the UK, 145 thousand of them are Turkish Cypriots. Simply, there are as many Turks in London, as they are in Cyprus. At that point, naturally their Turkish-ness (as identity characteristics) is in passport and in their language. Nevertheless, the way they grow up and live is English... In addition to this Kurds living in London are the Turks who escaped from Turkey say 'I am harmed in Turkey'. Most of the 40 thousand Kurdish immigrants are said to be Turks who have to say I am Kurdish to have a job... there is another category that

I do not trust most of them unfortunately. They are Turks came from Turkey to raise their business... Another category is academicians and students...this heterogeneous body prevents people from gathering together to do something... with the help of the state and embassy we tried to do something together 6-7 years ago, but it did not work... nevertheless the environment in here is more harmonious. Since, they feel they have to live here, they keep the peace... however they do not have harmony in making business together.

As it can be understood from her/his discourse, petit entrepreneurs somehow create an imagined homogeneous community ideal for the people living in Turkish Republic. They feel nostalgic about this homogeneity as if it was lived during the foundation period of Turkish Republic and as if it is the ideal type. They, somehow wish to find this imagined homogeneity in diaspora as well.

Most of the informants of this study have more or less the same categorization about the Turkish Republic oriented people living in the United Kingdom. In their categorization their main reference point is the way people get along with the system and the way they apply their national-traditional values.

III.3.d. Self-perception of Being an 'Entrepreneur' in London Diaspora

They differ themselves from the Turkish entrepreneurs in Turkey in the way they make business and their networking systems. Most of them has an understanding and definition about being an 'entrepreneur'. This is easily felt in their own success stories. They mention their difference as 'European' entrepreneur. In that sense, it can be said that their identity formation is shaped by globalization values.

Although they try to identify themselves as entrepreneurs with European values, as a transnational practice they always mention the cases in Turkey. For them technology or other tools are not enough to be European. At this point they differ themselves from Turkish businessmen and develop a kind of self-perception about their existence in London diaspora as 'modern Turkish entrepreneurs'. However, although they see themselves as pure entrepreneurs, the way they practice their entrepreneurship is quiet different from the Western approaches. If we take the relation between entrepreneurship and innovation as a base of being an entrepreneur, we observe some points that this study's entrepreneurs could not fulfill. Although they follow all the regularities and

procedures about the business, they do not invent any new dimension to their business. Moreover, their relation and expectancy from the state is very high. In their discourse, most of the time they refer the failure of the state and they list their demands. They expect everything to be corrected by the state.

I1 is confident about her/his entrepreneurship. S/he defines what it means and s/he calls her/himself as a successful entrepreneur. S/he started business in Turkey and after her/his military service s/he came to the UK. In the UK s/he started again her/his business with two partners. In time, s/he succeeded to make her/his own business. S/he says s/he does not see many Turkish people in London. In Turkey s/he does not meet with people except her/his relatives, as s/he visits Turkey 3 or 4 times a year.

As a good entrepreneur I5 points out how trustable and how proactive his company is:

They come to us because we're ... entrusted people in London. So our approach is different to them because we are more proactive and they are telling us what they want to do so that we can become facilitators. Sometimes we say: "look there's a properties here and you should be buying them because they are really good for returning investments." So we become proactive and it's that kind of a relationship. But usually for Turkish clients, we are a combination center. For clients here, because we are serving regularly and look at their financial planning and their tax situation and everything, that obviously affects our procedures.

It is worth mentioning one more time that I5 is the one speaks in English.

In I2's success story it is very possible to see the levels of being entrepreneur in Europe. S/he explains how s/he went to some countries to expand her/his business for training and constituting relations. S/he tries to show her/his mastery in her/his business. S/he also adds that s/he believes in life-long education: "We investigated this. We are one of the brokers in this sector. I went to courses in Brazil and in New York. After that I started my business." S/he explains her/his story as a successful example for Turkish businessmen.

I8 is a ballerina / balet, but s/he runs a company, which creates entertainment activities for companies and foundations. Besides, her/his profession, s/he also runs small trading company. However, s/he is more concentrated on her/his own profession in her/his discourses. Since this gives her/him a status. S/he started her/his business with a credit from an English bank. Her/his company has approximately 90 dancers. Sometimes s/he

makes choreography for companies in Turkey. S/he describes his story as a success story with the words follow: "... even I danced for Queen, I have received lots of invitations. I have prestige and I have an honor". Interestingly, s/he says the secret of her/his success lies in her/his sincerity. In this case we can also see that some values about ethics or personal character are materialized in the process of being entrepreneurship.

III.3.e. Being 'Modern Turk': In Between Situation of Political Apathy and Being Modern Republican

As it is mentioned in the historical background of the modernization process of Turkish national identity, Turkish political arena itself is a struggle arena. This highly affects the formation of modern Turkish identity and makes it a struggle battle where the binary oppositions and the other characteristics appear in itself. When it comes to the political issues, most of the informant's reference point is nationalism, or in other words their national identity.

Although most of them have double citizenship, in their daily life they are interested mostly in Turkish political issues. As I mentioned above, all have satellite TV channels, where they can follow political and social developments in Turkey. Especially when they are together, they never talk about the United Kingdom's domestic politics, unless it is directly related with their business agenda, or in other words, if it is not related with their global reference point.

Although they have clear ideas about Turkish domestic and foreign politics, nobody except two come to Turkey to vote in the elections. These twos' journey to Turkey for voting is conditional as well. As s/he sees Muslim fundamentalists as danger, s/he regularly comes and votes for 'democratic' side. The other one tries to arrange her/his vacations during the elections, if it is possible.

The samples of this study are formed from liberal and neo-liberal individuals. One of the main political behaviors of a citizen in liberal theory is voting. This shows that literally that they are 'apolitical'. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they do not talk about Turkey's political issues. Actually political issues form the basic subject of their

social space. The informant group has two opposite positioning regarding to political behaviors, in which one of them comes to Turkey especially for voting; whereas the other one explains her/his reason to start to live in the UK because of the political environment in Turkey in 1970s. I1 says "There are problems in Turkey like left and right wings. I did not want to engage to them". This does not mean s/he does not have any idea about Turkey's domestic politics and the issues which define Turkey's modern national identity such as '*Atatürkçülük*', Kemalism, Kurdish issue, headscarf, laicism, and so on. These are main components, which I prefer to discuss Turkey's national identity with them. As these components are highly influential and determining on 'modern Turkish national identity', I do not prefer asking direct question related with these components. At that point I prefer using my observations and information that I have gathered from some of my intervention tactics.

Before discussing these components, I would like to remind one more time that they differ themselves from the other groups of Turkish diaspora in London as well as Turkish entrepreneurs, businessmen and people in Turkey. Since they believe they are different from them they take a representative²⁰ role and try to represent modern Turkish values in the best way in the United Kingdom. Secondly, they all believe by heart Turkey has a 'wrong image' that has been going worse, because of events or facts that are wrongly represented in international society by media and political actors (for instance Kurdish issue, headscarf, discourses about Armenian genocide, etc.). That is why they emphasize their representative role more. The establishment of this NGO is even for establishing solidarity in diaspora and changing the wrong image of Turkey in international society. Since this image harms their business and also their existence. I3 use the word of '*alaturka*' as adjective for defining Turkish mentality. In that sense, they also have a self-orientalist gaze both to the Turkish immigrant group in the United Kingdom and sometimes to Turkish people in Turkey.

Before passing to the components that form the Turkish national identity, I will first discuss the notion of 'being Turk' from my informants' gaze. I believe this makes to understand further discussion easier. It is possible to observe the problematic in the

²⁰ Today the role of the representative is highly arguable as well. In postmodern era, as every individual represents only her/himself, it can be said that there are not representatives, since there is a big gap

definition of Turkishness. In their mind 'being a Turk' carries some double-faced characteristics, which led them to have a paradoxical discourse. On the one hand, it includes some 'good' values such as knowing Turkish, following the principles of Atatürk, having a unity, being modern and so on. On the hand it carries values like having bribery relations, not having business ability and so on. 'Being a Turk' is their transnational arena for them, where they can both protect their values that comes from heritage and gain new modern, developed values from their new country. In that sense it is the meeting place of the values where the new outcoming value is prepared to the children as a heritage. In that sense, most of them try to build it first through education. They want to be sure that all will be well educated as the prospective modern individuals or as modern Turks. Besides, language plays the crucial role in carrying their homeland values to their new country. I9 mentions that,

I did not suffer from language related difficulties. Some people tried to teach their children English as soon as they had them and they did. But then, they forgot about Turkish. I did not let my children speak English at home. It is forbidden; we speak Turkish at home, English is spoken at school. My daughter did not speak a word of English until she went to school. Why? To prevent loss of Turkish, that's why... I tried to connect them to Turkey as much as I can, I got satellite TV, and I took them to Turkey every summer even when I had to borrow money to do that. I helped them to be familiar to Turkey, know their past, and know their grandparents. I took them to Turkey every year to accomplish all these... That's why my children are not alienated from Turkey, unlike many Turkish children who live in UK.

On the other hand, although at the first glance it sounds that they highly emphasize language and their values form the components of being Turk, in their adaptation phase to their new country, they have a conformist discourse. In this discourse they criticize the Turkish style business and politics. I3 claims,

The mechanism would work much better if we really dealt with UN sanctions. However our famous ignorance, laid back attitude, self destruction and letting other people use us... They use all these against us. They use these by telling lies.

Their political standing regarding to love Atatürk and being a Kemalist highly differs. Some of them romantically love Atatürk as a part of 'modern Turkish identity', whereas others accept heavy Kemalist discourse as a political standing point. In both cases Atatürk is a very important part of their identity.

between representative and being represented (Foucault). The position of being a representative itself differs informants from 'other' Turks. In this way, they suppose somehow they gain power.

I1 is example of the Kemalist ones. In this point I have to mention that none of them say Kemalist to themselves. S/he says "I love Ataturk, actually I adore him like many do".

And I1 adds,

The group that we call real Ataturk supporters is very disorganized. They do not come together, they do not watch out for each other. They should get together soon and we should protect our Turkish identity. I feel this very strongly; you must have felt it too.

I9 believes "followers of Atatürk misuse" Kemalism. S/he adds, "The guy would say he is Ataturk supporter but would not even know when Ataturk was born or cannot name the principles of the Turkish revolution."

Different from the continental Europe, the relation between the Turks and Kurds are more flexible in the United Kingdom. One way or another, all of them accept Kurdish people as an issue in the international arena. The informants think that the creator of this problem is Kurdish people themselves, not Turkish Republic's political approach towards the issue. Through out my field study I have observed how their discourse towards the Kurdish issue has altered. At the beginning they could not even stand accepting the practice of any cultural rights for Kurdish people as an ethnic minority in Turkey. Nevertheless, with the European Union's intervention to Turkish politics regarding with the issue (to gain a new flexible approach), their discourse also change in this way. So, being Turk also changes. They tolerate Kurdish people as long as they do not demand any political rights. I1 says:

I have no compromises on that subject. If someone comes and tells me he is Kurdish, I would respect that unless he mentions Kurdistan. We are actually past those issues; we wanted to help them but less than one single, Turkish, identity. This should have happened long ago. Why could he not speak and read in Kurdish? That is OK. Many of these people come here running from poverty. They have nothing in where they come from but can live a happy life here. They would be given lots of opportunities that they would not have back home and abuse this.

S/he believes that Kurdish people use their unlucky conditions (like poverty, etc.) as opportunity to gain political power. Thus, s/he defines them as politically incorrect.

On the other hand, similar point can be observed in I6's discourse: "The Kurdish people are not that discriminatory here. They are not fanatic about the nationality subject. I know many examples where they accepted Turkish people into their own society".

One of them, I9, separates Kurdish people into two: the good and the bad. The ones who follow PKK are the bad and the good ones behave in a way of respecting and practicing in conformity with the Turkish Republic's values (including traditional ones): "There are some PKK sympathizers between them but there are also many who just love their country, like you and me." On the other hand, when s/he mentions the drugs commerce in London, s/he directly addresses the Kurdish people: "Many of them would trade drugs here. It is mostly the Kurdish that does this, not the Turks."

I10 ignores the Kurdish people in her/his speech:

The so-called Kurds are not actually Kurds, but Turks that claim they've been discriminated in Turkey for being Kurds. These now add up to 40,000 people, and not all Kurds. We established some groups, even religious groups to merge these two communities. But these people have different views of life. It is difficult to get them together, do business together.

The above-mentioned nostalgic homogeneous imagined community ideal of them is reformed again through 'other's discourse. Here it is Kurdish community.

Although s/he is very flexible and ignoring towards the Kurdish people in London, in one of the NGO's meetings s/he harshly rejected to own a Turkish community club near the Kurdish community by saying: "we all know each other. Ok they do not kill us, but we cannot afford the damages towards windows".

Some of them ignore the being of Kurdish people. Their approach is highly related with Turkish Republic's politics. When I ask Kurdish issue to I2, s/he does not give any direct response related with the questions. On the other hand, I5 only analytically explains the positioning of Kurdish people in London diaspora in English as well:

If you look at Kurds, they have probably a much a closer relationship. Because they came here with nothing and they have been given all the opportunities. So they have to learn from each other. And owing to their culture, they are more united as well.

Heavy arguments on one of the meetings about the headscarf prevent me from asking direct questions about the issue. Therefore, I could only ask the question to the ones who is not the member of the NGO. In that period, AKP's policies about headscarf were

in the agenda and the role of the headscarf in the public sphere was argued. Most of them think headscarf should be like our grandmother's 'natural religious' one. Here the term 'natural' refers to the 'pure'. Their voice changes, softens and shows affection while mentioning it. In the group conformity, they accept this idea. Nevertheless, when I speak separately with them, their views are quite different. I1, I13, I6 and I10 are totally against the usage of headscarf in political public sphere, since it is against the secularity and principles of Atatürk. They all claim that they know the real reason of the headscarf, which is only political. As a liberal, I2 is flexible in the usage of headscarf in the public sphere. However, s/he mentions that s/he is aware of the fact that it is a political sign. I3, I5, I9 and I7 are flexible in her/his approach towards headscarf. However it should be kept in mind that, they are liberals who directly interrelated with the democratic atmosphere of the United Kingdom. Besides, I9 has a political ideology that is close to neo-Islamist approaches. I7 says

We have to get over this "wearing scarf" thing. The more we get stuck to this, the more legitimized they get. (S/he starts to speak in English) That's the problem, that's not the real democracy. That's why I am happy that Islamic fundamentals are the ruling party. (S/he continues in Turkish) I find many of their policies wrong, not because of their political stance of left or right, but because inexperience they make a lot of mistakes. On the other hand many relevant arguments come up. Many of my friends criticize me of being under their influence but that's not the case. I deal with all kinds of people from left or right.

I9 adds "I do not regard the prayers to be good and the others bad. I treat them equally; people are all the same, regardless of their religious practice. Their political, religious, dressing code decisions are all personal.

When it comes to the political issues it is clear that the main reference point is still Turkish Republic. When the Turkish Republic's discourse changes, in a way they try to change themselves. At the beginning when they first started the projects of the NGO, one of their political issues is Armenian issues and the movie 'Midnight Express'. With one intervention that is supported by some members they decide to change their issue. They accept the suggestion about focusing on European Union subject and decide not talk about Armenian issue and 'Midnight Express' one more time unless it is open by the 'others'. They start to organize European Union seminars, which they invite academicians, politicians related with the issue. They easily change their mind in their political focus area since this new suggestion is highly parallel with Turkish Republic's discourse.

Their conformity to the discourse of the ideology of the nation-state can be seen in Kurdish issues as well. As I discuss above, their discourse has started to become flexible towards Kurdish people about their right to practice their values. As Turkish Republic let them practice their language, the informant group decides to behave flexible with one constraint, which is "as long as they do not demand Kurdistan".

At the moment, they are highly confused about the Cyprus issue. Although they joined to the marches in London against the integration of Cyprus and most of them highly support the sovereignty of Turkish part, last arguments of Turkish Republic with European Union confuse them. In the mean time, they are about to reproduce a new discourse.

IV. Conclusion

“The road to hell... is paved with good intentions – a piece of worldly wisdom which agents of a great power should cherish more than ambitions and attractive theories about society or revolution”

(Elie Kedourie in 1997)

The basic outcome of this study is the influence of globalization and nationalism on the formation of identity, where modernity plays the crucial role in shaping all. The discourse of the informants reflects state's ideology and the values shaped by globalization. In their daily life and business practices petit entrepreneurs have been affected by globalization, whereas regarding political issues their discourse has been mainly shaped by the changing state ideology, since nation-state is the temple that has allowed the formation of their modern national identity based on traditional values. Therefore, their identity is reconstructed under the guidance of the state's discourse, which is shaped by the stages of modernization.

Petit entrepreneur's preference, as being a part of the diaspora as a transnational community is the continuation of Turkish nation-state's preference as well. The founders of the Turkish Republic decided to establish a nation-state, since it was the only way for managing their surviving strategy under the circumstances of their period. Modernization's influence on identity formation dates back to the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turks were the leaders and representatives of the stages of modernization in the late Ottoman Empire period. In the contemporary world order, Turkish petit entrepreneurs can be regarded as leaders and representatives of the new stage of modernization, which is influenced by globalization. Young Turks were intellectuals, since the modernization project of Turkey was an intellectual project. Nevertheless, the project towards constituting a new Turkey is a more strategic one rather than intellectual, which was shaped by neo-liberal policies. Therefore, this opens a path to understand the Turkish identity in globalized world throughout examining petit entrepreneurs' behavior in different countries. As they claim, they have a representative role, which includes the values of Turkey, as well as the changing world order. In other words, they represent identity politics in the globalized world, since they are the product of this era.

As petit entrepreneurs were brought up in the institutions of the Turkish Republic, they all naturally use the state's discourse. Nevertheless, the affect of being at the center of the neo-liberal economy affects their identity by creating a self-orientalism towards Turkey. In that sense they resemble Young Turks. Mentioning the thoughts of a historian who was interested in the First World War politics, Kedouire argues that Young Turks were the elites who criticized their society from Europe (Rejwan 1997) but who returned to their country for completing the modernization mission that they envisioned for Turkey. The petit entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom are not much different from Young Turks. Although petit entrepreneurs keep their relation with strong connections and regard the Turkish Republic as their reference point in political issues, they feel the right to criticize Turkey and its 'backwards', underdeveloped, sides. In that sense they have a hidden self-orientalist view.

Their 'special' type Europeanness allows their struggles to be more apparent. They have issues that they struggle about which stem from both globalization and their derivative discourse. One of their inner crises is due to the formation of the Turkish national identity, which includes binary oppositions as well as the effects of newly emerged values. On the other hand, the other crisis is the outcome of being in the United Kingdom's modern multicultural atmosphere. The NGO's identity goes through these struggles as well. On the one hand, under the influence of liberal, global new world order, they try to be as 'democratic' as they can. On the other hand, they cannot give up their national discourse. Naturally, the level of this challenge differs from one informant to the other. For instance, regarding the Kurdish issue, their discourse follows the discourse of the nation-state. At the beginning they perceive the Kurdish community as a danger to the Turkish Republic's unity; they think that the Kurdish community is just a political product. However, they accept and respect the differences in cultural values in the United Kingdom, but, paradoxically, they do not admit the fact that there are also different cultural, ethnic values in Turkey. They all expressed their wish on behalf of Turkey's acceptance to the European Union, but without mentioning the minority rights and similar issues. This seems highly schizoid. Moreover, the level of schizoidness increases when the state discourse towards the Kurdish issue has changed under the influence European Union processes. This led to a breaking point in the minds of the petit entrepreneur. One day one of the informants frankly told me "Nil, are you aware

that Kurds were 15 million?" Her/his voice was not angry, but surprised. This radical difference made her/him sad, challenged and beaten. However, as facing this reality was part of the politics of becoming a European Union member, which is the latest modernity project, they start to reformulate their identity as well discourse. They face similar challenges when different approaches related to the Cyprus issue develop in the Turkish foreign policy. Simply put, they want and need an authority in order to change. When someone or an authority, which they perceive as modern and from 'them' says, "change, it will be better and civilized", they change. Otherwise they do not.

Everybody experiences complexities and paradoxes when they meet the things, which the traditional, national and global bring about. However, whether living in the national community or the transnational one, everybody has the same reference point in the globalized world order: the Western universalism. Everybody shares the outputs of the technological developments, as well as the disadvantages of the macroeconomical factor, which is namely globalization. Traditional, national and global cultures as well as communities have an ongoing relation, which has led them to reformulate their existential values.

The global political economy and the mass media together affect the identity formation. In this post-modern era, not only individual identities but also national identities have been influenced by global values. Although it is theorized in the contemporary academic discourse, the hybridization of identities is not something new.

The outcome of this study makes me curious about the 'modern Turkish identity' of petit entrepreneurs in continental Europe as well as in Turkey. Thus, further study can be held on examining the discourse of petit entrepreneurs living in Europe and in Turkey. I believe especially the continental European Turks' discourse may be different from the discourse of the informants of this study who live in the United Kingdom. Different political circumstances may have led them to formulate their identity differently.

Finally, although, I try to use all the ethical codes in my observations and in my in-depth interviews, I am aware of the fact that I, myself, am both a part of their establishment process and at the same time I was trying to produce an academical

analysis. In that sense I criticize myself for being in the middle and to certain extent, for acting as an orientalist, though I always reminded my self not to. Nevertheless, as I speak from an academical point of view, I have no other choice. Under these circumstances I have constantly reminded myself of Spivak's "when subaltern speaks, he is not subaltern anymore" notion. In the globalized world, I believe we are all subalterns. Speaking on behalf of others or trying to examine them does not mean we stop being subaltern's of 'others'.

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