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RECONSIDERING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRAZIL AND TURKEY

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Reconsidering Democracy Promotion: A Comparative Analysis of Brazil and Turkey

Demokrasi Teşvikini Yeniden Düşünmek: Brezilya ve Türkiye Karşılaştırmalı Analizi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	The Brazilian Cooperation Agency
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Office
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
ALALC	Latin American Free Trade Association
ALADI	Latin American Development and Integration Association
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNDES	Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CHP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
DSP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi)
EC	The European Community
EU	The European Union
IATRA	Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa
IHH	Humanitarian Relief Foundation
IIRSA	The Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America
IMF	The International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IPEA	The Institute of Applied Economic Research
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Movement Party)
MINUSTAH	The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MUSIAD	The Independent Industrialists and Businessman's Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	The Organization of the American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PSDB	Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PT	Partido Trabalhado (Workers' Party)
RSC	Regional Security Complex
SINAMOB	Sistema Nacional de Mobilização
TİKA	Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency
TUSKON	Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
TUSIAD	The Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
UN	The United Nations
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
UNASUL	The Union of South American Nations
UNOSOM	The United Nations Operation in Somalia
US	The United States

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ABSTRACT

Brazil and Turkey are two regional actors that have succinctly promoted democracy which marked an apparent shift in their foreign policies towards their regions between 2000 and 2015. This study intends to answer why Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion in their foreign policies.

Shedding light on the lack of comparative research on non-Western regional actors in comparative perspective across spatial and temporal dimensions, this study makes an empirical and theoretical contribution by looking at democracy promotion as a particular foreign policy outcome. Empirically, the study examines and maps all the democracy promotion practices by Brazil and Turkey, regardless of their limits, and chooses three cases amongst them as a within-case analysis for comparative research. For Brazil, Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000), Venezuela (2002, 2012), and for Turkey, Libya, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab Uprisings erupted in 2011 were subject to comparative analysis. Theoretically, positioning itself in alignment with Neoclassical Realism, the study aims to fill the gap between the increase in their relative power as a systemic variable and democracy promotion as an outcome of foreign policy. To this end, the study resorts to Role Theory and contends that the relative increase in their regional power was translated at the state-level through pro-democratic regional leadership roles claimed by decision-makers, based on their states' ideational and material capabilities.

Building upon official reports, parliamentary speeches, newspaper articles, press releases, and interviews conducted in both countries; this study contends that securing/maximizing geostrategic commitments and retaining regional power motivated democracy promotion as a foreign policy outcome, which was caused by the relative increase in Brazil's and Turkey's regional power that resulted in decision-makers' claim for the pro-democratic regional leadership role.

Keywords: Democracy Promotion, Neoclassical Realism, Role Theory, Brazil, Turkey

ÖZET

Brezilya ve Türkiye, 2000 ve 2015 yılları arasında buldukları bölgelerde yer alan ülkelere uyguladıkları demokrasi teşviki politikalarla ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışma; Brezilya ve Türkiye'nin 2000 ve 2015 yılları arasında dış politikalarında neden demokrasi teşviki uyguladıkları sorusundan hareket eder.

Batılı olmayan bölgesel aktörler üzerine mekânsal ve zamansal boyutlardaki karşılaştırmalı araştırmaların azlığına ışık tutan bu çalışma, dış politikada demokrasi teşvikini incelerken ampirik ve teorik bağlamda katkılar sunar. Ampirik olarak, verili zamanda Brezilya ve Türkiye'nin bölgelerinde uyguladıkları tüm demokrasi teşviki politikalarını araştırır ve vaka-içi analiz için Brezilya ve Türkiye'nin demokrasi teşviki politikası uyguladığı üç ülkeyi inceler. Bunlar; Brezilya vakası için, Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000) ve Venezüella (2002, 2012), Türkiye için; 2011 yılında ortaya çıkan Arap ayaklanmalarından hareketle; Libya, Mısır ve Suriye'dir. Teorik olarak, Neoklasik Realizm ile paralel bir çizgide ilerleyen çalışma, sistemsal bir değişken olarak ele alınan bölgesel güçteki görece artış ile dış politika sonucu olarak demokrasi teşviki arasındaki boşluğu doldurmayı hedefler. Bu amaçla, bu çalışma Rol Teorisine başvurur. Buradan hareketle bu çalışma, bölgesel güçlerindeki görece artışın, devletlerin fikirsal ve materyal kapasitelerine dayalı olarak karar vericiler tarafından talep edilen demokrasi yanlısı bölgesel liderlik rolü aracılığıyla devlet düzeyinde dönüştüğünü iddia etmektedir.

Resmi raporlar, parlamento konuşmaları, gazete makaleleri, basın açıklamaları ve her iki ülkede yürütülen mülakatlardan oluşan bir kaynağın kullanıldığı bu çalışma, bölgesel güçlerindeki görece artışın karar-alıcıları demokrasi yanlısı bölgesel liderlik rolü benimsemesine yol açması ile, jeostratejik bağımlılıklarını koruma/arttırma ve bölgesel güçlerini sürdürme motivasyonu güderek Brezilya ve Türkiye'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları uyguladığını tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokrasi Teşviki, Neoklasik Realizm, Rol Teorisi, Brezilya, Türkiye

INTRODUCTION

State and non-state actors have been staging democracy promotion since the early years of diffusion of liberal and democratic ideas in the history of international politics. Flourished by the idea to spread democracy, earlier encounters with democracy promotion date back from the Peloponnesian Wars when Athenian democracy promotion began to expand aggressively with underlying strategic calculations to the American Revolution in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789, strengthened the diffusion of liberal and democratic ideas (Huber 2015, 8). As Gilpin (1981, 22) noted, the political ideologies of liberalism and conservatism became essential constituents of foreign policy after the French Revolution. Nevertheless, it was not until the 20th century that major actors in global politics commenced promoting democracy as a principled foreign policy objective. Actors started to engage with democracy promotion succinctly, throughout, as Börzel and Zürn (2021) described, the liberal multilateralist international order, characterizing the period after second world war, shifting to post-national liberalist international order, characterizing the post-cold war context. In the post-nationalist liberal order, promoting democracy became a common practice in the foreign policies of developed democracies (Ichihara 2018). Guilhot (2005, 33) approached democracy from a critical perspective, arguing that the idea of actively promoting democracy took shape at the same time as the concept of totalitarianism is entrenched into intellectual and official political discourse as the symbol of an extensive international and domestic threat.

The research agenda of democracy promotion has a multidisciplinary nature. For example, Carothers (2010, 2) has stated that democracy promotion “sits awkwardly in between the disciplines of international relations, comparative politics, development studies, and law – related to all four but not finding a home in anyone.” Similarly, Beichelt (2012) emphasized that International Relations and

Comparative Politics stimulated democracy promotion literature; the former focuses on the motives of actors according to theoretical perspectives, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and the latter focuses on the dynamics of domestic political settings. The fact that the research agenda has a multidirectional focus makes it challenging to choose the starting point of inquiry and frame the democracy promotion debate in current times.

This dissertation embarks on the empirical observation that Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy in their respective regions between 2000 and 2015. Based on this empirical observation, the dissertation assumes that democracy promotion emerged as a foreign policy outcome in Brazil and Turkey to support and defend democracy resulting from the political disruptions occurred in their respective regions. However, a closer look at democracy promotion actions by Brazil and Turkey towards their target countries shows that the enactment of democracy promotion has not always been identical. Specific shifts occurred during their enactment of democracy promotion. For example, in the case of Brazil, within the given time frame, democracy promotion is observed towards cases of Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Brazil promoted democracy in Paraguay in 2012 when the Paraguayan Congress decided to impeach President Fernando Lugo on the claims that he failed to fulfill his presidential role. Democracy promotion efforts by Brazil targeted the governing institutions by using the instruments of negative conditionality in the form of sanctions and bilateral diplomatic pressures, activated by Brazil's leading role in regional organizations, specifically Mercado Comun del Sur, commonly known as MERCOSUR and Union de Naciones Suramericanas, known as UNASUR. In Peru, a political crisis emerged due to the legitimacy issue of Alberto K. Fujimori's presidency and the electoral fraud in the 2000 elections. As opposed to its democracy promotion in Paraguay, Brazil urged democracy promotion indirectly through the regional collective mechanism, which functioned under the auspices of the Organization of the American States, the OAS. Finally, as for Venezuela, two political crises provided an opportunity to act for Brazil's democracy promotion: a coup d'état attempt in 2002 against Chavez and the unfair

presidential elections in 2012. In 2002, Brazil responded promptly by using democracy promotion instruments of bilateral diplomacy and regional mechanisms. As opposed to 2002, Brazil's democracy promotion was relatively benign or limited in 2012. With the intensification of political polarization and social unrest in Venezuela in 2012, the democracy promotion reached a deadlock, which caused a dilemma regarding Brazil's commitment to democracy promotion.

In the case of Turkey, within the given time frame, democracy promotion was observed in Iraq in response to the first general elections held in 2005 after the country's invasion in 2003. Thus, Turkey's democracy promotion targeted the political process in 2005, which was the first elections for the war-torn Iraqi society and the constitutional referendum, by using the instruments of diplomacy and assistance. With the Arab uprisings starting in 2011, Turkey's interest in democracy was reshaped. The unfolding of the Arab uprisings provided an opportunity to act for democracy promotion, which was observed in Libya, Egypt, and Syria. With the unfolding of protests in Libya in 2011, Turkey first opposed joining the NATO-led intervention, but soon after, Turkey changed its approach and sided with NATO, engaging with coercive democracy promotion by military assistance to help enforce an arms embargo against Libya. In addition, Turkey used the instruments of financial assistance for capacity-development projects, diplomatic pressures, and persuasion. In the case of Egypt, Turkey's democracy promotion efforts targeted the governing institutions and political processes, specifically the elections, using financial assistance and positive conditionality to strengthen the economic and political infrastructure of the regime. Turkey was supporting the protests against Mubarak and endorsing Mohamed Morsi, the head of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party until he was ousted in coup d'état in July 2013 culminated in the electoral victory of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in May 2014 elections. Turkey changed its democracy promotion policy. When Morsi was overthrown in 2013, Turkey ceased its positive conditionality and used negative conditionality as an instrument in the form of diplomatic pressures by demanding the United Nations (UN) Security Council impose sanctions on Sisi. This policy shift resulted in

critiques concerning Turkey's sectarian orientation in its foreign policy. For example, Turkey initially engaged with strong diplomatic pressures on the regime in Syria when the uprising unfolded in 2011. In the beginning, capitalizing on their strategic partnerships developed through economic and military agreements between 2002-2010, Turkey used the tools of diplomatic pressures and persuasion. However, the Al-Assad regime did not comply with Turkey's objectives; thus, Turkey, in turn, applied negative conditionality using economic and financial sanctions.

Taking into consideration the complex nature of democracy promotion efforts by Brazil and Turkey, the dissertation is driven by the following research question: Why did Brazil and Turkey enact democracy promotion practices between 2000 and 2015 in their foreign policies? This question is important in understanding their foreign policies that significantly affected their regional contexts to uncover the distinct motives that cause or hinder the enactment of democracy promotion. Although assessing the impact and strategies of democracy promotion policies is crucial to elucidate their effectiveness and analyze its consequences in target countries, this dissertation is interested in the motives that have caused Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion in their particular regional contexts. In that sense, the dissertation is interested in exploring the motives for their democracy promotion actions only in their corresponding regions in a specific time frame. Thus, the dissertation offers spatial and temporal comparative research with the aim to contribute to the capacity of the research field to explain and make sense of the role of non-Western actors in promoting democracy from a comparative perspective. In doing so, this dissertation approaches democracy promotion through the framework of Neoclassical Realism. The main argument is that strategic commitments to secure and (or) maximize geopolitical/economic interests motivated Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion as a foreign policy instrument between 2000 and 2015. Building on Neoclassical Realist premises, it is argued that state-level variables translate the systemic variables at the international level, resulting in democracy promotion in

the given time frame. In the case of Brazil and Turkey, distribution of power at the region is the system-level variable that resulted in Brazil and Turkey's emergence as regional leaders. Decision-makers translated this regional distribution of power at the state-level. More specifically, decision-makers' role conception as pro-democracy regional leaders at the unit-level motivated Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion. Thus, it became an instrument of their foreign policy between 2000 and 2015.

Democracy Promotion as a Research Field

The dissertation starts the inquiry of democracy promotion with the literature suggesting that the research on democracy promotion evolved in parallel with democracy and democratization literature. Especially, democratic transitions in the 20th century marked the increasing role of external actors in democratization processes, thus situated democracy promotion in the research agenda of democratization studies. In 1986, When Laurence Whitehead asked in his essay, "what motivates some major governments to proclaim the 'promotion of democracy' as an important goal of foreign policy, and how realistic are such claims?" democracy promotion had already obtained an essential role in foreign policies of major actors. In retrospect, US President Woodrow Wilson advocated the Kantian understanding of international peace and proposed fourteen points to maintain a peaceful transition, known as Wilson Principles, for the reestablishment of the post First World War international order. As an outcome, the League of Nations was established in 1920 and embraced the promotion of democratic ideals and norms among its members. Although it did not last long, as it terminated itself in 1946, the first collective attempt at the international level towards promoting democracy was undertaken. At the end of the Second World War, the US emerged a great power pursuing democracy promotion policies with financial tools to maintain balance and stability at the international level. The US financial aid was allocated in the framework of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and aimed at containing the expansion of communism using financial assistance to support democratic

regimes in Greece and Turkey. Guilhot (2005, 33) argued that by using the Truman doctrine, the US portrayed “a radical opposition between two models of civilization and value systems, between democracy and totalitarianism.”

In Europe, during the “third wave of democratization,” which was described by Huntington (1991, 14) as the period of democratic transitions that emerged between 1974 and 1990 initiated by the revolutions in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, the European Community (EC) had an essential role on the democratization processes of Southern Europe through the carrot of EC membership, aiming at not only securing economic benefits but also ensuring the stability of democratization trajectories. During the 1980s, the weight placed on spreading democracy by the major powers became even more vocal. The emphasis on democracy in foreign policy was further elaborated when Sir Winston Churchill and President Ronald Reagan came together in Westminster in 1982. Churchill underlined “the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries,” while Reagan quoted, “democracy is not a fragile flower; still, it needs cultivating. If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy”¹. Reagan emphasized the promotion of democracy when he asked actors in world politics to join the United States in spreading democracy extending beyond the communist regimes (Apple Jr. 1982). In regards to the underlying motives of democracy promotion during Reagan’s presidency, Adesnik and McFaul (2006, 24) argued that “democracy promotion was not just a moral objective but also resulted in clear, tangible gains for US national security.”

With the erosion of socialist regimes and bipolarity of the international order by the beginning of the 1990s, the US and the EU began to exercise their military, diplomatic, and economic power in the name of democracy promotion (Magen et al. 2009, 6). In the US, during the early 1990s, the foreign policy agenda was firmly

¹See National Endowment for Democracy.

committed to promoting democracy throughout the presidency of Bill Clinton. In fact, Clinton proposed “democratic enlargement”, emphasizing promoting democracy among other foreign policy principles, while he addressed the UN General Assembly on in 1993 (Brinkley 1997, 111). Thus, a shift in the US foreign policy emerged towards a normative and principled outlook by making democracy promotion a foreign policy objective. Peceny (1999, 4) argued that the US reached domestic unity for an expansionist foreign policy to fulfill its security interests, thus recognizing the potential of democracy promotion policies. In fact, “the US National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” published in 1994, 1995, and 1996 stated that “all of America’s strategic interests — from promoting prosperity at home to checking global threats abroad before they threaten our territory — are served by enlarging the community of democratic and free-market nations. Thus, working with new democratic states to help preserve them as democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights is a key part of our national security strategy.” Promoting democracy in the US foreign policy was also approached from a critical viewpoint. In his book *Promoting Polyarchy* (1996), William Robinson analyzed the promotion of democracy in US foreign policy from a critical theoretical perspective, using the Gramscian analytical framework to explain US foreign policy motives. In a subsequent article, Robinson (1996, 616) analyzed why the US reoriented its foreign policy from assisting authoritarian elements to promoting democracy in a given political setting and argued that promoting democracy served as an instrument to keep the changing dynamics under control at the global level.

Apart from the US objectives in democracy promotion, the EU became an essential democracy-promoter with noticeable policies of democracy promotion, especially by using political conditionality. For example, in 1992, the European Parliament insisted on emphasizing democracy in the general budget of that year, followed by the creation of PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy) in 1989 and TACIS in 1991 (The Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Program), targeting not

only market reforms but also politics and civil society (Olsen 2000, 148). Even more firmly, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 explicitly recognized the ‘development and consolidation of democracy’ as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. Adopted in 1993 as an essential part of its enlargement policy, the EU accession criteria set forth as Copenhagen Criteria required that countries becoming new members shall meet political criteria, which are stated by the European Commission as “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”. Moreover, the legal foundation of promoting democracy was founded upon Article 177 in the Maastricht Treaty, prioritizing development cooperation as one of the EU’s foreign policy goals. Subsequently, the EU (2003, 3) adhered to democracy promotion as the primary constituent of its foreign policy (Crawford 2005, 574). Similarly, the European Commission’s 1995 declaration institutionalized the foreign policy agenda on democracy, which became the first explicit statement of the EU’s intentions for democracy promotion (Kurki 2013, 149).

Thus, by the late 1990s, as Carothers (2020, 114) argued, the new order of the international level situated democracy promotion at the center, defined by democracy and dominant Western influence. A liberal world order based on liberal values and democratic norms was widely accepted, yet scholars also began to discuss the universality of democratic standards. While, according to Huntington (1996), the liberal democratic values of the West were not universal, Sen (1999, 12) and Diamond (2008, 28) argued that democracy was becoming a truly universal value, even if there was not a universal consensus. Thus, the principle of fundamental democratic rights has become a widely acknowledged norm internationally (Franck 1992, Halperin and Lomasney 1993, Rich 2001), and democracy has increasingly been recognized as the best form of government among people of every world region (Diamond 2008). The advantages of having democracy as a system of government favored this increasing global appreciation of democratic norms. According to Dahl (1999), for example, these advantages

included the prevention of ruling by cruel and vicious autocrats, ensuring fundamental human rights, and promoting democracy.

As democracy promotion was at the focal point of the newly emerged international order during the late 1990s, the US and the EU began actively engaging with democracy promotion in their foreign policies and emerged as two important actors. With their policies aiming at advancing the democratic attributes in domestic political settings of third countries, the research field of democracy promotion concentrated on democracy promotion by the US and the EU (Kopstein 2006, Niblett 2007). Consequently, the research field developed based on two overriding yet slightly different styles of democracy promotion. The first one relates to the US-led policies, which were leaning towards “democracy promotion” (Merkel 2010, 438), while the second one relates to the EU-led policies, leaning towards “democracy assistance.” Ikenberry (1999) and Cox et al. (2000) argued that the difference between the two styles stemmed from the overall categorical difference, in which the US-led policies approach democracy promotion from a grand political strategy perspective that incorporates democracy promotion as an essential component of foreign policy, whereas a policy-oriented view drives EU-led policies. As opposed to studies approaching democracy promotion from a grand strategy perspective as part of foreign policy, Olsen (2000) and Youngs (2006) approached promoting democracy from a policy-oriented perspective; with a comparative analysis of the tools and strategies of various governments without engaging in a conceptual articulation of democracy promotion. As democracy promotion began to assume a central role in foreign policies, the research field attracted either single case or comparative analyses of objectives, instruments, and strategies of supporting democracy used prominently by the US and the EU (Cox et al. 2000, Magen et al. 2009, Risse et al. 2009, Cox et al. 2013, Mitchell 2016, Markakis 2016). The research agenda of democracy promotion was stimulated by the “euphoria of democratic universalism” and focused on the instruments, strategies, and effectiveness of international democracy promoters and divided into the studies of electoral assistance, support to civil society, or parliamentary aid

during the early 2000s (Leininger 2019, 448). A noteworthy example of such studies was given by Carothers (1999), who examined democracy aid programs that focused on “the democracy template” constituted by formal and informal institutions. During this period, studies have primarily concentrated on evaluating policies and instruments of democracy promotion (Carothers 1997, Schraeder 2002, Burnell 2007, Merkel 2010). However, with the expansion of democracy assistance policies of Western liberal democracies, the question of strategies that democracy promotion is based upon was also called into question (Burnell 2005). Beginning from the late 1980s through the 1990s, with a focus on targeted sectors of US democracy assistance, Carothers (1997, 115) questioned the model of US democracy promotion and argued that it was an “institutionally-oriented” and “western model of liberal democracy,” which defined democracy in terms of “regular elections, a constitution guaranteeing basic political and civil rights and a three-part governing structure; composing of executive, legislative and judiciary branches.”


A critical weakness of these studies was observed by Burnell (2007), arguing that they were primarily driven by the assessment of democracy assistance projects and programs in terms of their effectiveness and lacked prior theorization concerning the motives and strategies of democracy promotion. Thus, Burnell (2007) argued that the research field should shed light upon the mechanism of strategies and decision-making of democracy promotion “because strategies for democracy promotion are constitutive of the political relationship with countries” and “different strategies have different implications.” Hence, beginning from the first decade of the 2000s, research on democracy promotion started to focus on offering an in-depth analytical perspective to categorize analytical models based on external democratization, which not only described but also theorized the strategies actors use to support democracy in the target countries (Whitehead 2001, Kubicek 2003, Schimelfenning and Sedelmeier 2005, Börzel and Risse 2009). While until the 2000s, the research on democracy promotion was largely overridden by practice-driven studies, it evolved into theory-driven studies since the 2000s. A

sequence of political events affected this shift in the research field, which was unfolded by the September 11 terrorist attacks in the ensued with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the overarching position of Western influence on the research agenda was critically undermined and the US dominance in democracy promotion began to decrease. In parallel to the US involvement in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised doubts regarding the use of military intervention in bringing democracy, which questioned the principles of democracy promotion and cast doubt on the effectiveness of external support of democracy (Diamond 2020, 46). In this sense, 9/11 triggered an entrenched shift in the foreign policy of the US, with the coupling of notions of idealism and realism, in contrast to the liberal democratic ideas of the 1990s. In his second inaugural speech in 2005, George W. Bush emphasized that the United States “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world” (Bush 2005) which echoed realist and idealist motives as he quoted; “America’s vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one” (Bush 2005). The retreat of US influence gained momentum with the 2008 financial crisis. As Fukuyama (2020, 17) argued, the 2008 financial crisis and the 2010 euro crisis undermined the credibility of elites promoting liberal norms, thus “setting the stage for populism’s rise in the succeeding decade.” As opposed to his famous essay in 1989 on the “triumph of liberal order as the final form of human government,” Fukuyama’s observation was critical concerning the current challenges that democracies are facing at the global level.

Rising Threats to Global Democracy

Compared to the expansion of democracies since the unfolding of the third wave of democratization in 1974, referring to the data on Freedom House Survey, Larry Diamond (2016, 77) argued for a prolonged halt of democracy since 2006, which fueled the debate on “democratic recession.” Regarding Freedom House data, the number of electoral democracies stabilized since the 2000s and started to show an inevitable decline since 2014, as the figure below illustrates.

Figure 1.1. Number of Electoral Democracies since 1990



Source: The Freedom House

As the data suggested, the assertion of democracy as a “universal value,” once suggested by Sen (1999), was no longer sufficient to maintain the optimistic view of democracy and democratization studies. As elaborated by Fareed Zakaria (1997, 23), constitutional liberalism was not flourishing; instead, liberal norms in democracies were waning and resulting in the emergence of illiberal democracies. The evidence suggested by quantitative analyses on freedom and democracy by Freedom House led to the inference that democracy was in decline. Yet, scholars studying democratic transitions, such as Schmitter (2015, 44), found this argument flawed and argued that democracy is not declining but instead in crisis and the transition process from one type to another. This refined argument indicated the challenges emerging from within democratic regimes. For instance, Levitsky and Way (2015, 52)² described the competitive authoritarian rise as “the coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and serious incumbent abuse yields electoral competition real but unfair”, arguing that threats to democracies could originate within the institutions of democratic regimes and yield in the strengthening of

² See also Levitsky and Way (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2010)

authoritarian elements. Retreats from democracy were also reinforced by rising populism, turning a critical eye on liberal democratic regimes with the presidential election victory of Donald Trump in 2016. In their thought-provoking essay, Foa and Mounk (2016, 15) argued that as opposed to consolidated democracies, democratic deconsolidation might well be already in process in the US and Europe, as illustrated by Trump's presidency and the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe.³ In addition to the discussions regarding retreats from democracy, the decline in support for democracy in the US and other Western countries was observed due to the rise of illiberal populist and nationalist movements (Gershman 2020). The declining support for democracy assistance became evident in the US foreign policy very recently. To illustrate, the Trump administration proposed funding cuts for democracy assistance in 2018 and 2019 by 40% compared to 2017, which met with strong resistance among congress members where discussions resulted in a reduction of 16% compared to 2017.⁴ For the 2021 proposal, Trump aimed to make a 21% cut in foreign assistance, which sought 44.1 billion USD for 2022 compared with 55.7 billion USD decreed in 2020, and allocate the funds for combatting economic pressures from China and Russia (Mason 2020).

In parallel to the declining role of promoting democracy in the US, Russia and China started to promote their authoritarian values, which adversely affected the retreats from democracy on the global scale. For example, Russia increased its dominance over countries from different regions like Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Venezuela, while China endorsed alternative regional mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Asian Infrastructure Bank by financially assisting through its Belt and Road Initiative as opposed to the endorsement of Western norms (Levitsky and Way 2015, 58). Russia's or China's increasing impact urged the literature to explore their roles in the context of

³ See Carpenter (2017) for further discussion on how populist nationalism affects the international system, comparing the foreign policies of the US, Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and the Philippines.

⁴ See Lawson and Epstein (2019)

democracy promotion. In this respect, Risse and Babayan (2015) discussed that illiberal regional powers posed challenges for democracy promotion actions undertaken by Western actors in their regional contexts. In parallel with the upsurge in illiberal regimes, Börzel (2015, 521) observed that regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the Arab League, promoted autocracy by supporting the legitimacy and recognizing the sovereignty of their autocratic members. Therefore, the democracy promotion research agenda necessitated research on explaining the causes underlying why and how autocracy promotion occurred (Burnell 2010) and what type of threats and limitations authoritarian intervention could bring (Way 2016). The major focus of autocracy promotion studies was the capability of autocracies to shape the transition of the regimes by supporting emerging autocratic political settings and opposing the spread of democracy (Obydenkova and Libman 2014, 349). Therefore, a group of studies explored the motives of autocracy promotion to understand why and under what circumstances autocracy promotion occurs. For example; asking whether an autocratic power could promote autocracy in other countries, Bader et al. (2010, 82) argued that “an interest in regime convergence, authoritarian and democratic powers alike, tend to be driven by an overarching preference for ‘stability’ in foreign relations”. Despite these studies that aimed to analyze why and how autocracy promotion emerges empirically, the conceptual ambiguity regarding what autocracy promotion has remained. Thus, autocracy promotion as a concept suffered from seemingly ambiguous definitions. Burnell (2010) defined autocracy promotion as “all the international forces that move a political regime away from democracy and towards semi or fully authoritarian rule,” while Vanderhill (2013) defined autocracy promotion as “actively supporting illiberal elites, groups, or regimes through direct assistance”. Nevertheless, both definitions received criticism. Tansey (2016, 144) argued that Burnell’s definition was too comprehensive and Vanderhill’s definition was unclear to understand whether the defined process is “the promotion of authoritarianism or rather the enabling of authoritarianism as a by-product of the promotion of some other goal.” I agree with the criticism towards Vanderhill because authoritarianism might be enabled while

pursuing other goals. Hence, autocracy promotion might not be projected as an end in itself. In other words, a question would be, could it be that democracy promotion efforts would strengthen autocratic elements in a target country as an unintended consequence? For example, Vanderhill (2014) asked why American and EU efforts led to democratization in Slovakia but not in Belarus and argued that democracy assistance might increase the capabilities of pro-authoritarian elites, thus yielding to the promotion of authoritarianism. However, this explanation assumes a relation between democracy assistance and the promotion of authoritarianism, which would lead to the conclusion that democracy promotion efforts could intentionally be used to promote autocracy. Therefore, Pikulik and Bedford (2019) systematically analyzed how democracy promotion efforts affected domestic political actors and institutions in the case of Belarus and resulted in the strengthening of the autocratic rule due to “principal-agent dilemmas.”⁵ In so doing, the strategic considerations of actors at the donor and recipient ends have been theorized as an intervening variable, which resulted in the strengthening of authoritarian elements in Belarus. Thus, the research suggested that democracy promotion policies could also result in the strengthening of pro-authoritarian elements. Similarly, Bush (2015) argued that many democracy assistance programs that target local governance and women’s representation do not necessarily threaten the survival of autocrats. Such studies focusing on a global retreat and weakening of democracy, reversal of democratization, and the role played by illiberal regimes in democracy promotion rekindled research on autocracy promotion. At the theoretical level, Tansey (2016) addressed “serious conceptual flaws” regarding autocracy promotion and advanced a “strict” definition that underlined “a clear intent on the part of an external actor to bolster autocracy as a form of the political regime as well as an underlying motivation that rests in significant part on an ideological commitment to autocracy itself.” Another study delivered a very recent definition of the concept, arguing that autocracy promotion refers to the phenomenon of political actors’ attempts to

⁵ For further reading on democracy promotion efforts towards Belarus from the perspective of political and developmental approaches; see Babayev (2014).

support autocratic regimes from the outside consciously or to slow down processes of democratization (Kastner 2019, 411).

The research on autocracy promotion that was born out of the democracy promotion research agenda paved the way for two-fold research paths: The first path relates to the distinction that was drawn between the strengthening of authoritarian elements in a given country as an unintended consequence of democracy promotion instruments and promotion of autocratic values for settling in a dictatorial regime since it serves the strategic interests of the promoter. This research path has so far demonstrated that; on the one hand, using means of democracy promotion does not necessarily yield democratization; and on the other hand; the means of democracy promotion such as financial or development assistance, military interventions or sanctions, could be used by authoritarian powers to induce autocratic regimes in other countries that serve to their strategic preference on the regime outcome. The second path relates to the focus of autocracy promotion literature on non-Western regional actors and their actions affecting the course of democratization in other countries, with their foreign policies that enact democracy promotion instruments to tackle a political crisis in a given country. Building upon the second research path, the below section will discuss and situate the increasing role of non-Western regional actors in the democracy promotion's research scope. In doing so, the section below aims to make sense of why this dissertation selects Brazil and Turkey as cases for democracy promotion.

Regional Actors and Democracy Promotion

Starting from the 1990s, the shifting distribution of power in the international system from bipolarity towards multipolarity and the pronounced level of a global decline in a liberal democracy throughout the 2000s necessitated a reconsideration of democracy promotion. In the midst of weakening US influence and aggressive economic and foreign policies of authoritarian governments in Russia and China, scholars began to argue the prominence of the role played by non-Western democracies in global politics. For example, Onis and Kutlay (2020)

recently referred to an emergent post-liberal order which they defined as the new “age of hybridity”, constituted by non-Western great powers that enact counter-hegemonic foreign policy behaviors, as illustrated by China. Therefore, the literature on democracy promotion necessitated studies from the perspective of non-Western actors. In line with this research necessity, Diamond (2015, 19) suggested that democracy promotion policies by countries including Brazil and Turkey, must be differentiated from democracy promotion efforts of the US or the EU since their practices are neither similar to Western democracy promotion efforts nor embrace an aggressive agenda like Russia and China do; thus, fall short of understanding the dynamics and motives of non-Western democracies. Thus, in parallel to the discussions on the fault lines between democracy promotion and autocracy promotion, the role played by actors, including Brazil and Turkey, in the international system at the onset of the 2000s introduced the debate on non-Western “rising democracies” in democracy promotion. Therefore, studies began to analyze democracy promotion by rising democracies, which included Brazil and Turkey along with India, Indonesia, and South Africa, from a comparative perspective. Piccone (2016) defined rising democracies as states that emerged from either colonialism, apartheid, or military rule/dictatorship but are rooted in a constitutional democracy with market-oriented economic policies. Thus, rising democracies were accredited as “ideal candidates to assist the United States and Europe in promoting democracy in a post-Western world” (Stuenkel 2016, 48) and “a source of renewal for the field of democracy support as models in their regional contexts” (Carothers 2020, 116). These rising democracies used diplomacy as an instrument by engaging with multilateral orientation through collective regional mechanisms that focus on promoting democracy, including the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the OAS and Mercosur in South America, (Petrova 2014, 6). For example, the literature illustrated a burgeoning curiosity in democracy promotion in Latin America, including the role of collective security mechanisms in regional organizations such as; the Democratic Charter adopted by the OAS, the Ushuaia Protocol by Mercosur, the Democratic Protocol by Unasur, and the various

constraints that these regional mechanisms encountered during their democracy promotion actions (McCoy 2006, Legler 2012, Heine and Weiffen 2015).

With their growing economic influence and aspirations to promote their model of development and democracy, rising powers found the ability and determination to exert their power and influence (Youngs 2015, 141). Sooner than later, the democracy support practices of these actors did not affirm the arguments regarding their promising role in democracy promotion. Their democracy promotion commitments were deemed “inconsistent, ad hoc, and low-priority efforts” (Petrova 2012, 135). It was questioned whether rising democracies would contribute to the support of democracy and international liberal order or align with non-democracies to pursue their narrowly defined self-interests (Piccone 2016). To this aim, democracy promotion literature often urges scholars to undertake comparative studies (Tocci 2008; Magen et al. 2009; Carothers and Youngs 2011; Petrova 2012, Börzel et al. 2015). The reason is that comparative research on democracy promotion by non-Western actors would add value to the explanatory power of theories seeking to explain why democracy promotion occurs and how it is undertaken. Yet, comparative studies on democracy promotion by newcomers are relatively scarce, though inspirational. An influential study by Petrova (2014, 22) compared the motives underlying democracy support policies by newly emerged countries in the post-communist space, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Petrova theorized a causal mechanism of democracy promotion practices by newly emerged democracy promoters. Huber (2015) compared the US, the EU, and Turkey, hence incorporating a non-Western perspective in comparative studies on democracy promotion, asking what encourages and/or constrains their democracy promotion efforts. From the perspective of constructivism, Huber argued that not only the influence of international norms on norm-compliers but also their self-image and ‘the other’ at the internal level enabled the promotion of democracy. Youngs (2015) reflected on the current trends and challenges that Western democracies face and explored the concept of non-Western democracies with the urging need to examine their emerging role in democracy support policies

in the post-Western world order. Piccone (2016) added to this research agenda by the inclusion India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Indonesia, recognized as rising democracies. Arguing that their understandings of foreign policy about democracy at the global level are “stuck between notions of neutrality and strategic autonomy, on the one hand, and a principled concern for international stability earned through democratic processes, transparency, and the rule of law, on the other”, Piccone emphasized that their individual and collective approaches would offer an “antidote to the contrasting visions of China and Russia.”

Case studies of democracy promotion practices by regional actors help address such controversies in their regional contexts. Despite the considerable research on democracy promotion region-wise, the existing studies mainly focus on democracy promotion policies towards the third country in a given region. In other words, the research field lacks a cross-regional comparative analysis of democracy promotion by different states from different regional contexts. Moreover, the literature mainly explains the motives through a predominantly system-level approach. For example, in the Asia-Pacific, the democracy support policies of Indonesia and India in Myanmar’s democratic transition appeared as an interesting case study from a system-level perspective. Asking whether Indonesia and India support democracy or pursue their self-interests in their regional contexts, it was argued that democracy support was either motivated or constrained by self-interests and geostrategic concerns. In parallel to its push for incorporating the principles of democracy support and democratic norms at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Youngs 2019), Indonesia actively became interested in the democratic transition of Myanmar back in 2007 and became even more vocal in supporting democracy in Myanmar in 2011 (Ichihara et al. 2016). The research agenda on democracy promotion attracted scholarly attention in the case of Indonesia, as Sukma (2011) argued that Indonesia developed into a state strongly committed to liberal norms and democratic principles in the Asia Pacific. Similarly, Rosyidin (2020) showed that democracy was situated at the center of Indonesian foreign policy yet, diverged from liberal democracy promotion by bringing the

principle of non-interference to the fore. The democracy promotion by Indonesia was also approached from a national role conception perspective, as Karim (2016) argued that policymakers articulated Indonesia's role conception with a democratic identity, which bolstered its overlapping roles as regional leader and a bridge-builder, at regional and international levels. On the other hand, India's democracy support policies in Myanmar largely remained muted and fell short of the expectations of the Burmese. Since 2006, India has provided technical and infrastructural support to Myanmar (Ichihara et al. 2016).⁶ Yet, India's controversial stance in tackling the humanitarian crisis caused by the flow of more than half a million Rohingya refugees from Rakhine, Myanmar to India in late August 2017 cast doubt on India's democracy support policy (Sahoo 2017). It is argued that this dilemma stemmed from India's geostrategic concerns due to growing security threats, resulting from China's dominating role in Myanmar and the self-proclaimed Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and the escalation of ARSA as a terrorist group (Sahoo 2017). Further research focused on democracy promotion by Japan in the region with a focus on the role of actors, targets of democracy support policies, and the motives underlying such policies. Examining the influence of non-state actors in Japan's democracy promotion towards Malaysia, Ismail and Ismail (2019) found that civil society organizations in Japan played a rather limited role and adopted a rather accommodating approach to the state-driven policy on democracy promotion. Research on Japan's democracy support provided key descriptive findings for understanding the scope of Japanese democracy assistance (Ichihara 2013), strategic motivations behind Japanese democracy promotion (Ichihara 2014) as well as Japan's ambiguous stance in its democracy promotion policy toward Burmese democracy (Ichihara 2015). Ichihara (2018) analyzed Japan's democracy assistance policies from a neoclassical realist perspective by asking why Japan has started integrating democracy assistance as a foreign policy instrument, arguing that Japan's emphasis on democracy assistance is motivated by

⁶ See Mohan (2007), Cartwright (2009), Mallavarapu (2010), Faust and Wagner (2010), Destradi (2012), Mishra (2012) for further analysis of democracy promotion of India.

increasing its political influence from a comparative perspective to China based on democratic values. In addition, Ichihara (2019) asked why Japan and Indonesia emerged as supporters of democracy in East Asia in the mid-2000s and argued that domestic liberal norms as a normative factor and intention to legitimize foreign and domestic politics as a strategic factor explain their democracy support policies. Feldmann et al. (2019) argued that a comprehensive understanding of democracy support by state-level foreign policy analysis is much needed since the literature overlooked the importance of the state-level factors and thus focused on a comparative analysis of democracy support policies of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This dissertation attempts to build on the existing studies with an in-depth, cross-regional comparative analysis that also considers the role of state-level factors in explaining the motives underlying the promotion of democracy comparatively in Brazil and Turkey. The dissertation aims to fill this gap through neoclassical realism, which allows for tracing how system-level factors are transformed into state-level factors that result in particular foreign policy practices, such as democracy promotion.

Although some studies focused on the individual motivations behind democracy promotion efforts by Brazil and Turkey, comparative research on the motives of democracy promotion actions remained relatively scant in the literature. Burges (2007) argued, “Brazil has not behaved consistently in support of democratic norm enforcement”⁷. For example, Brazil had a decisive role in responding to the political crisis in Paraguay in 2008 by suspending Paraguay’s Mercosur membership after the President Fernando Lugo was impeached (Stuenkel 2013, 345). In contrast, concerning its policy toward Venezuela, Brazil’s democracy support is deemed inconsistent. While under the presidency of Lula, Brazil opposed the coup attempt against Hugo Chavez, the country pursued a muted policy against the anti-democratic procedures during the 2013 elections. It

⁷See Burges and Daudelin (2007)

overlooked the demands of the opposition in Venezuela, which marked the beginning of instability in Venezuela. To explain this inconsistency, Stuenkel (2013, 346) argued that Brazil's democracy promotion is not an end in itself but rather an instrument to reinforce its mounting material interests. In the analysis of Brazil's democracy promotion, Burges (2008, 65) argued that with democracy promotion actions, Brazil began to activate its ideational capability to project a system for the region, while according to Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006, 21) Brazil was able to preserve and raise its capacity to determine its foreign policy actions by promoting democracy. Spektor (2012, 59) asked whether Brazil's efforts for humanitarian intervention could be engaged with the international system, and argued that Brazil aimed to bring "legitimacy to global governance because it seeks to preserve humanitarian intervention while defending the weak from the selective geostrategic predations of the most powerful". From a comparative perspective, Stuenkel (2013) analyzed the democracy promotion efforts of Brazil and India from the perspective of "rising democracies" in a post-Western world where the influence of established democracies was in decline. Further research focused on the impact of rising powers on international order and development cooperation (Quadir 2013).

As for Turkey, it was argued that the country began to engage with a proactive foreign policy with peacekeeping and humanitarian operations during the first half of the 2000s (Bayer and Keyman 2012). Thus, the scope of Turkey's democracy support and development cooperation policies gained attention to empirically analyze the background of development assistance since the 2000s (Hasimi 2014). In addition to descriptive analysis, the emerging Turkish model of humanitarian assistance from a comparative perspective with similar emerging powers was analyzed, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Turkish humanitarian and civilian capacity assistance (Keyman and Sazak 2014). Committed to democratic change in the region urged by the Arab Uprisings in 2011, Turkey first seemed to be consistent in its democracy promotion efforts. However, its democracy promotion policies soon proved dilemmas between moral and

strategic motives (Ozel and Ozcan 2011) or between ethics and self-interest in its democracy promotion efforts (Onis 2012). Onis (2012, 46) argued that AKP did not build its foreign policy upon the principles of promoting democracy, but rather on “the Westphalian logic of respecting the independence of nation-states and the principle of non-intervention in the domestic politics of states”. Although not echoing a principled commitment to promoting democracy, as Aydın-Düzgit (2020, 2) argued, despite its retreat from democracy, Turkey continued its efforts to support the democratic transition in the MENA throughout the Arab uprisings and with policies on state-building in sub-Saharan Africa since 2005.

The research field of democracy promotion offers immense pathways for comparative foreign policy. Brazil and Turkey were addressed for their democracy promotion policies either as single-case studies or in comparison, yet, research inquiring about their motivations for democracy promotion in cross-regional comparison is limited. Two main gaps are observed in the literature in the case of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey. First, the literature generally approached democracy promotion by both countries from a policy-oriented perspective and offered a limited theoretical approach to analyze democracy promotion policies in a wider temporal dimension. The second critical gap is that earlier research is mainly driven by the assumption and identification of Brazil’s and Turkey’s role from the perspective of ‘rising power’. Unlike the research that identifies Brazil and Turkey as rising powers, this dissertation uses regional actors as an analytical category to maintain theoretical parsimony and to situate democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey in the broader scope of literature focusing on regional powers. With this endeavor, the below section discusses Brazil and Turkey as regional actors.

Brazil and Turkey as Regional Actors

The literature on regionalism and security traces back many decades (Thompson 1973, Lebovic 1985, Solingen 1998). The vast literature on the regional

powers offers different categorizations to define a state as a regional actor. Mainstream literature defines a regional power “as an actor which exerts a regional hegemony akin to the global dominance of imperial power but at a sub-systemic level. It plays an important intermediate role in a sphere of influence by dominating a region, while still being subordinate to major actors at the center of global feudal networks” (Vayrynen 1979, 350) or, more simplified; “as states who possess sufficient capabilities to project power throughout and who disproportionately influence the security dynamics within their regional security centers” (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 4). Studies of regional power advocated that regions have not only raised their significance but also obtained a certain degree of autonomy from the systemic pressures urged by great powers (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 4), that “we live in a world of regions” (Katzenstein 2005), “a regional architecture of world politics” (Acharya 2007) and “multiregional system of International Relations” has emerged, which questioned whether regional powers could claim leading responsibility in regional and global security (Hurrell 2007, 141). As Wohlforth (1999, 30) argued, due to the multipolar system, regional powers obtained a position to counterbalance the leading actors in their regions.

Similarly, Öniş and Kutlay (2013, 1409-10) also argued that newly emerged regional powers started to claim more autonomy in their domestic and foreign affairs with multipolarity. Consequently, the current global order represents an amalgam of great powers, newly regional actors, and multiple regional structures, which necessitates a closer study to understand their decisions and strategies since they aim to have a more prominent role by asserting their power (Cooper and Flemes 2013, 945). In this respect, Ebert and Flemes (2018, 9) argued that regional powers prioritized multipolarity as a foreign policy objective and sought to consolidate regional power as a tool to become regional powers in a multipolar system, which enables them to pursue their self-interests in the multipolar distribution of power. On that note, the increasing autonomy in their domestic and foreign affairs cast doubt on newly emerged regional powers concerning possible

threats they pose to the international order maintained through the rules, norms, and structures of international society (Devetak et al. 2016, 369).

During the 1960s, the categorization of ‘middle power’ emerged concerning the material power and structural power actors can create. Keohane (1969, 298) posited that a middle power is “a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively, but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution”. According to Holbraad (1972, 78) a middle power is “a state occupying an intermediate position in a hierarchy based on power, to a country much stronger than the small nations though considerably weaker than the principal members of the state’s system.” Cox (1996, 245) argued that their interest in stability and order in their immediate regions makes middle power a significant player in international organizations in contrast to their inactive roles during the Cold War. A distinctive theme of middle power definitions is; according to Flemes (2016, 95), that there is a scholarly agreement regarding defining a middle power based on its international behavior rather than material power. For example, Cooper et al. (1993, 19) described middle power in behavioral terms, stating that in their foreign policy behaviors, middle powers possess a multilateral orientation when coping with international disputes.

Jordaan (2003, 168) identifies states like Brazil and Turkey as middle powers, which emerged after the Cold War, transitioned to democracy albeit with undemocratic aspects⁸ and an unequal domestic distribution of wealth, integrated with the region, and constructing an international identity to distinguish themselves from other regional actors. Middle power categorization differentiates from regional power categorization as it explains why such actors adopt active foreign policy and embrace ambitious and aggressive foreign policy approaches. For this reason, a middle power concept is a necessary tool that explains democracy promotion as policy entrepreneurship, which becomes a part of foreign policy

⁸ According to Jordaan (2003, 171) democracy often has a poorer quality in emerging middle powers considering the cases of Nigeria, Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa.

activism. Recent scholarly discussions have started to reflect on the internal and external conditions that motivate such foreign policy turns towards active foreign policy.⁹ Middle-power states engage with foreign policy activism in their foreign policies to get involved in global issues and conflicts (Jordaan 2003, 167) and engage in policy entrepreneurship with a willingness to extend their limited material capacity (Burges 2013, 290). In this respect, Sandal (2014, 696) asks “why some middle powers formulate new policies, pursue entrepreneurial leadership positions in international relations” and use foreign policy activism is used as a strategy of legitimation to tackle the challenges of integrating with the global market.

In light of these discussions, this dissertation concurs with the definition offered by Flesmes and Nolte (2010, 6), which argues that even though a state can be attributed to different labels such as middle power or regional power, all definitions share a set of common characteristics such as; (a) sharing a common geographical region; (b) claiming leadership; (c) possessing the necessary material and ideational capabilities; (d) Influencing regional affairs with a claim of ideational leadership, in addition to intertwining economic, political and cultural dimensions across the region.


Amid such definitional abundance regarding regional actors, how can we come up with a unified definition to facilitate comparative analysis? To solve this puzzle and eliminate conceptual ambiguity, the dissertation will focus on a set of material and ideational capabilities to facilitate a comparative analysis of Brazil and Turkey as regional powers. With their regional roles, and orientations in their foreign policies depending on their possession of material capabilities, regional actors shape their regional orders at the regional security complexes they are situated (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 44). As an analytical concept, Regional Security Complexes (RCSs) (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 47) help situate both countries in their

⁹ See Öniş and Kutlay (2017, 5) for the conditions under which middle powers would play a productive role.

respective regions regarding their relative powers vis-à-vis the regional distribution of capabilities.

First defined by Buzan (1983, 106), RSC is “a group of states whose primary security concerns links together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another.” Buzan and Wæver (1998, 201) further elaborated and defined an RSC as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another,” emphasizing the state-centric and political and military dimensions. As the international system's substructures, RSCs are described by their polarity, i.e., unipolar, bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 48). According to Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012, 67), even though power as a multidimensional concept is more complex than the assessment of material capabilities, analyzing how material capabilities are distributed region-wise is an essential component of RSCs that facilitates understanding foreign policy behaviors. Hence, the possession of material capabilities of a state is a necessary condition to define a regional power, albeit not a sufficient one. Structural realists like Mearsheimer takes material capabilities as a defining element and attribute significance first to the military assets and second to the socio-economic ingredients, which are determined by the level of wealth and population, helping to solidify a state’s military power (Mearsheimer 2006, 72). The ideational factors also can be described as factors that contribute to a state’s normative power. While material factors are considered GDP growth and military expenditures, ideational factors are considered cultural interconnectedness, ideational affinity, and kinship-based approach in their respective regions. This dissertation categorizes Brazil and Turkey as regional powers based on both material and ideational elements. From a comparative perspective, the figure below shows the GDP annual growth by percentage, which indicates that Brazil and Turkey followed the same trend between 2000 and 2019.


Figure 1.2. GDP Growth of Brazil and Turkey (Annual %) 2000-2019



Source: The World Bank and OECD.

As for the military expenditures, the figure below shows that Brazil and Turkey follow a somewhat similar trend.


Figure 1.3. Military Expenditures of Turkey and Brazil (% of GDP) 2000-2019



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

To claim that Brazil and Turkey are regional actors concerning their military power, their military expenditures should be situated from a regional perspective. The below figure illustrates Brazil's stance in comparison to the Latin America and Caribbean region by the share of military expenditures in GDP, in parallel to Turkey's stance in comparison to the EU in particular and Europe and Central Asia in general. The figure shows that Turkey ranks higher than the Europe region whereas Brazil also ranks higher than the Latin American and Caribbean regions in general.

Figure 1.4. Military Expenditures of Turkey and Brazil in Regional Perspective (% of GDP) 2000-2017



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Brazil's insistence on reforming and democratizing international institutions such as the G20 and its commitment to claiming a permanent membership at the UN Security Council constituted the ideational factors underlying Brazil's regional power; since the 2000s (Ebert and Flesmes 2018, 12). Brazil assumed a primary role in leading its region, pursuing concertation or consensual and cooperative hegemony with soft balancing efforts (see Merke 2015, Burges 2016, Flesmes and Wehner 2015). This approach has been observable since the 2000s, as Brazil asserted a pro-democracy role in its foreign policy, involving elements of development aid and democracy assistance across the region during political crises in the given time frame. However, the political crisis invoked by corruption scandals in Brazil has adversely affected the political and economic domains. Since Michel Temer's taking office in 2016 after Dilma Rousseff's impeachment, Brazil's efforts to strengthen its foreign policy were limited by polarized domestic politics and regional fragmentation on political and economic dimensions, which proved

that internal and external pressures necessarily shaped the foreign policy behavior (Ebert and Flemes 2018, 12).

Turkey, on the other hand, has also demonstrated a rising status at the regional level resulting from a mixture of material and ideational factors from the beginning of 2000 until 2015. As for the ideational factors, a shift in its foreign policy toward a pro-democracy role has become more noticeable under the ruling party, AKP. Turkey imaged itself as a model of democracy across the region (Ozel and Ozcan 2011, 130) and incorporated development and democracy assistance into its foreign policy at an accelerating pace. From a constructivist perspective, asking whether ideational and strategic commitments result in a policy shift under the AKP government and analyzing the democracy assistance by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency, TIKA, Ipek (2015) argued that the significant increase in the Agency's activities is influenced by ideational forces and material interests. Similarly, Aras and Görener (2010) analyzed different national role conceptions between 2002 and 2010 by unpacking the ideational foundations of active foreign policy in the Middle East and argued that domestic factors such as; the domestic political balance of power in Turkey and leadership skills explain a dominating role conception. Similarly, Ayata (2015) discussed the role of ideational and domestic factors in foreign policy toward the Arab uprisings, arguing that the "value and identity-based foreign policy resulted in extreme and erratic reactions as in cases of Syria and Egypt." Ideational foundations in Turkey's foreign policy were not only observable in its Middle East foreign policy. With a specific focus on Turkey's foreign policy toward Eurasia, particularly focusing on post-Soviet Turkic states, Köstem (2017) argued that the idea of the "Turkic World" emerged as the ideational basis that decision-makers used when it overlapped with the evolving national identity conceptions.

Enactment of Democracy Promotion under Autocratization? Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015

Building on this strand of research in democracy promotion, this dissertation aims to contribute by asking why Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion in their regional contexts between 2000 and 2015. What makes this research question intriguing is that Brazil and Turkey have demonstrated democratic setbacks and aggregating authoritarian elements to varying degrees, a trend both countries have been going through for the last decade. According to the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Democracy Report in 2020, autocratization is affecting regional actors like India, Brazil, and Turkey, which are similar in terms of their economies with large populations and their material possessions in terms of their military, economic, and political impact at the international level. The same report found that Turkey and Brazil are among the world's top ten main autocratizing countries (V-DEM Democracy Report 2020). Brazil and Turkey are two regional actors with certain common characteristics that offer a stimulating comparison worthy of analysis due to shifts in their domestic political settings and foreign policies between 2000 and 2015. The time frame that covers the period between 2000 and 2015 is consciously chosen, and this choice is based on two fundamental reasons, which are found at state-level and international-level.

As for state-level factors, a close reading of their recent political history since 2000 tells the reader that Brazil and Turkey have undertaken dual restructuring in their political and economic domains. In fact, in the political domain, both countries experienced shifts in political power as a result of elections. In the economic domain, both countries reformed their economic and fiscal policies resulting from the fiscal and economic crises in the early 2000s. In the political domain, the first leg of presidential elections in Brazil on October 6th, 2002, and general elections in Turkey on November 3rd, 2002, resulted in a shift of domestic political power, which turned a critical eye on the political history of both countries. In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the candidate of leftist *Partido Trabalhador, PT* (Workers' Party), elected president in the first round. As popularly known, Lula

ended the presidential term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso from *the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB* (Brazilian Social Democratic Party), who became president on January 1, 1995, and was reelected in the 1998 presidential elections (Caldas 2002). Similarly, in Turkey, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP* (Justice and Development Party) established in 2001 and headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won the November 2002 elections that marked the beginning of tectonic shifts in Turkey's political history. The result of the November 3rd elections ended the coalition government established by the left-leaning *Demokratik Sol Partisi* (DSP, Democratic Left Party), run by the then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and supported by *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (MHP, National Movement Party) and *Anavatan Partisi* (ANAP, Motherland Party). The election of left-leaning PT under Lula and right-leaning AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan kicked off far-reaching political and economic implications. Both the PT and the AKP came to power amid severe monetary and fiscal circumstances. As noted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) before the elections in Brazil in 2002, a possible shift of political power towards the left-leaning PT under the leadership of Lula could raise Brazil's vulnerability if market-friendly economic policies were dismissed and capital outflow occurred when Brazil's economy was suffering from structural problems such as; enduring budgetary problems and current account deficits (IMF 2007). In September 2002, the IMF provided financial assistance amounting to 15-month stand-by credit of about 30.4 billion USD for Brazil's economic and financial program through December 2003, which improved Brazil's economic and financial situation significantly following Lula's election (The IMF 2007). In the case of Turkey, Turkey had already established the agreement with the IMF in 1999 when the AKP won the November 3rd, 2002 elections. The close reading of the Letter of Intent (LoIs) and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) between 1998 and 2008 demonstrated that the decision-makers were committed to the already existing IMF program that focused on the restructuring banking system and calibrating fiscal and monetary policies. The IMF program, which started in late 1999 with the support of a stand-by arrangement, has continued under the program outlined in the Memorandum of Economic Policies (MEP) for 2001 and 2002 (The IMF 2001).

Following the electoral victory of AKP in 2002, the government's LoI to the IMF indicated the government's commitment to the IMF program by stating that; "financial markets reacted favorably to the election of a strong single-party government, helping to reinforce trust in Turkey's economic prospects" and "the decision of the European Union leaders at the Copenhagen Summit in December also provided an impetus to stabilization and reform efforts on the way to full membership of the European Union" (The IMF 2003). Thus, by the beginning of the 2000s, both states had urged political and economic transformations; in terms of shift of political power through elections and structuring of their monetary and fiscal systems through positive leverage of IMF, which helped them to integrate with the global financial system.

The second fundamental reason for choosing this particular time frame is that, at the international level, both countries emerged as regional leaders, especially between 2003 and 2010. Studies on Brazil's emergence as a regional leader (Spektor 2009, Kenkel 2010, Burges 2010, Malamud 2011) and on Turkey's emerging role as a regional leader (Aras 2009, Ayata 2015, Onis and Kutlay 2013, Onis and Kutlay 2017) emphasized that both countries pursued engagement with their regional context and international order, which was initiated by a foreign policy shift from their traditional isolationist foreign policies towards foreign policy activism. Such foreign policy recalibration has urged the literature to explain their shifting foreign policy behaviors. The ideational elements such as Western orientation in foreign policy, commitment to collective security mechanisms and autonomization efforts in the region made Turkey an intriguing case study as the country experienced transformations in domestic political and economic settings at the onset of the 2000s (Öniş and Kutlay 2013, 1410). Scholars used different analytical concepts to facilitate an understanding of Turkey's emerging role in the region. For example, Turkey's engagement with the region and the international system has often been explained by the concept of 'middle power' (Hale 2000, Bayer and Keyman 2012, Dal 2016, Onis and Kutlay 2017, Susler 2019). In this sense, similar to Turkey, 'middle power' categorization has also been used as an

analytical framework to explain Brazil's foreign policy (Kenkel 2010, Dauvergne and Farias 2012). Brazil and Turkey emerged as typical regional actors for their endeavors to challenge the entrenched international system through international institutions, attempting to increase their relative material capabilities. Therefore, at the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey and Brazil substantially shifted their traditional foreign policies by incorporating foreign policy activism.

Sandal (2014) argued that as part of their middle-power status, Brazil and Turkey devised increasing activism in their foreign policies, which is pursued mainly as a legitimation strategy, which is described as a strategy to mitigate the tensions brought by integration into the world markets at the beginning of 2000s. Accordingly, both states engaged with foreign policy activism to claim a primary regional role in resolving regional or global issues and exercise coalition-building with each other. For example, Brazil and Turkey acted in alignment when they voted against a UN Security Council resolution imposing further sanctions against Iran (Bayer and Keyman 2012, 74). One may recall the joint declaration signed between Brazil, Turkey, and Iran on May 17, 2010. The joint statement underlined that "Turkey and Brazil appreciated Iran's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its constructive role in pursuing the realization of nuclear rights of its member states. The Islamic Republic of Iran likewise appreciated the constructive efforts of Turkey and Brazil in creating the conducive environment for the realization of Iran's nuclear rights." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey). Even though its long-term implications were limited, the fact that both states arrived at a policy convergence on the issue of the 2010 Iranian deal became symbolic in the sense that coalition-building between regional actors could exert influence through the effective use of multilateral organizations and that regional actor coalition could pose challenges.

Both governments began enacting democracy promotion as part of their foreign policy activism during this time frame. The enactment of democracy promotion has been exemplified by their responses to political crises in their

regional contexts. To illustrate, Brazil's democracy promotion occurred in Paraguay in 2012, when the Paraguayan Congress impeached President Fernando Lugo based on failure in fulfilling duties and responsibilities. Democracy promotion efforts by Brazil targeted the governing institutions by using the instrument of negative conditionality in the form of sanctions and bilateral diplomatic pressures, activated by Brazil's leading role in leading regional organizations, Mercosur and Unasur. In Peru, a political crisis emerged due to the legitimacy issue of Alberto K. Fujimori's presidency and the electoral fraught in the 2000 elections. As opposed to its democracy promotion in Paraguay, Brazil urged democracy promotion indirectly through the regional collective mechanism, which functioned through the OAS. Finally, for Venezuela, two political crises provided opportunities to act for democracy promotion: the 2002 coup d'état attempt against Chavez and the 2012 presidential elections, which were deemed as unfair. In 2002, Brazil responded promptly by using democracy promotion instruments of bilateral diplomacy and regional mechanisms. As opposed to 2002, Brazil's democracy promotion was somewhat limited in 2012. With the intensification of political polarization and social unrest in Venezuela in 2012, the democracy promotion by Brazil reached a deadlock, which questioned whether Brazil is genuinely committed to promoting democracy or not.


In case of Turkey, within the given time frame, democracy promotion was observed in Iraq in reaction to the problems that occurred during the first general elections to be held in 2005 for the war-torn Iraqi society and the constitutional referendum after the country's invasion in 2003. By the elections, Turkey's democracy promotion targeted the political process in 2005 by using the instruments of diplomacy and assistance. With the Arab uprisings starting in 2011, Turkey's interest in democracy was reshaped. The unfolding of the Arab uprisings provided an opportunity to act for democracy promotion, which was observed in Libya, Egypt, and Syria. For example, following the unfolding of protests in Libya in 2011, Turkey was not sided with NATO in the organization's attempt to intervene in the country. As a strategic member of NATO who led crucial operations in cases

like Afghanistan, Turkey did not approve to provide military assistance for a NATO-led operation. Soon after, Turkey changed its approach. Turkey sided with NATO and engaged with coercive democracy promotion by military aid to help enforce an arms embargo against Libya. In addition, Turkey used the instruments of financial assistance for capacity-development projects, diplomatic pressures, and persuasion. In the case of Egypt, Turkey's democracy promotion efforts targeted the governing institutions and political processes, specifically the elections, using financial assistance and positive conditionality to strengthen the economic and political resources of the regime. However, Turkey's democracy promotion was shattered by the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Morsi resulting from a coup against him in July 2013, and the electoral victory of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in the presidential elections of May 2014. When Morsi was overthrown in 2013, Turkey ceased its positive conditionality and used negative conditionality as an instrument by demanding the UN Security Council impose sanctions on Sisi. This policy shift resulted in critiques concerning Turkey's sectarian outlook on foreign policy. In the case of Syria, with the unfolding of uprisings in 2011, Turkey swiftly responded by robust diplomatic pressures on the government of Bashar Al-Assad and explicitly supported the opposition groups. In the beginning, capitalizing on their strategic partnerships developed through economic and military agreements between 2002-2010, Turkey used the tools of diplomatic pressures and persuasion. However, the Al-Assad regime did not comply with Turkey's objectives; thus, Turkey applied negative conditionality by employing economic and financial sanctions.

Thus, their positioning in the international system due to the shifting distribution of power toward multipolarity shaped the studies on democracy promotion. Therefore, the literature overlooked the changing political dynamics in their domestic contexts and their relevance for promoting democracy as a foreign policy outcome. However, Both Brazil and Turkey demonstrated setbacks in their democracies in recent years. To illustrate, according to the data derived from the report by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem 2021), Brazil and Turkey's Liberal

Democracy Index (LDI) below demonstrated the change in LDI over the past 20 years. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, 1095) argued that the democratic retreat experienced in the regimes of states including Hungary, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey fueled autocratization at the global level. While Turkey performed worse than Brazil, both countries showed a decline in their liberal democracy index. Hence, democracy promotion studies disregarded exploring the motives underlying the use of democracy promotion instruments despite pressing domestic political conditions that affected their regime type as liberal democracies.

Figure 1.5. Liberal Democracy Index




Source: Varieties of Democracy, v10 Data.

According to the above figure, Turkey’s liberal democracy started its decline in 2006 while in Brazil, the downfall began after 2012. It is worth noting that V-Dem has significant advantages because shifts in the implementation of democratic procedures are reflected in the dataset, which helps to observe the gradual changes in autocratization processes on a temporal basis, allowing researchers to identify the starting year of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019, 1096). With this aim, Maerz et al. (2020) compared indicators underlying the unfolding of autocratization across the top ten autocratizing countries between 2009 and 2019, including Brazil and Turkey. They demonstrated a common path underlying the autocratization process. Comparative tables below are compiled on the basis of indicators measuring media freedom, civil society organization (CSO) repression, free and fair elections, and freedom of literary and cultural expression,


of V-Dem between 2000 and 2019, which demonstrated the unfolding of autocratization according to Maerz et al (2020, 916).

Figure 1.6. Election free and fair




Source: Varieties of Democracy

Figure 1.7. Freedom of academic, cultural expression




Source: Varieties of Democracy

Figure 1.8. Media bias




Source: Varieties of Democracy

Figure 1.9. Government censorship efforts – media



Source: Varieties of Democracy

Figure 1.10. Civil Society repression



Source: Varieties of Democracy

The figures above demonstrate that autocratization in Brazil and Turkey began to unfold respectively after 2015 (Brazil) and after 2010 (Turkey). It is worth mentioning that two important domestic factors significantly influenced the downward trajectory of the above variables. In Brazil, the corruption scandal unfolded in 2015, which involved critical figures of PT, in addition to the economic deterioration and political volatility with growing polarization, and in Turkey, the intensification of AKP's monopoly on power with serious legislative, juristic, and executive amendments in 2010. In Brazil, violence against journalists increased, with seven journalists murdered in 2015 alone, making Brazil the third country with the most casualties in media, after Mexico and Honduras, all of which were investigating political issues relating to corruption and organized crime (Reporters without Borders 2016). Turkey's performance on media freedom and civil liberties

began to worsen before 2009, and its incremental autocratization process culminated in the breakdown of democracy in 2014 (Maerz et al. 2020, 917).

In fact, since the 2010s, there has been a growing body of literature on aggravating democratic backsliding in Turkey. Focusing on competitive authoritarianism¹⁰ or illiberal democracies¹¹, a growing body of research on democratic setbacks and autocratization in Turkey started to question whether the regime type evolving in Turkey can be understood as a competitive authoritarian regime. In their detailed analysis derived from June 2015 election and political trends in Turkish politics, Esen and Gumuscu (2016) argued that not only tutelary democracy in Turkey has come to an end but also a competitive authoritarian regime has settled in, demonstrated by unfair elections, systematic violation of civil liberties and a governance system that favored the ruling AKP.

Thus, despite growing elements of declining levels of democratic attributes in their regimes, Brazil and Turkey were enacting democracy promotion instruments towards political crises that resulted in the halt of democracy in their corresponding regions. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical research on autocratization in Brazil and Turkey urged a reconsideration of promotion of democracy as a foreign policy outcome under increasing autocratization. In a recent article comparing democracy support policies in countries going through Arab uprisings between 2011 and 2013 and sub-Saharan Africa, Aydın-Düzgüt (2019, 278) asked whether a non-democracy with authoritarian elements like Turkey could promote democracy and found that Turkey employed democracy assistance instruments with an underlying commitment to its economic and geostrategic interests. Democracy support by non-democracies was put into comparative perspective with two regional actors experiencing democratic backsliding, Poland and Turkey (Petrova and Aydın-Düzgüt 2021). Exploring why both countries

¹⁰ See Levitsky and Way (2010)

¹¹ See Zakaria (1997)

continue their efforts to support democracy, Petrova and Aydın-Düzgit (2021) argued that their motives are strategic rather than normative, where economic and security interests prevail in their foreign policy orientation to support democratization in politically volatile countries. The dissertation examines why economic and security interests were the driving motives for democracy promotion. Thus, the dissertation differentiates from earlier research for two main reasons: First, it approaches the promotion of democracy as an outcome of their foreign policies from the perspective of their positionings in their respective regional security complexes. Therefore, the dissertation looks into the relative increase in Brazil's and Turkey's material and economic capabilities to explain the enactment of democracy promotion. Second, the dissertation differentiates from earlier research by arguing that regional power shifts were translated at the state level by decision-makers' perceptions through the regional leadership role they assumed for their states. Hence, this dissertation aims to build upon the earlier research by exploring the underlying motives of democracy promotion through a system-based and role-based approach in the context of aggravating decline in democratic regime attributes in the last decade. Skaaning (2020, 1542) argued that current autocratizing states, including Brazil and Turkey, are significant actors whose foreign policies could directly or indirectly undermine democratization and democratic stability elsewhere. Thus, a reconsideration of democracy promotion policies of Brazil and Turkey in a comparative perspective from empirical and theoretical points of view would not only contribute to the democracy promotion per se from a theoretically informed policy-oriented perspective but also would contribute to situating democracy promotion with underlying motives in their foreign policy approaches in the context of autocratization.

Structure of the Dissertation

The remainder of this study consists of four chapters: Chapter 1 frames the debate on democracy promotion, explores the research field and defines "democracy promotion" as it is used in this study. An in-depth understanding of

democracy promotion is fundamental because Bridoux et al. (2012, 7) argued that democracy promotion policies employ policy instruments to assist democracies in installing similar political and economic models or carry specific ideological principles. Accordingly, the chapter discusses three main questions concerning the understanding of democracy promotion: What democracy promotion entails, how it is promoted and why democracy promotion occurs. In doing so, the origins of democracy promotion are outlined, while at the same time, the policy instruments used by actors are identified.

As this dissertation aims to bring together the IR discipline and Comparative Politics, the origins of democracy promotion require insight from two major research fields: The first is the democratization literature, which focuses on distinct types of instruments and strategies of democracy promotion. The second is theoretical underpinnings offered by IR schools of thought and Foreign Policy Analysis, focusing on explaining why an actor would promote democracy. To put it simply, while democratization studies provide insights as to what democracy promotion entails and how democracy promotion is pursued, IR theories offer a theoretical framework as to why an actor would engage with democracy promotion policies in some instances while not others. The theoretical discussion informed by IR theories, i.e., realism, liberalism, and constructivism, elaborate on the motives of democracy promotion, asking why actors promote democracy.

Chapter 2 defines the dependent variable of this dissertation, “enactment of democracy promotion,” and specifies the main hypotheses driven by Neoclassical Realism, focusing on system-level and state-level hypotheses to explain the enactment of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey. The chapter proceeds with the justification for the selection of cases by conceptualizing Brazil and Turkey as regional actors. This is particularly important as Petrova (2014,177) argues that regional powers shape orders at the regional and international level, asking in what ways actors, including Brazil and Turkey, constitute a new coalition of states interested in global transformation and in what ways they embrace ideals about

economic and political liberalism or whether they actively strengthen liberalism internationally. Finally, the method and data used in this dissertation are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Emphasizing that this study is a comparative case analysis, according to George and Bennett (2005, 70-71), case studies must involve “within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases since there is a growing consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program.” As George and Bennett (2005, 76) argued, “case studies have powerful advantages in the heuristic identification of new variables and hypotheses through the course of fieldwork—such as archival research and interviews with participants, area experts, and historians.” Thus, the empirical data in this dissertation draw from primary and secondary sources. In addition, the chapter will discuss the methods to be used for identifying the causal path between independent and dependent variables.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 compile the dissertation’s empirical part, and each chapter is designed as within-case analysis. Chapter 3 will descriptively analyze the dependent variable of this dissertation, “enactment of democracy promotion,” with an emphasis on the targets and instrument of democracy promotion in the case of Brazil. To do so, Brazil’s democracy promotion efforts in Paraguay (2008), Peru (2000), and Venezuela (2002, 2012) are compared. Similarly, Chapter 4 will descriptively analyze the “enactment of democracy promotion” in the case of Turkey, with a comparative analysis of Iraq (2005) and Libya, Egypt, and Syria resulting from Arab uprisings that unfolded in 2011, focusing on the targets and instruments employed by Turkey. Finally, the conclusion chapter puts the significant findings into a comparative perspective by visiting empirical and theoretical analyses. This section unfolds with similarities and differences to observe whether or not there is a shared pattern concerning the causal pathway that yielded Brazil and Turkey to enact the promotion of democracy in foreign policies. Last but not least, suggestions for further research will be offered.

CHAPTER 1:
DEBATING DEMOCRACY PROMOTION:
OLD NARRATIVES AND CURRENT DEBATES

There is a pervasive misunderstanding about democracy promotion due to distinctive terminology used interchangeably in the literature. First, to offer a clear-cut perspective regarding what democracy promotion entails as a concept, this chapter addresses the origins of democracy promotion derived from democracy and democratization studies, which would allow the reader to understand the foundations of the concept. Furthermore, this chapter explores the underlying notions of democracy and democratization studies, which complement democracy promotion. Thus, it provides a perspective on understanding what democracy promotion entails substance-wise. Second, addressing different definitions of democracy promotion existing in the literature, the definition this dissertation embraces is elaborated. In addition, the targets and instruments of democracy promotion policies are described. In doing so, the chapter aims to define democracy promotion and major related concepts that have persisted in the literature and articulate its principal components by reflecting on the current literature.

1.1. Defining Democracy Promotion

Different approaches in studies of democracy and democratization and schools of thought in International Relations contributed to democracy promotion as a state of inquiry. Therefore, this chapter acknowledges the interconnectedness between research fields of comparative politics, focusing on democratization studies and IR theories in the literature on democracy promotion. However, this multidisciplinary nature of democracy promotion can only be grasped through an understanding of the complex nature of the concept. In fact, as Bridoux et al. (2012, 7) argued, a detailed account on the notion of democracy promotion is fundamental since ideas and conceptions regarding democracy shape the motives and strategies of actors that integrate democracy promotion practices into their foreign policies.

This chapter engages with concept specification to offer a full perspective on what democracy promotion entails. Concept specification is defined as a process by which the attributes of the concept to be used in research are defined, to find analytical instruments that enable clarification for the unambiguous theoretical discourse and the terms with which to operate (Wonka 2007, 43). To specify democracy promotion for analytical purposes, this chapter looks into three components that make a concept as defined by Wonka (2007). Embarking on Gerring (2001) and Sartori (1984), Wonka (2007, 42) summoned the following three components: *a term*; which ascribes a name to a concept, and *intension*; which is described as all attributes that describe the meaning of the concept, and *extension*; which explains the empirical scope of an analytically helpful concept. This chapter defines the *term* as democracy promotion. To understand its substance, in other words, in Wonka's term, the *intension* of democracy promotion, the chapter further explores the foundational attributes rooted in democratization studies. Next, for analytical purposes, the chapter explores the *extension* of democracy promotion to define the concept's empirical scope.

The chapter finds two democracy promotion approaches in the literature based on three different understandings in democratization studies. Minimalist, developmental, and actor-based perspectives in democratization have shaped democracy promotion into two different approaches: political vs. developmental (Carothers 2007). These approaches also inform the actors concerning the policy instruments they have integrated into their foreign policies.

In what follows, first, to define the term, different democracy promotion definitions offered in the literature will be discussed. In doing so, the definition chosen by this dissertation will be justified. Second, three perspectives on democratization will be addressed - minimalist, developmental, and actor-based-. In doing so, the attributes that define the substance of democracy promotion will be clarified. It is also argued that these understandings have shaped two approaches in democracy promotion; - political vs. developmental – and informed the actors

concerning different policy instruments. This way, actors' policy instruments, and approaches are identified, and the empirical scope of democracy promotion is explored. Following this, the chapter addresses why democracy is promoted and outlines the debate on the motivational aspect of democracy through the prism of different schools of thought in International Relations, i.e., Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. Thus, this chapter answers how each school of thought would illuminate the motivational aspect of democracy promotion. In sum, this chapter addresses three main questions: what is democracy promotion, how is democracy promoted, and why does democracy promotion emerge. In doing so, this chapter focuses on the definition of democracy promotion by critically engaging with established debates and novel perspectives in the literature.

1.1.1. What is Democracy Promotion?

The literature on democracy promotion has suffered from a deficiency in offering a unified, well-structured definition. Offering a clear-cut explanation for what democracy promotion is has become a tricky task because different terms relating to democracy promotion have been used interchangeably in the literature. For example, Burnell (2000, 4) stressed that terms such as democracy assistance or democracy promotion are used interchangeably, although they are not synonymous, and even “each one carries value-laden connotations.” Moreover, policy instruments such as; electoral support, civil society aid, or democracy assistance democracy promotion defined were used to define the promotion of democracy (Burnell 2008, 417). Emphasizing the lack of a clear-cut definition, Grimm and Leninger (2012) argued that definitions of democracy promotion lacked parsimony. Parsimony, Grimm and Leninger argued (2012, 397), “facilitates the careful identification of conflicts of objectives, the discovery of their origins, and the determination of how actors deal with them; in addition, it simplifies the analysis of their consequences”. Therefore, a parsimonious definition of democracy promotion would clearly define three components: the objective of promoting democracy, the origins of why democracy promotion occurs, and the instruments

by which democracy is promoted. Such a parsimonious definition would delineate the framework that helps to explore the motives that result in democracy promotion and the factors that result in effective democracy promotion policies.

To fill this gap in the literature, several definitions have been proposed. One group of definitions focused on defining democracy promotion as an objective that facilitates democratization. Schmitter and Brouwer (1999, 12) referred to democracy promotion as; “overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries”. Hobson (2012, 458) suggested democracy promotion as an all-purpose term to refer to all processes in which international actors take actions to influence the democratization process in a target state. Similarly, Grimm and Leininger (2012, 396) defined the promotion of democracy in terms of “activities by external actors that seek to support democratization; that is, to enable internal actors to establish and develop democratic institutions that play according to democratic rules.” Heine and Weiffen (2015, 14) differentiated the term from other terms such as democracy assistance, arguing that, “democracy promotion is any attempt to foster and support a democratic transition, i.e., the retreat of a non-democratic regime, the holding of elections and the establishment of democratic institutions”. Although these definitions agreed on the main goal of democracy promotion, which is facilitating or supporting democratization, they refer to democracy promotion either as “activities”, “processes” or “attempts”, which makes it difficult to analyze democracy promotion policies from a theoretical perspective. In other words, these definitions are driven by policies that have already been undertaken and thus mainly focus on the effects of democracy promotion policies. In that sense, these definitions correspond to what Burnell (2007) argued as *ex post*-assessment, which refers to the evaluation of democracy assistance with an emphasis on its effectiveness. Yet, a parsimonious definition of democracy promotion would also aim at theorizing democracy promotion in addition to the policy-driven

implications. In this respect, the second group of definitions attempted to define the term by locating it from a theoretical perspective. Huber's (2015, 23) definition indicates that the promotion of democracy is "all those foreign policy activities, which aim at fostering the transition to, consolidation of or improvement of democracy in other states and their societies". By doing so, Huber viewed democracy promotion from a foreign policy perspective, which allows her to position democracy promotion in a theoretical context to explore the theoretical origin of democracy promotion in foreign policy. Yet, Huber's definition takes into account democracy promotion policies implemented towards regimes in process of democratization or democratic consolidation. What about democratic breakdowns or retreats from democracy in regimes with already established formal democratic institutions; such as elections and governing institutions; executive, legislative and judiciary? In this respect, Petrova (2014) defined democracy promotion as "purposeful actions taken to encourage a transition to democracy, enhance the quality of democracy in regimes that have already moved toward democratic governance, or prevent the backsliding from or the breakdown of democracy in such regimes". In this dissertation, I prefer to use the definition offered by Petrova, for two reasons. First, it helps to differentiate democracy promotion from other relating concepts that have been used interchangeably; such as democracy assistance or democracy support. In addition, rather than identifying democracy promotion with malleable terms such as "attempts" or "activities" as previous definitions did, this definition puts emphasis on "purposeful actions". In doing so, it allows to situate democracy promotion policies in a theoretical perspective with a clear objective and enables theorizing the motives for democracy promotion in addition to analyzing the impact of such policies. Second, the definition sets the objective not only as to encourage democratic transitions or to improve the quality of democracy but also to prevent democratic breakdowns in regimes with democratic institutions. The emphasis put on the prevention of democratic breakdowns in the definition is very helpful in terms of observing democracy promotion actions that are enacted as response to political crises that might result in democratic breakdowns.

A related question that emerges as to defining democracy promotion is what type of democracy is promoted. There is a wide acceptance in the literature that democracy promotion adheres to a model of liberal democracy.¹² This is particularly important to understand because liberal democracy enabled the elaboration of democracy promotion as a concept since, by definition, it possesses the idea that democracy has a universal element. To illustrate, Sartori (1995, 102) defined two elements of liberal democracy: First, freeing the people (liberalism); which refers to “demo-protection,” meaning protecting people from dictatorship, and second, empowering the people (demo-power); meaning implementing popular rule, which argued that demo-protection is a universal element that can be exported and implemented elsewhere. Embarking from here, the below section elaborates the underlying notions of democracy and democratization that have shaped the substance of democracy promotion. In what follows, three perspectives are found in democratization studies, which are embedded in democracy promotion: Minimalist, developmental and actor-centered perspectives.

1.1.2. How is Democracy Promoted?

The search for understanding and defining democracy promotion necessarily brings the question of how democracy is conceived by the literature on democracy promotion. The literature on democracy and democratization suggests that three mainstream perspectives in democratization studies are embedded in democracy promotion and shaped the concept in terms of the policy instruments and strategies

¹² In parallel to the US foreign policy following the 9/11 and ensuing invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the literature of democracy promotion raised doubts with regard the notion of liberal democracy embedded in democracy promotion. In her essay, Kurki (2010) opened up conceptual questions on the meaning of the idea of democracy in democracy promotion and explored deep conceptual contestation over this concept in the literature or in policy practice, which are overwhelmingly referring to liberal democracy when defining democracy promotion. Elsewhere, Kurki (2013, 216) argued that the role of democracy promotion as a practice of “liberal world ordering” is unconscious and hidden and contended that liberalism played an increasingly important role in tailoring contemporary democracy promotion discourses and practices. As a response to this critique, Youngs (2012, 211) argued that the problem is not the inherent understanding of democracy promotion from a liberal democratic model, but “the lack of priority attached to advancing core liberal values”.

to promote democracy: Minimalist perspective, developmental perspective and actor-centered perspective. These perspectives are reflected on the research agenda of democracy promotion with a categorical difference of “political vs. developmental approaches”, as delineated by Carothers (2009). Political and developmental approaches in democracy promotion explain the policy instruments preferred by actors in enacting democracy promotion actions. The difference between political and developmental approaches based on minimalist, developmental, and agency-centered perspectives from democratization studies is significant as it has evolved democracy promotion as a state-of-art. Notwithstanding its contribution to shaping democracy promotion as a concept, it has also shaped the policy strategies of actors in terms of which instruments to use for promoting democracy in a third country. The following section discusses the political and developmental approach to democracy promotion with references to three perspectives in democratization: Minimalist, Developmental, and Actor-Centered.

1.1.2.1. Political Approach of Democracy Promotion: Minimalist Perspective of Democratization

Suggesting a categorical difference between the political and developmental approaches of democracy promotion, Carothers (2009, 5), argues that, “the political approach proceeds from a relatively narrow conception of democracy—focused, above all, on elections and political liberties— and a view of democratization as a process of political struggle in which democrats work to gain the upper hand in society over nondemocrats” whereas, “the developmental approach rests on a broader notion of democracy, one that encompasses concerns about equality and justice and the concept of democratization as a slow, iterative process of change involving an interrelated set of political and socioeconomic developments. It favors democracy aid that pursues incremental, long-term change in a wide range of political and socioeconomic sectors, frequently emphasizing governance and the building of a well-functioning state” (Carothers 2009, 5).

The political approach to democracy promotion refers to the minimalist conception of democracy. The minimalist perspective of democracy is understood as a political method and an institutional design through which decisions are taken. Minimalist definition of democracy can be traced back to Joseph Schumpeter (2003, 250) who defined democracy as a political method and argued that the “democratic method is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.” Schumpeter, with such a definition in his seminal book, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, articulated free elections as the viable mechanism that can render a government accountable in a democracy. Robert A. Dahl, with his definition of “polyarchy”, advanced this line of minimalist definition of democracy. Dahl (1971, 2) articulated democracy as “a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to its citizens”. Following this, Dahl categorized existing political systems and argued that the closest political system to democracy is polyarchy, which he defined “as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes, or, to put it another way, polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation” (Dahl 1971, 8). Adding on to Schumpeter’s notion of democracy, Dahl reformulated the effectiveness and legitimacy of a political system in line with public contestation and inclusiveness. In the same vein, definition of Schmitter and Karl (1991, 221) understands modern political democracy as “a system of governance”, which is “an ensemble of patterns that define the methods of access to the principal offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to aim access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions”. This definition pinpoints the vital role of elections as a formal institution in democracies, not only for the democracy itself but also for the political actors participating in elections. In fact, Przeworski (1991, 10) sharply highlighted the notion of elections as he defined

democracy as “a system in which parties lose elections”. As Przeworski (1999, 45) argued elsewhere, “the mere possibility of being able to change governments can avoid violence” and “being able to do it by voting has consequences of its own”.

Understanding democracy in line with the Schumpeterian-Dahlian perspective, the focus of the political approach to democracy promotion as defined by Carothers (2009, 5) is assisting political processes and institutions of a domestic political setting, which include agents such as political parties and civil society organizations and informal institutions such as elections. However, the political approach has a narrow perspective in the sense that it does not focus on the policy instruments through which civil society development is supported. Thus, Carothers offered the developmental approach, which embarks on the relationship between development and democracy and focuses on the role of actors in democratization.

1.1.2.2. Developmental Approach of Democracy Promotion: From Developmental Perspective towards an Actor-Centered Perspective of Democratization

The arguments related to the relationship between democracy and development further contributed to the shaping of democracy promotion from a developmental perspective, born out of modernization theory. Modernization theory, encompassing studies on political development that prospered in the 1960s, concentrated on comparative analysis of political systems (Guilhot 2005, 103). In that capacity, the developmental perspective focused on the role of socio-economic development in explaining democratization (Grimm and Leininger 2012, 393-4). As Carothers (2009, 8) argued, the developmental approach advocated “supporting democracy based on the conviction that basic features of democratic governance—such as transparency, accountability, and responsiveness—contribute to more equitable socioeconomic development overall. The developmental approach thus values democracy as a contributing factor in the larger process of national development”. The modernization theory also crystallized the interrelation between foreign policy and democracy promotion. For instance, Pye (1966, 8) explained the

purpose of American foreign policy after Second World War by stating that the process of modernization in other states was facilitated so that states became stable and undertook a process of social change without disrupting the international system. As an extension of this argument, Guilhot (2005, 104) argued that development aid was situated in the policy agenda of the US foreign aid policy directed toward the Third World countries, which aimed to expand the internationalization of American capital and to contain anti-colonial nationalism in the Third World, posing serious threats not only to American prosperity, but also to the stability of the international order under an increasing Soviet influence.

The developmental approach in democracy promotion aligned with the arguments in the literature related to development and democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset in *Political Man* (1959) correlated democracy to the levels of socio-economic development of a given country. In a similar fashion, with a minimalist conception of democracy, According to Lipset (1959, 71), democracy is defined “as a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials”, yet he extended this argument and contended that economic development affects the effectiveness and legitimacy of democracy. Lipset considered legitimacy and effectiveness as two features of a stable democracy and explained the stability of democracies with their levels of economic development. While effectiveness was defined as the “actual performance of a political system, the extent to which it satisfies the basic functions of government”, legitimacy included “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (1959, 86). Taking democracy as the dependent variable, developmental approach equated democracy with promoting development. However, authoritarian regimes throughout Latin America through late 1960s and 1970s raised critiques from within the modernization theory and discredited its scientific narrative, as modernization was carried out by authoritarian modernizers—bureaucrats, technocrats, and the military (Guilhot 2005, 117).

Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, critiques coming from within modernization theory left their place to an agency-centered approach. Though not denying the impact of structures on regime outcomes, with a focus primarily on agency, O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argued that actors at political and civil society levels became key determinants of the transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy (Merkel 2010, 18-19). In parallel to the third wave of democratization started in 1974, the research on democratic transition and democratic consolidation focused to a great extent on the decisiveness of domestic factors leading to democratic outcomes such as; elites unity, civil society, political culture, state control, and national economy (O'Donnell et al 1986, Diamond 1993, Linz and Stepan 1996, Alexander 2001).

Understanding democracy from a developmental perspective, Carothers (2009, 9) argued that the developmental approach to democracy promotion would support civil society development; such as capacity-development projects, addressing social and economic problems, and human rights. In line with the emphasis given to domestic actors due to the actor-centered approach to democratization, Finkel et al (2007, 410) argued that democracy is promoted indirectly when policies are aimed to empower domestic agents such as; political institutions, and civil society organizations, that struggle for regime change in the domestic setting. Drawing a distinction between direct and indirect democracy promotion, Grimm and Leininger (2012, 396) argued that the objective of direct democracy promotion is to improve fundamental institutions and build the capacities of political and societal actors; whereas the objective of indirect democracy promotion aims at enhancing fundamental conditions for democratic transition. In parallel, as Huber (2015, 25) argued, democracy promotion often targets the institutional mechanisms such as political system, political representation, democratic-will formation, and citizens; with goals to enhance democratic constitution, human rights, the rule of law, free and fair elections, civil society organizations, independent media and inclusiveness of citizens.

Therefore, the democracy promotion literature shifted from the Schumpeterian-Dahlian notion of democracy toward an actor-centered understanding of democracy and democratization. Although Carothers' classification of political and developmental approaches in democracy promotion corresponds with the distinction between Schumpeterian-Dahlian democracy and the developmental notion of democracy driven by modernization theory, it is limited in the sense that it fails to account for the particularities driven by domestic factors, as stressed by the actor-centered approach of democracy and democratization. Therefore, this dissertation understands democracy as a political system consisting of not only Schumpeterian-Dahlian elements of democracy such as elections and political parties; but also, actor-centered understanding that is consisting of elements such as civil society, inclusiveness of citizens and non-state actors, etc. Thus, this dissertation embraces a classification of democracy promotion actions from the perspective of an actor-centered understanding of democracy promotion, which cuts across the instruments associated with Schumpeterian-Dahlian and Modernization approaches to democracy and democratization. To this end, rather than offering a new classification of targets and instruments that would add up to ambiguities in the literature, the dissertation uses the classification offered by Petrova (2014), because it embraces the literature from the actor-centered notion of democracy and systematizes the targets and instruments accordingly. In addition, it also analytically facilitates the classification of observable implications of democracy promotion. Borrowing from the categorization offered by Carothers (2000, 188) that classified targets of US democracy promotion, Petrova (2014, 130) subsumed democracy promotion actions under three general categories, which categorize different aspects of the domestic political order in the recipient country: First, *governing institutions*, including strengthening of state apparatus on the legislature, the executive and the judiciary dimensions; second, *political processes*, including assisting regular, free and fair elections as well as political rights and civil liberties and investments in political party development; and third, *civil society*, including assisting civic groups and non-state societal actors such as the media, education, health sector, to name a few. In doing so, Petrova offers a well-ordered

classification, which facilitates the observation of the direction of democracy promotion actions.

1.1.2.3. Instruments of Democracy Promotion

The classification and definitions of instruments associated with targets of democracy promotion may vary according to the conceptual framework that the researcher employs. There is a general tendency in the literature to use the famous classification offered by Joseph Nye (2004) as soft power and hard power; the former refers to the instruments relevant to diplomatic capability, and the latter refers to instruments of coercive actions. The democracy promotion literature brings together some elements of both categories; including diplomatic pressure, conditionality, and sanctions (Burnell 2007, 420-1). The literature suggests different categorizations of foreign policy instruments that are available for actors. For example, Schraeder (2003, 26) defined instruments, which are conventional diplomacy, aid, conditionality, sanctions, and interventions including paramilitary and military interventions; while Merkel (2010, 456) defined interventions by the level of coercion, meaning diplomacy is the least, and military intervention is the most coercive instrument.

However, the identification of these policy instruments does not offer an analytical perspective as to how democracy is promoted. Therefore, a group of works attempted to categorize the analytical models through which actors carry out democracy promotion, and thus offered a more systematic approach. By offering three models of external democratization; contagion, control, and consent; Whitehead (2001) made the first and most prominent attempt. Whitehead's models are based on empirical foundation; for example, contagion refers to the regional neighborhood, Southern Europe in the 1980s and Central Europe in the 1990s, and control refers to the relation of an external power with an asymmetrical power, the case of the US in Latin America, and finally, consent refers to a model in which external assistance complements an already ongoing process, the case of Southeast

Asia in the 1980s. Although Whitehead empirically distinguished and categorized the efforts of external democratization, it is context-dependent in the sense that it is applied to transitional countries. Therefore, Kubicek (2003) advanced Whitehead's categorizations by focusing his analysis empirically on EU enlargement to include new member states. Kubicek (2003, 4) conceptualized how international actors may shape processes of democratization in four general categories: control, contagion, convergence, and conditionality. Compared to Whitehead, the difference that Kubicek made was to introduce convergence and narrow down the control category into two subcategories; control and conditionality, the former referring to limited maneuverability for the democratizing country, and the latter referring to incentives offered to a democratizing country. In the research field of external impact on democratizing countries, the efforts of Whitehead and Kubicek were further elaborated by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) who offered an understanding of social action and tailored three different models which are; external incentives, social learning, and lesson-drawing. The external incentives is a rationalist bargaining model, which posits that actors behave in accordance with their preferences as they interchange knowledge, threats, and commitments (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 10). The social learning model is founded upon the logic of appropriateness and argues that a government would adopt rules and procedures if they are appropriate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 18). In the same vein; Börzel and Risse (2009) categorized the endeavors of external democratization under four main categories; coercion, conditionality, persuasion, and socialization. First, as for coercion, referring to Hurd (1999), Börzel and Risse (2009, 5) argued that actors would accept an idea because they are forced by threats or coercive actions. Successful cases of coercive democratization are the cases of Japan and West Germany in the aftermath of the second world war (Montgomery 1957). Democracy promotion by coercion attracted further scholarly interest due to the invasion of Iraq. While military actions in Iraq were classified as an occupation (Cockburn 2007), Arato (2009) evaluated it as efforts of state-building and offered an explanation for the constructive role of American actors in constitution-making

in Iraq.¹³ The second mechanism concerns conditionality, which is defined by Börzel and Risse (2009, 7) as the diffusion of ideas by means of negative and positive incentives, with the aim to fulfill self-interests or promote ideas. Third, by means of socialization based upon the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989, 1998), actors are motivated by doing “the right thing” rather than increasing existing capabilities (Börzel and Risse 2009, 11). Last, persuasion, based on communicative rationality, actors aim at convincing each other to validate their assertions or statements (Börzel and Risse 2009, 11).

Born out of these analytical models of external democratization, Petrova (2014) situated the policy instruments within the research field of democracy promotion, which aligns with the distinction made by Burnell (2006) as “active vs. passive senses of democracy promotion”. On the one hand, active sense refers to ‘the promotion of democracy’ and is interested in which actors do what, how, and to what extent. On the other hand, ‘passive sense’, refers to ‘democracy being promoted’, and is interested in the extent to which democratic developments are influenced by external actors and international events (Burnell 2006, 3). Petrova (2014, 14) reflects on the active sense of democracy promotion through four policy instruments. *Intervention*, which refers to military or political intervention, covert and overt coercion, *diplomacy*, which covers persuasion, socialization, and pressure, and *assistance*, consisting of projects and programs consisting of advisory, technical and financial support (Burnell 2007, 420-1); and *conditionality*, in the form of either incentives or sanctions. Among these instruments, conditionality through integration emerged as the latest movement in promoting

¹³ Democratization through war is discussed systematically by addressing issues of legality, legitimacy and effectiveness of external democratization culminating after violent conflicts. (See Grimm and Merkel 2008, Merkel 2012, see also Routledge Handbook of Democratization edited by Jeffrey Haynes 2012).

democracy with the enlargement of the EU toward Central and Eastern Europe in the last decade (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004, 94).¹⁴

The category that Petrova employed is also in line with the direct and indirect democracy promotion dichotomy; the former refers to focusing on enhancing key institutions and developing capacities of political and social actors and the latter refers to improving basic conditions for a favorable context of transition and survival of democracy, including technical and financial cooperation measures (Grimm and Leininger 2012, 396). In this regard, Petrova's classification is comprehensive in the sense that it embraces and refines the aforementioned literature on different models and instruments of external democratization and successfully applies it to the research field of democracy promotion. Therefore, this dissertation uses the classification of Petrova when it empirically discusses which instruments Brazil and Turkey have used with respect to democracy promotion in the given time frame.

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that although Petrova grapples with why Polish policymakers, as regime change diffusion entrepreneurs, emerge and promote democracy in Ukraine, the conceptual motivation is on exploring the mechanism underlying the democracy promotion practices by the EU's Eastern European members between 1989 and 2009. Therefore, on one hand, Petrova's categorization of democracy promotion instruments embarks from empirically-informed findings based on Eastern EU approaches to democracy promotion, by analyzing the target of a state's democracy promotion practices and the policy instruments used. Based on realism, liberalism, and constructivism, Huber (2015) on the other hand has developed a theoretically informed classification of instruments. In this sense, Huber (2015, 24) defined three types of democracy promotion respectively:

¹⁴ However, conditionality is discussed and criticized as it is declining in importance and the challenge for Western governments is to move beyond conditionality towards engaging in an effective leverage (Youngs 2012, 295).

coercive democracy promotion, utilitarian democracy promotion, and identitive democracy promotion. The first type is democracy promotion coercively through military intervention, the threat of intervention, or covert force (Huber 2015, 24). The second type, utilitarian democracy promotion, seeks to shape regime structure through instruments of negative and positive conditionality and financially assisting in advancing democratic institutions and practices in a domestic political setting (Huber 2015, 26). Negative conditionality known as the stick approach is employed by limiting military or economic assistance in response to democratic disruptions; positive conditionality known as the carrot approach is employed by strengthening the economic and political capabilities of a domestic political setting; and finally, identitive democracy promotion employs persuasion to convince the other through speech acts¹⁵ (Huber 2015, 26-27). Although Petrova's and Huber's starting point is different, the former starts with empirical findings and the latter with theoretical underpinnings, both classifications complement each other as they are useful in terms of associating theory with practice. While Petrova's classification helps to analyze democracy promotion by analyzing the targets and instruments of democracy promotion, Huber's classification allows for asking why a state chooses a particular democracy promotion instrument. In other words, Huber's classification acknowledges that motives to promote democracy also shapes the instruments that actors prefer to use in promoting democracy. Therefore, it would make sense to reflect on the classification that Huber offered in parallel to the empirically informed categorization of Petrova. The table below summons democracy promotion instruments when empirically-driven and theory-driven categorizations are taken into consideration together.

¹⁵ See Austin (1962) and Searle (1969)

Table 1.1. Democracy Promotion Instruments

	Theory-driven		
	Coercive DP	Utilitarian DP	Identitive DP
Practice-driven	intervention	Negative/positive conditionality	Persuasion
	Covert force	assistance	socialization
	diplomacy	diplomacy	diplomacy

Following this discussion on what democracy promotion entails and how it is undertaken; the section below will elaborate on the theoretical origins of motives of democracy promotion, which are founded on IR schools of thought.

1.1.3. Why is democracy promoted?

Democracy and democratization studies have triggered the empirical research on democracy promotion, yet the motivational dimension of democracy promotion with respect to why democracy is promoted in certain cases while not in others is often overlooked despite the efforts at theorizing democracy promotion. Therefore, democracy promotion as state-of-art suffered from a deficiency, which is defined by Wolf and Wurm (2011, 77) as “to embed the empirical research on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international relations”.

This dissertation aims to build upon theoretical studies in the literature through a theoretical framework driven by Neoclassical Realism. Neoclassical Realism is chosen over other IR theories and the main reason is that it offers a two-level theorization by taking into account the factors at the system-level and state-level in explaining democracy promotion enactment. Neoclassical realism is the most appropriate theoretical framework for its explanatory power because while it acknowledges the primacy of system-level factors, it puts forth that state-level intervening variables are significant in shaping a particular foreign policy behavior. Thus, this section discusses how neoclassical realism approaches democracy promotion in comparison to realism and neorealism. In addition to realism, this

study also examines liberalism and constructivism. The theoretical underpinnings derived from each theory contextualize democracy promotion from different perspectives thus offering different motives and commitments for why states enact democracy promotion in their foreign policies. In line with Petrova's categorization (2014), this chapter acknowledges two main motives that explain democracy promotion with reference to realism, liberalism and constructivism: geostrategic and normative motives. Nevertheless, this categorical difference focuses more on system-level factors and provides a limited understanding in terms of state-level factors underlying democracy promotion. At this point, neoclassical realism steps in because it traces how system-level variables are translated at the state-level and results in a particular foreign policy behavior, in this case, democracy promotion.

In what follows, first, the main principles of realism, liberalism and constructivism are explored and discussed in relation to the rationale underlying democracy promotion based on geostrategic and normative motives, which is a classification offered by Petrova (2014). Each IR theory offers different variables underlying geostrategic and normative motives in explaining democracy promotion enactment. It is argued that in line with geostrategic motives, realism would emphasize an increase in relative power as a variable in democracy promotion enactment while liberalism would emphasize relative gains in terms of economic interests as a variable in democracy promotion enactment, and in line with normative motives, constructivism would pay attention to the democratic identity as a variable in explaining democracy promotion enactment. The dissertation further asks how system-level variables are traced at the state-level and uses Role Theory from Foreign Policy Analysis as a theoretical tool. The section concludes with a discussion on the benefits and relevance of using role theory in setting the state-level intervening variables.

1.1.3.1. Realism and Democracy Promotion

Realism is a dominant approach in international relations, which became salient through the sequence of events in world history. Modern realism emerged in the 1930s, due to the collapse of the post-World War I international order; the collapse of great power cooperation situated realism at the center of international order following World War II, the US-Soviet antagonism has further increased the salience of realism in the Cold War (Wohlforth 1995, 91). With the newly emerged actors in international order due to the multipolar distribution of power emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War, realism has become even more salient in terms of its explanatory power with respect to explaining the change in international relations. One of the seminal thinkers of international relations, Robert Gilpin urged scholars to search for underlying causes of change in order to explore the gaps “between the capabilities of states and the demands placed upon them by their international roles” (Wohlforth 1994, 15). As Gilpin (1981, 9) put it, economic, technological, and other related developments change actors’ interests and the balance of power between them and “those actors who benefit most from a change in the social system and who gain the power to effect such change will seek to alter the system in ways that favor their interests. The resulting changed system will reflect the new distribution of power and the interests of its new dominant members.”

Tracing back the quintessence of Realism to two essential works; Thucydides’ *History of Peloponnesian Wars* from the ancient times and Morgenthau’s (1954) *Power Among Nations* from the modern times, Keohane (1986, 165) summons three underlying assumptions of Realism. First is the *state-centric assumption*; regarding the prominence of states in world politics, second is the *rationality assumption*, regarding states as rational unitary actors that calculate the cost of actions and maximize expected utility under uncertain conditions and third is the *power assumption*; regarding the states’ search for power and maximizing their interests in terms of power. In the literature, Classical Realism

refers to the studies produced during the interwar and the early post-Cold War periods (Wohlforth 2008, 136, Ashley 1984, Lebow 2003). Articulating a scientific approach to Realism influenced by positivism, *Theory of International Politics* by Kenneth Waltz (1979) constituted the theoretical school of neorealism, also known as structural realism. The distinctive feature brought by Waltz to realism was the articulation of structure in international politics. Arguing that “structure is based on the fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes” (Waltz 1979, 81), Waltz distinguished the behavior of states from the outcomes that emerge on the internal and external levels. Emphasizing that the ordering principle of a domestic political structure is hierarchical, Waltz articulated that international political structure is anarchical because of the absence of a centralized authority that governs the behavior and outcomes of interacting units. In other words, defined as the absence of a centralized authority that possesses the ability to draft and enforce behavioral rules on states, in an anarchical international system, states seek survival, define their own interests, and use instruments of their own choice (Layne 1994, 11). In fact, as put by Waltz, “to achieve their objectives and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy...must rely on the means they can generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves. Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order” (Waltz 1979, 111). Thus, arguing that international politics is characterized by anarchy (Ashley 1987, 404), neorealism recognizes states as the most prominent actors, which are constrained by anarchy, acting within the limits of their material capabilities in an anarchic international system (Pevehouse 2002, 516). Therefore, international relations is understood as a self-help system from a competitive, security-oriented perspective, carrying the possibility of war whereas cooperation is limited, due to constraints by the constant quest for security and survival. Hence installing ultimate peace and decreasing the levels of competition for survival is unlikely (Mearsheimer 1995a, 9).

Building on the fundamental insights of neorealism, two important sub-theoretical schools emerged: offensive realism and defensive realism (Wohlforth

2008, 139, Snyder 1991, 11–12; Rose 1998). Following a neorealist premise, offensive realism argues that states are forced to engage with offensive political strategies to attain security and survival due to systemic pressures posed by increasing levels of conflicts (Layne 1995, 130–176, Mearsheimer 1995b, 79–129). According to offensive realists, the motivation behind states' offensive strategies is the anarchic international system which drives them to increase their relative power to maintain their security; thus, power-seeking states obtain incentives generated by the international system, which are pursued by means of aggressive foreign policy approaches (Lobell 2009, 47). Therefore, the offensive realists are motivated with the aim to increase power and preserve their autonomy and regional hegemony at the international level (Beach 2012, 43).

Unlike offensive realists, defensive realists argue that the states adopt benevolent foreign policy behaviors to maintain their security, based on the argument that a move toward maximizing relative power would provoke counterbalancing behaviors, thus states only expand when they are threatened by their environment (Lobell 2009, 47). As opposed to scholars focusing on the distribution of power in the international system, scholars such as Walt (1995) or Glaser (1995) focused on the explanatory power of factors like threats or sources defined in terms of technology, geopolitics, offensive capabilities, and intentions. In accordance with this view, states in pursuit of security are likely to decrease the level of threats, which would reduce conflictual tendencies (Carlsnaes 2012, 439). Therefore, the core motivation of defensive realists is to protect themselves from threats, which is defined as a mixture of factors including the relative power of states, geographical positionings, offensive military capabilities, and historical perceptions of other states (Beach 2012, 41).

Different than the variants of offensive and defensive realism that are built on the main propositions of neorealism, there is a sub-school within realism, called neoclassical realism, which is based on the fundamental insights of classical realism's toolkit with the aim to offer an explanatory framework for foreign policies

of states (Wohlforth 2008, 39). Neoclassical realists are distinguished from classical realists with emphasis put on state-level factors, which acts like intervening variables between system-level variables and foreign policy outcomes, with a particular focus on exploring the conditions under which state-level factors prevail (Beach 2012, 64).

Neoclassical realism is interested in how systemic factors are translated at the state-level in a manner of shaping a state's foreign policy goals. Thus, just like neorealism, with its offensive and defensive variants, neoclassical realism puts emphasis on the role of systemic factors in shaping foreign policy behavior. However, neorealism considers the state as a closed, black box and perceives domestic factors as reductionist, since neorealism is a system-level theory (Waltz 1979); whereas neoclassical realism starts with efforts to explain puzzles peculiar to foreign policies, that neorealism does not account for (Wohlforth 2008, 39). As with neorealism, neoclassical realism acknowledges the anarchy of the international system and conceptualizes material power capabilities in terms of factors that define foreign policy objectives (Beach 2012, 64). Although neoclassical realism, like neorealism, takes into account relative possession of material capabilities and the role of systemic pressures as the main factors shaping foreign policy, it distinguishes itself from neorealism by arguing that "the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level" (Rose 1998, 146). In doing so, neoclassical realism emphasizes that restricting the analysis to structural conditions alone would be misleading because they only allow for identifying the opportunities and constraints that enable or limit an actor (Schweller 1998, 5). Thus, identifying the role of intervening variables at the unit-level in explaining state behavior at the international level is the focal point of neoclassical realism. In other words, neoclassical realists begin their analysis by examining the system-level variables and "trace precisely how, in actual cases, relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state actors" (Rose 1998, 166).

Although not abandoning the primacy of systemic variables and prioritizing the international system, neoclassical realism theorizes foreign policy on a two-level basis, which emphasizes state-level dynamics; such as domestic politics and perceptions of decision-makers in addition to the system-level variables (Foulon 2015, 637). For example; neoclassical realists explore the effect of elite debates on the definition of national interest in a particular period by theorizing leaders own understanding (Beach 2012, 64). While Rose (1998, 147) emphasized the perceptions of political leaders and elites as an example of an intervening variable, Harnisch (2003, 323) also underlined the role of perceptions and ideas. Similarly, Freyberg-Inan et al. (2009, 260) distinguished between two “versions” of Neoclassical Realism: Version 1, focusing on the role of leaders, ideas, and beliefs, and Version 2, focusing on the role of domestic politics. To give an example, Monten (2005, 116), analyzing the motives of democracy promotion as part of the Bush doctrine, investigated the causal mechanism that translated the relative power into foreign policy behavior through unit-level variables and argued that ideological changes shape how states act to international pressures and opportunities, emphasizing that power and ideas are intertwined, thus “they are not mutually exclusive”. Lobell et al (2009) developed the emphasis on intervening variables and determined unit-level intervening variables that mediate the effects of the international system such as; perceptions, decision-making, and policy implementation, which constrain or facilitate the ability to enact a particular foreign policy behavior of all type of states.

In what sense would a neorealist and neoclassical realist differ when explaining enactment of democracy promotion? As for democracy promotion from a neorealist perspective; an analysis would primarily focus on the impact of systemic level variables on states that result in the enactment of democracy promotion. Thus, hypothetically, a neorealist would argue that states would promote democracy with the motivation to increase their relative power in terms of material capabilities. The important point here is that a neorealist would emphasize the determinacy of system-level factors in terms of facilitating or constraining the

enactment of democracy promotion. Therefore, neorealists would question the determinacy of system-level factors that cause democracy promotion and states' commitment to democracy promotion if they conflict with the state's interests (Hyde-Price 2008, 39). Neorealists would argue that democracy promotion could be likely, under the condition that promoting democracy overlaps with other geostrategic and economic interests (Stuenkel 2013, 340). In other words, security interests would always prevail when enactment of democracy promotion would decrease states' relative power in terms of their material capabilities. This neorealist analysis of democracy promotion was criticized on the basis of the argument that it only offers a limited understanding of the state's interests defined solely by means of security concerns (Huber 2015, 31). In other words, neorealists could only conceptualize national interest as 'survival' (Morgenthau 1951) or meeting the security requirements due to the self-help nature of the anarchical international system (Waltz 1979) when explaining democracy promotion. Criticizing the definition of national interests defined in terms of security by neorealists, neoclassical realists suggested investigating a state's identity by asking "how a given state understands its national interests and role in the world", which explains why "two states with similar levels of power and placement can have very different national identities" (Beach 2012, 65). Such a critique emphasizes that a neorealist analysis disregards the unit-level intervening variables when explaining a particular foreign policy. Hence, a neoclassical realist analysis would fill the gap left by neorealists in the analysis of democracy promotion. In fact, a neoclassical realist analysis would ask why states would enact democracy promotion and suggest tracing the system-level variables on state-level, thus, exploring the intervening variables that explain the enactment of democracy promotion. In other words, while a neorealist analysis would explore solely system-level factors, a neoclassical realist analysis would look for unit-level variables that translate relative power at the international level, thus motivating states to enact democracy promotion. For example, from a neoclassical realist perspective, Wolff and Wurm (2011, 83) argued that states promote democracy when decision-makers believe that it serves to enhance a country's geostrategic positioning, without adversely affecting

national security and relative power. Thus, a neoclassical realist would argue that states would promote democracy because “Inasmuch as the spread of liberal democracy creates shared values, common interests, and, most important, greater transparency of state motivations, it should lower threat perceptions and increase cooperation among states” (Schweller 2000, 43). In other words, threat perceptions of decision-makers could also act as an intervening variable that explain the enactment of democracy promotion.

It should be noted that realist school of thought, with its sub-schools, acknowledges that democracy promotion is enacted when it serves as a means to fulfill national interests in terms of security and geostrategic benefits. Thus, interests other than security-based ones, are of secondary importance. Liberalism would help readers to understand whether national interests other than security have the potential to motivate states to promote democracy. Therefore, the below section examines the notions of liberalism and its relation to democracy promotion.

1.1.3.2. Liberalism and Democracy Promotion

The general acceptance in the literature is that the intellectual foundations of democracy promotion are founded upon the theory of democratic peace (Goldsmith 2008, 131). Especially throughout the post-Cold War context, and with newly emerged democratizing states, democratic peace theory had an explanatory value in analyzing the actions of democracy promotion by Western powers. The democratic peace theory has its legacies in the philosophical underpinnings of Immanuel Kant. Kant assumed that individuals are able to discover universally valid moral imperatives and act accordingly, which is a progressive process of morality by which individuals see themselves as belonging to a “universal cosmopolitan existence” (Hurrell 1990, 197-8).

Kant believed that perpetual peace can only be achieved by the advancement of morality individually, which can be enabled by a sound political constitution

(Hurrell 1990, 196). In his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace”, he described the conditions that favor the constitution of a liberal republic which led to a “pacific union” as far as liberal foreign relations are concerned. According to Kant, there are three conditions for systemic peace among states; which are, a representative republican government, including an elected legislative power, separation of powers, and the rule of law; a principled commitment to peace founded upon respect for the non-discriminatory rights that all human beings have the right to claim, and the prospect of social and economic interdependence (Kant 1991, 93-130). Kant argued that republican governments make war unlikely to occur because the material interests converge and the cost of war rises (Hurrell 1990, 198).

This core argument of democratic peace theory can also be found in the literature with the argument that posits “...constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another” (Doyle 1983, 213) or “democracies rarely clash with one another, and never fight one another in war” (Maoz and Abdolali 1989). Empirical studies also demonstrated that democracies rarely engage in war with each other (Buono de Mesquita et al. 1991, Lake 1992, Russett 1993, Chan 1993), though it was heavily contested in the literature¹⁶. In relation to this, it is argued that “democratic polities transform conflicts of interests into moral crusades, demand nothing less than total victory and unconditional surrender, and engage in ‘liberal interventionism’ to promote their own vision of the morally proper international order.” (Levy 1989, 659). Hence, the argument that the more democratic the world becomes, the more peaceful it will be, provides a good reason for trying to expand the spread of democracy (Mandelbaum 2007, 138), and explain the international commitment to democracy promotion through liberalist lenses.

In this realm, liberals put emphasis on the relationship between liberal rights and interests as a basis of interdependencies (Doyle 1983, 232), and focus on human

¹⁶ See Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 8), for the challenging arguments on democratic peace theory by using similar methods and databases between 1811 and 1980.

rights, multilateral institutions, and the impact of economic interdependence (Ikenberry 1999, 58). In effect, these liberal propositions constituted Strobe Talbott's (1999, 49) argument regarding the underlying rationale behind the US national security to defend and promote democracy, if and when necessary. As for foreign policy analysis through a liberal outlook, Doyle (2012, 65) suggested examining the causal effect of liberal factors pertaining to economic and ideational factors in shaping policy preferences. According to Doyle (2012, 69), aims, resources, threats, and allies constitute the core elements of a liberal foreign policy; and by balancing aims and resources, minimizing threats, and developing allies, liberal foreign policy reaches for the goal of diffusing liberal democracies, which is also compatible with the policies of democracy promotion.

Liberalism relates to democracy promotion in the sense that, economically driven national interests result from increasing "aggregate welfare gains" or eliminating conflict of interests at the domestic level in terms of the "economic benefits for powerful private actors" (Moravcsik 1997, 528–9). Therefore, maximizing the economic interests of state-level actors can be deemed as a motivation to promote democracy (Ikenberry 1999). Thus, although the core motivation is survival when economic interdependence is high, states shift their focus on preserving mutually beneficial economic ties (Beach 2012, 50). Thus, the enactment of democracy promotion may be well-intentioned, determined, and motivated by the relative gains in terms of economic interests. Therefore, the enactment of democracy promotion practices would vary across cases depending on the level of economic interests at the state-level or sub-unit level, meaning domestic economic actors.

1.1.3.3. Constructivism and Democracy Promotion

According to Checkel (1998, 326), constructivism questions the materialism and methodological individualism upon which neorealism and neoliberalism are built and has two fundamental assumptions. Checkel (1998, 326) assumes that first

regards the environment in which agents act is material, and the second argues that the social environment shapes the understanding of the agents regarding their interests. These two assumptions put constructivism in striking contrast with realism and liberalism. As for their actions, in contrast to realism and liberalism, which follow the 'logic of consequences', constructivism posits that actors follow the 'logic of appropriateness'. The logic of consequences assumes actor take strategic actions whereas the logic of appropriateness posits that actors take appropriate actions (Schimmelfennig et al 2000, 17). On that note, actions are considered rule-based oriented, which means that actors claim an identity that relates the inherent responsibilities and obligations of their roles to a particular situation and prioritizes the fulfillment of identity over the pursuit of interests (March and Olsen 1998, 951). Therefore, constructivists attribute key importance to identity and argue that interests or preferences concerning the choice of action are constituted by identities (Hopf 1998, 175). Unlike neorealists, Wendt (1992) argued that preferences and interests are constructed by ideas (Hudson 2005, 11). This assumption is most strikingly observed in the definition of anarchy, which is in contrast with neorealists' understanding of it. As for anarchy, Wendt (1992, 394-5) suggested that it is not the structure, but the process that creates self-help system and structure, thus, "self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy" and "anarchy is what states make of it".

The constructivist research agenda is interested in identity construction, and mutual reproduction of norms and practices (Hopf 1998, 192). In contrast to realists who perceive norms as lacking causal force and neoliberals who believe that norms serve to fulfill strategic calculations to maximize benefits, constructivists perceive norms as collective understandings underlying actors' identities and interests (Checkel 1998, 328). For constructivists; identity, which refers to how an agent perceives the self, its social environment, and its relations with other agents, depends on the existence of an 'other', positing a constitutive view of interests and actions, as opposed to realists and liberals that understand actors with their self-interests and fixed identities (Flockhart 2012, 85). Yet, constructivists argue that

state identities are partially outcomes of the social practices that constitute identity at home, which gives an explanatory power to domestic identity politics in terms of their limiting or facilitating effect on state identity, interests, and actions (Hopf 1998, 195).

The puzzle found by constructivism is the relation between states' interests and identities, without necessarily rejecting that states do follow their interests. A major contribution of constructivism is the role of agents' understandings which mediate between their actions to material opportunities and their identities (Cochran 2008, 310-1). Put differently, constructivism assumes that there is a mutually constitutive relation between actors and structures; the process of identity construction involves the interests; power is material as much as discursive; change at the international level is possible yet not easily achieved, whereas prevailing social practices at the state and international levels either limits or facilitates state actions (Hopf 1998, 179-181). A similar duality is also observed in the foreign policy, as constructivists view not only objective material elements such as trade or relative power; but also, ideational factors as drivers of foreign policy (Beach 2012, 58).

To use constructivism as an analytically-facilitative framework for foreign policy, two foreign policy approaches are suggested: "foreign policy as practice" and "foreign policy as action" (Flockhart 2012, 88-89). The practice-based foreign policy understands the practice as "unconscious or automatic activities embedded in taken-for-granted routines" (Swidler 2001, 84). In this sense, the practice-based foreign policy serves best to maintain stability rather than serving to induce change in the international system; which can only result from unforeseen disruptions or discursive actions, such as changes in practice, persuasion, and argumentations (Risse 2000, Crawford 2002). Diplomacy is the prevailing policy instrument of practice-based foreign policy (Koivisto and Dunno 2010). Action-based foreign policy is motivated to attain particular goals (Taylor 1964) and is performed mainly through actions for settlement in response to problems or for bringing in a novel

perspective (Flockhart, 2012, 89). Recalling that democracy promotion aims to preserve the democratic institutions and prevent the breakdown or backsliding of democracy, instruments that are reflexive and related to this specific aim; such as assistance, diplomacy, intervention, and conditionality, may well be understood as part of practice-based foreign policy. Yet, democracy promotion can also be conceived as an action-based foreign policy since it also aims to establish democratic standards following disruptions or breakdowns in a given country, targeting different sections of a political system; hence introducing a novel thinking.

According to constructivism, when agents promote democracy, they mutually construct an identity between the self and the other, by identifying the self as democratic and the other as undemocratic, which is reflected at the international level (Huber 2015, 37). As a corollary, based on this constructivist underpinning of identity, Huber (2015) identified “democratic role identity” as a factor that facilitates democracy promotion. Huber (2015, 37) defined this identity as “an identity that is constituted by democracy being a shared foreign policy purpose that defines a community’s relations with the ‘undemocratic other’” and it is “highly complex and Janus-faced; it stands at the interface of the domestic and the international level; it is always internally and externally oriented.” Huber argued that democratic role identity has both internal and external parts which push for democracy promotion to become a foreign policy action. At the domestic level, Huber explains that foreign policy can become a means for identity affirmation and actors promote democracy by means of four mechanisms, which are anchoring mechanism, imitation mechanism, substitution mechanism and spillover mechanism. Democracy promotion works as an *anchoring mechanism* when fundamental democratic values are threatened by non-democratic groups; when a state is not recognized as a democracy, democracy promotion works as an *imitation mechanism*, to assert its identity as a democracy; democracy promotion works as *substitution mechanism* when democratic standards and procedures are contested at the domestic level, and finally, democracy promotion works as *spillover*

mechanism, when advancement of democratic norms spread to other policy areas; such as foreign policy (Huber 2015, 37-38).¹⁷ Huber's categorization derived from the constructivist conception of identity is an important contribution towards the theory-development of democracy promotion since the theorization of identity in the context of democracy promotion shows how identity works both at internal and external levels and becomes a variable that results in promoting democracy.

1.2. Democracy Promotion and IR Theories: Between Strategic and Normative Motives

According to Petrova (2014, 89), each IR school of thought, perceives democracy promotion either as a goal in itself and/or a means to other foreign-policy ends, thus the literature on democracy promotion has conceived of democracy promotion actions either as principled and/or strategic foreign-policy exercises. In fact, when each IR theory is applied to democracy promotion, it draws a line between democracy promotion motivated by interests vs. democracy promotion motivated by norms. Petrova has classified this distinction underpinned by IR theories and this dissertation reflects on that classification developed by Petrova (2014) on the "Rationales behind Democracy Promotion", which distinguished two different types of commitments: "democracy promotion in terms of strategic motives" and "democracy promotion in terms of normative motives".

The former argues that states aim to fulfill their self-interests, which makes democracy promotion a means to construct a "congenial international environment informed by causal ideas about the consequences of democratization and democracy" (Petrova 2014, 90). The latter posits that advancing democracy for its own sake stems from principled beliefs such as "cherished domestic values and/or an emerging universal right to democracy" (Petrova 2014, 90). Classifying the observable implications of democracy promotion in terms of resoluteness,

¹⁷ See Huber (2015, 40) on her categorization of enablers of democracy promotion as she discussed three pulls, which are confidence pull, moral pull strategic pull.

recipients and consistency, Petrova elaborates on the strategic and/or normative commitments underlying democracy promotion. The following table borrowed from Petrova summarizes the propositions of each type of commitment.

Table 1.2. Petrova’s classification of strategic vs. normative type of commitments

TABLE 4.1. *Observable Implications of the Rationales behind Democracy Promotion.*

Observable Implications	Type of Commitment to Democracy Promotion	
	Strategic	Normative
<i>Resoluteness</i>	Seek benefits of having democratic international partners	Uphold universal right to democracy and/or export domestic values
<i>Recipients</i>	Target economic or security partners perceived as important but unstable or underdeveloped	Work where there is perceived solidarity (salient shared identity) and grave violations or demand for support
<i>Consistency</i>	Support for democracy abroad is shamelessly sacrificed when there are more direct routes to primary foreign policy goal(s)	Support for democracy abroad is sacrificed when in contradiction with core foreign policy goals, but there is shame or anxiety about the sacrifice

Source: Extracted from Petrova (2014, 93)

In sum, there are two alternative explanations offered by mainstream IR theories for why actors promote democracy. From rationalist perspective, which is in line with strategic commitment defined by Petrova, democracy promotion is considered as a process propelled by material incentives that can be found in security and economic benefits as well as in maintaining regional leadership, echoing neorealist and neoliberalist assumptions. Thus, actors that are motivated by strategic commitment perceive democracy promotion as an instrument to further their self-interests. The table illustrates that states promote democracy with a strategic commitment because having democratic partners serve to their interests, which echoes liberal-democratic reasoning for democracy promotion embedded in democratic peace theory. These interests stem from geostrategic or economic reasons. In fact, states who promote democracy strategically choose to promote democracy in unstable or underdeveloped countries, where economic or security

interests aligns with their core foreign policy interests. Thus, consistency of democracy promotion actions in foreign policy depends on the likelihood of clash of interests with democracy promotion. If promoting democracy clashes with other interests, democracy promotion is sacrificed. According to Schimmelfennig et al (2000, 19), promoting democracy is an instrument to improve the actors' own security or power. In this regard, democracy promotion is subject to cost/benefit calculations. The higher the material benefits or political opportunities the more likely that human rights and democracy are promoted. On the contrary, from the perspective of normative commitment defined by Petrova, states promote democracy in line with the logic of appropriateness, because promoting democracy is not a means but an end in itself. Thus, states with a normative commitment to democracy promotion would endorse democracy as a universal right and export their domestic values. In this regard, states promote democracy in countries where there is a popular demand for fundamental democratic norms and values and there is a kinship in political, cultural, or religious terms. Thus, in line with the constructivist argument, states promoting democracy with normative commitment would perceive that doing so would match the obligations of their identity or role, and democracy promotion is associated with their identities. States with normative commitment would sacrifice democracy promotion when it clashes with other foreign policy goals, thus democracy promotion would result in inconsistency. However, different from the inconsistency observed in strategic commitment, states with normative commitment practice shame or anxiety via diplomatic means when democracy promotion is sacrificed.

Insofar, democracy promotion as a concept is explored with questions of what is democracy promotion, how is democracy promoted and why is democracy promoted. These three questions provided an analytical framework through which democracy promotion actions can be classified empirically according to three defining attributes: targets, instruments and motives. The following table provides a three-fold framework that this dissertation will refer to in order to empirically

examine the democracy promotion actions of Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015.

Table 1.3. Democracy Promotion: Three-Dimensional Framework

TARGET	INSTRUMENTS	MOTIVE
Governing institutions: Executive Legislative Judiciary	Diplomacy Assistance Intervention	Strategic-driven: Economic security threats
Political Processes: Elections	Conditionality	Normative-driven:
Civil Society: NGOs Education Health etc.		Political affinity Cultural affinity Religious affinity

The above table is deduced from the literature and empirically facilitates the examination of democracy promotion actions by Brazil and Turkey; with a focus on the targets, instruments and motives. In other words, it facilitates the descriptive analysis to explain what, how, and why democracy promotion is promoted by Brazil and Turkey. Nevertheless, the research question, of *why Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy* and thus promoted democracy in the given timeframe, would remain limited to system-level variables. The existing literature is constrained within the limits of system-level theories for reasons to maintain parsimony and ensure explanatory power. The distinction between normative and strategic commitment from the perspective of motives found in realism, liberalism and constructivism, allows to empirically identify the motives of democracy promotion through descriptive analysis. Of course, as King et al argue (1994, 34) description is the chief role in all explanation, thus “it is not description versus explanation that distinguishes scientific research from other research”. However; by asking *why Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy* in a particular timeframe, this dissertation aims to go beyond the system-level analysis to investigate the role of state-level variables in the enactment of democracy promotion during the given timeframe.

It is for this particular reason that this dissertation resorts to neoclassical realism in explaining the motives underlying democracy promotion practices. It facilitates investigating system-level conditions that are translated through state-level variables and whether system-level conditions are translated and result in a particular foreign policy action: the enactment of democracy promotion. For example; neoclassical realism offers a comprehensive analysis to explore the transformation of systemic pressures through domestic contestation about the “national interest” among the decision-makers (Beach 2012, 62). Neoclassical realism accounts not only for the foreign policy of great powers but also of regional and rather small powers because “while shifts in power at the international system dominate, threats can also emanate from the sub-systemic or regional and domestic environments”, which can either facilitate or constrain foreign policy decisionmakers (Lobell 2009, 43). Therefore, the strength of neoclassical realism is its ability to explain why two states with similar positionings in the international system can produce different foreign policy choices (Beach 2012, 62). Thus, the dissertation is consciously situated within the contours of neoclassical realism as it is conceived of a foreign policy theory, as “neoclassical realists use theories as heuristic tools and in a very pragmatic fashion” (Beach 2012, 64). Thus, within the scope of this dissertation, neoclassical realism is the main theoretical tool that helps us to explain not only why Brazil and Turkey with similar positionings at the international level promoted democracy in their foreign policy; but also explain why their democracy promotion actions differ from each other. In that sense, neoclassical realism allows for a two-level theorization: system-level; focusing on the system-level variables that offer incentives or constraints for the enactment of democracy promotion, and state-level; focusing on the role of state-level intervening variables to investigate the motives underlying the enactment of democracy promotion. IR theories enable us to discover system-level factors. For example; according to neorealism, an increase in relative power is a variable that enables geostrategic motives because a state would enact democracy promotion towards reaching its security-driven interests. As for neoliberalism; a state’s relative gains in terms of economic interests are another variable and for constructivism;

democratic role identity is a variable that guides a state’s motives underlying democracy promotion enactment.

Table 1.4. Variables underlying Geostrategic and Normative Motives according to IR theories

	Geostrategic motives	Normative Motives
Realism	increase in relative power	-
Liberalism	Relative gains in terms of economic interests	-
Constructivism	-	Democratic identity

At this point, a neoclassical realist would trace these variables at the state level to understand why these particular variables result in democracy promotion enactment and asks for intervening variables underlying democracy promotion enactment. Therefore, neoclassical realism helps not only to descriptively analyze the motives as to whether they are strategic or normative but also to enable us to explore the intervening variables at the state-level which lead to the enactment of democracy promotion. To give an example, Monten (2005, 116), in his article analyzing the motives of democracy promotion as part of the Bush doctrine, investigated the causal mechanism that translated relative power into foreign policy behavior through unit-level variables and argued that ideological changes in foreign policy shape how states react to external limitations and opportunities, emphasizing that “power and ideas are not mutually exclusive explanations, but interact to produce foreign policy outcomes of interest”.

In this dissertation, in addition to neoclassical realism, role theory is used as a middle-range theory in order to build the explanatory framework that merges state-level and system-level hypotheses. As George and Bennett argue (2005, 58) a middle-range theory helps to reveal “recurring conjunctions of mechanisms and provide hypotheses on the pathways through which they produce results, provide more contingent and specific generalizations for policymakers and allow researchers to contribute to more nuanced theories.” I find particular advantage in employing Role Theory as a middle-range theory in relation to Neoclassical

Realism. In what follows, the definition of role theory is introduced. In addition, I discuss why and how the thesis uses role theory and why the thesis uses neoclassical realism with foreign policy analysis, rather than using FPA or neoclassical realism only.

1.3. Using Role Theory for Democracy Promotion: Context and Relevance for Democracy Promotion

Role Theory, a theory in which the origins of national role conception are found, traces back to 1970s, when Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) began to develop as a sub-discipline. During the 1990s, a necessity for a particular FPA emerged due to the systemic pressures incurred by the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, which defied the established security understandings that did not suffice to explain the post-Cold War context (Breuning 2007, 154). With the emergence of democratization as the major political transformation in the post-Cold War environment, the appearance of newly emerged actors necessitated new analytical approaches to explain the behaviors of these new actors. Thus, the post-Cold War context required an emphasis on not only systemic shifts but also shifts in domestic and external contexts and the shifting effects of agency on decision-making mechanisms in foreign policy.

This shift in international politics led scholars like Neack, Jeanne, and Hey (1995) to distinguish between first-generation and second-generation foreign policy scholarship. First-generation, emerged as positivism in social science, began to flourish between the 1950s and 1960s (Neack et al 1995, 5), and modernization theory was the overriding theoretical perspective (Wiarda 1985). The first-generation foreign policy resorted to the foreign policy behavior models, quantitative methods, and the use of event data to relate ideal nation-types to foreign policy behaviors (Neack et al 1995, 6). However, with the wane of positivism and the discrediting of modernization theory in the 1970s and 1980s, the research field of foreign policy opened into a second-generation scholarship, which embraced a diversity of quantitative and qualitative research techniques and emphasized the

complex interactions between different foreign policy factors (Neack et al 1995, 11).

Developed in parallel to the second-generation scholarship of FPA, Role Theory allows for an empirical relationship between agent and structure; where agents' interaction with the structure provides opportunities to inject their influences and to undertake structural changes, as well as put constraints to reshape preexisting roles (Breuning 2011, 16). Role theory entered into the agenda of FPA in reaction to the constructivist' emphasis on identity. A critique of constructivism posited that the constructivist research agenda overlooks or ignores social roles in identity-based action. Wehner and Thies (2014, 412) argued that constructivism blurs the lines between roles and identities, and the explanatory power of the conceptual foundations of role theory is often overlooked in constructivism. Similarly, Breuning (2011, 22) argued that constructivist studies share common grounds with the national role conception studies, including subject matters such as identity or self-images. In a similar fashion, McCourt (2011, 1600) argued that by enacting particular roles in given situations, states behave in the international system in a manner of affirming their identities.

Being a leading scholar in studies of Role Theory, the approach offered by Holsti (1970, 235) is based on perceptions and is interested in policymakers' understandings of the possible roles that can be assumed by their states at the international level.¹⁸ Holsti (1970, 245-6) argued that “a national role conception includes the policy makers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems”. Holsti emphasized the national role of elite perceptions, arguing that elite perceptions play a determining role in foreign policy

¹⁸See Broderson (1961), Hess (1963), Renshon (1977) Bobrow et al. (1979) for analysis of national role conception.

choices (Hudson and Vore, 1995, 219). According to the governments' passivity and activity, Holsti (1970, 261-8) defined a category of national role conceptions such as regional leader, regional protector, mediator-integrator, and regional-subsystem collaborator.¹⁹ Holsti (1970, 245) classified two different categories of sources that impact a national role conception; the first relates to the factors of policymakers' national role conceptions, including geography, state capabilities, socio-economic necessities, ideology, values, public opinion, and individuals and the second relates to the role perceptions by the alter, which include the structure of the system, values, principles, and commitments. In parallel to Holsti, Wish (1980, 533) defined a national role conception in terms of decision-makers' perceptions with respect to their states' positioning in the international order.

Nevertheless, role theory is not without its critics. It is argued that Role Theory overemphasizes a structural explanation that is dominated by the structure and material power in how decision-makers determine a national role conception (Bevir et. al 2013a, 165, Bevir et. al, 2013b). Earlier studies of role conceptions are criticized for the argument that the state is a unitary actor and domestic factors influencing national role conceptions are neglected. On that note, it has been argued that Role Theory should focus on the inherent political processes and internal contestations among domestic actors over national role conceptions and that other factors such as traditions, beliefs, and dilemmas should be considered as the sources of national role conceptions rather than solely material factors (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, Wehner and Thies 2014, Brummer and Thies 2015). Regarding this, Wehner and Thies (2014, 417), offered an interpretivist approach, arguing that interactions between agents result in patterns or structures thus, situating the role of actors as the subjects of study. Cantir and Kaarbo differ from traditional role conception theorists who treat the state as a unitary actor, as they unbox agency and use domestic contestation as a state-level variable. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012, 17) start by defining roles as "social positions" and "socially recognized categories of

¹⁹ See Holsti (1970) for a detailed analysis and cluster of various national role conceptions.

actors” which, according to Harnisch (2011, 8), are “constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group”. These expectations may stem either from domestic actors defined as ego expectations or national role conceptions and/or from external actors defined as alters. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) further argue that domestic consensus over an actor’s international role is rare; moreover, vertical contestation (elites vs. the public) and horizontal contestation (elites vs. elites) within states shape the enactment of a national role conception. In particular, research on horizontal contestation shows that leaders instrumentalize foreign policy to manipulate domestic politics to decrease the contestations deriving from internal disputes or to legitimize their actions, which makes foreign policy serve the particularistic interests of political power dynamics in authoritarian contexts (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012).

The domestic contestation over a national role conception finds its origins in the two-level game metaphor, developed by Putnam. Two-level game metaphor argues that the domestic and international contexts are entangled. Putnam (1988, 460) emphasized that the two-level metaphor recognizes conflict or contestation at the domestic level over national interests as inevitable and that decision-makers aim at balancing domestic and international imperatives at the same time. As also emphasized by Breuning (2007, 13), decision-makers play a two-level game that necessitates agents to maintain the balance between domestic and international imperatives. Two-level game analysis foresees that decision-makers simultaneously play a game at internal and domestic levels, in which moves at one level affect the choices made at the other level (Hudson and Vore, 1995, 227). In this sense, a two-level game would allow for the role of domestic imperatives in explaining why states enact a particular foreign policy. As an extension of the two-level game, Hagan (1995, 122) defined two domestic imperatives that political leaders consider; making policy coalitions and retaining political power. These are; policy coalitions that relate to building domestic support for policy preferences (Hagan 1995, 126) and retaining political power that relate to the political survival of the governing elites (Hagan 1995, 124). Both imperatives generate a “logrolling”

effect that results in aggressive foreign policy actions; which would fulfill the interests of domestic constituents and allows governing elites to keep their grip on political power by manipulating foreign policy (Hagan 1995, 127). Therefore, imperatives at the domestic level become an important factor that motivates states to enact particular foreign policies.

As Role Theory is distinguished from Realist, Liberalist, and Constructivist schools of thought by filling the theoretical vacuum left by them (George and Bennett 2005, 99-100); it allows for improving policy-driven theoretical findings of strategies and problems encountered in different contexts (George and Bennett 2005, 100). Role Theory helps to understand how roles that states perceived for themselves translate into particular foreign policy actions. In addition, Role Theory also helps to theorize the relation between decision-makers' perceptions about the role their states assume and the enactment of democracy promotion. In this dissertation, Role Theory as a middle-range theory helps to develop the theoretical underpinnings of promotion of democracy by focusing on the role that Brazil and Turkey imaged for themselves between 2000 and 2015, in different geographical contexts. Thus, it is argued that democratic regional leadership is the national role conception enacted between 2000 and 2015 by Brazil and Turkey. Based on their regional leadership role, Brazil and Turkey manifested democratic regional leadership through the enactment of democracy promotion as foreign policy behavior. Thus, their role conception as democratic regional leaders motivated Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion. This way, promoting democracy affirms their role as democratic regional leaders, hence, retaining their soft power in the region.

In this dissertation, I use role theory with reference to building a state-level hypothesis with respect to the enactment of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey. Using role theory is useful for two reasons: First, empirically, it helps to comparatively analyze the enactment of democracy promotion in different geographical contexts. Second, theoretically, Role Theory aligns with Neoclassical

Realism, in its attempt to uncover the state-level variables that motivate the enactment of a particular foreign policy through national role conception. It should be noted that although neoclassical realism affirms the neorealist argument that the relative power states possess in terms of material capabilities define and determine their foreign policy actions, neoclassical realism further argues that states are not only constrained by international politics but also by domestic politics; and perceptions of decision-makers and domestic political settings as intervening variables at the unit-level must be analyzed to understand a state's foreign policy actions (Rose 1998, 152). Therefore, neoclassical realism allows for room to apply middle-range theories such as role theory, in order to trace system-level variables and analyze state-level intervening variables in explaining the enactment of democracy promotion in a particular time frame across different geographical contexts.

There are two fundamental analytical reasons to use FPA along with neoclassical realism. The first reason pertains to the role of decision-makers as agents of foreign policy. As argued by Hudson (2005, 3) the most critical contribution by FPA to IR theory is the capability of material and ideational factors to determine state behavior, which can be possible by the agents of decision-makers or governing elites alike in a given state. Thus, FPA focuses on decision-makers (or governing elites) in order to better understand how and why material and ideational factors of a state's capability result in a particular foreign policy behavior. FPA attributes analytical salience to decision-makers' role in explaining particular foreign policy outcomes.

The second reason pertains to the role of intervening variables between *explanans*, or independent variables and *explanandum* or dependent variable. Neoclassical realism emphasizes the role of intervening variables at the state-level in explaining particular foreign policy outcomes, yet FPA helps to reify the variables by explicitly drawing a distinction between variables derived from state-level and system-level of analysis.

In parallel with neoclassical realism; the FPA literature categorizes variables under two broad classifications; (1) unit-level (state) as ‘variables inside the state’ referring to variables derived from unit-level; such as the domestic political system and agents operating in that system, the government, and the leaders (2) international-level (system) as ‘variables outside the state’ referring to the variables at the international-level derived from the international system; such as the structure of the international system, the attributes of existing world politics, and other agents’ actions (Kaarbo et al 2013, 7). This categorization brought by FPA aligns with the approach of neoclassical realism in distinguishing between system and state-level variables to explain particular foreign policies of states. Additionally, it helps the analysis to maintain theoretical parsimony when tracing how systemic pressures are translated to the state level of analysis. Identifying state-level variables is important because they possess the potential to either limit or enable a state’s capacity to react to systemic pressures (Lobell et al. 2009, 4). Therefore, according to FPA, foreign policy decision-making is dispersed through multiple factors and levels, therefore it aims to examine the variables at different levels of analysis affecting the decision-making process (Hudson 2005, 2).

Scholars who resort to FPA through neoclassical realism such as Walt (1987), Wohlforth (1993) and Schweller (2004) emphasized that integrating systemic and state-level variables is crucial to maintaining theoretical parsimony. For example, While Wohlforth (1993) posited that perceptions of political leaders regarding their relative power shaped their foreign policy preferences, Schweller (1988) theorized motivations guiding the state, and Jervis (2005) analyzed utility factors underlying economic and security affairs. Other scholars such as Monten (2005) referred to the perceptions of national history. Schweller (2004) used Neoclassical Realism and FPA when explaining the balance of power against threats. Arguing that the domestic political process plays a determining role in countering threats, Schweller (2004, 9) theorized three main state-level intervening

variables that influence foreign policy outcomes; which are cohesion in governing elites, cohesion at the societal level, and government stability.

Therefore, as much as this dissertation is situated in neoclassical realism, the FPA approach to explaining democracy promotion is a significant tool that strengthens the understanding of the enactment of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey, with hypotheses built on system-level and state-level. Thus, this dissertation also aims to maintain parsimony by using role theory to uncover the state-level factors to explain the motives underlying democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey.

This thesis applies Breuning's approach to "Role Theory as a cognitive model of the agent-structure relationship" as illustrated in the figure below (See Table 2.2. in Breuning 2011, 26). The model is useful both theoretically and empirically. In theoretical sense, the model allows for analyzing the neoclassical realist premise that system-level factors are translated through unit-level variables. The model does this empirically by analyzing actors' capabilities in the capacity of their material powers. In addition to that, the model looks for opportunities to act that actors may exercise in accordance with their material capabilities. In this dissertation, opportunities to act are incurred by democratic disruptions in a neighboring country. In addition to the material factors, the model also takes into account the ideational factors at the state-level (identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience), which enables a role conception. It is by decision-makers' perceptions of ideational and material factors that actors construct a national role conception and democracy promotion results from that role conception. Thus, this dissertation employs the model by Breuning as illustrated below to theorize pro-democratic regional leadership as the national role conception that results in the promotion of democracy.

Figure 1.11. Breuning's figure of National Role Conception and Role Enactment




Figure 2.2 Role Theory as a Cognitive Model of the Agent–Structure Relationship.

Source: Extracted from Breuning (2011, 26)

The following section will present the research design and hypothesis informed by neoclassical realism in addition to the method and data to be used.

CHAPTER 2:
RESEARCH DESIGN:
HYPOTHESES, METHOD, AND DATA

This section aims to bridge the theoretical section to an empirical section of the dissertation and discusses the main hypotheses, the method and data that are used to explain the enactment of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015.

2.1. Hypotheses

This dissertation embarks on the observable implications that Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy as a foreign policy outcome in the period between 2000 and 2015.

In this regard, the research question proposed by this dissertation is; why Brazil and Turkey, two regional actors, enacted democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015. Thus, the dependent variable is the ‘enactment of democracy promotion practices’ by Brazil and Turkey. This dissertation approaches the enactment of democracy promotion from the framework of neoclassical realism. As a sub-school of realism that is interested in explaining particular foreign policies, neoclassical realism starts by observing the systemic conditions at the international level; such as the balance of power, relative power, or material capabilities of states, which is considered the primary determinant of foreign policy behavior. However, neoclassical realism traces the systemic conditions to explore the role of state-level variables in explaining particular foreign policy outcomes. In other words, neoclassical realism goes beyond systemic conditions and argues that systemic conditions at the international level are translated through unit-level (states) intervening variables, which result in particular foreign policy preferences. Embarking from this theoretical vantage, this dissertation is interested in explaining the enactment of democracy promotion by exploring not only the system-level

variable at the international level but also at the unit-level, by exploring the state-level intervening variables that motivated the enactment of democracy promotion in foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015. Hence, the dissertation aims to offer a two-level theorization and analyzes the enactment of democracy promotion (dependent variable) in two steps: First, democracy promotion practices of Brazil and Turkey are empirically analyzed according to three defining elements; target – instruments – motives, as outlined in Table 1.1. In doing so, a descriptive analysis is offered while democracy promotion is substantively examined. The second step consists of a quest for a causal link between hypotheses 1 and 2 (system-based and role-based level) and the dependent variable, ‘enactment of democracy promotion’. The hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1:

1. Between 2000 and 2015, power shifts at the international level resulted in a relative increase in the material and economic capabilities of Brazil and Turkey in their respective regions. This systemic shift situated Brazil and Turkey at the international level as regional actors. Due to the increase in their relative power; the international system pushed governing elites in Brazil and Turkey to promote democracy with the motivation to fulfill their strategic commitments to secure and (or) maximize geopolitical/economic interests and retain their regional power. (system-based hypothesis)

Hypothesis 2:

2. The regional power shift was translated at the state-level by decision-makers’ perceptions through the role they assumed for their states. Between 2000 and 2015, decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey claimed democratic regional leadership roles due to their own perception of increasing material and economic capabilities in their regions. Thus, their role conception as democratic regional leaders enabled Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion. This way, the promotion of

democracy became an instrument of foreign policy, between 2000 and 2015 to affirm their role as democratic regional leaders, as an instrument to preserve their regional power and to secure/maximize their interests. (role-based hypothesis)

Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion to secure and/or increase their material and economic capabilities to preserve or strengthen their regional positioning, if and when a political crisis that withholds democratic norms and procedures occurs in a neighboring country, in which economic and/or geostrategic interests are high. In this sense, material interest corresponds to the geostrategic commitment to democracy promotion offered by Petrova (2014). Thus, the regional distribution of capabilities in comparison to other regional actors triggered Brazil and Turkey to preserve or strengthen their relative power in their corresponding regions, which motivated the enactment of democracy promotion as a viable foreign policy action that serves to secure or maximize their geostrategic commitments. But how relative power derived from the international system is translated at the state-level and result in the enactment of democracy promotion? Here, I turn to the state-level intervening variables derived from the framework of neoclassical realism. The argument is, that Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion because decision-makers assumed a democratic regional leadership role. Enactment of democracy promotion served as an instrument to affirm their pro-democracy regional leadership while ensuring that their strategic commitments are fulfilled. This argument emphasizes that material and normative motives are not mutually exclusive, but rather, interact may together and result in democracy promotion enactment. In a nutshell, from a neorealist perspective, Brazil and Turkey had a relative increase in their regional material capabilities between 2000 and 2015. The relative increase in their regional material capabilities is a systemic pressure and it was transformed through decision-makers' claim for pro-democratic regional leadership at the state-level. Thus, an increase in their relative power enables democracy promotion enactment through decision-makers' pro-democratic regional leadership. In doing so, democracy promotion enactment served to affirm

their pro-democratic regional leadership. How does democracy promotion work to affirm their identity? I answer this question by using Huber's (2015) take on democracy promotion as an imitation mechanism and substitution mechanism. To reiterate, democracy promotion works as an *imitation mechanism* to affirm a state's own democratic identity, if a state is not recognized as such internationally. Given the rising levels of autocratization in their countries, democracy promotion would serve as an instrument to affirm their pro-democratic regional leadership roles. Additionally, democracy promotion works as a *substitution mechanism*, which motivates governing elites to promote democracy in order to affirm their own democratic image. Thus, driven by their regional material and ideational capabilities, decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey assumed pro-democratic regional leadership roles. Democracy promotion is used as a foreign policy instrument because decision-makers aimed at securing and/or maximizing their material interests while retaining their regional positioning and affirming their pro-democratic regional leadership. By enacting democracy promotion, Brazil and Turkey also aimed at affirming their democratic identity and projecting a democratic image at the international level.

Thus, the second hypothesis above emphasizes that Brazil's and Turkey's role conceptions as pro-democratic regional leaders motivated them to enact democracy promotion to retain their regional power. Therefore, an increase in relative power and the quest for identity affirmation are not contradictory, but rather act together to fulfill material interests, which result in the enactment of democracy promotion. Hence, being a regional power is an enabling factor for democracy promotion. From a neoclassical realist perspective, at the system-level democracy promotion is conceived as a foreign policy instrument to maintain their regional positionings. At the state-level, democracy promotion serves to secure and maximize strategic commitments, while it works as a mechanism of identity affirmation for their role as pro-democracy regional leaders, despite increasing levels of autocratization. As a result, the thesis argues that Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion because decision-makers endorsed a national role

conception that is pro-democratic regional leadership, based on the ruling governments' perceptions of their states' possession of material and ideational factors, which were enabled by shifting regional distribution of power between 2000 and 2015. At this point, the relation between a state's national interests i.e. geostrategic/economic interests, and the role they enact i.e. pro-democratic regional leadership role, should be amplified. Adigbuo (2007, 90) argued that "a role can lead a state to undertake actions that contradict its national interest – thus allowing the analyst to separate interests from power". From a neorealist point of view, national interests are conditioned by anarchy, and states pursue their geostrategic interests. Although neoclassical realists would agree with this, they further argue that domestic causes such as decision-makers' perceptions or public opinion shape and redefine national interests (Dueck 2006, 236). As a result, states use material and ideational factors that they possess towards pursuing those interests. In line with this argument, a neorealist would argue that the interests of Brazil and Turkey are defined by the anarchic international system and democracy promotion is unlikely when promoting democracy contradicts national interests. However, neoclassical realists would further argue that decision-makers' understandings of their states' power and the role they claim could result in particular foreign policy action. Democracy promotion is enacted as a foreign policy as a result of decision-makers' enactment of the pro-democratic regional leadership role, which culminates from states' possession of material and ideational factors. It is through this role conception that states aim to fulfill their geostrategic interests in order to maintain and maximize their security and/or economic goals. In other words, while geostrategic/economic interests are conditioned by the distribution of power in an anarchic international system, the pro-democratic regional leadership role is conditioned by the decision-makers' conception of ideational and material factors at the state-level. Thus, conditioned by increasing relative power at the system-level and pro-democratic regional leadership role at the state level, Brazil and Turkey enacted democracy promotion to secure and maximize their geostrategic/material interests while affirming their pro-democratic regional leadership role.

2.2. Method and Data

The countries selected for the case studies, Brazil and Turkey, promoted democracy between the period 2000 and 2015. The dissertation chose Brazil and Turkey because they both have a positive value on the dependent variable; enactment of democracy promotion. On that note, it should be reminded that an important limitation that all case studies face is case selection bias. In this dissertation, one may argue that the cases explored in this dissertation, Brazil and Turkey, are chosen deliberately on the basis of a shared particular outcome; which is the presence of democracy promotion enactment in their foreign policies between 2000 and 2015. However, George and Bennett (2005, 84) assert that cases selected based on a similar dependent variable shall not be completely rejected because studies with a small number of cases distinguish between necessary or sufficient conditions. Therefore, the dissertation is designed as small-N research that employs structured and focused comparison.

As George and Bennett (2005, 175) defined, the method is “structured” in the sense that the research question reflects the aim of the research and each case under study answers the question to make a systematic comparison, while the method is “focused” in the sense that it merely takes into account particular aspects of the cases under study. By selecting Brazil and Turkey for comparative analysis, this dissertation investigates the motives of enactment of democracy promotion that is not biased by the specificities of each case. Therefore, for the case of Brazil and Turkey, all cases of democracy promotion enactment are mapped. In this mapping, the observable implications could emphasize that democracy promotion enactment towards certain cases may remain limited despite the possibility that the democracy promotion could be enacted. Therefore, as opposed to the positive cases in which democracy promotion enactment is observed, the fact that democracy promotion did not occur or remained limited are deemed as negative cases, which can also be thought as control cases (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). The Small-N Research design is often encouraged to include negative cases (Przeworski and Teune 1970, Skocpol 1984, Ragin 2000), or control cases, which explore contextual attributes and attain

control in causal analysis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 655). Mahoney and Goertz (2004, 654) proposed ‘The Possibility Principle’ in choosing the negative cases, which holds that “the negative cases should be those where the outcome has a real possibility of occurring—not just those where the outcome has a nonzero probability.” Skocpol (1984, 378) also made a similar argument, by stating that they should be “as similar as possible to the ‘positive cases’ in all respects except for their value on the dependent variable.” Similarly, Ragin (2000, 60) argued that “negative cases should resemble positive cases in as many ways as possible, especially with respect to the commonalities exhibited by the positive cases.” Therefore, the comparison of Brazil and Turkey, based on the observable implications of democracy promotion will first sort out all the cases in which democracy promotion enactment is observed and second, will control for the negative cases which holds the possibility of democracy promotion enactment as much as possible, but remained limited compared to other cases.

With this aim, this research recognizes the potential strengths and weaknesses of selecting two cases, in other words, of small-N research design. As for weaknesses, generalization across cases beyond the ones subject to analysis is hard to achieve with small-N research. In relation to this, a small-N research design is much weaker because few cases are not appropriate for evaluating causal claims (Brady and Collier 2010, 10). Thus, the main rationale for studying the two cases derives from their strengths. Rather than strong generalization, selecting two cases helps to closely scrutinize qualitative features, which can produce evidence with significant potential to eliminate rival explanations (Jacobs 2015, 69). Therefore, causal-process observation becomes significant for the small-N research design with cases of Brazil and Turkey. As Brady and Collier (2010, 24) argue, the strength of these observations is found in the richness of contextual attributes, processes, or mechanisms. Yet the most challenging part is to cautiously frame the comparative analysis which necessitates applying robust tools to undertake within-case analysis (Brady and Collier 2010, 10).

In order to tackle this methodological challenge; this dissertation primarily uses qualitative research practices and employs; process-tracing, interviews, and content analysis. George and Bennett (2005, 513) suggested that the researcher can use process-tracing to draw a causal path from the independent variable to the dependent variable. In other words, process-tracing focuses on developing a causal path to set up to show the link between factors or conditions to outcomes (Schimmelfennig 2015, 101). According to Schimmelfennig et al (2006), for each independent variable that is coherent or changes with the outcome, the researcher has to collect additional data to meet the theoretical outlook when drawing a causal path linking variables to the outcome. Therefore, process-tracing is abundant with resources that is manageable only for one or two cases (Schimmelfennig 2015, 105). For a successful example of process-tracing, the causal mechanism between independent and dependent variables “would involve whether the hypothesized parts of the mechanism were actually present” (Beach 2012, 233). To give an example; Schimmelfennig et al (2006) applied process-tracing with the aim of showing the link between the presence or absence of the hypotheses and successful socialization, leading to the outcome. Layne (2006) also used process-tracing by testing Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory to investigate the US foreign policy strategy after the early 1940s towards Western Europe and asked why the strategy of extra-regional hegemony dominated its foreign policy.

In a similar fashion, I aim to apply process-tracing to show how the independent variables formulated at the state-level and system-level are connected to the dependent variable, thus demonstrating the causal path of democracy promotion enactment. Process-tracing gives an opportunity to better analyze the causal mechanism in which the motives for the enactment of democracy promotion are transmitted into foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey by agents. The definition of causal mechanisms is also varied. Causal mechanism is defined by Bennett (2008, 207) as “processes through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific contexts to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities”. In a similar manner, Waldner (2012, 75) posited that a mechanism is “an agent or entity

that has the capacity to alter its environment because it possesses an invariant property that, in specific contexts, transmits either a physical force or information that influences the behavior of other agents or entities”. This dissertation will use explaining-outcome-process tracing method. Beach (2012, 63) defines explaining-outcome process-tracing as “case studies whose primary ambition is to explain particular historical outcomes, although the findings of the case can also speak to other potential cases of the phenomenon”, as exemplified by Schimmelfennig’s (2001) study of why countries that once were skeptic about the enlargement of the EU decided to support it. By asking why Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy, this dissertation studies why Brazil and Turkey with prior isolationist, status-quo oriented, traditional foreign policies, enacted democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015. In doing so, this dissertation tests in every single case (Brazil and Turkey) if hypotheses derived from neoclassical realism and role theory would be sufficient to explain the enactment of democracy promotion. Therefore, explaining-outcome process-tracing tests the theory repetitively to see if it can provide a sufficient explanation (Beach 2012, 63). In this dissertation, for every single case under study, first, the hypothesis derived from neoclassical realism based on an increase in relative power will be tested to see whether it explains the enactment of democracy promotion. Thus, governing elites see democracy promotion as a viable instrument of foreign policy to retain their relative power in terms of their geostrategic commitments in their respective regions. However, this dissertation holds that this argument provides only a limited explanation of how system-level variable (increasing relative power) transmit through intervening state-level variable (decision-makers’ perceptions) to result in the enactment of democracy promotion. Therefore, this dissertation builds on existing literature to build a case-specific causal path, which links relative power to democracy promotion. In order to do so, the national role conception embedded in role theory is used to investigate whether pro-democratic regional leadership can explain the enactment of democracy promotion. This causal path is explored in Brazil’s and Turkey’s democracy promotion actions towards their respective regions. Therefore, the parts of the causal path in each single case study are expected to include case-specific

factors relating to decision-makers' domestic beliefs and ideas towards formulating pro-democratic regional leadership roles as well as to the motives of democracy promotion.


Below is a demonstration of the case-specific causal mechanism of democracy promotion enactment that this dissertation hypothesized for Brazil and Turkey.

Figure 2.1. Pathway to Democracy Promotion Enactment Part I (ideational part)

X	<u>decisionmakers</u>	<u>decisionmakers</u>	<u>decisionmakers</u>	<u>decisionmakers</u>	outcome
Relative power vis-a-vis other actors in the region	redefine their foreign policy approach with the desire to preserve or strengthen their regional positioning and/or retaining their regional power.	claim regional leadership depending on their possessed material/ideational capabilities	respond to disruptions in their region as an opportunity to act to secure and/or maximize their interests, and strengthen their pro-democracy regional leadership	use instruments targeting governing institutions/political process/civil society to ensure democracy. The government may instrumentalize cultural/ideological/religious affinity with the motivation to secure/maximize their geostrategic interests.	democracy promotion as part of foreign policy - to affirm their role as regional leaders, to retain their regional power

The table above demonstrates how the argument is formulated to explain democracy promotion. It aims to show how relative power in comparison to other actors in the region as an independent variable translated by decision-makers at the state level and results in the enactment of democracy promotion. In addition to this, the figure below aims to reify how variables at system and state levels of analyses act together and result in democracy promotion.

Figure 2.2. Pathway to Democracy Promotion Enactment Part II (variables)



The figure above shows that the analysis starts at the system level and it takes a shift in relative power at the regional scale as an independent variable. As Neoclassical Realism dictates, an increase in relative power is translated at the state-level through an intervening variable of role conception, which is pro-democratic regional leadership. This role conception is enacted by decision-makers as a result of the material and ideational capabilities that their state possesses. It is hypothesized that increasing relative power is translated at the state-level through a pro-democratic regional leadership role. This role emerged as a result of decision-makers view of their states' possession of ideational and material factors. Increasing relative power and pro-democratic regional role act together and result in democracy promotion, which is motivated by strategic commitments and/or normative commitments that governing elites possess.

The dissertation applies this two-part mechanism to Brazil and Turkey in order to uncover and compare the case-specific particularities with respect to motives of democracy promotion as part of their foreign policies.

In addition to process-tracing, this dissertation uses interviews and content analysis as two qualitative methods. Semi-structured interviews were conducted both in Brazil and in Turkey. The method of purposive sampling and snowball

sampling was used for the interviews. Purposive sampling is based on the aim of the study and the researcher's access to the population under study, and entails interviews with a pre-defined, sampled set of actors, as required by the research (Tansey 2007, 782-783, Bakkalbasioglu 2020, Mikecz 2012). Snowball sampling - also known as chain-referral sampling - is also used, which refers to asking participants for recommendations of connections who might qualify for participation (Robinson 2004, 37.) I spent February/March 2016 at Fundação Gutelio Vargas and conducted semi-structured, in-depth, face-to-face interviews with selected, non-governmental political and civil society actors engaged with democracy promotion and foreign policy in Brazil. Additionally, interviews were conducted in Turkey in August 2017, with former officials who supervised military aid as part of Turkey's democracy assistance in the region and civil society actors. The interviews were composed of a set of ten interviewees in each country, in which they were asked a set of ten questions, which are listed in the Appendix. In a nutshell; conceptually, the questions target the principles and guiding motives of the foreign policy of countries and the salience of democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015. Empirically, the context, target, instruments, and the motives underlying democracy promotion policies pursued by Brazil and Turkey are explored.

Content analysis was conducted both on primary and secondary documents to understand the discourse on democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey. The official documents of Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015 including Foreign Ministry press releases, statements by official authorities, development agencies (in Brazil, Brazilian Cooperation Agency – ABC - and in Turkey, Turkish Coordination and Cooperation Agency - TIKKA -), political and social actors, parliamentary speeches and reports available online as well as newspaper articles in Brazil and in Turkey are examined. Additionally, secondary sources for numerical data; such as military expenditures, technical and financial aid amounts, economic data such as GDP, inflation rates and OECD ratings were also used.

CHAPTER 3:
BRAZIL AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
BETWEEN 2000-2015

This chapter aims to detail and analyze democracy promotion policies undertaken by Brazil between 2000 and 2015, and explain why Brazil enacted democracy promotion in its foreign policy, by empirically demonstrating and testing the two-level theorization based on the insights from Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory.

The chapter unfolds into two main sections: The first section aims to undertake a descriptive analysis of democracy promotion in the foreign policy of Brazil between 2000 and 2015 based on observable implications during major democratic disruptions at the regional level. To this end, this section asks what instruments Brazil has sought to use and to what ends. In doing so, the chapter explores the target of democracy promotion policies undertaken and the instruments through which democracy was promoted in the foreign policy of Brazil in the given time period. All cases in the region subject to democracy promotion enactment by Brazil are mapped in this section. These cases are Peru (2000), Ecuador (2005), Bolivia (2003,2005), Paraguay (2012), Honduras (2009), and Venezuela (2002, 2012). All these cases demonstrated a positive value for democracy promotion enactment, except for Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2012), in which limited democracy promotion enactment is observed; which situated these countries as control cases among others. Therefore, for analytical purposes, three cases; Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000), and Venezuela (2002, 2012), are chosen and are analyzed in-depth as a within-case comparison.

The democratic disruptions in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela provided opportunities to act for Brazil to promote democracy. In a nutshell, in Paraguay, disruptions in governing institutions emerged because of a political crisis resulting

from the impeachment of the then President Fernando Lugo in 2012, corresponding to Lula's presidency in Brazil. In Peru, disruption in the political process emerged due to electoral disputes in 2000, and finally, in Venezuela, the country experienced disruptions in governing institutions through the coup attempt in 2002 and disruption in the political process in 2012, of which the political ramifications have persisted even after 2015. While the case of Paraguay is an emblematic case of democracy promotion enactment in terms of the use of diplomacy and conditionality, the cases of Peru and Venezuela remained limited despite the opportunity to enact democracy promotion. Therefore, the limited democracy promotion undertaken by Brazil in these cases has explanatory value in terms of explaining why democracy promotion was enacted by explaining why it remained limited. The inclusion of these control cases will help the analysis to identify and control the contextual features both in the target countries as well as in Brazil.

The second section aims to undertake a theoretical analysis, building upon the observable implications derived from the empirical analysis of the three cases to explore the motivations of Brazil's democracy promotion and asks why Brazil enacted democracy promotion. Following a descriptive analysis of what has Brazil done in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela in terms of democracy promotion; based on insights from Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory, I examine the motives underlying the enactment of democracy promotion in the cases of Peru, Paraguay, and Venezuela in the given timeframe, by testing two hypotheses: system-based and role-based.

The analysis is based on a number of sources: First, I conducted interviews with scholars and representatives of civil society organizations in Sao Paulo in 2016. Second, I examined official governmental and non-governmental documents, reports, scholarly research, and newspaper articles as secondary sources. Additionally, diplomatic positions and deliberations taken by Brazil in regional organizations such as the OAS, Mercosur, or Unasur were reviewed.

In what follows, the origins of democracy promotion in the foreign policy of Brazil are visited to situate the democracy promotion policies in a contextual framework. The aim is to trace the historical background of democracy promotion on a temporal dimension, in three main stages: early 1900s, mid-1900s, and late 1990s. The analysis showcases the main features of Brazilian foreign policy in each stage concerning the origins of democracy promotion in the foreign policy of Brazil. In a nutshell, in the early 1900s; with effective leadership, Brazil developed a multilateral approach under the effective leadership of Rio Branco, driven by regional integration in response to the regional conflicts. The period between the early 1900s and 1985 marked a return to authoritarianism under the leadership of Gútelio Vargas. Brazil pursued ISI economic model which encouraged a strong state apparatus to maintain economic development. Multilateralism in foreign policy became an instrument to pursue economic interests in the region. The early 1990s staged the return to democracy, which induced economic and political restructuring. The foreign policy decision-making process started to increasingly involve actors from political and economic domains in addition to the civil society actors, thus strong state apparatus in foreign policy is weakened while the role of the Foreign Affairs Ministry – Itamaraty - decreased. The 1988 constitution addressed the role of the state apparatus by redefining and adjusting the role of governing institutions in the foreign policy-making process. The foreign policy principles were also clearly defined in the constitution; which are multilateralism, regional integration, cooperation, national independence, the prevalence of human rights, non-intervention, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

3.1. Origins of Promotion of Democracy in Brazil's Foreign Policy

To analyze democracy promotion enactment through a two-level analysis based on the empirical observations, first, the context in which democracy promotion flourished will be explored. As discussed below, the understanding of the context demonstrates that foreign policy approach by Brazil has shifted and changed in parallel with Brazil's democratization process. Following gaining independence from Portugal in 1823, Brazil swung back and forth between

authoritarianism and democratization until the latest democratic transition phase in 1988. After the independence in 1823, the Republic adopted a presidential system and gradually became centralized and eventually dictatorial (Lee and Gomez, 2011, 62) under the presidency of Gútelio Vargas, who served as president between 1930-45 and 1951-54, the phase in which the country remained authoritarian until the military coup in 1985. After the adoption of new constitution in 1988, Brazil started to develop a more structured and institutional approach in its foreign policy, which enabled democracy promotion.

3.1.1. Towards the 20th century: Developing a Multilateral Approach in Foreign Policy through Leadership

In the period following its independence, Paraguay's dictator Francisco Solano Lopez declared the Paraguayan War (1864-70) on Brazil in December 1864 and Argentina in 1865 and invaded their territories, which culminated in the Treaty of Triple Alliance on May 1865 between Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (Bethell 1996, 1). The Triple Alliance is deemed crucial in the sense that it had initiated regional engagement, as a result of the end of the Paraguay War, the last major war that Brazil fought against Paraguay aligned with Argentina and Uruguay (Malamud 2011, 5). Not only the region-wise the Paraguay War was crucial, but also for Brazil's political history. The Paraguay War culminated in the effective political leadership of José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, shortly the Baron of Rio Branco, a bureaucrat known as the father of Brazilian foreign policy. With the effective leadership of Rio Branco, the perpetual goal of Brazilian foreign policy was defined as to facilitate the unity and friendship among South American nations, with underlying motivations of Kantian perpetual peace (Lafer 2000, 215-6). The Paraguay War is deemed critical in the sense that effective political leadership played a crucial role in shaping Brazil to prioritize multilateralism in foreign policy. Rio Branco envisioned the idea of foreign policy activism for Brazil in the international system and encouraged multilateralism. Therefore, following the end of the Paraguay war, regional engagement through multilateralism and effective

political leadership became important drivers of Brazilian foreign policy by the beginning of the twentieth century. To illustrate, Rio Branco urged for hosting the Rio de Janeiro Pan American Summit in 1906 and participating in the 1907 Hague Conference; which gave an incentive to Brazil to join the Versailles Treaty negotiations and played a role in the Executive Council of the League of Nations (Burgess 2012, 351). Moreover, Brazil also took part at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and aimed to reform the emerging collective security system envisioned by the League of Nations (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 25-26). Rio Branco was also performed an effective political leadership in solving regional and conflictual disputes, such as the war between Colombia and Peru, and the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia during the 1930s (Lafer 2000, 214-6), which reinforced Brazil's regional role.

3.1.2. 1930-1985: Return to authoritarianism and limited multilateralism

Starting from the 1930s, the leadership of Getúlio Vargas marked Brazil's history over the next four decades. In the economic realm, the country tackled economic crisis stemmed from the agro-exporting model and replaced it by the model of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in the 1930s. This transformation in the economic domain culminated in rapid industrialization with a central role given to the state, as the governing bodies started to use foreign policy as an important instrument of the ISI model (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 23). Therefore, Brazil focused on decolonization and economic development in its foreign policy. For example; in 1961, the then Brazilian Foreign Minister Alfonso Arinos stated that Brazil, as an ex-colony, was building a new civilization based upon anti-colonialist and anti-racist account, and in 1993, the then Foreign Minister Araujo Castro declared the "Three D's" speech (de-colonization, development, and disarmament) emphasized by economic motivations (Lafer 2000, 213). The post-1945 order also facilitated this foreign policy outlook, which focused on integrating developing countries into the institutional framework with the objective to promote

economic development and deepen political autonomy, which Brazil certainly fitted in (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006, 25-26).

One can claim that the multilateral emphasis in foreign policy emerged during the 19th century driven by the leadership of Rio Branco, and reinforced during the 20th century, with underlying economic motivations. In fact, Brazil's role in trade and development negotiations has gradually become prominent. From a utilitarian perspective, to maximize its economic benefits, Brazil defended a trade regime based on principles such as cooperation, development, non-discrimination, implementation of differential treatment rules favoring developing countries, non-reciprocity; as well as political alignment with the G77 (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 25-26). Examples of such multilateral attempts include; the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) in 1960 superseded in 1980 by Latin American Development and Integration Association, (ALADI); the 1969 Plate Basin Treaty; Treaty with Paraguay resulting in the Itaipu hydroelectric plant in 1973, Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation in 1978; and the launch of the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline in 1999 (Lafer 2000, 216-7). Although the period between the end of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century signified a change towards multilateral orientation with underlying economic motivations driving foreign policy; it was not until the democratic transition in the 1980s that the origins of democracy promotion emerged in the foreign policy of Brazil.

3.1.3. From the 1990s to 2000s: Democratization

Since the beginning of the early 1990s, Brazil had gone through a series of shifts in political and economic domains, which represent a critical turning point regarding the economic restructuring and the emergence of a new domestic political and constitutional setting in Brazil.

The political and economic restructuring was triggered by the collapse of the military regime due to the exhaustion of ISI as a valid economic model,

economic stagnation, and rising domestic and international protests. While politically, the democratization process was incurred as Brazil adopted a new constitution in 1988; economically, Brazil shifted to a competitive economic model. The shift towards a competitive economic model and the democratization process facilitated the inclusion of different political and economic actors in the foreign policy-making (Saraiva 2010, 153). Thus, the 1990s marked a political and constitutional restructuring to reflect the pluralization of actors in the foreign policymaking process.

1988 constitution addressed new institutional arrangements with respect to foreign policy-making. From the early 1990s onwards, Brazilian foreign policy-making illustrated signs of change related to institutional restructuring (De Faria 2008, Pinheiro 2009). Actors in governmental societal levels enabled this shift by the strong demands to get integrated into the foreign policy-making processes to reflect their interests (Cason and Power 2009; De Faria et al 2013).

To meet these demands, the 1988 constitution changed the role of the formal institutions that govern the state apparatus; the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Itamaraty. The legislature's role in foreign policy decision-making processes was expanded and normative principles regarding state action in international politics (Constitution, Article 4 of Title I) were included (Milani, 2015, 70). Roles of the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary were decentralized, with the Executive and the Itamaraty primarily functioning towards democratization of foreign policy (Milani, 2015, 70). Burges and Chagas Bastos (2017) argued that since the beginning of the 1990s, the president had important powers in the definition of Brazilian foreign policy and individual leaders started to possess decisive strength in the conduct of foreign policy, making them the main drivers of foreign policy shifts in Brazil. In the following periods, the number of actors that influence foreign policy making increased, and the rise of presidential diplomacy diminished the traditional dominance of Itamaraty (Cason and Power 2009, 11). As argued by de Lima (2000), from the 1990s onwards, the foreign policy

agenda started to be conceptualized as a public policy and attracted the interest of different agents in civil society, which decreased Itamaraty's autonomy in policymaking process. Similarly, it was argued that foreign policy has become a public policy within the context of Brazil's process of democratic consolidation and it was challenged by the civil society's growing demand for consultation and participation in the foreign policy decision-making process (de Lima, 2016). Civil society's demand for integration into the foreign policy-making mechanism, was also observed during our interview with Observatorio do Sol e Brasil, a civil society organization focusing on South-South cooperation. It was stated that the civil society actors had been advocating transparent and fair representation of civil society organizations in foreign policy decision-making mechanisms in order to advocate human rights and democracy issues in foreign policy.

The institutional restructuring and the increase of actors during the 1990s enabled the idea of 'autonomy through participation', which removed the legacy of authoritarianism from foreign policy and abolished the defensive stance of the military regime towards many international regimes; such as human rights and nuclear non-proliferation, yielding in the full participation of all international regimes (de Lima and Hirst 2006, 24). For example, commitment to the multilateral human rights regime was included in Brazilian foreign policy as illustrated by Article 4 in the 1988 Constitution, which states that human rights shall be the prevailing principle in Brazil's international relations (Milani 2015, 71). As also underlined during the interview with the Civil Society Organization Conectas, respect for human rights is protected by the Brazilian Constitution and should be a reference for any political decision. As stated in the interview with civil society actors, Article 4 of Brazilian constitution explicitly puts forward foreign policy principles, which are based on normative principles, multilateralism, regional integration and a strong emphasis on peace. The principles that govern the international relations of the Federative Republic of Brazil defined in the Constitution's Article 4 are national independence, the prevalence of human rights, self-determination, non-intervention, equality among states, defense of peace,

peaceful settlement of conflicts, rejection of terrorism and racism, cooperation among peoples for the progress of mankind, and granting of political asylum.²⁰ Therefore, commitment to these norms also means commitment to the constitution.

Brazil's transition to democracy in 1988 and the subsequent political and economic transformations become a critical turning point for the emergence of Brazil as a regional actor. Until the 1990s, key principles of Brazilian foreign policy were the preservation of national sovereignty and non-intervention, which prevented efforts to promote democracy abroad and created a dilemma in Brazilian foreign policy since taking an assertive pro-democracy stance would conflict with the principle of non-intervention (Stuenkel 2013, 343). Cason (2013) also argued that 'Brazil has been particularly meticulous in insisting on the principle of non-interventionism in other countries' affairs', within an overall policy of 'respect for sovereignty and an unwillingness to intervene in, or comment on, the affairs of other countries'. However, by the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the ISI model and transition to a model of competitive integration into the global economy facilitated Brazil's proactive stance, in contrast to low-key position in the context of Cold War (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006, 22-26).

From 1990s onwards, along with domestic political and economic shifts ensued with institutional restructuring, Brazil gradually became responsive to regional and international engagement through an effective multilateral approach. The governing bodies in Brazil started to engage with the region (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, Flemes 2006, Burges 2008). In fact, Brazil's support for involving a reference democracy in the Organization of American States (OAS) traces back to then-President Jose Sarney in the late 1980s (Stuenkel 2012, 344). In the following years, the establishment of MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 was critical in terms of the regional leadership that Brazil claimed. Initially MERCOSUR aimed for an effective and strategic

²⁰ The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 3rd Edition.

restructuring of the Brazil-Argentina relationship during major regional economic difficulties, but later, the organization engaged in issues related to democracy and human rights. In fact, in April 1996 the United States, the OAS, MERCOSUR, and the South American customs union, helped to defend democracy in Paraguay from overthrow by the commander of the armed forces, which urged MERCOSUR to amend its charter to exclude any member country that “abandons the full exercise of republican institutions” (Talbot 1996, 54).

Within this politico-historical context, Brazil has become much more vocal and embraced an active foreign policy towards the 2000s, specifically under two significant presidential terms: First, the Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso between 1995 and 2002, and second, the two terms of administration under the Presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, between 2003 and 2010. Enactment of democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015 emerged as part of their foreign policy activism, which were mainly concentrated on both presidential terms. Opportunities to act incurred by democratic disruptions in the region emerged and Brazil responded by democracy promotion practices. The section below analyses the democratic disruptions in the region between 2000 and 2015, corresponding to the late period of Cardoso’s presidency, Lula’s presidency and Rousseff’s early period of presidency, which resulted in democracy promotion enactment in the given time period.

3.2. Democracy Promotion Between 2000 and 2015: Empirical Implications

Democracy promotion in the Brazilian foreign policy has been a debated concept. Motivations stemming from strategic or normative commitments underlying democracy promotion were subtle, which made it difficult to claim that Brazil has a genuine interest in democracy promotion.²¹ In retrospect, even though Brazil sought to promote democracy and development assistance as part of its

²¹ Interview at Conectas, February 2016

foreign policy activism in the region since the 1990s, it has yet to show consistency in democracy promotion. In fact, there are critical views in the literature with respect to democracy promotion in Brazilian foreign policy. For example; Burges and Daudelin (2007) argued that “Brazil has not behaved consistently in support of democratic norm enforcement”, Burges (2008, 65) argued that actions to preserve democracy have been “tepid” and Piccone (2011, 140) contended that Brazil has been “ambivalent and often unpredictable” in external democracy support. For example, Brazil remained silent in terms of promoting or defending democracy after the military coup in Suriname in 1990, which corresponded to the Presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92). Brazil disregarded military intervention in Suriname due to economic interests; remained silent in 1992 over a political crisis in Ecuador and abstained from Security Council Resolution 940 in 1994, authorizing the use of force in Haiti to reinstate President Aristide, who had been removed from power in 1991 through a coup (Stuenkel 2012, 343).

The following table presents the disruptions in domestic political settings in the region between 2000 and 2015 onwards and maps Brazil’s democracy promotion efforts towards these political crises. The purpose of this analysis is to descriptively demonstrate whether Brazil’s responses to crises can be counted as a principled promotion of democracy.

Table 3.1. Democratic Disruptions and Democracy Promotion Efforts of Brazil, 2000-2015

Country	Date	Disruption	Target	Instrument
Peru	2000	Electoral Disputes	PP	D
Ecuador	2000/2001	Military Coup	GI	D
Ecuador	2005	President ousted	GI	D
Bolivia	2003/2005	President ousted	GI	D
Paraguay	2000	Coup Attempt	GI	D, C
Paraguay	2012	President ousted	GI	D, C
Honduras	2009	President ousted	GI	C, D
Venezuela	2002	Coup Attempt	GI	D
Venezuela	2012	Coup Attempt	GI	D

*Instrument: Diplomacy (D), Intervention (I), Assistance (A), Conditionality (C)
Target: GI (Governing Institutions), PP (Political Process)*

The table shows the political crises that occurred in the region and Brazil's response to the crises between 2000 and 2015, which were mainly related to the governing institutions and political processes. One may question whether democracy promotion is enacted only in the emergence of democratic disruptions. The answer is; that since Brazil historically pursued non-intervention principle in foreign policy, the governing elites refrained from any political action that may be perceived as interference to the domestic politics of third countries. Therefore, democracy promotion efforts emerged reactively, as a response to democratic disruptions, always in line with two fundamental principles of Brazilian foreign policy: respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Enshrined principles of preservation of national sovereignty and non-intervention create a dilemma in the analysis of democracy promotion in Brazilian foreign policy, as it brings tension against attempts to advocating self-determination and defending human rights internationally (Stuenkel 2013, 343). Therefore, the prevalence of non-intervention and sovereignty in Brazilian foreign policy has deemed a source of policy incoherence, despite democracy promotion actions by Brazil, which are enacted as a response to democratic disruptions in the region.²² Santiso (2003, 343) defined this as an inherent tension between democratic commitment and democratic engagement.

Although the democracy promotion enactment by Brazil is positive in each case, an in-depth analysis underpins that not all democracy promotion enactment is pursued consistently. Amongst these cases Paraguay (2012) stands out as an emblematic case for democracy promotion enactment by Brazil, whereas Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2002, 2012) demonstrate limited democracy promotion despite the opportunity to enact democracy promotion. Therefore, these three cases are chosen as subjects of within case comparison for the enactment of democracy promotion by Brazil. The reason for this choice is two-fold: First, considering that

²²Interview at Conectas February 2016.

all of the above cases are chosen on the positive value of dependent variable - that is the enactment of democracy promotion - it is observed that Paraguay has a symbolic situation in the literature due to the use of diplomacy and conditionality as instruments of democracy promotion towards disruption in governing institutions stemming from the ousting of president. Contrary to Paraguay, the observable implications in the case of Peru showed that Brazil's democracy promotion was limited, which makes it a control case in terms of democracy promotion. Therefore, it is important to examine this case in depth in order to understand why democracy promotion enactment remained limited despite the possibility to enact democracy promotion due to democratic disruption stemming from electoral disputes in 2000. Finally, the case of Venezuela demonstrated that while Brazil enacted democracy promotion as a response to coup attempt in 2003, Brazil's enactment of democracy promotion in 2015 remained limited. Thus, the second reason is that; inclusion, rather than omission of control cases of Peru 2000 and Venezuela 2012 would help the analysis to identify the contextual features that otherwise cannot be observed, and to explain the motives of democracy promotion enactment by understanding why democracy promotion enactment remained limited despite the presence of opportunity to enact.

3.2.1. Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective: Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela

3.2.1.1. Promoting Democracy in Paraguay

The promotion of democracy by Brazil towards Paraguay traces back to a political crisis that emerged in 1996, corresponding to the presidency of Cardoso. The democratic disruption in Paraguay on 22-24 April 1996 was deemed a milestone for shaping Brazil's commitment to democracy promotion in the region (Valenzuela 1997, 1999). Moreover, the Paraguayan political crisis had also shaped the use of conditionality as a viable policy instrument by the regional organizations, namely the OAS and Mercosur. The engagement of Brazil with Paraguay took place following the 1996 political crisis under the presidency of Cardoso, to prevent the

breakdown of governing institutions by a military coup. Cardoso activated diplomacy through conditionality leveraged by Mercosur and the OAS and diplomatically pressured General Lino Oviedo not to undertake a coup d'état against then-President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (Stuenkel 2013, 344).

The political crisis in Paraguay emerged as an institutional crisis stemming from a political confrontation between President Juan Carlos Wasmosy and General Lino Oviedo. General Oviedo played a crucial role leading a chief role in planning and executing the 1989 coup which ended the dictatorship and culminated in the process of democratic transition. Yet, his ambitious role during the democratization process never ceased and manifested itself with constant involvement in party politics and national affairs.

The Unit for the Promotion of Democracy under the auspices of the OAS organized a Democratic Forum titled “The 1996 Institutional Crisis in Paraguay”. During that meeting, the Representative of the Government of Paraguay, Senator Carlos Podesta, had defined the political crisis as the opponency between the governing elites in the governing institutions. Podesta was quoted as saying:

“The pressure mounted by Oviedo to prevent internal elections in the National Republican Association (Colorado Party), his opposition to plans for governmental reform, and his constant meddling in government affairs outside his purview eventually became too much for the President to tolerate. Finally, President Wasmosy summoned him and informed him of his decision to retire him, in the presence of the commander of the armed forces, General Silvio Rafael Noguera. From that moment on, General Oviedo resisted compliance with the order by various means” (OAS 1996).

The response of newly established Mercosur, of which Paraguay is a founding member, was critical in demonstrating their commitment to democratic norms. Regarding the attitude of Mercosur, César Gaviria, Secretary-General of the OAS was quoted,

“Mercosur and the swift action of its presidents, foreign ministers, and some of their military played a key deterrent role in this crisis...It was absolutely critical to the peaceful conclusion and to General Oviedo’s finally relinquishing command of his troops and requesting his retirement from active duty” (OAS 1996).

As a response to this political crisis, the Cardoso government pursued a multilateral approach. The continuation of market liberalization policies and expanding bilateral trade and economic relations had critical importance. Any disruption in governing institutions could have an adverse economic impact not only for Brazil individually but also regionally. To trigger a regional reaction, Brazil advocated the promotion of democratic commitment by using conditionality as an instrument through Mercosur. Through enforcement of conditionality, Brazil sought to uphold with non-intervention principle, while pursuing promoting and defending democracy simultaneously.

Regarding the reaction of Mercosur to the institutional crisis, then Ambassador Antonio Mercader, permanent Representative of Uruguay to the OAS was quoted saying,

“Paraguay’s trading partners warned those who were encouraging the coup that, if they were to succeed in their design, Paraguay would suffer sanctions that might entail its exclusion from MERCOSUR’s basic agreements...The most important of these is the revival of the old quarrel between the now-irresistible democratic principles and the classic principle of nonintervention...The pro-democratic and peacemaking intervention of a regional economic bloc in the internal affairs of one of its members may occur again in the future and create a certain amount of confusion, especially regarding the limits, forms, and requirements of such intervention” (OAS 1996).

The 1996 crisis was significant in the sense that the balance between the non-intervention principle and defense and the promotion of democracy was facilitated through seeking a multilateral approach by using conditionality as an instrument. Using conditionality, Brazil was able to respect the nonintervention principle while at the same time could pursue the promotion and defense of democracy. Moreover, Brazil exercised a benevolent regional leadership role by pursuing a multilateral approach not only for the sake of the region as far as stability is concerned but also for Brazil's geostrategic concerns stemming from economic and security interests. In fact, Valenzuela (1997, 1999) arguably claimed that Brazilian diplomacy was motivated by protecting its economic interests.

3.2.1.1.1. Disruption in Governing Institution: Impeachment of Fernando Lugo in 2012: Target and Instrument of Democracy Promotion by Brazil

Democracy promotion efforts in Paraguay continued under the presidency of Lula. In 2012, Fernando Lugo was impeached by the Paraguayan Congress, on the basis of failure in performance of duties. The impeachment of Lugo was significant because Lugo's election ended decades of one-party rule. In other words, power transition from one party to another was achieved through peaceful political processes for the first time in the country's history. Therefore, the impeachment of Lugo is closely related to governing institution in Paraguay; which also makes the target of Brazilian democracy promotion towards governing institutions. In response to the impeachment of Lugo, the government of Brazil declared that;

“The Brazilian Government condemns the summary proceeding to impeach the President of Paraguay, decided on 22 June, in which the full right to defense was not adequately granted. Brazil considers that such a procedure compromises a fundamental pillar of democracy, which is an essential condition to regional integration” (Itamaraty 2012).

Similar to the case of 1996 crisis, Brazil maintained its multilateral approach, this time through UNASUR. UNASUR condemned what was widely

seen as a ‘constitutional coup’. In 2012, during the presidency of Dilma Rousseff, Brazil, together with Uruguay and Argentina, proposed the suspension of Paraguay from UNASUR as well as Mercosur, both of which have rules in support of democratic governance and, led by Brazil, approved the suspension of Paraguay from both organizations. Before the suspension of Paraguay from UNASUR, the government of Brazil declared that;

“MERCOSUR and UNASUR members are assessing the appropriate measures to be taken pursuant to the breach in the democratic order in Paraguay, in light of regional agreements on democracy. The Brazilian Government underscores that no harmful measures to the fellow people of Paraguay will be taken. Brazil reaffirms that democracy was an achievement that required the effort and sacrifice of the countries in the region, and thus must be unwaveringly upheld” (Itamaraty 2012).

Using negative conditionality as a policy instrument, Brazil was able to respond to anti-democratic efforts in the region, prioritizing the defense of governing institutions and political processes. As illustrated in the 1996 and 2012 crises, Brazil consolidated its defense and democracy promotion policies through effective use of multilateralism under regional organizations and by institutionalizing conditionality, with the aim to sustain collective security, economic integration, and democracy promotion. In addition to that Brazil also provided structural funds albeit in an asymmetrical way, which arguably did not ensure political stabilization²³. By urging democratic clauses in regional organizations, Brazil led the regional commitment to democracy promotion, which also strengthened its regional role. When Brazil used negative conditionality by suspending Paraguay’s membership from the Mercosur and UNASUR, the OAS and the US did not align with Brazil. In fact, the then President Franco of Paraguay believed that the reason for Paraguay’s suspension is not democratic disruption in

²³ Interview with Conectas, 2016.

Paraguay, but rather, the chance to integrate Venezuela as a full member of Mercosur, a decision that Paraguay's Senate had not been approving (Feldmann et al 2019, 460). The decision was questioned in Paraguayan domestic politics which was followed by increasing nationalist sentiments and disputing Mercosur's instrumentalization by Brazil as a hegemonic power (Lambert 2016a, 39).

3.2.1.2. Promoting Democracy in Peru

Since the end of the Cold War, Peru's volatile domestic political issues caused disruptions in the well-functioning of democratic institutions. A major political crisis in Peruvian political history stemmed from a disruption in election process in 2000, which gave an opportunity to act for defense and promotion of democracy by Brazil, yet efforts to do so remained limited in its scope compared to the case of Paraguay. In order to understand the nature of the 2000 crisis, the background features need to be acknowledged, which traces back the analysis to the political disruption in governing institutions in 1992. Both instances took place under the incumbency of President Alberto K. Fujimori.

Democratization process in Peru during the post-Cold War period was volatile and very much disputed. It faced a breakdown that took place on 5 April 1992, when President Alberto K. Fujimori terminated the Congress, suspended the constitution and purged the judiciary in a military-backed self-coup, also known as *autogolpe*²⁴ (Levitsky 1999). Announcing his decision in a televised speech, Fujimori declared that; "The country cannot continue to be weakened by terrorism, drug trafficking and corruption," and that "the political corruption and the infiltration have reached such a degree that it can be found in all levels and rulings of the judicial power." (The New York Times 1992). In reaction to autogolpe, Brazil had a quiet approach advocating that taking an action would be considered intervention to internal politics of Peru. Brazil only responded with a declaration

²⁴ On the autogolpe see Cameron (1997), Stokes (1996).

that expressed its expectation that Peru would return to constitutional order without resorting to authoritarian tendencies (Burgess and Daudelin 2007, 116).

Even though Brazil did not take any firm reaction with respect to promoting democracy and that Brazil's reticence is rather ambivalent, Brazil's reaction was in fact consistent with its non-intervention principle. While in the Paraguayan case Brazil opted for a regional mechanism through MERCOSUR, in the case of Peru in 1992, Brazil held a benign approach because a collective regional mechanism was not yet consolidated. Nevertheless, Brazil's benign approach stimulated a regional reaction and invoked the mechanisms of regional organizations. In fact, the Rio Group responded by suspending Peru's membership and the OAS invoked Resolution 1080 and summoned member states to issue a resolution against Fujimori antidemocratic actions (Legler, 2003, 62; Levitt 2006, 103).

3.2.1.2.1. Disruption in Political Process: 2000 General Elections

For 2000 general elections, the candidacy of Fujimori, who was elected in 1990 and reelected in 1995, caused political volatility regarding the legitimacy of his presidency for a third term. As stated in the OAS report, the reason of this political volatility was rooted in the 1993 Constitution that came after 1992 autogolpe, requiring that the presidential term began in 1990 should not be regarded as the first one, although it came under the preceding Constitution (OAS 2000).

3.2.1.2.2. Target and Instrument of Democracy Promotion by Brazil

The question of legitimacy for Fujimori's presidency was not the only issue that prevailed during the 2000 elections. In addition to that, the main concerns in the 2000 election process in Peru focused on the electoral process and media freedom, arguing that the state's financial resources were directed in the Fujimori's electoral campaign, and opposition candidates had lack of access to the mass media, particularly public television networks (OAS, 2000). In the disputed first round elections Fujimori won just under 50% of the vote, which would have yielded in

the second round; however, the main opposition leader, Alejandro Toledo, withdrew from the second round due to electoral fraud and Fujimori refused to postpone the second round, despite recommendations to do so by international observers (Conaghan 2001, Cooper and Legler 2001). While there was almost unanimity that it would have been best if the second round of elections had been postponed, a North-South divide emerged around the legitimacy of the election; as the United States immediately questioned Fujimori's victory, assembling a 31 May meeting of the OAS to consider applying Resolution 1080, which automatically excludes nondemocratic states from the organization (Burgess 2009, 136).

However, Brazil refrained from taking quick actions and advised the OAS for preserving the balance between protecting democracy and respecting sovereignty (Levitt 2006, 109). Brazil was not in favor of implementing Resolution 1080, as statements by the President Cardoso suggested that respect for sovereignty throughout the region might erode and result in interference; as the then director-general of Itamaraty's Americas Department assured this position, stating that there was a sense that these bodies - OAS or NGOs acting as reference sources - were becoming the main actors to the detriment of Peru's democratic development (Burgess 2009, 136). Itamaraty's main concern was that the Peruvian case might set an example for dissatisfied states to cancel elections viewed as unfavorable to their interest and would open the door for the role of external influence that Itamaraty's democracy-protection policies were trying to avoid (Burgess 2009, 136). Thus, the reason behind Itamaraty's position was not only to prevent the creation of an interventionist precedent, but also to limit the role of extracontinental actors in state and continental affairs in South America (Burgess 2009, 137). Yet, according to McClintock (2001, 138), election fraud was overlooked by Brazil in part because many regional leaders preferred to maintain their favorable relationship with Fujimori.

Brazil's reaction to this gradually incremented institutional crisis was similar to its reaction to autogolpe in 1992. Brazil embraced a benign attitude during

Fujimori's inauguration and a year later, in 2001, Brazil supported the process of enforcing the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS (Stuenkel, 2013b). The Democratic Charter, signed in 2001 in Lima, Peru, enshrined the defense and promotion of democracy across the region. The charter enshrines representative democracy as a fundamental necessity to maintain regional stability and development, emphasizes that combatting poverty is a crucial instrument in promoting democracy, and reaffirms that the protection of human rights is a fundamental prerequisite for a democracy. The very first Article of the Charter states that "The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas."²⁵

3.2.1.3. Promoting Democracy in Venezuela

The promotion of democracy by Brazil in Venezuela emerged in two consecutive periods. The first period is between 2002 and 2013, which illustrated an aggressive democracy promotion outlook. The year of 2002 marks the coup d'état attempt against Hugo Chavez, which resulted in quick return of Chavez to the presidency as he remained president until his death in 2013. Brazil illustrated an aggressive approach in defending and promoting democracy in Venezuela following the disruption in governing institutions, incurred by the 2002 coup d'état against Chavez, which corresponded to the last period of Cardoso government and the beginning of the Lula's presidential term.

The second period corresponds to 2013 and beyond, which displayed a passive democracy promotion outlook. In this period, political polarization in Venezuela was driven by the opposition in Venezuela against the successor of Chávez, Nicolas Maduro, regarding undemocratic procedures in political processes

²⁵ See Inter-American Democratic Charter, Available at; https://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm

and economic deterioration due to hyperinflation and recession. Regarding democracy promotion by Brazil, this period marks a passive approach and a muted foreign policy, which is in sharp contrast compared to the 2002-2013 period. This period is crucial for the analysis of democracy promotion by Brazil to discover the reasons behind this shifting foreign policy approach.

3.2.1.3.1. Disruption in governing institution: coup d'état attempt against Hugo Chávez in 2002

The analysis of this period will start by a brief historical context leading to the 2002 coup d'état against President Chávez, which would facilitate the understanding of democracy promotion in Venezuela.

On 6 December 1998 presidential elections, Hugo Chávez Frías, a former lieutenant colonel in the Venezuelan army and a leader of one of the failed 1992 coup attempts, was elected president with 62.46% of votes, followed by his main opponent, Henrique Salas Römer with 31.48%.²⁶ Following his appointment, a new constitution in 1999, which was promised by Chávez during his presidential campaign as a “peaceful revolution”, was approved in the referendum on December 15, 1999. The 2002 coup d'état attempt stemmed from this constitutional shift since the opposition argued that the new constitution gave Chávez near-dictatorial power as the senate was eliminated, the president was given power to dissolve the National Assembly under certain circumstances, state intervention in economy was increased, civilian oversight of the military was reduced and soldiers won the right to vote (Rohter 1999).

According to the OAS report, on 11 April 2002, in Venezuela “previously programmed military mechanisms to overthrow the legitimately elected president were activated” (OAS 2002). Political polarization was climbing as there were

²⁶ See Consejo Nacional Electoral.

many casualties. As a consequence, the president was detained and an interim president was appointed to dissolve and abolish the state apparatus including the governing institutions, the constitution, laws pertaining to social and economic rights, and local governing bodies (OAS 2002). However, the coup d'état led by the opposition was not supported by society at large and met a serious reaction. On, 13 April 2002, popular masses assembled to protest the coup and demanded that President Chavez be released. Thus, the coup did not reach its objective and on 14 April 2002, President Chavez returned to his post as the President of Venezuela (OAS 2002).

3.2.1.3.2. Target and Instrument of Democracy Promotion by Brazil in 2002

Brazil's reaction to the attempted coup was solid and quick, using the tools of bilateral diplomacy and multilateral instruments. On 12 April, Itamaraty issued a *communiqué* stating its position on the situation in Venezuela, and calling for a rapid "return to democratic normalcy" (Santiso 2003, 350). The then president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso stated that the de facto government is not legitimate until new elections legitimize the new order, which would restore freedom, respect for the media and societal organizations. Cardoso also stressed the importance of exerting influence on Venezuela on a regional scale. He was quoted, "We have to have a common attitude, based on a presupposition that this continent is democratic and does not accept forced government. There needs to be elections" (Giraldi 2002).

During the last period of the Cardoso government, Brazil upheld the importance of this political crisis for the region as a whole and emphasized the use of a negative conditionality mechanism in order to bring back Venezuela to the functioning governing institutions. The Cardoso government clearly indicated that the disruption in the governing institutions in Venezuela would jeopardize the process of regional integration, thus, suggesting that Venezuela may be suspended from the OAS, the Rio Group, and the Summit of South American Presidents as per

the “democratic clause” as agreed in the meeting held in Brazil, in 2000 (Santiso 2003, 350). With a commitment to the use of regional mechanisms, the Cardoso government had demonstrated its multilateral approach to defending and promoting democracy in Venezuela. Therefore, the political crisis in Venezuela kindled a solid multilateral reaction, in which Brazil played a crucial role. The member states of the Rio Group met in San Jose de Costa Rica on 12 April 2002, opposed the rupture of the constitutional order, and advised a return to the normalcy of democratic governing institutions (OAS 2002). They also requested that a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council be convened in accordance with the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Article 20 (OAS). This political forum met on April 13 in Washington, D.C., and adopted resolution CP/RES. 811 (1315/02) entitled “The Situation in Venezuela,” in which it condemned the alteration of the constitutional order and convened a special session of the General Assembly (OAS 2002). It was followed by resolution AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E02) “Support for Democracy in Venezuela,” in which foreign ministers expressed their “satisfaction at the restoration of the constitutional order and the democratically elected government of President Hugo Chávez Frías in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela” with the return of Chávez to the presidency. They expressed “the determination of the member states to continue applying, without distinction, and in strict accordance with the letter and spirit of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the mechanisms provided for therein for the preservation and defense of representative democracy, reiterating their rejection of the use of violence to replace any democratic government in the Hemisphere.” They supported “the initiative of the Government of Venezuela to convoke immediately a national, all-inclusive dialogue” and urged “all sectors of Venezuelan society to participate and devote their best and most determined efforts to bringing about the full exercise of democracy in Venezuela” (OAS 2002).

Following the return of Chávez to the presidency, Cardoso government continued on exerting democratic pressures to mitigate and prevent further political polarization through diplomatic means. President Cardoso asked President Chávez

to grant amnesty to those responsible for attempting a military coup against his government. Cardoso also defended the governing institutions and reiterated that Brazil is opposed to any process of breaking the constitutional order. He was quoted, “The Brazilian position does not imply value judgment on specific names or conditions, but rather reflects the defense of a principle.” Cardoso also talked about the Venezuelan situation with the presidents of Bolivia, Costa Rica and Chile (Mignone 2002), this way, engaged with regional shuttle diplomacy. During an interview with Financial Times, Cardoso was quoted as saying, “We are pleased that we have collectively overcome the era of coups d’état in the region, and when events in Venezuela have taken the form of a military coup there has been a reaction from everyone” (Folha De S. Paulo 2002). In doing so, Cardoso not only exerted his influence as a regional leader but also enshrined the concerted regional reaction in solidifying defense and promotion of democratic norms through a multilateral approach.

3.2.1.3.3. Disruption in Political Process: 2012 Elections in Venezuela

During the 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, *Ventajismo*, described as “an unfair advantage in favor of the incumbent”, emerged in the 2012 electoral campaign by using state-owned financial resources and state-owned media illegally and manipulating the electoral votes.²⁷ In Venezuela, Brazil was rather reluctant to impose any democratic pressures as far as democratic norms during political processes such as elections are concerned. Stuenkel (2013, 346) explained that Brazil’s democracy promotion efforts remained limited in such cases because economic interests were not adversely affected. Nevertheless, Brazil opted for a multilateral approach. During the meeting of Unasur, then-President Rousseff emphasized the security of political processes and argued for the role of electoral missions as an instrument of democracy promotion by supporting democratic order

²⁷ The Carter Center 2012, Study Mission to the October 7, 2012, Presidential Election in Venezuela, October.

not only in specific cases like Venezuela but also in the region as a whole (Vieira de Jesus 2014, 27).

3.2.1.3.4. Target and Instrument of Democracy Promotion by Brazil in 2012

The 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, with the highest level of participation by 80.52%, won by Chávez, resulted in the intense political contestation and polarization amidst the claims by the opposition that Chávez used state resources for his election campaign.²⁸ The increasing political polarization reached a political stalemate with the death of Chavez in March 2013, which ignited a critical juncture and triggered the beginning of an enduring political crisis. The successor of Chávez who served as vice president, Nicolas Maduro took the office. In the April 2013 elections, Nicolas Maduro won by 1.6% margin against the opposition candidate Henrique Capriles. Even though the opposition demanded recount, claiming election fraud, the Election Commission rejected it saying that the results were irreversible (Watts 2013).

Brazil ignored the anti-democratic procedures during the 2012 elections and ignored the voice of the opposition in Venezuela, which marked the ascent of political polarization and instability. It is argued that the Brazilian governments did not respond with a principled commitment to the Venezuelan opposition, thus Lula and Dilma did not promote democracy, with their particularistic interest to protect the interests of Brazilian companies in Venezuela (Briceno-Ruiz 2016, 169). Thus, the case of Venezuela demonstrates incoherency within itself in terms of enactment of democracy promotion.

²⁸ The Carter Center 2012, Study Mission to the October 7, 2012, Presidential Election in Venezuela, October.

3.3. Why did Brazil Enact Democracy Promotion? A Theoretical Analysis

The empirical observations derived from the cases of Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela suggest that there are both similarities and differences in terms of democracy promotion enactment by Brazil.

First, Brazil's democracy promotion mainly concentrated on targets of governing institutions and to a lesser extent, political processes, mainly through the instruments of diplomacy and conditionality. Second, the principle of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty has often clashed with democracy promotion enactment and the said principles have prevailed. Therefore, Brazil opted for conditionality as an instrument if and when applicable, in order to enact democracy promotion towards disruptions of democracy in its neighborhood. Third, Brazil pursued democracy promotion, albeit in an inconsistent fashion. As in the case of Venezuela, while Brazil enacted democracy promotion as a response to coup attempt in 2003, Brazil's enactment of democracy promotion in 2012 remained limited. This section aims to explain what motivated Brazil to enact democracy promotion in each case.

Based on the shared assumption with Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism would argue that the increase in Brazil's relative power at the regional level would define and determine its foreign policy behavior, thus would explain the democracy promotion enactment between 2000 and 2015. Scholars argued that Brazil's regional power has gradually increased in the given period. For example; according to Spektor (2009), starting from the 2000s, sustained economic growth, decreasing levels of social inequality, increasing income per capita compared to India, China and Russia, and growing trade and investment ties with the US contributed to Brazil's increasing regional power.

As South America's largest state in terms of its material capabilities defined by population, territory, GDP, and military expenditures, sustained economic

growth marked Brazil between 2000 and 2015 (Ebert and Flemes 2018, 11). As Ikenberry (2011, 344) argued, the liberal international order created favorable conditions for rising states to navigate in the international order and find incentives to attain their economic and political interests. Not only norms relating to the use of overt and covert force such have shifted, but also the economic developments to due financial crisis and global economic recession experienced in the 2000s, positioned rising states with incentives to reform and strengthen regional and global institutions, for a greater voice in the governance of liberal international order (Ikenberry 2011, 224). Foreign Secretary of Britain, William Hague, acknowledged that economic power and economic opportunity were shifting toward Brazil, India, China and other significant economies such as Turkey and Indonesia (Hague 2010). Specifically, since 2005, Latin America as a region performed steady levels of economic growth through their trade and investment linkages, by which they countered against the relative economic weight of the United States in the region; especially during the financial crisis in 2008 (Legler 2012, 862). In addition, in 2007, with the discovery of new petroleum reserves larger than what Venezuela possessed, Brazil's material capability would increase while in 2008, Brazil became a net energy exporter, announcing plans to join OPEC (Armijo and Burges 2010, 22). The discovery of major oil reserves acted as a factor that facilitates the transformation of Brazil into an emerging actor in energy politics together with Venezuela and Bolivia (Legler 2012, 862), and situated Brazil amongst the top ten oil producers in the world (Brian, 2010).


Between 2000 and 2015, power shifts at the international level resulted in relative increase in material and economic capabilities of Brazil. In parallel with Neoclassical Realism, the analysis starts with an assessment of the regional distribution of power between 2000 and 2015 to define Brazil's relative possession of material capabilities. I concur with Stewart-Ingersoll and Fraizer (2012, 54) to make a holistic assessment of system polarity to understand regional distribution of power and Brazil's relative power in terms of material capabilities in the period between 2000 and 2015, in the regional security complex the country is situated in.

In fact, assessing the regional polarity facilitates our analysis to identify which states are more likely to shape a regional security order as well as the specific material constraints the country would possess (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 67). In addition to that, assessing the material capabilities region-wise would help analyze the extent of Brazil's regional power in terms of material capabilities. The following variables are analyzed below for this purpose: a) relative population size b) GDP c) National Material Capability Index from the Correlates of War (CoW) Project d) SIPRI military expenditure database. Based on this data, I concur that between 2000 and 2015, South America is characterized by a unipolar regional distribution of power, with high concentration of material capabilities within one state, Brazil.

3.3.1. Brazil's Relative Power in a Unipolar Region between 2000 and 2015

According to the 2015 World Bank Population data, Brazil's population of 204,471,759 million people accounts for 45,7% of the countries subject to comparison and 32,8% compared to the overall population of Latin America and the Caribbean Region. The next largest state in terms of population is Mexico with 121,858,251 million people. Brazilian territory makes up 48 percent of the South American land area and is over three times the size of the next largest state; Argentina (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 62).


Figure 3.1. Population Total in Comparative Perspective



Source: The World Bank, Population, total.

Brazil's economy is also the largest amongst the countries subject to comparison. The figure below shows that Brazil has possessed its economic lead over the rest of the countries of the South American region throughout the 2000–2015.

Figure 3.2. GDP in Comparative Perspective




Source: The World Bank

The Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score, measures the national power of a given country based on six different factors such as; demographic (total and urban population), economic (iron and steel production and energy consumption), and military (expenditure and personnel) (Singer et al. 1972), and illustrates the relative increase of Brazil's national capability compared to its regional competitors. The CINC represents capabilities that allow states to shape and influence the regional security complex that they are situated in and is used to identify the structure of system polarity (James and Brecher 1988; Lemke, 2010).

The figure below compares the CINC data between 2000 and 2015 in comparison with Argentina and Mexico; two countries of which are deemed closest rivals of Brazil in terms of regional leadership, and Venezuela and Colombia. The figure illustrates that in the given time period, Brazil ranked higher in terms of sum of national material capabilities compared to Argentina and Mexico.


Figure 3.3. National Material Capabilities in Comparative Perspective



Source: The Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities Data Version 6.0


Brazil is also ahead of Argentina and Mexico, in terms of military expenditures by share of GDP between 2000 and 2015. Despite the higher percentage of military expenditure by share of GDP by Colombia, the military expenditure in USD shows that Brazil leads the rest of the countries

Figure 3.4. Military Expenditure by Share of GDP (2000-2015)



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 3.5. Military Expenditure in USD



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Taking the above variables into consideration, South America has a unipolar structure, with Brazil's lead over the rest of the regional security complex in the period between 2000 and 2015, as a result of the relative increase in power in terms of distribution of capabilities. In the given time period, an increase in relative power vis-à-vis other actors in the region pushed decision-makers to redefine their foreign policy approaches toward foreign policy activism. In fact, it is observed that at the beginning of the 2000s, decision-makers responded to the unipolar structure of the region by an orientation toward foreign policy activism in foreign policy, which began with the presidency of Cardoso and continued under the presidencies of Lula and Rousseff.

In fact, it is argued that Cardoso and Lula administrations capitalized on precedent principles in foreign policy and reoriented Brazil's approach by reproducing innovative responses to Brazil's shifting positioning in the international system (Cason and Power 2009, 11). While the Cardoso government aimed to exert Brazil's influence over the region, Lula aimed to transcend this influence not only through the region but also through a wider group of developing countries (Burgess 2014, 294). Although the primary foreign policy principles as stated in the 1988 Constitution have not changed drastically, a foreign policy paradigm shift was observed between both presidencies. It is argued that Cardoso's

primary foreign policy paradigm was ‘Pragmatic Institutionalism,’ which emphasized the gradual opening of the Brazilian economy to the global market and multilateralism as a legitimation strategy. In contrast, the Lula government embraced an ‘Autonomist’ paradigm stressing the importance of South-South cooperation extending to South America (Valença and Carvelho 2014, 72). As part of the autonomist paradigm, Brazil started to engage in democracy promotion and defend normative principles relating to human rights, peace, and non-proliferation (Fonseca Jr. 1998, 374). According to Fonseca (1998, 368), autonomy in foreign policy was “a desire to influence the open agenda with values that translate diplomatic tradition and capacity to see the international order with one’s own eyes and fresh perspectives.” Thus, the search for autonomy has become a fundamental principle in Brazilian foreign policy, specifically under Lula (Saraiva 2014, Lehmann 2017).

Foreign policy activism started with the Cardoso government (1995-2002) through engagement with regional policies aiming to diffusion democratic norms and development. Lafer (2001, 81) argued that Brazil used development in foreign policy as a means to diminish the asymmetrical power. This foreign policy approach became more vocal under the Lula government (2003-2010), with the idea of promoting democracy and the development model of Brazil throughout the unipolar regional security complex.

Along with significant changes in the international order, Brazil has become an active player in establishing international order under the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula, adopting an objective to democratize globalization, which has become the impetus of Brazilian foreign policy (Cervo 2010, 9). This foreign policy orientation continued under the Rousseff administration. Albeit the region is characterized by unipolarity, the Defense White Paper published under the presidency of Dilma Rousseff in 2012 emphasized the multipolarity of the international order. According to the Defense White Paper (2012, 34), the multipolar structure of international order “refers to the coexistence of several

centers of power in the international system, each influencing the other's actions" and argued that cooperation through multilateral coordination mechanisms should prevail over conflicts and "Brazil must contribute with actions and opinions in favor of a multipolar and cooperative environment, by its historical defense of international law." Regional stability is also considered a "national objective" because "a country's security is affected by the degree of instability in the region where it is located" thus, consensus, political harmony, and convergence of action the region-wise would make the region more robust, which are factors that motivate to cooperate in the region, including in the military area (Defense White Paper 2012, 37). As much as the emphasis was put on multipolarity, the unipolar regional order led by Brazil resulted in governing elites' perception that Brazil's stability would eventually positively impact regional prosperity. To quote the Defense White Paper, "Brazil's stability and prosperity reinforce its security and produce positive effects on all South American nations" (Defense White Paper 2012, 37). Thus, between 2000 and 2015 multipolar structure of international order pushed decision-makers in Brazil to claim regional leadership within a unipolar regional security complex. The claim for regional leadership stems from decision-makers' view of Brazil's material and ideational capabilities. This way, the regional distribution of power was translated at the state-level through the role decision-makers' claimed for Brazil. The below section uses Breuning's Role Theory to offer a role-based analysis for the enactment of democracy promotion.

3.3.2. Brazil as a Pro-democratic Regional Leader between 2000 and 2015

According to Breuning (2011), ideational and material sources contribute to the formation of national-role conception, which results in a role enactment. Referring to Breuning's model (2011, 26), ideational source includes decision maker's perception of a state's identity, cultural heritage, domestic audience whereas material source refers to decision maker's perception of a state's capability and opportunity to act.

The material and ideational sources contribute to the definition of a role conception which can be related to an issue area or a geographic domain. It is by this role conception that role enactment occurs, which can broadly be defined as a foreign policy behavior. According to this argument, on the one hand, the system-based analysis in the previous section provides that the possessed material capabilities and opportunities to act incurred by democratic disruptions enabled Brazil to define a national role conception as the leader of a unipolar regional security complex in South America within the given time period.

As discussed above; these material capabilities are composed of the population, the CINC, military expenditures and GDP in relative terms. In addition, the opportunities to act in terms of enacting democracy promotion was enabled by the disruptions in governing institutions or political processes in Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. On the other hand, politico-cultural heritage and Brazil's identity as a pro-democracy regional leader developed under Cardoso and Lula governments constituted the ideational sources that define the role conception. In fact, as the historical analysis illustrates, the political leadership with presidential-led diplomacy shaped Brazil's foreign policy gradually since its independence and incorporated democracy in the country's constitutional framework while consolidated respect for sovereignty and non-intervention principles when promoting democracy. At the same time, collective regional mechanism was a key in solving regional disputes. Therefore, decisionmakers viewed Brazil as a pro-democracy regional leader which respects non-intervention and sovereignty. The following table sorts out the combination of material and ideational sources that culminated in the pro-democracy regional leadership between 2000 and 2015.

Table 3.2. Pro-Democratic Regional Leadership Role of Brazil between 2000 and 2015

Pro-Democratic Regional Leadership Role of Brazil between 2000 and 2015		
Material	capability	unilateral positioning vis-a-vis other regional actors
	opportunity to act	democratic disruptions in Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000), Venezuela (2002,2012)
Ideational	identity	pro-democracy and developmentalist
	cultural heritage	historical legacy of multilateralism and adherence to collective regional mechanism, politico-historical ties

Brazil's role conception as pro-democratic regional leader resulted in Brazil to enact the promoting democracy as a foreign policy outcome. Democracy promotion is used as an instrument of foreign policy between 2000 and 2015 to affirm their role as regional leader and to preserve their regional power. Two presidents played an important role in shaping Brazil's role as regional leader between 2000 and 2015: Cardoso and Lula. Thus, their definition of Brazil as regional leader based on ideational and material sources, in response to democratic disruptions resulted in enactment of democracy promotion. In other words, the underlying reason for democracy promotion enactment was to preserve and maintain Brazil's regional leadership role, as defined by the Cardoso and Lula governments. Therefore, the governing elites' claim for Brazil's regional role results in promotion of democracy as a foreign policy behavior, which is motivated by geostrategic commitments. To this end, in what follows, regional role conception under the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula is analyzed. The analysis is followed by motives of democracy promotion in cases of Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.

3.3.2.1. Regional Role Conception in Foreign Policy between 2000 and 2015: Cardoso and Lula Governments

The argument put forth in this dissertation according to the role-based hypothesis is that Brazil's role conception as regional leader motivated the country to enact democracy promotion. This way, democracy promotion became a viable instrument of foreign policy, between 2000 and 2015 that serves to affirm their role as regional leader and as an instrument to preserve their regional power.

The different roles Brazil assumed during the given time period is often emphasized in the literature as well. For example; Armijo and Burges (2010, 27) argued that although indirectly, Brazil has become a regional peacemaker and conciliator. Valença and Carvalho (2014, 77) argued that Brazil's elites perceived their country as holding a distinctive status compared to other Latin American countries and believed that further involvement with peace and war issues would enhance its international position. In this dissertation, I argue that Cardoso and Lula governments conceived of Brazil as a pro-democracy regional leader. In fact; Brazil was ready to assume leadership; displayed the necessary material and ideational capabilities for regional power projection; and was highly influential in regional affairs; was economically, politically and culturally well interconnected within its region; provided the collective goods of relative stability and security as well as regional infrastructure; operated an ideational leadership project based on the protection of democracy, economic growth and regionalized responses to the challenges of globalization; and its leadership was accepted by most of the region (Flemes and Lemke 2010, 324). This role conception which led to democracy promotion enactment as a foreign policy outcome, is manifested in foreign policy approaches of two presidents: Cardoso and Lula.

During the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil started to become a regional power with an overt foreign policy approach in the region. In fact, democracy promotion can be understood as a foreign policy instrument within the broader approach of foreign policy activism. Cardoso government contributed

to Brazil's emergence as a regional actor and its foreign policy activism. Cardoso (2007, 359) stated that;

“...a rapidly maturing democracy, an expanding if somewhat volatile economy, and a growing force in international trade. Of course, the best way to change antiquated perceptions was for us to take care of business at home. But our domestic efforts could be complemented by a responsible, active foreign policy.”

Since the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency, who previously served as Minister for Foreign Relations and Finance in 1992 and was re-elected as President in 1998, Brazilian foreign policy has embraced a strong regional orientation with an underlying commitment to strengthening democratic norms at the regional scale (Santiso 2001). The Cardoso government perceived the importance of regional cooperation in order to consolidate Brazil's position at the global level (Saraiva 2010, 157). Thus, the tenures of Cardoso signify the change with regards to reviewing traditional attitudes based on non-intervention and adopting regional leadership aspirations for regional security, stability, and development, which has come to the fore when a democratic regime in the region was under threat (Villa 2004). In this sense, I would argue that during the Cardoso government, Brazil initiated a change towards a foreign policy activism in its regional orientation based on decision-makers' perception of Brazil's possessed material and ideational capabilities. Cardoso government acknowledged a desire for change toward foreign policy activism. In fact, Cardoso was able to achieve elite unity for Brazil's foreign policy activism. According to a survey conducted with members of the foreign policy domain in 2002, two terms of the Cardoso government indicated that there was an elite consensus for Brazil to play an active and influential role at the international level (de Lima and Hirst 2006, 25). Hence, backed up by governing elites' consensus, the Cardoso administration laid the domestic institutional foundations for the enactment of democracy promotion in its foreign policy activism. For example; the first National Human Rights Program was released by the Federal government in 1996, the Department of Human Rights and

Social Issues was established by the Foreign Ministry, in 1997 the Presidency's Special Secretariat for Human Rights was founded, in 1998, the government recognized the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and in 2000 Brazil was among the signatories of the International Criminal Court of Justice and ratified it in 2002 (Milani 2015, 71). In addition, the Cardoso government activated the already existing institutional arrangements with the aim to expand its regional influence driven by geostrategic and economic motivations. In fact, Brazil linked economics with security and consequently, its foreign policy actions have involved initiatives that focus on the connection between the two, as also illustrated in its interest in the stability of the South American economic system and its vital natural resource base in Amazon region (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2002, 170). For example, Brazil invigorated the Amazon Pact created in 1978 by a group of states between Brazil and its Amazon neighbors and developed cooperation, which was seen as suspicious by Argentina and Chile while supportive by Venezuela and Bolivia (de Lima and Hirst 2006, 30). Brazil's initiatives to develop trade cooperation in the region have met by the self-image pro-democratic leadership role in regional crises. A major issue during the Cardoso government was the territorial issue between Peru and Ecuador, which demonstrated Brazil's principled idealism as to the maintenance of constructive relations in the region as a mediator to resolve this century-old border dispute (Alden and Vieira 2005, 1084). Brazil founded the resolution upon the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol, signed after the conflict along the frontier in 1941, and established a definite boundary between the two states thanks to the concerted mediation between the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States, which are guarantor states (St. John 1977, 329). Therefore, Brazil's role as one of the guarantors of the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol to help creatively resolve the territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador is considered one of the great diplomatic accomplishments of the first term of Cardoso administration (Lafer 2000, 216).

Brazil built a national image as a pro-democracy actor in Latin America, with an emphasis on building intra-regional relations with other governments in the

region (Spanakons and Marques 2014). During the Cardoso period, Brazil attempted to image itself as a benign regional actor assuming a primary role in the resolution of regional crises. The initial strategy by the Cardoso government was in line with a neoliberal approach, promoting cooperation in fields of issue-specific areas. Under the presidency of Cardoso, a new group of governing elites advocating market liberalism and liberal ideas reproduced foreign policy. For example, Brazil was concerned with deepening cooperation in trade and promoting cooperation in infrastructure projects, especially in issue areas of transportation and energy (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 30). In this respect, during the Cardoso government, foreign policy activism was rooted in self-image as a pro-democracy actor, which facilitated the promotion of cooperation in strategically concerned issue-specific areas such as trade or energy. The pro-democracy identity of Brazil can be echoed in the below quote of Cardoso, which also stresses the importance of non-intervention principle when promoting democracy, since democracy cannot have a prescribed model. Cardoso (2001) stated that;

“It is important that the promotion of democracy should be pursued without arrogance or an attempt to impose one’s own will. Democracy should not be confused with the political system of any particular country. It does not have a pre-established model, a recipe to be copied by all nations. Yet democracy does have a set of values that are fundamental and which may not be negotiated away. And it is appropriate that those fundamental values should allow each people to follow, in complete freedom, their own history according to their own decisions, learning from their own mistakes, bringing to maturity and perfecting their institutions and strengthening the various forms of expression of citizenship.”

In his memoirs, Cardoso (2007, 313-314) underlined that he played a significant role in regional disputes; such as the 1998 dispute between Ecuador and Peru. Nevertheless, he also enshrined the principle of non-intervention and use of diplomacy as a soft power instrument to defend democracy.

“Brazil also acted as a mediator in regional disputes. I played a significant role in negotiating the peace treaty that ended a border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. My government also granted exile to several leaders from Paraguay to help end the constant turmoil there. We believed, however, in using “soft power” to expand our influence in the region; we didn’t want to become the new gringos of South America. Brazil operated instead through simple diplomatic channels, employing measures such as sponsoring cultural events at Brazilian embassies abroad. Under my government, Brazil would never attempt to use a heavy hand to become a regional power. I have always believed in the concept of national self-determination, and we refused to meddle in other countries’ affairs.”

Therefore, when Cardoso left the presidency to Lula in 2002, Cardoso had shaped Brazil with a pro-democracy foreign policy identity based on its role as a regional leader. Following Cardoso, Luis Inácio da Silva, known as Lula, with his trade unionist background and influential role in founding the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party), had a remarkable role in shaping Brazilian foreign policy since election to the presidency by the end of 2002. Lula da Silva inherited a legacy which shaped Brazil’s new role in international affairs. The tenure of Lula maintained what the Cardoso administration initiated in the realm of foreign policy, which stressed the notions of regional stability, market liberalization and democratic commitment across the region. Lula’s presidency has not altered the foreign policy realm at a major level. However, Lula’s presidency empowered an elite group that prioritized the underrepresented classes of the society and addressed socioeconomic imbalances not only in Brazil but also across the region. Therefore, the presidency of Lula empowered a previously subordinate elite group who conceived of foreign policy less relevant with their values of eradicating poverty, inequality and social imbalances.

The increasing activism and rhetorical and practical efforts demonstrating Brazil’s growing interest in the region (Spektor 2010, 192), is described by Lula’s foreign minister Celso Amorim (2003) as ‘responsible activism’, regional shuttle diplomacy being a major instrument of regional order. In the same manner, the Lula

administration constructed its regional leadership through means of soft power with underlying strategically driven notions. According to Cervo (2010, 9) three main interest-driven objectives have underlined Brazil's regional leadership under Lula's incumbency: First, was the market liberalism ensuring mutual benefits; the second was the expansion of the Brazilian business sector through trade and globalization, and the third was the military reinforcement to shape the international order. The Lula administration aimed to maintain closer political ties with Argentina, a historic rival, and to improve state-business relations in the region, which spillover in promoting regional political stability; and strengthening global aspirations by consolidating regional support (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006, 30).

The tenure of Lula focused on strengthening multilateralism in the region, revisited the tradition of non-intervention and constructed its regional leadership through means of development cooperation with the aim to enhance Brazil's economic development (Saraiva 2010, 160). The Lula era reformulated foreign policy by preserving principles adopted from its conventional diplomacy, and increasing its multilateral orientation (Cervo 2010, 9). Thus, an important aspect of Lula's foreign policy was the peak of multilateralist²⁹ orientation at the region. In fact, historically, multilateralist orientation in Brazilian foreign policy through multilateral institutions and initiatives was a response to how to best realize its regional power aspirations without threatening neighboring states and directly challenging the great powers (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 195-196). Examples include Brazil's increased efforts to engage in multilateral diplomacy in the pursuit of an entente with Argentina and Chile (Hirst, 2005), Brazil's efforts as US' ally to establish an inter-American system of cooperation among Latin American states, as demonstrated in its support of the Inter American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) in 1947 and the establishment of the OAS in 1948

²⁹ Claude (1958) describes multilateralism as a forum for debate; Ruggie (1992) argues that multilateralism consists of the perception of the indivisibility of threats to the collective, emphasizing the open-ended target of collective responses toward an open or unspecified problem. See Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier (2012) for further discussion on multilateralist orientation.

(Hirst, 2005) or multilateral endeavors, joining the G-77 in 1964 and serving as a negotiator within the UN and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the 1970s to address North–South trade relations (Selcher 1978; as cited in Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 195-196). In doing so; Brazil has sought to move itself and the region away from US influence, and attempted to place itself as the new leader of South America by providing multilateral alternatives to the institutions established by the United States (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 196). The most important example was the establishment of MERCOSUR by the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 signed by Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil, leading to not only multilateral cooperation economically but also politically with respect to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of peace (Smith, 2001; as cited in Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 196). This multilateralist orientation continued under the Lula administration both in its response to democratic disruptions and its foreign policy of South-South cooperation. An example of this approach was the IBSA initiative, launched in June 2003 with India, Brazil, and South Africa, which included a commitment to fundamental democratic institutions and values molded by the principles of South-South cooperation on issue-specific areas such as; development, poverty alleviation, and multilateralism (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006, 25). In this sense, since the inauguration of his term, Lula used effective multilateralism to reinforce actors' role as international negotiators and defend national interests pertaining to socio-political and economic issues. For example, at the Conference of World Trade Organization in Cancun, in 2003, Brazil assertively emphasized the participation of emerging countries in solving trade issues (Cervo, 2010, 9). Brazil has also been a primary actor in the creation of UNASUR and its newly formed South American Defense Council, both of which are involved in the wider goal of resolving problems at the regional level and providing a mechanism by which to ensure peace and stability throughout South America (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2002, 196). Brazil, a country with a unipolar stance in the South American Regional Complex, has historically been using multilateralist orientation towards the region, which has persisted in the period between 2000 and 2015. It is argued that Brazil opted for multilateralist

orientation because first; it cannot accomplish its goals unilaterally, second; multilateralism reduces concerns of a Brazilian bid for hegemony throughout the region and third, multilateralism helps to strengthen its regional influence while simultaneously giving Brazil greater power at the global level (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 196). Also, the use of multilateral initiatives helps to further strengthen group identity as a community of South American nations facilitating the acceptance of generalized principles of conduct (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 197). In this context, democracy promotion enactment became a viable foreign policy through which Brazil was able to use conditionality, thus employ multilateralist orientation which would strengthen its role as a regional leader when democratic crisis occurred in the region and secure its strategic interests at the same time.

A very distinctive element of Lula's foreign policy activism was the emphasis put on alleviating domestic social imbalances in cooperation with states sharing the same principle in their foreign policies (Soares de Lima and Hirst, 2006, 25). Therefore, during the early years of 2000s, Brazil's foreign policy activism rested on strategically driven outlook to foster development and economic objectives at the regional scale. During an interview with the Foreign Policy Office of Conectas, it was stated that Lula's foreign policy was based on human development and emancipation with a component of political stabilization. In foreign policy, development has been the main goal. Lula administration considered foreign policy as a public policy, which had a developmental approach to strengthen South-South cooperation. It is underlined that during Lula's term, room for maneuver and South-South cooperation dimension has prevailed, with the aim to expand active and independent foreign policy, especially with the Foreign Ministry of Celso Amorim.³⁰ In this realm, Brazil used its own model of development cooperation as a capacity-building framework for other South countries, which was

³⁰ Interview at Conectas, February 2016.

an instrument of foreign policy and soft power that defined the regional leadership role of Brazil.

While the Cardoso government aimed at an economic take-off, with Lula coming to power in 2002, Brazil has sought an active foreign policy at the international level and at developing innovative social policies at the domestic level. Especially with the ideological approach of PT, the emphasis was on reducing the income redistribution inequality. For example, the Lula government aimed at curbing social imbalances through social assistance programs and government assistance programs such as *bolça familia*. This social and development policy at the domestic level was transformed also at the international level, which culminated in building a national image as a defender of human development as a regional actor. The claims regarding Lula's self-image as a global champion of the world's poor (Cason and Power 2009, 130) stems from this developmental approach undertaken at the domestic level. During the Lula period, the foreign policy had a strong emphasis on the issues of poverty; hence, foreign policies focused mostly on development goals with emphasis put on South-South cooperation. Lula also underlined this vision. In his speech delivered during the UN General Assembly in September 2004, Lula was quoted as saying; "Brazilian foreign policy, in all its dimensions, seeks to join other nations in efforts aimed at the establishment of a world of justice and peace" and "only an international order based on multilateralism can promote peace and the sustainable development of nations" (Lula da Silva 2014). Foreign policy during the Lula period endorsed a development-oriented outlook coupled with increasing public-private sector cooperation. The interview with the diplomatic mission, the then Consul General of Turkey in Sao Paolo, focused on the efforts of the Lula government to be on good terms with the private sector, defending the private sector's interests as far as the customs were concerned. The customs income earned from the private sector was directed to the assistance programs aimed at alleviating social imbalances in the low classes and improving their social rights. In this respect, Lula's outlook engaged with foreign policy activism for addressing poverty and practically using

state-business relations as an instrument of foreign policy. Lula's foreign policy approach also stressed the importance of an economic framework in the foreign policy decision-making process. During the interview with the then Consul-General of Turkey in Sao Paolo, it was emphasized that, especially with the economic take-off achieved at the beginning of the 2000s, foreign policy has gained an active role, which became more visible in Brazil's leading role in Mercosur.

In this sense, there was no breakthrough from the precedent foreign policy paradigms; but there was a considerable increase in cooperative actions between states with similar capabilities located in different regional contexts, which illustrated the reorientation in foreign policy strategy (Alden and Vieira 2005, 1086). Under Lula administration, Brazil used technology exchange and joint actions with other emerging countries and focused on technical and financial cooperation with other regional actors (Saraiva, 2010, 161). Two important actors emerged in foreign policy. On one hand, the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been conducting those technical cooperation projects in regions such as Africa, South America, and Asia. On the other hand, Brazil could decrease the influence of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank as the region's largest lender and aid donor through Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) (Khanna 2012, 66). Through the active agency of BNDES, Brazil could use policy instruments of assistance, thereby increasing its regional influence (Burgess 2008, 77). Founded in 1952, the goal of the BNDES was to support and promote the development of the domestic private sector through financing investments in infrastructure, heavy industry, and agriculture, but since the early 1990s, BNDES started financing Brazilian companies working in other countries (BNDES 2006; Doctor 2014). In the 2000s, the BNDES started assisting integration models with as Mercosur and Unasur and become the representative of Mercosur in Uruguay in 2009 (BNDES, 2002). The aim of the BNDES is "to offer growing support for the activities of Brazilian companies in South America, broadening strategic commercial ties" (BNDES, 2012, Valença and Carvelho 2014, 85). The interview with civil society

representatives emphasized that BNDES was instrumental in capacity-building policies and acted as an agent of foreign policy that helped Brazil's soft power, development cooperation, and image.³¹

Embracing an active foreign policy also brought responsibility to maintain political stability through the promotion and defense of democratic institutions and values in the region, especially in times of regional crisis. Under Lula, Brazil has intervened in disruptions in different states like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Haiti. Similar to the successful resolution by the Cardoso administrations of a territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru between 1995 and 1998, Lula also took a mediating role in 2002 against a coup attempt against President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (Spektor 2010, 193). In Haiti, Brazil was responsible for The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since 2004. Domestic conflicts in Haiti during February 2004 resulted in a coup d'état, which ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from office and forced him to leave Haiti. When the UN Security Council mandated action in Haiti, Brazil came to the fore to lead a South American force with the most significant military assistance and financial assistance through funding (Spektor 2010, 193). With the leading role undertaken by Brazil in the UN peacekeeping mission, MINUSTAH, Brazil demonstrated the government's commitment to play a stabilizing role in regional conflicts (Alden and Vieira 200, 1085), which were compatible with the mission's larger goal to ensure economic and political stability in the region, an objective also shared by the US democracy promotion. As Brazil's most significant military deployment since World War II, MINUSTAH demonstrated that decision makers in Brazil had reoriented foreign policy though not abandoning its traditional focus on national sovereignty (Spektor, 2012).

Following the end of Lula's presidency, his successor, Dilma Rousseff, served as the country's first female president until her impeachment in 2016. In

³¹ Interview at Observatorio do Sol e Brasil, March 2016.

2003, Lula appointed Rousseff Minister of Mines and Energy. In 2005, Rousseff became the Chief of Staff of the state-owned oil company Petrobras until 2010. She left her post to run for the elections, and on January 1, 2011, Rousseff became the president. In the context of foreign policy making, there were no drastic changes compared to the foreign policy of Lula. Like Lula, Rousseff emphasized “benign multipolarity” or “inclusive multipolarity,” which aims to integrate emerging economies and to develop states into the decision-making mechanisms, achieve fair and equal governance at the global level, and democratize the international system (Jesus 2014, 20).

The comparison of the Cardoso and Lula governments illustrates elements of continuity in governing elites’ understanding of Brazil’s role as a regional leader. In fact, the shifts in international order after the Cold War influenced Brazil’s domestic and international settings. While domestically, Brazil presumably realized its transition to democracy in 1988 and re-structured the institutional mechanisms, internationally, the country sought to achieve a regional role, given its leading status of distribution of capabilities in the region. Thus, Brazil emerged as a regional actor, led governing elites to assume a regional leadership role and adopted foreign policy activism, which had become structured institutionally by the beginning of the post-Cold War context and Cardoso government. Despite the continuity of foreign policy during both presidential terms, both administrations illustrate different degrees of engagement with active foreign policy. For example, it is argued that while the Cardoso government upheld legitimacy and acted within the legitimate framework of bilateral relations, the Lula government extended these boundaries to include unofficial actors in the conduct of foreign policy.³² Despite their considerable differences in the articulation of foreign policy activism, an analysis of the foreign policy of both administrations demonstrates how Brazil evolved into a pro-democratic regional leader, foreign policy activism has been formulated, and defense and democracy promotion has become a part of it.

³² Interview with Cardoso Foundation, March 2016.

In both administrations, two principal trends marked foreign policy-making; the pluralization of actors and presidentially-led diplomacy (Cason and Power 2009, 119). The 1988 constitution triggered the democratization of foreign policy with an inclusive approach to reflect the interests of different state, business, and civil society actors, hence pluralization. According to Doctor (2017, 645), the Brazilian democratization in the late 1980s gave rise to a set of interest groups from different sections of society to influence and shape foreign policy, thus weakening the governments' autonomy. Such pluralization also contributed to the erosion of Itamaraty's monopoly in foreign-policy making. From the 1990s onwards, in Brazilian foreign policy, the role of Itamaraty was weakened as a result of the participation of non-state actors. The pluralization of actors and their agendas to be reflected in the decision-making process was the characteristic element of the redefined foreign policy of Brazil (Soares de Lima 2016). Zilla (2017, 9) argues that pluralization took place at the horizontal and vertical levels; the former refers to the expansion, differentiation, and delegation of specific areas and responsibilities from Itamaraty to other ministries, and the latter refers to the incorporation of civil society actors through dialogue and consultation.

On the other hand, presidentialization, though seems like a contradiction to the pluralization of various actors in decision-making refers to the active involvement of leadership in carrying out foreign policy. Presidentialism in foreign policy-making has become a characteristic of the Cardoso and Lula governments. For example, Cason and Power (2011, 127) argue that Cardoso and Lula effectively used their linkages in carrying out their foreign policies.

Due to pluralization and presidentially led diplomacy, autonomy has emerged as a defining characteristic of foreign policy activism by the end of the Cold War. The autonomists advocated active foreign policy and a developmentalist outlook in foreign policy, prioritizing regional cooperation and multilateralism. Initial reflections of this foreign policy reorientation steered diverging domestic

opinions, as conservatives and political actors opposed the erosion of non-interventionist tradition. At the same time, autonomists or revisionists welcomed commitment and involvement in regional politics (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 32). Autonomists perceived regional integration and cooperation as a means to gain access to other markets or open up new prospects for Brazil's industries abroad and as an instrument that could strengthen Brazil's negotiation power on the economic front (Saraiva 2010, 161). Cardoso government symbolizes the first embodiment of this revisionist and developmental turn in foreign policy. At the onset of the 2000s, while the Cardoso government accelerated regional engagement as a regional actor and used foreign policy for regional stability and security, the Lula government expanded that foreign policy agenda by promoting a development cooperation model throughout the region. Another essential feature of Brazil's role as a regional leader was its multilateralist orientation, which employs collective security mechanisms and means of diplomacy to reconcile regional disputes such as the war between Ecuador and Peru in 1998 (Armijo and Burges 2010, 28). Lula's consensual hegemony erupted in this multilateral orientation, which simultaneously emphasizes the promotion of democracy, economic growth, and development in the region (Flemes and Melke, 2010, 314). Brazil has projected this approach as serving the interest of the area as a whole, yet, Brazil's economic capability increased remarkably through its multilateral commitments in The Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and MERCOSUR, as indicated by Brazilian exports and foreign direct investment in South America (Flemes 2009,175). This multilateral orientation has persisted under Dilma Rousseff. Defense Paper (2012, 37), published during Rousseff's tenure, emphasized that the Union of South American Nations (UNASUL) is a proven instrument for not only the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, the defense of democracy in South America, but also the progressive development of an industrial defense base in South America.

Despite their similarities, the Lula government diverged from Cardoso government. The Cardoso government did not articulate an assertive regional role

due to the tough economic situation that Brazil was going through whereas the Lula government demonstrated a shift towards increasing vocal and forceful regional role in the international system (Burgess 2012, 352). In the economic domain, Cardoso and Lula had similar outlooks. Following Cardoso, Lula pursued policies that stemmed from the IMF agreement and maintained a coalition with center-right partners (Cason and Power 2011, 127). However, the main difference was that Lula government externalized the economic development at the domestic level into the South-South cooperation. In fact, Cardoso channeled the presidentially led diplomacy in its relation to developed countries, especially the United States and Europe, with the main objective to break-up with the *terceiro-mundista* (*third-worldism*) orientation of previous presidents (Almeida 2004, Lins da Silva 2002). In contrast, Lula believed in improving South-South cooperation and used presidential diplomacy as an instrument to cooperate with actors from Asia, Africa and the Middle East (Cason and Power 2009, 122).

Taking into consideration the foreign policy approaches by Cardoso and Lula under which Brazil emerged as a pro-democracy regional leader, the causal mechanism of democracy promotion enactment as to why Brazil promoted democracy is hypothesized as follows: Brazil's relative power vis-à-vis other actors in the region, resulting in a unipolar distribution of power, which was concentrated under the leadership of Brazil. Brazil's relative power was translated at the state level through foreign policy activism. Hence, Brazil's regional power led Cardoso and Lula governments to redefine their foreign policy approach toward a foreign policy activism. As part of their foreign policy activism, Cardoso and Lula governments assumed pro-democratic regional leadership, depending on Brazil's possessed material and ideational capabilities. When democratic disruptions emerged in the region, Brazil enacted democracy promotion with the aim to preserve and maximize its strategic commitments, which were perceived as mutually interdependent with the region's stability and prosperity, and to retain its regional power. The section below examines the underlying strategic commitments that motivated Brazil to enact democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015.

3.3.3. Motives of Democracy Promotion between 2000 and 2015: Geostrategic Commitments in Cases of Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela

A closer reading of Brazil's democracy promotion towards the democratic disruptions in the region illustrates that Brazil has strategic ties with each case delineated as the target of democracy promotion in Table 1.

For example, as a strategic partner of Brazil, the Foreign Ministry stresses the importance of the economic dimension in bilateral relations with Ecuador. The strategic significance of Ecuador is based on the multimodal integration project of the Manta-Manaus Axis, which would increase commercial exchanges and contribute to the economies of the North and Center-West of Brazil, especially at the Manaus Customs Free Zone³³. It is also designed as an alternative to the transportation of goods through the Panama Canal, making Brazilian exports to Asia more competitive. Dialogue and bilateral cooperation with Ecuador are intense, also in areas of migration and education. Two countries work in close coordination to fight against irregular migration networks in the region. Brazil is among the countries that have sent most missions to Ecuador to promote cooperation in social issues, chiefly policies of combat to hunger, extreme poverty, and child malnutrition (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil). Ecuador faced several presidential breakdowns in 1997, 2000, and 2005. In April 2005, to curtail the protests and appease the firing of the Supreme Court due to corruption charges, president Lucio Gutiérrez was forced to leave his post while Brazil granted asylum to ex-President Gutiérrez and prevented the implementation of sanctions by the OAS as Lula pushed for another multilateral forum, Community of South American Nations, to initiate a dialogue between contending political fractions in Ecuador (Burgess and Daudelin 2007, 118).

³³ Manaus Free Trade Zone, located in the center of the Amazon Forest, was designed for the socioeconomic development of the Amazon Region, one of the poorest regions in Brazil, and to step up its political integration into the rest of the country (See Castillo et al. 2018).

Similarly, Bolivia is another case that Brazil attributes priority to its relations. Being Bolivia's primary trade partner, Brazil is the recipient of Bolivian exports of natural gas; economic ties with Brazil have fostered Bolivian development due to Brazil's economic presence in the country in terms of trade surplus, investments, and remittances of immigrants (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The disruptions in Bolivian politics were caused by issues about natural gas and the management of the economy. For example, in 2003, an advocate of free-market policies, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, resigned as president as he was under strong critics due to his policy of exporting natural gas to the United States through a port in Chile, a country that Bolivia has been traditionally in rivalry (Rohter 2003). In 2005, his successor, the then President Carlos Mesa, offered his resignation after 19 months in office in an attempt to bring widespread protests regarding greater state control of natural gas reserves and calls for more independence from some of the country's wealthier provinces (Lennard 2005). Following Mr. Mesa's resignation, Evo Morales took office in 2006, nationalized the oil and gas sector, and expropriated more than 20 private companies in various industries (Neuman 2014). Nationalization of possessions owned by Petrobras in Bolivia resulted in a diplomatic crisis, as it was counterproductive for the economic benefits of Brazil and created duality for Brazil as to either preserving Petrobras or promoting multilateralism at the regional level for all actors (Stuenkel 2016). Brazil's efforts to pursue an active foreign policy in the region met with challenges from Brazil's rivals like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina (Stuenkel 2016). In 2008, Morales faced violent political unrest because of his particularistic efforts to reallocate oil royalties and to manipulate the Constitution to accelerate a land reform specifically addressing the indigenous majority in Bolivia; which led to further polarization as a result of a referendum over Morales' policies, in which Morales was approved by 67% (Romero 2008).

Bolivia has been a significant case that illustrates Brazil's regional leadership. Brazil pursued a multilateral approach in its foreign policy toward

Bolivia. In this context, UNASUR played a crucial role in promoting democracy in Bolivia's constitutional crisis in 2008. While Morales maintained socioeconomic levels through social inclusion, economic growth, and decreasing poverty levels, he also tightened the control over governing institutions and media, dismissing the results of the 2016 referendum, which could have prevented him from a fourth presidential term (Stuenkel, 2017). Lula was actively involved in the negotiation efforts, which tested the Brazilian capability in democracy promotion across the region. Espinosa (2014, 45) argued that Brazil played a crucial role in solving the crisis in Bolivia, using UNASUR as a vehicle. Political stability in Bolivia was a critical objective for Brazil, not only because of geographical proximity, sharing 3,400 kilometers of border, but also because more than half of Brazilian gas consumption depends on Bolivian imports (Breitegger 2015).

In Honduras, on 28 June 2009, the military forces ousted President Manuel Zelaya, who shared ideological affinity with Chavez, after enduring political tensions concerning his efforts to lift the limits on the presidential term. The then President Obama was also deeply concerned and quoted "to respect democratic norms, the rule of law and the tenets of the Inter-American Democratic Charter" and that "any existing tensions and disputes must be resolved peacefully through dialogue free from any outside interference" (Malkin 2009). Conditionality was used to defend and promote democracy in Honduras. Honduras case demonstrated concerted regional action. Then President Zelaya invoked the "self-help" clause, Article 17 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and summoned the OAS for a meeting (Legler 2010, 602). With Resolution 953 (1700/09), the OAS argued that the new government came after it is not recognized. OAS has condemned the coup and asked for "the immediate, safe and unconditional return of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales to his constitutional functions" (OAS 2009). The OAS General Assembly suspended the right of Honduras to participate in the institution in the aftermath of the coup d'état that ousted President Zelaya, and in an ensuing resolution by Secretary-General, José Miguel Insulza, the OAS decided "to reinforce all diplomatic initiatives and to promote other initiatives for the

restoration of democracy and the rule of law in the Republic of Honduras and the reinstatement of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales” (OAS 2009). Brazil defended democracy in Honduras through the instrument of negative conditionality by suspending its aid projects and military cooperation with Honduras, which was followed by canceling a visa-waiver program and increasing diplomatic pressures on the Honduran government to reinstate Zelaya, who met with Lula and then-foreign minister Celso Amorim (Stuenkel 2014). The most critical issue was when Mr. Zelaya and his wife secretly reentered the country and was hosted at the Brazilian embassy on September 21, 2009 along with some 70 supporters, after consultations with the then Foreign Minister Amorim and the then President Lula, however, Brazil’s embassy in Tegucigalpa staged violent protests between Zelaya supporters and opponents. Although Brazil played an effective leadership, the country refused to claim a leadership role as a mediator, arguing that the OAS as a regional collective security mechanism should take the lead (Stuenkel 2014). Strategic interests of Brazil prevailed in defending democracy in Honduras, which are observed in the energy sector. In fact, Lula and Zelaya had developed their cooperation by signing six cooperation agreements on August 6, 2007 and offered Brazil’s assistance in facilitating the exploration of petroleum via the state-owned oil firm Petrobras, in addition to developing hydroelectricity projects. Other cooperative ties between both countries included issue-areas as diverse as cooperation on water resources and medical assistance for combatting HIV/AIDS.³⁴

Brazil enacted democracy promotion to secure and/or increase their material and economic capabilities to preserve the regional security and its leading regional power position, when democratic disruptions occurred in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. In other words, democracy promotion was enacted as part of its multilateral approach to ensure that both Brazil’s strategic interests are preserved and democratic disruptions are contained through collective regional mechanisms such as Unasur or Mercosur, to prevent further regional instability. Therefore, the


³⁴ <http://www.ticotimes.net/2007/08/24/brazil-honduras-strengthen-relations>

relative power of Brazil in the unipolar regional order triggered the enactment of democracy promotion as a foreign policy outcome in order to preserve national interests manifested in terms of their geostrategic commitments. Brazil's democracy promotion was enabled by a pro-democratic regional leadership role, which was claimed by a combination of material (unilateral positioning, democratic disruptions) and ideational sources (pro-democracy/developmentalist orientation and legacy of multilateralism and collective regional mechanism). The motivation underlying enactment of democracy promotion is found in Brazil's geostrategic commitments. In fact, the section below argues that Brazil was motivated by maximizing or securing its geostrategic commitments constructed through politico-historical ties with Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.

3.3.3.1. Geostrategic Commitments in Paraguay


In Paraguay, geostrategic ties were heavily concentrated on economic and social aspects. The figure below illustrates the increasing levels of trade balance with Paraguay (2000-2015) while the next figure measures the share of trade balance over Brazil's GDP.

Figure 3.6. Trade Balance with Paraguay, 2000-2015



Source: The World Bank

Figure 3.7. Share of trade balance with Paraguay over Brazil's GDP



Source: The World Bank

As for the social ties, Paraguay hosts the second largest Brazilian community living abroad, estimated at 330 thousand people.³⁵ Brazilian immigrants that live in Paraguay, a case of board migration known as ‘Brasiguaios’ (Milani et al. 2015, 76) constitute strategic importance between both countries, tracing back to the 19th century.³⁶ During the 1960s, Brazil faced a landlessness problem due to the expansion of soy production, which was solved by the high quality, cheaper land and low taxation in Paraguay, which offered favorable incentives for Brazilian landowners (Lambert 2015, 41). The flow of Brazilian migrants to Paraguay was enabled by policies on minimal land taxation in Paraguay and Brazil’s financial aid for migrants in Paraguay, also known as Brasiguayos (Nickson 1981), who benefited from economic incentives in Paraguay exercised a strong economic impact on Brazil (Nickson 2008).

Beginning from the 1990s onwards, soy production started to dominate Paraguayan economic life, with soy production was corresponding to 46 percent of total national export by 2015 (Lambert 2016a, 42), with more than 85 percent of the soy being produced by Brasiguayos (Ortiz 2011). A crucial problem regarding

³⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Paraguay.
<https://www.gov.br/mre/en/subjects/bilateral-relations/all-countries/republic-of-paraguay>

³⁶ See Nickson (1981) for political, historical and economic roots of Brazilian immigration in Paraguay.

Brasiguayos was related to Paraguayan efforts for tax system reform under President Lugo which was effectively obstructed by the Brasiguayo-dominated Soy Producers' Association and the Rural Association of Paraguay (Zibechi 2008, Lambert 2016a, 42). At the societal level, it resulted in escalation of political tensions illustrated by increasing numbers of occupied lands, anti-Brazilian rhetoric, and threats to Brazilian landowners (Lambert 2016a, 43). Since 2000, Brasiguayos began to organize protests using tractors, known as *tractorazos*, employed paramilitary groups to defend their lands and lobbied with political actors in Paraguay and Brazil (Lambert 2016a, 43). Brazil proactively supported Brasiguayo interests in collaboration with the Paraguayan government to manage the legal aspects relating to their political and financial status (Lambert 2016a, 43). In 2008, President Lula developed a national mobilization system called Sistema Nacional de Mobilização (Sinamob, national mobilization system), which bestowed the President with power to act against foreign aggression to protect the interests of Brazilian economic actors and citizens outside the country (Lambert 2016a, 43). The decree affirmed that “threats or acts that are harmful to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the Brazilian people or national institutions, even if they do not mean invasion of the national territory” (Zibechi 2008). With the application of Sinamob, Brazil demonstrated regionally that it is in a position to give a military response to any developments that threatens its interests.³⁷ Following this, Brazil undertook two major military exercises, Fronteira Sul 1 and 2, on 17 and 24 October 2008, corresponding to the inauguration of President Lugo, which was considered a clear warning sign that Brazil would not tolerate policies that would adversely affect the interests of Brasiguayo landowners or Brazilian business actors (Torres Gonzalez, 2008). Following the October 17 military exercise, the Lugo government took the issue to the OAS Permanent Assembly, affirming that Brazil wants to negotiate peace for the soy producers for a small increase in the price of the energy produced from Itaipu, leading to a round of discussion between both Lugo and Lula

³⁷ E'a, 'Brasil y la doctrina de las fronteras,' November 8, 2008. Available at; [vivas/http://ea.com.py/brasil-y-la-doctrina-de-las-fronteras-vivas/](http://ea.com.py/brasil-y-la-doctrina-de-las-fronteras-vivas/)

governments (Zibechi 2008). Brazil's effective role persisted as a land dispute involving Brasiguai landowners erupted in July 2011 (Lambert 2011, 43, Chavez 2014).


3.3.3.2. Geostrategic Commitments in Peru

At the beginning of the 2000s, strategic ties with Peru were at moderate levels, since then-President Toledo thought that Brazilian President Cardoso was supporting Fujimori in the 2000 elections (St John 2016, 148). Yet, under Lula's presidency, the improvement of strategic ties began to improve. Presidents Toledo and Lula initiated a strategic alliance in April 2003 which stressed the objectives including economic and political cooperation, regional development, technological capacity-building to be used for surveillance in the Amazon (Sistema de Vigilancia de la Amazonía, SIVAM, Sistema de Protección de la Amazonía, SIPAM), and promotion of democracy as essential elements of socio-economic development (St John 2016, 149).

Being Brazil's third-largest trading partner, Peru's strategic importance in terms of Brazil's economic interests extends beyond the region. Geographical location is an important element of Brazil's economic interests. For example, Brazil has access to the Asian market, particularly China, through the Pacific ports in Peru (Christensen 2013, 276). Thus, Peru is considered a commercial bridge linking Brazil into the Pacific by means of Peru's Free Trade Agreements with China, South Korea, and the US (Rathbone 2011). Additionally, Brazil undertook three vast infrastructure projects financed by Brazil's state-owned bank, BNDES, which are planned to connect through canal, road and train, Brazilian markets to Peru's port and then to Asia (Rathbone 2011). Various Brazilian companies also undertook investments. For example; the mining company Votorantim Metais purchased zinc mines and Peru's biggest refinery Cajamarquilla whereas Petrobras, Brazilian state-owned company, had investments plans which in return, provided labor and market access to Brazil, and resulted in sevenfold increase in bilateral trade between 2005


and 2011, amounting at 3.4 billion USD (Rathbone 2011). Trade balance figure and share of trade balance over Brazil's GDP illustrates the increase in bilateral trade between 2000 and 2015.

Figure 3.8. Trade Balance with Peru (2000-2015)



Source: The World Bank

Figure 3.9. Share of Peru's trade balance over Brazil's GDP (2000-2015)



Source: The World Bank

In addition, Brazilian governing elites from Worker's Party (PT) advised Ollanta Humala (presidential term 2011-2016) on campaigning strategies and made his first visit after the election victory in 2011 in Brasilia (Rathbone 2011). In fact, a former army officer who led a military revolt in 2000 and a political opponent of Keiko Fujimori, Humala worked with Brazilian campaign advisers with links to PT (Romero 2011). Political strategists and campaign managers for the Brazilian Workers' Party and Lula's presidential victory in 2002, worked on repositioning Humala and reidentified him as a center-left political figure to attract broader political support (St John 2016, 153-154). On his visit to Brazil for meeting the

then-President Dilma Rousseff, Humala identified Brazil a strategic partner, and later on his visit to Lula, Humala stated that Peru needed to combine its solid economy with efficient social inclusion policies, as Brazil had done under the Lula government (Zissiz 2011). In 2013, Rousseff and Humala signed three bilateral agreements to consolidate their strategic alliance, which emphasizes social, communication, and environmental issues; extending from labor cooperation to facilitate Peruvian citizens to work in Brazil, to the protection of mutual rivers in the Amazon.³⁸

3.3.3.3. Geostrategic Commitments in Venezuela

For politico-ideological and strategic reasons, the case of Venezuela holds a strategic importance in the foreign policy of Brazil. The analysis of democracy promotion by Brazil in Venezuela addresses crucial interlocking internal and external dynamics in both countries, which explain motives of Brazil in supporting and promoting democracy in Venezuela.

The improvement of strategic ties between Brazil and Venezuela trace back to the presidency of Itamar Franco, continued under the presidency of Cardoso, and deepened with Lula. The so-called Lula–Chavez axis relaunched the bilateral agenda, with bilateral strategic partnerships signed in 2005 (Briceno-Ruiz 2016, 160) and strategic ties between Brazil and Venezuela gained impetus under the presidencies of Chávez and Lula da Silva, during Lula’s tenure between 2003 and 2010. With the coming of Lula to power in 2003 bilateral relations were deepened; as the ideological affinity between Lula’s PT and the “Venezuelan revolution” raised expectations of closer cooperation (Briceno Ruiz, 2016, 162). The strong emphasis Lula put on South-South cooperation, equal redistribution of power at the multilateral platforms, and eradication of global poverty along with his leftist

³⁸Brazilian, Peruvian presidents praise strategic alliance. 12 November 2013. Available at; <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/824182.shtml>

ideology resonated in the political ideology of Hugo Chávez, facilitated rapprochement between both countries in political and economic terms. Both countries shared similar policy preferences in the region, such as rejecting the Free Trade Area Agreement (FTAA) or promoting of South American economic and political regionalism, in addition to their joint projects of strategic importance; such as; a joint venture between Petrobras and PDVSA to build an oil refinery (Briceno Ruiz 2016, 162).

A closer analysis suggests that Brazil provided assistance to Venezuela when its interests were at stake. For example, after the return of Chavez to the presidency following the short-lived coup d'état in 2002; Cardoso advised and persuaded Chavez to enter into dialogue with leading opposition figures involved in the plot and provided the Venezuelan government oil shipments to avoid an economic collapse when oil workers went on strike against Chavez in late 2002 (Stuenkel 2017, 55). Cardoso continued his efforts and provided assistance during a general strike that took place between December 2002 and January 2003, which coincided with the decision of the BNDES, to provide financial assistance for infrastructure projects developed by Brazilian firms in Venezuela (Briceno-Ruiz 2016, 160).

The political crisis in Venezuela and the ways the domestic political actors in Brazil reacted to it also held critical importance as for the domestic politics of Brazil. Considering that the year 2002 was the year for the Brazilian national elections, the presidential candidate of the PT, Lula, used his political stance towards Venezuela as a tool to solidify his political-ideological attitude across the region, emphasizing solidarity with Chávez and regional stability. In a speech delivered to the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Sao Paulo, Lula was quoted,

“Nobody represents stability as much as I do on this continent. Nobody has the support that I have in the trade union movement, the social and popular movement. Stability will be guaranteed because we will implement a policy of conversation with all

sectors. I will not govern just for those who have PT's little star on his chest. It will be a government for the 170 million Brazilians.”

With the coming of the Lula government in 2003, the diplomatic efforts of Brazil to defend democracy in Venezuela continued following the end of the political crisis in 2002. During the Lula government; Brazil's foreign policy toward Venezuela and Chavez, as illustrated by the creation of the 'Friends of Chávez' group established by Lula, indicates that Brazil had used its politico-ideological affinity with the Bolivarian leader to maintain the defense and promotion of democracy in Venezuela.³⁹ In this way, Lula's approach to defense and democracy promotion in Venezuela shifted toward support to the government in Venezuela to pursue and maximize strategically driven motives.


Apart from the political-ideological affinity between the political leadership of both countries, commercial rapprochement played a decisive role not only economically but also politically. At the beginning of the 2000s, both countries expanded their commercial relations, into the agriculture and construction sectors, which initially focused on energy cooperation. For example, both countries decided to jointly build an oil refinery in north-eastern Brazil, with 40% of it shared by PDVSA, Venezuela's state-own oil firm while the rest to be shared by Brazil's state-owned oil firm Petrobras (BBC 2007). After his decision on reducing trade with Columbia following the opening of Columbian bases to U.S. troops, Chávez decided to replace Columbian imports with imports from Brazil and Argentina (Rondon and Mozz 2009). This political decision of Chávez, have motivated Brazil strategically to increase its exports to Venezuela. In fact, imports coming from Brazil ranged from vehicles to agricultural food products, in addition to the increase in the investments from Brazilian businesses for transportation as well as for the construction of dams, bridges, and railroads (Jacome 2011, 79). For example, there had been important operations of Brazilian companies in Venezuela, in the field of

³⁹ Interview with Conectas, 26 February 2016.

civil construction, for the country’s infrastructure, such as roads, hydroelectric power plants, subway lines and irrigation. In addition to the areas in which Brazil traditionally offered technical and educational cooperation (health, agriculture, teaching of Portuguese, scholarships for undergraduate and graduate courses), relations with Venezuela have incorporated an important range of projects propelled by representations of Brazilian agencies in Caracas, such as Embrapa, the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal). An example of this innovative cooperation is the application of Brazilian social technology developed in the program “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” to support the formulation of the Venezuelan equivalent “Gran Misión Vivienda”.

The primary strategic motivation of the Lula government was expanding Brazilian exports in Venezuela. Therefore, maintaining political stability had the utmost importance. The assertive policy of Brazil concerning ensuring stability in governing institutions using democracy promotion through the tools of diplomacy and multilateralism across the region had a positive commercial impact. The election of the politico-ideologically akin leader in Brazil, Lula, contributed to the expansion of Brazilian exports in Venezuela almost six times from the beginning of Lula’s tenure in 2003 until the end of his tenure in 2010.


Figure 3.10. Brazil’s export to Venezuela between 2000 and 2017



Source: The World Bank


For Venezuela, Brazil is a major trading partner (Briceno-Ruiz 2016, 163). The data on the trade balance and share of trade balance over Brazil's GDP, as shown in the figures below, provides an understanding of the strategic ties between both countries.

Figure 3.11. Trade Balance between Brazil and Venezuela (2000-2015)



Source: The World Bank

Figure 3.12. Share of Trade balance with Venezuela over Brazil's GDP (2000-2015)



Source: The World Bank

Brazil's reaction to the 2002 political crisis was decisive for defense and promotion of democracy. Moreover, there had not been a significant change in foreign policy toward Venezuela during the power transition from the presidencies of Cardoso to Lula. Nevertheless, the democracy promotion efforts by Brazil in Venezuela were not always consistent; in fact, the defense and promotion of democracy varied. The puzzle found in Brazil's foreign policy is that while political

crises occurred in governing institutions are responded by firm democracy promotion policies, Brazil instead ignored the disruptions in political processes or refrained from using any multilateral or diplomatic tools to bring democratic norms to political processes. The 2012 election in Venezuela is a case that illustrates the incoherent policy of defense and the promotion of democracy in Venezuela.

Although Lula overtly campaigned for Chávez for his election in 2012, Brazil remained silent when Chávez dismantled the democracy the following year. It is argued that favorable contracts with Brazilian construction firms such as Odebrecht helped Brazil to strengthen its regional role. Thus a cost-benefit analysis proved that it was risky promoting democracy when economic interests were under threat (Stuenkel 2017, 58). It was also reported that political actors, both Chávez's party and Venezuela's opposition, received donations from a large Brazilian construction firm before the elections, which Chávez did not welcome as he threatened the Brazilian company to expel from the country (Stuenkel 2017, 58).

Brazil was reluctant, and it stemmed from prioritizing the stability of trade relations and the interest of business circles rather than the political instability that could be incurred by further political polarization arising from disruption in political processes. Therefore, the then president, Dilma Rousseff, endorsed the Maduro government after the elections. Rousseff was quoted, "We wish you great success with your presidential mandate and your government," during a news conference with Maduro in Brasilia (Diaz-Struck and Forerp 2013). Rousseff confirmed assistance of food supplies to Venezuela and increased cooperation energy sector, whereas Maduro ensured Brazilian infrastructure investment using Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, projecting to construct a 1.5-million-tonne-a-year urea plant in Venezuela, in addition to the strengthening of military ties between Brazil and Venezuela (Reuters 2013). Therefore, the main interest of the business in Brazil was the continuity and expansion of the business contracts in food exports and construction projects that were initiated between Lula and Chávez. Before the elections took place, the then-president of Brazil's Foreign Trade

Association, Jose Augusto de Castro, was reported saying, “In the near term, a Maduro win would be best” (Israel 2013).

The impact of Lula was also very determinant in the 2013 Venezuela elections. In a statement issued by the Venezuelan government, Lula was called “President ‘Obrero’ [from the working class] who always defended the democratic character of the Bolivarian revolution and helped consolidate a solid relationship generating numerous infrastructure works” (Folha de S. Paulo 2013). Sympathy for Lula stemmed from his personal linkages with Maduro. Lula was Maduro’s political advisor during and after the election, Lula was mainly concerned with the early period of Maduro’s government, which faced strong opposition from his main opponent, Henrique Capriles. Nevertheless, Brazil kept its diplomatic silence and refrained from any diplomatic act to defend or promote democracy. The political climate in Venezuela aggravated following the arrest of the opposition leader Leopoldo Lopez in 2014 on charges of triggering social unrest and the street protests to oust Maduro.

Economic deterioration due to recession and hyperinflation, with a 63.1% annual inflation rate in 2014 and 121.738% in 2015 (The World Bank), worsened the political situation. Even though the opposition Democratic Unity coalition won the majority of the National Assembly for the first time in sixteen years in 2015, the Supreme Court took over the functions of the National Assembly in 2017. Due to international pressures, the decision was backed; however, it had already caused anti-government protests that resulted in 100 casualties. During the interview with the then Ambassador of Turkey in Sao Paulo, Mehmet Özgün Ataman, on the issue of whether Brazil promotes democracy or not, he stated that Brazil failed on democracy promotion as illustrated by the Venezuela policy of the Rousseff government. The silence of Brazil towards Venezuela under Dilma Rousseff received critics from the domestic audience in Brazil. Foreign policy toward Venezuela during Dilma Rousseff’s term has triggered domestic opposition

claiming that the government is incapable to de-escalate tension in Venezuela.⁴⁰ Therefore, the question is why Brazil was able to defend democracy in 2002 coup d'état but remained hesitant to defend democracy despite the electoral fraught and escalating political polarization?

3.3.3.4. Constraints of Democracy Promotion in Peru (2000) and Venezuela (2012): Impeachment and Economic Deterioration as Domestic Imperatives

The existence of strategic ties across three cases did not immediately translate into democracy promotion when democratic disruptions emerged. Even though geostrategic commitments exist, democracy promotion can be incoherent. The cases showed that, the promotion of democracy remained limited in Peru and Venezuela, even though the opportunity to enact have emerged. In other words, for Brazil's democracy promotion enactment, the empirical observations suggest that the existence of geostrategic interests is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. Further analysis of Peru and Venezuela suggests that domestic imperatives were constraining factors behind inconsistencies of democracy promotion in Peru and Venezuela.

What were the factors that limited Brazil's opportunity to promote democracy in Peru in 2000 and in Venezuela in 2014? A closer examination reveals that unit-level intervening variables, political disruption in Brazil urged by impeachment of presidents and economic deterioration in Brazil are domestic imperatives that limits the enactment of democracy promotion.

3.3.3.4.1. Peru: Impeachment and Economic Deterioration in Brazil in 2000

A closer analysis suggests that intertwining developments in political and economic domain in Brazil has shaped Brazilian foreign policy in general and limited its opportunity to act in defense and promotion of democracy in Peru in

⁴⁰ Interview at Conectas, February 2016.


2000. In addition, the unconsolidated collective regional mechanisms across the regional organizations such as MERCOSUR or UNASUR also limited the effective use of collective regional mechanism for democracy promotion enactment by Brazil.

Shifts in domestic political and economic framework impeded Brazil to take a firmer stance. At the political front, in 1992, Brazil had been going through a major internal political crisis. In December 1992, The National Congress voted for the impeachment of President Fernando Collor de Mello due to corruption. Accused by his brother Pedro Collor in May 1992, the claim was that an extensive corruption network had been directed by Paulo Cesar Farias, former campaign director of Fernando Collor de Mello (Weyland 1993). A commission, *Comissao Parlamentar de Inquerito*, was set up to investigate and found evidences proving then-President Mello's involvement in corruption through extensive network connections controlled by Farias, which went far beyond using state-owned funds for political purposes, and established a parallel organization to collect cash flows (Geddes and Neto 1992, 642). Herewith, 1992 marked the Brazilian political history as Fernando Collor de Mello had become the first (and certainly not the last)⁴¹, popularly elected Latin American president to be impeached for corruption.

After the impeachment of Collor de Mello, his Vice-President, Itamar Franco, served as President until 1995. During this period, Brazil had gone through critical stages and become inward-looking focusing on the political and economic problems that was caused by the corruption. At the economic front, Brazil reached hyperinflation. The table below shows the increase of inflation rate in Brazil which incremented drastically since the impeachment of Cardoso de Mello in 1992 and reaching its peak during the presidency of Franco, reaching 2477, 15% in 1993.

⁴¹ Dilma Rousseff, successor of Lula da Silva, was impeached in August 2016 for manipulating the budget.

Figure 3.13. Annual inflation in Brazil, 1990-2001



Source: www.inflation.eu

Unable to control the inflation rate, the general public opinion and social unrest due to the deterioration of the economic situation, Franco appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who later became the President, as the Ministry of Finance and External Affairs in May 1993. Cardoso successfully ensured a parliamentary majority and obtained public support for the stabilization plan also known as “*the Real Plan*” which necessitated tight public debt control measures and monetary reform, culminating in a new currency, *the real*, in July 1994.⁴²

Amidst political and economic situations incurred by corruption ensued with hyperinflation and impeachment, Brazil was urged to embrace an inward-looking, isolationist, status-quo oriented foreign policy behavior in the region. It is even argued that it has caused a paradigm change in Brazilian foreign policy, altering its traditional foreign policy approach since Rio Branco, which resulted in a different foreign policy outlook with the emergence of societal actors with interests to influence decision-making mechanisms (Valença and Carvalho 2014, 71). In this capacity, Brazilian democracy promotion towards Peru remained benign and limited since a collective regional mechanism was not yet consolidated across the regional institutions and any effort by Brazil would violate the non-intervention principle. Therefore, domestic concerns regarding issues of corruption,

⁴²See Fundação Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

hyperinflation and extreme poverty and its limited material capability due to economic problems refrained Brazil from taking an assertive approach with regard to promoting democracy in Peru.

Disruption in the election process in 2000 opened yet another possibility for Brazil to exercise enact promotion of democracy. 2000 elections, as a crucial component of the political process in Peru, become a case where Brazil could implement its influence and democratic pressure. As promotion and defense of democracy have increasingly become a core objective of Brazilian foreign policy under the Cardoso government, the balance between principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs has also become a critical issue. While Brazil was able to achieve the promotion and defense of democracy against disruptions in governing institutions through collective regional mechanisms, disruptions in political processes such as elections were more susceptible to violation of the non-intervention principle. Therefore, in the case of disruption in the political process in 2000, Brazil opted for democracy promotion indirectly through a collective mechanism at the international level. In the case of Peru 2000, this collective mechanism functioned through the OAS. Brazil's regional role activated the use of negative conditionality in the form of suspension of Peru from the OAS in 1992, aiming at preventing the breakdown of the regime. In contrast, in 2000, due to the impeachment process and economic deterioration in Brazil, and unconsolidated collective mechanisms in regional organizations, Brazil's opportunity to act to defend and promote democracy with purposeful actions targeting the political process in Peru 2000 was limited.

3.3.3.4.2. Venezuela: Impeachment and Economic Deterioration in Brazil in 2015


In 2015, Brazil staged the major corruption scandal in the political history of Brazil to date, which revealed the intertwining interests of actors in political and economic domains. The corruption scandal changed the political power in Brazil as

Dilma Rousseff was impeached, followed by the transition of power to her successor, Vice-president Michel Temer, and then resulted in the 2018 presidential elections with the victory of Jair Bolsonaro from the Social Liberal Party. The impeachment and the corruption investigation are crucial to understanding since they functioned as a mechanism of change not only for the political power transition in domestic politics of Brazil but also for the foreign policy outlook.

In retrospect, the political stalemate in Brazil started with the approval of one of 34 impeachment requests for Dilma Rousseff on 2 December 2015. The impeachment approved by the Chamber of Deputies was concerned with the claims that Rousseff manipulated fiscal accounts to conceal budget deficits, which was a violation of Brazil's Fiscal Responsibility Law (Leme and Uribe 2016). In March 2016, the biggest corruption investigation in Brazil, known as "Lavo Jato", also known as, "Operation Car Wash", unveiled strong political links and resulted in political repercussions. The operation started as to investigate money dealers who used small businesses, such as petrol stations and car washes for money laundering. However, the political links of money dealers soon were discovered. The senior executives of the state oil company, Petrobras, were using money dealers to pay business contracts with construction and oil companies. Petrobras was forming agreements with those companies to ensure that if and when they are guaranteed business, they would share between 1% and 5% of every deal into slush funds, which were used by Petrobras to fund election campaigns of politicians and political parties they were aligned with (BBC 2016). The investigation expanded and in March 2016, Lula was requested to testify. The involvement of Lula created political unrest as political demonstrations started for or against him. In addition to escalating political tension, the economic situation in Brazil aggravated as Petrobras suspended its business contracts, which also included the biggest construction firm, Odebrecht. In an attempt to safeguard Lula, Rousseff asked him to join the cabinet and Lula became the chief of staff but the judiciary blocked his appointment. On 17 April 2016, Rousseff was impeached and Michel Temer became the interim president in May 2016.

The political unrest also had an impact on the economic situation. As the below graph illustrates, the annual growth of GDP in 2002 with 507.962 billion USD peaked under the Lula government with 2.626 trillion USD in 2011. With the onset of the corruption scandal, the GDP fell to 1.796 trillion USD in 2015.


Figure 3.14. GDP Annual Growth in Brazil, 2002-2017



Source: The World Bank

The below figure represents the government deficit as percentage of total GDP. The government deficit⁴³, illustrates a volatile trend with a harsh fall from -2.32, the year Lula left the presidency in 2012 to -7.75 in 2015, the year that the corruption scandal and the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff erupted.

Figure 3.15. General Government Deficit in Brazil, 2002-2017 (% of GDP)



⁴³ OECD defines government deficit as “the balance of income and expenditure of government, including capital income and capital expenditures”.

Source: The OECD

The incumbency of Michel Temer altered the country's identity as his cabinet was the first cabinet ever since the re-democratization process of Brazil in 1988, that was totally white, wealthy and male, and concentrated foreign policy on new bilateral trade agreements, realignment with the West (USA and Europe), MERCOSUR's market opening, and the regional isolation of Venezuela (Milani 2019). Temer's administration prioritized recovery of economic situation through a new approach to public affairs. The then Foreign Minister Ferreira underlined that; "foreign policy is also an extremely crucial tool in any broader national development strategy" which will be used in the service of economic recovery (Ferreira 2017). As Ferreira prioritized economic needs in foreign policy, he also followed a cautious approach in enacting democracy promotion. Ferreira was quoted; "The pursuit of interests must go hand in hand with the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms...Brazil will continue to pursue its legitimate economic interests, but it will do so in a way that does not disregard human rights and democratic values. This is the rationale behind our firm stance in defense of democracy and human rights in Venezuela" (Ferreira 2017).

CHAPTER 4:
TURKEY AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
BETWEEN 2000-2015

This chapter aims to detail and analyzes democracy promotion policies undertaken by Turkey between 2000 and 2015 and explain why Turkey enacted democracy promotion in its foreign policy by empirically demonstrating and testing the two-level theorization based on the insights from Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory.

The chapter unfolds in two main sections: Following a brief account of Turkey's origins of democracy promotion, first, the dissertation aims to descriptively analyze democracy promotion in Turkey's foreign policy between 2000 and 2015 based on observable implications. To this end, this section asks what instruments Turkey has sought to use and to what ends. In doing so, the chapter explores the target of democracy promotion policies undertaken and the instruments through which Turkey promoted democracy in the given period.

With this aim, first, the democracy promotion efforts by Turkey in the given period are examined. The democracy promotion efforts include the cases in which Turkey did promote democracy and the cases in which Turkey's democracy promotion remained limited or was incoherent. This choice aims to identify the contextual features peculiar to Turkey's regional context. Inclusion, rather than omitting cases that showed inconsistent, limited, or absence of democracy promotion, untangles the motives underlying democracy promotion by understanding why democracy promotion enactment was absent despite the opportunity to enact.

Turkey's geopolitical positioning shaped Turkey's democracy promotion efforts in three significant regional spaces; the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkan region. To illustrate; Afghanistan in the aftermath of

the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Iraq in its first elections in 2005 after the invasion in 2003, Somalia after 2011, and the Balkans covering a longer temporal dimension due to the deeply rooted historical ties built by the Ottoman legacy; were the geographical directions in which Turkey's democracy promotion enactment was observed, primarily until the 2010s. However, after the 2010s, Turkey's democracy promotion practices focused more on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) when Arab Uprisings erupted. The literature discussed several factors that caused Turkey's engagement with the Arab uprisings in the MENA, as the AKP notably shifted its focus on the MENA as the central axis of Turkish foreign policy (Aras and Polat 2007, Oğuzlu 2008, Öniş and Yılmaz 2009, Altunışık and Martin 2011). Furthermore, the declining hegemonic power of the US facilitated Turkey's reorientation as it created a power vacuum and gave Turkey an incentive to act proactively in the MENA (Aras and Akarçeşme 2012, 45). Turkish policy-makers eventually capitalized on this opportunity. Thus, taking Arab uprisings in 2011 as a critical turning point for Turkey's foreign policy, arguing that it provided Turkey with an opportunity to act in terms of democracy promotion enactment, three cases stand out and are analyzed in-depth as a within-case comparison: Libya, Egypt, and Syria. The study compares these three cases because, despite the positive value of the democracy promotion enactment, democracy promotion demonstrated incoherence within each case due to Turkey's swiftly changing policy instrument preferences. Therefore, comparing these cases offers control for contextual factors in explaining the underlying motives of democracy promotion enactment by Turkey.

Second, the dissertation undertakes a theoretical analysis, building upon the observable implications derived from the empirical analysis of the three cases. Third, in light of descriptive analysis relating to what Turkey has done in Libya, Egypt, and Syria regarding democracy promotion, based on insights from Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory, the study examines the motives underlying the enactment of democracy promotion in the given timeframe.

In what follows, this section explores the origins of democracy promotion in Turkey to situate the democracy promotion policies in a contextual framework. First, in the case of Turkey, the roots of democracy promotion are found in the 1990s. Second, the analysis sorts out the cases of democracy promotion in its corresponding region during the given period. Next, the analysis engages with an in-depth and comparative analysis of democracy promotion enactment in response to the Arab Uprisings that erupted in 2011 in Libya, Egypt, and Syria. Third, this section explores system-based and role-based hypotheses as the underlying mechanism that drives the enactment of democracy promotion. From the perspective of Neorealism, the analysis commences with a system-level variable, that is, Turkey's relative power. Next, Turkey's pro-democratic regional leadership role enabled the translation of Turkey's relative power at the state level. Finally, arguing that democracy promotion is a foreign policy outcome produced by Turkey's relative power and pro-democratic regional role, the study discusses motives derived from Turkey's democracy promotion enactment in Libya, Egypt, and Syria.

The following sources compile the empirical data: First is interviews with military personnel in Turkey in 2016 who served in the field as part of Turkey's democracy promotion actions and the deputy president of the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, IHH, an Islamist-oriented civil society organization. Second, the study analyzed official governmental and non-governmental documents, reports, scholarly research, newspaper articles, and press releases. Last but not least, the analysis reviewed diplomatic positions and deliberations taken by Turkey.

4.1. Origins of Democracy Promotion in Turkey's Foreign Policy

The origins of democracy promotion in Turkish foreign policy are found during the 1990s, relatively new compared to Brazil's historical ties with democracy promotion, founded in the 19th century.

The primary shifts in Turkish foreign policy were triggered by the systemic pressures that emerged in the early 1990s. Political and historical developments that marked the post-Cold War era, such as; the ending of the Soviet Union, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Bosnia war, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the Gulf War, took place in Turkey's neighborhood (Bilgin 2005, 186). Reaching its climax after the Gulf War, the armed Kurdish insurgence shifted the principles of national security in the late 1980s, resulting in the gradually increasing role of the military (Ozcan 2004). The geopolitically driven foreign policy agenda inherently focused on security issues as it strategically motivated the foreign policymakers to withdraw from the initially isolationist foreign policy and adopt a proactive foreign policy.

The shift towards foreign policy activism during the 1990s was enabled by a blend of dynamics at the state and international levels. Coupled with the shifts in the distribution of power at the international level at the beginning of the 1990s, the shift in political power under the leadership of Turgut Özal with the newly established Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*) ensued as a result of the 1983 elections following the end of the 1980 military coup. This shift in political power had strongly affected a transformation in Turkish foreign policy, which was led by the increasing role of governing elites.

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To illustrate, in his first parliamentary speech as the Prime Minister of Turkey, Turgut Özal underlined two major factors in the Turkish foreign policy. The first was the expansion of foreign trade relations and recalibration of relations with neighboring countries based on maximizing economic interests and mutual

interdependence. Taking a neoliberal turn, Turkish foreign policy was mainly guided by the economic objectives to increase export and achieve a balanced trade with the neighboring countries. Turkey's reasoning between economic and security explicitly adhered to the Kantian understanding that peace can survive between liberal democracies and industrialized countries. Thus, Turkey explicitly emphasized the principles of liberal understanding in ensuring security, and multilateralism had an instrumental role in Turkey's foreign policy. Therefore, the second factor was multilateralism. In his parliamentary speech, Özal highlighted the importance of membership to NATO in maintaining national security and consolidating regional and international peace, while he also highlighted the relations with European Economic Community and Turkey's commitment to the full membership prospect. Özal also emphasized that the existing relations with the Middle East and the Islamic world were complementary notions for Turkey's foreign policy. Özal was quoted as saying, "On the one hand, the geographic location as a bridge between West and the Middle East, on the other hand, common historic and cultural legacy shared with the Islamic world, necessitates Turkey to attach importance to close relations with Arabic and Islamic countries to enhance relations and efficient cooperation" (TBMM 2014).

Therefore, foreign policy was structured on strategic commitments to achieve economic interests and to diminish security challenges for a peaceful regional environment to pursue mutual interests since the late 1980s. To this end, the conventional foreign policy principles of the Republic were redefined to meet the developments that ensued with the post-Cold War period (Sayari 2000, 170). As the Cold War ended, the regional security complex that Turkey is situated in was characterized by political volatility. With the end of communism, the fragmentations in Turkey's neighborhood caused ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Gulf region, and in the Middle East geopolitical positioning were redefined, which posed serious security challenges by the Kurdish question in its relations with mainly Iraq and Syria (Huber 2015, 149). In response to these regional challenges in its foreign policy, Özal proposed the concept of "active

foreign policy” at a 1991 post-Gulf War press conference, with the objective to adjust to the developments in the aftermath of -Cold War period, as he advocated that Turkey “should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy”.⁴⁴ In doing so, Özal aimed to strengthen a firm alliance with the Western partners, by extending its role in the region through economic ties and political involvement in response to the regional necessities (Sayari 1997, 45).

In the following years, Ismail Cem, foreign minister of the coalition government between 1999 and 2002, expanded foreign policy activism with a strong Western commitment⁴⁵ to increase Turkey’s role as a regional actor. In this regard, the late 1990s displayed major turning points in terms of Turkish foreign policy. According to Altunışık (2011, 11-13), this foreign policy had three major consequences: First was the improvement of Turkish-Syrian relations after the October 1998 crisis that cause political tensions; the second was the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations in 1999, which contributed to the rapprochement and confidence-building between two countries; and the improvement in the diplomatic relations with the Maghreb countries mainly in the fields of economic relations, energy, trade, and construction. Ismail Cem introduced a process of peaceful change in foreign policy attitude, which was warmly welcomed by the EU as indicated by the EU’s declaration of Turkey as a candidate country in Helsinki in 1999 (Terzi 2010, 42). Moreover, Ismail Cem was a key decision-maker shifting Turkey’s approach towards the Middle East, emphasizing four elements; which were historical and cultural dimensions, multicultural identity, Turkey’s potential as a role model for the region and enhancement of political ties with the Middle East (Terzi 2010, 42). In doing so, İsmail Cem significantly developed foreign policy activism by developing Turkey’s soft power capabilities and multilateral orientation in foreign policy.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Makovsky (1999). For expanded information on Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War, see Hale (2000) and Robins (2003).

⁴⁵ See Cem (2005).

In this sense, during the 1990s, similar to Brazil, decision-makers initiated a change from a status-quo oriented foreign policy to an active foreign policy in Turkey's regional orientation with the desire for change towards foreign policy activism; motivated by security and economic interests. The decision-makers also perceived ideational factors such as historical and cultural affinity and multicultural identity as a source of Turkey's role conception as a model for the region. Thus, during the 1990s, foreign policy activism as a foreign policy behavior, as a result of national role enactment stemmed from ideational and material factors. In ideational terms, the center-right Motherland party under the leadership of Turgut Özal had a political identity that embraced the masses with its neoliberal economic outlook, conservatism, and nationalist approach that aimed to significantly reduce the impact of state institutions and established elites at political, economic and societal levels. In the foreign policy realm, there was a strong alignment with the West by pursuing a multilateral outlook in the economic and security realm. However, the historical and cultural legacy of the Arab and Islamic countries were also addressed in the region, which symbolized the abandonment of isolationist and defensive approach in foreign policy, leaving its place for a mediating role in conflictual areas. Unilateral and confrontational activism had taken place as illustrated by the tensions with Greece in 1996 and Syria in 1998 (Huber 2015, 149). Under the foreign ministry of İsmail Cem, Turkey seized the opportunity to act with confidence-building policies which enhanced relations between Turkey and Syria as well as between Turkey and Greece. In material terms, during this period the ruling government perceived that the state's capability was strongly influenced by the neoliberal paradigm prioritizing economic interests, yet at the same time pursuing security interests in the regional conflicts. These ideational and material factors culminated in Turkey's role enactment as a regional leader, resulting in foreign policy activism.

Therefore, this period was critical in the sense that it marked the beginning of foreign policy activism, which was later embraced by the AKP government during the early 2000s. Thus, the origins of democracy promotion can be

understood and found during the 1990s, when Turkey emerged as a regional actor, and democracy promotion in Turkish foreign policy began to take shape, notably with the reorientation of foreign policy activism and democracy support policies propagated in Turkish foreign during the 2000s.


4.2. Democracy Promotion Enactment Between 2000 and 2015: Empirical Implications

While democracy promotion was pronounced substantively in Brazil as the constitution of 1988 overtly refers to democracy promotion in foreign policy and clearly defines non-interference and respect for sovereignty as guiding principles, Turkey neither referred to democracy promotion nor defined any guiding principle in constitutional terms until 2010. In July 2010, a law came into force, which dictated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should “defend and promote human rights and democratic values ... and fight against all sorts of discrimination based on language, race, color, political thought, philosophical belief, religion, confession, etc.” (Ozel and Ozcan 2011, 134). The law resulted in the establishment a Directorate on Global and Humanitarian Issues, and paved the way for institutionalizing democracy promotion as a policy instrument as emphasized to fulfill Turkey’s goals and interests in the Middle East (Ozel and Ozcan 2011, 134).

When promoting democracy, official development assistance, also known as ODA, is used as a policy instrument since the institutionalization of regular assistance and aid through TIKA, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, founded in 1992. Being the key institution accredited to collect and report Turkey’s development cooperation record to OECD, TIKA is the major driver of Turkish development assistance, under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Office. Using ODA as an important instrument, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that Turkey resorted to the ODA as a soft power instrument (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

As ODA has become an important instrument, the existing academic literature developed into examining the various dimensions of development assistance in Turkish foreign policy (Kulaklıkaya and Nurdun 2010, Ozkan 2013, Haşimi 2014). In addition, Turkey’s role as an emerging donor and a humanitarian state (Keyman and Sazak 2014, Altunışık 2014) was discussed while the relation between development assistance and support and promotion of democracy was analyzed theoretically and empirically (Huber 2015, Aydın-Düzgit 2019). Since the establishment of TİKA, Turkey’s ODA contribution demonstrated an increasing trend, especially after 2010. The figure below shows the amount of net ODA in million USD, which illustrates an increase from 109.882 million USD in 1992 to 8 trillion USD in 2017, amounting to a 72% increase.


Figure 4.1. Net ODA in Million USD, 1992 – 2017



Source: The OECD

OECD statistics show that in 2016, ODA reached 6.2 billion (0.79% of GNI), representing an increase compared to Turkey’s net ODA, which amounted to USD 3.9 billion in 2015, corresponding to an increase of 26% in real terms in 2014 and illustrates an increase in the share of GNI from 0.45% in 2014 to 0.50% in 2015 (OECD). In addition to official development assistance, Turkey provided 1 billion 248 million USD in total private flows in 2016, including NGO assistance of 655 million US Dollars and direct investments of 593 million US Dollars (TIKA 2018). As seen in the figure below, Turkey’s allocation of ODA has been versatile not only amount-wise but also region-wise since the 1990s.

Figure 4.2. Distribution of ODA by region, 1992 – 2017




Source: The OECD (OECD does not have the data for 1996 and 1997)

In the period following the establishment of TİKA in 1992 until 2000, the major recipient of ODA was South and Central Asia, possibly due to the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the changing economic infrastructure in the region. After 1995, the share of ODA percentage in the Balkans increased due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. As per the country, in 2015, Turkey provided the largest share of its bilateral development cooperation to Syria, Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, and Afghanistan, mainly focusing on the development cooperation in the sectors of humanitarian aid, refugee support, governance, and civil society, education, health, and population. Turkey ranked first in humanitarian aid in 2015 with a ratio of 0.37% according to the proportion of humanitarian aid provided to GNI and became the second-largest donor of humanitarian assistance with outflow amounting to 3.2 billion USD, which was increased by 31% as compared to the previous year (TİKA, 2015). According to TİKA, in 2014, the total ODA delivered by Turkey increased by 8.6% and pioneered in the field of international humanitarian aid. Turkey delivered significant assistance to Syrians as assistance amounting to 799.52 million USD was provided for Syrians, Afghans, Africans, Asians, and Middle Eastern populations. In addition to humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees, the amount delivered reached 2.5 billion USD. As the figure illustrates, following South and

Central Asia, the Middle East with 486.6 million, the African region with 383.3 million, and the Balkans and Eastern Europe with 133.8 million dollars (TIKA 2015). The following figure shows that The MENA region constitutes a substantial portion of humanitarian aid between 2000 and 2015.

Figure 4.3. Distribution of Humanitarian aid in ODA, 2002 – 2017



Source: The OECD

Although the allocation of assistance and aid had a consistent and increasing trend in Turkish foreign policy, investing in assistance and aid alone is not democracy promotion. Therefore, the following table presents the political disruptions in Turkey’s region and identifies the target and instruments of Turkey’s democracy promotion efforts between 2000 and 2015. This descriptive analysis aims to guide the research to infer whether the promotion of democracy can be considered a principled commitment.

Table 4.1. Democratic Disruptions and Democracy Promotion Efforts of Turkey, 2000-2015

Country	Date	Disruption	Target	Instrument
Afghanistan	2001	Fall of Taliban Regime	GI	A (military)
Iraq	2005	Elections	PP	D, A
Somalia	2011	Humanitarian	CS	A
The Balkans	2000-2015	N/A	CS	A
Libya	2011	Uprising	GI	D, A, I
Egypt	2011	Uprising	GI, PP	D, A
Syria	2011	Uprising	GI	D, A, I, C

Instrument: Diplomacy (D), Intervention (I), Assistance (A), Conditionality (C)
Target: GI (Governing Institutions), PP (Political Process), Civil Society (CS)

The table shows that Turkey has used different types of instruments toward different targets in each case. Thus, the instruments used by Turkey were diverse. Until the unfolding of the Arab uprising in 2011, it is observed that Turkey has been enacting democracy promotion, mostly through the instrument of assistance in the form of development projects and diplomacy with a developmental approach. However, the Arab uprisings triggered Turkey's enactment of democracy promotion as a response to the disruptions that these countries were experiencing, hence resulting in the intensification of a political approach to its democracy promotion enactment, which concentrated on governing institutions and elections as part of political processes. Although the democracy promotion enactment by Turkey is positive in each case, an in-depth analysis underpins that Turkey enacted democracy promotion, albeit in an inconsistent manner. Especially Libya, Egypt, and Syria stand out as cases in which Turkey's democracy promotion illustrated inconsistency due to shifting policy preferences, which casts doubt on Turkey's diverging interests in democracy promotion. Therefore, Libya, Egypt, and Syria cases are chosen as subjects of within-case comparison for the enactment of democracy promotion by Turkey.

4.2.1. Democracy Promotion Enactment during the Arab Uprisings in Comparative Perspective: Libya, Egypt, Syria (2011)

The unfolding of Arab uprisings in December 2010 marked a critical milestone in Turkish foreign policy through Turkey's more pronounced approach toward democracy promotion. The overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi in Libya; successful elections in Tunisia; and democratic turmoil throughout the Arab World (Puddington 2012) provided Turkey with an incentive for the opportunity to act. Furthermore, it is stressed that the Arab uprisings altered Turkey's systemic role, resulting in abandoning its traditional stance towards delineating a new regional role (Salloukh 2013, 42).

A close examination of the Libya, Syria, and Egypt cases illustrates notable incoherence regarding the instruments of democracy promotion used in each case. Libyan and Syrian crises proved that Turkey is between ambitious foreign policy discourse and its Western realignment (Dal 2012, 258). In a nutshell; while in Libya, Turkey initially opposed military operations but then accepted them through the NATO plan, in Syria, the government was initially oscillating between appeasement and significant concerns over the developing civil war before it decided to support the Syrian National Council and host the Free Syrian Army (Öktem and Kadioğlu 2009, 6). With the acceleration of armed conflict between the regime forces and the rebels in Libya, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan first opposed military intervention and encouraged dialogue between both sides, however; since Turkey did not get any support, she joined the noncombat components of NATO operations under UNSC Resolution No. 1973 (Yeşilyurt 2017, 69). On the other hand, Turkey initially used diplomacy through diplomatic persuasion in Syria but then abandoned this instrument, opted for military forces, and found itself in opposing positions vis-a-vis other actors involved in the conflict, such as Russia. In Egypt, on the other hand, Turkey was the pioneer in welcoming the fall of Mubarak, as the ruling AKP called for respect for the demand for democracy of the popular will. However, with the ousting of Morsi, Turkey engaged with a proactive approach against the incumbent Sisi, which was in sharp contrast with the policies of the US and the EU, resulting in Turkey's isolation. Therefore, comparing Libya, Egypt, and Syria is intriguing to explore the underlying motives of democracy promotion enactment, despite the shifting policy preference in terms of instruments employed to enact democracy promotion.

4.2.1.1. Promoting Democracy in Libya

The protests that unfolded in Libya in February 2011 were severed by the Qadhafi regime's targeting of civilians. The outbreak of protests and violence quickly resulted in prompt action by the UN Security Council to pass resolutions

on 26 February 2011 (Resolution 1970) and 17 March 2011 (Resolution 1973). In response to the call by the UN to protect the Libyan people in March 2011, NATO enforced an arms embargo, which included a no-fly zone and civilian protection under Operation Unified Protector (OUP) and was successfully concluded in October 2011 (NATO 2015). Refusing a NATO intervention to enforce a no-fly zone, Turkey used humanitarian assistance and diplomatic pressures to propose a negotiated ceasefire between Qadhafi and the rebels (Tocci 2011, 3). After unsuccessful efforts to mediate with Qadhafi, Turkey changed its policy and adopted a stronger position in demanding Qadhafi's resignation (Ayata, 2015, 101). The Turkish officials explicitly stated that their policy consists of; a ceasefire, a humanitarian aid corridor, and a transition to a new political order in Libya (Kalin 2011). Thus, to promote the safeguarding of governing institutions, Turkey initially used the instruments of diplomatic pressures and persuasion when it embraced a unilateral approach. In early July 2011, the foreign minister Davutoğlu visited Libya and, after meeting with the Transitional National Council leaders, announced Turkey's recognition of the Council as the legitimate actor (Tugal 2016, 386). Thus, Turkey's initial policy suggested that Turkey aimed at taking unilateral actions to tackle the reordering and restructuring of the political system in Libya rather than following a multilateral approach through concerted actions to address security issues through multilateral institutions such as NATO. While initially refusing to supply armed forces for the NATO operation, the ruling AKP completely changed its policy, insisting on NATO's sole role as the operation's command; dispatched naval forces to help enforce an arms embargo against Libya, and approved military assistance. Siding with NATO, Turkey ceased its initial unilateral, anti-Western approach and demonstrated commitment to its multilateral engagements. Therefore, when Turkey shifted towards a multilateral approach in alignment with NATO, Turkey's instruments to support and promote the governing institutions also changed. Turkey used assistance toward training Libyan security forces, as opposed to the initial support given to the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP), which was unsuccessful in the General National Congress elections in 2012, winning 10% of the votes (Yeşilyurt 2017,72).

When the NATO operation was over, Turkey started to use financial assistance for capacity-development projects and humanitarian aid. According to OECD records, Turkey's humanitarian aid amounted to 50.65 million USD in 2011. As TIKA reports indicate, Turkey directed humanitarian aid mostly at the health sector (TIKA 2011), with aid and medical assistance delivered to those affected by the Turkish Red Crescent both in Turkey and in the town of Al-Keish, amounting at 3.196 tones of humanitarian aid and eight tones of medical assistance (TIKA, 2011). Turkey also provided technical training when the new regime came to power. For example, Turkey offered police academy training to Libyan forces in İstanbul, judiciary training for judicial institutions and constitutions writing as well as small-scale entrepreneurship training (Altunışık 2014, 343).

4.2.1.2. Promoting Democracy in Egypt

When the protests erupted in Egypt and the people gathered in Tahrir Square in January 2011, Turkey succinctly responded and supported the protests. During an interview with Cairo Review, Davutoğlu said,

“Promoting democratic transformation in our region for years, Turkey welcomes Egypt’s peaceful revolution and fully respects the Egyptian people’s sovereign choice. With the revolution, the Egyptian people have embarked upon a historical journey that would bring greater democracy, freedom, stability, and prosperity to its future generations. We believe in Egypt’s democratic vision, and we are fully confident in the Egyptian people’s ability to move forward in unity, solidarity, and determination. The democratic transition period in Egypt will have important repercussions for the entire region, and Egypt’s democratic success will create an important precedent that will inspire other nations” (Davutoğlu, March 12, 2012).

Similarly, the then Prime Minister, Erdoğan, diplomatically pushed Mubarak to accept the people's demands and step down. He further quoted;

“Turkey demonstrates a strong will for democracy, universal law, rights, and freedoms to prevail as well as peace, stability, and harmony in its region. We are the representative of an understanding that wants our other brothers what we want for ourselves. We have made every effort so far and will continue so that brotherly people and neighboring countries do not experience instability and are not dragged into fraternal quarrels.” (Erdoğan, February 01, 2011)

Following the toppling of Mubarak, Turkey used the instrument of financial assistance to shape the political processes. Regarding the policy instrument used by Turkey in Egypt, Turkey used the carrot approach, in other words, positive conditionality, to strengthen the economic and political resources of the regime. In this sense, Turkey's democracy promotion can be utilitarian democracy promotion, which sought to influence the political process of Egypt to build democratic structures by investing through the instruments of democracy assistance. For example, Turkey provided financial assistance to the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party of Mohamed Morsi for political party development, amounting to a 1 billion USD loan in 2012 and 2013 (Reuters 2012), and for financial infrastructure amounting to a 2 billion USD (Bradley 2012). In addition to financial assistance, given its electoral success, political assistance in terms of consultancy and exchange of know-how was provided to Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) by the AKP, with the aim for FJP "to reach the widest section of society to correct the false image that the Muslim Brotherhood aims to monopolize political activity" (Egypt Independent). For example, Turkey hosted a group of young people to observe the process of the parliamentary elections in June 2011, in addition to the visits by al-Wasat linked with Muslim Brotherhood and the April 06 Movement, who met with the then President Abdullah Gül, followed Erdoğan's election rallies, and visited the Republican People's Party (CHP) (Altunışık 2014, 342). This way, Turkey engaged with political advisory and assistance. Morsi then attended the AKP party congress in 2012, publicly expressing his gratitude to Turkey for her support during the uprising (Aydın-Düzgüt 2014). During Erdoğan's visit as Prime

Minister to Egypt, he emphasized the political, social, and economic reforms necessary for democratic transition. He was quoted as "Turk and Arab people should lay claim on their mutual future," which echoed Ottoman nostalgia (Ergin 2013). However, the July 2013 coup against Morsi and the AKP government's support for Morsi, whom Muslim Brotherhood-backed, cast doubt on Turkish foreign policy due to Turkey's sectarian outlook. The July 2013 military coup decreased relations with Egypt as Turkey was considered to pursue a sectarian outlook in its foreign policy (Grigoriadis 2014, 170). Ayata (2015, 97) argued that Turkey's reaction to the ousting of Morsi was so explicitly partisan on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, which resulted in the loss of credibility as a neutral mediator. Decision-makers in Turkey emphasized the legitimate demands of the Egyptian people, underlining the democratic elements of elections and arguing that the inclusion of citizens would ensure political stability and economic development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey). In November 2013, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan criticized Egyptian authorities for Morsi's overthrow and urged them to free him, which culminated in ousting of the Turkish ambassador to Cairo, Huseyin Avni Botsalı (BBC 2013), based on the claims of Erdoğan's provocation and interference in Egypt's internal affairs. This diplomatic move shifted Turkey's positive conditionality to a stick approach, meaning negative conditionality, as Turkey limited its assistance. In addition, Turkey sought to enforce sanctions on Sisi at the global level through the UN Security Council in August 2013, but Egypt intensely lobbied against Turkey's possible candidacy to participate in the UN Security Council (Cagaptay and Sievers 2015). Following the presidential election victory of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in the May 2014 presidential elections, the Turkish government's support for Muslim Brotherhood-backed Morsi changed course, as Saudi Arabia formally designated Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in March 2014 (BBC 2014). With the loss of regional support and expectations of reversing the political power shift in Egypt, Turkey changed its approach as then-President Abdullah Gül extended his congratulations on the victory of General el-Sisi.

Turkey employed financial assistance, diplomacy, and persuasion as instruments of democracy promotion targeting the political process in Egypt, explicitly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Morsi. After the ousting of Morsi, the ruling AKP engaged with diplomatic pressures and negative conditionality, which not only surfaced Turkey's explicit support for an ideologically akin political actor but also deemed Turkey isolated on the international level since its approach did not meet any counterparts at the regional or international level.

4.2.1.3. Promoting Democracy in Syria

Turkey started its attempts to promote democracy in Syria by building upon the existing bilateral agreements and politico-historical ties between both countries. The-then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu described the policy instruments that Turkey pursued in its efforts to safeguard the domestic political settings from further democratic disruptions. Davutoğlu (2014) defined a three-legged policy on Syria at the state, regional, and international levels, which are diplomatic pressures on reforms, regional mechanisms aligned with the Arab League to endorse initiatives such as an observatory role, and the support for a UN Security Council Resolution.

Building upon the existing political relations with the Assad regime, Turkey initially took unilateral actions to support and protect the governing institutions. For example, the initial response by Turkey was to promote reforms by means of diplomatic pressure to induce political opening in Syria; however, Turkey's ability to promote democracy remained limited, as Assad's policy resulted in more than 15,000 deaths as of June (Onis 2012, 9). Initially, the ruling AKP was targeting a democratic transition (Tugal 2016, 391). To this end, as soon as the unfolding of uprisings in Syria erupted, Turkey, along with other regional actors, engaged with diplomatic persuasion as the then-Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Damascus in 2011 (The Guardian 2011). The diplomatic persuasion efforts continued on Turkey's side as Erdogan was quoted saying, "we do not see Syria as a foreign problem; Syria is our domestic problem because we have an 850-

kilometer border with this country, we have historical and cultural ties, and we have a kinship. Therefore, Turkey could never be just a spectator of what was going on in Syria, but on the contrary, Turkey had to hear the voices and do what was necessary” (Erdoğan 2011). Davutoğlu (2013, 869) also stressed Turkey’s efforts on diplomatic pressures on the regime to make reforms and the regime’s resistance to comply with reforms. Despite the regime’s resistance to making reforms and legalizing the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkey insistently continued its efforts to do so with the underlying motivation to establish Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated governments in the Uprising states (Yeşilyurt 2017, 72). Finally, Turkey announced economic and financial sanctions on Syria as all financial relations with Syrian state-owned banks were frozen due to a ban on arms sales. Turkey overtly started to support the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated anti-Assad opposition in Syria, but the Brotherhood lacked widespread support; thus, with increasing violence, more radical and military actors started to gain ground, increasing regional security threats for Turkey and leading Turkey to support militarily effective Islamist groups (Dalacura 2021, 1131). Moreover, it was reported that Turkey facilitated the opposition forces and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to execute their actions against the al-Assad rule (Stack 2011). Turkey’s Syrian policy became even more militarized when twin car bombings occurred in the Southern border town, Reyhanlı, close to the Syrian town Idlib, and resulted in more than 50 casualties on May 11, 2013.

In addition to using democratic pressures and persuasion to support democratic governing institutions, Turkey started to employ humanitarian assistance as the flow of Syrian refugees severed. The OECD data illustrated the rise of ODA relating to the refugee crisis in Syria, which reached 70% of Turkey’s total ODA in 2015. Hosting around 3.7 million official Syrian refugees (UNHCR), the amount of humanitarian assistance Turkey provided reached 8.399 million USD in 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Turkey also received funds from the EU in the framework of the ‘Refugee Facility for Turkey’ to facilitate the refugee crisis,

which Turkey received 2.4. billion Euros between 2016 and 2019 (The European Commission).

4.3. Why did Turkey Enact Democracy Promotion? A Theoretical Analysis

The empirical observations based on targets and instruments of democracy promotion derived from the cases of uprisings in Libya, Egypt, and Syria suggest that two major factors are common in democracy promotion enactment. First, in all three cases; democracy promotion enactment was mainly concentrated on governing institutions and to a lesser extent, political processes. Second, Turkey employed different instruments and they shuffled between different democracy promotion instruments in each case. An important source of this shuffling resulted from Turkey's imbalance between pursuing a unilateral vs. multilateral approach in response to tackling political disruptions and supporting and promoting governing institutions. Turkey opted for diplomatic pressures, persuasion and positive conditionality when it embraced unilateral action while employing negative conditionality and diminishing diplomatic pressures when resorting to multilateral actions through NATO as in the case of Libya or the UN as in the case of Egypt. This section aims to explain what motivated Turkey to enact democracy promotion in each case.

Based on the shared assumption with Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism would take into consideration the increase in Turkey's relative power at the regional level that defines and determines its foreign policy behavior. Next, Neoclassical Realism would explore how relative power is translated through state-level variables to explain a particular foreign policy outcome, that is, democracy promotion enactment between 2000 and 2015. To this end, the analysis takes 'increase in the relative power of Turkey vis-a-vis other actors in the region' as the starting point by analyzing the material capabilities in the given timeframe in comparison to potential regional rivals. This analysis would enable us to understand the regional structure of distribution of power and to define Turkey's relative possession of material capabilities from a comparative perspective from the


perspective of Neoclassical Realism. The analysis is followed by explaining how relative power is translated at the state-level and argues that the increase in Turkey's relative power was translated through the pro-democratic regional leadership role claimed by decision-makers.

4.3.1. Turkey's Relative Power in a Multipolar Region between 2000 and 2015

As in the case of Brazil, the study takes a holistic assessment of system polarity to understand Turkey's positioning for regional distribution of power in terms of material capabilities for the period between 2000 and 2015 in the Regional Security Complex wherein the country is situated. An important factor here is that, due to its geopolitical positioning, as opposed to Brazil, Turkey expands to a wide array of overlapping geographical contexts including; Europe, the Caucuses, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. However, based on the comparative cases, the analysis focuses on Turkey's democracy promotion actions in the MENA. Through this analysis, the material capabilities at the regional level help explore Turkey's regional power in terms of material capabilities and reveal the process resulting in democracy promotion enactment. To this end, the variables are as follows: a) relative population size, b) GDP, c) National Material Capability Index from the Correlates of War (CoW) Project d) SIPRI military expenditure database. Based on this data, the study concurs that between 2000 and 2015, as opposed to the unipolar South America Regional Security Complex led by Brazil, the MENA is characterized by a multipolar regional distribution of power, with a diverse concentration of material capabilities among different states. Including Turkey, six noteworthy countries stand out as regional actors in the MENA region. These are; Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

The World Bank Population data illustrates that, between 2000 and 2015, Turkey and Iran are two leading actors. Turkey's population in 2015 with 78,5 million people accounted for %37,5 whereas Iran's population with 78,4 million also accounted for %37,5 amongst the cases subject to comparison.


Figure 4.4. Comparison of Population in the MENA



Source: The World Bank

In terms of GDP, the figure below shows that Turkey was leading amongst the countries subject to comparison. According to the 2015 data, Turkey accounted for 31,7% of the total GDP of the countries subject to comparison, which is followed by Saudi Arabia with 24%.

Figure 4.5. Comparison of GDP between 2000 and 2015




Source: The World Bank

The figure below compares the CINC data between 2000 and 2015 and shows that Turkey and Iran are the two dominant actors, followed by Saudi Arabia, which illustrates that the region is characterized by a multipolar distribution of material capabilities. The CINC data measures six factors relating to demography, economy,

and military, and demonstrates Turkey’s national capabilities compared to its regional rivals. The CINC is an important variable showing the capability of states to influence other states in a given geographical context. The figure below shows that UAE, Qatar, and Israel lagged behind in terms of CINC, whereas Turkey was closely followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia.


Figure 4.6. National Material Capabilities between 2000-2015



Source: The Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities Data


The military expenditure data shows that Saudi Arabia spent more than Turkey and other countries, and its share of military expenditures in GDP is much higher than that of Turkey and other countries in the analysis. Thus, Turkey is the rivalry with Saudi Arabia while it intersects with UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel.

Figure 4.7. Military Expenditures (USD Current) (2000-2015)



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Figure 4.8. Share of Military Expenditure in GDP (2000-2015)



Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database

Based on these data, from the perspective of the regional security complex, the MENA region is characterized by multipolarity in terms of distribution of capabilities. While Turkey illustrated an increase in material capabilities and was situated in a leading position in terms of CINC data, the country had been in a constant regional rivalry with other actors, most notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. Thus, while Brazil was found in a unipolar distribution of regional context, Turkey was found in a multipolar regional context. An important difference is, though, while Brazil embraced multilateral orientation in its foreign policy despite its unipolar positioning in the region, Turkey took unilateral actions specifically in its democracy promotion enactment towards Arab uprisings. Taking into

consideration the potential for regional instabilities and conflicts in a regional space characterized by power struggle, Turkish decision-makers believed that efforts to transform the MENA region into a unipolar region, one that is led by Turkey, would serve to geostrategic commitments of Turkey and the region itself.

Thus, between 2000 and 2015 multipolar structure pushed decision-makers in Turkey to claim regional leadership within a multipolar regional security complex. The claim for regional leadership stems from decision-makers' understanding of Turkey's material and ideational capabilities. This way, the regional distribution of power was translated at the state-level through the role decision-makers claimed for Turkey. Using Breuning's Role Theory to offer a role-based analysis for the enactment of democracy promotion, the section below discusses the changing role conception of Turkey as a regional leader. A role-based analysis helps to observe how the increase in Turkey's relative power is translated at the state-level, and results in the promotion of democracy. In fact, the system-level variable, that is, the relative increase of material capabilities is translated by decision-makers through two intervening state-level variables: Turkey as a role model and cultural/religious affinity with the region.

4.3.2. Turkey as a pro-democracy regional leader between 2000 and 2015

As for the material capabilities, the system-based analysis in the preceding section provides that relative increase in regional power in addition to opportunities to act incurred by the Arab uprisings in 2011 are two material elements that contributed to the definition of a national role conception of a regional leader by the governing elites. A system-based argument would argue that Turkey promoted democracy to transform the multipolar structure of regional distribution of power toward unipolarity in which Turkey would lead and shape its immediate neighborhood motivated by its geostrategic commitments. In addition to its possessed material capabilities, two unit-level factors contribute to the ideational capabilities of Turkey: the ruling government's possession of ideational capability

in terms of cultural and religious affinity and Turkey's identity as a model for its neighborhood, which was instrumental in defining Turkey's role conception as pro-democratic regional leader between 2000 and 2015, resulting in democracy promotion enactment as a foreign policy behavior.

The system-based analysis shows that Turkey was positioned in a multipolar regional order, in close competition with actors such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel. Therefore, Turkey was found in a realist, security-oriented environment in which the struggle for power was prevailing. In this security-oriented anarchic structure, two systemic pressures erupted as enabling conditions: At the international level, the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and at the state-level, the rise of AKP to political power in 2002, enabled the change in Turkey's role conception.

These two enabling conditions have shaped the ideational capability of Turkey as far as the decision-makers' perceptions of the state's identity in its foreign policy and cultural/religious affinity with the region are concerned. The first enabling condition was pertaining to the influence of the 9/11 attacks on the possible role that Turkey could play region-wise. Turkey, a secular and democratic country with a Western-oriented foreign policy legacy (Onis 2003, 5), and with a historical legacy of modernity, multi-party parliamentary democracy, and free-market economy (Keyman 2009, 36), emerged as a critical state in the region.

In relation to this, the second enabling condition was the electoral victory of the AKP, winning the majority votes of 34%, as a political party embodying a pro-Islamic political ideology molded by a neoliberal outlook, which represented a critical turning point in Turkish politics. Turkey was considered a pivotal state based on identity-based assertions resulting from the decision-makers' reorientation of foreign policy, which turned Turkey into a pivotal state (Keyman 2009, 38). Turkey's strategic partnership with the US was defined by the concept of 'pivotal state' (Chase et al. 2000), in the post-9/11 context. However, it was argued that Turkey's claim to a pivotal state status traces back to the late 1990s (Onis and

Yilmaz 2005, 270). Taşpınar (2011, 2) argued that the AKP's neo-Ottomanism vision shaped Turkey's foreign policy, which perceived itself as a pivotal state with an active role in diplomatic, political, and economic realms in the region and required a nation-state at peace with its multiple identities, including its Muslim and multinational past. Analyzing Turkey as a pivotal state, Keyman (2016) examined Turkey's role in the refugee crisis and the fight against ISIL in 2011 and argued that the instrumentalist understanding of Turkey's role as a buffer state in response to dealing with these crises is not a practical policy approach in the MENA region. Under the influence of these two enabling conditions, the ruling AKP government has shifted Turkey's role conception and enacted democracy promotion.

4.3.2.1. Regional Role Conception in Foreign Policy between 2000 and 2015 under the AKP Government

The coming of AKP to power in 2003 redefined Turkey's regional role. Two interrelated elements in this period enabled the change in Turkey's foreign policy activism and differentiated it from the 1990s: Autonomization and Pluralization of actors in foreign policy.

In the period between 2000 and 2015, Turkish foreign policymaking began to be characterized by increasing autonomy under the ruling government. A major challenge that faced the AKP when it came to power was the military legacy that had dominated Turkey's domestic and foreign policy (Ayata 2015). The AKP, with the claim of representing the suppressed segment of society for their religious and cultural preferences, began to diminish the role of previously established secular political actors in Turkey, including the military. Decisionmakers in the AKP used democratic reforms to diminish the role of military in Turkish politics, while at the international level, the AKP redefined its foreign policy approach by developing relations with Syria and other Arab countries (Ayata 2015, 107). The military's role was particularly dominant in foreign policymaking, especially through the agent of

the National Security Council (NSC). In the context of Turkey's full EU membership prospects, the reforms implemented by the sixth and seventh EU harmonization packages in 2003 significantly diminished NSC's role in foreign policymaking. Reforms in the Constitution and the Legislative abolished the privileged positioning of the military by the 1982 Constitution (Ozbudun 2007, 180), and turned it into a consultant body (Muftuler-Bac 2009, 27). Such institutional restructuring leveraged by the EU reforms, enabled autonomy in foreign policymaking, as the AKP curtailed the legacy and dominance of the military elite from foreign policy. In a sense, the AKP gradually situated in a hegemonic position in the domestic political setting (Onis 2014, 207). With increasing autonomy in foreign policymaking, the ruling government started to advocate for an active foreign policy orientation and developmentalist outlook in foreign policy. Through this redefined policy approach, Turkey's relative power in comparison to other actors in the region could be strengthened. This approach perceived regional integration and cooperation as a means to gain access to other markets or open up new prospects for Turkish industries abroad. Thus, along with autonomization, the pluralization of actors emerged. As noted by Kirişçi (2012, 320), a wide range of geopolitical, domestic, and identity-related developments, together with the diversification of actors, including political parties, business actors, and civil society organizations, could be counted as the changing factors in Turkish foreign policy, compared to the 1990s. In the words of Davutoglu (2008, 83);

“Turkey now enjoys an image as a responsible state which provides order and security to the region, one that prioritizes democracy and liberties, while dealing competently with security problems at home. Turkey's aim is to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central country to global power. It should also be underlined that this transformation is the result of the performance of all actors involved in foreign policy. Turkey's success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous other

organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision.”

The role of business in foreign policy started to become an essential characteristic of the Ozal period, with the espousal of business interests in foreign policy-making. Instead, the reproduction of business elites was peculiar to this particular period. From 2000 until 2015, the “conservative bourgeoisie” emerged as a new class resulting from the rise of political Islam and the emerging industrial centers in Anatolia, which established their business associations to discover market-friendly opportunities and clientelistic business partnerships (Atlı 2011, 116). According to Onis, this period was marked by conservative globalism, molded by liberal and conservative elements, engaging with global economy and democracy principles while preserving their conservative norms (Onis 2009, 22).

Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu, TUSKON (Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists), founded in 2005, was one such example of this new foreign policy agent. Davutoglu (2008, 83) emphasized some actions the civil society actors from the business took, which included TUSKON’s relation with Africa, TUSIAD’s policies for admission to the EU, and MUSIAD’s relations in the Gulf region. With their pro-active attitude, the business actors started to get integrated into the foreign policy-making process by representing their interests (Atlı 2011, 121). The business, as a non-state actor, engaged particularly with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which was considered by the Turkish decision-makers as an instrument aiming to eliminate the authoritarian elements in these countries (Altunışık 2014, 341). Thus, from the 2000s onwards, foreign policy attracted the interest of different actors from civil society as a means to materialize their interests. In this respect, the case of Turkey shows similarity with the case of Brazil, which also experienced ‘autonomy through participation’ in which the foreign policy-making had gained an autonomous structure with the participation of different actors and elimination of the dominant role of the Foreign Ministry, which points to the pluralization of actors in foreign policymaking. Not only the actors from the

business but also the role of civil society organizations started to increase. In addition to the rekindled role of TIKA founded in 1992, Turkey's Disaster and Emergency Management Office, AFAD, and Turkish Red Crescent, Kızılay, have become other agents that assist TIKA to deliver development assistance. Besides, ideologically-driven pro-AKP increased their interest in foreign policy-making. Some examples include; Mazlum-Der, and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH). IHH, organized an aid flotilla, MV Mavi Marmara, to take assistance to Gaza, but was attacked by Israeli troops in international waters on 31 May 2010; resulting in nine Turkish casualties and many wounded (Ozel and Ozcan 2011, 136). As pointed out in our interview with the deputy head of IHH who himself was on the flotilla, civil society increasingly constituted an autonomous role in shaping the foreign policy preferences of Turkey.⁴⁶ In addition, the role of *Diyanet* (Directorate of Religious Affairs) in foreign policymaking increased during the AKP government. Diyanet established religious ties with Africa through assistance via mosque building program and education of Muslim students (Tepeciklioglu et al. 2017).

With autonomization and pluralization, Turkey's interactions with its immediate neighborhood gained impetus as decision-makers redefined Turkish foreign policy in line with foreign policy activism. Davutoglu (2010) stressed that not only the geostrategic motives stemming from regional security concerns but also the normative motives were underlying this foreign policy shift. Thus, the impact of the identity-oriented foreign policy started to gain ground in explaining the redefinition of Turkish foreign policy, as Turkey raised its visibility in the Middle East and North Africa based on shared historical and religious grounds (Aras and Gorener 2010).

The role of Davutoglu and their understanding of Turkey's material and ideational capabilities was a major driver behind the redefinition of Turkish foreign

⁴⁶ Interview with Hüseyin Oruç, IHH, December 2016.

policy during the early years of AKP's tenure. Davutoğlu had emphasized certain principles which differentiated the foreign policy activism under AKP from the preceding periods. These were; "balance between security and democracy, zero problems toward neighbors, proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, multidimensional foreign policy, and rhythmic diplomacy" (Davutoğlu 2010). In proposing these principles, Davutoğlu (2013, 685) emphasized the need for adaptation to the changing regional and international contexts and advocated humanitarian diplomacy, which, he argued, was an essential principle for the multidimensional proactive foreign policy of Turkey. In light of these changing principles, Keyman argued that (2009, 39) Turkish foreign policy had become proactive, while Aras and Açıkmeşe (2012, 45) also posited that Turkish decision-makers claimed a proactive orientation. Onis and Kutlay (2015, 16) explained that during the course of the AKP's first two terms in office, the government heavily invested in humanitarian diplomacy. According to Davutoğlu (2013, 870), further institutional changes in Turkish foreign policy were needed to carry out successful humanitarian diplomacy; which included restructuring of the Foreign Ministry, a durable political authority and strong political will, capable interagency coordination between the ministries and related institutions, and finally public support.

Davutoğlu reproduced the foreign policy activism with his 'strategic depth' thesis stemming from the geostrategic positioning of Turkey and ideational affinity and political and economic ties with the region. Defined as part of "strategic depth" by Davutoglu (2008), Turkey continued to embrace and expand its regional and global influence by pursuing foreign policy activism yet with a different tone. In this concept, Turkey is situated in a geostrategically central location that involves different regional identities pertaining simultaneously to different regional spaces, including Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caspian, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean (Davutoğlu 2008, 78). Kınıklıoğlu (2007) noted that; "from Bosnia to the Crimea, and from Karabakh to Iraq, Turks are constantly reminded about a distinctly Ottoman geopolitical space". According to Aras (2013), Turkey had

notably expanded its regional space resulting from this proactive foreign policy approach. Therefore, moving away from its Western orientation, conceptually, Turkey was recognized as an emerging regional leader in a “civilizational basin,” encompassing the former Ottoman territories and uniting with populations of Muslim and Turkic origins (Bilgin and Bilgiç 2011). In this context, Turkey engaged with foreign policy actions to mediate and improve its strategic interests. Turkey’s attempts to strengthen its capabilities vis-à-vis other regional actors are reinforced by an understanding that a reasonable level of security for its partner states should have been ensured to affirm the role of Turkey as a regional leader. For this reason; Turkey endorsed rapprochement with Syria and Greece, supported the Annan Plan for Cyprus, and took steps to develop diplomatic ties with Armenia and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq, along with mediation efforts in the cases such as; Israel and Syria, Israel and Hamas, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia (Kirişçi 2011, 28). Thus, the ruling government considered the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to act to expand its regional leadership and embraced a more proactive foreign policy (Kirişçi 2011, Huber 2015, Aydın-Düzgüt 2020) gradually. As a corollary, the ruling government reproduced Turkish regional leadership based on Turkey’s potential as a role model for the MENA. It was argued that Turkey’s rapidly growing economy, industrialization, and successful Islamist government were the reasons the ruling government perceived itself as a role model (Ennis and Momani 2013, 1127). NATO’s Secretary-General Rasmussen also stated that Turkey could stabilize the region and act as a role model for democratization (Erlanger 2011).

The process resulting in the enactment of democracy promotion can be explained as follows: Turkey’s relative power vis-à-vis other regional actors, resulting in a multipolar distribution of power. Thus, Turkey’s regional positioning relative to other regional actors led the decision-makers to redefine their foreign policy approach towards a foreign policy activism-oriented approach, aiming to change the regional distribution of power toward unipolarity led by Turkey to retain its regional power and maximize its strategic commitments. As part of their this

approach, the ruling government assumed pro-democracy regional leadership, depending on Turkey's material and ideational capabilities. While in material terms, Turkey was taking advantage of its relatively higher positioning in GDP and CINC data vis-à-vis other regional actors, in terms of ideational capability, the ruling government's heritage of geostrategic positioning, cultural/religious affinity, politico-historical ties, and its capacity as a model in the given period contributed to pro-democracy regional leadership of Turkey. The table below illustrates the elements of material and ideational sources that culminated in the pro-democracy regional leadership between 2000 and 2015.

Table 4.2. Pro-Democratic Regional Leadership Role of Turkey between 2000 and 2015

Pro-Democratic Regional Leadership Role of Turkey between 2000 and 2015		
Material	capability	multilateral positioning vis-a-vis other regional actors
	opportunity to act	Arab Uprisings, 2011
Ideational	identity	model of democracy
	cultural heritage	heritage of geostrategic positioning, cultural/religious affinity, politico-historical ties

Similar to the case of Brazil, domestic imperatives such as the pluralization of actors and the autonomization of foreign policy-making further enabled Turkey's role as a pro-democracy regional leader. Therefore, when democratic disruptions erupted in the region by the Arab Uprisings, Turkey responded with instruments to promote and defend democracy with the motivation to secure and/or maximize its interests and to affirm its regional leadership role. To this end, Turkey used instruments of diplomatic pressures and conditionality to prevent further erosion of democratic institutions, targeting mainly governing institutions and election processes. In the case of Turkey, the instrumentalization of ideological/religious

affinity is more visible than in the case of Brazil due to the support given to Muslim-Brotherhood-backed political actors in the uprising states since having ideologically akin governments could facilitate the fulfillment of the ruling government's geostrategic commitments. Thus, the outcome was democracy promotion enactment as part of foreign policy, which would affirm Turkey's embedded geostrategic commitments and retain its regional power; while affirming pro-democratic regional leadership, thus shifting the regional distribution of capabilities towards a unipolar structure, one led by Turkey. Therefore, decision-makers at the state-level translated Turkey's relative power in the multipolar regional complex by claiming a pro-democratic regional leadership role, which resulted in democracy promotion as a foreign policy behavior when disruptions emerged in its region. Then, what motivated Turkey to promote democracy, albeit shifting approaches in each case? The section below examines the underlying motives and discusses that Turkey was motivated by geostrategic commitments in the cases of Libya, Egypt, and Syria to enact democracy promotion between 2000 and 2015.

4.3.3. Motives of Democracy Promotion between 2000 and 2015: Geostrategic Commitments in Cases of Libya, Egypt, and Syria

A closer reading of Turkey's democracy promotion towards the democratic disruptions in the region is derived from the empirical observation as seen in Table 4.1. and highlights two main findings: First is that Turkey has prevailing geostrategic commitments in each case under study, and second, Turkey's democracy promotion enactment embraced a developmental approach, specifically in cases of Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. In Iraq, Turkey pursued a political approach to promoting democracy by targeting elections as a political process. However, starting from the unfolding of the Arab Uprisings, Turkey intensified its political approach in its democracy promotion enactment, mainly targeting the governing institutions and political processes. However, after the Arab uprisings, when Turkey intensified its political approach, democracy promotion

became incoherent in terms of shifting policy preferences through different instruments.


To illustrate, Turkey's development assistance is based on historical and religious kinship between both countries Afghanistan and Turkey (Bayer and Keyman 2012). Tracing back to an agreement signed between both countries in 1921, Turkey's assistance in Afghanistan focused on the modernization of the military and the reforms on governing institutions and the education sector.⁴⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined a four-legged foreign policy in Afghanistan based on territorial integrity, security, stability, participatory political structure, and maintenance of peace by eradicating terrorism (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey).

As the Taliban regime ended in 2001, Turkey's democracy promotion efforts intensified with the aim of restructuring the domestic political setting. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey stated that development assistance for Afghanistan started in 2001 and amounted to 1.1 million USD, which was the largest assistance program Turkey had developed for a country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey). Turkey's promotion of democracy in Afghanistan was aligned with a developmental approach. TIKA's development assistance targeted different sectors of Afghan society. For example, in 2013, TIKA organized training called 'Combatting Terrorism and Organized Crime' for a group of thirty Afghan Judges and Prosecutors in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice (TIKA 2013). Between 2005 and 2014, Turkey conducted approximately eight hundred projects, including education, health, sanitation, agriculture and transportation (TIKA 2015). As of 2019, TIKA indicated Afghanistan the leading recipient of assistance in the least developed countries, amounting to 32,94 million USD in 2019 (TIKA 2019, 28).

⁴⁷ Interview with retired Colonel, Ankara, 18 July 2017

Turkey’s assistance was also extended into the military sector. For example, Turkey commanded the ISAF, International Security Assistance Force, in 2001 and 2009, trained over fifteen thousand Afghan military personnel, while financially assisting with equipment amounting to 50 million USD, trainings amounting to 7 million USD, and medical assistance above 180 million USD (Gurcan 2014). Furthermore, TIKA engaged with vast education infrastructure projects in Afghanistan. For example, Turkey developed a capacity-building project for Kabul Military High School, founded by Turkey in 1935 (TIKA 2015). In addition, the figure below illustrates the allocation of technical cooperation and humanitarian aid (in millions of USD) in ODA since 2002.

Figure 4.9. Technical cooperation and humanitarian aid in Afghanistan since 2002



Source: The OECD

Afghanistan case illustrates that Turkey’s assistance both through technical cooperation and relatively lower levels of humanitarian aid, along with its military involvement through multilateral international settings, targeted advancement in governing institutions and civil society development to prevent the breakdown of the political regime, hence indirectly promoting democracy.

Iraq is another case of strategic importance for Turkey. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey’s strategic importance as a regional actor increased (Yeşilyurt 2017). At the beginning of the 2000s, the regional context was

characterized by political volatility induced by the end of the Iraqi war after the aftermath of Iraq's invasion in 2003.

Therefore, the initial promotion of democracy practices in the Middle East took place in the aftermath of the Iraq war, which affected Turkey's foreign policy orientation to a great extent.⁴⁸ The democracy promotion efforts in Iraq in 2005 targeted the political process, namely the first elections for the war-torn Iraqi society and constitutional referendum. With respect to the Iraqi Constitution in preparation, then-President Ahmet Necdet Sezer emphasized in his parliamentary speech that Iraq's territorial integrity and democratic functioning institutions were Turkey's strategic interest for regional stability, which was quoted on October 01, 2005,


“It is our great hope to see the Iraqi overcoming the hard times with success. For Iraq to reach achieving welfare, will not only be a major interest for the region and the international society, but also for the neighborhood. In case of Iraq's dragging into chaos, the impact will not only confide into Iraq itself but also will reflect on the region. Being conscious of this necessity, Turkey pursues an approach that entails a democratic Iraq whose territorial integrity and national unity are preserved, is in peace with their neighbors and is prosperous. Particularly with contributing to the constitutional preparation and sharing our own experience with our democratic structure, our dense dialogue with all fractions of Iraq will continue. Turkey, particularly with Neighboring Countries Initiative, will keep on maintaining its leading role and its effective policies based on Iraq's stability and integrity at multiple levels.” (Sezer, October 1, 2005)

Underlying that an unstable Iraq would have consequences not only for the region but for the wider international society, Turkey's main strategic interest was preserving Iraq's integrity and unity. Therefore, stabilizing democratic institutions and ensuring elections were the primary target of Turkey's democracy promotion

⁴⁸ On the role of the Middle East in shaping foreign policy of Turkey, see Oğuzlu (2008).

enactment. To this end, Turkey employed diplomacy as well as development assistance. As for development assistance, both technical cooperation (grey) and humanitarian aid (yellow) were the tools disposable in Turkey’s foreign policy, the components of overall official development assistance (blue). The figure below shows the total ODA, humanitarian aid, and technical cooperation amounts allocated since 2002. It is observed that after 2002, Turkey raised its assistance on humanitarian aid and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid had larger amounts compared to technical cooperation.

Figure 4.10. Humanitarian aid, Technical Cooperation and Net ODA in Iraq since 2002.




Source: The OECD

Turkey’s foreign policy orientation in Iraq echoed the focus on multilateral actions. In 2003, Turkey founded “Iraq’s Neighboring Countries Process” which aimed at concerting regional collective security mechanism to stabilize Iraq (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey).

Turkey actively used diplomatic means to influence political process when Sunnis refused to participate in the first free elections in January 2005, which was yielding in the empowerment of the Shia majority and the Kurds; yet, Turkish efforts facilitated the involvement of Iraqi Sunnis by going to the ballot box on December 15, 2005 general elections (Binyon 2010). In 2006, the then President İbrahim Caferi visited and thanked Prime Minister Erdoğan for his support. During

a press conference following Caferi’s visit, Erdoğan paid attention to the terrorist attacks in Iraq and was quoted; “Not a single Sunni could attempt bombing Ehlibeyt Tomb. That does not seem possible. Both political and religious governing bodies should stand tall against the aspirations and aims of terrorist organizations in Iraq” (Hurriyet 2006). Observations of a retired military colonel who worked in the field of assistance in the region in the given time period stated in the interview that the support given to the Sunnis’ involvement in the political process demonstrated the realist, security-oriented motivations with underlining religious and sectarian outlook; arguing that ensuring higher levels of participation by the Sunni in the election served to fulfill Turkey’s security interests. This contention points to Turkey’s objective being stability in its immediate region. According to Hale (2009, 146), instability in northern Iraq could have a severe impact on Turkey’s internal Kurdish problem, which is why Turkey opted to support the establishment of a strong and effective government in Iraq in order to preserve the regional balance of power to ensure regional security and stability. Regarding Turkey’s actions in integrating the Sunni population into the domestic political system, Davutoğlu (2008, 86) stressed that; Turkey’s diplomatic engagements with other regional actors, its diplomatic persuasions over the US, and its principled bilateral relations with Iraq constituted Turkey’s structured strategy in Iraq. In addition, the economic interests through trade were an essential component of strategic ties with Iraq. The figure below shows the increasing Turkish export since 2003. As to the latest data from World Bank, Iraq is the fourth biggest partner of Turkey in terms of export.

Figure 4.11. Export in Iraq since 2002



Source: The World Bank

The examination of reports by TIKA since 2010 illustrates the projects developed in the health and education sectors. In this regard, Iraq is a strategic partner for Turkey for security and economic concerns, in which the stability of the country is of utmost importance for the security of Turkey and the region. Therefore, democracy promotion efforts through purposeful actions via means of diplomacy and assistance aimed at preventing the breakdown of functioning political processes.

Africa constitutes an essential segment of Turkish development assistance and illustrates Turkey's developmental approach to democracy promotion. Opening its first embassy in 1979, Turkey's assistance in Africa traces back to the post-Cold War context; when Turkey joined the United Nations Peace Force and Observatory Missions in 1993-1994 and the operations undertaken by the UN; UNOSOM I, and UNOSOM II in 1993, followed by Africa policy initiative by the Turkish government in 1998. During the AKP period, Sub-Saharan Africa, abundant in energy resources, became geostrategically important to decrease Turkey's energy dependence on Russia and Iran. Although Turkey sought to maximize its political and economic benefits, its engagement in Somalia nurtured Turkey's ambition to construct her identity and affirm it at international and state levels (Sucuoğlu and Stearns 2016, 23). It was not until a change in foreign policy narrative towards a multidirectional foreign policy in 2005 that 'African initiative' in foreign policy became vocal and assertive, aiming at reviving the 'opening to Africa' policy initiated in 1998 (Ozkan and Orakci 2015). This new policy initiative, it was argued, rested on three pillars: First is humanitarianism, second is; the implementation of development policies, and third is the role of Turkey at regional and global dimensions (Ozkan and Orakci 2015, 346).


Building on the existing historical ties with Somalia, drought and famine in 2011 provided Turkey with an opportunity to act to exercise its soft power and manifest its regional role. Erdoğan claimed responsibility for the international community to restore stability and peace in Somalia through collective actions

(Erdoğan October 10, 2011). In September 2011, Erdoğan addressed the UN General Assembly and was quoted;

“Turkey has launched an aid campaign for Somalia, collecting \$300 million within the last two months. It also organized an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that resulted in more than \$350 million in pledges, and has undertaken various projects, ranging from transport and agriculture to education and construction of roads, hospitals and schools...by re-opening its embassy in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, Turkey has shown the world that claims of security challenges cannot be an excuse for delaying assistance...In addition to alleviating the humanitarian situation, it is also necessary to act urgently to support efforts to build peace and stability in Somalia” (Erdoğan September 23, 2011).

Turkish aid in Somalia started during 2011 famine and expanded to assistance and trainings for infrastructure, health and education. The following figure shows the humanitarian aid in Somalia as part of Turkey’s ODA.

Figure 4.12. Humanitarian aid (USD Millions) in ODA by Turkey in Somalia since 2002



Source: The OECD

According to OECD data, the development assistance targeting development cooperation and capacity-building projects in the health and education sectors reached 125 million USD in total ODA. In 2011, TIKA founded a coordination office in Mogadishu to execute the operations in Somalia (TIKA 2016). In 2012, over four hundred Turkish universities provided education aid for students, universities and schools in Mogadishu (Achilles et al., 2015). In addition to capacity building in the health and education sectors, Turkish officials offered significant technical assistance. Some examples are training of Somali diplomats by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local municipalities, and medical training for doctors and managers working at the Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital (Achilles et al. 2015). Referring to TIKA's role and projects carried out in Somalia, and in Africa in general, Erdoğan drew attention to the shifting role of Turkey from a recipient to a donor of assistance. Erdoğan stated;


“When we came to power, Turkey was a recipient country before 2002; but we closed down that era through our growing economy, and graduated to a donor country. At this point, our annual assistance exceeded 2.5 billion USD; we achieved it. Why? Because we know that the giving hand is more auspicious than the receiving one. In the last 11 years, we transferred more than 1 billion TL of funds to merely TIKA. This represents an increase of 335 percent on the earlier times” (TIKA 2014).

Business actors in Turkey benefited from Turkey's opening to Africa by securing strategic infrastructure deals, such as the construction and management of the airport and seaport in Mogadishu (Sucuoğlu and Stearns 2016, 20). Examples include; 35 million USD allocated for the renovation of Digfeer hospital in Mogadishu, which was renamed the Somalia-Turkey Training and Research Hospital (Achilles et al. 2015).

The figure below shows the increase in Turkish exports in Somalia. Turkey increased the percentage of exports in Somalia in 2017 by 98% compared to 2011. The exports not only raised in amount, but Turkey has also diversified the export

commodities. Besides the trade relations, the Turkish government provided direct budget support to the Somali Central Bank amounted to US\$4.5 million per month between June and December 2013 (Achilles et al. 2015).

Figure 4.13. Total exports in Somalia since 2002



Source: The OECD

Somalia is also an intriguing case to discuss the role of ideational affinity in guiding Turkish development assistance policy in the particular and foreign policy of Somalia in general. It was argued that Erdoğan chose Somalia as leverage for Turkey's role as a global actor by capitalizing on its ties with Muslim Brotherhood (Cannon 2016, 99). In other words, Somalia offered an opportunity to reinforce Turkey's image as a soft power at the global level (Lough 2012). Turkey's political and economic interests in Somalia motivated Turkey to fulfill this role. On the one hand; politically, Turkey's Somalia initiative would legitimize its existence in Africa and strengthen its global role; on the other, economically, Somalia had rich underground sources such as minerals and energy, which had critical significance for business actors in Turkey; especially in the maritime and construction sector (Akpınar 2013, 748). Observable implications imply that the main objective of Turkey in Somalia was to deliver urgent aid and development assistance and develop state capacity through technical and financial assistance. Strategically driven economic interests were a driver for the ruling party's interest in development assistance, culminating in a developmental approach to democracy promotion enactment.

Despite these economic interests, a severe security concern was terrorism originating from Somalia, triggered by the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabaab. Turkey had faced terrorist attacks on its humanitarian forces and diplomatic missions in Somalia. For example, in April 2011, a bomb attack in Mogadishu on a group of Turkish Red Crescent killed several Somalis and three Turkish officers and in August 2013, an explosives-laden car hit the housing of the Turkish embassy staff in the Somali capital and killed a Turkish police officer (Timocin 2013). It was argued that Al-Shabaab used these attacks as a warning to Turkey, in response to their lost control of the significant local trade-in Mogadishu and their charcoal trade, because African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces interrupted the trade routes, resulting in declining local revenues (Kabandula and Shaw 2018, 2319). Due to the rising security concerns and volatility in Somalia throughout the region, According to Kabandula and Shaw (2018, 2323), Turkey's political and security engagement with Somalia resulted in militarization, stemming from Turkish involvement in the region along with its allies, mainly Qatar, and adversaries such as; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Nevertheless, Turkey resisted the threats posed by al-Shabaab, continued its democracy promotion efforts, and pursued a multilateral orientation, as illustrated by the High-Level Partnership Forum on Somalia organized in Istanbul in February 2016.

The Balkans constitute a salient place in the foreign policy of Turkey both regionally and historically, due to the Ottoman legacy. In the post-Cold War context, Turkey had an opportunity to enact democracy promotion. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized not only the material factors including the security-oriented and economic-driven interests but also the ideational elements pertaining to ethnic and cultural diversity, and religion, which made foreign policy toward the Balkans driven by “regional ownership” and “inclusiveness”, of all ethnic, sectarian and linguistic groups (Davutoğlu, 2011, 6). With this perspective, Turkey participated in the collective regional mechanisms initiated by the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), the Implementation Force (IFOR),

Kosovo Force (KFOR), and the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Kosovo (Linden and İrepoğlu 2013, 232).

The course of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans demonstrated continuity, stemming from the regional stability and economic interests and change and the increasing emphasis on cultural, religious and identity kinship. An example of economic relations is when Turkish-Kosovar bilateral trade volume reached 248.750 million USD in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey) whereas Turkish-Bosnia and Herzegovina bilateral trade volume amounted to USD 543 million in 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey). Additionally, Turkey is known as one of the top three investors in Kosovo and owns Kosovo's main airport as well as the power company (Hopkins and Pitel 2021). Turkey has been a major trading partner and is heavily involved in major infrastructure projects across the Balkans, where it has financed the construction of some of the region's largest mosques (Hopkins and Pitel 2021).


A major element of foreign policy in the Balkans is the instrumental role of identity. In fact, governing elites considered the identity as a means to restructure Turkey in the region and reconstruct the political domain through identity, aligned with the legacy of Ottoman Empire (Yavuz 1998, 34). In this sense even though the Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans have not changed fundamentally since the 1990s, the methods and the instruments are different as the religious discourse started to become dominant.⁴⁹ For example, in its development assistance, TİKA provided assistance to the existing Islamic community in their sociopolitical settings (Oktem 2010, 29). Although economic relations with the Balkans started to constitute increasing importance, the role of non-state actors in Turkish and Muslim communities in the Balkans gained much relevance in guiding foreign policy (Rüma 2010, 134). However, as religion gained much relevance for Turkish assistance policies in the Balkans; conflicts of interests emerged between actors,

⁴⁹ Interview with a retired Colonel, Ankara, 18 July 2017.

such as TIKA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and religious communities, such as the Gülen Cemaat and other Nurcu communities (Oktem 2010, 41).

As the Arab uprisings erupted in 2011, the MENA increasingly became the main axis in Turkish foreign policy, with opportunities to act provided by disruptions in Libya, Egypt, and Syria in addition to the relative power that Turkey possessed in a multipolar region. Turkey used all policy instruments to promote democracy in the uprising states (see Börzel et al 2014). For example, Turkey prioritized diplomacy by using persuasion and military intervention in Libya and Syria, while Turkey also used negative conditionality by sanctions and employed assistance for financial and technical restructuring (Ayata 2015, 100). In all cases, Turkey used development assistance as shown in the figure below, which illustrates Syria as the highest beneficiary of ODA.

Figure 4.14. ODA (USD Million) in Egypt, Libya, Syria since 2010




Source: The OECD

Nevertheless, ODA is not sufficient to argue that Turkey promoted democracy through a coherent foreign policy. In all three cases, Turkey had geostrategic commitments stemming from embedded geostrategic and economic ties, which motivated the enactment of democracy promotion.

4.3.3.1. Geostrategic Commitments in Libya

As emphasized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, politico-historical ties with Libya attach importance to the security and welfare of the country.⁵⁰ Libya has been a strategic partner for Turkey's economy before the uprisings unfolded. The below figure shows that the export has significantly increased during the early 2000s, yet decreased sharply after 2010 and peaked around 2014.

Figure 4.15. Export of Turkey in Libya since 2002



Source: The World Bank

In fact, when international sanctions against Libya are abolished in the early 2000s, Turkey aimed to further enhance economic ties with Libya during the then prime minister's visit to Libya in 2009 (Kardaş 2011). When the uprisings unfolded in Libya, Turkey's major strategic concern was to secure its economic interests and investment and to repatriate Turkish citizens living and working in Libya (Tocci 2011, 3; Altunışık 2014, 343). It should also be noted that Turkey has conducted the largest evacuation effort in the country's history for Turkish citizens living and working in Libya, during which, a Turkish worker was killed (Karvey 2011).

At the onset of the uprisings in Libya, Turkey was not able to balance its unilateral and multilateral actions. Strong geostrategic and economic interests

⁵⁰Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/bilateral-relations-between-turkey-and-libya.en.mfa>

underlined Turkey's initial unilateral approach. Initially, Turkish economic investments and a large Turkish population working in Libya impeded Turkey to endorse protests against the Qadhafi regime (Dalacura 2021, 1130). The strategic agreement signed between Libya and Turkey illustrates the significance of geostrategic interests, extending the security and military cooperation to energy exploration, which would likely cause significant consequences for the security of the region (Butler and Gumrukcu 2019). Rivalry for gas in the eastern Mediterranean has been a major geostrategic motivation for Turkey. In fact, the establishment of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, EMGF, by Egypt, Israel, and Cyprus and plans to build a gas pipeline between Greece and Italy, EastMed, was significantly reducing Turkey's relative power in the region (Colombo and Varvelli 2020, 85). Therefore, the agreement with Libya was crucial leverage, which bestowed Turkey with the right to explore gas and strengthened Turkey's relative power vis-à-vis Greece in terms of the route of energy transportation in the region (Colombo and Varvelli 2020, 85). Despite the vested economic interests before the uprisings started in Libya, Turkey upheld a unilateral approach as the uprisings intensified, which contrasted its alignment with multilateral commitments through collective security mechanisms incurred by NATO. With the involvement of the UN and NATO, Turkey had to realign with its multilateral commitments. Considering the need to balance the powers of regional actors in this region, Turkey's unilateral approach had to align with its multilateral commitments in order to preserve its economic and security interests.

4.3.3.2. Geostrategic Commitments in Egypt

In Egypt, Turkey's use of democracy promotion instruments aimed at strengthening its role in the region vis-à-vis a historically competing rival in the region, Egypt, through democracy support policies overtly given to politically and ideologically akin Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Morsi. Yet, Turkey's response to the Morsi's overthrow resulted in the collapse of democracy support policies, culminating in an increased risk of trade for Turkey. Altunışık (2014, 343) argued the overthrow of Morsi finished the AKP government's assistance to promote


democracy, thus increasing the risk for Turkey's economic interests in Egypt, while Börzel et al. (2015) argued that the AKP support for Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi jeopardized its economic interests.

Egypt and Turkey are two countries that have had aspirations for regional leadership historically. The national roles both countries claimed as leaders of the region trace back to the Cold War period. While Nasser's role conception as leader traces back to the decolonization period between 1950s and 1970s, Turkey maintained a pivotal⁵¹ role due to its Western alignment (Magued 2016, 303). However, since the 1990s, in addition to its Western alignment, Turkey's shift toward foreign policy activism targeting its extended region including the Middle East raised concerns on part of Egypt. Although the strategic interests of Egypt and Turkey converged with Iraq as a sovereign nation-state with territorial integrity in 2003 (Abou-El-Fadl 2009, 237) or in their positioning relating to Iran's nuclear program (Magued 2016, 304), their approaches in other major regional issues diverged significantly. In fact, Turkey's foreign policy activism resulted in Egypt's counterbalancing actions and resistance in the region. A major example is; Egypt's ambition to engage with Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the only mediator and Turkey's position in supporting Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Hamas in Palestine. In 2006, Hamas's electoral victory against opposition Fatah justified the AKP's support for Hamas, as illustrated by the visit of its leader Khaled Mashaal's to the AKP party conference in February 2009, which sided the AKP with hardline Islamist movement, Hamas, that was labelled a 'terrorist' (Dalacura 2021, 1136). In fact, skeptical of Turkey's regional role, the Mubarak regime was concerned by the coming of Hamas to power in 2006, which raised fears that the Islamic opposition, notably the Muslim Brotherhood, might gain political ground in Egypt; leading Egypt to prevent the entrance of the pro-Islamic NGO's, aid flotilla to Gaza (Magued 2016, 303). Known as the *Mavi Marmara* incident, Israeli forces attacked the aid flotilla on May 31, 2010, resulting in ten deaths and many casualties.

⁵¹ See Fuller (2007) for Turkey as a pivotal state.

Although the Mavi Marmara incident caused a diplomatic crisis in Turkish-Israeli relations, it confirmed Turkey’s support for the Palestinian cause and some Arabic media reports hailed Erdoğan as ‘the new Nasser’ (Samaan 2013, 62), as Turkey’s demonstrative effect was strengthened (Kirisci 2011, 43). Therefore, due to their contrasting stances in political issues, strategic ties between Turkey and Egypt were only limited to economic relations (Magued 2016, 304). Despite the political frictions, Egypt is a key country in Turkey’s trade relations. The figure below shows the trade balance between both countries which illustrates that even after 2010, the trade balance between both countries increased, irrespective of different political stances.

Figure 4.16. Trade Balance between Turkey-Egypt (2000-2015)



Source: The World Bank

Following the Uprisings, the decision-makers in Turkey considered an opportunity to maximize economic interests in Egypt, thus using assistance to expand its regional influence and maintain regional stability (Altunışık 2014, 345). An example of Turkey’s efforts to expand its economic tie would be the three-year ‘Ro-Ro’ (Roll-on Roll-off) agreement signed between In Egypt and Turkey in March 2012 to facilitate the access of Turkish exports into the Gulf region (Alsahary 2014). However, following the toppling of Morsi and Turkish harsh criticism against Sisi, Egypt terminated the agreement, which strongly diminished Turkey’s economic benefits in the Gulf region (Alsahary 2014).

4.3.3.3. Geostrategic Commitments in Syria

Turkey's strategic commitments in Syria tracing back to the post-Cold War period encompassed serious security issues. During the 1990s, a prevailing component of strategic ties with Syria was concerning terrorism by PKK, Partiya Kerkeran Kurdistan, Workers Party of Kurdistan. Posing a severe threat for Turkey's territorial integrity, the decision-makers viewed relations with Syria from a security perspective while support given to the PKK by Syria was instrumental to contain any ambition of the Kurdish population in Syria (Altunışık and Tür 2006, 233). As a result of incremental political and military tension, Syria decided to oust Ocalan from Damascus (Altunışık and Tür 2006, 237). Following the resolution of this political crisis in 1998, both parties signed Adana Accords on 20 October 1998, and relations began to enhance in the 2000s, which had four main reasons. First, civil and military elites were satisfied by the security cooperation, second, the Ecevit government endorsed a region-oriented foreign policy, third, the importance Syria for Turkey's presence in the Middle East, and finally, Syria's role as an economic partner (Altunışık and Tür 2006, 240). Rapprochement between Syria and Turkey expanded into military cooperation due to the mutual security concerns regarding a possible disintegration and a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq as a corollary of the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003 (Altunışık and Tür 2006, 241). In addition to the improving ties in political and security issues, economic ties began to improve as well. Both parties signed a free trade agreement on 22 December 2004, which entered into force in 2007 (UNCTAD), aiming at promoting trade cooperation and eliminating barriers such as abolition of custom duties (World Bank). Final strategic tie between Syria and Turkey consists of the water conflict in relation to the co-management of the Euphrates and Tigris Basin⁵². Although the analysis of the origins of the water dispute extends the scope of this study⁵³, it is

⁵²The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers originate in Turkey, crossing Syria and Iraq. In Euphrates, Turkey constitutes the 90% of the water flow while Syria constitutes the rest and for the Tigris, Turkey constitutes 40%, Iraq 51% and Iran 9% (Kibaroglu and Scheumann, 2013).

⁵³ See, Kibaroglu (2014).

worth noting that High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC) meetings, the first of which took place on 22-23 December 2009 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey) in Damascus, represented the political will regarding rapprochement between both parties. In fact, Syria and Turkey drafted protocols concerning possible models to manage and control the Basin (Kibaroglu and Schuemann 2013, 291).

In Syria, Turkey first enacted democracy promotion through diplomatic pressures targeting the breakdown of governing institutions. Turkey's initial policy to support democracy would also serve Turkey's politico-economic interests; a peaceful, democratized environment, in which marketization could be pursued aggressively, would be beneficial to Turkish business as well (Tugal 2016, 391). Hence, Turkey's initial motivation was to ensure the vested security interests developed at the onset of the 2000s. However; the diverging policies of the decision-makers raised regional security threats at the expense of supporting the opposition forces in Syria, which undermined Turkey's efforts of principled democracy promotion. Thus, before the uprising in 2011, rapprochement with Syria was contributing immensely to Turkey's soft power, but Turkey's policy tackling the Uprising in Syria cast doubt on its regional influence (Sever 2020, 145).

Reyhanlı town bombings in 2013 was a critical turning point that damaged the AKP government's efforts of democracy promotion in Syria. Due to the increasing levels of security concerns triggered by car bombings in 2013 in Reyhanlı, Turkey's Syria policy has led to harsh domestic political discussions in 2013, between Erdoğan and the leader of the main opposition party, CHP, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who blamed Erdogan as a 'murderer' over Reyhanlı car bombings in Turkey (Çandar 2013). The then Interior Minister Muammer Guler stated that "This incident was carried out by an organization which is in close contact to pro-regime groups in Syria and I say this very clearly, with the Syrian Mukhabarat", which was denied by Syrian Information Minister Omran al-Zoub (BBC 2013). The dire consequences of Turkish foreign policy were also reflected in the public opinion

surveys. The Turkish Perceptions Survey in 2015 conducted by the German Marshall Fund highlighted a strong isolationist tendency among the Turkish public regarding foreign policy in Syria. 70 percent of respondents said that Turkey should deal first with its internal problems; only 20 percent said that Turkey should play a more active role in the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asia. 51 percent of respondents disapproved of the foreign policy, while 41 per cent approved of it.

As much as Turkey was involved in humanitarian assistance, it also was dragged into security threats and overt military action as a result of the ISIL bombing of Suruç in 2015, after Kobanê was taken from ISIL by the People's Protection Units (YPG). Turkey's approach in Syria confirms the neoclassical realist argument that not only systemic pressures concerning security issues at the regional level but also, the decision-makers' understanding of Turkey's capabilities to tackle the growing security threats has also constrained Turkey's foreign policy outcome. In northern Syria, the Syrian wing of the PKK, the Party of the Democratic Union (PYD), and growing Kurdish autonomy became a critical threat in the eyes of the ruling government and restricted Turkey's room for maneuver. Assad's response to the Erdogan government further raised security concerns for Turkey, which included; a citizenship agreement to Syrian Kurds, a cut of intelligence sharing on the PKK, and leaving the control of Kobanê to the PYD, resulting in the gradual formation of an autonomous Western Kurdistan (Rojava) in 2013 and 2014 (Tugal 2016, 396). The case of Syria also worsened the relations with Russia, when a Russian jet was shot down by the Turkish F-16s and Russia increased its support for the PYD (Yeşilyurt 2017, 77). The case of Syria significantly reduced the material capability of Turkey to exercise its role as a regional leader, as Turkey aimed at maintaining the regional balance of power and preserving its interests that conflicted with those of Russia. Russia advocated respect for sovereignty claiming that intervention in Syria is a violation of sovereignty, as opposed to Turkey's policy for regime change in Syria (Onis and Yilmaz 2015, 81). However, due to its reduced material capabilities emanating from increasing threats posed by terrorism and Russia's positioning in supporting the Al-

Assad regime, Turkey changed its unilateral approach and adopted a multilateral orientation. An example of this policy shift is Turkey's involvement in the three-wat summit in Sochi, Russia, organized on November 22, 2017, with Syria and Iran. With the objective of state-building, emphasizing inclusiveness of all societal fractions, Russia proposed 'Syrian National Dialogue Congress' to ensure national unity guaranteed by a new constitution and elections that would entitle Al-Assad, which met Turkey's resistance to excluding Syrian Kurds that played a decisive role in combatting ISIS, claiming their links with terrorist groups in Turkey (Wintour 2017). Adopting a unilateral orientation, Turkey's motive was to decrease security threats and reclaim its active role in shaping its immediate neighborhood, through the Syrian congress.

On Turkey's part, decision-makers in Turkey considered their democracy support policies during uprisings as an opportunity for affirming their own democratic image, which resonated in Tunisia or Libya, Turkey as a model (Ayoob 2012). The general elections in 2011 also served to Turkey's role in the region. The ruling AKP's electoral victory securing 49,8% of the votes with 327 seats⁵⁴, in three consecutive years, consolidated its domestic political power. As Aydin-Duzgit (2020, 273) argued, the electoral victory of the ruling AKP in 2011 contributed to its claim to the regional leadership role even more assertively. Yet, the period after the 2011 elections in Turkey was also characterized by growing democratic reversal, as shown by declining figures in political and civil liberties, as Freedom House ranked Turkey 'not free' in its 2019 report (Freedom House 2019). Additionally, Turkish Islamic actors increasingly became autocratic due to the stalemate in relations between Turkey and the EU, and shifting regional dynamics ensuing Arab uprisings (Somer 2016, 13). Thus, ideological/religious elements became more pronounced. The ruling party's ideological/religious affinity in the Uprising states contributed to its pro-democratic regional leadership role. Tugal (2016, 388) emphasized that decision-makers instrumentalized ideological heritage

⁵⁴ Supreme Election Council of Turkey.

in their policy toward the Arab uprisings. To this end, as the then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu argued, Turkey had to either continue its relations with rulers in the uprising countries or support the protests to defend fundamental democratic principles and rights (Davutoğlu 2013). In addition, Davutoğlu stated that;

“Our government, therefore, made an unequivocal decision from the very first day of the Arab Spring to extend our assistance to the people of the region, so that they could enjoy the same universally acknowledged rights as their peers do elsewhere in the world. We refused to stand idly by as the basic democratic rights enjoyed by the Turkish people were denied to others by violence and oppression. We thus called for peaceful and gradual political transformation, such that the new regional governments could be shaped by the popular demands of their citizens. When some Arab regimes ignored such calls, we did not hesitate to support the people’s legitimate struggle for reinstating popular sovereignty as the basis of political authority and regional stability.”⁵⁵

In its foreign policy in reaction to Arab uprisings, religious affinity manifested itself drastically and raised critical voices regarding Turkey’s sectarian outlook that guided its foreign policy. Davutoğlu (2013, 869) strongly rejected this sectarian argument. He was quoted as saying;

“I do not share the idea of an inevitable threat that would unfold through a Sunni-Shiite division, akin to a Cold-War mentality, in an area encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Such an understanding and political division do not exist in the humanitarian diplomacy perspective of Turkey. The sectarian theses of disintegration are concentrated on Syria, and Turkey’s policy has been accused by some circles of sectarianism. If the ruler were a Muslim who oppressed Christians in Syria, we would equally be against him/her. There is no discrimination made in either the refugee policy that we implement or the humanitarian aid that we provide”.

⁵⁵ Supreme Election Council of Turkey.

Nevertheless, Turkey was drawn into enduring sectarian conflicts, such as the Sunni-Shiite rivalry, especially in the Syrian case (Onis 2014, 206). For example, the AKP supported the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Syrian opposition and was criticized for overlooking radical Islamist fractions such as; Al Nusra and ISIS (Sommer 2016, 13). The likelihood of Muslim Brotherhood-backed governments close to the AKP in the uprising states motivated decision-makers in Turkey to assume a regional leadership role (Aydin-Duzgit 2019, 10). Turkey's claim for regional leadership was further bolstered by the compatibility of Turkey's political and economic environment with Islamic elements; such as the coupling of democracy and Islam and Islamic coalitions in business (Hinnebusch 2014, 15). Therefore, democracy promotion as part of Turkish foreign policy activism instrumentalized religious affinity. As the MENA increasingly became the main axis in Turkish foreign policy, the ruling government considered the links with Muslim Brotherhood-backed political actors a major factor driver in response to the Arab Uprisings. It should be noted that the AKP's guidance for the Muslim Brotherhood political parties trace even before the emergence of the Arab Uprisings in 2011. Turkey's policy toward Islamist movements in the region including the Egypt and Syria branches of the Muslim Brotherhood date back to 1970 when Necmettin Erbakan, the leading figure of the Milli Görüş Hareketi – Sunni Islamist National Outlook Movement that the AKP emerged from (Yeşilyurt 2017, 70) founded the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (Ozkan 2019, 7). To illustrate, when Erbakan, then prime minister of Turkey, visited Egypt, Mubarak criticized him for his close relations with Muslim Brotherhood and he offered mediation with the Brotherhood to enable its integration into Egyptian politics, based on kinship with Erbakan's party Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) (Stein 2014, 40). In relation to Syria⁵⁶, it is argued that even though overt support for the Brotherhood was not the official foreign policy under Erbakan, Turkey's intelligence and security forces established ties to the Brotherhood to strengthen

⁵⁶ For the impact of political developments in Turkey on political Islam in Syria, see Al-Azm (2011).

Turkey against Syria whenever it was in their interest to do so (Ozkan 2019). In Libya, the Muslim-Brotherhood-backed Justice and Construction Party (JCP) visited the AKP for political advisory before the elections in 2012 (Yeşilyurt 2017, 70). In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party and Vasat Party, established by a group left by the Muslim Brotherhood upon the toppling of Hosni Mubarak, adopted the founding program of the AKP (Gurpınar 2015, 28). Therefore, the AKP considered the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political actors as agents of its democracy promotion policies in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, thus supporting their elections (Altunışık 2014, 342). In this regard, the AKP instrumentalized the religious affinity to retain regional power and preserve its leadership role which serve to pursue its geostrategic commitments (Yeşilyurt 2017, 70). Thus, while in the pre-Arab spring period Turkey's developmental approach to democracy promotion was strongly urged by geostrategic and economic interests, in the post-Arab spring period, geostrategic and economic interests were still at stake but ideological/religious affinity was instrumentalized with the motivation to preserve and maximize its geostrategic commitments in each case under study and to retain regional power.

CONCLUSION

Democracy promotion in the foreign policies of states has persisted as a subject of international relations and comparative politics, as a crucial constituent of foreign policy since the early years of diffusion of liberal and democratic ideas. This dissertation was motivated by the need for comparative research on non-Western regional actors in general and Brazil and Turkey, in particular, to explore their motives for promoting democracy in their corresponding regions. In this study, democracy promotion has been analyzed from the perspective of Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory. This concluding section aims to revisit the lessons learned from case studies and the contributions offered to the theorization and conceptualization of democracy promotion in general.

Research Scope Revisited

This dissertation engaged with the empirical observation that two regional actors, Brazil and Turkey, promoted democracy to tackle the democratic disruptions that emerged in countries in their respective regions between 2000 and 2015. To this aim, the dissertation engaged with an elaborate analytical framework that works at system and state-levels in a comparative perspective. To explore what motivated Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion in a specific timeframe, from 2000 to 2015, in their respective regions. The question of why Turkey and Brazil enacted democracy promotion, was deemed salient in regards to understanding the foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey that significantly affected their regional contexts.

The dissertation aimed to make a two-fold contribution to the literature, empirically and theoretically. First, in empirical terms, taking into consideration the lack of comparative research on non-Western regional actors, the dissertation explained and made sense of the role of non-Western actors in comparative perspective across spatial (for Brazil; South America, and for Turkey; the Middle

East and North Africa and temporal (2000-2015) dimensions. To this end, the dissertation examined and categorized all the democracy promotion practices by Brazil and Turkey, regardless of their limits, and chose three cases for comparative research. In addition, Brazil; Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000), Venezuela (2002, 2012), and Turkey; Libya, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab Uprisings erupted in 2011 were subject to comparative analysis. Second, in theoretical terms, this study aligned itself with Neoclassical Realism and used Role Theory as a middle-range theory to explore state-level intervening variables to explain what motivated democracy promotion.

Analytical Framework Revisited

The theoretical positioning aligned with neoclassical realism shaped the analytical framework in two steps: First analytical cut, embarking from the neoclassical realism's argument that relative material capabilities determine the foreign policy of a given state and are translated through state-level variables, the dissertation explored systemic conditions at the international level and analyzed the distribution of capabilities in their respective regional security complexes. Thus, the dissertation departed from relative material capabilities but also traced this systemic variable at the state-level to understand why democracy promotion was enacted. This way, this dissertation aimed to fill the gap between the increase in their relative power as a systemic variable and democracy promotion, which emerged as an outcome of foreign policy in the cases of Brazil and Turkey. This analytical endeavor held particular importance in understanding why a regional actor pursues a particular foreign policy. Therefore, the second analytical cut is the use of Role Theory as a middle-range theory; to identify the underlying mechanism of democracy promotion by bringing back the state-level into the analysis. In this respect, Role Theory as a middle-range theory helped to develop the theoretical foundations of this dissertation by incorporating the roles that Brazil and Turkey assumed between 2000 and 2015 in their respective regions. It was argued that based on the material and ideational capabilities that their states possessed, the pro-

democracy regional leadership role was claimed by decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015.

The dissertation employed a particular type of process-tracing, which is explaining-outcome process-tracing, to explain why the foreign policies of Brazil and Turkey between 2000 and 2015 enacted democracy promotion. Defined as a repetitive research process, which means that the research process should be done for both cases, the dissertation applied explaining-outcome process-tracing to case studies with the major objective to explain an outcome in a particular timeframe, which can also be observed in other cases. Therefore, the analytical framework based on Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory is tested in each case under study, Brazil and Turkey, respectively, to explore the motives that resulted in democracy promotion. The outcome being explained in the dissertation is not regional power behavior in general but rather a particular historical period that is relevant to particular regional spaces; which is the promotion of democracy in Turkish foreign policy in the MENA region and the promotion of democracy in Brazilian foreign policy between in South America, between 2000 and 2015.

In accordance with this method, the dissertation undertakes an analytical first cut using Neoclassical Realism to see whether an explanation solely based on relative power in a particular region can explain the enactment of democracy promotion. According to Neoclassical Realism, the systemic factors (i.e., material power capabilities) are translated at the state-level through state-level variables, which define foreign policy actions of a given state. Therefore, as a second analytical cut, based on Role Theory, the dissertation explored the role conception that decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey claimed for their states based on the possession of material and ideational sources, temporally specific to the period between 2000 and 2015. Because beliefs and ideas of decision-makers about states' possession of material and ideational sources are different and unique in each case, the research cannot use those particularities to explain the foreign policy actions of other similar regional powers but can only analyze those patterns for their relevance

in other geographical contexts. Therefore, this analytical framework is applied repetitively to the case studies of Brazil and Turkey to observe if it provides a sufficient explanation.

Drawing upon a set of sources, including official reports, parliamentary speeches, newspaper articles, press releases, and interviews conducted in both countries; the dissertation has shown that despite the existence of normative elements such as ideological and cultural affinity with target countries, Brazil and Turkey were motivated by geostrategic commitments to promote democracy. Their motivation was caused by the relative increase in Brazil's and Turkey's regional power that resulted in decision-makers' claim to the pro-democratic regional leadership role. The case studies have confirmed both hypotheses developed in this dissertation; which are:

First, from the system-level perspective, between 2000 and 2015, power shifts at the international level resulted in a relative increase in the material and economic capabilities of Brazil and Turkey in their respective regions. This systemic shift situated Brazil and Turkey at the international level as regional actors. Due to the increase in their relative power, the international system pushed governing elites in Brazil and Turkey to promote democracy with the objective to fulfill their geostrategic commitments to secure and (or) maximize geopolitical/economic interests and to retain their regional power. (system-based hypothesis)

Second, from the state-level perspective, regional power shift was translated at the state-level by decision-makers' perceptions through the role they assumed for their states. Between 2000 and 2015, decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey claimed pro-democratic regional leadership roles due to their perception of their regions' material and economic capabilities. Thus, their role as democratic regional leaders enabled Brazil and Turkey to enact democracy promotion. This way, the promotion of democracy emerged as a foreign policy outcome between 2000 and 2015 to

affirm their role as democratic regional leaders, retain and preserve their regional power, and secure/maximize their geostrategic commitments. (role-based hypothesis)

Empirical analysis has shown similarities and differences across Brazil and Turkey. First, Brazil and Turkey have differed in terms of distribution of material capabilities and their relative regional power. The case studies (Chapter 3 - Brazil and Chapter 4 - Turkey) started with a system-level analysis by analyzing the relative power of Brazil and Turkey vis-à-vis other actors in their corresponding regions. To analyze the relative power, the dissertation used the 'Regional Security Complex' (RSC), an analytical concept that examines the structure of distribution of material capabilities in a given region. Analysis of RCS is critical because it fundamentally examines the material capabilities that shape the foreign policy orientations of regional powers and their roles, as material constraints significantly influence the foreign policy outcome. In line with Stewart-Ingersoll and Fraizer (2012, 54), the dissertation made a holistic assessment of system polarity based on their population, military expenditure, GDP, and their material capabilities. In doing so, the dissertation analyzed Turkey's and Brazil's relative power in terms of material capabilities in a given spatial and temporal dimension. The system-based analysis has shown that Brazil and Turkey are two regional actors with different positioning in their regional security complexes based on the relative material capabilities compared to other regional actors. While South America has a unipolar regional distribution of power, with Brazil's leading positioning over the rest of the regional security complex, Turkey was positioned in a multipolar distribution of power in the MENA in the period between 2000 and 2015. In other words, while the relative material capabilities resulted in unipolarity in South America with Brazil leading the region, relative material capabilities resulted in multipolarity in the MENA, putting Turkey in rivalry with other regional actors such as; Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Yet, despite their different positionings due to regional distribution of capabilities, Brazil and Turkey enacted the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy outcome. Why did they promote democracy despite their

different material capabilities that resulted in a different distribution of regional power? This dissertation answers this question by bringing the level of analysis to the state-level.

Thus, second, this study has shown that despite their different regional positionings in different structures of regional complexes (unipolarity for Brazil, multipolarity for Turkey), an increase in relative power pushed decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey to redefine their foreign policy approaches toward foreign policy activism. In Brazil, the foreign policy activism began at the beginning of the 2000s with the presidency of Cardoso and continued under the presidencies of Lula in 2003 and Rousseff in 2011, and in Turkey with the rise of AKP to political power in 2003. Tracing the relative increase in regional power has shown that two common enabling factors at the state-level facilitated redefinition of foreign policy toward active foreign policy orientation and paved the way for promoting democracy as a foreign policy outcome: Pluralization of actors and Autonomization in foreign policy. Autonomization refers to the decreasing power of centralized foreign policy-making with solid dominance of state apparatus and established elites in decision-making, whereas pluralization of actors refers to the increasing role of domestic actors as agents of foreign policy-making such as; Civil Society Organizations or business actors and their ability to transform their interests into foreign policy-making. The analysis of Brazil and Turkey showed that these two domestic imperatives pushed decision-makers to redefine their foreign policy approach toward foreign policy activism, especially under the Lula administration and the AKP government, which enabled decision-makers to claim pro-democratic regional leadership based on the material and ideational sources that their countries possessed.

Third, employing “Role Theory as a cognitive model of the agent-structure relationship” by Breuning (2011) this study has shown that in both countries, the states’ material and ideational capabilities have shaped the beliefs and ideas of decision-makers about the roles that their countries could assume due to their

regional power incurred by the regional distribution of capabilities. Therefore, the role-based analysis has shown that decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey claimed pro-democracy regional leadership roles based on their states' material and ideational sources. The following table summarizes the ideational and material elements contributing to Brazil and Turkey's conception of pro-democracy regional leadership between 2000 and 2015. In addition to the findings from system-based analysis of relative capabilities, opportunities to act erupted by democratic disruptions constituted the material elements, whereas the states' identity and cultural heritage constituted the ideational elements that resulted in the role assumed by Brazil and Turkey in their regions. The analysis showed that Brazil's unilateral positioning and opportunities to act incurred by democratic disruption in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela and Turkey's multilateral positioning and opportunities to act incurred by the Arab uprisings in 2011 constituted the material sources of pro-democracy regional leadership in the given timeframe.

Table 5. Pro-democracy Regional Leadership in Comparison

Pro-democracy regional leadership between 2000 and 2015			
		Brazil	Turkey
Material	capability	unilateral positioning	multilateral positioning
	opportunity to act	democratic disruptions in Paraguay (2012), Peru (2000), Venezuela (2002,2012)	Arab Uprisings, 2011
Ideational	identity	pro-democracy and developmentalist	model of democracy
	cultural heritage	historical legacy of multilateralism and adherence to collective regional mechanism, politico-historical ties	heritage of geostrategic positioning, cultural/religious affinity, politico-historical ties

As for ideational sources; Brazil's long historical legacy of multilateralism to maintain regional stability and peace, adherence to collective regional mechanisms in solving regional disputes, and the principles such as respect for sovereignty and non-intervention embedded in the constitutional framework

resulted in the Cardoso and Lula governments' perception of Brazil as a pro-democracy regional leader. Capitalizing on Brazil's ideational possession of multilateralism and principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty, the Cardoso government conceived of Brazil as a pro-democratic regional leader. When Lula came to power, the decision-makers pursued the foreign policy approach initiated by Cardoso, which stressed the notions of multilateralism, market liberalization, and democratic commitment across the region. Yet, the Lula administration expanded this vision by defining foreign policy as a 'responsible activism', which stressed not only multilateralism and regional integration but also development cooperation with and beyond the region. Equating Brazil's national security and stability to the regional development, Brazil's decision-makers in the given period believed that economic development and prosperity can be maintained in a regionally stable context. By the beginning of the 2000s, the Cardoso government accelerated regional engagement as a regional leader and used foreign policy for regional stability and security, while the Lula government expanded that foreign policy agenda by promoting a development cooperation model throughout the region. Therefore, given the origins of democracy promotion in the history of Brazil, the country embraced a multipolar orientation in its foreign policy to shape the collective regional mechanisms, such as Mercosur or Unasur, and thus, was able to apply conditionality through these mechanisms when democratic disruptions erupted. Strengthening regional collective mechanisms, Brazil maintained a room for maneuver in its foreign policy to preserve the principles embedded in its foreign policy historically; respect for sovereignty and non-interference.

As for the ideational sources in the case of Turkey, the dissertation showed that the ruling government's possession of ideational capability in terms of cultural and religious affinity and its claim of being a model for its neighborhood resulted in Turkey's role conception as a pro-democracy regional leader between 2000 and 2015. The origins of democracy promotion are relatively new in the history of Turkey, tracing back to the emergence of foreign policy activism as part of the foreign policy activism during the 1990s. Therefore, Turkey's democracy

promotion is not institutionally and principally consolidated as opposed to the case of Brazil. Turkey's historical legacy of modernity, the coupling of Islam and democracy with a strong secular state structure, and a free-market economy were ideational elements that have driven the decision-makers to initiate a change toward foreign policy activism during the 1990s. With the AKP's rise to political power in 2002, Turkey's regional role became more pronounced. The ruling government conceived of Turkey as a pro-democratic regional leader by not only capitalizing on the existing material and ideational elements but also stressing the historical, cultural, and religious ties in its neighborhood as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire, which was a breakthrough from its Western-oriented foreign policy. The decision-makers defined the principles such as; balance between security and democracy, zero problems toward neighbors, proactive foreign policy, multi-dimensional foreign policy, pre-emptive diplomacy, rhythmic diplomacy, and humanitarian diplomacy, which conceived Turkey as a pro-democracy regional leader.

Employing Breuning's model for Role Theory, this study showed that despite differences in their possession of ideational and material sources, Brazil and Turkey enacted a similar role conception, pro-democratic regional leadership role, in different regional contexts between 2000 and 2015. As Neoclassical Realism asserts that states are not only constrained by the international system but also are shaped by state-level factors, applying Role Theory showed that the pro-democratic regional leadership role acted as a state-level intervening variable that has translated the relative power of Brazil and Turkey and culminated in the enactment of democracy promotion.

Motives of Democracy Promotion Revisited

To summarize what Brazil and Turkey have done to promote democracy, in a nutshell; the empirical analysis has shown that Brazil targeted mainly governing institutions and, to a lesser extent, political processes (electoral dispute in Peru 2000) (see Table 3.1.), while Turkey targeted not only governing institutions but

also civil society (Somalia, the Balkans) and political processes (Elections – Iraq, 2005 and Egypt 2011) (see Table 4.1.).

This study showed that Brazil's and Turkey's democracy promotion enactment was aligned with a developmental approach, equating democracy with promoting development and supporting civil society development, such as capacity development projects aiming at addressing social and economic problems and human rights. In Turkey, although democracy promotion enactment was aligned with a developmental approach focusing on capacity development projects and development assistance as illustrated by the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Balkans; with the outbreak of Arab uprisings in 2011, democracy promotion enactment also recalibrated with the political approach, targeting at fundamental political processes and institutions; with an emphasis on political processes, elections, and political parties through democracy aid and assistance, as was in the case of Egypt, Libya and Syria. In the case of Brazil, the political approach was equally pronounced in Venezuela, with a close Lula-Chávez rapprochement between the ruling governing parties. In terms of the instruments, Brazil embraced utilitarian democracy promotion by using negative conditionality (Paraguay, Venezuela, Peru) and assistance (Venezuela) in the form of sanctions of collective regional mechanisms such as Mercosur and Unasur and, to a lesser extent, identitive democracy promotion by using diplomacy and persuasion, which was present in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Turkey resorted to utilitarian democracy promotion by using negative and positive conditionality (positive conditionality – Egypt, Libya) and assistance (Egypt, Libya, Syria) but switched swiftly between identitive democracy promotion through persuasion and diplomacy (Syria, Egypt, Libya) and coercive democracy promotion through military assistance backed by NATO (Libya).

As this dissertation is a contribution to the literature on democracy promotion through Neoclassical Realism, as the major finding of this dissertation, it is confirmed that geostrategic commitments motivated Brazil and Turkey to enact

democracy promotion to secure and maximize their geostrategic commitments and retain their regional power.

In Brazil, the cases of Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela demonstrated that geostrategic commitments motivated Brazil to promote democracy, and the moral imperative to promote democracy was not observable. Brazil had economic and/or security interests in all three cases that are perceived as essential but unstable due to democratic disruptions. In addition to geostrategic commitments, decision-makers instrumentalized ideological affinity to secure geostrategic interests, as observed in the case of the Lula-Chavez rapprochement in Venezuela. In Paraguay, geostrategic interests were concentrated on economic and social aspects. The large Brazilian community living in Paraguay, Brasiguayos, constituted a strategic migration issue for Brazil with a strong economic impact, as illustrated by the taxing prerogatives for Braziguayos and large soya production. The escalating political tensions on the issue of tax reform between Paraguayans and Braziguayos resulted in concrete actions by Brazil, such as undertaking two major military exercises on 17 and 24 October 2008 on the borders of Paraguay (Fronteira Sul 1 and 2), corresponding to the inauguration of President Lugo. Given these embedded economic and political interests, Brazil promoted democracy using conditionality when Lugo was impeached in Paraguay. Considering that political volatility would put Brazilian economic and political interests at stake, Brazil used negative conditionality by endorsing Paraguay's suspension from Unasur and Mercosur. By suspending Paraguay from Mercosur, Brazil also endorsed Venezuela's membership in the organization for vested economic interests, as Venezuela was previously had been blocked from membership due to Paraguay's opposition.

The empirical cases of Peru and Venezuela have shown that the inconsistency of the democracy promotion actions resulted from domestic imperatives such as impeachment and economic deterioration, which worked as domestic constraints to prioritizing democracy promotion in foreign policy. In Peru, strategic interests were also concentrated on the economic aspect. Peru has been a

geostrategically important country for Brazil's opening to Asian markets; therefore, a potential escalation of political instability in the country could adversely affect Brazil's economic ties. Nevertheless, the democracy promotion enactment remained somewhat benign and limited when disruption in the 2000 elections occurred due to political volatility stemming from the legitimacy of Fujimori's election. Brazil did not endorse OAS resolution 1080 because it violated the non-interference principle. The reason for Brazil's benign attitude to democracy promotion was found in domestic constraints in Brazil. Following the impeachment of Brazilian President Collor de Mello, President Cardoso came to power in 1995. Amidst the economic and political upheavals, Brazil experienced hyperinflation and impeachment, thus embracing a status-quo-oriented approach in its foreign policy until the 2000s. Domestic imperatives resulting from corruption, hyperinflation, extreme poverty, and its limited material capability due to economic problems refrained Brazil from taking an assertive approach to promoting democracy in Peru in 2000.

In Venezuela, strategic ties were also concentrated on economic aspects, the oil, gas, and construction sectors having the utmost importance in their bilateral relations. For example, in 2002, Cardoso assisted the Venezuelan government with oil shipments to avoid an economic collapse, and BNDES financed infrastructure projects by Brazilian firms in Venezuela. When a coup d'état erupted against Chavez, Brazil swiftly engaged with democracy promotion enactment. However, Chavez's undemocratic attitudes in the 2012 elections met with silence on the part of Brazil since the economic and political risks associated with opposing Chavez were too high. Brazil prioritized the stability of trade relations and the interest of business circles rather than the political instability. Therefore, the then president, Dilma Rousseff, endorsed the Maduro government after the elections, while Lula provided assistance and advisory for Maduro's election campaign. At the same time, domestic imperatives erupted in Brazil by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and economic deterioration.

In Turkey, strong geostrategic commitments were observed with the countries subject to comparison; Egypt, Libya, and Syria. In Libya, Turkey had vested interests in the economic aspect, with the construction sector as the driver of strategic ties between both countries. In Egypt, strategic commitments culminated from Turkey's and Egypt's competing regional roles, tracing back to the Cold War. In addition, there were strong political interests due to mediating role Egypt aspired between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Turkey's support for Muslim Brotherhood-backed Hamas in Palestine. Despite their politically competing positionings, both countries have developed strong economic relations, Egypt being the biggest African trade partner of Turkey and a gateway for Turkey's access to the Gulf region due to Egypt's geostrategic positioning. Turkey also had geostrategic commitments in Syria based on security interests about terrorism and water conflict concerning the co-management of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. Nevertheless, the existence of strategic commitments does not ensure that democracy promotion emerges consistently as a foreign policy outcome. In Libya, the ruling AKP first delayed its endorsement of the popular protests against the Qadhafi regime in 2011 due to vested Turkish economic interests and the Turkish business community in the short term. However, despite the vested economic interests before the uprisings started in Libya, Turkey upheld a unilateral approach, which pitted against the collective regional security mechanism at play; NATO; and risked Turkey's geostrategic commitments in the long-term. In Egypt, Turkey used democracy promotion instruments through assistance overtly given to politically and ideologically akin Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Morsi. Yet, the overthrow of Morsi shifted Turkey's foreign policy preference. In Syria, too, Turkey first enacted democracy promotion through diplomatic pressures to ensure vested security and economic interests, but the ruling government's diverging policies raised the security threats in the region at the expense of supporting the opposition forces in Syria, which undermined Turkey's efforts of principled democracy promotion.

As a corollary, in Brazil, the democracy promotion was motivated by preserving the region's unipolarity, hence Brazil's leading positioning in the region.

In Turkey, the motivation for democracy promotion was to challenge the regional distribution of capabilities and shift the multipolarity to unipolarity by engaging with unilateral orientation in its foreign policy. It has shown that Turkey's strategic commitments in Egypt, Syria, and Libya indicated its unilateral orientation, as Turkey has primarily sought to engage with the region based on bilateral relations rather than collective security mechanisms, i.e., NATO, to secure and maximize its geostrategic interests and transform the distribution of capabilities within the region towards unipolarity under its lead. In contrast, Brazil's strategic commitments in Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela indicated Brazil's multilateral orientation. Brazil primarily sought to maintain its unilateral positioning in the region by securing and maximizing its geostrategic interests through collective regional mechanisms, such as Mercosur or Unasur.

In contrast to Brazil's multilateralism, Turkey enacted democracy promotion without adhering necessarily to collective security mechanisms. In response to Arab uprisings, Turkey enacted democracy promotion to accomplish state objectives without concerns of strategic interaction or conforming or adhering to collective preferences or restraints. Therefore, Turkey's democracy promotion enactment lacked multilateral orientation. Embracing a unilateral orientation in its enactment of democracy promotion, Turkey's democracy promotion enactment was motivated by geostrategic commitments. On the contrary, Brazil's democracy promotion enactment was also motivated by geostrategic commitments, but the behavior of other regional actors was equally important to eliminate any counterbalance to its unilateral positioning in its regional order.

While Brazil adhered to consultation and collective security mechanisms in the identification of democratic disruptions in its region, Turkey solely adhered to its national interests when identifying democratic disruptions in its region. Therefore, Brazil opted for collective action and multilateralism while enacting democracy promotion, whereas Turkey pursued and executed democracy promotion enactment on its own, based on its bilateral relations. Hence, in the

process of enactment, Brazil perceived multilateral institutions as a first resort, while for Turkey, it was not the case. All in all, while in the case of Brazil, the process of democracy promotion enactment was recognizing the indivisibility of security of the region and adhering to principles such as non-intervention, in Turkey, democracy promotion enactment did not include any adherence to collective action with other actors involved in the region, since for Turkey, geostrategic interests and security concerns were prevailing and religious and ideological affinity in the region was instrumentalized to secure its security and economic interests with an expectation that politically akin governments could be installed in Uprising states. Thus, for Turkey, democracy promotion enactment was generated by motives inherent in the geostrategic commitments of the decision-makers, while for Brazil, geostrategic interests were diffused through collective regional mechanisms.

All in all, the underlying motives of democracy promotion by Brazil and Turkey are driven more by geostrategic commitments and less by normative commitments; hence maximizing and/or preserving security and/or economic interests was the driving force, while ideological affinity was only instrumental in fulfilling the geostrategic commitments. In relation to this, another major assertion of the dissertation is that ideational factors are conceptualized as a state's possessed capability that contributed to the pro-democratic regional leadership role, rather than being a motivation for democracy promotion. Thus, unlike the research agenda that discussed the role of normative commitments as motives for the promotion of democracy, this dissertation showed that ideational factors work at the state-level through decision-makers' ideas and beliefs concerning the role their states could assume primarily to fulfill geostrategic commitments.

Therefore, both Brazil and Turkey embraced a utilitarian approach and sought the benefits of pursuing having pro-democratic regional partners and targeted governing institutions and political processes that were deemed unstable and risky for preserving or maximizing economic or security interests incurred by

their bilateral relations. Therefore, for Brazil and Turkey democracy promotion was not an end in itself. In fact, it is not the promotion of democracy but the promotion of regimes suitable for their geostrategic commitments through democratic means that legitimate their pro-democratic regional leadership roles. This assertion derived from Brazil and Turkey as non-Western regional actors leads to the conceptual reconsideration of democracy promotion.

Democracy Promotion Revisited

This dissertation offered a contribution to the comparative literature on democracy promotion (Petrova 2014; Huber 2015; Börzel, Dandashly, and Risse 2015; Piccone 2016; Feldman et al. 2019; Carothers 2020) as it sought to suggest a holistic conceptualization of democracy promotion, through Neoclassical Realism and Role Theory. Role Conceptions have been raised as an explanatory factor in the literature (Breuning 2011, Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, Wehner and Thies 2014). What differed in this study was how roles were conceptualized concerning Neoclassical Realism to explain the motives underlying democracy promotion. Embarking on the Neoclassical Realist assertion that systemic pressures are translated at the state-level, this study employed Role Theory born out of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to theorize pro-democratic regional leadership roles.

The dissertation found a lack of research in the democracy promotion literature regarding how system-level variables relate to democracy promotion as an outcome observed in foreign policy. In other words, the causal pathway filled the gap between states' relative power vis-à-vis other actors in their corresponding regions and democracy promotion by the pro-democratic regional leadership role. The causal pathway of democracy promotion explains that Brazil and Turkey promoted democracy because relative power vis-à-vis other actors in the region results in regional distribution of capabilities; which manifested itself as unipolarity in South America led by Brazil and multipolarity in the MENA region, led by a struggle for power between close rivals of Turkey such as Saudi Arabia, UAE or

Israel. This systemic shift pushed governing elites toward a foreign policy activism in their regional orientation for Brazil to maintain its unilateral positioning and for Turkey to retain regional power and challenge the multipolar regional distribution of power with the desire to shift the regional structure towards unipolarity led by Turkey. Therefore, considering their ideational and material capabilities, decision-makers in Brazil and Turkey enacted pro-democratic regional leadership roles. Thus, when democratic disruptions erupted in their respective regions, Brazil and Turkey responded by instruments targeting governing institutions or political processes, with the motivation to secure and/or maximize their interests by affirming their regional leadership role. Thus, the outcome was democracy promotion enactment, which aimed to affirm their embedded geostrategic interests and ensure regional stability while simultaneously confirming their roles as pro-democratic regional leaders. In this way, democracy promotion acts as a significant foreign policy instrument for non-Western regional actors with aggregating autocratic notions in their political systems. In this respect, democracy promotion also acted as an imitation mechanism to affirm a state's own democratic identity and as a substitution mechanism, which gives an incentive to governing elites for democracy promotion with the objective of framing a democratic image (Huber 2015, 37-38). Thus, given the rising levels of autocratization in their countries, democracy promotion would also serve as an instrument to affirm their pro-democratic regional leadership roles and project a democratic image at the international level. Promoting democracy with this rationale speaks to the two-level game metaphor suggested by Putnam (1988). In fact, this dissertation showed that, under increasing levels of autocratization, Brazil and Turkey as regional actors perceived foreign policy as a device that facilitates an interplay of domestic and international politics for the political survival of governing elites at the domestic level (Hagan 1995) and retaining their states' regional power. This motivation makes democracy promotion a power-seeking instrument rather than a principled, norm-diffusing policy. Considering that democracy promotion received critiques during the 1990s for actors like the US to sustain their hegemonic power (Robinson 1996), in the current post-nationalist liberal international order, it necessitated a

revisited comprehension. Thus, this dissertation suggests that in the post-national liberal international order, democracy promotion by non-Western regional actors motivated by narrow interests of governing elites would undermine the liberal international order from within their regional contexts. This is the peril posed by non-Western regional actors when they resort to democracy promotion to install or promote regimes by which their geostrategic commitments could prevail. Thus, decision-makers do not act with a fixed preference to promote either democracy or authoritarianism but to promote particular regimes to maintain the survival of their own regimes and retain their regional power. Further research may build upon this anomaly of promoting democracy under growing autocratization. For example, recently, Petrova and Pospieszna (2021) provided evidence on how Poland, under the influence of autocratization, continued its democracy promotion policies in the period after 2015. In this sense, aligning with Tansey (2016), this dissertation suggests that democracy promotion by non-Western regional actors could reinforce autocratic elements, albeit an unintended consequence, as confirmed by Brazil's democracy promotion in Venezuela or Turkey's democracy promotion in Syria. This discussion points to another crucial research path, which is the potential of non-Western regional actors as norm-contesters rather than norm-diffusers, undermining the post-liberal international order.

Since the dissertation is designed as comparative analysis and its theoretical positioning is neoclassical realism aligned with role theory, the analysis remained primarily structural, and interpretivist approach is mainly missing. Therefore, further research could strengthen interpretivist contributions specifically relating to contributions by role theory to the research of democracy promotion, a research path that has not been extensively explored yet. For example, embracing an interpretivist approach, Aydın-Düzgıt and Dandashly (2022, 463) examined the relevance of the Turkish model since the fall of Mubarak in Egypt and argued that the reception of the model rhetoric was minimal and highly contested by the local political actors. Building on this research strand, an interpretivist approach could

unpack the discursive elements of pro-democratic regional leadership by the decision-makers as norm diffusers.

Although the structural analysis is case-specific and the mechanism of democracy promotion enactment takes into consideration Brazil and Turkey in a specific time frame, the analytical framework can be applied to other cases to explore whether there is a shared pattern in terms of the similarities and differences concerning the role of non-Western actors and their take on democracy promotion enactment; which would broaden the contours of democracy promotion research field.

The dissertation treated the material and ideational capabilities as a constant factor, whereas a shift in capabilities of actors not only changes their ability to tackle systemic pressures, but also changes their role conceptions. Therefore, a change in the international power structure and declining relative regional power would necessarily constrain the likelihood of democracy promotion.

Last but not least, this study showed that focusing on a particular foreign policy outcome, in this case, democracy promotion has the potential to shed light upon different elements in a foreign policy-making process; such as its positioning at the system-level, domestic imperatives at the state-level that constrained democracy promotion or enabled redefinition of foreign policy towards foreign policy activism, decision-makers' beliefs and ideas and overall foreign policy approach. However, the dissertation is bound by a specific timeframe, 2000 and 2015, and does not account for the post-2015 context of Turkish and Brazilian foreign policies under increasing levels of autocratization. Further research focusing on shifting role conceptions in Turkey's and Brazil's foreign policies would further contribute to how changes in domestic imperatives such as a shift of political regime, institutional structure, political power, or decision-makers' perceptions would explain a particular foreign policy outcome.

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APPENDIX

Interview Questions

1. Can you please tell me about your career and your role in this institution?
Can you also tell me about the aim of your institution?
2. How would you describe the general aim of Brazilian/Turkish foreign policy?
3. Do you think democratic norms and methods have an importance in Brazilian/Turkish foreign policy?
4. Do you think Brazil/Turkey promotes democracy abroad?
5. Why is promoting democracy in other countries important for Brazil/Turkey?
6. What sort of democracy promotion policies does Brazil/Turkey engage with? Is there any financial source/budget allocated for these policies?
7. Can you tell me about the aim and context of these policies? By which tools these policies are pursued? (diplomacy, technical/financial assistance, military intervention, incentives/sanctions)
8. Specifically, in which countries do these policies are undertaken?
9. In your opinion, if Brazil/Turkey have not engaged with democracy promotion policies, what would have been the difference at the regional/international context?
10. In your opinion, is there a role of democracy promotion policies in Brazil's/Turkey's role in the regional/international level?

ETHICS BOARD APPROVAL

Ethics Board Approval is available in the printed version of this dissertation.