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Abstract

In this dissertation, the question as to what extent European Defense Integration needs to be enhanced will be discussed. Initially, Europe's slow-paced defense integration process will be overviewed briefly from the end of World War II to the creation of CSDP. Then, with the crises in Libya, Syria and Ukraine, it will be indicated that CSDP was unable to generate a common defense policy. The EUGS will be reviewed to point out why the EU introduced the strategic autonomy as an objective. The problems of PESCO, EDF and any other relevant defense initiatives that followed the announcement of EUGS to deliver strategic autonomy will be examined. As a result, creation of an army at a supranational level within the EU will be suggested as a solution for obtaining strategic autonomy in order to assure a credible CSDP. In the meantime, difficulties and disputes pertaining to a European Army will be pointed out. Based on that, it will be suggested that the idea of a European Army is not possible in the near term, but should remain on the political agenda of the EU as a long-term objective for acquiring strategic autonomy at full spectrum in order to be a security provider as a major international player with a European identity.

Key Words; European Union, CSDP, PESCO, Strategic Autonomy, European Army

Özet

Bu tezde, Avrupa Savunma Entegrasyonun hangi dereceye kadar ilerlemesi gerektiği sorusu incelenecektir. İlk olarak, Avrupa'nın yavaş tempolu savunma entegrasyonu süreci 2. Dünya savaşının sonundan Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (CSDP)'nin oluşumuna kadar özetle gözden geçirilecektir. Daha sonra, Libya, Suriye ve Ukrayna'daki krizler vasıtasıyla, CSDP'nin Avrupa Birliği için ortak bir savunma politikası oluşturmak için yeterli olmadığı gösterilecektir. Avrupa Birliği'nin niçin stratejik otonomiye bir hedef belirlediğini göstermek için Avrupa Birliği Global Stratejisi gözden geçirilecektir. Stratejik otonomiye sağlamak adına Avrupa Birliği Global Strateji'nin ilanına müteakip başlatılan PESCO, EDF ve diğer benzer savunma inisiyatiflerinin sorunları incelenecektir. Sonuç olarak Avrupa Birliği bünyesinde ulusüstü bir ordunun oluşturulması, güvenilir bir CSDP sağlama amacıyla stratejik otonomiye ulaşmak için çözüm olarak önerilecektir. Aynı zamanda, Avrupa Ordusu'na dair zorluklar ve tartışmalara işaret edilecektir. Buna bağlı olarak, Avrupa Ordusu fikrinin yakın süreçte mümkün olmadığı, fakat Avrupa kimliğiyle önemli bir uluslararası bir aktör olmak, stratejik otonomiye tam kapasite olarak elde etmek için Avrupa Birliği'nin Avrupa Ordusu'nu uzun dönem hedefi olarak politik programında bulundurması gerektiği öne sürülecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler; Avrupa Birliği, Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, PESCO, Stratejik Otonomi, Avrupa Ordusu.

Introduction

As what anticipated in the Schuman Declaration, “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”¹, The defense component of European integration, including the idea of a European army, has been evolving slowly but steadily as a result of the exposure of the EU and its member states to crises and challenges. In that context, the first steps for European Defense Integration will be deferred until the introduction of CSDP. The EDC treaty will indicate how the idea of a European army entered the European political agenda.

In this respect, NATO has been the main defense framework of the Union. The US has been committed to European security through NATO, which afforded the US political and military privilege within the continent. However, overdependence on the US disturbed some countries which desired autonomy for European Defense alongside NATO. This pursuit, together with the détente years, resulted in the formation of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) as a more comprehensive framework incorporating Eastern and Western European countries into its structure. Although it was institutionalized by converting from CSCE to the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) following the end of the Cold War, Russia’s aspirations of equipping the institution with military means to break the dominance of NATO in Europe and the US’ strict resistance to that hampered OSCE in taking a leading role in the European Defense. Thus, the EU witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing crises under the security umbrella of NATO.

¹ The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en (accessed at 27.03.2020)

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought frozen conflicts to surface so that the European continent was surrounded by a ring of fire during the 1990s. Though European officials were ambitious about the EU's role in these crises as a changemaker on its own continent at first, the catastrophic outcomes denied optimistic expectations of the EU's security identity on the account of crisis management. The US evaluated the crises as European and initially did not want to engage in them. It waited for the EU to intervene. However, due to the military capability problems and unwillingness of the European states, the US had to intervene in the region and stop the conflicts. Deficits in the European Defense and overdependence on the US led the EU to take important steps to build up a common stance on foreign relations and security identity. The demand on transformation of Europe resonated in the treaties of the EU and different steps have come one after another. At the end of the 2000s, CSDP was introduced to produce a common defense policy and provide the EU with a security identity.

Following crises in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, it will be indicated that CSDP was not a direct solution to problems the EU had prior to the European Defense. For that purpose, the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) will be referenced to point out how the EU perceives the world through increasing multidimensional threats and what it brings to the European Defense Integration. Consecutive to the introduction of EUGS, the EU launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and related defense initiatives in accordance with the strategic autonomy highlighted in the EUGS. PESCO's projects will be scrutinized regarding the political, industrial and operational aspects of strategic autonomy. PESCO's importance will be emphasized for Europe's contribution to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, at this part, it will be indicated that the EU needs more than PESCO because of the challenging problems within the initiative stemming from chronic obstacles before the European Defense.

In the later part, debates on a European Army pertaining to the launch of PESCO will be cited to demonstrate that the idea of a European Army is back on the

political agendas of European leaders as an ultimate purpose of European Defense Integration. While the EU officials repeatedly denied rumors of a European Army to soothe some Eurosceptic countries and its Trans-Atlantic allies, debates on the topic reveal that in the aftermath of countless failures in the European Defense, some European countries see a European Army as a landmark in obtaining strategic autonomy. In terms of that, problems of intragovernmental governance will be illustrated through past attempts in comparison to supranational governance. Transatlantic challenges will be pointed out as additional dynamics pushing the EU member states towards defense integration via establishment of a European Army. The US has been withdrawing from the European Defense gradually, but this tendency gained significant momentum in continuation of escalating nationalist policies within the country and shifting its focus towards Asia, specifically to China. Brexit has also meant a considerable loss for European Defense along with the departure of the UK. Most of the defense budget for CSDP operations was financed by the UK and its military power was crucial for the EU's military capability. However, the UK's departure is also an opportunity for deeper defense integration, as its opposition was a major obstacle to further defense initiatives, notably the establishment of a European Army. Thus, the US' withdrawal from European Defense and UK's permanent departure from the EU have been portrayed as compelling reasons for deeper defense integration and in connection with the European Army.

The need for a European Army will be highlighted also through its possible contributions to CSDP. So far, the EU has stayed inactive in times of crises due to disagreements and unwillingness among member states in foreign policy. However, this approach has caused complications on a considerable scale for the EU in which migration flows through the Mediterranean and its Southern borders challenged the integrity of the EU, as in Brexit. Therefore, the EU needs to respond to crises around the Mediterranean and its Southern borders in a united manner, with robust CSDP. Russia with its military power has definitely returned to the MENA region, where the

EU has relevant strategic interests. Russia additionally poses important security risks for Eastern European states. While China is not deemed a direct security threat by the Europeans, it is one of the main buyers of Russian military equipment and is strengthening its army by its cooperation with Russia. They launch joint drills overseas and sometimes include third states like Iran in their drills. Furthermore, China-USA rivalry, particularly over Taiwan, may cause a rise in tension around the Asian continent and drag the EU into a crisis in which it does not want to get engaged. It will be stressed that the EU may equip CSDP with an army at supranational governance against threats stemming from these global powers and crises around the MENA region.

Additionally, it will be projected that the idea of a European Army may be thought of as a solution to problems inside PESCO and recently launched defense initiatives. Within PESCO, milestones for most of the projects are not clear, and the allocated budget for these projects is tight for delivering the demanded results. CROC, as one of the projects of PESCO, is not equipped with an adequate military level of ambition when thought approximately 1.5 million people in uniform and is away from covering operational capacity deficit of the Union in which oddly France and Germany as leading countries of PESCO already lead different defense initiatives on behalf of operational capacity of Europe besides CROC. European Defense Industries still are fragmented, with mistrust towards their counterparts, national protectionism instincts and different ambitions on strategic autonomy. In this respect, it will be suggested that a European Army could be a worthwhile solution to those obstacles, to assure strategic autonomy by means of a common budget, integrated military forces furnished with readiness, and common procurement regulations for military equipment.

A European Army's possible contributions to maritime security and air forces will be described, based on the current problems they face. For trade relations with various countries overseas, maritime security is important for the EU. Increasing migration flows and human trafficking and smuggling incidents have brought more

attention to maritime security in recent years. Operations Atalanta and Sophia were started to overcome these crises, but owing to unwillingness and disagreements of member states, they were unable to reach strategic outcomes. Moreover, they were not assigned to address the roots of crises, but mainly aimed at stopping migration flows and piracy activities overseas and were technically devoid of important strategic enablers to generate strategic outcomes. As for air power, Europe is renewing their fighter jet fleets with sixth-generation fighter jets and dropping less advanced jets from their fleets whose maintenance will be costly. For some European countries, renewal of fleets will not be possible. For the Libyan air campaign, while the participant European countries made thrilling achievements during the operation, European countries' dependence on the US was undeniable, in contrast to strategic autonomy. It will be claimed that with the European Army, the EU can deliver the strategic enablers at a European level to its navies and air forces to augment operational capacity of the continent. This would create comprehensive military forces incorporating both advanced and less advanced military enablers at affordable costs. Also, the EU would obviate the unwillingness of member states with supranational governance.

In the last part, although the European Army has been spearheaded as a transformative solution to the chronicle problems of European Defense, it will be indicated that there are still many obstacles in the way of a European Army. However, the EU and member states are ambitious about the concept of strategic autonomy. Some of them are also interested in the idea of a European Army. There is no explicit consensus as to the precise definition. There are also serious questions about governance of a possible European Army because of the EU's unprecedented governance structure; there has never been a similar example before.

Furthermore, the EU as tested in the Brexit period is more fragile than previously assumed. In fact, EU integration has gone so far that it cannot be easily undone. However, the EU is vulnerable to national elections in the next few years. The EU may have to struggle with challenges to its integrity if a nationalist candidate with

a Eurosceptic agenda is elected in a member country. There are important member countries which have Eurosceptic tendencies. They are opposed to further defense integration and in connection oppose the idea of a European Army. Beyond these reasons, COVID-19 has unexpected and unprecedented results for the EU, in that supply and demand chains have been harmed significantly. This is even worse than the 2008 crisis in that European economies will suffer from the aftereffects severely in the coming years. Likewise, European Defense will be exposed to the outcomes of this crisis even more than other domains of European integration. Some European initiatives' budgets like the EDF have been cut off. Based on that, the defense integration will not be the EU's first priority for the near term. The EU will most probably seek autonomy in health issues to decrease its dependence on external factors and to increase its credibility in the eyes of its citizens.

As a result, it will be concluded that in this political context, the idea of a European Army does not seem possible in the near term, but should be taken into consideration as the long-term and ultimate target of the European Defense Integration for its potential transformative character in European Defense. For this purpose, it will be suggested that maritime security can be a pilot domain to develop practices in order to overcome uncertainties about the idea. Because European strategic interests are more at stake in maritime security and some European countries already integrate their navies at the supranational level to cover their deficits, like Belgian and Dutch cooperation, this sort of integration can be expanded to the European level. Added to that, Europe's strategic interests already push the European states to work together in maritime security, as seen through joint drills in Mediterranean. Thus, the EU may gradually build up a path towards establishment of a European Army on account of being a credible international player as outlined in the EUGS.

I. EUROPEAN DEFENSE INSTITUTIONALIZATION

A. THE COLD WAR ERA

Without examining the roots of the idea of European defense, it would not be possible to understand its evolution or to project its future path. The dynamics that have shaped European defense in the past may be enlightening to those trying to understand contemporary European defense and security structures. In this respect, the Cold War and its implications emerge as an important component in the historical background of European defense.

1. The First Agreements

After World War II, it was understood that the reconstruction of the European continent was not enough to maintain European stability. Europe needed to be protected against any possibility of a war within the continent and cooperating on security and forging a common defense infrastructure was seen as a way of securing this goal. Hence, the cooperation efforts among European countries were not only limited to economic measures but also covered security and defense. Even during World War II, the search for a tangible European security alliance was being discussed by British officials based on the Franco-British alliance². Following the end of World War II, the UK brought its intent and plans to the fore, resulting in the UK and France signing the Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and creating a defense alliance based on mutual assistance. The two major European countries pledged to cooperate very closely with one another, while continuing their cooperation with other United Nations countries on peace keeping and resisting aggression.

In 1948, this initial attempt was extended by the Brussels Treaty, which included the three more European countries; Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg. These

² Chappell, Laura, Mawdsley, Jocelyn, From Cold War to European Peace, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis, 2019, (p. 16).

countries together constituted the Western European Union (WEU), which was the first European defense alliance following the end of World War II. The signers of the Brussels Treaty committed to, “afford assistance to each other [...] in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression”. Thus, the clause of the mutual assistance was legally affirmed by the treaty.³

2. The Foundation of NATO

European countries were aware that their defense alliance was not able to hinder possible Soviet Union aggression against Europe. The devastation in Europe following World War II was so great that the former imperial powers of Europe were weakened as never before, particularly when compared to the superpowers of the Cold War.

Therefore, European countries, especially the UK and France, were concerned about the USA’s disengagement from Europe by withdrawing its troops from the European continent. But critical events came to reverse the USA’s intentions. The Greek Civil War, along with geopolitical tensions in Iran and Turkey, assured the USA that the Soviet Union was braced for an expansion. The USA knew that European countries were neither prepared nor powerful enough to stop Soviet Union’s expansionism. As such, the USA announced its commitment to the defense of friendly countries in the vicinity of the Soviet Bloc. This was in stark contrast to its former approach based on the rejection to world leadership following World War 1. For these reasons, British politicians came up with a proposal to tie the Brussels Pact states to the USA in a more collectivized security architecture⁴.

As a result of negotiations between these countries, the Washington Treaty was signed, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949. The principal defense organization of the Western countries was thus constituted, and

³ 1947-1954, The road to European defense cooperation, <https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/our-history/inception>, (accessed at 27.09.2019)

⁴ Chappell, Laura and Mawdsley, Jocelyn, From Cold War to European Peace, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 2019, (p. 16-17).

the first step in the institutionalization of Western defense was taken. The objective of NATO was defined by its first General Secretary, Lord Ismay, as “Keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”⁵ There was a specific emphasis on keeping the Americans focused on the security of Europe in the face of Soviet power.

NATO adopted a policy of massive retaliation and nuclear deterrence against the conventional forces and massive deployment abilities of the Soviet Union in Europe to deter any possible attack⁶. But NATO wasn't in a dominant position in Europe when compared to the Soviets' presence on the continent in terms of conventional forces. NATO's ground forces were not up to the task of facing the Soviet threat, and the USA didn't see nuclear deterrence alone as sufficient protection for the West. At the same time, the USA also needed to deal with the Soviet threat on the Korean Peninsula during the 1950s. Therefore, West Germany's rearmament through NATO appeared to be necessary to strengthen the Western Bloc. But this possibility was not welcomed by some European countries because it was feared that the rearmament of West Germany could trigger the return of German domination of Europe. This proposal welcomed by the German population either, which was focusing on the industrial development of the country. Despite this, the Konrad government supported the proposal to resurrect Germany's sovereignty over its army and forging closer ties with the Western bloc countries.⁷

3. The EDC Treaty

In particular, the objection of France to the rearmament of Germany had a deep effect on European politics in the form of the Pleven Plan. Even before the Pleven Plan,

⁵ Hill, William. No Place for Russia (Woodrow Wilson Center Series), Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition, 2018, Kindle Location (417)

⁶ Chappell, Laura and Mawdsley, Jocelyn. Mawdsley, Jocelyn, A Changing Security Architecture, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 2019, (p. 7).

⁷ Chappell, Laura and Mawdsley, Jocelyn, From Cold War to European Peace, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition. 2019, (p. 17).

another scheme aiming to integrate European countries economically was being discussed. The Schuman Plan foresaw the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the foundation of what would become the EU. The ECSC was to take the control of member states' steel and coal industries, thereby removing national sovereignty over these resources. France, as the instigator of both plans, was aiming to repair its devastated economy and ensure its industrial development through its access to vast European, specifically German, coal and steel resources. For France, Germany was still a threat and the supranational governance of steel and coal resources was intended to forestall Germany from using its natural resources as it wanted. But the USA's plan to rearm West Germany caused France to fear that a rearmed West Germany could lose interest in participating to the ECSC.⁸

However, Jean Monnet believed in a united Europe, and that West Germany was an unconditioned partner that should have been integrated to Schuman Plan. To keep Germans in the Schuman Plan, while also keeping a rearmed German army under control, Jean Monnet designed another plan that focused on collective European defense. Until the end of World War II, the European continent had been a battlefield for many centuries. But the Pleven Plan sought to establish the European Defense Community (EDC), which would commit member countries to the common defense of Europe. For this purpose, member countries were required to shape a European army that was to be ruled at the supranational level through the EDC. Thus, the sovereignty of European countries over their national armies would cease, except for special provisions described in the EDC treaty for international operations outside Europe under UN and NATO mandates.⁹

⁸ Gavin, Victor. (2008). Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954). *French History*. 23. 10.1093/fh/crn065. p. (75-76) (accessed at 21.09.2019)

⁹ Trybus, Martin, The Legacy of the European Defence Community and the Future of European Defence and Security Integration (January 20, 2007). Pre-print version of Martin Trybus, Chapter 2, in Martin Trybus and Nigel White (eds.), *European Security Law* (OUP, 2007). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896178>, (accessed at 27.09.2019) p.(11)

Through the EDC Treaty, the rearmament of West Germany was going to be implemented, but as part of a European army that would be integrated into NATO to fortify the transatlantic alliance. This would harmonize the opposite US and French approaches to the German problem. Furthermore, France would be able to keep the upper hand over West Germany through the EDC and prevent Germany from adopting an aggressive stance as it had done in World War II. And, at the same time, France could ensure the alignment of West Germany with other European countries in a controlled manner¹⁰.

3.1. The Failure of EDC Treaty

The EDC Treaty was signed by the Benelux countries, France, Italy, and West Germany in 1952. According to the treaty, the EDC was going to have common budget, institutions, and armament procurement programs. But France, with its enthusiasm for European autonomy in defense through the EDC, was to get distracted by its own national interests, causing the failure of the EDC Treaty. The reasons behind this failure were indicative of France's understanding of European defense. France was in favor of European defense autonomy alongside the Transatlantic alliance, which simultaneously preserves the national identities and sovereignties of the European countries.

There was an important political figure in France who supported this sort of loose European integration in the defense matters and had a lasting effect on France beyond its understanding of European defense. De Gaulle was a retired a French general who tended to the political life of the country and became president in 1960. During the debates on the Plevin Plan, De Gaulle strictly opposed the approval of the EDC Treaty. Although he was in favor of European defense integration, he was a

¹⁰ Gavin, Victor. (2008). Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954). French History. 23. 10.1093/fh/crn065. (accessed at 21.09.2019).

passionate supporter of keeping firm national sovereignty over the French army and defined the proposals of the Pleven Plan as “stateless confusion”¹¹. What was more, as an indicator of his nationalist-oriented European integration idea, he described the EU as “a coach with horses”, Germany as “a horse”, and France “a coachman”¹². As a result of French opposition to the treaty on nationalist grounds, it was canceled by the very country that had designed it in 1954.

4. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The aim of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was to create a row of allied countries stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals¹³. The US agreed to meet with the Soviet Union at consecutive meetings of the CSCE in Helsinki about negotiations for a permanent cooperation agreement between the Eastern and Western blocs. Both sides were keen to end the hostility between each other.

The Helsinki Final Act (or the Helsinki Accords) was of substantial value to European politics. By accepting the act, European borders were recognized and legitimized. The territorial integrity of states was to be respected and the use of force was to be reined in by all sides. For the USA, territorial integrity and the limitations on the use of force were preemptive precautions against the Brezhnev Doctrine of Soviet interventionism. For the Soviet Union, the Helsinki accords represented the approval of the status quo in the Eastern and Central Europe¹⁴. It also contained commitments to basic human rights and fundamental freedoms under the supervision of the CSCE. However, the implementation process of the Helsinki Act was not well defined at the

¹¹ Gavin, Victor. (2008). Power through Europe? The case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954). French History. 23. 10.1093/fh/crn065. p.(81), (accessed at 21.09.2019)

¹² Raine, Sarah. Europe's Strategic Future (Adelphi series, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, p. (94)

¹³ Sloan, Stanley, Defense of the West, Manchester University Press, 2016, Kindle Edition, Kindle Location (487).

¹⁴ Galbreath, David J. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, (p. 70).

time. The developments that resulted from the negotiations were very valuable in providing guiding principles and rules of conduct for all states within the Euro-Atlantic domain.¹⁵

Another of the CSCE's successes was its contribution to European security by assuring transparency between the Cold War blocs and introducing confidence-building measures between the defense ministers and military forces of participating states. Regular meetings were to be conducted annually and participant states were obliged to inform their counterparts in case of any major military maneuvers. With the transparent and reciprocal stream of information, the two blocs would be able to obviate unexpected and hazardous tensions. Furthermore, the CSCE took a very influential role in arms control negotiations between the superpowers of the Cold War, such as at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Mutual Balanced Forces Reduction Talks¹⁶.

The détente years were taken as an opportunity to increase relations and normalize processes with the Eastern Bloc. As a result of the CSCE meetings, the Helsinki Accords were a promising result of the détente years. The Helsinki Accords legitimized the territorial integrity of the states and introduced transparency among the participant states. The establishment of the CSCE as an official dialogue channel between East and West was unprecedented, with its comprehensive and collective structure on the security of Europe. In a broader context beyond NATO, the CSCE approached and focused on the security of Europe in three areas: politico-military, economic-ecological, and humanitarian issues¹⁷.

¹⁵ Hill, William. *No Place for Russia* (Woodrow Wilson Center Series), Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition, 2018, Kindle Location (539)

¹⁶ Hill, William. *No Place for Russia* (Woodrow Wilson Center Series), Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition, 2018, p. (25) Kindle Location (568)

¹⁷ Dunay, Pál. *OSCE Activities and Dimensions*. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2006, pp.37, *The OSCE in Crisis*, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07044.7. (accessed at 26 Apr. 2020)

Although, there were valuable and considerable achievements following the establishment of the CSCE and the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, the normalization process between the East and West had to take a break. In fact, Soviet Union's main purpose was to obtain the recognition of the status quo in Central and Eastern European states. When Western countries aimed to utilize the CSCE to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Soviet Union, as well as to improve its relations with Warsaw Pact states, the progress in relations between the Soviet Union and the USA during the détente years was reversed¹⁸.

4.1. Russia's Ambitions on the OSCE

From the beginning, the CSCE was designed to usher in a political solution for conflict prevention, rather than to provide military means to engage in conflicts on the part of NATO. Although there was a need to intervene in conflict zones, and this sort of security mission was referred in the Helsinki Final Act, the founding countries of the organization opted to equip the CSCE with modest civilian crisis management tools. The USA and many of its Transatlantic allies winced at the formation of an organization that might compete with their own bloc. On the other hand, Russia and its former Soviet allies wanted the CSCE to take precedence over NATO and any European security architecture. For instance, the President of Russian Federation asserted that the CSCE would have to take responsibility for the security architecture of the post-Soviet European region¹⁹.

At the Budapest Summit in 1994, the CSCE was reinvented as the OSCE. Russia, to consolidate the role of the OSCE as a hard security organization, then invited the organization to Chechnya following accusations of severe human rights violations

¹⁸ Sloan, Stanley, *Defense of the West, NATO, the European Union and the transatlantic bargain*, Manchester University Press, 2016. Kindle Edition. Kindle Location (2433),

¹⁹ Galbreath, David J., *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Contemporary European Security* Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, (p. 76).

in 1995. With that surprising invitation, Russia aimed to strengthen the status of the OSCE in the European security environment and present it as an alternative to NATO²⁰. Later, the OSCE provided peace-keeping operations in different parts of the world, including Georgia, Azerbaijan-Armenia, Kosovo, and Bosnia, with its comprehensive security agenda. But its lack of military capability and disputes between Russia and its Western counterparts, notably with the USA regarding the role of the OSCE, stunted its development, efficiency, and effectiveness in times of crises as a hard security organization when compared with NATO. These situations make the OSCE's future uncertain. In relation to that, in the continuation of the Russia-Georgia war, Former President of the Russian Federation, Dmitri Medvedev, proposed a new European security architecture²¹ instead of putting more emphasize on the OSCE.

B. THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

1. The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War came about quickly and unexpectedly, as the result of a series of events that had significant importance to politics and security in Europe. One of them was the speedy reunification of West and East Germany. The states within the Soviet Union started to announce their independence, and the Soviet Union started to dissolve rapidly. In December 1991, Gorbachev signed the Soviet Union's termination document, which meant the end of the Cold War after many decades of rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs. The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity of a peaceful period as European countries downsized their armies and defense budgets.

On the other hand, the end of the Cold War meant the proliferation of frozen conflicts around the globe. Before the end of the Cold War, there were 104 nationalities

²⁰ Hill, William. No Place for Russia (Woodrow Wilson Center Series), Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition, Kindle Location (3051).

²¹ Hill, William. No Place for Russia (Woodrow Wilson Center Series) . Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition, Kindle Location (296).

within the Soviet Union, 89 of which had not had their own republics previously. Furthermore, 64 million people were living in states where they were ethnic minorities²². Contrary to European countries' naive expectations, there was a protracted and painful process ahead for Europe in the 1990s.

2. Bosnian War

The Bosnian War between 1991 and 1995 was the bloodiest war on European soil since World War II, which cost death of many civilian lives and the displacement of millions of people. The cost of this war was a clear indicator of the failure of the Western Bloc's assumption that in the aftermath of the Cold War, and especially following the Gulf War, the international community would no longer suffer divisions and would be able to concentrate its resources on the preservation of peace and stability. But the EU's failures proved that there was a clear gap between ends and means, which prevented it from acting in the crisis sufficiently²³ to affirm this assumption.

At the start of Yugoslavia's dissolution, European officials were hopeful that the role of the EU in the crisis would ensure the acceptance of the EU as an important international power. Luxemburg's foreign minister announced to the European Council that, "It was the hour of Europe, not of America"²⁴. Despite this passionate announcement, the EU was not able to unite and provide the required military assistance and means to end the bloodshed in the Balkans. Due to the lack of coherence and capability, small-scale but deep-seated political tensions gradually unfolded into chaos in Yugoslavia.

²² Lawrence, Philip. 'European security: From euphoria to confusion, European Security, 1994, p. (217)

²³ Andreatta, Filippo, The Bosnian War and The New World Order, Failure and Success of International Intervention, Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, 1997, p. (6-7)

²⁴ Larivé, Maxime H. A.. Debating European Security and Defense Policy (Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series) . Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2016, Kindle Location (1363)

3. Kosovo War

As in Bosnia, the EU was aware of what was going on in Kosovo from the beginning and was content with its role as an observer. The European Parliament in 1989 defined Serbia's nationalist oppression over Kosovo Albanians as "explosive" and "bordering on civil war", and expressed serious concerns that "the danger to peace if nationalist sentiments in Yugoslavia continue to be inflamed could have grave consequences for Europe"²⁵. Due to these worries, the EU warned Serbia to stop its repressive policy over Kosovo and end its attempts to abolish the cultural identity and economic and democratic rights of its Albanian habitants. But the EU's numerous warnings went unheeded with the result that violent conflicts accelerated in Kosovo.

Consecutive to the escalation of violence in Kosovo, Europeans understood that further negotiations with Belgrade officials would only lead to more mass graves. They felt the urgency to act and appreciated the situation as an opportunity to atone for their failure to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian War. Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, expressed his concerns about the violence occurring in Kosovo and highlighted the possibility of applying military force to stop the humanitarian crisis. "I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So, I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no mandate. You must act."²⁶

In spite of many ambitious discourses, the EU was faced with the capabilities-expectations gap again. Although the EU employed 1.5 million military personnel, it couldn't deliver the required military means to stop the civil war in Kosovo. The ceasefire was only became possible after the USA reflected on the situation. Without seeking authorization from the UN to prevent a possible blockade of Russia and China,

²⁵ Branislav Radeljić European Union approaches to human rights violations in Kosovo before and after independence, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 24:2, 131-148, 2016, p. (5)

²⁶ Branislav Radeljić European Union approaches to human rights violations in Kosovo before and after independence, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 24:2, 131-148, 2016, p. (11)

the USA, which was confident in its military power to right the world's wrongs, launched the US-led NATO operation against Yugoslavian-Serbian forces²⁷ which ended the conflict. But in the end, thousands of innocent people were killed, wounded, or forced to leave their homes, and another catastrophe after the Bosnian War could not be prevented. This was another failure for Europe.

4. The Need of A Security Identity

During all the catastrophic events taking place on the European continent, the EU was paralyzed and couldn't intervene in the process as it desired. Nevertheless, some may argue that the EU had nothing to do with the wars resulting from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. But given the motto of "never again Auschwitz", adopted after World War II, the feeble response by the EU caused the emergence of new camps in Europe.²⁸

The Maastricht Treaty was accepted in the early stages of the Yugoslavian wars and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was defined as one of the EU's main approaches to creating a common political posture for prompting the union to an international player. The EU was required to become a more proactive actor on its own continent in the wake of the wars in the 1990s with respect to the newly reinforced CFSP, and its commitment to not allowing a repeat of Auschwitz²⁹.

In the course of the Cold War, the EU's strategic vision was limited to the continental defense of Europe against the Soviet threat. But with the changing security environment around Europe, the EU invented the CFSP and indicated its willingness to undertake responsibility for the defense and security needs of the continent. In light

²⁷ Goldgeier, James and Grgicmarc, Gorana, The Kosovo War in retrospect, Commentary, March 24, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/the-kosovo-war-in-retrospect/> accessed at 05.04.2020

²⁸ Marolov, Dejan, The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia Special emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia, 2012. P. (2)

²⁹ Marolov, Dejan, The EU policy towards the dissolution of Yugoslavia Special emphasis on the EU policy towards the Republic of Macedonia, 2012. P. (3)

of this fundamental change, the Balkan countries were very central to the European security. The EU needed to take action to protect its strategic interests. Any instability could have serious implications on the continental stability of Europe. For this reason, the implementation of the CFSP was crucial to European strategic interests. The CFSP could form a legal basis to act militarily for the sake of European security³⁰. In relation to that, the USA expected the EU to act on its own. The USA, since the end of World War II, has often tried to encourage its European allies to take more responsibility in their own defense matters and regarded the situation in Yugoslavia as a European issue. The EU shared this opinion as well. Nevertheless, the changemaker of these wars was not the EU, but an outspoken USA by means of its military power.

The wars in Yugoslavia made it clear that the EU could not form a common political stance after the CFSP, and lacked the military means for crisis management and conflict prevention. The EU was definitely dependent on the USA's military umbrella to manage the crises and ensure the stability of Europe. The lack of military means and divergence between the member countries caused irrevocable humanitarian crises in both the Bosnian and Kosovan wars. As such, the EU had to rethink the creation of a security identity after the failure of the EDC Treaty because the transatlantic alliance with USA would not be always an efficient way of dealing with European security problems like the fallout from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

NATO had been established to oppose the expansionism of the Soviet Union, but following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence and future of the Transatlantic alliance was being questioned and was a hotly debated topic at that time. As such, NATO was very busy with uncertainties and ambiguities while war spread across the Balkans. Beyond that, these wars were not directly relevant to the Transatlantic alliance since they fell short of triggering Article 5, and the USA initially judged the crises to be European issues that needed to be sorted out by Europeans

³⁰ Arıkan, H. (2009). The European Union Policy towards the Balkan States in the Post-Cold War Era. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi , 2009 (2) , p.(17) .

themselves. Hence, there was no intervention in the conflict zones by NATO until there were aggregated deaths of civilians that the USA felt obliged to address. While the OSCE advanced its field missions during the crises around different parts of the world, it was not capable of ending these conflicts without military means. In addition, the military race between participating countries in the Soviet and Western blocs hampered the proper working of the OSCE. Because of that, the EU was in need of a security identity at European level rather than at national level.

C. COMMON DEFENSE AND SECURITY POLICY (CSDP)

The end of the Cold War compelled Europe to transform its structure in accordance with the new realities of the continent. There were two main reasons for the need for transformation inside the community. Firstly, when the Berlin Wall was demolished in 1989, one of the main symbols of European division vanished towards the end of the Cold War. The subsequent reunification of Germany was completed quickly, and the European Community could not continue with its integration process using the same dynamics of the Cold War. Also, the wars in the vicinity of Europe, principally in Kosovo and Bosnia, were exacerbated by the inaction of the EU. This situation created disappointment for the EU's ambitious politicians who deemed the wars in the Balkans as a series of tests of the union as a security provider on its own continent. Nevertheless, as Milton Friedman stated, "Only a crisis, actual or perceived, produces change"³¹ These crises originated new structure and fundamental changes in the European Community through the treaties that firstly changed the European Community to the European Union, and also aimed to deepen the integration process

³¹ Lee, Dwight R., Capitalism and Freedom a 50th anniversary tribute to the Milton Friedman, 03.10.2012, www.fee.org/articles/capitalism-and-freedom-a-50th-anniversary-tribute-to-milton-friedman//amp (accessed at 13.05.2020)

of Europe in various aspects. In a break with the past, the fundamental treaties of EU incorporated important initiatives related to the defense integration of the EU.

1. The Maastricht Treaty

Europeans believed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO would soon be outdated. As such, there were debates on the security autonomy of the union. Some European leaders, especially the French President, were in favor of increasing operational capacity to deliver security autonomy to the EU. Jacques Delors, as well as the European Commission President, addressed the need for an autonomous European security identity in a speech in 1991³².

In light of these debates and needs, the member countries of the European Community agreed on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and reinforced it in 1993 to minimize disunity in Europe in its foreign relations and boost the security identity of the union. With the treaty, the European Community was reorganized as the European Union. The union was based on a three-pillar structure, one of which was the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was tasked with taking care of any questions related to the security of member states and to gradually building a common defense policy within the EU. The other pillars were the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and the European Community, which was based on supranational governance, and the CFSP together with the JHA, which were based on intragovernmental governance.

Also, the provisions in the treaty related to the CFSP introduced a new term for EU defense integration under the title of “mutual solidarity”³³. However, the concept of mutual solidarity was not clarified within the strategic priorities or the division of labor between the institutions and member states. The referral of the term was

³² Larivé, Maxime H. A.. *Debating European Security and Defense Policy* (Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series) . Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2016, Kindle Location (2926)

³³ Larivé, Maxime H. A., *Debating European Security and Defense Policy* (Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series) . Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2016, Kindle Location (2947)

promising for European defense integration. In addition to that, the EU was devoid of a legal framework for any military involvement in conflict zones until the acceptance of Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty constituted the first legal framework to provide for joint action within the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article J.4 stated that, “The Union requests the Western European Union (the WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union that have defense implications...”³⁴. This regulation was done with unique timing and foresight in face of the events unfolding in the Balkans. The statement meant that the defense issues of the union should have been and were going to be taken more seriously at European level. Nevertheless, like the idea of mutual solidarity, the statement did not explicitly assign responsibilities to member states or make provisions for the possible use of military force in conflict areas.

2. The Amsterdam Treaty

Starting with the European Council talks in March 1996, the Amsterdam Treaty was agreed on in 1997 and reinforced in 1999. The treaty came up with substantial changes for both ensuring unity in foreign policy and accelerating the pace of European defense integration. The treaty introduced an important amendment to the decision-making procedure of the CFSP. The rule of unanimity was hindering the EU from acting in times of crisis. Instead of ousting the unanimity rule totally, the member countries agreed to implement the “constructive abstention” rule in certain decisions. Member countries that were not interested in the foreign policy issue in question could withdraw from the decision-making process without interrupting other member countries’ ability to act³⁵.

³⁴ Arıkan, H . (2009). The European Union Policy towards the Balkan States in the Post-Cold War Era. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi , 2009 (2) , p.(17)

³⁵ Larivé, Maxime H. A.. Debating European Security and Defense Policy (Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series) . Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2018, Kindle Location (2977)

The treaty provided for a more concrete formation to the CFSP through the invention of the High Representative (HR) position to increase cohesion in foreign policy and also to tackle the external representation problem of the union. The HR was to be the official face of the union when dealing with non-member states and was charged with ensuring the power transfer between the rotating presidents of the Council. Also, the establishment of this new post constituted the troika of the Commission, the Council, and the HR for dealing with non-member states.³⁶ The HR was responsible for evaluating the security environment of the EU and potential threats against the union. For that purpose, the HR position was outfitted with a policy planning and early warning unit.

As for the security identity of the union, under the Amsterdam Treaty the Petersberg Tasks were accepted. These included peacekeeping, humanitarian work, rescue mission, and various combat missions for crisis management and peacemaking. Actually, these tasks were formulated and integrated into the WEU in the declaration of 1992. But when the WEU was presented as the defense component of the union to fortify the European side of the Transatlantic alliance within the Amsterdam Treaty, these tasks were also applied at EU level³⁷.

These tasks outlined the areas and ways by which European national armies could be used through the CFSP. Article 17 (TEU), in particular, refereed to the idea of common defense: “The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, [...] which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.” Although this common defense emphasis was uncertain

³⁶ Larivé, Maxime H. A.. *Debating European Security and Defense Policy* (Global Interdisciplinary Studies Series) . Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2018, Kindle Location (2977)

³⁷ Boin, Arjen, *The European Union as Crisis Manager*, Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition, 2013, (p. 57).

and vague like in the Maastricht Treaty, it was important that the defense of the union as a whole was back on the EU's agenda after 37 years³⁸.

3. The Saint Malo Declaration

The Saint Malo declaration was a significant milestone for the integration of European defense in terms of the military autonomy of the union. After a meeting between UK and France, the result was unexpected in most European countries. Despite the UK and France cooperating on European defense during the Cold War, they had different motives and perceptions of European defense. But the conclusion thereafter was that European policies should have been supported by credible military force, a lesson learned from the wars in Yugoslavia.

In the following year, the declaration on the constitution of credible military force within the union was supported by the EU Council in Cologne, which announced that the necessary means and capabilities should have been granted to the EU to undertake its responsibilities stemming from the CFSP. For that purpose, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was established. Its main purpose was to supply the required military means to the union to realize the Petersberg Tasks in cases of crises, and to allow it to act properly and urgently. Related institutions were founded to strengthen the institutional development of the ESDP. These institutions were the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee, and the Military Staff. They were created to increase the operational capability of the union³⁹.

In another meeting of the EU Council in Helsinki in 1999, the member states determined a set of targets in relation to the military capabilities of the EU to be fulfilled by 2003. These targets were announced as the Helsinki Military Headline Goals

³⁸ Trybus, Martin, *The Legacy of the European Defence Community and the Future of European Defence and Security Integration* (January 20, 2007). Pre-print version of Martin Trybus, Chapter 2, in Martin Trybus and Nigel White (eds.), *European Security Law* (OUP, 2007). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896178>, (accessed at 27.09.2019) p.(15)

³⁹ Boin, Arjen, *The European Union as Crisis Manager*, Cambridge University Press, Kindle Edition, (p. 58).

(MHG). The MHG proposed to establish 15 brigades, each to be made up of 50,000 to 60,000 troops in support of the CFSP. This development was a significant step in the evolutionary path of the EU's military identity, especially after the EDC's failure, which showed that a pan-European military force was again on the European political agenda⁴⁰.

However, after the Saint Malo declaration France and the UK struggled through some very divergent understandings of European defense, as they had done during the Cold War years. For instance, France and the UK were divided on the need for military headquarters within the EU. France was a rigid supporter of having defined military headquarters, while the UK claimed that this sort of arrangement would cause a duplication problem with NATO's headquarters. Therefore, the goals determined by the EU Council after the Saint Malo declaration could not be implemented. Hence the EU could not reach the intended level of military ambition even two decades after the start of the CSDP. Moreover, following those 20 years, EU member countries experienced a reduction in their military capabilities of between 30 and 80 percentages⁴¹. This enormous military capability gap is due to the fact that European member countries had indeed been reluctant and hesitant to conceive their defense priorities in line with European priorities and develop their defense capabilities through the European defense identity during the implementation of these goals over the years.

4. European Security Strategy (ESS)

It is possible to say that since its foundation, the EU has had problems developing a united foreign policy. To solve this problem, European countries took on different initiatives and applied different solutions. The CFSP was started to tackle the disunity of the union in the first post-Cold War years. But it was seen that even the

⁴⁰ Arikan, Hakan, The European Union Policy towards the Balkan States in the Post-Cold War Era, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Spring 2017, p.63

⁴¹ Major, Claudia, and Mölling, Christian, The EU's military legacy, Chapter Two, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), THE CSDP IN 2020, 2020, p. (44)

CFSP alone was not enough. Particularly in the course of the Yugoslavia Wars, European countries were divided along the lines of their former alliances with Balkan countries in previous wars. This sort of disunity was very visible in the political stance of the EU in times of crisis.

Among these challenges, Javier Solana, the former HR of the EU, started to look for solutions to abolish these intricate divisions and kicked off the writing of a new strategic vision to put the foreign policy of the union on a stable course. His purpose was to bridge the crippling differences between member states by introducing a new strategic vision. In the ESS, it was highlighted that there were new threats to Europe and the world. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WPD), failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts needed to be faced seriously and carefully. For Europe, these threats required the adaptation of a more comprehensive and collective approach, since European countries were not able to tackle these problems using their own strategic capabilities. According to the ESS, “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own” (EUHR 2003: 13). Thus, the importance of unity was boldly emphasized in the document. Also, the ESS was inviting the member states to adopt required measures to create a strategic culture within the union. Especially after the Saint Malo declaration, there was a clear intention for the CFSP to possess a credible military force. The ESS stated the need for “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (EUHR 2003: 13).⁴² The publication of the ESS was seen by some scholars as a milestone in the first phase of European defense integration between 1999 and 2003⁴³.

⁴² Tocci, Nathalie, *Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World* (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics) . Springer International Publishing, 2017, Kindle Location (1077)

⁴³ Serrano, Pedro, *Truth and Dare, A personal reflection on 20 years of CSDP*, Chapter One, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), *THE CSDP IN 2020*, 2020, p. (16)

5. The Lisbon Treaty

Despite the invention of the CFSP, the EU was still suffering from the disunity in its foreign policy, which was restraining Europe from becoming an international player. This disunity was visible in almost every crisis the EU exposed that instead of prioritizing its institutional identity, member states were aligning their foreign policy interests with their own national interests. To overcome this division, the treaty created a new institution: the European External Action Service (EEAS). Besides, the treaty prescribed the establishment of “Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)” in order to tackle the military capability problem. This cooperation project foresaw the harmonization of all redundant capability differentiation in European defense. Together with these changes, the ESDP was renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Spectacularly, the clause of mutual assistance was introduced by Article 42 (7) as a specific provision on behalf of the CSDP. It states that in case of an armed aggression on the territory of a member state, other member states are obliged to lend assistance using whatever power or means necessary. But, like former treaties, there has been no provision or consensus on strengthening the crisis management capability of the EU on the grounds of the CSDP⁴⁴. With the Lisbon Treaty, it was assumed that the CSDP would generate a common political stance and tackle the military capability problem in terms of forming a security provider identity for the EU as an international player. But because of the CSDP’s intragovernmental character, disputes and the unwillingness of member states to cooperate have been major obstacles to these targets. Beyond that, PESCO, which was introduced to overcome the military capability of the union, was not reinforced until 2017 due to the unwillingness of the member states to further defense integration and the negative effects of the 2008 global economic crisis.

⁴⁴ Cîrlig, Carmen-Cristina, The EU's mutual assistance clause First ever activation of Article 42(7) TEU, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing November 2015, p.(2) p. (1-9), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572799/EPRS_BRI\(2015\)572799_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572799/EPRS_BRI(2015)572799_EN.pdf), (accessed at 11.11.2020)

As a result, the CSDP was not equipped with the required military means for crisis management. Nonetheless, based on qualitative changes and visionary projects like PESCO, referred to in the Lisbon Treaty, some scholars saw the reinforcement of the treaty in 2009 as constituting the second phase of European defense integration⁴⁵.

II. NEED FOR TRANSFORMATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

A. UNSEEN CSDP

After the launch of CSDP, the EU was more confident on the European defense in terms of addressing the unity, cohesion and military capability problems. However, crises outside the Union unveiled the failure of the CSDP, in that these plans for the future of European Defense could not go beyond rhetoric and remained unrealized. The reactions of member states to these crises indicated a recurrent deficit in European Defense. Initially, European countries could not present a united response to these severe crises or some of them wanted to stay away from those troublesome crises beyond their borders. The EU did not have the required military capabilities to conduct operations to manage these crises around European strategic interests.

1. A Winter in The MENA Region

Subsequent to the first period of peaceful protests, the response of the regimes made the events spin out of control. Protesters' fight against governments' oppression developed into civil wars in these countries. The civil wars have engulfed these countries for nearly a decade in the pain of humanitarian crises. Most of the governments in these countries fell. However, violent conflicts have continued up to now. Thus, tremendous changes occurred for the region. In the meantime, these wars not only changed the MENA countries but also affected the rest of the world and international organizations like the EU.

⁴⁵ Major, Claudia, and Mölling, Christian, The EU's military legacy, Chapter Two, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), THE CSDP IN 2020, 2020, p. (38)

1.1. Libyan Crisis

After the outbreak of the protests, Qaddafi applied force to oppress the protesters. He was warned by the international community to stop the violence against opponents. To prevent the events from escalating, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared a no-fly zone and permitted member countries to take all required measures short of a foreign occupation force in Libya. At first, the coalition of France, the UK and the US launched a set of air strikes against Qaddafi's forces. Then, with the authorization of the UNSC, NATO took over the air strike mission.

1.1.1. Dead CFSP in Libya

Though the mission of ending Qaddafi's rule in Libya was completed and the UN was praised for its rapid intervention and unity, the EU was criticized harshly for its lack of defense policy and divided approach towards the crisis. It was even claimed that the CFSP was dead in Libya after its weak, incoherent, late, scattered reactions to the crisis. This claim was not completely unfair. This crisis was the first examination of the CFSP, and CSDP after the announcement of the Lisbon treaty. In the treaty, measures were announced to overcome the cohesion and military capability problems. However, these measures were not effective to produce the needed defense policy. The HRVP and EU Council contradicted each other for the purpose of intervention in Libya. These bodies were not even sure of the EU's precise policy direction.

Also, most of the diplomacy measures the EU applied under the EEAS were not in control of this institution but were relevant to decision-making procedures of member states. Beyond that, there was confusion and a lack of coherence even within the agents of EEAS. As a result of these problems, the European Parliament was an important critic of the EEAS, comparing its job to "money thrown out of the window." The mechanisms invented by the Lisbon treaty lacked efficiency and needed to be

overcome. As a result, the EU overwhelmingly felt the need for a real defense policy⁴⁶ which could ensure cohesion and efficiency in these crises. Therefore, it needed to prepare sweeping arrangements and take further steps under the CSDP.

Because the turmoil in Libya affected the EU extensively, it started debates on the Schengen area. More than one million people fled Libya and significant numbers of migrants headed towards Europe, mostly through the Southern European countries. The surge of migration sparked disappointment and rage in these countries. This situation raised problems with allocation of these migrants and moreover the Schengen Area. Despite member countries' heated debates around the issue of allocation of migrants, the EU is far from finding a permanent solution to that problem.

The results of the Europeans' inefficient and divided approach were not limited to events within the borders of the Union. When Qaddafi wanted to stop revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt with force in continuation of the Arab Spring, France and the UK came forward to intervene in Libya to prevent Qaddafi from killing protesters. Although the US was not willing to make an intervention there, it participated in the attacks at their insistence. In the aftermath of NATO's Libya intervention, the war against Qaddafi was won. However, thousands of mercenaries in the Libyan army spread over different regions of Africa like Mali with their military equipment and arms. These militias dragged Mali into a civil war, in which France felt it had to intervene as a consequence of its past colonial ties with the country.⁴⁷ Aside from tactical gains and temporary progress, Europeans with divided policies could not manage the crises near its continent, but also contributed to the civil war in Mali.

⁴⁶ Koenig, Nicole. The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence? Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), 2011, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09708. Accessed 15 June 2020. P.(3-16), P. (1-20)

⁴⁷ Biscop, Sven. European Strategy in the 21st Century (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, (p. 75).

1.1.2. The Europe Not A Player, But A Payer

Based on its trade power, the EU invests and gives loans to increase the resilience of failing states, but this does not seem to be enough to be a reliable partner and a key power broker for the MENA countries. Moreover, those EU funds are used to fund terrorism in Libya. Since the tide of migrants crossing the Mediterranean increased, the EU started pouring millions of Euro into Libya to stop illegal migration and human trafficking. An AP report found that without a functioning government, the EU funds are being exploited by militiamen, human traffickers and coast guards who profit from migrants⁴⁸. Although the purpose of EU funding is to combat these problems, most EU funding is used for the opposite purpose, causing a vicious circle that again emphasizes and indicates the lack of a real defense policy. As expressed by former Israel Prime Minister Sharon in relation to the inefficiency of the EU in the Middle East, this circumstance was confirmed his claim that the “EU was a payer, not a player.”⁴⁹

The EU is not still one of the main players to affirm a solution process to instability and violence in Libya, which puts development of CFSP and CSDP in a zero-sum game after years of effort. Consequently, despite the EU’s desire to take control of events in Libya as a security provider at first, it could not address the crisis there with a comprehensive approach and defense policy after two decades of wars in the Balkans.

⁴⁸ Michael, Maggie, Hinnant, Lori, Brito, Renata, Making misery pay: Libya militias take EU funds for migrants, AP News, December 31, 2019, <https://apnews.com/9d9e8d668ae4b73a336a636a86bdf27f> (accessed at 17.06.2020)

⁴⁹ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, Contemporary European Security, Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, (p. 163).

1.2. Syrian Crisis

Probably, it would not be wrong to claim that the country most affected by the Arab Spring has been Syria. This crisis has not merely changed the Middle East but changed a great deal in world politics. Russia has consolidated its rise and control over the MENA mainly through its success in keeping the Syrian regime alive in spite of stark challenges. Iran's will to export its regime to other Middle East countries has been empowered by its inclusion in conflicts on behalf of the Syrian regime. On behalf of the Western Alliance, the US' policy was filled with confusion and indecisiveness. Since the announcement of Pivot to Asia, the US has turned its attention to other regions of the world. Thus, the military footprint of the US has been fading in the Middle East. Necessities in Syria attracted the US to the region again. However, the main policy direction of the US has been unchanged. The US withdrew some units of its troops in Syria suddenly in September 2019, and this situation created a power gap. As for the EU, the last of these results has been to bear the burden of this crisis along with other international players. The Syrian Civil War generated huge waves of migration towards various parts of the world, and member countries of the EU have been the main destinations for these migrants. Also, terrorist attacks directed by extremist organizations in Syria have killed many civilians in Europe and terrified the continent.

1.2.1. No CSDP in Syria

Despite the importance of Syria to the continent on that scale, The EU's inaction since the beginning of the protests left its role in Syria negligible. At first, the EU chose to wait and continued to criticize the Assad regime's oppression of protesters. The EU's inaction was due to the fact that according to its assumptions, Assad's regime would fall soon after the protests. Additionally, the new institutions and posts under the CSDP after implementation of the Lisbon treaty were caught unprepared for the crisis.

Because of this, the EU's reactions to the crisis in military terms were limited to reactions of member states.

It can even be claimed that the rise of violence in Syria is related to the absence of CSDP in the Middle East since the beginning of the Arab Spring. When NATO intervened in Libya, opponents in Syria thought that the West would step up to protect them. However, this expectation was wrong. The West supposed that an intervention in Syria would increase tension and violence in the country and wrongly expected that the Assad regime would fall soon after the protests. Contrary to this assumption, violence reached horrifying levels. Militarization of the country paved the way for extremists, and various terrorist organizations emerged around the country. The most dangerous of these was ISIS, which aimed to establish a state in the region. They controlled some regions and made important profits by operating petrol fields there. Later, ISIS started to spread terror in both Syria and Iraq and spread its violence to the rest of the world. Thousands of foreign fighters poured into the region to join ISIS. Europe was one of the main sources of these fighters, which increased the continent's relevance to the crisis beyond the migration problem. European citizens were both working to spread terror in the Middle East and using their personal contacts to stage terrorist attacks in Europe.⁵⁰

1.3. Implications of The Wars in the MENA Region

The instability and civil war in the MENA region provoked the overwhelming amount of immigration flows towards the Europe, which constituted one of the most critical and severe crises of the continent. The migration of Syrian refugees created important debates among member states that especially Greece, Italy and Malta accused the EU to leave them alone with the migration problem, which caused the rise of Euroscepticism around the continent.

⁵⁰ Biscop, Sven. *European Strategy in the 21st Century* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, 2019, (p. 77).

Brexit has deep roots with the anti-establishment sentiments, xenophobia, populism that together with these factors, the Euroscepticism has been one of the main triggers of the Brexit voting process in UK. As people casted their ballots, the numbers of asylum seekers around the Europe was witnessing a peak in which according to the post-Brexit analyzes, immigration issue was alone most efficient driver of the Leave vote at the end⁵¹. Not only UK, but lots of European countries have witnessed the rise of the nationalist and Eurosceptic policies in the last years. Nationalist and Eurosceptic policies have been existent in the political spectrum of the continent, but with booming of immigration movements towards the Europe, the rise of right-wing nationalist and Eurosceptic political parties has been exponential and they gained considerable political momentum AFD in Germany, Five Star Movement in Italy, Vox in Spain, FPÖ in Austria, National Front in France, Sweden Democrats in Sweden, and Fidesz in Hungary have made significant political gains in reaction to anti-migration sentiment in Europe, whose further rise in their countries may challenge the integrity of the EU in the future. For instance, National Front which is known for its anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic policies has become powerful in France. If Le Pen, the leader of the party, were able to defeat Macron in the elections, Europe might be debating “Frexit” after the shock of Brexit.

The stability in the MENA region is vital to the European strategical interests. In fact, no individual member country of the EU has direct interests in Syria or is able to tackle the crisis there alone that the EU as a whole has direct interests. This situation urges the EU to adopt a real defense policy under the CSDP and develop its military capabilities for crisis management and conflict prevention in the regions which are directly in the strategical interests of the Union.

⁵¹ Garrett, Amanda, The Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and the Reframing of Immigration in Britain, EuropeNow, Commentary, <https://www.europenowjournal.org/2019/09/09/the-refugee-crisis-brexit-and-the-reframing-of-immigration-in-britain/>, (accessed at 13.11.2020)

2. The Ukraine Crisis

After the MENA situation, the EU had to face another serious crisis. Russia intervened in Ukraine militarily and seized Crimea unlawfully. For Russia, Ukraine was at a critical point. It was like a gate spanning Europe and Asia. Without Ukraine, Russia would cease to be a Eurasian empire⁵². Additionally, the democratization of Ukraine could be a role model for Russians that might eventually challenge and threaten Putin's oppressive rule. Putin has had to suppress civil rights movements through the power of state several times. A democratic country adjacent to Russia would escalate the demands of Russian people tremendously. Due to that Russia could not afford to lose Ukraine to the Western alliance.

2.1. The EU's Share at Ukraine Crisis

As opposed to Russia's interest in keeping Ukraine under its control, Ukrainians were interested in entering into a period of Europeanization. After adoption of the Eastern Partnership program by the Union in 2009, Ukraine and the EU started to develop closer ties. The EU became a role model for modernization and improvement process to most Ukrainians⁵³. In 2013, the EU and Ukraine were negotiating to sign the Association Agreement. However, Ukraine, in face of strict opposition by Russia, had to suspend talks with the EU. Russia wanted to keep Ukraine away from the influence of the Western Bloc. However, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Kiev in favor of Europeanization and clashed with police. The protests were suppressed and left thousands of people dead. It was the bloodiest event to occur in Europe since the

⁵² Larrabee, F. Stephen, et al. The Ukrainian Crisis and European Security: Implications for the United States and U.S. Army. RAND Corporation, 2015. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15sk8s2. Accessed 21 June 2020. P.(3) p. (1-47)

⁵³ Getmanchuk, Alyona, Tracing the origins of the Ukraine crisis: Should the EU share the blame?, Europe's World, Security and Defense, 2014, p. (78) p. (78-82) <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ew.pdf> (accessed at 21.06.2020)

war in the Balkans in the 1990s⁵⁴. Subsequent events resulted the annexation of Crimea by Russia and Russian-backed rebels announced their independence from the Ukrainian central authority in eastern cities of the country.

Europe could not produce a firm defense policy against Russian intervention and was not clearly aware of the shocking events which took place rapidly during the annexation of the Crimea within only two weeks. The EU underestimated Russia's seriousness about its anti-European stance and was overconfident about European aspirations in the Ukrainian government to defend Europeanization. Besides, the EU undervalued the desire of the Ukrainian people for pro-European change in the country⁵⁵. The lack of a realistic foreign and defense policy to evaluate the Russian threat during the EU's interaction with Ukraine has not made the Union the sole bearer of this crisis but has made it one of the main stakeholders. Particularly, the absence of a consistent defense policy has been felt so deeply that the EU's credibility has been harmed. For instance, problems in the EU defense policy have been criticized by Brexiters. Boris Johnson accused the EU of triggering real trouble in Ukraine by pretending to have a defense policy.⁵⁶

Added to that, more apparent disappointment was felt in Ukraine due to the incoherence and indecisiveness within the EU. For the Ukrainian people, Europeanization meant distancing themselves from Russian influence and forestalling a slide into dictatorship, like in Belarus or Russia itself. That is why the Ukrainian people held a firm stance on the Europeanization process through close ties with the EU. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian people were frustrated with the reluctance of the EU

⁵⁴ Thompson, Nick Ukraine: Everything you need to know about how we got here, CNN World, February 3, 2017, <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/10/europe/ukraine-war-how-we-got-here/index.html> (accessed at 21.06.2020)

⁵⁵ Getmanchuk, Alyona, Tracing the origins of the Ukraine crisis: Should the EU share the blame?, Europe's World, Security and Defense, 2014, p. (78) p. (78-82) <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ew.pdf> (accessed at 21.06.2020)

⁵⁶ Grant, Charles, Is The EU to Blame for The Crisis in Ukraine?, Centre for European Reform, June 01, 2016, <https://www.cer.eu/insights/eu-blame-crisis-ukraine>, (accessed at 22.06.2020)

over the escalation of violence in the country. Many Ukrainians believed that although many people died for the idea of Europeanization, the EU stayed inactive and did not go harsh against Russia at least with sanctions. The sanctions only came into force after a civilian plane was hit by Russia-backed rebels. Due to that, the Europeanization idea has lost its lustre in the minds of the Ukrainian people. Ukrainians chose to be more realistic about the EU.⁵⁷

However, there were other rationales behind the events in Ukraine. There was a power gap in the region because of the political shift by the US under the policy of “Pivot to Asia .” The US assumed that Europe was secure and stable, allowing it to focus more on Asia and the Middle East. Also, according to the US, Russia was more like a partner rather than an adversary. as opposed to the Cold War period. However, these assumptions hit the wall, which had severe results in the region. In addition to the policy shift of the US towards Asia, there was another factor that encouraged Russia to move forward blatantly. Putin was sure that, NATO would not act to protect Ukraine in case of a threat without the status of membership in NATO.⁵⁸

2.2. Ukraine; The Need of More European Defense

Nevertheless, NATO boosted its presence in Eastern European countries after the intervention of Russia in Ukraine. To deter the Russian threat in the eastern flank of the alliance, NATO has deployed new units. These new units have been located around the Baltic countries and Poland in particular. However, even during the deployment process of new units, NATO had problems with its European allies on grounds of their reluctance and capability problems. NATO could not convince its European allies to assume the command of the fourth battalion. Spain and Italy were

⁵⁷ Getmanchuk, Alyona, Tracing the origins of the Ukraine crisis: Should the EU share the blame?, Europe’s World, Security and Defense, 2014, p. (79) p. (78-82) <https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ew.pdf> (accessed at 21.06.2020)

⁵⁸ Amadeo, Kimberly, Ukraine Crisis Summary and Explanation, January 27, 2020, <https://www.thebalance.com/ukraine-crisis-summary-and-explanation-3970462>, (accessed at 21.06.2020)

in favor of bolstering the southern flank of the alliance to stop illegal migration across the Mediterranean. France was also ambivalent about taking a role in Warsaw.⁵⁹

This command problem was eventually solved. However, the lack of a real defense policy through the CSDP was left untouched and disappointing for Europeans. Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgium Prime Minister pointed out in his book that the EU should have united urgently for European Defense. He criticized the EU to be content with only a few targeted sanctions against Russia, leaving leadership to the US about an issue related to the EU's security interests, as during the Balkan conflicts. Despite the existent CSDP, not the EU, but the US protected Ukraine's airspace and provided military equipment for most of the eastern European countries. Also, joint large-scale military drills were launched to ward off a possible Russian invasion in the region under the US's leadership.

According to him, Europe relied upon the US heavily for its security needs and even its territorial integrity. For that purpose, Europeans participated in the formation of NATO at its inception to keep Americans in the European Defense. During the Cold War, Europe found shelter against the Soviet threat under the wings of the US through NATO. Also, after the end of the Cold War, this reality has continued. Many times it has been agreed that participation in NATO was essential for European Defense. However, in the meantime, it was concluded that NATO was not built in accordance with European strategic interests. To him, the EU should have taken control of events into its own hands in the vicinity of its strategic interests. He wrote: "The discord over the American invasion of Iraq and Europe's fatal indecisiveness in the face of Russian provocation in Ukraine have taught me that we will never play a significant geopolitical

⁵⁹ Riegert, Bernd, NATO beefs up presence in Eastern Europe, DW, Europe, June 14, 2016, <https://www.dw.com/en/nato-beefs-up-presence-in-eastern-europe/a-19330029>, (accessed at 21.06.2020)

role if we do not first succeed in establishing a European defense community, and soon.”⁶⁰

3. A New Phase for the European Defense

The inefficiency of the EU in these crises helped European countries to understand the fact that after the announcement of the Lisbon treaty, the point the CSDP had reached was not much different than its inception. The cohesion between member states was beyond something written in the ambitious papers of the Union documents. The EU has not been able to generate a consistent defense policy under the wings of the CSDP so far and exclusively member states chose to pursue their strategic interests through bilateral relations with counterparts of the crises. Moreover, the crises the EU exposed witnessed rivalries both between member states and within the institutions of the Union.

The EU accepted the fact that Europe needed a common strategic roadmap to overcome all the destabilizing factors inside the Union. In 2003, ESS was published for that purpose, but its effects stayed limited. This document was important for the EU's strategic thinking, but it was in need of calibration at certain intervals. Unfortunately, it has not been updated recently. In 2008, there was an attempt to update the ESS, but efforts to create a new strategic roadmap were overshadowed by the global economic crisis. In this respect, the EU was like a ship in a rough ocean, trying to get ahead through high waves without a strategic compass. The crises mainly in Libya, Ukraine and Syria and other regional conflicts around the globe were proof of this deficit in European defense.

This new roadmap had to be comprehensive, for all strategic needs of member states for unity in CSDP. With this strategic roadmap, the EU had to learn to facilitate and use the tools of power in different ways. To be an international player, the EU had

⁶⁰ Verhofstadt, Guy. *Europe's Last Chance: Why the European States Must Form a More Perfect Union*. Basic Books. Kindle Edition, p. (247) p. (247-259)

to adopt the language of power⁶¹ and internalize this strategic culture throughout the whole Union. Indeed, the economic and trade power of Europe alone has not been enough to surmount the crises faced until now. The EU's role generally has been remiss as a security provider in the crises.

Due to that, the HRVP requested her aides to work on a strategic roadmap globally for a more contested and connected geopolitical order. The strategic interests of the Union should not have been contended with issues only occurring around the European continent. The world we live in now is more integrated with its components than ever before. This fact is valid for Europeans as well; that is why the EU propelled its efforts to think globally in its new strategic thinking process. Europe was creating a global network of foreign relations with every part of the world outside the Union that could not close its borders. For instance, a problem in Munich could be linked to events taking place in the siege of Aleppo⁶². Likewise, any event around the globe could affect the EU in a serious way.

3.1. The European Union Global Strategy (EUGS)

In advance of intensive endeavors together with member states, institutions, and think tanks, the maturation of the strategy was completed in 2016. It was going to be announced in June of 2016. However, this period overlapped with the Brexit vote process and most of the attention of either the member states or EU institutions was drawn more to the Union's most challenging crisis at that time. Due to that, it was profoundly feared that European officials would not galvanize enough interest in the new strategy of Union to move into action. Postponement of the announcement was among the options to be declared later in a more stable period. HRVP Federica Mogherini insisted on publishing the document in this fragile and fragmented situation

⁶¹ Bomassi, Liza, Vimont Pierre, Reimagining a Global Europe, Dec. 11, 2019, Carnegie Europe, p. (1), p. (1-8)

⁶²De France, Olivier, After the EU Global Strategy Security and Defense, Consulting Experts, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), October 2016, p. (20), p. (19-21).

for the EU. Indeed, the EUGS already had been prepared to promote policy direction, to strengthen political unity and to boost effectiveness of external actions within the EU.⁶³ Therefore, during a staggering and traumatic period for the EU, the EUGS was presented by the HRVP in the Council to ensure political unity just after the Brexit referendum results.

3.1.1. The EU Goes Global

The EUGS (EU Global Strategy 2016)⁶⁴ concerns global interests of the EU. In the ESS, there was not such strong emphasis on going global, but now, the EU was feeling a push to move globally in emergence of a challenging strategic environment. In turn, the world was demanding that the EU be more proactive on the global stage. In addition to that, EU citizens wanted the EU to be more globally focused and take responsibilities. According to a study conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 2015 regarding policy matters, there was a wide range of support by Europeans for a vigorous foreign policy and security role of the EU. In another study conducted by the ARD-DeutschlandTREND in 2016, 83 percent of participants replied that they would like the EU to take a strong political stance in foreign policy.⁶⁵ Owing to these reasons, the writers of strategy chose to think globally and call the new strategy global.

According to the EUGS, the world is more contested, connected and complex than ever. In a contested world, failed states and ungoverned spaces are accelerating. The EU's neighborhood in the East is surrounded by economic and political problems and contains energy supply fragilities as well. In the south, due to the lack of rule of law, corruption and conflict-based politics, instability and violence are so widespread.

⁶³ Tocci, Nathalie. Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics) . Springer International Publishing. Kindle Edition, Kindle Location (293)

⁶⁴ EU Global Strategy, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, (accessed at 21.07.2020).

⁶⁵ Kellner, Anna Maria, Optenhögel, Uwe, The Strategic Environment, Strategic Autonomy and The Defense of Europe, Dietz Press, 2017, p. (14), p. (13-34)

Fifty million people are expelled from their homes. The Middle East is enmeshed in wars fueled by identity politics. Together with all these uncertainties, open society in Europe is threatened.

In a more connected world, globalization brought world countries closer and made them interdependent. A security problem in the Middle East could concern many countries in the world. Any technical development in military affairs could be traced and used either by states or non-state actors maliciously in a short period of time. Beyond that, human mobility and migration increased with unprecedented pace. Not only states, but humans as well are more connected, and the migration issue is one of most challenging problems in political life of policy makers. This scope of connectivity in a fragile world compels Europeans to view human rights, citizenship, health and security and defense issues again from a different perspective. Now that globalization has been the inevitable result of our era, the EU has had to think globally for its grand strategy as well.

In a complex world, the EU witnesses important power shifts around the globe. Over the course of events since the end of the Cold War, the US with its own will has been separating from its traditional Trans-Atlantic Alliance and adopting a more unilateral approach in its foreign relations. In Asia, China is the new rising global power, and with its oppressive and coercive political agenda it constitutes a worrisome situation for Europeans. Russia wishes to experience its previous Soviet-era power and take former Soviet states under its influence. Additionally, Russia has chosen to cooperate with China to accelerate its power scale against the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Not only these major powers, but in different parts of the world, many regional powers are most likely on the rise in the global rankings. Whilst it is unlikely that they would form a sort of alliance, they represent a significant danger to the European political agenda. These power shifts on a major scale around the globe have been putting Europe in a bind.

It has been apparent that a period of crisis is prevalent and inevitable in the future, both within the EU and beyond its borders. The peace, prosperity and democracy around the continent which have been acquired via the European project are being severely challenged. This situation has meant that exclusively, the EU has been under blatant threat and needs to protect European integration whose gains were constructed over long decades and great efforts. Thus, in contrast to the overoptimistic understanding of the 2003 ESS that Europe is surrounded with a ring of friends, the EU is accepting the seriousness of threats around Europe by the EUGS⁶⁶.

In this respect, the EUGS proposed to bring together member states around a shared vision and then prompt them to common action, as was in the headline of the strategy. No individual European country could tackle these global crises alone. Only with cooperation of all European countries would the EU be able to achieve being a real global player.

3.1.2. The Strategic Autonomy

The EUGS pointed out that values and interests of the EU were hand in hand, not at odds. The EU, whose values like rule of law and human rights were at the heart of its existence, should defend them even beyond its borders, not merely within the continent. Europeans should also defend their interests like the security of energy supply and free access to trading routes overseas. The EU feels its values are hidden in its interests. They are complementary parts of the Union's strategy.

In terms of that, the EUGS introduces strategic autonomy as an important target for the EU⁶⁷ to pursue its strategical interests while getting committed to its core values. The strategic autonomy refers to being able to act when required in times of crises with its own military capabilities, which urges the EU adopt the language of power through

⁶⁶ Kellner, Anna Maria, Optenhögel, Uwe, *The Strategic Environment, Strategic Autonomy and The Defense of Europe*, Dietz Press, 2017, p. (14), p. (13-34)

⁶⁷ Coelmont, Joe, *European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?*, Egmont Institute, Security Policy Brief, No.109, March 2019, p. (1), p. (1-5)

investing in the European Defense besides its trade power. With its social and economic aspects, the EU is generating a considerable potential to be a change maker in the global stage. But this potential stumbles without the required military means. The member countries should have been well equipped and trained in a common sense. The EU should invest in the European research and development of the military capabilities and get rid of irrelevant redundancy in the European military systems. As far as the member countries conduct their defense spending together, the result would be more promising for the creation of more competitive European Defense Industries as well. Thus, the EU would have the ability to overcome the inefficiency problem in the CSDP and acquire the strategic autonomy in order to act when required and necessary.

The reference to strategic autonomy in the EUGS harks back to the Saint Malo Declaration⁶⁸ which pointed out the need of credible military forces within the EU for pursuing its strategical interests. For covering this deficit, later the Military Headline Goals were determined to address the military capability problem of the union. But these developments sparked off reactions from the US on the accounts of transatlantic alliance. While the Saint Malo Declaration stated that “while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO,”, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright under Clinton Administration warned the EU for not duplicating, decoupling and discriminating the transatlantic alliance, which has been famed with 3Ds and has constituted the redlines of the US in connection to European Defense Integration.⁶⁹ In order to hamper similar reactions and divisions within the transatlantic alliance, the EUGS under the headline of the Security and Defense has indicated NATO as the primary security framework of the Union to respond to the external threats. The EUGS emphasized to deepen transatlantic alliance and partnership with NATO. Two weeks after the publishment of the EUGS, the EU and NATO agreed on a Joint Declaration

⁶⁸Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy, Working Paper, KFG, No.90, p. (7), August 2018,

⁶⁹ Kochis, Daniel, Recent EU Strategic Autonomy Advances Threaten the Transatlantic Link, The Heritage Foundation, Background, No. 3470 | March 9, 2020, p. (5), p. (1-22)

for the EU-NATO strategic partnership. Then, the Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration addressing a common set of proposals was issued in December 2016⁷⁰. In that matter, the EU aimed to preserve and strengthen its ties with NATO, while it was trying to obtain strategic autonomy.

B. THE PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION (PESCO)

1. The Launch of PESCO

After a busy decade for European defense in the 1990s, a period of standstill encapsulated the European Defense Integration due to political and economic challenges in the 2000s. In particular, the global financial crisis in 2008 drew most of the EU's energy to other areas and the focus on European Defense weakened, and already shrinking national defense spendings had to face severe effects of the global financial crisis. There were still some attempts to deepen cooperation among member states in defense, but they were not able to change policy direction of the EU and receive enough attention. For instance, whilst the Lisbon treaty was reinforced in 2009, PESCO was put on the shelf to be implemented later.

However, crises around Europe and MENA countries compelled Europe to think about European Defense seriously with concrete projects. Following those crises, European leaders both increased their national defense spending and expressed their support for deeper European Defense Integration. Additionally, the shocking decision of the UK with Brexit meant to be another phase for European Defense Integration. While the UK was in favor of increasing military capabilities of the EU to respond to the demands of the US in terms of defending Europe with its own resources, the UK was a strict opponent of deeper European Defense Integration. The stage of European Defense has been left to two main protagonists of Europe, France and Germany. In continuation of call in the EUGS for acquiring strategic autonomy to act independently

⁷⁰ Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy, Working Paper, KFG, No.90, p. (6-7), August 2018.

when required, France and Germany started to take action to mobilize the stalled European Defense Initiative, PESCO, whose launch formed a milestone in the European Defense Integration.⁷¹

In light of the EUGS, France and Germany gathered for launching further projects in the European Defense. They wanted to base their efforts on a more synchronized frame within the EU. Then Italy and Spain accompanied their initial efforts. Together these four states sent a letter to the HRVP for the foundation of PESCO. Officially, PESCO started in December 2017. In this new initiative, member states aim to issue security challenges of the union together and accomplish stronger and more integrated defense cooperation. If they achieve these purposes, the EU member states could be ready to contribute to EU military operations more effectively and efficiently so that the military capabilities of the EU would contribute to protecting European citizens, augment robust defense spending and increase credibility of the EU as an international security actor.

Moreover, the PESCO is a treaty-based defense initiative whose aims explicitly expressed in Article 42 (6), 46 and in Protocol 10 of the Treaty on EU.⁷² With this feature, PESCO differentiates from previous European Defense Initiatives in that it will not disappear following thrilling announcements like former European Defense Initiatives. In example of PESCO, participating member states are required to be compatible with 20 binding commitments whose main focus is to make members of PESCO increase their national defense spending and calibrate their respective defense planning.⁷³ In former examples, the EU defense initiatives were fizzling out after a few

⁷¹ European defense between NATO and PESCO: Charting a course for Czech defense policy, Policy Paper 21, AMO.CZ, December 2017, p. (6), p. (1-11), <https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AMO-European-defense-between-NATO-and-PESCO-Charting-a-course-for-Czech-defense-policy.pdf> (accessed at 01.08.2020)

⁷² PESCO Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States, EU Defense, May 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_november_2019.pdf, (accessed at 08.08.2020)

⁷³ Nissen, C., Banke, C., Schmidt, J., Olesen, M., Mouritzen, H., Rahbek-Clemmensen, J., . . . Andersen, L. (2020). EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION AND THE DANISH DEFENCE OPT-OUT: Report on the developments in the EU and Europe in the field of security and defence policy and their

years when it was understood that member states were not willing to do anything about them. As for PESCO, as written in the EU Law, the HRVP is given the task of presenting a report to the Council of Ministers annually assessing progress made by member states emanating from their commitment to PESCO. Member states are also obligated to have their own annual National Implementation Plan.⁷⁴

However, formation of PESCO was not so easy. Similar to the France and UK divide on the European Defense, there were dividing lines between the major powers of the EU, France and Germany, on different aspects of PESCO, like the level of inclusiveness. In other words, ambivalence between the UK and France was replaced by that of France and Germany.⁷⁵ While France wanted to make up PESCO with a limited number of countries which would take the lead on projects with adequate technical capabilities and be willing to contribute to these strategic projects with sufficient defense spending, Germany opposed the idea of creating a club based on a limited number of committed countries. France preferred an exclusive approach, but Germany favored an inclusive approach for PESCO as much as possible. Notwithstanding that, at last, the EU Council decided to adopt an inclusive approach for PESCO because of the fact that most European countries were under ambitious criteria outlined in the TEU 42.6 which would trigger exclusion of these ineligible European countries from formation of PESCO. For instance, as one of the most ambitious European countries for deeper European Defense Integration, Belgium is one of the lowest defense spenders in the EU⁷⁶. With an exclusive approach, Belgium

implications for Denmark p. (28), (pp. 25-39, Rep.). Danish Institute for International Studies. doi:10.2307/resrep25193.9

⁷⁴ Biscop, Sven, European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance, IISS Survival: Global Politics and Strategy June–July 2018 May 2018, Volume: 60 Edition: 3, p. (163), p. (161-180)

⁷⁵ Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy, Working Paper, KFG, No.90, August 2018, p. (9), p. (1-21)

⁷⁶ Maulny, Jean-Pierre, Di Bernardini, Livia, Moving PeSCo forward: what are the next steps?, ARES Policy Paper 39 May 2019, p. (8-9), p. (1-30)

and member states in similar conditions would be out of PESCO. Thus, the EU council wanted to prevent new dividing lines in the EU through PESCO.

With the inclusive approach, except for Malta, Denmark and the UK as a member state at that period, 25 member countries signed up to PESCO. This situation was a result of compromise between French and German views as to the European Defense, which was closer to the German view that Europe was moving towards greater defense cooperation almost as a unified EU with less intensified framework than France and TEU had planned at first.⁷⁷

After its launch, the PESCO has been based on a two-layer system governance. In the Council level, participating states undertake the responsibility of policy direction and evaluation of progress made by each participant country. The decisions are taken unanimously except for issues related with suspension of membership and entry of new members, which are taken in qualified majority voting. In the projects level, governance is conducted in particular of projects. Every country is responsible on management of the project in which it takes part under overview of the Council.⁷⁸

2. Projects

At the beginning, PESCO was not planned to incorporate so many members. For that reason, France and Germany agreed to proceed five to 10 projects in PESCO. However, after adopting an inclusive approach, almost all member states were included. Not accepting other participating states' proposals did not seem possible and reasonable. There were about 50 of these proposals. Because these two countries were

⁷⁷ Nissen, C., Banke, C., Schmidt, J., Olesen, M., Mouritzen, H., Rahbek-Clemmensen, J., . . . Andersen, L. (2020). EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION AND THE DANISH DEFENCE OPT-OUT: Report on the developments in the EU and Europe in the field of security and defence policy and their implications for Denmark p. (28), (pp. 25-39, Rep.). Danish Institute for International Studies. doi:10.2307/resrep25193.9

⁷⁸ PESCO Deepening Defence Cooperation among EU Member States, EU Defense, May 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_november_2019.pdf, (accessed at 08.08.2020)

not at the point of imposing their views on other European countries, they dropped out some of the agreed projects to keep numbers of proposals at a manageable level.

The participating member states started to debate as to which projects should be included in PESCO. Following that, the first set of projects was accepted in March 2018, the second in November 2018 and the third in November 2019, a total of 47 projects⁷⁹. These projects mainly focused on training facilities, land formation systems, air systems, cyber, maritime, joint enabling and space⁸⁰. With completion of these projects, the EU plans to activate the strategic autonomy outlined in the EUGS. Thus, the EU would be both able to act when required with its own military capabilities and to contribute to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in a stronger way, which has been a goal of the US since the end of the Cold War.

Again, the total number of projects is considerable, to the extent that at the beginning, France and Germany gave up some of their own projects to reduce the number. In the near future, lack of focus on projects should have been revised for covering strategic shortfalls in the European Defense which could add real value to PESCO in that manner. In the current situation, member states prefer to propose projects to cover up national shortfalls. They tend to focus more on their national interests rather than European strategic interests. Therefore, strategic enablers obviously are absent in PESCO like air-to-air refueling, strategic airlift and smart ammunition.⁸¹ Without overcoming these shortfalls, the EU would be deprived of the

⁷⁹ Current list of PESCO projects, European Defense Agency, [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-\(PESCO\)/current-list-of-pesco-projects](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/permanent-structured-cooperation-(PESCO)/current-list-of-pesco-projects), (accessed at 03.08.2020)

⁸⁰ Nissen, C., Banke, C., Schmidt, J., Olesen, M., Mouritzen, H., Rahbek-Clemmensen, J., . . . Andersen, L. (2020). EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION AND THE DANISH DEFENCE OPT-OUT: Report on the developments in the EU and Europe in the field of security and defence policy and their implications for Denmark p. (29), (pp. 25-39, Rep.). Danish Institute for International Studies. doi:10.2307/resrep25193.9

⁸¹ European defense between NATO and PESCO: Charting a course for Czech defense policy, Policy Paper 21, AMO.CZ, December 2017, p. (7), p. (1-11), https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/AMO_European-defense-between-NATO-and-PESCO-Charting-a-course-for-Czech-defense-policy.pdf (accessed at 01.08.2020)

ability to deploy European military forces beyond its borders. Only a limited number of European countries could conduct some expeditionary missions outside Union borders, but the strategic effect of these European countries would be limited. Even at this point, they would need to lean on the US military assets.⁸²

Another obstacle facing member states related to PESCO is that participating states cannot envisage a clear path in developments procedure of projects. Despite the fact that there should have been feasibility work done on the projects, for most of the projects this kind of effort has yet to be conducted and the extent of work and milestones for projects remains unclear. This leads to another consequence, that because participating member states remain blind in projects without clear milestones, they cannot foresee an end to their projects. Planning, determining and achieving milestones is crucial for their implementation process. Another quintessential determinant of success is assuring an end to the projects. Pledging an end to the projects would get participating states motivated and momentum within PESCO would endure possible challenges on the road. Although there are some projects to give results in the short term to satisfy politicians either in the EU or member states and keep momentum going in PESCO, ends awaiting for long-term projects is a thorny and challenging issue for the future of PESCO.⁸³

3. PESCO and Other Defense Initiatives

3.1. The European Defense Fund

The EU officials and European leaders expressed their support for deeper European Defense Integration and tried to clarify its beneficiaries for all across Europe.

⁸² Biscop, Sven, European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance, IISS Survival: Global Politics and Strategy June–July 2018 May 2018, Volume: 60 Edition: 3, p. (164-167), p. (161-180)

⁸³ Béraud-Sudreau, Lucie, Efstathiou, Yvonne-Stefania, Hannigan, Conor, Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: an early assessment of PESCO implementation, IISS, May 2019, p. (4-5), p. (1-15).

In contradiction to those ambitious desires, they could not deliver tangible tools to the hands of European countries to realize them. However, the start of the EDF was a step to cover this deficit with its tangible tools. That is why establishment of the EDF destroyed a taboo⁸⁴ by delivering European funds to be used in the European defense.

The existence of the EDF is mainly to contribute to solving problems of fragmentation in the European Defense Industries and development of military capabilities. With their current fragmentation, European Defense Industries cannot be competitive in the market and activate its potential. They cannot cooperate within Europe. Their efforts cannot produce strategic enablers under development of military capabilities to allow EU militaries to operate in areas of European strategic interest. They cannot increase their market share. For that purpose, the EDF provides funds to projects whose companies cooperate across borders within the EU in military research and development. In addition, if this cooperation is within PESCO, these countries obtain extra bonuses. The EDF also provides support to states cooperating for defense procurements. However, these kinds of regulations mostly concern governments which usually have circumvented them in their countries. They see these attempts as an intervention in their sovereignty. Defense procurements are important for domestic politics in terms of job opportunities, national defense industries and infrastructure⁸⁵ which means that member states still adopt active protectionism in defense-related issues.

Despite these issues, the EDF still maintains its attractiveness for projects within PESCO. Many projects wait confirmation of EDF funding. Without this confirmation, participating states tend not to proceed with feasibility and cost work on

⁸⁴ Fiott, Daniel, What does it mean to be a European Defense Company? IFRI, 25 November 2019, p. (2), p. (1-6)

⁸⁵De France, Oliver, Major, Claudia, Sartori, Paola, How To Make Pesco A Success, Ares Policy Paper 21, September 2017, p. (12), p. (1-16)

projects, which constitutes a considerable obstacle for the success of PESCO⁸⁶. However, there is another problem, in that the capacity of the EDF would not be available for all projects. Currently, there are 47 projects and most of them are expected to cost billions of dollars. Financing problems for PESCO projects may surface more often in the future, given the devastating effects of COVID-19 on European economies. Immediate effects of this chaotic situation can be observed easily in that before COVID-19, the scope of the EDF was planned at 13 billion euros between 2021-2027. Considered that even 13 billion euros was not adequate for generating planned results, the EDF had to face a shock after a decrease in its funding as a result of Multiannual Financial Framework summit.

That is why before the MFF negotiations, defense ministers of the leading countries of PESCO, Germany, France, Italy and Spain wrote a letter⁸⁷ to the other 23 member states and the HRVP, Josep Borrell, to attract their attention to the negative effects of COVID-19 on the European Defense. In the letter, it is said that there are only few organizations that can face such a multifaceted crisis other than the EU, with policy tools at its disposal. In this regard, Europe should act as a union to manage this multifaceted crisis. In this fight, security and defense should be a top priority. The EU should not risk its gains by stepping back; instead, it needs to keep its way steady in European defense. The EU ought to continue developing its military capabilities to act and react autonomously, whenever necessary. For that purpose, defense ministers of these countries emphasized the need for strong interaction between the projects and the EDF for achieving an ambitious PESCO. They link PESCO and the EDF as important

⁸⁶ Béraud-Sudreau, Lucie, Efstathiou, Yvonne-Stefania, Hannigan, Conor, Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: an early assessment of PESCO implementation, IISS, May 2019, p. (4-5), p. (1-15).

⁸⁷"At the heart of our European Union", Gouvernement, 29 May 2020, p. (1-6)
<https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/at-the-heart-of-our-european-un> (accessed at 07.08.2020),

components of European defense cooperation and want them to work hand-in-hand for better results in development of European military capabilities.⁸⁸

In spite of this call, only 7.014 billion euros between 2021-2027 have been earmarked under the EDF according to the newly accepted Multinational Financial Framework (MFF).⁸⁹ This sort of allocation of European funds for the EDF in the coming six years means significant decrease compared to what was planned before COVID-19. Given the COVID-19 effect on the global economy, it is most likely easy to understand that the costs of projects within PESCO will rise significantly, as opposed to decreasing defense budgets across Europe and not every project within PESCO will be funded through the EDF. Thus, crucial questions arise on the future of PESCO of whether some projects will be abandoned, or national defense spending will get more weight in completion of these projects. Most probably, completion of these projects would be beyond the capacity of the national defense budgets, particularly after the negative effects of COVID-19 on European economies, so another push from the EU funds becomes essential for the success of PESCO.

3.2. CDP and CARD

PESCO needs to be in line with priorities highlighted by the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD). The CDP aims to take a full picture of capability development to bolster decision making at the EU and national level regarding defense capability development issues. The CDP has been run by the EDA annually since 2008 and the latest version has been

⁸⁸ Maulny, Jean-Pierre, Di Bernardini, Livia, Moving PeSCo forward: what are the next steps?, ARES Policy Paper 39 May 2019, p. (19), p. (1-30)

⁸⁹ Dobber, Jeroen, EU Budget 2021-2027: What's in It for Europe's Defence?, FNFEUROPE, 06.08.2020, <https://fnf-europe.org/2020/08/06/eu-budget-2021-2027-whats-in-it-for-europes-defence/> (accessed at 07.08.2020)

adopted in 2018 by the EDA, which lays out 11 new capability development priorities for member states⁹⁰

As for the CARD, the EUGS made a call for “gradual synchronization and mutual adaptation of national defense planning cycles and capability development practices” for deeper and strategic defense cooperation between member states. For this reason, the Council established the CARD and launched the CARD Trial Run in 2017, conducted through bilateral dialogues with participating member states, the EDA and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The purpose of this cooperation between these entities is to arrange collected data in three lines: Member States’ aggregated defense plans, implementation of CDP priorities and improvement of European cooperation so that upon this process, collected data is analyzed for completion of the CARD trial⁹¹. The cycle of CARD gives the required top-down guidance at maximum level ranging from head of governments and states, relevant EU institutions and member states. Upon successful implementation of this vigorous cycle, the EU can line up national defense plans in a more collaborative manner so as to eliminate irrelevant duplications within the EU, and strategic enablers which cannot be possessed individually could be produced and owned collectively.⁹²

The CARD has close ties to and similarities with the CPD. They are both important initiatives for making PESCO move in the right direction. Both of them have been referred to in 20 binding PESCO commitments. For clarifying relations between them, it can be said that the CDP features the main priorities to focus on for member states, the CARD determines where the EU and member states stand, and advises the next steps. PESCO provides opportunities to achieve these steps collaboratively.

⁹⁰ Capability Development Plan, European Defense Agency, <https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/capability-development-plan>, (accessed at 08.08.2020)

⁹¹ Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), European Defense Agency Fact Sheet, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-11-26-factsheet_card , (accessed at 08.08.2020)

⁹²Coelmont, Joe, European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, No. 109, March 2019, p. (4), p. (1-5)

Following that, EDF offers European funds to be used in these collaborative projects mainly but pledges a bonus for uses within PESCO.⁹³

Nevertheless, it should be noted that ambiguities between PESCO and the CARD ought to be clarified for better synchronization and more decisive interaction. Although the CARD applies to all member states in the EU, participation to the CARD trial runs is voluntary. That situation means an easy escape for member states which tend to do less or nothing at all. On the contrary, participating states of PESCO are bound to this framework with binding commitments, which highlights the fact that further convergences are needed between these two important initiatives.⁹⁴

4. PESCO and Strategic Autonomy

4.1. Operational Capacity of the EU

Among the 20 binding commitments of PESCO, there are references to interoperability, availability and deployability of European national militaries to augment and bolster the operational capacity of the EU to achieve strategic autonomy as the main purpose behind the existence of PESCO. For this reason, CROC was assigned to feature force generations for expeditionary operations. France and Germany prepared the “Food-for-Thought” paper which proposed a generic contingency plan for possible expeditionary operations and propel existence of a division, or three brigades, as well as strategic enablers attached to this force package. In that way, the start of this initiative was a positive step activation of the Headline goal which foresaw establishment of a corps headquarters, three divisions and nine to 12 brigades. Thus, the joint proposal of France and Germany indicates their seriousness in

⁹³ Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), European Defense Agency Fact Sheet, https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2018-11-26-factsheet_card, (accessed at 08.08.2020)

⁹⁴ Zandee, Dick, PESCO implementation: the next challenge, Clingendael Policy Report, September 2018, p. (4), p.(1-15),

treating the Headline Goal as an essential component of PESCO for achieving a full-spectrum force package.

With the launch of CROC, integration and specialization of European national armies could be assured through its framework. Firstly, a clear division of labor could be achieved in specific domains and for the rest, the EU member states could blend their armies into permanently integrated multinational forces. Secondly, standardization of equipment and doctrines could be achieved, so that this thriving development would also constitute a positive synergy around other PESCO projects to be completed more efficiently and effectively. Thirdly, the existence of CROC could be used to measure the need for strategic enablers as per operational needs. Hence, the EU could lead expeditionary operations without the need to lean on other actors.⁹⁵ However, the problems faced during the formation period of CROC raise crucial concerns for its future. France and Germany's Food-for-Thought paper issued no tangible names of capabilities and forces regarding establishment of CROC at the beginning which drove an official to describe the CROC as "no more than an Excel sheet."⁹⁶

Even if concrete terms are granted on account of generating force packages and capabilities within the CROC in its development period, there are more serious problems than focusing on maturation of this initiative. With EUGS approval, all member states agreed on delivering strategic autonomy to the EU to convert it to an international player. However, the issue on which they disagreed considerably was how they could achieve strategic autonomy. Despite the fact that the CROC was incorporated within PESCO for which member states could cooperate around a mutual

⁹⁵Biscop, Sven, Putting the Core at the Centre, The Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC) and the Future of PESCO, Egmont Institute, Security Policy Brief, No. 119, December 2019, p. (1-3), p.(1-5)

⁹⁶ Biscop, Sven, European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance, IISS Survival: Global Politics and Strategy June–July 2018 May 2018, Volume: 60 Edition: 3, p. (169), p. (161-180)

European framework in order to activate the operational aspect of the EU, France was in pursuit of another initiative for achieving this purpose.

French president Macron's speech at the Sorbonne in 2017 was a precursor to critical changes in the next period. France initiated the European Intervention Initiative (EI2). However, why would France want to pursue another initiative, while there was already an existing one? On behalf of France, there were several reasons for that. Firstly, consequent to the Mali Crisis, France launched a counterterrorism operation there and invoked Article 42.7, for European military assistance on grounds of CSDP rather than NATO. However, invoking Article 42.7 had only a symbolic effect⁹⁷ as France understood that its European counterparts did not share the same understanding of the security environment. Secondly, in the framing period of PESCO, France wanted to form this mutual framework with able and willing countries. Contrary to that, PESCO was framed with an inclusive approach alongside the German view that this state disappointed France on PESCO⁹⁸. France established the EI2 mainly for these reasons, not even merely outside PESCO, but also outside the EU by inviting the UK to membership.

The challenges to PESCO were not limited with that initiative. Germany launched another initiative within NATO, the Framework Nation Concept (FNC) with the participation of 17 states in Central, Eastern and Northern Europe. Germany took the leadership of this framework for mustering considerable forces to deter Russia from any coercive activity. On the other hand, the UK devised another initiative, the Joint Expeditionary Force, which incorporates states from the Scandinavian and Baltic regions to indicate that these countries approach the Russian threat to the region seriously and take concrete precautions. Additionally, in that way, the UK exhibits its willingness to continue as a European leader even following Brexit. Beyond that, the

⁹⁷ Biscop, Sven. *European Strategy in the 21st Century* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) (p. 96). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

⁹⁸ Zandee, Dick, Kruijver, Kimberley, *The European Intervention Initiative, Developing a shared strategic culture for European defence*, Clingendael Report, September 2019, p. (2), p. (1-29)

main issue is that major European powers, including the EU itself, instead of combining their efforts for the purpose of achieving strategic autonomy, are in a race against each other to make the others follow their own way.⁹⁹

4.2. European Defense Industries

Although many major steps have been taken like the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR), European Defense Agency (EDA), European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), the European defense industries could not overcome their infancy and fragmented structure. Although the civilian side of European industries is competitive and holds substantial value, the economic scale of European defense industries is far from dominating the global market.

At present, Europe is perceived as an attractive market for US defense firms. For instance, in 2017, 33 percent of 1800 fighter aircraft in European air force inventories were procured from US defense firms, either directly or through workshare programs. And now, plenty of European states tend to replace their air force inventories with newly developed fifth-generation American F35 Lightning II fighters. Furthermore, some European member countries are fond of buying off-the-shelf US military equipment for enhancing and increasing bilateral relations with the US. In fact, both European and US defense industries indeed want to boost their share in the market. However, what differentiates the US from the EU is that domestic production is the responsibility of the federal government and total production must be aligned with domestic consumption and exports. As for the European side, there are no such regulations and most of the European Defense Industries operate nationally, instead of operating at a European level. So there is not a dynamic and healthy balance between demand and supply across Europe. Domestic demand for European military equipment

⁹⁹Howorth, Jolyon, European defence policy and subsidiarity: The imperative of the EU level, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, 2019, p. (6), p. (1-9).

is at a low level. Therefore, while some defense industries conduct exports to the US, mostly direction of the European Defense production happens towards the Middle East and Asia.¹⁰⁰

Considering the fragmented structure of the European Defense Industries and related problems, the introduction of PESCO and EDF was welcomed by many of the European defense industries. Firstly, these initiatives mean more investment in defense, in that this situation reciprocally promotes the existence of more projects inside the Union. Also, projects within PESCO are based on groups of participating states that increase cooperation between participating member states. This implies acceleration of the scale of cooperation between the European Defense industries, in which they would be inclined to combine their research and development. This sort of consequent cooperation would lower costs in the manufacturing line and promote output of more profitable products. With these developments, the European Defense Industries could be competitive and boost its share in the global market.

Nevertheless, there are serious challenges ahead of creating more united defense industries across the EU. Particularly, a lack of essential funds in European Defense gets more challenging in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the coming years, most of the European states are expected to reduce their defense budgets as a result of their shrinking economies, which jeopardizes the success of PESCO and development of the European Defense Industries. Beyond that, defense industries operate through the contributions of technical experts, engineers and scientists. They are the center of military technology development. Therefore, their contribution to defense industries is crucial for new capability developments within the continent. However, there is currently a significant lack of experts in European Defense Industries. In addition to that, worsening economic conditions in the coming years may

¹⁰⁰ Fiott, Daniel, Defence industry, industrial cooperation and military mobility, Chapter 6, Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy (Editors), THE EU AND NATO, The essential partners, ISS, 2019, p. (47-48), p. (44-51)

propel these experts to work in other sectors than defense. The lack of funds has severe results for the European Defense that consequently endangers the success of PESCO.

Another jeopardizing factor for PESCO is the different ambitions of defense industries as to cooperation and synchronization regulations on the market. One of PESCO's important ambitions is to augment consolidation between these industries. However, some defense industries are more dependent on national demand than others. They are hesitant to open up their supply chains to other defense industries. Before the introduction of PESCO, some of them were already competitive in either European or non-European markets. Therefore, a contradictory situation crops up in which some defense industries are supportive of defense initiatives due to low national demand, while others are concerned that further integration may cause loss of their intellectual property rights.¹⁰¹

4.2.1. French and German Defense Industrial Cooperation

These divergences can be noticed more obviously within German and French Defense Industrial Cooperation. These two countries played such critical roles in the establishment of PESCO that their cooperation is enlightening for other European countries' paths. If they can spearhead a successful model of cooperation within PESCO and related domains, they can lead other member states to cooperate in like manner for thrilling achievements in the European Defense. These two countries have the potential to transform European Defense from a zero-sum game to situation of credible CSDP that both are members of G7 (Group of Seven) with their economic power and major military powers of the continent with their military capabilities. However, due to the low scale of national defense spending and lack of integration, they are like sleeping giants in military terms. In particular of Germany, aggregated

¹⁰¹ Fiott, Daniel, What Does It Mean to Be A European Defense Company Today?, Ifri, 25 November 2019, p. (1-4), p. (1-6)

output of top 30 European defense industries was equal to just one third of entire output of Volkswagen in 2015.¹⁰²

One of the main areas of cooperation in PESCO is defense industries. While their cooperation is promising to some extent, there are strict challenges ahead. Not only now, but in previous decades, cooperation between these two major countries of Europe has been cumbersome. Despite that, they plan to invest 100 billion euros in the next decades. However, they have to handle serious problems ahead of their cooperation to obtain successful results from their investment. According to multiple interviews¹⁰³ with government officials, industry stakeholders, there are vital differences, misperceptions among these two countries. From the French point of view, Germany and France do not have the same understanding of security threats due to both their location and divergent threat perceptions. Likewise, their different perceptions cause differentiation of military requirement programs. In France, a new military development program is determined through capability, effect-based understanding and system-of-system approach. This kind of methodology for developing military capability does not exist in Germany at the same scale.

In the French view, France feels superior to Germany in defense, in that France determines military capabilities and needs and manages equipment programs of complicated weapon systems better, such as technologies utilized in these weapons. However, because Germany developed a competitive operating global industry, they want to take leadership in defense industries contrary to French assumptions. Also, French defense actors believe that benefits emanating from defense industry

¹⁰² Chagnaud, Marie-Louise, Mölling, Christian, Schutz, Torben, Voss, Alicia von, *Arming Europe: The State of the European Technological and Industrial Base*, Bartels, Hans-Peter, Kellner, Anna Maria, Optenhogel, Uwe (Editors), *Strategic Autonomy and the Defense of Europe, On the Road to a European Army?*, 2017, p. (55), p. (53-66)

¹⁰³ Mölling, Christian, Maulny, Jean-Pierre, *Consent, Dissent, Misunderstandings, The Problem Landscape of Franco-German Defense, Industrial Cooperation*, DGAP Analysis, German Council on Foreign Relations, No.1, January 2020

cooperation are not in the same scope. French defense actors attract fewer benefits than their German counterparts.

As for the German view, German industry and government officials consider consolidation and cooperation between these countries in the defense industry to be valuable and bolstering. However, they define some weaknesses within defense industry cooperation. In the German view, German defense companies are exposed to disadvantages when compared to their French counterparts in terms of regulations and standards pertaining to the production process. German defense production is constricted by strict bureaucratic obligations and procedures. Unlike Germany, defense-related decisions are taken at highest level in France and French companies take advantage of operating through strong networks. In Germany, defense industries are not among the government's top priorities. Also, the German government does not have a strategic rationale for defense industries. Though a strategic paper adopted in 2015 addressed the need to strengthen defense industries in Germany, the government lacked the will to implement targets referred there.

Another disagreement between these countries pertains to what they understand as strategic autonomy. The term was introduced in the EUGS to improvise a common strategic understanding at a European level. However, either France or Germany wants to possess autonomy in political, military and technological terms at national levels, rather than at European level. This expectation endangers current and future European defense projects seriously. Both take into consideration any projects to continue momentum within their national DTIP. This reciprocal approach promulgates mistrust for each country that converts consolidation and cooperation efforts into a struggle due to internal policy issues. For example, in the case of a new military capability development agreement between these countries, the location of the company becomes a troublesome issue as to which country will be the center of job growth and development of technology.

What French and German defense industrial cooperation means for Europe is that an admirable model of cooperation can pave the way for deeper cooperation among other countries. Their cooperation may be transformative across the EU, proving that European cooperation in defense industries can be successful. And for PESCO, cooperation in defense industries is quintessential in that PESCO, which is based on serial of projects, can achieve its purposes through vigorous cooperation between defense industries across Europe. Together with other aspects, a successful model of cooperation in defense industries by Germany and France may be a distinctive factor in the future of PESCO. Structural and governance differences in defense, mistrust issues and competitive environment around defense industries are not valid only for Germany and France. Similar situations exist between other European countries that the EU needs a model to follow. Otherwise, the future of PESCO may be undermined by crucial divisions between member states like in the example of France and Germany.

5. PESCO and the Transatlantic Alliance

5.1. PESCO and NATO

The launch of PESCO triggered important reactions from Trans-Atlantic Alliance as well. In particular, there were attempts to establish force packages within the EU and heated debates on the future of NATO-EU relations. According to some officials and states in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, these new attempts were a precursor to the EU's departure from the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, some experts saw PESCO as a result of dissatisfaction by the Europeans on the policy direction of the US and the idea that the US is not a trustworthy actor in security matters. That is why the US and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg warned the EU over their defense plans not to duplicate NATO and build up economic barriers between

both parts of the Atlantic.¹⁰⁴ These debates on the implications of PESCO over European Defense and Trans-Atlantic Alliance recalled the 3Ds warnings of former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

Contrary to those concerns, even before the launch of PESCO, the EU and NATO published a joint declaration in 2016 in continuation of the announcement of the EUGS. The declaration made meaningful points in the EUGS, that as stated NATO continues to be the main defense framework of the Union. The declaration was for more interactive cooperation among the Trans-Atlantic Alliance members. To promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area,¹⁰⁵ they pledged to cooperate in 72 specific action spots containing defense industries and military mobility.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, EU officials assured their allies multiple times that the existence of PESCO is complementary to NATO, not detrimental to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. Former HRVP of the Munich Security Conference, Federica Mogherini, said: “... as we strengthened Europe’s defense, we have also strengthened our cooperation with NATO like never before... Cooperation with NATO is for the European Union the natural choice. NATO is the pillar of Europe's collective defense.”¹⁰⁷ In the same speech, she stressed that no duplication or competition is meant when referring to strategic autonomy. Moreover, in terms of addressing the importance of the alliance for Europeans, she introduced the term: “cooperative autonomy.” Despite his initial

¹⁰⁴ Biscop, Sven, PESCO: Good News for NATO from the EU, Egmont Institute, p. (2), p.(1-3), <https://www.egmontinstitute.be/pesco-good-news-nato-eu/>, (accessed at 15.11.2020)

¹⁰⁵ JOINT DECLARATION ON EU-NATO COOPERATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36096/nato_eu_final_eng.pdf, (accessed at 15.08.2020)

¹⁰⁶ Fiott, Daniel. Defence Industry, Industrial Cooperation and Military Mobility. Edited by Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy, NATO Defense College, 2019, p. (56), pp. 55–64, NATO and the EU: The Essential Partners, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19964.11. Accessed 14 Aug. 2020.

¹⁰⁷ Speech by High Representative/Vice- President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference, EEAS, Munich, 15/02/2019, (accessed at 15.08.2020), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/58232/Speech%20by%20High%20Representative/Vice-President%20Federica%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20Munich%20Security%20Conference

concerns, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg commented that strengthening Europe in defense was equal to strengthening the alliance in the same event.

As US profoundly goes harsh on the Europeans in terms of inadequate defense spending, PESCO consists of binding commitments which request participating member states to increase their defense budgets, to augment defense investments to the extent of 20 percent of total defense budget. What is more, for encouraging member states to spend more in defense, the Commission introduced the EDF whereby the EU affirms its willingness to undertake more responsibility for its security just as their counterparts in the US expected from them.

At the other side of PESCO, projects are valuable on account of the EU's contribution to NATO as much as they are essential for the EU's strategic interests. For instance, military mobility is one of the committed projects by participating member states within PESCO. Although the EU member states constituted the Schengen zone at a supranational level which permits EU citizens to get across European countries without border controls, freedom of movement of military assets and personnel is not possible. To address this problem, the EU Parliament published a report on defense in October 2016 inviting member states to adopt the military Schengen to provide transfer of military personnel, equipment and assets in case of invocation of the solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU). For accomplishing this purpose, legal, physical and regulatory barriers to transportation of militaries across European borders should have been removed.¹⁰⁸ Due to that, military mobility was amid the first 17 projects accepted within PESCO. Following approval of the MFF, 1.5 billion euro were allocated for this project for the next seven years between 2021-2027.¹⁰⁹ From NATO's point of view, these enhancements in the European Defense are complementary to the Trans-Atlantic

¹⁰⁸ Fiott, Daniel. Towards a 'Military Schengen'? European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017, p. (1-2), p. (1-4) www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17450. Accessed 15 Aug. 2020.

¹⁰⁹ Dobber, Jeroen, EU Budget 2021-2027: What's in It for Europe's Defence?, FNFEUROPE, 06.08.2020, <https://fnf-europe.org/2020/08/06/eu-budget-2021-2027-whats-in-it-for-europes-defence/> (accessed at 07.08.2020)

Alliance. When applied to Article 5 in case of emergency, transportation of EU-NATO militaries across Europe would be quintessential for rapid response to threats against the alliance. As an instance, US generals repeatedly called for military mobility within Europe for facilitating transportation of NATO military forces in a rapid manner, in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea.¹¹⁰ Military mobility is merely one of the projects within PESCO that projects pertaining maritime security, intelligence, cyber security, etc. serve the same purpose. Therefore, it can be claimed that the more the EU develops in defense, the more NATO benefits.

Similarly, further developments in the European Defense would be a response to the warnings of the US that the EU should care of European security needs with its own capabilities. What the US demands from the EU is to bear a fair share of the burden. The message sent by former US presidents, Republican or Democrat, is the same: "Sometimes, dear friends, you will be on your own."¹¹¹ Particularly, given the withdrawal of the US from the European continent and its drift towards Asia, especially China, under the policy of Pivot to Asia, the maturation of European Defense through further steps like PESCO currently has become more essential. While the US intensifies its attention around the Asian continent, the EU could pursue its strategic interests around the Mediterranean with its own military capabilities. Some necessities are behind the threshold of Article 5 which obligates Europe to move forward apart from the alliance. Nevertheless, activation of strategic autonomy and moving forward with its own capabilities does not mean to be only of a European character, or in other words to quit multilateralism. As a strong upholder of multilateralism, the EU would choose to get into action under the security umbrella of any flag like UN, NATO, EU, national

¹¹⁰ Fiott, Daniel, Defence industry, industrial cooperation and military mobility, Chapter 6, Gustav Lindstrom and Thierry Tardy (Editors), THE EU AND NATO, The essential partners, ISS, 2019, p. (48), p. (44-51)

¹¹¹ Coelmont, Joe, European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?, Security Policy Brief, Egmont Institute, No. 109, March 2019, p. (2), p. (1-5)

or ad hoc coalition, but in the contingency of European command and appliance to European forces and military assets.¹¹²

The existence of PESCO or any further developments in European defense is not detrimental to the future of EU-NATO relations. The existence of a successful alliance corresponds to the extent to which the EU and the US continue to uphold a broad outlook on the world. In pursuit of this broad outlook, these traditional allies can convert their mutual security structures as per requirements of the security environment around them in a coherent way. Otherwise, the 74 points agreed through the Joint Declaration and contribution of the EU to NATO through PESCO would be meaningless.¹¹³

5.2. PESCO and USA

While the US usually encouraged European countries to undertake more responsibilities pertaining to their security needs, US support was limited to the borders of the transatlantic alliance. NATO has been one of the main reasons for US leadership and prerogatives in Europe. That is why the US repeatedly invited its European allies to carry out their commitments like increasing their defense budgets under NATO. Due to that, the US has been skeptical of any other pan-European defense integration steps. For that reason, 3Ds were elaborated by US state actors as a warning to their European counterparts not to undermine the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. This skepticism of European Defense Integration peaked exponentially during the Trump administration, as Trump has criticized the allies bluntly many times. As opposed to the term “Buy American” spearheaded by the Trump administration very frequently, the cooperation between member states of the EU at the supranational level was perceived as the

¹¹² Biscop, Sven, *The EU or NATO; That is not the Question*, Corentin Brustlein(ed.), *Mutual Reinforcement, CSDP and NATO in the Face of Rising Challenges*, Ifri, October 2019, p. (18), p. (12-20)

¹¹³ Sven, Biscop, *EU-U.S. Consensus and NATO-EU Cooperation*, Tomáš Valášek, editor, *NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SHARED SECURITY:NATO’S NEXT 70 YEARS*, Carnegie Europe, November 28, 2019, p. (15), p. (15-18)

elaboration of the EU as a competitive actor against the US that Trump inclined to threaten their European allies.

The launch of PESCO was an initiative whose introduction was not welcomed by the US. In fact, beyond disfavor over PESCO, the US is concerned. Third countries' participation in either PESCO or EDF is so vague and complex that the US feels intentionally excluded from European defense initiatives. The US is in favor of PESCO and EDF as far as they offer solutions to fulfill military capability gaps of European countries regarding their contribution to the NATO alliance, but when it comes to references to third countries' participation in PESCO and EDF, they label these initiatives "poison bills"¹¹⁴.

To participate in PESCO, any willing state should be first be a member of the EU. For participating in EDF-funded projects, any willing country or subsidiary defense firm's contribution to the project should be crucial for completion in contingency of no access to sensitive information and intellectual property.¹¹⁵ In relation to that, the industrial cooperation side of PESCO elicited harsh criticism from the US due to a strong focus on more possible loss in the defense market than it may add to EU and NATO military capabilities. In almost every European capital, the US lobbied against PESCO as example of sheer protectionism.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, when regulations implemented in the US defense market in terms of curbing foreign investment and procurement are considered, reinforcement of PESCO and EDF is not framed for delinking the US from the European defense market. PESCO and the EDF do not regulate procurement laws within the EU. As a legitimate

¹¹⁴ Brattberg, Erik, and Tomas Valasek. Current EU Defense Initiatives as Seen From Washington. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019, pp. (14, 16), p.(16), EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20973.8. Accessed 23 Aug. 2020.

¹¹⁵ Kaya, Emre Kürşat, European Defense Ecosystem, Third Countries' Participation and the Special Case of Turkey, Edam, Foreign Policy and Security 2019/9, June 2019, p. (5-6), p.(1-9),

¹¹⁶ Biscop, Sven, European Defence and PESCO: Don't Waste the Chance, EUIDEA, Policy Papers No. 1, 5 May 2020, p. (8), p. (1-15)

actor, the EU aims to protect its security interests at a European level that accusation of the US on European defense initiatives through “poison bills” becomes meaningless. Additionally, the European defense market has been always more open to the US than the other way around, from which the US has benefited for long decades. For example, whilst defense exports from the EU to the US totaled 7.6 billion dollars, defense exports from the US to the EU totaled around 62.9 billion dollars; that considerable difference can be clearly understood. According to data from the US Federal Procurement Data System, European defense industries are at a disadvantage in bidding for US defense contracts as well. In 2018, the top 100 contractors received 229 billion dollars from the Pentagon. European firms were awarded only 2.1 billion dollars. Oddly, they were not even defense firms, but petro-chemical companies BP and Shell. For being awarded as one of the European defense firms, they are required to improve and produce defense systems on US soil in which technology is being kept within the soil of the US.

Moreover, as opposed to claims of constructing a “fortress Europe,” US defense industries are surrounded with strong legislations as examples of protectionism, such as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) which can hamper access of foreign entities to sensitive military expertise and technology and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which supervises defense exports between two or more states, even in the case that none of them is the US and access to sensitive knowledge. For cases breaching the ITAR, any entity may have to face tremendous fines or imprisonment, which indicates how US defense firms are protected through legislative procedures when compared to European defense firms.¹¹⁷ So, as opposed to the US’ concerns, PESCO and EDF are not poison bills, but they are introduced to protect the strategical and economic interests of the EU.

¹¹⁷ Fiott, Daniel, The Poison Bill, EU defense on US terms?, EUISS, Brief 7, June 2019, p. (1-5), p.(1-8),

6. The Problems for The Future of PESCO

Undoubtedly, the launch of PESCO is a thrilling step on behalf of European Defense. If achieved properly, the contribution of PESCO to European Defense would be momentous. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU would be able to act autonomously in times of crises to pursue European strategic interests. Owing to that, 20 commitments within PESCO and in total 47 projects were designed to achieve strategic autonomy as outlined in the EUGS.

Briefly, with PESCO, EU member states have been required to increase their national defense spending. This sort of increase of defense budgets is the same thing demanded by their trans-Atlantic allies for fair burden sharing within NATO. Regarding that, for motivating participating member states, the EDF has been introduced in order to fund European defense projects across European borders. The defense projects are also beneficial in that through these projects participating member states will be able to cooperate on concrete terms. As a natural component of this cooperation, European defense industries would be able to tackle its fragmented structure and focus more on manufacturing arms prior to European strategic interests. Beyond that, at the core of PESCO, for accomplishing strategic autonomy, the EU will be able to generate force packages for expeditionary missions abroad.

However, as mentioned, PESCO is surrounded with a number of serious problems. The inclusivity of PESCO increased the numbers of projects, which distracted the attention of member states from prioritizing strategic enablers at the core of PESCO, which are mostly needed during expeditionary missions. These projects mostly correspond to national military capability gaps rather than those on the European level. In other words, projects staged by member states are ambitious, but also ambiguously drafted and some projects partly are of a contradictory character to others that participating member states choose to prioritize and interpret as they

prefer¹¹⁸. Also, participating member states are delivering clear milestones and ends to projects that they expect to get Union budgets for. On the contrary to that expectancy, when considered deteriorating economic conditions in the wake of COVID-19, not only around Europe, but globally, most likely, costs around projects will increase in time. European funds for European defense projects like the EDF have already been reduced for the next seven years following MFF talks from the initially planned draft.

In the wake of Brexit, instead of France and the UK alliance and ambiguity on European Defense, recently, Germany and France alliance and ambiguity are dominant and distinctive on European Defense. Existent mistrust and disagreements in relation to PESCO exemplify well enough this ambiguity between major countries of Europe. From the beginning, they diverged on the structure of PESCO. While France adopted an exclusive view on formation of PESCO for only bringing together able and willing countries, Germany defended the inclusivity of PESCO for reducing further divisions inside Europe. France led the establishment of EI2 and on the other side, Germany constituted the FNC initiative within NATO. In the meanwhile, besides all these initiatives, PESCO foresees launch and development of the CROC for generating force packages with European identity to act autonomously when required. As one of the main interest domains of PESCO, divergences, mistrust issues between these major powers and even competing against each other while cooperating in defense industries are concerning obstacles in the way of PESCO's success as well.

Added to these obstacles, what all European states understand and want from the concept of strategic autonomy varies tremendously. While some countries take on PESCO as a way of developing their national defense industries, others only focus on covering military capability gaps within their national armies. Or although some member countries are not much interested in pursuit of strategic autonomy, with fear of being excluded from European defense initiatives and European funds on grounds

¹¹⁸ Dossi, Amos, PESCO Armament Cooperation: Prospects and Fault Lines, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 241, March 2019, Editor: Benno Zogg, p. (4), p. (1-4)

of protecting their defense industries and national armies, they participated in PESCO. Thereupon, succinctly, the question European states mainly ask to PESCO is “What can PESCO do for us?” instead of asking “What can we do for PESCO?” to reach the spot of strategic autonomy. Besides, although many countries agree on possession of credible military forces for expeditionary missions, the EU lacks a strategic compass for formation of these force packages. The EU does not have a clear politico-military strategy on defense and security responsibilities that member states will shoulder to decide which aims will be met through which types of operations. Also, the EU is not sure precisely how to shape these forces, to what extent, and with which concurrency¹¹⁹ As one of the projects within PESCO, the future of CROC is going to struggle through these ambiguities.

NATO and US concerns over PESCO are not passed off, in spite of multiple assurances by member states and EU officials that the primacy of NATO in European Defense will not change, and these developments are complementary to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance at the same time. NATO is still concerned for the future of EU-NATO relations. Some countries in the alliance feed these concerns. When hesitance of outsiders inside the EU is added to these concerns additionally, the future of PESCO is exposed to more pressure and ties bound by participating member states around PESCO may be overstretched in time. In addition to free riders around Western Europe, outsiders in Northern and Eastern Europe are integration-sceptic and non-aligned¹²⁰. Particularly, in the continuation of Crimea’s annexation by Russia, while Eastern European countries welcomed the footstep of NATO in their countries, they approached European defense initiatives with suspicion for not damaging EU-NATO relations in case of imminent threats from Russia.

¹¹⁹ Biscop, Sven, European Defence and PESCO: Don’t Waste the Chance, EUIDEA, Policy Papers No. 1, 5 May 2020, p. (8), p. (1-15)

¹²⁰ Dossi, Amos, PESCO Armament Cooperation: Prospects and Fault Lines, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, No. 241, March 2019, Editor: Benno Zogg, p. (3), p. (1-4)

The ambiguity and complexity pertaining to third countries' participation in PESCO is disturbing in that in addition to the US, other countries closely associated with European Defense like the UK, Norway and Turkey want to get involved in further projects and have a say in European Defense. However, the issue stays unresolved and for the future, it does not seem that it will be solved easily. While some European countries are supportive of third countries' participation in PESCO due to close relations with the US in defense industries, some member countries are dubious about incorporation of third countries in PESCO due to their access to sensitive information and intellectual property rights. That is why the US lobbies against PESCO in every European capital through its bilateral relations as well as by implying application of retaliatory actions.

Amid all these serious challenges, PESCO's success does not seem feasible. Yet unlike other European defense initiatives, PESCO will not disappear that it is a treaty-based framework. However, European states need to change their understanding of European Defense so that in the example of PESCO, instead of asking "What can PESCO do for us?" they should ask "What can we do for PESCO?" Otherwise, efforts at European Defense may not go beyond being good intention and like before the EU would remain content to be a payer instead of being a player in times of crises.

III. MISSING PART IN THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE

A. EUROPEAN ARMY

After the consequential crises happened around Europe, most member states and EU officials supported deeper integration of defense for the security and prosperity of EU citizens in the beginning of 2010s. Moreover, some of ardent supporters of a defense union started to speak of the possibility of an EU Army¹²¹. For instance, former

¹²¹Lazarou, Elena, Dobрева, Alina, Security and Defense, Briefing, EU policies – Delivering for citizens, European Parliament, EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, p. (7), p. (1-8), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635533/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)635533_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/635533/EPRS_BRI(2019)635533_EN.pdf), (accessed at 29.08.2030)

Luxemburg prime minister and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker elaborated the idea of a European Army and called for its establishment. According to him, with an army, the EU would be taken seriously as an international security actor and deter the Russian threat to defend European values.¹²² Additionally, he envisaged completion of a defense union within the EU by 2025. French President Macron also called for establishment of a European Army, stating: “We will not protect Europeans unless we decide to have a true European army.” His call was welcomed by German Chancellor Merkel, who conveyed her support for a true EU Army.¹²³ Added to these calls, Hungary and Czechia encouraged the EU to usher in the establishment of an EU Army as soon as possible.

Regarding that, the introduction of PESCO was perceived as a precursor of an EU Army and triggered speculations about the idea. Notably, during the Brexit period, Brexiters applied these speculations as an internal policy tool to blame the EU for building up an army. In advance of that, former UK Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson declared the idea of an EU Army as an absolutely crazy idea. To him, the EU absolutely should not thwart NATO by creating a separate military force within the EU.¹²⁴ Beyond that, US president Trump unraveled his criticism more blatantly that he sparked backlash against the call of France on his personal Twitter account that “Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the U.S., China and Russia. However, it was Germany in World Wars One & Two — How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S.

¹²² Sparrow, Andrew, Jean-Claude Juncker calls for EU army, Sun 8 March 2015, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-military>, (17.11.2020)

¹²³ Stone, Jon, EU army: Brussels ‘delighted’ that Angela Merkel and Macron want to create European military force, Independent, Wednesday 14 November 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-army-angela-merkel-macron-germany-france-military-european-commission-juncker-a8633196.html>, (accessed at 30.08.2020)

¹²⁴ Bates, Liz, Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson brands EU army plan ‘crazy and dangerous’, PoliticsHome, 20 November 2018, <https://www.politicshome.com/news/article/defence-secretary-gavin-williamson-brands-eu-army-plan-crazy-and-dangerous>, (accessed at 30.08.2020)

came along. Pay for NATO or not!’¹²⁵ Due to these criticisms from their trans-Atlantic allies, as one of the leading actors of PESCO, HRVP Federica Mogherini assured their allies that the EU was neither constructing an EU Army nor converting a military alliance¹²⁶.

In terms of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, assurances by multiple EU officials and member states were important for mitigating concerns over PESCO. However, there was a controversial point at which the HRVP said that to her, the EU has achieved what its founding fathers dreamed of. The dream was done.¹²⁷ Indeed, was the launch of PESCO the full realization of a dream? Contrary to these claims, when PESCO is scrutinized comprehensively, it can be understood that the EU was at the start of its journey in European Defense Integration.

1. Supranationalism

PESCO is a brilliant step in the wavy way of European Defense Integration. This fact is accepted by most of the member states, union officials, think tanks and scholars. PESCO was welcomed and supported for overcoming prolonged problems in European Defense. However, meanwhile, PESCO is concerned with serious problems which put the future of European Defense at risk. These problems mainly stem from unwillingness of member states in protecting their national sovereignty on defense. PESCO has been furnished with a nuclear option, that in case of a state’s non-

¹²⁵ Stone, Jone, Angela Merkel calls for creation of 'real, true' EU army, Independent, Tuesday 13 November 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/emmanuel-macron-eu-army-european-france-angela-merkel-germany-trump-a8631806.html>, (accessed at 16.11.2020)

¹²⁶ Remarks by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the press conference following the Foreign Affairs Council (Defence), EEAS, Bruxelles, 20/11/2018, p.(7), p. (1-8), <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/en/42996/Remarks%20by%20HR/VP%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20press%20conference%20following%20the%20Foreign%20Affairs%20Council>, (accessed at 31.08.2020),

¹²⁷ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the Munich Security Conference, EEAS, Munich, 15/02/2019, p.(2-3), p.(1-5) <https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/en/58232/Speech%20by%20High%20Representative/Vice-President%20Federica%20Mogherini%20at%20the%20Munich%20Security%20Conference>, (accessed at 31.08.2020)

compliance with commitments, it can suspend membership of this participating state. This nuclear option does not seem most likely applicable in the future¹²⁸ due to the intragovernmental structure of PESCO, however. Probably, it would not be wrong to claim that a whole series of European defense initiatives failed for this reason, protecting national sovereignty in defense. While some European countries stayed unwilling to pursue their strategic interests through European identity, beyond that, some European countries deemed European regulations in relation to defense as intimidating acts against their national sovereignty that instead of success, the historical background of European Defense Integration is filled with disappointments and failures like in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Syria and Ukraine.

1.2. The Intragovernmental Character of the EU Defense

But, the intragovernmental structure of the European Defense is evolving towards a supranational level more than ever with the new initiatives. Before the launch of EUGS, neither the European Parliament nor Commission had a distinctive role in the European Defense. With the emergence of the EDF, this situation has changed. The EDF was proposed by the Commission, debated through the Community method and after approval of its budget by the EU Parliament, it will be enforced by the Commission. In its current form, the EDF epitomizes a good example of supranational policy within the EU regarding the defense policies. As such, it is not a defense policy alone, but represents a link of the Commission in the EU Defense. Added to the EDF, as one of the projects of PESCO, military mobility is also one of the supranational defense policy tools in the European Defense which aims to promote free movement of military within the borders of the Union. Again there, the Commission is a crucial player with its funding to transport infrastructure through the EU budget.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Biscop, Sven, European Defence and PESCO: Don't Waste the Chance, EUIDEA, Policy Papers No. 1, 5 May 2020, p. (7), p. (1-15)

¹²⁹ Haroche, Pierre, EU defence policy is becoming increasingly supranational, LSE, June 3, 2019, p.(1-3), p.(1-4), <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/euoppblog/2019/06/03/eu-defence-policy-is-becoming-increasingly-supranational/>, (accessed at 02.09.2020)

This supranationalization of defense policies has never leaped to the one of most crucial points in European Defense Integration, which has been integration of European national armies at a supranational level. Although the EU tried to reinforce the EDC treaty at the supranational level with its own army at the end of WWII, this sort of attempt did not come up on the political agenda of the EU for decades. In contrast to that, the EU opted for force generations at intragovernmental level several times, yet none of these forces have been deployed in conflict zones like Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups. Because intragovernmental structure could not produce a political decisiveness to tackle the unwillingness of the member states. In order to accomplish strategic goals, any force packages should have been backed up with decisive political will. As defined by Carl Von Clausewitz, that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”¹³⁰ There is a strong and interactive relation between deployment of armies and the decisiveness level of responsible political actors. Seeking unanimity or even qualified majority in an intragovernmental system amplifies ambiguities that the EU has not been able to utilize a firm political stance behind the CSDP and has not dispatched its military forces to conflict zones. Hence, the EU has never been able to prompt an efficient and effective CSDP like in Syria, Libya, Ukraine and any other low-scale conflicts.

After those repeated tries, the EU contemplates ways to achieve strategic autonomy via PESCO. As a quintessential part of strategic autonomy, it lays out the CROC alongside other projects within PESCO as intervention union force during crises. With CROC, the EU aims to improve European crisis management capabilities by boosting operational preparedness of force generations, willingness and commitment of member states to act in conflict zones that thus, inconsistency among Battlegroups and level of ambition addressed at the EUGS would be minimized.¹³¹

¹³⁰ McNeilly, Mac, The Battle of the Military Theorists: Clausewitz vs. Sun Tzu, History News Network, <https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/158123>, (accessed at 17.11.2020)

¹³¹ EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC), <https://pesco.europa.eu/project/eufor-crisis-response-operation-core/>, (accessed at 04.09.2020)

Despite that, incorporation of CROC within PESCO did not hamper other European countries to look for their solutions for obtaining strategic autonomy. For instance, France commenced E12 initiative as a European intervention force to be dispatched in conflict zones. Germany, although a coordinator of CROC, leads Framework Nations Concept (FNC) within NATO.

As Leon Trotsky said “You may not be interested in war, but war is very interested in you”¹³², the Europe needs to be in line with the necessities of warfare that threat of war legitimizes of a standing army¹³³. Particularly, when considered the events in Ukraine, Libya and Syria, the EU may need to take supranational governance of the European Defense through establishment of the EU army into consideration for overcoming the chronicle problems in the defense domain.

2. Transatlantic Challenges

When these points are considered, it can be claimed that supranationalism is a precondition for a real European Defense Integration. Without scare-mongering on national sovereignty, as one of the most fascinating European Defense initiatives, PESCO corresponds to tactical developments in CSDP in relation to its member state-driven structure. Besides, as highlighted in the EUGS, the main purpose of the EU is to reach strategic autonomy, which obliges European states to alter their perception of defense. Nevertheless, supposing European countries would alter their perceptions of defense fundamentally and switch to taking up defense matters at a supranational level just because of acquiring strategic autonomy does not seem realistic. Most of them would rather lean on NATO or the US on account of crisis management. But challenges in transatlantic alliance are rising to the surface more than ever in recent years, which urges the EU to take further steps in the European defense. When the Eurocentric world order ended at the end of WWII, the US pledged to take up the defense and security of

¹³² Howard, Michael, *War in European History.*, Oxford University Press, Kindle Edition, (pp. 148)

¹³³ Violakis, Petros. *Europeanisation and the Transformation of EU Security Policy* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy), Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, (Kindle Locations 4323-4324).

Europe against the imminent Soviet threat in the Cold War. However, at the end of the Cold War, the US gave indications of a gradual departure from the European Defense. The attention of the US was sliding towards the Middle East, and the US was savoring its unprecedented and unrivalled military power in the region.

2.1. Iraq War

The Iraq War was one of those major cracks that occurred along with other challenges in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance that had started to occur in the period before the war and continued to escalate in subsequent years. That is why 2003 was termed by some scholars as “annus horribilis” for the Trans-Atlantic Alliance¹³⁴. To exemplify this issue, the Iraq War demonstrated the departure of the US from European Defense concretely, as well as the US’ adoption of unilateralism as opposed to multilateralism as a leading country.

Before launching the attack, the US did not seek approval from either the UN or NATO. The US did not choose to seek a full compromise with the allies that in light of Germany, France and Belgium’s strict opposition to invasion of Iraq, Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to as “Old Europe”¹³⁵ during negotiations. Additionally, because it could not get Europe’s support as a whole, the US, unlike its traditional unifying stance with regard to European countries of which former US president George W. Bush said, “When Europe grows in unity, Europe and America grow in security,” opted to play up divisions between European countries through bilateral relations with them. In truth, Europe was never united in its foreign policy. This time, the US was intentionally exploiting Europe’s divisiveness. This

¹³⁴ Gnesotto, Nicole, EU, US; visions of the world; visions of the other, EUISS, Shift or Rift Assessing US-EU Relations After Iraq, 2003, p. 30

¹³⁵ Gnesotto, Nicole, EU, US; visions of the world; visions of the other, EUISS, Shift or Rift Assessing US-EU Relations After Iraq, 2003, p. 18

approach was precursor to a historic policy shift based on fragmentation instead of unification of Europe and perceived by Europeans as ‘divide and rule.’¹³⁶

2.2. Pivot to Asia

Significant policy shift of the US, in other words, departure of the US from European Defense continued after the following years. Starting from First Gulf War, the US slid its focus more on MENA countries rather than European Defense that this slide reached to peak with Iraq War and then Afghanistan operations. This circumstance was worrisome and alarming for the future of European Defense that Brussels started to debate more about defense integration. They were right about their concerns that the Trans-Atlantic Alliance was about to get startled with another policy change within the US. President Obama during his visit to Australia in late 2011 announced this policy change under the definition of “Pivot to Asia.” He explained the motive behind this change by stating, “Here, we see the future”¹³⁷ meaning in particular the rise of China in Asia. This development did not only mean the change of policy direction of the US, but also another warning for European Defense Integration. Since then, the EU cannot lean on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance whenever it needs to. The US officially affirmed its policy direction for the near future and maybe decades.

2.3. The US Withdraws from Europe

The US withdrawal from Europe can be observed in concrete terms. One of them is the shrinking footstep of the US military in Europe. Since the end of WWII, the US has withdrawn the majority of its troops from European soil. For instance, when WWII ended, 200,000 American troops were stationed in Germany. The number

¹³⁶ Young, Terry, Crawford, Peggy, Hands Across The Atlantic?, International Business & Economics Research Journal, Volume 2, Number 12, p. (90), p. (89-96).

¹³⁷ Sverdrup-Thygeson, Bjornar, Lanteigne, Marc, and Sverdrup, “For Every Action...”, The American pivot to Asia and fragmented European responses, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, January 2016, p. (2)

stationed in Germany has been steadily declining to the point that Germany now holds 36,000 American troops.¹³⁸

This tendency ramped up during the Trump presidency in that just recently, the US recalled 12,000 troops stationed in Germany¹³⁹. Despite an assurance by the US as to relocation of half of these units in Baltic countries to deter imminent Russian threat, the fact that must be accepted by Europeans is permanent withdrawal of the US from Europe on concrete terms. The US will not always be nearby to defend Europe. Europe, as expressed by European officials multiple times, needs to learn the language of power.

2.3.1. European Defense and The US Beyond the Trump Presidency

The uneven relations between the US and the EU have usually been at stake, but with the Trump presidency, the scope of uneven relations has reached unprecedented levels. During his presidency, Trump has approached almost every issue from the standpoint of “America First,” of which the Trans-Atlantic Alliance has gotten its share considerably as well. For instance, he described the EU as a “foe” for the trade deficit of the US and based on that, ordered increased tariffs on steel and aluminum on grounds of national security¹⁴⁰ which caused disappointment and fury within Europe. Furthermore, according to him, the US’ tremendous amount of defense spending for NATO was meaningless compared to the inadequate defense spending of Europe. He argued that the EU owes the US for European Defense and needs to pay for it.

Actually, even before the Trump presidency, the inadequate defense spending of European countries had to face criticism of past US presidents for a fair share of the

¹³⁸ Stewart, Phil, Ali, Idrees, U.S. to withdraw about 12,000 troops from Germany but nearly half to stay in Europe, Reuters, World News, July 29, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-military-idUSKCN24U20L>, (accessed at 10.09.2020)

¹³⁹ Stewart, Phil, Ali, Idrees, U.S. to withdraw about 12,000 troops from Germany but nearly half to stay in Europe, Reuters, Europe News, JULY 29, 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-germany-military-idUSKCN24U20L>, (accessed at 16.11.2020)

¹⁴⁰ Taylor, Paul, A minefield of opportunity - Transatlantic defence in the Trump era, Friends of Europe (FoE), Report — Spring 2020, p. (21)

burden on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance that this de facto problem has gotten chronic since the end of the Cold War. Based on these criticisms, in the Wales Summit of 2014, Europeans agreed to get committed to spend 2 percent of their GDPs on national defense. When they failed to increase their national defense spending to committed levels like before, Trump reiterated the traditional US criticism of the EU's inadequate defense spending, but this time he went much further. He called some of the traditional allies of the US "deadbeats" and accused them of exploiting the military power of the US without any compensation. He put pressure against Germany especially that he wrote a letter to Angela Merkel as a warning. In the letter, according to him, Germany's underspending on national defense has been triggering a ripple effect for other European countries that have been failing to reach the committed level of defense spending as well¹⁴¹ The bar he determined gratuitously for Europeans in national defense spending was much more than 2 percent of GDP which the majority of European states have never been able to realize, to increase their national defense spending to 4 percent of GDP¹⁴².

Besides, Trump questioned the quintessential part of Trans-Atlantic Alliance, of which Article 5 has been a critical component of the existence of NATO in assuring every member state's security against external threats. The EU introduced Article 42.7 of TEU for mutual defense within the union, providing every means of power from other member countries to the member state under attack. However, Article 42.7 has had a symbolic effect on European Defense so far. There has not been a clear path to its implementation until now. Owing to that, Article 5 is still indispensable for European Defense, or at least the EU does not have any alternative. Nonetheless, after Montenegro's acceptance to NATO, Trump questioned the relevance of Article 5 with

¹⁴¹ Davis, Julie Hirschfeld, Trump Warns NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, or Else, The New York Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html> (accessed at 10.06.2020)

¹⁴² Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical Contradiction or Ariadne's Thread?, KFG, The Transformative Power of Europe, Working Paper, No. 90, August 2018, p. (10), p. (1-21).

the US to him. Why would the US come to defend Montenegro in the event of an attack? ¹⁴³ The questioning of Article 5 by Trump put the credibility of alliance in question as well. This remark alarmed European defense for fundamental change.

Trump characterized NATO as obsolete in an interview. As per his interview, NATO was founded a quite long time ago, when the US was far more powerful than now in particular in economic terms. After decades, NATO has become beneficial to other countries, but not to the US. Despite that, these countries are not grateful for what the US has done for them. Even the alliance would be at stake after scrutiny of whether NATO is obsolete or not, according to his views. While he denied what he exactly stated later, his remarks in the interview were consistent with what he said throughout his presidential campaign.¹⁴⁴

At this juncture, a question may arise on whether Trump's presidency has been the cause or result of deteriorating Trans-Atlantic Alliance in recent years for which understanding this dilemma is crucial on the ground of hampering the current problems becoming more exacerbated in the coming years. Herein, it should be admitted that the Trump presidency has been unprecedented for both the US and the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in its instable governance and untrustworthy character. A rapid recovery in Trans-Atlantic Alliance may be witnessed with a new president after elections in November if Trump loses.

However, the roots of worsening relations among the Trans-Atlantic Alliance can be traced back to the Cold War years. The Trump presidency was not the actual cause behind the problems but is an extension of a prolonged US policy toward the alliance. The US was already withdrawing from Europe step by step and pursuing its

¹⁴³ Very aggressive': Trump suggests Montenegro could cause world war three, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/19/very-aggressive-trump-suggests-montenegro-could-cause-world-war-three> , (accessed at 25.05.2020)

¹⁴⁴ Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical Contradiction or Ariadne's Thread?, KFG, The Transformative Power of Europe, Working Paper, No. 90, August 2018, p. (9-10), p. (1-21).

national interests outside Europe even before Trump. Besides, dissent over NATO is being expressed louder by important scholars as well lately. International relations professor Barry Posen in his 2014 book calls for the withdrawal of the US from NATO and transfer of its overall functions to Europeans in ten years. Beyond that, he proposes that If Europeans do not allow transfer of NATO to them, NATO can be allowed to wane. His sentiments are echoed by various scholars that these sorts of views will extend to the mainstream in US politics eventually.¹⁴⁵ In this respect, Trump is not alone with his dissent on Trans-Atlantic Alliance, in other words, the problems of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance are not a result of temporary disagreements between allies. They have deep roots that need to be solved with fundamental changes. As for Trump, he just has put the problems in front of European leaders blatantly and succinctly, unlike former presidents that solutions should be sought beyond the unstable Trump presidency.

In that matter, the EU should bring fundamental shifts in its understanding of defense that the creation of a European Army can be one such shift. The EU cannot lean on the US as its only option in pursuit of its strategic interests as during the Cold War years and following years of Balkan wars. This is especially true following the US departure from European Defense with more tangible steps like Pivot to Asia and its decreasing military footprint in Europe. The developments in European Defense have already been drafted with this impetus, but they could not serve the purpose behind their launch.

In the wake of a European Army, the EU and the US would be able to make a fair division of labor between them. As proclaimed by the US, Pivot to Asia will be a leading cornerstone in US politics. The Trans-Atlantic Alliance will be affected by this policy shift significantly. As for Europeans, Mediterranean and Sahara countries will

¹⁴⁵ Howorth, Jolyon, EU-NATO Cooperation and Strategic Autonomy: Logical Contradiction or Ariadne's Thread?, KFG, The Transformative Power of Europe, Working Paper, No. 90, August 2018, p. (10-11), p. (20-21).

be a top priority for near future that while the US undertake more responsibility in Asia with its army and the EU would pursue its strategic interests in the South of the Union. In some cases, the EU and the US would move together in these regions in accordance with strategic needs of alliance and would augment their weight in global politics as real allies.

Furthermore, by forming a European Army, the EU would construct another gravity center that would keep and accumulate the attention of the US on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. If unwillingness and irresponsible attitudes of Europe triggered US reluctance toward the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, the opposite attitude by Europeans, strengthening the EU through creation of an army, would attract the US' focus on the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. In fact, before Brexit, one of the reasons behind the leadership of the UK in European Defense initiatives was related with keeping the US in European Defense so that constitution of a regular army within Europe may have a similar effect that an army within the EU would glue these traditional allies and empower the alliance. Especially, when considering rising violence around the Europe emanating from Russia and additionally as an empowering and threatening force in Asia, China, USA would like to work with an united Europe under coherent CSDP that USA and Europe needs each other more than ever with their maximum power. For that purpose, Europe, in terms of tangible CSDP, may need to integrate their national armies in the pot of an army so that USA can move into action with Brussel as a security provider.

2.4. The European Defense After Brexit

After Brexit, the UK is deprived of its privileged position in CSDP. According to treaties, only member countries are allowed to participate in the CSDP decision-making process. Even if the UK sustains its relationships with European countries pertaining to defense and security matters, this relationship will never give the UK authority to take part in CSDP decision making. The UK will not have a major

influence over CSDP missions from now on that the UK like any third countries may take part in CSDP missions through the Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA)¹⁴⁶.

Due to that separation, the credibility of CSDP is lessened considerably by the fact that the UK's contribution to the CSDP had been important for European security up until Brexit. The UK is one of the few European countries that spends 2 percent of GDP on national defense. Beyond that, it is the second defense spender in NATO behind the US and the world's fifth-largest defense spender. Alongside France in Europe, the UK is a nuclear power, has a veto right in the UN Security Council and has military bases around the world from bilateral agreements granting the right to deploy its troops. The UK is one of five countries that provide operational headquarters for the EU, as in Operation Atalanta¹⁴⁷. Moreover, the Royal Navy is recognized one of the most powerful in the world. In terms of these surpluses in its military power, the UK's departure is not pleasing to European Defense.

Related with that, the EU is obliged to fill in the blank created after the departure of the UK from CSDP to upraise the credibility of CSDP on the international stage with more integration in European Defense. After more integration beyond limited cooperation among member states, the EU may do more with fewer resources. If European institutions assume further responsibility in European Defense Integration at a supranational degree, for instance, the EU may reinforce binding regulations to acquisition of expensive military equipment and weapon systems. Those binding regulations can overcome or at least reduce negative impacts of the protracted inadequate national defense spending problem within the union. Besides, with

¹⁴⁶ Nissen, Christine. THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION AFTER BREXIT. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, pp. 43–55, Forged in Crisis: THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17368.7. Accessed 24 Sept. 2020, p. (48)

¹⁴⁷ Nissen, Christine. THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COOPERATION AFTER BREXIT. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017, pp. 43–55, Forged in Crisis: THE EU'S COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY AFTER BREXIT, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17368.7. Accessed 24 Sept. 2020, p. (46-47)

integration of national armies, the EU may generate integrated forces furnished with readiness for augmenting crisis management capability.

In this context, the outcome of Brexit can be seen as encouraging for further European Defense Integration. Beneath support for deeper integration in European Defense, the UK was utterly opposed to certain projects in European Defense. When the UK and France announced the Saint Malo declaration together, the UK ultimately rejected establishment of military headquarters at the disposal of the EU alongside NATO military headquarters. The UK also was a strong defender of unanimity voting rule in CSDP issues. Over all those problems, the UK was a strict opponent of any step leading to establishment of an army within the union as a pro-Atlantic country on the continent. UK officials repeatedly reaffirmed the firm stance of the UK on that issue. Britain's former defense secretary, Sir Michael Fallon, stated at the Munich Security Conference: "Defense is for NATO and not the European Union. We are not alone in trying to encourage the EU to avoid duplicating what is being done in NATO. NATO has to be our primary defense. At our last NATO summit, we agreed that the European Union and NATO need to work more closely together, need to avoid duplication. So, with other members of the European Union, we have been resisting calls for a European headquarters or a European army. We do not need that. We have NATO. We need to make NATO work properly for everybody."¹⁴⁸

Therefore, based on Brexit, the traditional French-British alliance in European Defense has been taken over by a German-French alliance, as France and Germany found more space to maneuver over European Defense in the wake of Brexit. In this consideration, release of the first of two papers on European Defense Integration by French and German foreign ministers four days after the Brexit vote was not a coincidence. In the paper, they interpreted the period they are in as mature to push for

¹⁴⁸ Küfner, Michaela, UK minister Fallon: 'Defense is for NATO and not the EU', DW News, 18.02.2017, <https://www.dw.com/en/uk-minister-fallon-defense-is-for-nato-and-not-the-eu/a-37611182>, (accessed at 23.09.2020)

a comprehensive, realistic, and credible Defense of the European Union¹⁴⁹ . Meaningfully, impressive initiatives ensued this request in the European Defense, such as PESCO and EDF. Upon these changes, the EU may debate on European army frankly in the future. Now, every European country can demonstrate and play their cards in the European defense in a straight way that a range of frank negotiations may be a benchmark for a path towards a European Army as a result in the long term.

3. European Army for Credible CSDP

The need of a military force within the union has been obvious since the end of Cold War that many attempts have been done for covering this deficit in the European Defense. While the Eurocorps and the EU Battlegroups were operationalized, due to the intragovernmental structure of CSDP, none of them has been able to give the planned outcome. Yet, the need of a military force for credible CSDP remains the same to face the challenges stemming from MENA region and coercive global powers like Russia and China. Otherwise, the EU may have to face severe results of its fragmented defense policies as experienced so far.

3.1. CSDP in MENA

Currently, ongoing conflicts indicate the relevance and significance of the region for the EU. The ramifications of crises around MENA like in Libya are not confined within the borders of the country in conflict. The results of the crises around MENA surround the European continent and force the EU to be interested in the course of developments there. Issues such as migration and the spread of terrorism in Europe based on the conflicts and disorder in the MENA have been an important driver behind the rise of far-right political parties around the continent over the last decade. These

¹⁴⁹ Raine, Sarah, Europe's Strategic Future (Adelphi series), Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition, (pp. 144-145).

movements are mainly Euro-sceptic and challenge the integrity of the Union, like in Brexit.

Especially, for the future, the EU may get obligated to be more focused on the region that as one of the striking crises around the globe, climate crisis may have a multiplying effect on already existent crises of MENA within the next years. Notably, climate crisis incorporates social, economic and political challenges around the countries in which agriculture lays at the center of their livelihood like in the MENA region. For instance, based on increasing frequency of herder-farmer conflicts, either the East or West Africa faces tightening social stress and tensions at community level¹⁵⁰, which may be precursors of new conflicts at national level. Because of that, the EU must be prepared for possible worst scenarios with its military forces, as the MENA is probably to be one of the regions that suffers most in the climate crisis in the future when compared to other regions and may also be mired in endless conflicts for the near future.

Despite these realities, the EU does not have a strategy for the region, but rather pretends to have one in spite of tremendous efforts and countless steps taken on CSDP. More than one hundred years ago, Sir Halford Mackinder in the *Geographical Pivot of History* (1904) pointed out the importance of the region when he said: “In fact, the southern boundary of Europe was and is the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean.” These realities compel the EU to have a strategy for the security of its southern neighborhood in MENA through CSDP. In terms of that, the EUGS determines five priorities: strengthening the resilience of societies and states, ranging from sustainable development, human rights, security to democracy in Europe’s East and South neighborhood. That sort of priority may sound positive and constructive for building up more peaceful neighborhood around the continent. However, the point Europe

¹⁵⁰ Krampe, Florian, *Climate Change, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace*, SIPRI Policy Brief, June 2019, p.(1-4), p. (1-8)

misses is that these societies are at war¹⁵¹ and Europe does not present a clear way of increasing resilience in these societies and states in conflict zones that for realizing this purpose, CSDP should be brought to fore.

For effective and efficient CSDP, the EU should seriously consider engaging in conflicts at the first phase under CSDP when required and they have the ability to influence the regions and focus on the post-conflict period. At this point, EU engagement in these regions does not mean all-out war but a contribution to resilience of those states and societies in conflict. An important step of resilient recovery from conflicts starts from activating mechanisms to de-escalate tensions¹⁵² before all-out war takes place. In retrospect, the EU needs to engage in conflict zones before low-scale conflicts escalate to all-out war. Without stopping these sorts of conflicts, the EU can cooperate neither with states nor societies for soaring resilience. In Libya, for example, funds provided by the EU to fight human trafficking and smuggling are exploited by human traffickers and smugglers due to the absence of stable state and society actors in the country. As it is aware of this reality, Brussels affirmed its willingness to learn the language of power. Because of that, the existence of an army at the disposal of the EU is crucial and essential to the credibility of CSDP and the identity of the union as a security provider and an international player foremost.

For instance, the EU needs to demonstrate its decisiveness with its military footprint in Libya. Currently that absence of Europe in the equation of Libya creates a power vacuum in the region, which is filled with other power actors¹⁵³. While Libya's instability is detrimental to the stability of the continent, the EU plays an ineffective and incoherent role whose importance for other counterparts is negligible. Without the

¹⁵¹ Biscop, Sven, In the desert or at sea? Securing Europe's southern flank, Elcano Royal Institute, ARI 96/2020, 16 July 2020, p. (1), p.(1-5)

¹⁵² Gaub, Florence, After The EU Global Strategy, Building Resilience, EUISS, Southern, Neighbours, Edit(Florence Glaub, Nicu Popescu), p.(43), p(43-45)

¹⁵³ Tocci, Nathalie, Europe needs boots on the ground in Libya, Politico, World View, 02 October 2020, p. (1-2), p. (1-6)

boots of European military forces, the EU is not taken into consideration for pursuing its strategic interests. Theoretically, the EU has Battlegroups to deploy in the region. However, the lack of political decisiveness to break down unwillingness of member states hampers dispatching these forces to the battlegrounds in which the situation in Libya indicates the need to create an army in control of the union. In this sort of scenario, a possible European presence in Libya under CSDP through an army would not be by reason of willingness to intervene in every conflict, but willingness to intervene in the regions where its absence affects the strategic interests of the continent.

3.2. Russia

Not only due to regional concerns, but for a working CSDP while contesting with major powers in a more challenging and complex order, the EU needs an army. Otherwise, the EU cannot respond to threats from other global powers. It would contribute to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance in a fragmented way that rising power Russia, with imperial desires on former Soviet countries, would see as advantageous. After the increasing Russian threat, NATO increased its weight and footprint on the continent, but this did not change the fact that the EU ought to undertake more responsibility against the coercive Russian approach for either defending the continent or contributing to the alliance with a firm stance through CSDP. Pretending to be interested in the Russian threat with incoherent and low-scale efforts does not absolve the responsibility of the union in a serious problem.

To epitomize, Baltic countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence as members of both the EU and NATO. While these countries are sometimes identified as Russia's near abroad, Russia is most likely deemed to commit its resources to former Soviet countries like Ukraine, Belarus, and the Central Asian states¹⁵⁴. However, foremost, the imminent threat from Russia

¹⁵⁴ Cohen, Raphael S., Radin Andrew, Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe Understanding the Threat, RAND Corporation, 2019, p. (xi-xii), p. (ix-xv)

stays undoubtedly real for these countries at the same time. When required, Russia would not hesitate to apply its conventional forces on the continent. With that in mind, Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid stated: “there is no secrecy about the fact that Russia does not respect its own signatures on international acts.”¹⁵⁵ Additionally, just recently announced Norway, Sweden and Finland’s broader defense cooperation agreement¹⁵⁶ is relevant to the Russian threat that brought the Scandinavian countries together in defense matters. In addition to the threat to the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, Russia’s interest extends to Southern Europe. In particular, European countries where the majority of the population speaks a Slavic language are strongly exposed to Russian influence. Furthermore, Russia has a considerable amount of public support in those countries besides the union. Although there is a low possibility of military confrontation with Russia around those countries, the EU must be ready to respond to every sensitive scenario with readiness of its military forces by reason of the fact that opportunities and dangers arise immediately and unexpectedly.

Particularly when considering the rise of Russia with its military might in different parts of the world, the EU must be ready for every possible scenario. The crimes Russia committed in Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea happened in front of Europe after the Ukrainian people sought to align with Europe instead of Russia. European countries could do nothing, and no points could be bestowed on CSDP. Since 2015, Russia as a main power behind the survival of the Assad regime has strongly engaged in Syria by conducting air strikes and dispatching its troops to the country. Consecutive to its engagement in Syria, Russia has amplified its relations with Persian Gulf Arab States in recent years. What is more, Russia has more close ties with

¹⁵⁵ Stolton, Samuel, Amid NATO tensions, Estonian President highlights Russia risk, EURACTIV, Defense Policy, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/news/amid-nato-tensions-estonian-president-highlights-russia-risk/>, (accessed at 28.09.2020),

¹⁵⁶ Finland, Norway and Sweden announce wider military cooperation, Trend News Agency, 24 September 2020, <https://en.trend.az/world/europe/3304229.html>, (accessed at 28.09.2020)

Israel that with its presence in Syria make Russia and Israel neighbors in the Middle East.

While the EU might be expected to undertake more responsibility in every case counted there, as a result, Russia, after its high level of relations with the region's countries back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has returned to the MENA as a major power¹⁵⁷ and increased its influence in continental Europe. Therefore, for facing off Russia, the EU should boost its military capabilities with the existence of an army for a credible CSDP. Existence of an army does not mean to get stuck in endless wars with Russia, but a reliable way of producing a consistent defense policy through CSDP. Unless the EU has an army on the ground, the EU does not seem to have a word in roundtables and negotiations on the future of regions at the center of European strategic interests. This is due to different threat perspectives and unwillingness of member states. As aware of this possibility, for not facing off united European Union, Russia is in very close relationships with Eurosceptic far right political parties of Europe to play on the divisions between the member states of the EU in times of crises that a credible CSDP also would not be welcomed by Russia in the meantime. As a response to the divisive approach of Russia, the EU needs to respond with more integration.

3.3. China

In the European view, China is not deemed a direct adversary or a strategic threat to European interests around the globe. The HRVP of EU, Josep Borell, draws a sensitive line on this issue. While he describes China as a systematic rival to the EU, he does not determine China as a threat to world peace. What is more to that, in spite of the EU and China's ambition on contradictory model of governance, to him, their support for multilateralism places them on the same side, instead of opponents.

¹⁵⁷ Rumer, Eugene, Weiss, Andrew S., A Brief Guide to Russia's Return to the Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Questions and Answers, October 24, 2019, p. (1-2), p. (1-3) <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/24/brief-guide-to-russia-s-return-to-middle-east-pub-80134>, (accessed at 29.09.2020)

Additionally, he sets up China as an economic partner for the EU and defends improving economic ties with China for the sake of both sides in a fair manner.¹⁵⁸

Nevertheless, on the other side of coin, the rise of China in military terms, not only within to Asia but globally, contains a dire situation for the Western alliance. In fact, the EU is aware of dreadful enhancement of China's military might. Though, the HRVP on behalf of the EU thinks that China is most likely not going to apply its military force for engaging in conflicts¹⁵⁹. In contrast to the confidence in China by Europe, when the latest developments and rhetoric are scrutinized, China's dangerous stance based on its military power can be detected explicitly. Chinese president Xi Jinping charged the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for any battle in face of unprecedented risks and challenges.

Yue Gang, a retired PLA colonel, related the call of Chinese president with the geopolitical struggle between China and the US. According to him, China is trying to maintain the readiness level of its army at maximum level for the worst scenarios prior to tensions with the US and Taiwan¹⁶⁰. Although China foresees a peaceful unification, Taiwan does not give up its assertion on independence that heightens tension between it and China. At this point, the US takes the side of Taiwan. In 2020, talks between these two countries regarding arm sales to Taiwan by the US outraged China, which resulted in China's threat to reunify the island of Taiwan with the mainland through deployment of PLA there¹⁶¹. Likewise, US officials draw attention to the growing

¹⁵⁸ Guillot, Louise, Europe has been 'naive' about China, says Josep Borrell, Politico, Europe Edition, 05 March 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-has-been-naive-about-china-josep-borrell/>, (accessed at 01.10.2020)

¹⁵⁹ Barigazzi, Jacopo, China is not a military threat, EU top diplomat says, Politico, Europe Edition, 06 September 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/china-is-not-a-military-threat-eu-top-diplomat-says/>, (accessed at 01.10.2020),

¹⁶⁰ Lau, Mimi, Chinese President Xi Jinping gives army its first order of 2019: be ready for battle, South China Morning Post, China, Politics, 5 January 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2180772/chinese-president-xi-jinping-gives-army-its-first-order-2019>, (accessed at 01.10.2020),

¹⁶¹ Shinkman, Paul D., China Threatens U.S. Over Taiwan Visit: 'Stones May Become Torpedoes', U.S. News, Sept. 17, 2020, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2020-09-17/china-threatens-us-over-taiwan-visit-stones-may-become-torpedoes>, (accessed at 01.10.2020)

threat from China. They point out China's multiplying overseas military bases and intelligence collection locations around the world. With China's expanding its already gigantic military power in its vicinity, added to its stance on Taiwan, neighboring countries Japan, India and Vietnam have expressed profound concern. Further to that, Japan refers to China as most dangerous security threat to their country, more so than nuclear-armed North Korea¹⁶².

Focusing on the threats emanating from Asia, specifically from China, the US officially announced its policy shift under "Pivot to Asia" In this respect, the EU's naïve approach and stance on China is not due to confidence on China's openness to diplomacy in times of crisis, but probably hinges on the fact that the EU does not want to take a side in the geopolitical Sino-US struggle. However, when the EU prescind China in security terms, can it avoid any negative effects of a Sino-US dispute or, although a low possibility, military confrontation? Most probably no. For instance, Sino-US struggle sparks off trade wars whose ramifications do not exclude Europe. In the same manner, a military confrontation among those global powers would mean ringing alarm bells for the EU as well that the EU would be able to face off any challenges and dangers upon a confrontation of which with a firm and consistent CSDP which is furnished with an army. Also, as an ally, if needed by the US, the EU would be able to help the US with its integrated army that in any scenario, as opposed to an united army at disposal of CSDP. Europe's fragmented national armies would not be enough to form a symmetry either with the US or China, furthermore in case of a cooperation between Russia and China.

Measures which the EU should take under CSDP are not only for a possible US-China military confrontation. China is like a neighbor for Europe, with its military ambitions around different parts of the world, exclusively in terms of boosting Russian

¹⁶² Barigazzi, Jacopo, China is not a military threat, EU top diplomat says, Politico, Europe Edition, 06 September 2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/china-is-not-a-military-threat-eu-top-diplomat-says/>, (accessed at 01.10.2020),

and Chinese military cooperation in recent years. Russia and China operated a joint exercise in the Baltic Sea for the first time in July 2017. The next year, China took part in the annual Russian Vostok military exercise, another first in their military relations. Not only do they carry out military exercises together, but China buys significant military equipment from Russia, including 24 SU-35 fighter aircrafts and S-400 air defense system. With that, US analysts are increasingly worried about warming Sino-Russia relations¹⁶³ that Russian and Chinese militaries gradually are getting more familiar with each other by joint training, making their weapons more compatible, harmonizing their communications, tactics and logistics. In all, Russia and China have organized war games on land, naval drills in the South and China Seas, the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea, and mutual air maneuvers in the Sea of Japan¹⁶⁴. On the other side, China is expanding its interests towards the Middle East. Iran announced its planned naval war games together with Russia and China along the Strait of Hormuz. In advance of that, China conducts escort operations off the East African coasts¹⁶⁵ that the EU and China are more like neighbors in reality strategically. For a strong deterrence together with the US, the EU should strengthen CSDP with constitution of an army, so that Europe can be ready for the worst scenarios.

With an army, the EU may respond to any future crisis in a united way that currently, the EU member states for the sake of keeping their economic ties with China are not capable of producing a common response to. The desire to maintain strong economic ties with China is not just valid for Southern and Eastern European countries

¹⁶³ Dobbins, James, Shatz, Howard J., Wyne Ali, A Warming Trend in China–Russia Relations, Rand Corporation, April 18, 2019, p.(1-2), p. (1-5), <https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html>, (accessed at 02.10.2020)

¹⁶⁴ Trenin, Dimitri, How Cozy Is Russia and China’s Military Relationship?, Carnegie Moscow Center, November 19, 2019, p. (1-2), <https://carnegie.ru/2019/11/19/how-cozy-is-russia-and-china-s-military-relationship-pub-80363>, (accessed at 02.10.2020)

¹⁶⁵ Greer, Lucille, The Chinese Piece in Iran’s War Games, The Diplomat, Flashpoints Security, December 16, 2019, p. (2-3), p. (1-5), <https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/the-chinese-piece-in-irans-war-games/>, (accessed at 02.10.2020)

which are dependent on Chinese investment, but also for economically powerful countries like Germany¹⁶⁶.

In this respect, the EU would be always vulnerable to China's economic pressure in times of crisis regarding CSDP issues of an intragovernmental character. In contrast to that, an army founded on supranational governance may be an effective solution to this vulnerability. For European countries, the EU may be a scapegoat in times of crises under CSDP. While European countries maintain their relations with China individually, China would not risk undermining its relations with Europe as a whole. This sort of situation is similar for relations with Russia, in that while the EU sometimes intends to implement a decisive policy towards Russia, some European countries tend to be unwilling to go harsh against Russia so as not to bring its rage upon them individually. If the EU can obtain a real security identity at a supranational level, Europe can create spaces for its member states to move forward in their relations with any coercive country in times of crises. Since then, the EU may reciprocally respond to rising security challenges so that if Sino-Russia, and moreover Iran, conduct naval drills overseas, the US and the EU can respond with their navies for deterrence.

4. Strategic Autonomy with European Army

4.1. European Defense Industries

As far as the EU gets the ability to develop and produce its own military equipment, Europe can decrease its dependence on external factors in relation to CSDP and obtain autonomy in a higher scale together with other factors. However, European Defense industries are so scattered and fragmented that they do not have a strategic compass as per European strategic interests to combine their potentials around. For that purpose, the introduction of PESCO was a significant step. The European countries were to have common projects at a European level as to research and development of

¹⁶⁶ Brattberg, Eric, Taussig, Torrey, Bonding over Beijing, *Internationale Politik Quarterly*, October 01, 2020, <https://ip-quarterly.com/en/bonding-over-beijing>, (accessed at 30.09.2020), p. (4), p.(1-7)

military equipment and then European national armies were to use the same equipment for interoperability. On the contrary to that, as scrutinized above, PESCO's projects, apart from mainly European strategic interests, have fallen on national demands of member states. Therefore, the main focus has not been centralized on strategic enablers whose existence is essential for independent expeditionary operations. Besides that, there are not yet clear milestones and end dates for the completion of many PESCO projects. Herein, it can be assumed that existence of the EDF as an outstanding financial assistance through European Funds can overcome these challenges and motivate member countries to invest in PESCO projects. In contrast to that, considering the gigantic defense spending of global powers such as the US, China and Russia, the approved amount of EDF following the MFF talks might have only limited effect on the European Defense for the next seven years, but cannot transform the European Defense and relatedly European defense industries. Moreover, due to the increasing pressure of COVID-19's effect on the European economy, most probably, delivery of many projects may be delayed, notwithstanding financial assistance through EDF.

In light of these problems, Europe may overcome these challenges by establishing an army, and this fundamental change would be able to provide the strategic compass the EU needs within CSDP. Currently, due to lack of integration amid European national armies, Europe possesses 178 different weapon systems. Because of that, European defense industries cannot prioritize their production line and remain fragmented and uncompetitive in the armament market. With an army, European armies would be inclined to use same weapons through procurement regulations based on supranational governance. Reciprocally, defense industries would arrange their production line as per European Army needs. Although, together with PESCO, the EU introduced CDP and CARD for decreasing redundancy within European armies and increasing efficiency in the European Defense, they would never have the same impact on the European Defense as a supranational army with mandatory

regulations. This sort of interaction between an army and defense industries would be an important component of strategic autonomy.

The US can be exemplified for clarifying this interaction. While the EU member countries possess 178 different weapon systems, the US holds only 30 weapon systems. Similarly, while the EU keeps 17 different main battle tanks, there is just one type of main battle tank in the US. The EU loses between 25 billion-100 billion euros annually due to this sort of redundancy in the European Defense¹⁶⁷. European Defense does not have a single market in the arms trade and has to divide its total defense spending as per each member state and again as per each redundant various weapon system. On the other side, the main absorber of US defense production is the US Army. It protects their defense industries with strong procurement regulations. When it comes to export of their defense products, only after mandatory procedures and permissions, defense industries can export their arms to permitted countries. Added to that, for keeping intellectual rights and high technology inside the US, they may punish any breaching company or individual actor in the defense market with severe fines or imprisonment penalties in which none of those regulations are reinforced across Europe. In this perspective, although the EU reached 17.3 percent of market share in the global arms trade over the past five years, with this interaction and regulations, the US holds 34 percent of total market share¹⁶⁸ and keeps its leadership in the market. This means that the EU is way behind competing with global powers with its fragmented industry. With an army, the EU may prioritize production of a minimized number of weapon systems by procurement regulations. Reciprocally, European defense industries with decreased research and development costs may enhance their

¹⁶⁷ A European Defence Fund: €5.5 billion per year to boost Europe's defence capabilities, European Commission, Press Release, 7 June 2017, Brussels, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1508, (accessed at 08.10.2020)

¹⁶⁸ Bendimered, Leila, PeSCo: Increased European defence integration and interoperability, Defense IQ, 24 January 2019, p. (2), p. (1-5), <https://www.defenceiq.com/army-land-forces/news/will-a-european-army-compliment-nato>, (accessed at 08.10.2020),

effectiveness and efficiency coherently and increase their market share in the global arms trade.

Further to that, as exemplified in French and German defense cooperation, there are serious problems ahead of deeper cooperation between defense industries. Mainly, they are not on the same page on what they understand from strategic autonomy, have mistrust problems and exposed various regulations and laws by their governments regarding defense matters. In this incoherent defense environment, defense industries cannot be competitive in the market and give the best outcomes to Europeans. By an army, France and Germany can determine precisely what they understand from strategic autonomy and tackle mistrust problems. As far as their national militaries stand on the front lines of the conflict zones together as partners under the European flag, the defense industries of each nation would build up trustworthy cooperation zone mutually by reasons of the fact together with their armies, they would be supposed to serve European strategic interests

The more they cooperate, the more they would become compatible eventually and produce fertile results together. In that manner, they would be confident sharing intellectual property rights, high technology and sensitive information between themselves extensively. They would be furnished with efficiency and effectiveness in their production in that way. Beyond that, with supranational governance of defense budgets at the European level, their defense industries would be able to make more investment in the research and development activities of new projects. They would be competitive in the defense market alongside the other global powers. Existence of an army would not change the fact that defense industries would continue to be rivals and have problems among them foremost, but it would have a greater positive influence on the European Defense Industries than that of PESCO, EDF, CDP or whatever different defense initiative.

4.2. Unsolved Military Level of Ambition

As a core part of strategic autonomy besides industrial and political aspects, the EU has a long way to go forward on the operational aspect. For accomplishing an expeditionary mission, dispatched forces need to be arrayed with readiness. As Sun Tzu states: “Rapidity is the essence of war”¹⁶⁹ Only forces arrayed with readiness can assure this and accomplish the mission. In relation to that, participating PESCO states agreed to take tangible steps to augment availability, interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their armies to accomplish tactical, operational and strategic targets¹⁷⁰. In contradiction to this objective, they do not see it as relevant to integrate their forces for readiness still. Although PESCO is expected to reach a coherent full-spectrum force package, the Franco-German “food for thought” paper did not contain a plan to recognize and assign units to CROC, whose added value to the operational capacity of the union remains limited. Similarly, the EU Force Catalogue, which outlines available capabilities without assigned units, makes readiness impossible.

In terms of assuring the readiness of any force package, the EU national armies need to be integrated. With integration, the EU member countries would equip their armies with readiness. This sort of integration would address many problems in European Defense, such as level of ambition. The CROC is envisaged to be made up of 1 division or 3 brigades, including essential strategic enablers, for expeditionary missions in the “food for thought” paper. This level of ambition was a good step for completion of the EU’s Headline Goals following the announcement in 1999 which proposed the creation of a corps headquarters, 3 divisions and 9-12 brigades¹⁷¹. Nevertheless, the EU has a lot to accomplish for this purpose. The EU needs more than

¹⁶⁹ Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*, Amazon Classics, Kindle Edition, p. (56), p.(54-64),

¹⁷⁰ Béraud-Sudreau, Lucie, Efstathiou, Yvonne-Stefania, Hannigan, Conor, *Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: an early assessment of PESCO implementation*, IISS, May 2019, p. (12), p. (1-15).

¹⁷¹ Biscop, Sven, *Putting the Core at the Centre, The Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC) and the Future of PESCO*, Egmont Institute, Security Policy Brief, No. 119, December 2019, p. (1), p.(1-5)

either of these levels of ambition for accomplishing strategic goals in keeping with the goals outlined in the EUGS, especially when considering 1.5 million personnel employed in uniform across Europe. The scale of these force packages as foreseen either within PESCO or Headline Goals might be sufficient only for generating tactical successes, as it is in the Mediterranean by European forces recently. The EU has never been a changemaker during any CSDP operation so far. This situation destroys the credibility of the EU as a security provider. The EU should integrate its national armies in place of an army. Only after this kind of deeper integration, 1.5 million across the continent would be furnished with readiness even if a limited number of forces is assigned at disposal of CSDP.

In that manner, the EU may respond to new evolving and developing situations in conflict zones and be a deterrent to security challenges. On top of that, though the CSDP was invented merely for expeditionary missions against security challenges abroad, the EU has been tasked with a new mission: protection of Europe¹⁷². At this point, since its inception, the protection of Europe has been a prerogative of NATO, but the EU has decided to incorporate this new task as part of strategic autonomy in addition to security challenges abroad. Integration of 1.5 million people would be more meaningful through establishment of an army along this new task. However, either for territorial defense or security challenges abroad, the EU can become a deterrent security provider with momentum of integrated 1.5 million people in uniform. As Clausewitz stated: “not to take the first step without considering the last”¹⁷³. Engagement in conflicts is way beyond dispatching troops in conflict zones. It compounds various social, economic, and political aspects and requires consistency in your defense and security policy. In this respect, deployed troops serve as bridges towards civil society and need to be consistent and constant with their presence. In the

¹⁷² Biscop, Sven, *European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance*, IISS Survival: Global Politics and Strategy June–July 2018 May 2018, Volume: 60 Edition: 3, p. (172)

¹⁷³ Singer, P. W., *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*, Updated Edition (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (p. 243). Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition.

example of US's intervention in Iraq, as opposed to the assumptions before the operation, the US had to deploy thousands of its troops in the country for the post-conflict period many years after the operation ended. The EU will never have ambitions of invading a country, but its plans, as Clausewitz warns, should be prepared in accordance with the worst scenario and last step of their defense policy under CSDP and the Iraq example is a good one for comprehending the need for integration. The US sent 144,300 troops to Iraq, and this number reached a peak in 2007 with 170,300 troops alongside its other deployments around the globe¹⁷⁴.

In retrospect, the only way for a credible CSDP at this point, as understood from the Iraq case, is integration of national armies. Any European country alone is not able to change the course of events in failed states or conflict zones permanently without integration or with limited scope of cooperation. For example, France could only dispatch one brigade to Mali and could continue on its way only with the help of other European countries and the US through cooperation prior to intelligence, transport and so forth¹⁷⁵. That is why the EU needs to be consistent and decisive behind its defense policy for defusing conflict among the regional actors in the country through applying readiness and deterrence of an army rather than deployment of a brigade. Inconsistent and fragmented acts do not bring the results planned at the end. As pointed out in the EUGS, if the EU is serious about its ambitions going global as a security provider, it is in need of integration of all military forces across Europe rather than planned several divisions and brigades in terms of being a real security provider and international player.

¹⁷⁴ Berger, Miriam, Invaders, allies, occupiers, guests: A brief history of U.S. military involvement in Iraq, The Washington Post, World, Middle East, Jan. 11, 2020, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/11/invaders-allies-occupiers-guests-brief-history-us-military-involvement-iraq/>, (accessed at 10.10.2020)

¹⁷⁵ Biscop, Sven, The Future of the Transatlantic Alliance Not Without the European Union, Strategic Studies Quarterly – Perspective, Fall 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_Issue-3/Biscop.pdf, (accessed at 19.09.2020). p. (84), p. (81-94)

4.3. Maritime Security

In recent years, along the developments in the Mediterranean particularly, the EU increased its presence overseas significantly that in addition to cooperation among army units on land, European countries tend to collaborate more with each other in terms of maritime security for securing their strategic interests. Recent operations in recent years can be a good example of strengthening relations between European member countries regarding maritime security. However, in relation to strategic autonomy, the EU needs much more than bilateral cooperation efforts to be a trustworthy and credible security provider overseas. As a global trading actor, the EU exclusively needs to secure transportation of trade commodities overseas, as the value of goods transported overseas is 1.8 times higher than that of goods delivered by air and approximately three times higher than that of goods delivered over land. In this respect, Asian countries as important trade partners of Europe demand the EU be a more proactive player in the Indo-Pacific region to address various security challenges either as traditional or non-traditional¹⁷⁶. Additionally, migration flows from overseas emanating from failing states near the EU's borders crucially challenge the integrity of the union. Indeed, the EU, as cognizant of this reality, has already taken important steps prior to maritime security at European level.

Even before the introduce of EUGS, the EU reinforced the EU Maritime Security Strategy in 2014, which adopted comprehensive approach on maritime security. The EUMSS listed a wide range of threats, from conventional military threats, piracy, and terrorism to indirect threats deriving from illegal fishing and climate change. Briefly, the EUMSS invited the union to enhance its role as a global actor and security provider through its efforts in the European Neighborhood within the maritime

¹⁷⁶ Pejsova, Eva. THE EU AS A MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2019, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21121. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020. p. (1), p. (1-8)

domain¹⁷⁷. The ambition of the EU in maritime security continued with the announcement of the EUGS that comprehensive and wide-ranging ambitions counted in the EUGS incorporated maritime domain as a component of strategic autonomy. Based on the ambitions in the EUGS, PESCO contains various projects regarding maritime cooperation among member states.

4.3.1. Operation Atalanta

The traces of Europe's activities in maritime initially hinge upon the fight against piracy as one of the significant examples prior to the security identity of the union. The EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta was deployed in 2008 to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Following the deployment, Operation Atalanta units joined forces with NATO, India, and Russia. Later, with inclusion of other naval forces around the world, the multi-naval Combined Maritime Task Force (CMF 151) was established in 2009. Based on its resources and capabilities, EUNAVFOR undertook the responsibility of leading cooperation among all international players around the region. EUNAVFOR also served as a useful diplomacy tool for boosting relations with third parties, in particular East Asian countries whose majority had no contact with Europe before. Moreover, EUNAVFOR Operational Commander was invited to a Chinese naval base in 2018, which was the first Western military personnel visit to a Chinese overseas base. The success of EUNAVFOR has made it possible to develop closer formal political and security linkages. To date, Operation Atalanta remains a bridge linking Asian countries to Europe through maritime security.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Landman, Lennart, The EU Maritime Security Strategy Promoting or Absorbing European Defence Cooperation?, Clingendael Policy Brief, April 2015, p. (1-6), p. (1-12)

¹⁷⁸ Pejsova, Eva. THE EU AS A MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2019, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21121. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020. p. (4-5), p. (1-8)

4.3.2. Operation Sophia

Besides Operation Atalanta, the EU has indicated its interest in maritime security with Operation Sophia which was primarily launched as a de facto police and rescue operation for the surge in numbers of migrants trying to flee from Libya to European countries in 2015. It evolved into a maritime security instrument under CSDP, whose main purpose was detection and monitoring of migrant networks around the Mediterranean and fighting against human trafficking. In accordance with official figures, since the inception of Operation Sophia to 2017, 491 boats were nullified, 117 suspected smugglers were arrested and 40 000 migrants were saved in rescue operations. Nevertheless, the official mandate on Operation Sophia was not fully implemented due to several reasons. One of the most significant of these was insufficient engagement in Libyan waters. A permanent solution to the migration and human trafficking is not visible yet. Another reason on the dilution of the effectiveness of the operation was the fact that European countries' interest in the operation faded, which led to downsizing.¹⁷⁹

4.3.3. Contribution to EU's Security

With the launch of Operations Atalanta and Sophia, the EU has been first responder to international crises beyond other multinational security frameworks or organizations. In terms of that, these operations have been a telling illustration of the EU's security provider identity. For instance, although the EU had already issued provisions committed to the common security approach prior to maritime security since the Maastricht Treaty, those provisions were brought to the fore after the deployment of Operation Atalanta in 2008. In connection with later Global Strategy's maritime strategies related to security, connectivity and the Arctic region, Operation Atalanta affirmed Europe's eagerness to possess a security identity in the maritime domain

¹⁷⁹ Tardy, Thierry. Operation Sophia's World: Changes and Challenges. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2017, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17451, p. (1-3), p. (1-5), Accessed 11 Oct. 2020.

alongside others. With Operation Sophia, the EU established its stance as a security provider in the maritime area, especially with relation to existing security provider institution NATO. When compared to Operation Sophia, Operation Shield by NATO has been complementary to NATO's support function to Operation Sophia has been referred in its official mandate.

The launch of Operations Sophia and Atalanta has demonstrated the ability of the Union to administer a range of policy tools as a security provider in maritime security. By these operations, the EU's security identity on accounts of maritime domain under CSDP evolves around three main points: the EU demonstrates its ambition to defend global maritime commons and Europe's borders, to protect commercial interests, in particular fisheries and shipping, to bolster stability in failing states and encourage development and maturation of democratic institutions¹⁸⁰.

However, on the other hand, some unpleasant facts in relation to maritime security should be acknowledged that including NATO operations, the EU's activities on maritime security have not been sufficient to generate strategic results in terms of addressing root causes of migration flows, failing states, broader insecurity and common criminal violations, either in the MENA region or Horn of Africa. These operations mostly aimed to decrease piracy by forcefully compelling pirates to give up their activities at sea and were devoid of geopolitical objectives for providing better means to make them more effective that as a result, lowered expectations of these operations¹⁸¹. Because of these deficits, Operations Atalanta and Sophia have not been adequate to address missions for which they were launched. In this respect, these operations can hardly be exemplified as proof of the EU's prowess in maritime security.

¹⁸⁰ Larsen, Jessica. THE ROLE OF THE EU IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN. Danish Institute for International Studies, 2019, pp. 25–33, THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR: Perspectives from the Maritime Domain, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21442.5, p.(26-31), Accessed 11 Oct. 2020.

¹⁸¹ Marcuzzi, Stefano. NATO-EU Maritime Cooperation: for What Strategic Effect? NATO Defense College, 2018, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19855ö p. (Accessed 12 Oct. 2020).

Besides, there are still serious problems with those operations. For instance, the EU cannot yet deploy their navy assets in Operation Sophia due to the opposition of Italy. Similarly, Operation Atalanta operates with merely two frigates. Furthermore, owing to lack of political unity between member states, extension of Operation Sophia witnessed long debates that the end of the operation was on the table foremost.

Contrary to this inefficiency and ineffectiveness, the EU has great potential in maritime security. With integration of European navies, the EU may have one of the largest navies in the world¹⁸². With supranational governance and establishment of an army, the EU may generate strategic outcomes compared to the tactical successes Operation Sophia and Atalanta produced. Though these operations delivered valuable results, their results and influence have been limited and constrained to tactical level, not strategic. This is due to the fact that maritime security cooperation at the intragovernmental level is insufficient to bolster the security identity of the EU in maritime strategies. Notably, the transnational character of maritime security challenges lays out the fact that in the maritime realm where strategic interests of member states get interlaced, strategic outcomes cannot be obtained via traditional roles of navies alone¹⁸³.

Together with political aspects of maritime security, establishment of an army also may address deficits in industrial aspects of maritime security that projects within PESCO regarding maritime domain do not focus on. Strategic enablers required autonomous operations overseas. The EU cannot afford strategic enablers for 27 member states, but with integration through an army, the EU may deliver an essential number of strategic enablers at the disposal of a European Army for strategic interests

¹⁸² Pejsova, Eva. THE EU AS A MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2019, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21121. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020. p. (3), p. (1-8)

¹⁸³ Pejsova, Eva. THE EU AS A MARITIME SECURITY PROVIDER. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2019, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21121. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020. p. (7), p. (1-8)

of the union. For these reasons, the EU needs to integrate its national navies in a way that already some European countries, aware of their deficits alone in maritime security, had already started doing for better results in maritime security, like Belgian and Dutch navy integration. While they deliver both frigates and minehunters to each other, their navies operate either under the Belgian flag with a Belgian crew or the Dutch flag with a Dutch crew. They have one common headquarters and one navy operational school located in the Dutch naval base. The Netherlands is responsible for taking care of maintenance, supply and training of both navies' frigates and reciprocally, Belgium is responsible for the minehunters¹⁸⁴. With a similar approach, the EU can create a global navy compounding these sorts of bilateral integrations between European countries as sub-army of a European Army from which they can retrieve a significant amount of impetus.

4.4. The EU Air Power in European Defense

Air power is one of the essentials for conducting successful expeditionary missions. In many of these, air forces can be adequate to reach targets regardless of dispatching ground troops in conflict zones. When considering the operations of the US Air Force (USAF), the significance of air forces for operational capacity can be clearly seen. For instance, the US commenced the Allied Force operation in Kosovo for averting suppression of Albanians by Milosevic's forces. That successful air campaign was at the core of withdrawal of Milosevic from Kosovo.

Based on experiences and lessons analyzed from those operations, notably in the aftermath of Desert Storm, inherent characteristics of air power through speed, range flexibility, lethality, precision had gained great importance for Western defense experts and particularly in the US. That is why the US has deployed its air forces around different parts of the world for the purposes of crisis management, no-fly zones,

¹⁸⁴ Biscop, Sven. *European Strategy in the 21st Century* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) (p. 119). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

fighting against terrorism, third-party intervention in failed states, air policing and constabulary tasks, humanitarian relief missions, etc. Air power is a multifaceted military instrument with less commitment of other military components like deployment of ground troops. A military actor with air power can attain its military objectives in an era of uncertainties. As aware of this reality, when army and naval assets added to the balance, approximately 50 percent of the US' defense spending goes to air power.

However, in contrast to its dominant role for the US, air power has never played a crucial role in the European Defense. This deficit in the European Defense creates a capability gap among the Trans-Atlantic Alliance that shows another of Europe's weaknesses in defense. This gap became more visible in the post-Cold War era. While the EU deployed its national air forces for multinational operations either under NATO, UN or ad hoc coalitions' command, the EU is not capable of conducting air force operations independently. It lacks required military capabilities and is devoid of political decisiveness at the European level¹⁸⁵.

For instance, this can be observed in the Trans-Atlantic Alliance Libya air campaign. In the aftermath, Qaddafi was overthrown and the mission was completed. Nevertheless, the Libya air campaign was useful to recognize the shortcomings in the alliance so that repeat of a similar success is not taken granted for the future, when this problem deserves the attention of allied leaders and military planners. Operation Unified Protector (OUP) was conducted with the lowest participation of NATO. During the operation, there were some divisions among the coalition. Lack of material support from Germany and Poland was one of the indicators of these divisions. Aside from that, some countries could not participate in the operation because of the lack of capability problem. Overall, non-US military capabilities have shown through OUP

¹⁸⁵ Anrig, Christian F., The Quest for Relevant Air Power, Air University Press, Air Force Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, August 2011, p.(15-39), p. (13-79), https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728506/-1/-1/0/B_0125_ANRIG_QUEST_RELEVANT_POWER.PDF, (accessed at 18.10.2020)

that while the alliance could undertake a mission without the US in a dominant role, it indicated how a mission without support of the US can be challenging¹⁸⁶.

4.4.1. Oversophistication Of European Air Forces

The EU needs to have a strategy at the European level as to air power. With current national defense spending of European states separate, the EU cannot afford air force like other global powers. The lack of strategy at the European level can cost the next 60 years of the continent. Within Europe, several clusters of cooperating European countries take place for the 6th generation of fighter aircrafts. While Italy, Sweden and the UK cooperate in the next-generation fighter concept under title of Tempest, France, Germany and Spain cooperate for production of a different next generation fighter concept under the name of Future Air Combat System (FCAS). The direction of these projects is distinctive of Europe's air power.

Through these projects, the EU not only transforms its national air forces, but adopts a technological dominance concept. But this transformation towards very high technology leaves very little space for alternative systems within their air forces. Although, other major powers like USA, Russia and China have power to maintain various systems within their air forces, European countries regardless of major or small states do not have the capacity to maintain various systems. Because, multifunctionality comes with huge costs that conduct of either specialized tasks varying from surveillance to electronic warfare or conventional tasks like air striking with those advanced aircraft fleets may be very precious to afford. Likewise, USA at first decided to replace its all fighter fleets with variants of F35s, but then perpetuated production

¹⁸⁶ Chivvis, Christopher S., Strategic and Political Overview of the Intervention, Chapter Two, Editor Karl. P. Muller, Precision and Purpose, Airpower in the Libyan Civil War, Rand Corporation, 2015, p. (41), p. (11-42) https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR676.html, (accessed at 18.10.2020)

and service-life extensions of less developed aircraft such as F15s and A10s in terms of maintaining more balanced fleets for affordable costs¹⁸⁷.

For overcoming these shortages within the European Air Forces, the EU needs to have air power strategy at a European level in which the creation of a European Army at a supranational level may assure pursuing a strategy within the entire continent. In this respect, the EU may both modernize its entire fighter fleets with advanced fighter jets and continue to maintain less advanced fighter jets for constituting more balanced air force across the continent. Aggregated defense spending within whole Europe cannot be sufficient to afford purchase and maintenance of both advanced and less advanced fighter fleets per 27 member states, but creation of balanced air force at disposal of EU can be constituted with establishment of an army. In that way, the EU can take role either in low intensity or peer-to-peer conflicts with more affordable costs that Europe can showcase its military capability for crisis management as a security provider and achieve another component of strategic autonomy in terms of acting when required and necessary independently. Therefore, the EU may claim more credible CSDP and at the same time, contribute to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance more efficiently and effectively.

B. HOWEVER...

European national armies which hold the heritage of the glory days of a bygone era to greater or lesser degree are constrained by their limited national resources. In the past, the crucial mass effect together with ability maneuver and shock of raid would be enough to achieve objectives in the battlefields like Napoleon, Joffre and Rommel. Even if they politically show eagerness to act, European armies are not capable of making strategic effects through warfare in our era unless they combine their power and integrate their armies. European countries do not have adequate resources

¹⁸⁷ Tack, Sim, Does Europe Risk Oversophistication of Air Power?, Clingendael Spectator, 25 Sep 2019, p. (1-5), p. (1-11), <https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/does-europe-risk-oversophistication-air-power>, (accessed at 18.10.2017)

individually to acquire essential military capability and technologies for autonomy in defense matters. For making high technology military capabilities affordable, European nations need to produce them within Europe. However, for that, Europe should decrease the production costs through a vast national armament market and immense export. Particularly, this sort of mass production gets more critical with shrinking defense budgets. Due to decreasing national defense spending, Europe downsizes their armies, reduces formats of various arms and critical platforms, uses military equipment much beyond its service life and chronically lacks sufficient investment in research and technology, which overall causes skills and autonomy to be lost.

This reality is even valid for the two most powerful armies. France cannot afford to renew its nuclear arsenal, to purchase a second aircraft carrier and build a new fighter aircraft and system alone. While the creation of an army at a supranational governance can be a solution to all those deficits in European Defense with common budget, common policy and common capabilities, its realization does not seem possible in near term. Many believe that unless there is either European identity or European nation, creation of a European Army is impossible¹⁸⁸.

1. The Difficulties on the Idea of European Army

According to opponents of the idea of a European Army, there are serious barriers to activation of this ambition idea. Although proponents of a European Army exemplify existing integration efforts among different European countries as a blueprint for constitution of a pan-European defense union like the Nordic defense co-operation (NORDEFECO) and the Dutch-German cooperation, opponents claim that these efforts emanate from economic reasons and close relations between these countries and cannot be the base of a European Army. As opposed to Dutch-German

¹⁸⁸ Mauro, Frederic and Jehin, Olivier. Why do we need a European Army? IRIS, EUROPE, STRATEGY, SECURITY PROGRAMME, April 2019, pp. 2-4. pp. (1-8), <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ProgEurope-MAURO-JEHIN-1-Eng-EU-army-2019.pdf>, (accessed at 20.10.2020)

integration by sharing soldiers, tanks, and different capabilities, as well as joint headquarters, the French-German brigade exemplifies an unhealthy version of an integration effort. Except for low-scale deployments in lower-risk zones, France and Germany have never agreed to deploy their troops in risky conflict zones. Based on that, creation of a European Army is like mixing apples and oranges together, which would probably trigger various problems in more comprehensive multinational EU units. In addition to that, the creation of a European Army means reinventing the wheel, in that some European member states are concerned that a European Army would compete with NATO structures¹⁸⁹. To them, beside NATO, the existence of a European Army is irrelevant. This concern is more tangible within Eastern European states. With an imminent Russian threat, they do not want to harm their relations with the US and cannot risk a US presence in the region with the vague possibility of a European Army.

Precisely, there are tougher questions in particular for a European Army. What does a European Army mean exactly? Who will decide on deploying soldiers and to where? Who will give orders? Which parliament will decide on a European Army? What kind of defense industrial base will Europeans have for their army? Without sorting out these questions, referring to a European Army would be a nice issue to talk about, but would remain vague and ambiguous. If Europeans cannot compromise on what European security principles are and to perceive the same things in threat assessment, they can never deploy European forces around the globe.¹⁹⁰

Establishment of a European Army is like a double-edge sword in that while it aims to unify European national armies under European flag, insisting too far on the idea may backlash and trigger further divisions among small and major European

¹⁸⁹ Besch, Sophia, An EU Army? Four Reasons It Will Not Happen, Center For European Reform, Insight, 12 May 2016, p. (2-3), p. (1-4), <https://www.cer.eu/insights/eu-army-four-reasons-it-will-not-happen#>, (accessed at 21.10.2020)

¹⁹⁰ Breitenbach, Dagmar, EU army a 'wonderful idea' but a long-term project, German security expert says, DW News, Europe, 09.03.2015, p. (2), p. (1-2), <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-army-a-wonderful-idea-but-a-long-term-project-german-security-expert-says/a-18303793>, (accessed at 22.10.2020)

states, wealthier and poorer states or between states which perceive threats from the South and East¹⁹¹. From this point of view, analysts criticize proponents of a European Army for not taking a lesson from the Brexit vote by reiterating their quest to assemble a federative European superstate in spite of strenuous opposition from various segments of Europe¹⁹².

Not only among states but also, the idea of a European Army lacks public support within the continent that European member states cannot take steps against public opinion or cannot go forward without public support. For instance, according to a survey organized within the continent by Eurobarometer in 2018, only 16 percent supported a European Army, 39 percent were somewhat in favor, but the rest opposed the establishment of a European Army. For security threat perception, only 22 percent perceived “Conflicts with Countries outside the EU” and 7 percent perceived “Armed Conflict within the EU” to be a danger for the EU to take action against. Whilst the illegal annexation of Crimea sparks outrage over Russia and support for CSDP within the countries nearby Russian border rises up to between 71-87 percent, support for a European Army in the Eastern European states stay between 50-71 percent, with exception of Estonia, where support for a European Army has been at 48 percent¹⁹³.

2. Fragility of Europe

Establishment of an army requires a strong political stance and unity. Among all the uncertainties and ambiguities, expecting such strong actions from the EU does not seem realistic or possible. Particularly, following the Brexit vote in 2016, If Marine Le Pen were to be elected as the next president over Macron in 2017, the EU would

¹⁹¹ Bilcik, Vladimir, After the EU Global Strategy Security and Defense, Consulting Experts, EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), October 2016, p. (11), p. (11-13).

¹⁹² Kern, Soeren, European Leaders Discuss Plan for European Army, Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council, September 14, 2016, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8935/european-army>, (accessed at 23.10.2020)

¹⁹³ Von Trapp, Amanda, European Defense Integration: Public Opinion and Instinct, European Union Studies Association, p. (2-3), p. (1-13), <https://www.eustudies.org/eusa-forum/eusa-interest-section-essays/18/download>, (accessed at 25.10.2020)

have to struggle with precipitously serious problems. While the EU had to confront the Brexit vote in 2016 and this result was not welcomed at first, later the result was interpreted as a positive outcome on behalf of European Defense Integration. Former HRVP Federica Mogherini stated: "I believe a window of opportunity has been opened to give life to a European defense. I wanted to send the message that, despite the British exit, Europe can and must move forward with the process of integration. The prospect of Brexit offered an opportunity not to be slowed by the country that was always most determinedly opposed to the idea of pooling the instruments of defense."¹⁹⁴.

However, as one of the founders of the Union France with a far right-wing leader would mean much more with its negative consequences than that of Brexit. Maybe this sort of scenario would not upend the EU immediately, but a nationalist European leader would cause a grave systematic crisis without doubt by which European decision-making might be blocked and existent European legislation might be suspended¹⁹⁵. Furthermore, the EU could experience a survival struggle after Brexit, as Marine Le Pen is known for her Eurosceptic views. France and the EU weathered this danger in the last election, but for the next election, the danger remains unsolved. In a recent poll, 18 months ahead of French election in 2022, Macron would take 23-26 percent, on the other hand, Le Pen would take 24-27 percent in the first round¹⁹⁶. In case of a nationalist leader's election in France, the EU may be exposed to another catastrophe.

Another problem is observed within the Netherlands that they are again more skeptical on the EU. When WWII ended, the Dutch expected a loose Trans-Atlantic

¹⁹⁴ Kern, Soeren, European Leaders Discuss Plan for European Army, Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council, September 14, 2016, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8935/european-army>, (accessed at 23.10.2020)

¹⁹⁵ Biscop, Sven. *European Strategy in the 21st Century* (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) (p. 138). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

¹⁹⁶ Torsoli, Albertina, France's Le Pen Could Top First Round of 2022 Elections: Poll, Bloomberg Politics, 4 October 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-04/france-s-le-pen-could-win-first-round-of-2022-elections-poll>, (accessed at 25.10.2020),

Alliance based on close trade relations with the UK, the US and other. However, because this did not happen, instead, they participated in ECSC due to the economic weakness of the country at that time. From the early time of their participation, they aimed to include the UK in the union. After the UK's participation in the Union, they worked together on many issues within the EU. Apart from the UK, they were softer on integration issues by engaging in monetary union and Schengen zone. However, after the UK's departure from the EU, their Eurosceptic instincts have resurfaced¹⁹⁷. The Dutch refers to the EU as a market and refuses further integration. This situation constitutes a major obstacle in the way of many political developments like a European Army, notably when thought that according to experts, Netherlands is considered the third major country following Germany and France¹⁹⁸.

Italy has been one of the European countries most affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. Its citizens have expressed rage toward the EU for a perceived lack of solidarity with Italy. Many Italians have accused the Union of an insufficient response to the crisis since its start. Because of that, while 51 percent of Italian public expressed their support to remain in the EU, the number of people dissatisfied with the EU has risen to 49 percent, according to a recent poll by Tecne. Not only that, some Italians were seen burning EU flags on social media and some Italian politicians took down EU flags from their offices¹⁹⁹. These protests against the EU have been interpreted as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Various newspapers in the UK and the US depicted events under headlines such as “After Coronavirus Response Failures, Almost Half of

¹⁹⁷ De Gruyter, Caroline, The Dutch Don't Love Europe—and Never Did, Foreign Policy, Argument, September 16, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/16/the-dutch-dont-love-europe-and-never-did/>, (accessed at 25.10.2020)

¹⁹⁸ De Gruyter, Caroline, The limits of “no, no, no”: Why the Dutch are so ambivalent about Europe, European Council, 3rd August, 2020, p. (2), p. (1-6), https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_limits_of_no_no_no_why_the_dutch_are_so_ambivalent_about_eur, (accessed at 25.10.2020),

¹⁹⁹ Tomlinson, Chris, After Coronavirus Response Failures, Almost Half of Italians Want to Leave the EU, Breitbart, 14 Apr 2020, <https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2020/04/14/poll-shows-almost-half-italians-want-leave-eu/>, (accessed at 26.10.2020)

Italians Want to Leave the EU”²⁰⁰, “Coronavirus outbreak eats into EU unity”²⁰¹ and “Brussels crumbling: EU flags BURNED by furious Italians as coronavirus divides bloc”²⁰².

In fact, European integration has gone so far that it cannot be undone such easily, but these problems demonstrate the fact that the EU is more fragile than it is supposed to be that with election result of a European nation, the EU gets exposed to severe problems, which challenge the integrity of the Union ²⁰³. In this political context of EU, establishment of an army does not get realistic and probably meaningful, at least in the near term.

3. COVID-19 in the European Defense

Since the end of the Cold War, defense budgets had been shrinking steadily within the continents based on the dissolution of the main threat to Europe, the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the 2008 crisis hit European defense hard, and the defense sector was one of the first domains to cut its share in the budget for member states. Approximately, European defense budgets decreased 30 percent in small states, between 10-15 percent in medium states and 8 percent in major states. Totally, 24 billion, or 11 percent of entire defense spending within the EU was cut after 2007-2008. Only after 2014, the total defense spending reached to pre-crisis level when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. This prominent danger at their borders has been a warning to put more emphasis on the European Defense. Nonetheless, the military capabilities of member states were not at the same capacity as in pre-crisis. European national

²⁰⁰ Ibid

²⁰¹ Adler, Katya, Coronavirus outbreak eats into EU unity, BBC News, 2 April, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52135816>, (accessed at 26.10.2020)

²⁰² Barnes, Joe, Brussels crumbling: EU flags BURNED by furious Italians as coronavirus divides bloc, Apr 21, 2020, Express, <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1271843/EU-coronavirus-news-Italy-EU-flag-burning-Josep-Borrell-latest> (accessed at 10.11.2020)

²⁰³ Biscop, Sven. European Strategy in the 21st Century (Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy) (p. 139). Taylor and Francis. Kindle Edition.

armies' capabilities were hit by a loss of 35 percent over the last two decades.²⁰⁴ In retrospect, even since the 2008 crisis, the defense domain has been more vulnerable than other social, economic and political aspects of European Integration.

After the EU began to feel the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the death toll and infection rates accelerated exponentially throughout the continent. As German Chancellor Merkel stated: "The coronavirus pandemic revealed the fragility of the European project."²⁰⁵ For this reason, the future of European Defense is jeopardized again after the 2008 crisis with the COVID-19 pandemic. Whilst different initiatives have been invented like PESCO and EDF to recover the scars in the European Defense, they have not been strengthened as much as it should have been. In the aftermath of MFF talks, the EDF's budget has been reduced from 13 billion to 7 billion, and Military Mobility's budget from 6.5 billion to 1.5 billion²⁰⁶. In this regard, the decreases in budgets will hamper development of essential military capabilities within European national armies for delivering strategic autonomy. European Defense Industries also will not merely suffer from any sudden decrease in demand, but, additionally from vagueness and unpredictability of the market for when or whether the defense activities will resume as in the precrisis period. Through uncertainty, European Defense industries may lose already an comparatively small share in the market and Asian investors, for instance, may capture crucial parts of Europe's supply chain in the defense market.²⁰⁷

In this context, although COVID-19 can be deemed a compelling and motivating factor for more cooperation among member states to tackle all these

²⁰⁴ Becker, Sophia, Molling, Christian, Schutz, Torben, Deterrence and Defense in Times of COVID-19, Europe's Political Choices, DGAP Policy Brief, No. 9 April 2020, p. (6), p. (1-10),

²⁰⁵ Von Der Burchard, Hans, Merkel: Coronavirus pandemic revealed Europe's fragility, Politico, 25.10.2020, <https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-coronavirus-pandemic-europe-fragility/>, (accessed at 26.10.2020)

²⁰⁶ Major, Claudia, Catalyst or crisis? COVID-19 and European Security, NDC Policy Brief, No. 17 – October 2020, p. (4), p. (1-4),

²⁰⁷ Becker, Sophia, Molling, Christian, Schutz, Torben, Deterrence and Defense in Times of COVID-19, Europe's Political Choices, DGAP Policy Brief, No. 9 April 2020, p. (6), p. (1-10),

concerning problems, it has been observed that some governments opted to preserve their insufficient national defense programs other than programs at the European level. They wanted to be sole decision-maker of procurement procedures and planned to maintain their industrial benefit. Assumptions as to the indirect contribution of COVID-19 to more cooperation among European member states do not seem valid presently.²⁰⁸

As a result, COVID-19 obviously will exert tremendous influence on strategic priorities and threat perceptions. Europe as its political priority will focus more on economic recovery as well as non-military risks such as pandemics. Thence, homeland protection, resilience, preparedness and prevention will be most probably at the top of the EU's political agenda. Indeed, COVID-19 has revealed Europe's dependence on China for critical commodities like personal protection equipment. This dependence highlighted the need to obtain autonomy in specific domains like medical supplies such as medical mask and vaccines. Certainly, this political shift distracts attention from European Defense. For instance, in the second semester of 2020 the German presidency will prioritize implementation of the leitmotiv "Together for Europe's Recovery" and Strategic Compass will take less attention. As another example, during the 2020 State of the Union Address by the President of the EU Commission, European Defense did not play a major part. Presently, security and defense issues are not at the top of the EU's agenda.²⁰⁹ that the idea of European Army after almost 70 years will be shelved for a while more.

Conclusion

After WWII, European countries realized that wars within the continent brought only devastation. For a prosperous and secure continent, they had to cooperate instead

²⁰⁸Marrone, Alessandro, Credi, Ottavia, COVID-19: Which Effects on Defence Policies in Europe?, Documenti IAI 20, 09 April 2020 p. (7), p. (1-10)

²⁰⁹ Major, Claudia, Catalyst or crisis? COVID-19 and European Security, NDC Policy Brief, No. 17 – October 2020, p. (2-4), p. (1-4),

of fighting each other. The roots of European integration were built upon this reality, and defense integration was a component of this process. While the European countries solicited to institute a permanent defense cooperation within the continent, the total military capability of Europe was not sufficient to face the Soviet threat. With the lead of the UK, the US was persuaded to commit to Europe's security, and this situation led to the birth of NATO. However, Europe did not give up constituting a pan-European defense union, and the EDC treaty was the result of this purpose. For the first time, the idea of a European Army was on the political agenda of European countries. In contrast to its present political stance, the US as well supported establishment of an army for a fair share of burden on Trans-Atlantic Alliance against the Soviet threat. At that moment, Europe was truly close to acquiring the strategic autonomy which the EU tried to achieve through countless initiatives decades later. Nevertheless, due to concerns over losing national sovereignty on defense matters, the EDC treaty failed.

Thus, NATO has remained the main defense framework of Europe since then and the US bolstered its presence on the continent as a guarantor of European continent's security. However, Europe has never taken off pursuing more space for European autonomy besides Trans-Atlantic Alliance that constituting OSCE alongside NATO was one of the results of this pursuing. While these institutions have been remarkably useful for European security over the years, they cannot cover the security needs of Europe entirely. The wars following the dissolution of Yugoslavia confirmed this reality. Although European countries interpreted this unstable period as “the hour Europe”, the Bosnia and Kosovo wars drifted apart in failure. In this regard, the EU took some crucial steps to cover deficits within the European Defense, either through new treaties or new institutions. This drove the establishment of CFSP and then gradually CSDP. However, first and foremost, the EU started to debate developing credible military forces to support Europe's foreign policies. Particularly, subsequent to the Saint Malo Declaration, the EU prompted the Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG) based on creation of European Battlegroups to intervene in crises for crisis

management. Nevertheless, these Battlegroups were not furnished with political decisiveness at a European level, as they had never been deployed in conflict zones. CSDP was like an incoherent body without arms for empowering and securing the EU's foreign policies and pursuing its strategic interests.

Ensuing crises like Libya, Syria and Ukraine reaffirmed the same problem within the CSDP, that the EU could not generate a common defense policy during all of those crises. CSDP was insufficient to tackle the unwillingness of member states to produce a common stance and to act. Even if a common defense policy had been determined successfully, CSDP was not equipped with credible military forces to pursue strategic interests of the Union for crisis management. In relation to these deficits, the EU has never been one of the major players or change makers as a security provider alongside other major international players. That is why these crises were esteemed as failures.

Inefficiency and ineffectiveness of CSDP have cost the EU so much to the extent that the integrity of Union has been challenged deeply. Migration flows as a result of conflicts and instabilities in these countries drove the rise of far right and Eurosceptic politics across the continent. Many of these groups have proportionally increased their voice in their parliaments. For instance, Brexit is one of the most tangible results of this period. During the voting process, the number of immigrants seeking asylum in the EU was peaking that Eurosceptic agenda gained significant momentum within the UK. At the end, the Eurosceptic political agenda of the Brexiters reached its ultimate purpose with the departure of the UK from the EU. Likewise, France was on the verge of getting into the same course of events with election of nationalist leader Marine Le Pen, whose policy agenda was filled with nationalist and Eurosceptic aspects. In the event of her election, the EU could enter a difficult period.

In this regard, the EU decided to put more weight on defense matters. As a first step, the EU targeted to calibrate different perceptions on global issues and determine

a clear path towards being a global player with announcement of the EUGS. In the document, the world was depicted as more contested, connected and complex than ever. and the EU had to be furnished with strategic autonomy for confronting any possible crises in such a challenging environment. For assuring strategic autonomy, the EU needs to be able to act when required and necessary and to be less dependent on production of its own military equipment upon which PESCO, EDF and any other related initiatives were built. However, both of them have serious problems which challenge instituting strategic autonomy within the EU. For PESCO, the main problem is that member states, instead of asking, “What can we do for PESCO?” tend to ask, “What can PESCO do for us?” This sort of approach dilutes the already limited resources of the Union. Secondly, PESCO with its intragovernmental character is not able to tackle the unwillingness of the European states, fragmented structure of European Defense Industries as in Germany-France cooperation, and ambiguity on operational capacity. As for the finance problem of European Defense, EDF is not of sufficient scale and scope for fueling the European Defense. With the event of COVID-19, its budget was cut by almost more than half after the MFF talks. In this perspective, PESCO and any related initiatives are not efficient to cover operational, industrial and operational aspects of the strategic autonomy in full spectrum.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the EU needs to change the way it esteems and approaches the European Defense. So far, every defense initiative has been of an intragovernmental character. Europe could not overcome their chronicle problems since the inception of European Defense Integration. At this point, Europe may need to take the idea of a European Army of a supranational character into consideration in order to find permanent solutions to their chronicle problems pertaining to the European Defense Integration. For instance, Eurocorps has been activated since 1995, but it has been never deployed in conflict zones in pursuit of European strategic interests. Later, after the announcement of Saint Malo, the MHGs were introduced for covering the deficit in the operational capacity. However again, stemming from the

intragovernmental character of the initiative, the unwillingness of European member states averted the EU Battlegroups to be deployed in times of crises. The same problem exists within the CSDP. After 20 years on the development of CSDP, yet, the EU is far away from getting united behind a common defense policy and then holding a firm stance on a political solution. In Syria, Ukraine and Libya, there are still strong divisive lines between the European states. While PESCO is made up of willing countries which accepted binding commitments and is featured with a nuclear option that in case of remaining under the commitment, membership of a country can be suspended, the intragovernmental character puts its future at serious risk. In this respect, a supranational governance seems to be needed in the European Defense, which can be reinforced through constituting a European Army.

The increasing debates and visibility of the idea of a European Army are not just contingent on internal necessities that external necessities are another dimension of which at the moment. The US has always urged its European allies to take more responsibility for their own defense, and relatedly decreased its presence in the European soil gradually. In fact, in the Iraq War 2003, Europe understood that it was on the verge of a turning point with its traditional ally. This turnout has reached the extent that the Obama administration adopted a new policy with “Pivot to Asia.” Even if the Trump presidency with its unprecedented and instable approach on the transatlantic alliance is replaced with a moderate administration on transatlantic alliance, and some overhauls can be seen in the worsening Trans-Atlantic Alliance later, the overall course of the US does not seem to change.

At this point, the harsh stance of the US, which is mainly summarized by the famous abbreviation “3Ds,” to newly introduced European defense initiatives is not fair criticism of the European Defense Integration. What the EU is trying to achieve recently is compliance with the realities of the Trans-Atlantic Alliance through the efforts on constituting strategic autonomy that the developments within the EU Defense integration is not weakening and detrimental to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. The EU

development of its military capability and the European Defense to be able to act when required and necessary is beneficial to NATO as well. Besides, UK's departure from the EU means substantial change for European Defense in that most of the defense spending for CSDP operations was coming from the UK. Added to that, its significant military power left an important space to be filled within the European Defense. On the other hand, this is an opportunity for deeper and further defense integration based on the fact that the UK has always objected to such attempts in the EU. In this respect, the EU may set off a way towards a European Army without UK objection and cover the space its departure has caused in the European Defense.

Accordingly, through a European Army, the EU may transform the European Defense so that many problems within PESCO can be tackled in an easier way with a different formation. With a European Army, the EU may impose binding regulations on procurement of military equipment, govern total European Defense spending supranationally and boost its operational capacity. In this manner, European countries would tend to purchase more European military equipment as less dependent on external producers, in which case European Defense Industries would increase their share in the armament market. In the meantime, the EU with its rebooted operational capacity can be counted as a trustworthy security provider without the unwillingness of the European national states. Also, Europe can obviate its unsolved military level of ambition problem with integrating 1.5 million in uniform across the continent instead of limited level of ambition determined in former attempts. As the EU decided to go global as outlined in the EUGS, Europe can confront crises around the globe via its integrated military forces at full spectrum for which strategic interests of Europe requires to furnish its national armies with readiness in terms of deterrence against any major threats.

Additionally, the EU's strategic interests are stretched to the extent which, added to land forces, the EU may create great momentum in maritime security and air force power generation with the European Army. Because the EU has strong trade

interests overseas as the value of goods transported by sea are 1.8 higher than that of air transportation and 3 times higher than that of land transportation, maritime security takes a significant place in the European Defense. Despite its importance, cooperation in maritime security does not take much attention. Operations Atalanta and Sophia brought up tactical successes but were devoid of strategic means and assets to change the course of events where they operated on account of strategic outcomes. For this reason, the EU needs to integrate their navies as some European countries already do presently and the European Army can assure this sort of integration for strategic outcomes. Importance of air forces in conventional operations remains powerful. In the last Western Operations, air forces with less commitment to the battlegrounds were used to reach targets in conflict zones, particularly in Libya. What is more, maintenance and operational expenditures of air forces are costly in comparison to navy and army units. While European countries are transforming their air fleets with sixth-generation fighter jets, not all European countries own adequate resources for this sort of oversophistication together with less advanced fleets. Europe may need to melt down their national air forces through a supranational European Army to confront these problems and shape a deterrent European air forces capable of conducting various operations, ranging from low to high-risk zones, at affordable costs.

This sort of transformation may ensure more visible and united CSDP unlike its historical background so far. The US demonstrates its willingness to go forward towards Asia rather than Europe and Brexit has left the EU in which European Defense Integration is more feasible thereafter. If the EU embarks on the path of a European Army, it may reinforce a robust and united CSDP in locations relevant to European strategic interests with credible military forces. With its ramifications for European Security, the MENA countries constitute de facto boundaries to European prosperity rather than official ones. On the contrary, the EU's response to crises in the region has been generally weak and fragmented. In the future, the EU may prove its security

identity as it always claims with its army at the disposal of Brussels, instead of European national capitals, to produce a common defense policy around the region.

Beyond that, the EU is not only facing regional actors, but also is in a race with global powers like Russia and China in a more contested world. Russia has strengthened its weight around the globe through its military power. Corresponding to decreasing military presence of the US, Russia has been one of the changemakers in the MENA region as well as in the Eastern Europe via illegal annexation of Crimea with its military power. Despite China is not seen a direct security threat by Europeans, it is strengthening its military alliance with Russia and is one of the main buyers of Russian military equipment. They conduct navy drills and trainings together through which China is even involved in the MENA region and increases its political weight around the region gradually. Moreover, China is in a rivalry with the US in different aspects, and the crucial Taiwan issue is one of the most heated debates between these powers. Although the EU may not be interested in getting involved, in case of rising tensions between China and the US, its traditional partner, the US, may seek its support. Essentially, the EU may find itself being dragged into a crisis without its consent. In either scenario, the EU may confront the crises with the European Army under governance of a united CSDP.

Nevertheless, ahead of building up a path towards a European Army, there are serious problems to be overcome initially. A European Army is starting to be debated again after long decades upon the appearance of the strategic autonomy concept. However, the problem is that European member states do not have a clear definition of either of them and prefer to inject their own interpretations, instead of consensus, into these concepts. This division can be illustrated through differences between France and Germany. While these two countries expressed their support for a European Army, both have been leading countries of different initiatives prior to the operational capacity of the EU. Also, there are many European countries directly opposed to establishment of a European Army from the beginning. According to polls, overall

support for a European Army is not at sufficient level among European citizens to push politicians into taking concrete steps on behalf of a European Army which may create more divisive lines amid European politics at the moment.

The EU's political stability is at stake in recent years more than ever and for the future, this problem remains unsolved. Brexit has been one of the examples of this fragility the EU has experienced since 2016. In the possible event of Marine Le Pen's election in France in 2022, the EU may have to confront a similar crisis which may challenge the integrity of Europe deeply and turn up as a survival struggle. Italy witnessed the rise of Eurosceptics' political momentum in the COVID-19 pandemic. Protesters burned EU flags as protest of its perceived lack of solidarity with the country. The Netherlands is another Eurosceptic country, and the third leading country. According to experts, it is one of the natural opponents of the idea of a European Army and may hamper further integration efforts in the European Defense. Before creating a European Army which will be characterized by political decisiveness through supranational governance, it should be admitted that initially, European countries should sacrifice on their national sovereignties that in this context, the EU which is vulnerable to national election results of any European member state is not capable of doing that instantly.

Exclusively, subsequent to the COVID-19 crisis, the attention of the EU will slide towards realms other than the European Defense. As one of the outcomes, the EU defense budgets most probably will shrink during the next decade. Unlike the 2008 crisis, both supply and demand chains have been destroyed and already, the EU budget allocated to the EDF and military mobility initiatives has fallen substantially below initially planned amounts. Europe is most likely to focus on obtaining autonomy in the health domain. During the pandemic, lack of personal protective equipment such as medical masks revealed incapability of the EU and its dependence on China. In other words, the EU would prioritize to shape a health army at a supranational level rather than a European Army in which the European Defense will get less attention for a while

unless the EU gets out of the COVID-19 crisis and recovers from its wounds. In terms of that, the idea of a European Army can be counted as a long-term ultimate purpose of the European Defense.

Nevertheless, the EU is aware that the US is leaving the European Defense permanently and Trans-Atlantic Alliance will not be same ever as before. German Foreign Minister, Heike Mass during his interview with German Press Agency (DPA) said that on assumption of Joe Biden's election, the relations between Germany and the US may still be severely injured and added that "Anyone who thinks that having a Democrat in office would reinstate the transatlantic partnership to what it was before is underestimating the structural changes."²¹⁰ What is more, Körber Stiftung together with the International Institute for Strategic Studies published a paper in June 2019, which featured a gaming scenario based on the US' withdrawal from NATO²¹¹.

Based on that, strategic autonomy will keep its importance in European politics. Because there are undeniable facts with which the EU needs to be compliant. For defending its strategic interests and integrity, the EU needs to learn use of power. Due to that, the idea of a European Army would most probably remain on the political agendas of European states and the EU officials. Otherwise, the EU's ambitions written in treaties and issues recently declared through the EUGS will not match to what the EU has on its hands. In this regard, Germany may take a leading role in the European Defense by dint of its political and economic power. The German Foreign Minister's explanation may indicate signs of such awareness. Moreover, although France is the most frequently mentioned country in the context of a European Army than any other European country, political parties in Germany dared to put the idea of a European

²¹⁰ Hall, Louise, German minister says a Trump defeat in November won't undo damage to transatlantic ties, Independent, 29 June 2020, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/trump-german-minister-heiko-mass-us-relationship-mass-angela-merkel-transatlantic-a9592126.html>, (accessed at 01.11.2020)

²¹¹ Kochis, Daniel, Recent EU Strategic Autonomy Advances Threaten the Transatlantic Link, The Heritage Foundation, Background, No. 3470 | March 9, 2020, p. (6).

Army into their political programs that Coalition Government of Germany (CPD-CSU-SPD) in its Coalition Treaty 2013 envisaged the establishment of European Army among long-term goals related with CSDP²¹². In terms of that, Germany may take a leading position in the European Defense Integration rather than France, which may drive rise of a European Army in the long term.

As a result, for this purpose, Europe should improve practices to overcome ambiguities on a possible European Army, such as who will govern a European Army? and which parliament will decide to deploy it and to where? In this respect, maritime security can be an applicable realm for finding replies and solutions to these problems. When compared to other domains, European strategic interests have more at stake overseas as the EU is exposed to threats around its Southern Borders and Mediterranean. At the same time, the EU has close ties with many countries through its trade overseas in which security of goods delivered by sea transportation is crucial.

In retrospect, for crisis management and securing trade relations, the EU may dispatch its united navy to address roots of various problems ranging from migration to piracy that while Operations Atalanta and Sophia were successful at tactical level with limited resources, they could not achieve strategic outcomes and suffered from the unwillingness of European member states. However, strategic realities push European leaders to cooperate more between them, so that upon disputes and rising tensions in the Mediterranean, some European member states already had to launch a joint navy drill there. Likewise, the EU may respond to the increasing presence of Russia and China overseas together with the US so that the EU would start to undertake more responsibility for its own defense and contribute to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance as the US always requested. The more the EU integrates in maritime security as a pilot domain, as is already being done by Dutch and Belgian navies, the more the EU may

²¹² Major, Claudia, Molling, Christian, Germany, Strategic Autonomy and the Defense of Europe, On the Road to European Army? Hans-Peter Bartels, Anna Maria Kellner, Uwe Optenhögel (HG), Dietz, 2017, p. (198), p. (198-208).

discover answers as to the ambiguities on the idea of European Army. No more is the EU able to pretend to be in a peaceful environment and behave like a big Switzerland, peaceful and neutral. While the EU is besieged with coercive neighbors and it is old, rich and defenseless, pacificism is not a choice.²¹³ As Leon Trotsky stated: “You may not be interested in war, but war is very interested in you.”²¹⁴

²¹³ Mauro, Frederic and Jehin, Olivier. Why do we need a European Army? IRIS, EUROPE, STRATEGY, SECURITY PROGRAMME, April 2019, p. (6), pp. (1-8), <https://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ProgEurope-MAURO-JEHIN-1-Eng-EU-army-2019.pdf>, (accessed at 20.10.2020)

²¹⁴ Howard, Michael. War in European History (pp. 147-148). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

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