

**THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES'  
REACTIONS TO MILITARY  
INTERVENTIONS IN TURKEY AND  
GREECE**

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**İSTANBUL BİLGİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
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- 1) Avrupa Topluluđu
- 2) Askeri Müdahaleler
- 3) Ordu-Siyaset İlişkileri
- 4) Demokratikleşme
- 5) Türk-Yunan İlişkileri

**Keywords**

- 1) European Community
- 2) Military Interventions
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## Özet

Geçtiğimiz yüzyılda, 1909-2009 yılları arasında, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da birçok askeri müdahale yaşanmıştır. 20. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren, dünya sürekli bir savaşa sahne olduğu için de bu askeri müdahalelere, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar müsamaha gösterilmiştir. Fakat Soğuk Savaş'ın başladığı yıllarda, ileride meydana gelebilecek olası savaşları engellemek için uluslararası organizasyonlar kurulmuş, ülkeler bu organizasyonların çatısı altında bir araya getirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye ve Yunanistan, aynı zamanda Avrupa Ekonomik Topluluğu (AET) üyeliğine başvurmuştur. İki ülkenin de bu üyelikten beklentisi, AET'den gelecek mali yardımla ekonomilerini düzeltmek ve bir Avrupa ülkesi olarak güçlü bir siyasete sahip olmaktı. Ancak, AET, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'da gerçekleşen darbeleri hoş karşılamamış, darbe sonrası kurulan askeri yönetimlere de karşı çıkmıştır. Askeri müdahalelerin, Türk ve Yunan demokrasilerine ara verdiğini ileri sürerek, ısrarla askeri yönetimlerin son bulmasını ve seçilmiş sivil politikacıların yönetime geçmesini talep etmiştir. Bu istekten yola çıkarak, bu tez AET'nin Türkiye ve Yunanistan'daki darbelere vermiş olduğu tepkileri karşılaştırmaktadır.

## **Abstract**

During the last century (1909-2009), several military interventions occurred in Turkey and Greece. These military interventions into politics were tolerable until the end of the Second World War, as the world had been facing ongoing warfare since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, in the early Cold War era, major international institutions were established to prevent war by forming alliances between countries. In this context, Turkey and Greece applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959 in order to improve their economies through financial aids and their political systems by integrating into Europe. However, the EEC did not approve of the coups d'état of the Turkish and Greek military and objected to the military regimes which were founded subsequently. Arguing that the military interventions disrupted Turkish and Greek democracies, the Community insisted on the replacement of military rule with civilian politicians. In the light of this demand, this thesis compares the reactions of the EEC to the Turkish and Greek coups d'état.

To my niece Derinaki

## **Acknowledgments**

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## **Abbreviations**

AMAG	American Mission for Aid to Greece
APD	Accession Partnership Document
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ASEA	Supreme Council of National Defence (Greece)
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoE	Council of Europe
CSF	Community Support Frameworks
CU	Centre Union (Greece)
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (Turkey)
DISK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Turkey)
DP	Democrat Party (Turkey)
EAM	National Liberation Front (Greece)
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EDES	National Republican Greek League (Greece)
EEC	European Economic Community
EENA	National Union of Young Officers (Greece)
EER	European Economic Recovery Programme
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ELAS	National People's Liberation Army (Greece)
EMU	European Monetary Union
EON	National Organization of Youth (Greece)
ESA	Military Security Police (Greece)
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union General Secretariat

FRP	Free Republican Party (Turkey)
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDA	General Directorate of Armaments (Greece)
GDDIA	General Directorate for Defense Investment and Armaments (Greece)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GR	Greek Rally (Greece)
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMP	Integrated Mediterranean Programs
IRC	International Red Cross
JDP	Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
JP	Justice Party (Turkey)
KKE	Communist Party of Greece (Greece)
KYP	Greek Central Intelligence Agency (Greece)
LoN	League of Nations
MP	Motherland Party (Turkey)
NAP	Nationalist Action Party (Turkey)
NAPC	North Aegean Petroleum Company
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	New Democracy (Greece)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NOP	National Order Party (Turkey)
NP	Nation Party (Turkey)
NP	Nationalist Party (Greece)
NP	New Party (Greece)
NPAA	National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis
NRU	National Radical Union (Greece)
NSC	National Security Council (Turkey / Milli Guvenlik Konseyi)
NSC	National Security Council (Turkey / Milli Guvenlik Kurulu)

NSP	National Salvation Party (Turkey)
NTP	New Turkey Party (Turkey)
NUC	National Unity Committee (Turkey)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece)
PDL	Party of the Democratic Left (Turkey)
PDT	Party of Democratic Turkey (Turkey)
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PND	Party of Nationalist Democracy (Turkey)
PP	Populist Party (Turkey)
PRP	Progressive Republican Party (Turkey)
PTP	Party of the True Path (Turkey)
RNP	Republican Nation Party (Turkey)
RP	Reliance Party (Turkey)
RPNP	Republican Peasants' Nation Party (Turkey)
RPP	Republican People's Party (Turkey)
RTUK	Radio and Television Supreme Council (Turkey)
SDP	Social Democracy Party (Turkey)
SSC	State Security Courts (Turkey)
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
TGNA	Turkish Grand National Assembly
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UDL	United Democratic Left (Greece)
UN	United Nations
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
USA	United States of America
WP	Welfare Party (Turkey)
WPT	Workers' Party of Turkey (Turkey)
YOK	Higher Education Authority (Turkey)

## Transliteration

For the simplicity of reading and understanding, I convert Turkish and Greek letters into their English counterparts as in the following tables:

Turkish	Latin
ç	c
ğ	g
ı	i
ö	o
ş	s
ü	u

Greek	Latin
α	a
β	v
γ	g , y
δ	d
ε	e
ζ	z
η	i
θ	th
ι	i
κ	k
λ	l
μ	m
ν	n
ξ	ks
ο	o
π	p
ρ	r
σ , ς	s
τ	t
υ	i
φ	f
χ	h
ψ	ps
ω	o

## **Chapter 1: Introduction**

With Greece under Ottoman rule between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, Turkey and Greece developed, starting from the Tourkokratia period, a dominant role of the military in politics due to the Ottoman tradition. After the Ottoman Greeks declared independence in 1821, both the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom adopted a ‘Westernization’ policy. In order to westernize their countries, both countries first aimed at the modernization of their armies. They followed the slogan: “the more powerful the army is, the more powerful is the country”. Seeing each other as the greatest enemies, the two countries had fought each other for a century (between 1821 and 1923) without cease.

In May 1919, Mustafa Kemal initiated the Turkish War of Independence. In October 1923, he founded the Turkish Republic. Due to the fact that army officers had founded Turkey and Greece after their respective wars of independence, the military was regarded as the top authority. Thus, given also the historical legacy of military dominance stemming from Ottoman rule, democracy was interrupted several times in Turkey and Greece by military interventions.

This thesis focuses on the military interventions in Turkey and Greece between 1909 and 2009. Did coups d’état occur synchronously in the two countries? What were the fundamental reasons and results of these coups? Is the military still dominant in Turkish and Greek politics? Which improvements were made by the governments in order to overcome military dominance? Keeping these questions in mind, the thesis explains civil-military relations in Turkey and Greece since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In line with their Westernization policies, Turkey and Greece aimed at their integration into Europe through membership in several international

institutions since the end of the Second World War. Membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) seemed sensible to them as a means to improve their poor economies. However, the EEC set conditions for membership, among which the most important one was the Communities' importance given to democracy. Therefore, the EEC reacted to the frequency of military interventions in Turkey and Greece and declared that the two countries could not become members of the Community as long as the military's dominance in the political sphere lasted. The main question of this thesis concerns the EEC's respective reactions to Turkey and Greece. Comparing these reactions, which country was tolerated more by the EEC? And why?

The thesis draws for the development of its argument on history books, working papers and journals of international relations, and reports and resolutions of the European Commission and the European Parliament. In giving historical background on the military interventions, Clogg (1992) on Greek history and Zurcher (2004) and Ahmad (1994) on Turkish history were frequently used. In order to explain the process of democratization in terms of an elimination of the military from politics in the two countries, the thesis draws on Hale (1994) for Turkey and Close (2002) and Veremis (1997) for Greece. Further books and articles were helpful for conveying an understanding of Turkish and Greek relations with the EEC/EU. The resolutions of the European Commission and European Parliament concerning the Turkish and Greek coups, which were sent to the author by the Commission and Parliament, were used as main source for the comparison of the reactions of the EEC to Turkish and Greek military interventions.

This thesis is divided into chapters according to the major turning points in Turkish and Greek histories. The second chapter deals with the modernization/Westernization movements of Turkey and Greece. When did modernization attempts begin in the Ottoman Empire? What was the role of the military in the Ottoman modernization movement? How did Westernization attempts continue after the establishment of the Turkish

Republic? How did Turkey attempt to become a European country? What were Greek attempts at modernization? How did Greece aim at integration into Europe? At the end of the chapter, the modernization/Westernization movements of the two countries are compared.

The third chapter of the thesis analyzes the time period from 1908 to 1945. First, the author provides historical detail on the Turkish and Greek military interventions. What were the reasons behind these coups? What were their effects on Turkish and Greek democracies? Then, global developments are discussed. Which destructive wars did occur? Which sides did Turkey and Greece take during the wars? Finally, internal and international decisions of the Turkish and Greek governments are compared. What were their foreign policy priorities? How did Turkish-Greek relations change?

The fourth chapter covers the period from the declaration of the Truman Doctrine until 1974. Which improvements were experienced in Turkey and Greece during this period? How did the role of the military in Turkish and Greek politics progress? Which military interventions did occur in Turkey? What were the causes and outcomes of the 1960 and 1971 coups d'état? When did the Turkish relations with the EEC begin? How did the EEC react to the military interventions in Turkey? In 1967, Greek Colonels established a dictatorship. What were the reasons for the foundation of the junta regime? When did the relationship between Greece and the EEC begin? How did the EEC respond to the seven-years-long Colonels' dictatorship in Greece? How did the Council of Europe react to the military interventions in two of its member states? How did Turkish-Greek relations evolve during this period? Finally, the reactions of the EEC to the Turkish and Greek coups are compared. To which country did the Community relate more positively after the military interventions?

In the fifth chapter, the coup d'état of September 12, 1980 and its afterwards are discussed. What caused the coup d'état of September 12, 1980? What were its outcomes? How did it affect the role of the military in the Turkish political sphere? How did the EEC react to the coup? And

finally, how did the EEC react to the coups d'état in Turkey in 1980 and in Greece in 1967? Were its reactions similar in the two cases?

The sixth chapter analyzes the civilianization period in Greece. How did Greece consolidate democracy after 1974? Did Greece exclude the military from politics until its membership in the EEC? When and how did Greece become member of the EEC?

Lastly, the seventh chapter covers the last two military interventions in Turkey in 1997 and 2007. What were the causes and outcomes of these military interventions? How did the European Union (EU) react to them? How did these military interventions affect Turkey-EU relations? What were the primary security issues of Turkey? How did the problems with Greece and PKK affect the role of the military in Turkish political sphere? How and when did the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece occur? How did Turkey-EU relations evolve since the early 1990s? What did the Regular Progress Reports of the European Commission note about Turkey? Each of the Progress Reports is explicated in detail. Did Turkey accomplish the political criteria of the 'Copenhagen criteria'? Is the power of the military diminished? What are the EU's demands from the Turkish government? What are the political reforms made by the Turkish government to fulfil the EU's requirements? These are the issues that this thesis deals with.

## **Chapter 2: Westernization / Europeanization in Turkey and Greece**

### **2.1 Turkey**

#### **2.1.1 Westernization Policies of the Ottoman Empire**

During the heyday of the Ottoman Empire, “Ottoman Westernization encompassed the consumption of Western goods and the adoption of Western forms in art and architecture” (Gocek 1996: 37). However, with the Ottoman army’s defeats on both the eastern and western fronts of the wars, the decline of the Empire began. “The primary reason behind the frequent Ottoman military defeats in wars was the development of the professional army in Europe during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries” (ibid.: 45). Thus, modernization efforts focused on the military from the mid-18<sup>th</sup> until the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, while the Sultanate did not attempt to improve the state apparatus (Sander 2004: 205). At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, “the weakness of the Ottoman army in comparison to its European counterparts” (Gursoy 2008: 100) led Sultan Selim III to establish a standing army, called the New Order Army (Nizam-i Cedid). His successor Sultan Mahmut II abolished the Janissary corps in 1826 and replaced them with “a new corps of regular infantry, trained and equipped along modern European lines” (Macfie 1998: 14). Afterwards, he established military schools, in which a European-style training, mainly by French instructors, was adopted (ibid.: 14). This shows that during Ottoman times, modernization implied for the Sultans to improve, or westernize, the organization of the military in order to win the wars against the Empire’s European counterparts. The army gained more importance when military training became westernized after the establishment of new military schools with European teachers.

Furthermore, “the major [18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup>] century Ottoman social transformation was the emergence of the Ottoman [bureaucracy]” (Gocek 1996: 44). The bureaucracy appeared as a consequence of the modernization attempts of Sultan Selim III and his successor Sultan Mahmut II (Findley 1980: 127-154; Sander 2004: 208). “Similar to the changes in military schooling, fundamental modifications were made in the educational system of the civilian bureaucrats” (Gursoy 2008: 100). Sultan Selim III initiated, in 1793, the establishment of Ottoman embassies in big European capitals. To survive in the modern state system, “Ottoman diplomacy adopted the reciprocal exchange of ambassadors by sending resident ambassadors abroad, thus ending the ‘unilateralism’ of the previous era” (Kurkcuoglu 2004: 132). Because these ambassadors did not know foreign languages, Christians among the population of the Empire served as translators. However, after the Greek War of Independence in 1821, the Sultanate no longer trusted in non-Muslims, believing that the non-Muslim bourgeoisie supported the independence movements of their ethnic groups (Gursoy 2008: 98). Thus, the Translation Office was set up in order to teach French to the civil servants who maintained diplomatic relations with the European countries. French became the most popular foreign language in the Translation Office in particular after the rebellion led by Mehmet Ali in Egypt (Sander 2004: 207).

Until the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Ottoman administrators adopted policies that aimed at the centralization of power in order to cope with military losses. However, subsequent to the French Revolution in 1789, “the Ottoman reformers took their cues from the innovations introduced by the French Enlightenment” (Karaosmanoglu 1993: 23). From then on, liberalization attempts throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century aimed at changes in the Ottoman state system in line with the French libertarian ideas. “In what could perhaps be labelled ‘defensive modernization’” (Aydinli 2004: 103), modernization/Westernization policies of the Ottoman Empire were applied in order to give an end to the military losses, and “in part to create a better state apparatus for coping with the destruction” (ibid.: 103). Thus, in order

to create a better state apparatus, new institutions and legal codes were inspired by France, which led to the increase of the contacts between the Ottoman Empire and Europe (Toprak 2007: 27). The first two liberalization attempts, inspired by the French libertarian ideas, were the adoption of Ser-i Contract (Ser-i Sozlesme) in 1807, which limited the Sultan's power, and of Sened-i Ittifak in 1808, which increased the power of the local authorities.

The third and fourth cornerstones of liberalization pressure in the Ottoman era were the Tanzimat Firman and Islahat movements (Aydinli 2004: 104). During the era of Sultan Mahmut II, the importance of civil bureaucracy increased. In 1835, Sultan Mahmut II "created a hierarchical bureaucracy with the Minister of Interior at the top and introduced a new division of labor among the offices" (Gursoy 2008: 100). In March 1836, he moreover established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After Sultan Abdulmecid I succeeded Sultan Mahmut II, he unilaterally declared the Tanzimat Firman in 1839, which aimed at placing certain limitations on the powers of the central authority and at according some fundamental rights to its citizens. Moreover, he opened new secular schools to educate the bureaucrats. Through the Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1876), the Ottoman state system was subject to Westernization attempts. "For the first time in the Ottoman Empire, a political liberalization movement similar to those in the European nations appeared" (Aydinli 2004: 104). The reforms were conducted by an intellectual group, the Young Ottomans, "who in contrast to their successors [Young Turks] did not advocate the total replacement of Ottoman institutions by European ones" (Turan 1993: 124). "Rather, they were interested in introducing some channels for representative government 'in order to save the Empire'" (ibid.: 124; see also Mardin 1999: 122-124). Thus, the transformation of the Empire into a constitutional monarchy would limit the Sultan's powers. In the end, they pushed the Sultan to declare a, short-lived, constitution in 1876 which officially transformed the Ottoman Sultanate into a monarchy.

In the meantime, the period of the Islahat movements began in the early 1850s. In the adoption of new reforms, the European countries'

pressure was apparent. “This pressure from the Europeans was met cooperatively by the Ottoman state, which issued in confirmation a new document entitled ‘Reform Edict’ (Islahat Fermani) on February 18, 1856” (Aydinli 2004: 106). The Reform Edict was the continuation of the liberal understanding of the Tanzimat Firman, especially as regards the protection of religious minorities. After the adoption of the edict, Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of the Ottoman Empire were to be regarded equal.

During this Westernization period, the Sultanate tried to make the Ottoman Empire a part of Europe. However, while “a British Foreign Office dispatch of 1856 included the statement that now ‘Turkey is to become an integral part of the European system’” (quoted in Heper 1993: 1), “the stereotype of the ‘Terrible Turk’ never lost its salience for many Westerners” (ibid.: 1).

When Sultan Abdulhamit II came to power, he tried to end the ongoing Westernization movements, placing special emphasis on the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire. In this way, “he tried to strengthen the institution and symbol of the Caliphate” (Ozkirimli & Sofos 2008: 29). Thus, a group of thinkers and writers, called the Young Turks, established the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti / CUP) at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a resistance to the Hamidian regime. Because the CUP aimed at the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, it led two coups d’état against the Sultan in 1876 and 1908. “The Young Turks were interested in either forcing the Sultan to reinstate the 1876 constitution or deposing him so that the next sultan could do what the current sultan refused” (Turan 1993: 129). After the Committee came to power, it governed the country until the end of the First World War.

During the Young Turk period, the CUP paid more attention to the military schools than to the schools that raised bureaucrats, for three reasons: First, civilian governments could not prevent the demise of the Empire. Second, starting with the Balkan Wars in 1912, the Ottoman Empire had been fighting for a decade, which led to increased importance of the military. Third, because Germany supplied military and financial

assistance as the Empire's closest ally, the German military tradition affected the Ottoman political system and helped to increase the power of the military bureaucracy (Heper 1974: 84-85; Sander 2004: 274).

All the abovementioned liberalization attempts to change the Ottoman state system since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century were made under the pressure of the European powers. "The Ottomans now felt themselves isolated in a Europe where they no longer made the rules, but found that they had to play by rules made by others" (Deringil 2007: 715). Even though these reforms seemed to be adopted on the public's account, they were in fact used to increase the power of the Sultan and of the civilian and military bureaucracy. Moreover, the reforms were meant to make the Ottoman Empire survive in the modern European state system by providing security and stability. Ironically, while the Ottoman Empire wanted to be regarded a European country, though it had already been a European power for 500 years "through the permanent warfare with its Christian neighbors" (Lewis 1988: 28), the country adopted and implemented the reforms to prevent either the intervention of European countries in Ottoman politics or war with them.

### **2.1.2 Westernization / Europeanization Policies of the Turkish Republic**

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the CUP was dissolved. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a former member of the CUP and the commander of the Third Army, initiated the War of Independence in May 1919. One year later, he opened the National Assembly in Ankara. At the time, "the Ankara elites were, given their bureaucratic backgrounds, well enough entrenched in the country administratively and militarily to carry out a 'revolution from above'" (Gursoy 2008: 101). They would have been soon organized under the Republican People's Party.

The Turkish War of Independence ended with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Blaming Islamic religion for the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the leaders of the newly founded Turkish Republic

adopted the policy of Westernization for the progress and development of the country (Mahcupyan 2000: 19). The new ruling elite under the leadership of Ataturk implemented a series of secularist reforms, trying to separate religion from state affairs. In line with Ataturk's Westernization policy, the caliphate was abolished in 1924, the new Latin alphabet was adopted in 1928, and religious schools and religious courts were closed down. Instead, a Westernized educational system was established with many of the teachers imported from Europe (Rustow 1987: 16). Moreover, religious law, the Sharia, was eliminated and replaced with the secular Swiss code. According to Tunaya (1960: 156-157), the most successful reforms of Ataturk in terms of getting closer to the West consisted of the creation of a secular government and a Westernized language with a Latin alphabet. Although Mustafa Kemal believed that "the West had always been prejudiced against the Turks, he emphasized that 'we Turks have always and consistently moved towards the West.... In order to be a civilized nation there is no alternative'" (quoted in Athanassopoulou 1999: 7).

In addition to these changes, the most important difference of the new Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire was the former's acceptance of the nation as an active value in the state administration (Tunaya 1960: 105). Thus, the abovementioned reforms were adopted, "under the dominance of 'thoroughgoing Westernizers'" (Barchard 1985: 12), in order to satisfy the Turkish people with better life conditions.

During the inter-war period, Turkey tried to integrate into Europe by placing emphasis on its European identity. Therefore, the new Republican elite rejected the linkage with the Ottoman past. For instance, only five years after the establishment of the Republic, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs "Tevfik Rustu (Aras) defined his country's new orientation and identity as that of a Western power to which 'the death of a peasant in the Balkans is of more importance than the death of a king in Afghanistan'" (quoted in Barlas & Guvenc 2009: 425).

In the 1920s and 1930s, there appeared two main initiatives for a united Europe: Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe movement and Aristide

Briand's European Union proposal at the League of Nations (LoN). Because the LoN had not been able to prevent the First World War, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposed the vision of a politically united Europe in his book 'Paneuropa' (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1926). In turn, French Foreign Minister Briand proposed a European Union at a conference of the LoN after the Great Depression of 1929, placing emphasis on its economic features more than peace and security.

The two abovementioned proposals for a united Europe "came at a time when Turkey was trying to break its international isolation and end its status as an outcast in European politics" (Barlas & Guvenc 2009: 431). When Coudenhove-Kalergi published his book in 1923, Turkey was a newly-established, fragile country. Thus, he did not want to incorporate Turkey into his Pan-Europe project. "Briand also excluded Turkey from his European Union proposal for two reasons: first, Turkey was not a member of the LoN; second, it was not a part of geographical Europe" (ibid.: 431).

Although Turkey was excluded from a united Europe in these proposals, the newly established Republic was to be Europeanized through Ataturk's Westernization reforms. That is to say, the Turks had struggled with the West to become a Western country (Tunaya 1960: 103).

When Turkey became a member of the LoN in July 1932, the principal supporter of its inclusion into the proposed Union was Greece. Thus, Greek Foreign Minister Michalakopoulos stated that "Turkey belongs to Europe rather than Asia" (quoted in Barlas & Guvenc 2009: 434). Moreover, due to the close relationship between Venizelos and Ataturk, the Venizelist governments insisted on the acceptance of Turkey as a Western civilization by European countries until Metaxas' dictatorship.

Out of the two initial projects of a united Europe, Turkish government had more affinity with Briand's European Union than Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe. In the end, the country took its place in the European continent just before the end of the Second World War.

At the end of the Second World War, when democracy defeated authoritarianism in the West, the Turkish ruling elite decided, under the

leadership of Inonu, to end the Republican People's Party's (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi / RPP) authoritarian one-party government. Thus, Westernization policy was one of the most important reasons behind the Turkish ruling elite's decision for the transition to a multi-party system. With the encouragement of Inonu, a faction inside the RPP established an oppositional party in January 1946, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti / DP). When the DP came to power in 1950, Turkey tried to develop an organized democracy and to present it to the West as part of its Westernization/Europeanization policy (Tunaya 1960: 124).

After the Turkish political system was transformed into a multi-party system, the importance of membership in European institutions for the integration with the West was realized. Therefore, Turkey became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, at the time of its establishment. The OEEC aimed at the distribution of financial aid stemming from the Truman Doctrine (see Chapter 4). In 1949, the Council of Europe (CoE) was established in order to defend human rights and freedoms in the European continent after the human rights violations during the Second World War. Turkey became a member of the CoE in 1949 and signed the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950. The Convention founded the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as an international judicial body to which both states and individuals can apply. When the treaties of the European Economic Community (EEC) were signed in 1957, the European institution most attractive for Turkey was formed. Thus, Turkey applied for membership in the EEC in 1959, just after Greece. With this, the European adventure began for the country.

According to Oncu (1993: 258), “the Turkish elite have been the articulators of a grand political project – Westernization – which has indelibly marked the path of modern Turkish history”. During more than a century, “‘Western-ness’ was coupled and identified with progress and development” (ibid.: 258) for the ruling elite and has served as a reference for the future Turkish political leaders.

## **2.2 Greek Policies of Westernization / Europeanization**

After the French Revolution, “libertarian principles and revolutionary ideas found an echo among Ottoman intellectuals, particularly the non-Muslims among which Greeks and Serbs led the way” (Toprak 2007: 27). After the adoption of the French Constitution in 1793, the Greek chauvinist Rigas Velestinlis announced his ‘Democratic Proclamation’ in 1796 and his widely distributed manuscript entitled ‘New Political Constitution of the Inhabitants of Roumeli, Asia Minor, the Archipelago and the Danubian Principalities’ in 1797 (Ozkirimli & Sofos 2008: 18-19). Through these declarations, “he sought to replace the Ottoman administration in the Balkans and Asia Minor with a new political system premised on the principles of equality, freedom of religious practice, and the rule of law” (ibid.: 19).

Furthermore, Greek merchants as well as other non-Muslim tradesmen constituted an economic bourgeoisie within the Empire. They had close ties with the West through import and export and their knowledge of one, (or more), foreign language(s). As soon as the libertarian ideas spread among the Greeks, they planned and organized for a revolt against Ottoman rule. The Empire’s efforts of the Tanzimat reforms could not prevent this.

When the Ottoman Empire began to lose wars at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the reason for its defeats was found in the lack of a Europeanized Ottoman army and of a Europeanized state system. Therefore, the Balkan nations regarded the Empire as backward and unable to compete with the European countries. Consequently, “they started to demand independence from the ‘backward’ Ottoman Empire and assumed an underlying desire for Europeanization, for catching up with their Western and Central European counterparts” (ibid.: 17). Thus, the Greek residents of the Empire revolted and initiated their war of independence.

After the secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, “the newly independent Greeks embarked on the task of building a nation-state out of a former province” (Frangoudaki & Keyder: 1). The

independence of the Greek Kingdom was recognized at the end of the London Conference in 1832. “The ancient Greeks invented democracy, but their linguistic descendants in modern times had to import representative government, a modern version of a democratic polity, from the West” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 44). However, “Greeks were afraid of losing their Hellenic identity while catching up with the West” (Exertzoglou 2007: 52).

Just as modern Turkey blamed the Ottoman Empire for inherited backwardness, Greece chose both the Ottomans and the Byzantine Empire as its sources of backwardness. Thus, “intellectuals and the emerging middle class of the Neohellenic Enlightenment movement championed a radical break with Ottoman traditions and the legacy of Byzantium which was thought to represent a period of decadence, decay, and superstition” (Ozkirimli & Sofos 2008: 23) in the Greek history.

Like in the case of Turkey, “coping with modernity carried an urgency [for Greece as well], due to its uncomfortable proximity to the source: Greece had to prove that it was just within the East-West boundary” (Frangoudaki & Keyder 2007: 3). Then, the country had to catch up with its European counterparts by modernizing its economy, politics, technology as well as culture.

In the first decades of the Kingdom, Greece paid attention to its military due to ongoing warfare. Thus, the country started its modernization attempts within the army. In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Trikoupis appeared as the first modernizer of the country and established the New Party (Neoteristikon Komma / NP). Because he aimed at the Westernization of Greece, “he was in favour of consolidating the parliamentary system and of the rule of law” (Tassopoulos 2007: 19). After the death of Trikoupis, Deligiannis, a traditional politician, came to power. However, “Greece’s 1897 defeat at Ottoman hands delivered a blow to Deligiannis’ Nationalist Party [Komma Ethnikofronon / NP] and opened the way for Theotokis’ New Party to pursue his policies of military reform in his ministries of 1899, 1903, and 1905” (Mazower 1992: 891). At the same time, Theotokis tried to establish

a standing army and to westernize it by means of imported new weapons and European-style training.

When Venizelos came to the Greek political scene in 1909, he had a revisionist policy in mind. He could easily expound his Westernized thoughts to the public through the daily press. “In a country with less than 500 miles carriageway and under 150 cars before 1912, control of the media was vital” (ibid.: 901). Moreover, Venizelos gave importance to urbanization, which was a widespread tendency throughout Europe.

Throughout the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Greek politics had faced instability. On the one hand, Venizelist governments were interrupted by frequent military interventions. On the other hand, Greece fought continuously in the Balkans, in the First World War, and with the Turks in the Aegean until 1922. Thus, Westernization attempts stopped during this period. After the declaration of an independent Turkish Republic, the Republican movement gained popular support throughout Greece. The Second Hellenic Republic was established in 1924.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Greece became a part of the two main initiatives for a united Europe mentioned above: Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe movement and Aristide Briand’s European Union proposal at the LoN. Because of its geographical position, the country was included in these projects. However, they did not last long due to both imperfections of these early initiatives and the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, since military interventions continued to be frequent and led to a four-year long Metaxist dictatorship in the second half of the 1930s, the Greek political system gradually became authoritarian - as was a more general trend in the Europe of the inter-war period. By the same token, the Westernization policy of the Republican rulers was interrupted until the early Cold War era.

From the establishment of the Kingdom on, the royal elite had followed the policy of Megali Idea, which aimed at national homogeneity, “the inclusion of all Greeks within the borders of the Greek state, and the continuity of the Greek nation over time” (Tassopoulos 2007: 12). “Among

the rulers, the diversity and plurality of Ottoman culture were considered an obstacle to development; standardization was seen as the key to modernity” (Sunar 2005: 190). Therefore, “modernization entailed the standardization and homogenization of culture, whereas tradition was seen as bogged down in diversity and heterogeneity of cultures” (ibid.: 190-191).

Based on this attitude, Greek rulers decided for population exchanges first with Bulgaria and then with Turkey at the end of the First World War. These reciprocal exchanges “purified” the three abovementioned nation-states, which are still dealing with the problems that resulted from the compulsory displacement of their citizens.

At the end of the Second World War, Greece became an “association maniac” (quoted in Tassopoulos 2007: 14) like many other European countries. “Associations were of every kind: political, educational, charitable, cultural, etc.” (ibid.: 14). Consequently, Greece became a member of the OEEC in 1948 at the same time as Turkey. Membership in this economic association guaranteed the country its economic development. Greece further applied for membership in the CoE in 1949 in order to reinforce democracy, human rights, and freedoms throughout the country. Finally, after the establishment of the EEC, Greece applied for associate membership in 1959. Membership was seen as guaranteeing a number of advantages, “such as maintaining and consolidating existing links with the West, going beyond historical dilemmas of the past between West and East, strengthening Greece’s international bargaining power, preventing foreign interference in internal and domestic affairs” (Tsardanidis & Stavridis 2005: 225), and securing its position against Turkey in the Aegean and Cyprus. Although Featherstone and Kazamias (2001: 4-5) argue that “Europeanization is more than just ‘integration’” into Europe, Greece, since the end of the Second World War, aimed at the recovery of its economy by integrating into an economic alliance (Stavridis 2003: 4).

### **2.3 Comparison of Turkish and Greek Modernization Movements**

According to Moschonas (1997: 327), modernization theory is, in the Weberian sense, based on a “total process” which “implies a gradual move from tradition to modernity”. Thus, “modernization becomes synonymous with Westernization, implying a process leading to a functionally integrated national or even supranational political system” (ibid.: 327).

Thus, when modernization movements were initiated in the Ottoman Empire and Greece, they understood this process as catching up with the West. In contrast to the Enlightenment movements in Western European countries, which started with the Industrial Revolution, modernization in the Ottoman Empire resulted from increasing territorial losses subsequent to military defeats and the diffusion of libertarian ideas among the officers of the Sublime Porte (Kalaycioglu & Saribay 2000: 6). With the adoption of the Tanzimat Firman, the Reform Edict, and the 1876 Constitution, the Ottoman state system was to be liberalized. Moreover, the libertarian ideas of the French Revolution influenced the Ottoman Greeks and caused them to revolt against the Empire. Therefore, the Greek Enlightenment started with the establishment of the Greek Kingdom. While Greek rulers tried to break their ties with the Ottoman Empire, which for them implied backwardness, they also aimed at modernizing the country in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Ottoman and Greek modernization movements focused on the armies, because they were involved in ongoing warfare. The Ottoman and Greek rulers thought that without a modernized, European-style standing army, they could not compete with the West. In this way, the Ottoman Empire tried to survive in the modern European state system, whereas the newly-established Greek Kingdom aimed at being accepted as a European country.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Westernization attempts intensified with Ataturk’s special efforts. While a series of secularist reforms were adopted in Turkey, Greece held a place among

European countries with its acceptance to the Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe project and Aristide Briand's European Union proposal. Turkey was not admitted to these projects because it was not regarded a European country.

In the late 1930s, authoritarian governments became common among European countries. Turkey and Greece were also influenced by this trend. Thus, the authoritarian National Chief period in the former and the Metaxist dictatorship in the latter slowed down modernization movements in both countries. The Second World War then ended with the victory of democracies over authoritarianism. Hence, Turkey and Greece tried to recover their democracies with political and financial aid of several international institutions.

Thus, after having become members of several major European institutions, Turkey and Greece applied at the same time for associate membership in the EEC. From then on, the EEC played a role in pushing both countries to become democratic and to respect the rule of law as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms of their citizens.

## **Chapter 3: The Role of the Military in Turkish and Greek Politics until the End of the Second World War**

### **3.1 Turkey**

#### **3.1.1 The Demise of the Ottoman Empire**

Before the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Janissaries, a military class in the Ottoman Empire, revolted from time to time in order to secure their power within the Empire (Goodwin 2006). “The old janissary rebellions had determined the locus of power within the state, but they had not aimed to challenge its basis of legitimacy” (Hale 1994: 306). When in 1839 the declaration of Tanzimat Firman promised equal rights for non-Muslim and Muslim Ottoman citizens in order to prevent nationalist uprisings of Christian groups, the Ottoman Empire entered into a new era (Hurewitz 1975: 269-271; Sander 2004: 206). The introduction of these administrative reforms aimed at ensuring the loyalty of non-Muslims to the Empire. Although the Firman was not implemented in practice, it ushered in the Tanzimat period, which lasted until 1876. Since the declaration of Tanzimat Firman, the Young Ottomans, a group of thinkers and writers who were influenced and inspired by the French Revolution, insisted on transforming the Empire into a constitutional monarchy (Karal 1983: 209-210; Sander 2004: 257). When the Young Ottomans understood that they could not work peacefully in the Ottoman Empire, they fled to France in 1867 and maintained their activities under the name of ‘Young Turks’ (Sander 2004: 257-258). The first constitution of the Empire was declared in 1876 but was implemented only for close to two years. The second attempt at the formation of a constitutional monarchy took place in 1908, when the Young Turks re-declared the constitution as Committee of Union and Progress. The CUP was founded by several generals against the rule of

Sultan Abdulhamit II. It was composed of military men who were organized both inside and, to greater extent, outside the country. They called their coup d'état a constitutional revolution. As Woodhouse states: "The outbreak of the revolution of the Young Turks was the beginning of Turkish nationalism in the European sense" (1991: 187). However, Akmese notes that these "revolutionary activities were rooted in a longer tradition of intellectual and political dissent, both civilian and military, stretching back to the Young Ottomans of the 1860s" (Akmese 2005: 57).

In the coup of 1876, the rivalry was between conservatives and constitutionalists. In 1908, the liberals were a further group taking part in this confrontation. "The most important result [of these two coups] was the transfer of the locus of power to the military, a transfer which served the ongoing Turkish military tradition" (Turfan 2000: 133). During the Young Turk period, the seeds of the bureaucratic and ideological bases of the single-party period (1923-1950) of the Turkish Republic were sown, which were consolidated in the first decades of the Republic (Sander 2004: 258).

After the 1908 coup, elections were held throughout the Ottoman Empire. As a rival to the CUP, Prens Sabahattin established the Party of Ottoman Liberals (Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi). He portrayed his party as liberal though it was in fact monarchist. Subsequently, the Unionists won the elections and became the majority in the new parliament. Because the Sultan was too well-regarded by the public to be eliminated, the Unionists did not attempt to abolish the Sultanate. However, after the elections, the power of the palace was limited and the leading bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte (Bab-i Ali), the government of the Ottoman Empire, "re-emerged as an independent political factor for the first time since 1878, while the CUP stayed in the background, relying on its majority in parliament to control the government" (Zurcher 2004: 95).

The Unionists also faced opposition by the public, such as demonstrations by anti-Unionist religious groups. Everyday fighting on the streets became common, so that people could not even walk the streets

safely. On the night of April 12, 1909, low-ranking army officers therefore rebelled against the government in order to restore Islam and Sharia.

The Party of Ottoman Liberals claimed that this counter-revolution of 1909 was directed solely against the Unionists. Consequently, many Unionists either fled abroad or went underground. The remaining deputies were controlled by the army and accepted whatever the generals demanded in conformity with Islamic rule. In response to these events, the CUP established the Action Army (Hareket Ordusu) in Salonika in order to regain control. Within one week, the Action Army occupied Istanbul, proclaimed martial law, and dethroned Sultan Abdulhamit II. He was succeeded by Sultan Mehmet V.

After the overwhelming of the counter-revolution, the power was left “in the hands of the army and more specifically in the hands of the commander in chief, Mahmut Sevket Pasha, who was made inspector of the three main armies, the First (Istanbul), Second (Edirne) and Third (Monastir)” (ibid.: 99-100). His authority continued unchallenged until elections were held and the martial law was lifted subsequently. Between 1909 and 1911, a number of conservative and liberal political parties were established. Even a so-called socialist party was founded, which was in fact liberal (ibid.: 102). These parties were constituted mainly in opposition to the CUP. For this reason, they eventually united in form of a single, new political party, the Party of Freedom and Understanding (Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi). In November 1911, the Party of Freedom and Understanding defeated the CUP in by-elections. As the Unionists did not accept this result, they enforced new general elections which they won in the spring of 1912. These elections “are known in Turkish history as the ‘election with the stick’ (sopali secim) because of the violence and intimidation with which the CUP made sure of its majority” (ibid.: 103).

In October of 1912, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro formed a “Balkan alliance” and decided to wage war against the Ottoman Empire (Jelavich 2006: 102). This First Balkan War further weakened the Empire. It ended with the official foundation of an Albanian nation-state.

Benefitting from the chaotic atmosphere, the Unionists staged a coup d'état on January 23, 1913, called the Sublime Porte putch, and again controlled the government. In the end of 1913, the Second Balkan War began due to the dissatisfaction among Balkan countries about the spoils from the previous war. Under the rule of the Unionists, the Ottoman Empire regained the province of Edirne that had been lost during the First Balkan War.

After the 1913 coup of the CUP, “the party’s power increasingly came to be concentrated in the famous wartime triumvirate of Enver, Cemal and Talat” (Rustow 1959: 516) Pashas. “The three men were certainly powerful: Enver controlled the army, Talat had great power within the Committee while Cemal was influential in national politics as long as he was governor of Istanbul” (Zurcher 2004: 110). Under the leadership of these three men, the CUP won the next elections held in the end of 1913.

One year after the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire was at war again, this time a world war. The great powers formed two opposite blocs, the Entente Powers and the Central Powers. The Entente was composed of the United Kingdom, France, and the Russian Empire. Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Japan, and the United States joined later. The Central Powers consisted of Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire. The seeds of this configuration had been planted since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Just before the war, the groups of the Entente and the Central Powers were finalized. Because of the Unionist leaders’ insistence, the Ottoman Empire took sides with Germany.

The First World War led to huge destruction in the warring countries and millions of people lost their lives. It ended in 1918 after four years with the victory of the Entente over the Central Powers. In fact, the war ended with the collapse of four empires: the Russian, Ottoman, German, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Armistice treaties were signed between the defeated countries and the Entente Powers. In order to prevent war in the future, the inter-governmental organization League of Nations (LoN) was founded in 1919.

On October 31, 1918 the Entente powers signed the Moudros Armistice (Mondros Ateskes Antlasmasi). In the agreement, “the most dangerous clause from the Ottoman point of view was Article seven, which stipulated that the Entente had the right to occupy any place in the Ottoman Empire itself if it considered its security to be under threat” (ibid.: 133). The implementation of this clause by the Entente countries precipitated the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

### **3.1.2 The War of Independence and the Foundation of the Turkish Republic**

One year after the end of the First World War, Greece occupied Izmir in the context of several other clashes on Ottoman territory. Resisting these occupations, Mustafa Kemal, who was a long-standing member of the CUP and of the Action Army, initiated the War of Independence of the Turkish people in Samsun on May 19, 1919. “Mustafa Kemal directed the military campaign against the Entente countries successfully between 1919 and 1922, and then rebuilt the political and cultural institutions of his country” (Hale 1994: 59).

As an important part of the Turkish War of Independence, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) was set up in Ankara on April 23, 1920. Furthermore, the Sultanate was abolished in 1922. After signing the Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish Republic was formally established on September 29, 1923. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was elected as the first President of the country, while Ismet Inonu became both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On March 3, 1924 the caliphate was abolished and the first constitution of the Republic was adopted. Four years later, the declaration of Islam as state religion was deleted from this constitution. “The establishment of the Republic was followed by further steps towards the implantation of a secular national culture” (ibid.: 64).

The Treaty of Lausanne, which officially recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic, was signed in July 1923 between Turkey and Greece at the end of the war between the two countries. During the negotiations at the Lausanne Conference, an important decision was

taken concerning the Turkish residents in Greece and Greek residents in Turkey. “An obligatory Population Exchange seemed a good solution for the national homogenization and the neutralization of minorities of both countries” (Ozkirimli and Sofos 2008: 153), for a Muslim Turkey and an Orthodox Christian Greece (Clark 2008: 15), as evolving nation-states.

Thus, almost 1.2 million Greeks left Turkey, with the exception of Greeks in Istanbul, Bozcaada/Tenedos, and Gokceada/Imbros, while about 355,000 Muslim Turks left Greece, with the exception of Turks living in Western Thrace (Hirschon 2004: 14-15). This population exchange created difficulties for both Turkish and Greek migrants. They reluctantly left places where they had lived for centuries as well as immovable property, work, friends, and relatives. Moreover, the migrants could not easily adapt to their new lives, because Turkish people did not accept the newcomers as real Turks, while the Greek public likewise saw the newcomers as Turkified Greeks (Karakasidou 1997: 146-152). In turn, Turks in Western Thrace and Rums in Istanbul and on the islands, who were exempt from the exchange, were granted a minority status based on religion in the Treaty of Lausanne. The Rums of Istanbul were arguing that they were different from the Greeks of Greece. “This is not to say that Rums would accept that they are less than Greek, but probably most would argue that they are not the same as all Greeks, and that there is a certain distinction about being from Istanbul” (Ors 2006: 85). Moreover, “there was a substantial amount of ill-considered and inappropriate settlement in both Turkey and Greece” (Aktar 2004: 88). For instance, “tobacco producers from both countries were resettled in regions where tobacco production was virtually impossible, and wheat-producing peasants were forced to settle in regions with olive groves” (ibid.:88). These structural limitations made the refugees’ lives more difficult.

In order to solve this problem, Turkey and Greece formed a Joint Commission and signed the Athens Agreement in 1923 and the Ankara Agreements in 1930 - “under which Turkey and Greece officially recognized the existing territorial boundaries and accepted naval parity in

the eastern Mediterranean” (Gallant 2001: 153) - and in 1933. The agreements aimed at securing the rights and properties of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace.

The population exchanges indirectly contributed to the establishment of authoritarian regimes in Turkey and Greece during the 1930s (Gursoy 2008: 95-96). In the Ottoman Empire, a non-Muslim merchant class had been central to economic activities. This was not approved of by the Sultanate and the members of the CUP because they saw the Christian businessmen as threat to the unity of the Empire. Thus, the CUP wanted to create a Muslim Turkish bourgeoisie to replace the non-Muslim economic class. While they could not suddenly create a Muslim economic class, the deaths and migrations resulting from the Balkan Wars, the First World War, the Turkish War of Independence, and the population exchange helped them to eliminate Christian power in the economy. “At the end of the Population Exchange, the powerful economic class left Turkey for Greece, so the political and military elites that won the War of Independence were left unchallenged” (ibid.: 96). Consequently, the RPP governed the country as a single party until the establishment of the Democrat Party in 1946. According to Gursoy (ibid.: 102), “if the economic elites had stayed in the Turkish Republic, it would have been more difficult to unify significant groups in Turkish society under a single-party regime in the 1930s”.

Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Committee of Union and Progress was a strong party that acted both in the parliament and in the area of battle. Just after the republic was founded, the co-founders of the CUP, Enver, Cemal and Talat Pashas, fled the country because they were seen as possible challengers of Ataturk, and the party was dissolved. In the early 1920s, the only political collectivity in the Assembly was the Defence of Rights Society (Mudafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) (A. Demirel 1995: 14). In 1922, it was divided into two rival groups, the First and Second Group. Ataturk transformed the First Group in the National Assembly into his own party on October 23, 1923: the People’s Party (Halk Firkasi), which was named ‘Republican People’s Party (RPP)’ in the following year. The

single-party period began in 1923 with the government of the Republican People's Party under the leadership of Ataturk and was maintained until 1946.

During this period, there were two attempts to establish oppositional political parties in 1924 and 1930. In 1924, the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi / PRP) was established by a close friend of Ataturk, Kazim Karabekir, a retired general (Zurcher 2003). This oppositional party survived for only about four months: a Kurdish revolt, the Sheikh Said revolt of February 1925, was used to close it down. It was claimed that the party had links with the rebellion.

Apart from the elimination of internal opposition, the single-party regime in Turkey was also reinforced by external developments. The stock market of the United States collapsed in October 1929. The crash of the U.S. economy influenced national economies throughout the world, resulting in the Great Depression. Because of the outcomes of the economic crisis, authoritarian regimes began to gain hold in the liberal world. Turkey's authoritarian single-party government was compatible with the weakened liberal world system (Emrence 2005: 213). Moreover, the Turkish economy had also been badly affected by the crisis. The first indicator of the impact of the Great Depression was the devaluation of the Turkish currency from May 1929 on (Tekeli & Ilkin 1977: 80). Hence, the Law for the Protection of Turkish Currency was adopted in early 1930. It "assigned the government the responsibility to assure the stability of the exchange rate, but the nature of the measures the government could take to fulfill this task was not stated" (Bugra 1994: 101). During the 1930s, interventions into the economy by the Turkish state had been on the rise; "with the enactment of the Law for the Protection of Turkish Currency, the allocation of foreign currency was centralized and a total control of international capital movements was institutionalized" (ibid.: 102). Furthermore, "since an important portion of the merchant activity in Turkey was based on exporting agricultural produce, the Great Depression and the crisis in the agricultural

sector caused the commercial sector to face heavy losses” (Gursoy 2008: 104).

As a response to the worsening economic situation, Fethi Okyar, a retired general, established in August 1930 the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi / FRP) with the encouragement of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Gursoy 2008; Yetkin 1982). Even though this second attempt at the organization of an oppositional party was encouraged by Ataturk himself, and even though it gained support from the public, it was easily eliminated from the political sphere. According to Gursoy (2008), the fate of the Free Republican Party is important for two reasons. First, it showed the degree of opposition to the RPP due to economic problems. Second, “the party’s weakness against RPP repression and the fact that it was closed down in only three months suggest that if a stronger economic group existed at this time, the FRP could have been more successful” (ibid.: 105-106). In other words, “at the beginning of the 1930s, unification of the elites under the single-party regime would have been jeopardized” (ibid.: 106) if the commercial and industrial businessmen of the Ottoman Empire had not left due to the war and population exchange between Greece and Turkey.

In addition, while Ataturk had initially promoted the organization of new political parties, he withdrew his support when these newly established parties gained popular support. In this way, he eliminated opposition to the RPP and continued to govern the country with his party’s single-party governments. After the closure of the FRP, three more attempts to form new political parties (Tuncay 1999: 285-293) met a similar fate. Furthermore, the Izmir assassination plot against Ataturk in 1926 helped him to exclude almost all of his old friends who had fought with him during the War of Independence from politics by blaming them to have been involved in the plot.

After the War of Independence, “Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu were not seen in uniform because they chose to administer the country as civilian rather than as military rulers” (Rustow 1959: 549). Actually,

“although Ataturk had long supported the idea that serving army officers should stay out of politics” (Hale 1994: 69), this principle was not implemented. That is, in the first years of the Republic, more than ten members of the parliament were still active army officers. Besides, political parties, which included many retired and active-duty military men, were established by retired generals. In fact, this shows that, although Ataturk declared that he aimed at excluding military from politics (Turfan 2000: XV-XVI), his main goal was “not to keep [the army] out of politics, but to make sure that it remained completely loyal to him and to the Republic, a court of last resort when needed to support his efforts to build the Turkish Republic” (Harris 1965: 56).

Fevzi Cakmak, the Chief of the General Staff between 1921 and 1944, played an important role in the Turkish single-party period. He was a close friend of Ataturk and Inonu and “enjoyed a position of cardinal importance in the government, taking precedence over cabinet ministers and ranking just below the Prime Minister” (ibid.: 60). “Although no longer a cabinet minister, Marshal Cakmak regularly appears to have attended cabinet meetings at which supreme matters of war and peace were discussed” (Rustow 1959: 549-550). Nevertheless, he was forced to retire in January 1944. Two years later, he entered politics with the establishment of the DP. In mid-1948, he established the religious Nation Party (Millet Partisi / NP), which initially was a faction within the DP, and became its leader.

Since the foundation of Turkey, the role of the military was determined by law. Article 34 of the Army Internal Service Regulation of 1935 stated that “the duty of the armed forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic, as determined in the Constitution” (Hale 1994: 80). In fact, this flexible statement was interpreted by the armed forces in such a way as to justify their occasional interventions into politics when they felt that Kemalist principles were being abandoned.

After the death of Ataturk in 1938, Ismet Inonu was elected second President of the country. Thus began the National Chief (Milli Sef) period - the title of Inonu - which continued until 1946. During his presidency, Inonu allowed the interventionist role of the military in politics.

Inonu's presidency coincided with the Second World War, which began in 1939 with the invasion of Poland by Germany and lasted until 1945. The Second World War involved two warring blocs: the Axis Powers under the leadership of Germany, Japan, and Italy versus the Allied Powers, led by the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and the USA. Since the first day of the war, Inonu insisted on the neutrality of Turkey. Therefore, he signed non-aggression pacts with both Winston Churchill (United Kingdom) from the Allied Powers, with whom Inonu secretly met in Adana in 1943 (Deringil 1989: 145-147), and Adolf Hitler (Germany) from the Axis Powers in the summer of 1942. In this way, Inonu balanced the two warring blocs and stayed out of the war. In addition, "one of the most remarkable achievements of Turkish diplomacy in this period was that it managed to procure arms from both sides involved in the conflict" (ibid.: 135).

Nevertheless, from early 1943 onwards, the major Allied Powers increased their pressure on the Turkish government to enter the war. After Turkish participation in conferences throughout 1943 and 1944, Inonu finally decided to declare war on the Axis Powers in February 1945 in order to receive military assistance from the Allied countries and to become a founding member of the United Nations (UN). The Second World War ended in 1945 with the victory of the Allied Powers. The Soviet Union and the USA appeared as the two rising world powers just after the war. The conflict between the two countries led to global polarization. Thus, the bipolar world entered into a new era, the Cold War era, after the end of the Second World War.

Furthermore, at the end of the Second World War, the League of Nations was abolished because it had not been able to prevent the war. It was replaced by a new organization, the United Nations, in 1945. Like the LoN, the UN was formed with the goal of preventing war and securing

world peace. Turkey and Greece were among the founders of the UN and became members of the organization since its establishment.

### **3.1.3 Transition to the Multi-Party System**

From the first day of the Republic on, Turkey was governed by the RPP's single-party governments for almost three decades (1923-1950). After the second weak attempt at creating an opposition in the political sphere between November 1930 and January 1946 [a period characterized by Weiker (1973) as a 'loose single-party government' (Kara 1984-85: 65)] "no opposition party among the elites formed in Turkey with the purpose of ending the dominant position of the RPP in politics and resisting single-party authoritarianism" (Gursoy 2008: 102). According to Gursoy (2008), this resulted from the lack of a strong economic class, especially after the non-Muslim business class had left Turkey with the population exchange.

While the political regime of a country is mainly determined by the structure of its society, it is also affected by general trends in the international arena (Kara 1984-85: 64). The defeat of authoritarian states and the victory of the Allied Powers at the end of the Second World War put an end to the influence of authoritarian tendencies which had dominated the international arena during the 1930s and made democratic rule the norm (ibid.: 64-65). In the light of democratic currents, the UN was established, promoting peace, freedom, human rights, and equality of nations. As a founding member of the institution, Turkey was also affected by these currents. Thus, the Turkish ruling elite recognized the importance of democracy by the mid-1940s, which was one of the reasons for transition to a multi-party system.

At the end of the Second World War, it was easily seen that "Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by establishing closer links with it" (Karpas 1959: 140). According to Kara (1984-85: 68), because the 'West' implied democracy in the post-Second World War era, Inonu personally decided to end authoritarian single-party government in order to gain the West's support against the Soviet Union. In his speech of November 1945, Inonu referred to

the democracies' victory over the fascist regimes and announced that he would make provisional arrangements in the Turkish political system in conformity with the Western tendency (Ahmad 1995: 147-148). Thus, "the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home" (Karpaz 1959: 140). Consequently, Inonu underlined the lack of an oppositional party in Turkish politics, which meant that he was ready to allow its establishment (Ahmad 1995: 148).

Moreover, popular discontent about the authoritarian regime had pushed Inonu and the ruling elite to decide for the transition, in particular in order to prevent any larger popular insurgence (Agaoglu 1972: 146; Avcioğlu 1969: 249; Karpaz 1996: 127-128; Lewis 1951: 324; Timur 1994: 18-27; Uyar 1998: 197). Whereas the RPP's imposition of its 'revolution from above' since 1923 had resulted in the transformation of a dead empire into a nation-state, these changes did not translate into improvements in the common people's lives. Thus, they began to be dissatisfied with and alienated from the Kemalist regime (Ahmad 2007: 25). Interestingly, the RPP's solution to popular discontent was to establish a second political party instead of taking other measures to satisfy the people (Kara 1984-85: 71).

After the death of Ataturk, fraction groups had emerged inside the RPP which became apparent at the end of the Second World War (Karpaz 1996: 80). One of these fraction groups was composed of Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu and Refik Koraltan, supported by Prime Minister Celal Bayar. They strongly opposed the Land Reform Law (the law for the expropriation of some of the lands of the large landowners) during the debates and in response submitted the Proposal of Four (Dortlu Takrir) to the National Assembly in June 1945. They demanded in this proposal the liberalization of party rule and of the country's regime. They mentioned the democratic nature of the Turkish Constitution, the attempts of Ataturk to liberalize the government, and finally "the fact that the fear of reaction had necessitated

the imposition of restrictions on the Constitution and that the Second World War had prolonged the enforcement of these restrictions” (Karpas 1959: 145).

Inonu subsequently tried to exclude the group from the RPP and encouraged them to found another party. According to Karpas (1996: 323), this was due to Inonu’s desire for deflecting criticisms regarding the RPP’s totalitarian features. Thus, the foundation of a second party would show the Western countries that Turkey possessed a democratic regime (Kara 1984-85: 73).

In fact, Inonu’s effort for the establishment of a second party out of the RPP led to ‘a smooth transition’ (ibid.: 75) to the multi-party system with the same politicians split up in two different parties.

As a result, the Democrat Party was officially established on January 1, 1946 (Ahmad 1995: 149). Despite the abovementioned internal and external reasons, the members of the RPP argued that the foundation of the DP resulted from neither the pressure of making the country amiable to the West nor an interest in comforting the public (Konyar 1999: 42).

### **3.2 Greece**

In the Greek case, “the Neohellenic Enlightenment cultural movement contributed to the development of a nation-building project” (Ozkirimli & Sofos 2008: 39-40). Thus, “Greek nationalism developed as a movement for independence, an attempt to break away from a sinking ship” (ibid.: 39). Consequently, Greeks revolted in 1821 (Brewer 2001: 70-78) and initiated their War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 12). In 1828, they established the First Hellenic Republic which only lasted five years. “Within the new state lived only 800,000 Greeks out of an estimated total of 4 million under Ottoman rule” (ibid.: 12). After the Greeks had fought with the Ottomans for eleven years, foreign powers - Great Britain, France, and Russia - interfered in the conflict and organized a conference in London in 1832. At the end of this conference, Greece was officially recognized as an independent Kingdom. “In the minds of all Greeks there were two main centers of Hellenism:

Firstly, Athens, the capital city of the Greek Kingdom; and secondly, the City of Constantinople, ‘the dream and hope of all Greeks’” (Clogg 1992: 48). “Most significant for the growth of a modern national identity and ideology, what came to be known as the ‘Great Idea’ (Megali Idea) projected the state as the arbiter of Greek fortunes” (Veremis & Koliopoulos 2003: 13). Under royal rule, the sole Greek ideology, the ‘Megali Idea’ (Skopetea 1988: 249-255), “aimed at territorial expansion to incorporate the Greek diaspora into the new Kingdom, thereby creating a Greater Greece to rival the glories of the Byzantine Empire” (Mazower 1992: 890).

After independence, Greece annexed territories in order to achieve the goal of the Megali Idea. “Like most nation-states, modern Greece was born out of war, expanded through wars, and went to war to defend its territory” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 342). At that time, it still adhered to a loose representation of Greek descent in politics. However, “in the early 1870s, the King accepted the principle that the leader of the majority in Parliament should be given the mandate to form a government” (ibid.: 53). In 1875, the two political party leaders - Harilaos Trikoupi who had westernized thinking and was the chairman of the New Party and Theodoros Deligiannis who was a traditional politician advocating the Megali Idea and the leader of the Nationalist Party - were invited to the parliament upon the request of King George to establish a government. From then on, the modern Trikoupi and the traditional Deligiannis involved in continuous competition with each other.

After the defeat of Greece by the Ottoman Empire in the ‘Thirty Day War’ in 1897 (Kodaman 1993), Trikoupi had died and Deligiannis was assassinated. Thus, King George remained unchallenged and the Greek Kingdom turned back to the old days of authoritarianism. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a successful politician emerged from the island Crete: Eleftherios Venizelos. He was supported by the Greek military that made the Goudi coup in 1909.

In May 1909, a group of young army officers in Athens formed their own ‘Military League’ (Stratiotikos Sindesmos) “to demand the military and

political reforms they believed necessary for a more aggressive foreign policy” (Mazower 1992: 886). In fact, the Goudi coup “was in part a response to the Young Turk revolution of 1908 which had resulted in the restoration of the short-lived Ottoman constitution of 1876 and the overthrow of Sultan Abdulhamit II” (Clogg 1992: 73). With this coup d’état, leaders of the Military League wanted to purify the armed forces from royalty. Their memorandum gained considerable support from the residents of Athens. However, eventually “it became apparent that the officers did not really know how to implement their demands so they invited Venizelos to Athens to advise them on the way out of their impasse” (Mazower 1992: 886). Consequently, the Prime Minister Dimitrios Rallis resigned. His successor, Kyriakoulis Mavromikhalis, implemented “under the watchful eye of the Military League and following a threat to impose an outright military dictatorship ... a number of the desired reforming measures” (Clogg 1992: 75-76). However, the leaders of the League promised to install civilian government. They favored Venizelos, the charismatic politician from Crete. Elections were held in August 1910 and Venizelos won the majority of votes as an independent politician. “In his speech of September 1910, which marked his entry onto the national stage in front of a crowd of thousands, Venizelos insisted on his fundamental differences with the old politicians” (Mazower 1992: 898):

I do not come here as the archigos [leader] of a new organized party. I come simply as the bearer of new political ideas... Recognizing the need to educate the Greek people and to emancipate it from personal partyism, I shall work to organize a political association with branches throughout the State and designed to constitute the organization of a new political party, of Regeneration (Anorthosis), whose formation is awaited by the People (quoted in Mazower 1992: 898-899).

Consequently, Venizelos established the Liberal Party (Komma ton Fileleftheron) and began to dominate the Parliament. After Venizelos had instituted a government, he rapidly launched reforms in every realm of

administration, while keeping good relations with the King. In spite of the goals of the Goudi coup, Venizelos did not object to the continuity of the King's influence on the military. "Once the new constitution was in operation, new elections were held in March 1912, which gave Venizelos an even greater majority" (Woodhouse 1991: 190). After strengthening and developing the Greek army, he decided in 1912 to join the Balkan League, composed of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. The Balkan League fought with the Ottomans in the First Balkan War and then with each other in the Second Balkan War "because they were not all satisfied with what they had won" (ibid.: 192). As a result, Greece gradually extended its territories and tried to maintain a place as a European country in the international arena.

Until the First World War, King Constantine I and Venizelos had a good relationship. However, this relation began to deteriorate "as a consequence of cooperation between Venizelos and the Entente because King Constantine I was married to the sister of the Kaiser and was impressed by the strength of Germany's army" (Woodhouse 1991: 195). While the King wanted to enter the war on the Central Powers' side, Venizelos was in favor of the Entente. As a result of this disagreement, "pro-Venizelist army officers in Salonica, backed by the pro-Entente Ethniki Amynta (National Defence) organization, launched a coup against the royalist government" (Clogg 1992: 91) in August 1916. One year later, King Constantine I abdicated in favor of his younger son Alexander. Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Greece did not give a break to warfare. Just after the First World War, Greece occupied Izmir and fought with the Turks while the War of Independence of the Turkish people was continuing. After the death of King Alexander due to blood poisoning caused by a bite from a pet monkey (ibid.: 95), Venizelos was deposed from office by King Constantine I who had come back from exile for the elections held in November 1920 (Smith 1999: 160-179).

In early September 1922, the Greek army was defeated in Turkey, an event called the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe' by Greeks while for Turks it

marked their independence. Because of the catastrophic climate at the time, the Greek Kingdom experienced a power vacuum. Hence, at 7:30 a.m. on September 26, the Revolutionary Committee formed by Venizelist Colonels (Gonatas, Plastiras and Captain Goudas) “to purge the shame of their defeat ... dispatched an ultimatum to the Government in Athens, giving them until 10 p.m. to accept the terms of the revolutionary proclamation” (Smith 1999: 312-313). “The first of these terms was the removal of the King” (ibid.: 313), but the Committee could not achieve it. Shortly after the coup, King Constantine I was succeeded by his elder son King George II and the military left the government to civilian politicians. After the replacement of the military-led government by civilians, Greek politics was once again interrupted in 1923 by (other) Venizelist officers who aimed at the abolition of royalty. King George II also faced opposition because the royal government was blamed for the defeat of Asia Minor. As a result, he had to leave the country. The Kingdom was abolished and the Second Hellenic Republic established in March 1924.

At the end of the Turkish War of Independence, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed between Turkey and Greece on June 30, 1923. It guaranteed the independence of Turkey and entailed an agreement on population exchange, which had been disputed since the end of the Second Balkan War (Yildirim 2006a: 76). “In Greek national historiography, the Turco-Greek Population Exchange stands out as the symbol of the Asia Minor Disaster (Mikrasaiatiki Katastrofi)” (ibid.: 47). Like in Turkey, the exchange of Greeks from Turkey with Turks from Greece had negative economic and political consequences in Greece. Due to the fact that Greece “simply did not have the funds needed to deal with the [fiscal] situation, various international relief organizations, like the American Red Cross and the League of Nations Refugee Treasury Fund, stepped in with food, supplies, and medicine” (Gallant 2001: 147).

Whereas the forced migration of the Orthodox Christians from Turkey “enhanced the role of the state elites in the republic, the arrival of the refugees to Greece facilitated the weakening of the previous politicians”

(Gursoy 2008: 110). According to Gursoy (ibid.: 110), politics in Greece was dominated before the 1909 military coup by political elites (tzakia) which came from four different groups. The first group of elites was composed of Orthodox Christian bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire, while the second group consisted of tax collectors. The third group was formed by the Greek merchants and the fourth group of elites was composed of the army officers which had initiated the Greek War of Independence. However, “the supremacy of the tzakia was broken in 1909” (ibid.: 111) after Venizelos started to represent a new economic class who had been excluded from politics. In other words, “1909-1910 had constituted Greece’s bourgeois revolution, in which the power of old elites crumbled under the pressure of the new commercial and modernizing classes” (Mazower 1992: 887).

Under the leadership of Venizelos, “the years 1910-1915 came to seem a golden age of domestic reform and foreign conquest” (ibid.: 887). After he clashed with King Constantine I at the beginning of the First World War, a republican-royalist division emerged in Greek politics. With the support of the Greek refugees from Turkey, Venizelos came to power after the elections and abolished the monarchy and the tzakia politicians’ power. “Because the refugees held the tzakia politicians responsible for the Asia Minor Catastrophe and their forced migration, they ranked almost solidly with the Venizelist camp” (Yildirim 2006b: 48). Thus, “unlike Turkey, in Greece, the population exchange contributed to the weakening of the dominant elite groups and allowed a strong opposition against the monarchy and the tzakia families to ascend to power” (Gursoy 2008: 113).

After the abolition of monarchy and the foundation of the Second Hellenic Republic in March 1924, General Pangalos made a coup in 1925 and established his military dictatorship, which continued until 1926. “He was overthrown in another bloodless coup by General Kondylis (August 1926) with the help of a para-military formation known as the Republican Guard, under Colonel Napoleon Zervas, originally created by Pangalos

himself” (Woodhouse 1991: 217). Thus, the first period of dictatorship in Greek history came to an end.

During the 1920s, “the old political division between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists ran deeper than ever before, and added to them was an equally deep division between those who wanted to keep the monarchy and those who favoured its replacement with a republic” (Gallant 2001: 150). Hence, a republican movement appeared and spread among army officers, which led to frequent military interventions. These numerous coups d’état created political instability throughout the decade. For instance, “just between 1924 and 1928 there were ten prime ministers, two presidents were deposed and one resigned” (ibid.: 151).

The new Venizelist government came into power in 1928 after a four-years-long exile of Venizelos and lasted until 1932. For the first time in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a government in Greece was not interrupted during its four-year term. This, in fact, “stems from Venizelos’ qualified success in keeping the army out of politics” (Stefanidis 2006: 197). “Venizelos’ prestige and crushing parliamentary majority actually discouraged any such tendencies among officers” (ibid.: 197). With the effects of the Great Depression felt throughout the world, Greece faced deep economic difficulties. The refugees were also hit by the crisis, but they did not receive any aid from the Venizelist government, although the latter had promised them in order to get the refugees’ votes at the time of elections. Besides, “they still had housing problems and difficulties integrating into the Greek culture so Venizelos and the Liberal Party lost support among the refugees when the immigrants were not compensated for the properties they left in Turkey” (Gursoy 2008: 114) as had been agreed in the Athens Agreement in 1930. Thus, the refugees turned to the Left and started to support the Communist Party.

Actually, Venizelos blatantly tried to prevent the rise of communism during his last premiership. “In order to take ‘measures for the security of the social regime and the protection of civil liberties’, the Idionymon Law 4229 of 1929 was accepted, which penalized the propagation of communist or secessionist ideas” (Stefanidis 2006: 199). Leftist supporters of Venizelos

reacted to this law but it was implemented between 1929 and 1932, and caused more than 1,500 persons' arrest (ibid.: 199).

When Venizelos' Liberal Party was defeated in the March 1933 elections by his rival politician Panayis Tsaldaris, the leader of the Populist Party (Laiko Komma), "the Venizelist military officer Plastiras attempted a coup d'état on the election day but it failed and Plastiras was forced to flee the country" (Woodhouse 1991: 226). After Tsaldaris came to power, he and his followers tried to re-establish the monarchy. Thus, the last republican coup in March 1935 came from Venizelos himself and he was sent into exile. Subsequently, "the Kingdom was restored after a plebiscite, in which 97 per cent of the electorate supposedly agreed" (Gallant 2001: 156). Thus, King George II came back from exile.

Due to the election system, the Populist Party and the Liberal Party gained almost the same number of seats in the parliament in the 1935 elections, in addition to the relatively few seats of the Communist Party. The coalition of the royalists and the republicans met with dissatisfaction of their supporters, who rebelled. Because this bloody popular discontent could not be subdued by General Papagos, King George II appointed General Ioannis Metaxas, the leader of the radical-right Freethinker's Party (Komma ton Eleftherofronon), as Prime Minister.

In addition to the economic crisis, the enduring competition between royalists and republicans kept the country in political instability. Thus, "using as a pretext the threat of general strikes planned for 5 August 1936" (Gallant 2001: 157), General Metaxas staged a coup d'état on August 4, 1936 and established his dictatorship with the support of the King, which lasted until 1941. The Metaxas dictatorship, named by himself 'the Fourth of August Regime' [the "day will be later a national holiday" (Pettrakis 2006: 29)], was an authoritarian regime and established in order to prevent the spread of communism among the lower class of the Greek people (Gursoy 2008: 119). In his rule of dictatorship, Metaxas was the leader of every area of administration with unlimited power (Woodhouse 1991: 231). Moreover, "he could easily control the police and press throughout the

country, and the Greek public neither actively resisted nor supported his regime” (Gallant 2001: 157). He banned the mass media from any kind of broadcasting and publication that criticized the Metaxas’ dictatorship. Instead, they had to praise the new authoritarian regime (Petraakis 2006: 9). In times, the monthly newspaper, *To Neon Kratos* (The New State), became “the Metaxas’ regime’s uppermost propaganda medium” (ibid.: 33) and continued to be such until the end of the dictatorship.

The Metaxas’ dictatorship “was seen by its founder and chief as an anti-communist Greek state that was totalitarian with an agricultural and labour basis” (Vatikiotis 1998: 156). Since Metaxas’ regime drew on anti-communist ideology, Greek politics was divided into two opposed camps, the right-wing dictator versus the Greek Communist Party (Kommunistiko Komma Ellados / KKE) (Close 1995: 15-23). Metaxas blamed the KKE, which “during the inter-war period had grown from small insignificant membership to play a central role within republican Greece”, for the backwardness of the nation (Petraakis 2006: 34). Despite the Venizelist government’s Idionym Law of 1929 which “penalized any attempts to propagate ‘dangerous’ ideas” (ibid.: 208), i.e. communist ideology, the Communist Party gained support, especially from the refugees. Like the leader of the party himself, many members of the KKE were immigrants from Asia Minor (Gursoy 2008: 116).

In turn, “Metaxas tried to regiment the population through the constitution of the National Organization of Youth (Ethnike Organosis Neon) [EON] which became effectively compulsory for all school children” (Close 1995: 46). In this way, he brought every realm of the country under his control. His totalitarian regime led to the fragmentation of the old bourgeoisie. “While the dictatorship prolonged the division between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, it created fresh divisions in the anti-Venizelist camp, much of which was antagonized by Metaxas’ tyranny” (ibid.: 52).

Under these politically and economically adverse circumstances, German and Italian troops occupied Greece at the end of 1940 and early

1941. Metaxas, who resisted the occupation and gained wide support from the public, died in January 1941 due to an illness (Gallant 2001: 233; Vatikiotis 1998: 180). He was succeeded by Emmanouil Tsouderos, the Venizelist chairman of the Bank of Greece. Nonetheless, General Georgios Tsolakoglou unofficially took power while the country was still under Axis occupation and tried to negotiate with the Germans in June 1941.

Due to the occupation, the Greek people lived under harsh conditions while the incoming winter brought famine and disease. “Food shortages, massive inflation, the black market and the everyday struggle for survival were the major preoccupations of most of the population” (Clogg 1992: 125). Despite the flow of several international relief organizations’ supplies to the country, “food shortages remained serious for the rest of the occupation, especially in mountain villages which had little chance of receiving Red Cross relief” (Close 1995: 61). In combination with an existing political power vacuum, these conditions led to the strengthening of the Communist Party. “While in December 1942 the party had over 12,000 members, its membership rose to 56,000 by mid-1943, then, over 250,000 in June 1944” (ibid.: 69). The KKE differed from other communist parties in the world insofar as it had no relation with the Comintern.

In order to end the existing chaotic situation, communists formed the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo / EAM) in September 1941 in order to resist Axis occupation. EAM, the biggest social movement in Greek history until that time, formed a military wing, the National People’s Liberation Army (Elinikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos / ELAS), in February 1942. While the EAM and ELAS quickly gained support among young people in society, a counter-group was established by anti-royalists and non-communists, the National Republican Greek League (Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos / EDES). “Guerrilla activity had already been underway in various places, on a small scale, by non-Communists and Communists” (ibid.: 73).

Besides fighting with the Axis powers, “clashes of these two rival guerrilla groups, EAM/ELAS and EDES, had become violent by February

1943” (ibid.: 102). This was supported by the Axis countries. The guerrilla war turned into a harsh civil war in 1946, which lasted until 1949. While conflict in Greece used to be between the Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, that is, between royalists and republicans, conflict lines were transformed into a fight between communists and anti-communists during the civil war.

In addition to the power vacuum in Greece for more than a decade, “dictatorship, war against the Axis, foreign occupation and the first stages of civil strife” (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 55) further deterioration of the Greek economy and of the living conditions throughout the country. Greece used to be supported by the United Kingdom especially economically. However, at the end of the Second World War, the UK passed its protector role to the USA as emerging great power, claiming that it could no longer afford the assistance to Greece. Greece then turned to the United States for financial aid.

### **3.3 Comparison of Turkey and Greece**

With the secession of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, the relationship between the two countries began fraught with tension. Greeks of the First Hellenic Republic had fought with Ottomans for eleven years until the Greek Kingdom was recognized as an independent country by the great powers in 1832. After its independence, the two countries continued to wage war against each other frequently during almost one century.

In terms of the internal developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom, similar events occurred in both countries in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In the Ottoman Empire, the Committee of Union and Progress was established by generals who aimed at replacing absolute monarchy with constitutional monarchy. Therefore, the Young Turks under the leadership of the CUP restored the short-lived Ottoman constitution of 1876, overthrew Sultan Abdulhamit II, and founded the constitutional monarchy in 1908. Although the CUP named this incident the ‘Young Turk Revolution of 1908’, it was in fact a military intervention into politics. That is, leading generals of the Committee transformed the regime of the Empire with a

coup d'état from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, which lasted until the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1922.

In the Greek Kingdom, generals founded an organization called the Military League. In correspondence to the Young Turks' coup of 1908 in the Ottoman Empire, the Military League made a coup d'état in 1909 in the Kingdom in order to prevent royal interference in the army. The League called this military intervention by the Greek generals the Goudi coup. The military-led government lasted for one year. After the 1910 elections, the generals left the government to civilians.

There was no relationship between Turkish and Greek political leaders during this period. Due to the Tourkokratia period from the 15<sup>th</sup> century until the independence of Greece in 1821 and the Janissaries' tradition of revolting against the Sultan when they disapproved of his decisions and policy implementations, Turks and Greeks were accustomed to military interventions in politics. The Greeks perpetuated this tradition after the foundation of the Greek Kingdom in 1832. In both countries, the leading generals founded military organizations which intervened in politics in close intervals until the end of the Turkish-Greek War in 1922. Because the internal politics of the two countries was mostly directed by military men, the relationship between leaders of Turkey and Greece remained at the level of fighting during this period.

The war between Turkey and Greece ended with the victory of the former in 1923.

Military defeat at the hands of the Turkish nationalist forces would all but bring to an end the millennial-long Hellenic presence in Asia Minor. Consequent upon this military debacle would be a decade of social unrest, political chaos, and economic disaster. Then Greece, like so many other places in Europe, would fall prey to the sickness of the inter-war period: authoritarianism (Gallant 2001: 135).

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the general Mustafa Kemal Ataturk established the Turkish Republic in October 1923 and governed the

country until his death in 1938. Similarly, in March 1924, the Greek Kingdom was abolished and the Second Hellenic Republic was established which continued until the restoration of the royalty in 1935. Moreover, the two leading political actors in both countries, Ataturk and Venizelos, established a good relationship with each other which influenced the relation between the two countries positively. Reciprocal visits took place and Venizelos nominated Ataturk for the Nobel Prize in 1934. These developments implied that the frozen dialogue between Turkey and Greece in particular after the end of the Turkish-Greek war had been improved through the leaders' efforts during the 1930s.

Both of these two powerful political actors led authoritarian governments during the inter-war period. Although Ataturk experimented with multiparty politics, his two attempts were premature. In turn, "Venizelos sometimes called for the formation of another political party to balance his own; but there was some truth in the characterization of his position as that of a 'popular dictator'" (Mazower 1992: 903). Hence, Turkey was governed by Ataturk's and Inonu's authoritarian single-party governments from its establishment until the end of the Second World War. Likewise, Greece faced dictatorial rule for three times in 1925-1926, 1935-1936, and then from 1936 to 1941 (Close 1995: 32).

Since the Greek War of Independence, "political entities, created and shaped by statesmen such as Charilaos Trikoupis, Eleftherios Venizelos and [later] Konstantinos Karamanlis, in modern Greece have mainly been products of their founders whose names they bore with pride" (Koliopoulos & Veremis 2002: 61). Likewise, Turkish political parties from the establishment of the Turkish Republic onwards became the products of their founders. In Turkish politics, Ataturk had in fact initiated this trend after he founded the RPP.

After the death of Ataturk, his successor Inonu, another retired general, continued to govern the country with authoritarian single-party governments of the RPP. Actually, authoritarianism in politics became a global trend during the 1930s and 1940s. Hitler's Germany, Mussolini's

Italy, Franco's Spain and Salazar's Portugal are its main examples. Given that the fascist thought of these soldier-politicians had global influence, Turkey and Greece, as evolving nation-states, were also affected by it and promoted authoritarian governments composed of both acting and retired army officers. In correspondence to Inonu's National Chief period that lasted for twelve years (1938-1950) in Turkey, Metaxas established his personal dictatorship in Greece for a five-year term during 1936-1941. "Unlike Hitler or Mussolini, Metaxas had no broad base of popular support; Greek fascism was not a mass movement" (Gallant 2001: 157). "Unlike them as well it was not based on any coherent ideology or racist dogma; at best, his rule can be described as authoritarian paternalism" (ibid.: 157). However, the two countries differed from each other in terms of political stability. That is, whereas the Greek army interrupted politics several times during the interwar years with coups d'état, Turkey was governed directly by the founder of the country, the retired general Ataturk, who did not allow any military intervention.

## **Chapter 4: The Early Cold War (1947 – 1974)**

### **4.1 The Truman Doctrine**

#### **4.1.1 The Truman Doctrine and the American Aid to Turkey and Greece**

During the Second World War, Turkey was exposed to the Great Powers' pressures to join the war. After the German invasion of Poland in 1939, Turkey, under the leadership of its National Chief Inonu, decided to remain neutral. However, the Allied countries - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - invited Turkey to several conferences throughout 1943. Churchill and Roosevelt in particular wanted Turkey to enter the war as soon as possible in order to use the country against the German attack (Kuniholm 1980: 29-50).

At all of these conferences - Casablanca in January, Adana in January, Quebec in August, Moscow in October, Cairo in November, Teheran in November-December, and lastly Cairo in December - the same issue was discussed: because Turkey feared Soviet post-war hostility, it abstained from participating in the war. Due to security risks, Turkey aimed to preserve its neutrality unless it was supplied with sufficient war material (Weisband 1973: 153-159). Consequently, the three leading Allied countries decided at the Teheran conference on assistance to Turkey: "no land forces, 20 squadrons, mostly of fighter aircraft, and three antiaircraft regiments" (Kuniholm 1980: 43). At the same conference, the Allies agreed to bring Turkey into the war by February 15, 1944. In spite of heavy pressure on the country by the British, it preserved its neutrality until February 1945. However, "Turkey officially declared war on Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945, just in time to secure its acceptance as a founder member of the United Nations" (Athanasopoulou 1999: 37). This declaration of war

was in fact symbolic and Turkey did not intend to fight at the fronts of the Second World War. In this way, it avoided war destruction.

Greece in turn was attacked by Italy in the end of 1940 and subsequently invaded by Germany in April 1941. It found itself in the Second World War under Axis occupation. Because it lacked military equipment, Greece received aid from the United Kingdom. Despite the British assistance, Greece could not resist the Axis powers, which occupied it until October 1944. As Kuniholm summarizes (1980: 84), in Greece under the Axis occupation, “550,000 Greeks died; ... 1,700 villages and one-fourth of all buildings were destroyed; two-thirds of the merchant marine was lost; communications and transportation were broken down”.

During the Axis occupation, communist ideology found popular support. Thus, the communist organizations took the lead in the Greek resistance movement. The rise of communism however irritated the British and U.S. leaders. They were interested in the Eastern Mediterranean and feared the spread of communist ideology to other countries in the area and their transformation into Soviet satellite states. During the Second World War, the United States was interested in the Northern Tier<sup>1</sup> but preferred not to get involved in the area and to wait for the end of the war. When the U.S. diplomat in Moscow, George Kennan, sent his ‘long telegram’ of February 22, 1946 in which “he warned about the dangers posed by the Soviet Union and of the need to adopt a tougher line towards Soviet demands” (Athanasopoulou 1999: 49), the American “containment” policy towards Soviet Union was adopted in line with Kennan’s warnings in order to stall the spread of communism (Gaddis 1982: 54).

At the end of the Second World War, the USA, as the winning side of the war, believed that the Northern Tier urgently needed financial and military assistance in order to develop their economies. Previously, Great Britain had assumed the role of supporter for Greece. However, during the Second World War, its economy began to weaken. As Kuniholm states, as a result of the war, “Britain had lost two-thirds of its exports, one-fourth of its

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<sup>1</sup> The term ‘Northern Tier’ describes Turkey, Greece and Iran, which are countries on the border of or near the Soviet Union.

merchant marine, one-half of its overseas investments, and one-fourth of its financial reserves” (1980: 406). Because it still had interest in the region, the country persuaded the USA to take over its former task. Consequently, Turkey and Greece understood that they “had to rely not only on the interests of Britain but also that of the United States” (Athanasopoulou 1999: 39) against the Soviet Union.

When civil war between communists and anti-communists began in Greece in 1946, the urgent need of U.S. aid became apparent. Actually, starting from the Axis occupation until 1947, Greece was aided by the USA with 147 million dollars “but these were inadequate to meet Greece’s severe economic and financial crisis resulting from the war, the internal fighting, and the inefficiency of Greek governments” (ibid.: 55). Therefore, the Truman administration decided on a financial assistance program on March 12, 1947: military aid of almost 400 million dollars in the aggregate, 100 million dollars of which were for Turkey and about 300 million dollars of which were for Greece. The aid was given mainly to protect the two countries from Soviet territorial ambitions and to control the possibility of the diffusion of communism from Greece to other Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. The American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) was established in July 1947 for the distribution of aid in Greece. “The main objectives of its policy were the stabilization of the economy, balancing the budget, the reconstruction of infrastructure and production, and the establishment of security throughout the country” (Vetsopoulos 2009: 281).

Turkey was aided by the USA with 139 million dollars during the Second World War up to 1947. Likewise, Greece was assisted by the United States after the end of the Second World War, which coincided with its civil war.

U.S. aid was announced by President Harry Truman on March 12, 1947. He stated in his famous speech:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed

minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes

([http://www.famousquotes.me.uk/speeches/Harry\\_S\\_Truman/](http://www.famousquotes.me.uk/speeches/Harry_S_Truman/)).

According to defenders and critics of the Truman Doctrine, this speech is seen as a turning point in the history of the U.S. foreign policy because it was the first economic and financial aid of the USA for the containment of the Soviet Union (Hamby 1998: 12). That is, U.S. policy-makers took the Truman Doctrine as a model throughout the Cold War which was subsequently used in justifying U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s in order to prevent “the domino effect” of communism (Jones 1998: 24).

After the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, popular discontent emerged among the American people, who mostly held the opinion that this aid was unnecessary (Frazier 1999: 233, 244-245). In response, the U.S. administration insisted on U.S. interests in the area and on protecting the security of the country. This did not mean, according to the State Department, that the USA “pulled British chestnuts out of the fire” (Kuniholm 1980: 412) because “Greece had long been part of the British sphere of influence” (Hamby 1998: 21). Moreover, President Truman identified problems such as “repeated Soviet maneuvers against Turkey, three crises in Iran, the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, and the weakened capacity of Great Britain to fill its traditional role in the Eastern Mediterranean” (Kuniholm 1980: 427) as reasons for his decision to aid Greece and Turkey.

As a result of the American aid program, the situation in Turkey and Greece improved politically, economically, and militarily. “As early as mid-1947 in Greece, ‘development’ and ‘industrialization’ started displacing ‘poverty of land’ and ‘viability’ in the vocabulary of centrist and right-wing politicians and intellectuals” (Kakridis 2009: 253). Furthermore, “the civil

war had ended, because the American officials in Greece often threatened to cut off aid as a result of the ineffectiveness of the Greek administration” (Botsiou 2009: 212). Turkey had transformed itself into a system of multiparty politics. In turn, the Iranian Shah was irritated because of the exclusion of Iran from the Truman Doctrine. Furthermore, discontent with American aid was expressed by some Turkish and Greek intellectuals. Several Greek intellectuals, i.e. Kofas (1989), argued that “the Marshall Aid failed in its primary mission, namely postwar recovery and reconstruction” (Botsiou 2009: 209-210). Moreover, critics have further claimed that the Truman Doctrine was “the ‘first shot of the Cold War’; a global license for American imperialism; and proof of an ‘arrogance of power’ that repeatedly dragged Americans into other countries’ domestic quarrels” (Jones 1998: 26-27; see also Kofas 1989; Papandreou 1970; Wittner 1982). They “have seen it as the beginning of the long process by which the United States became a world policeman” (Gaddis 1974: 386). In contrast, defenders of the Truman Doctrine argued that the United States had succeeded in the containment of Soviet communism and in the liberation of Turkey and Greece from authoritarianism (Gaddis 1982; Kousoulas 1965; Kuniholm 1980).

#### **4.1.2 The Effects of the Truman Doctrine on Turkey and Greece**

The Truman Doctrine influenced the Turkish and Greek governments’ thinking, which was encouraged by U.S. aid received since March 1947. Thus, after the end of the Second World War, Turkey and Greece increased their interests in associations with other European countries in order to break their international isolation. In August 1947, the Turkish ambassador to Paris, Menemencioglu, suggested to Great Britain a Mediterranean Pact between Turkey, Greece and Egypt. While the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs had agreed on this pact, Britain discountenanced the proposal. Thus, the British stance on the issue led to the abandonment of the project. Nevertheless, “the significance of this early Turkish proposal lies in the fact that, it came ten

months before Ernest Bevin's pronouncement in January 1948 of his plans for a western defence arrangement" (Athanasopoulou 1999: 69), the Western European Union, which was established in the spring of the same year. This proved Turkey's "serious thinking about the question of the organization of postwar security in Europe" (ibid.: 69).

The Truman administration excluded Turkey from the Marshall Aid Plan in early 1948 because it believed that the Truman aid was sufficient for Turkey to consolidate its military. However, Turkey reacted and insisted on the need for additional aid in order to recover economically through the inclusion of the country in the European Economic Recovery Program (EER). As a result, Turkey was admitted to the Marshall Plan in July 1948, just as Greece, providing that the aid was only devoted to agriculture, coal-mining and communications. It "received 108 million dollars in direct aid and the equivalent of 75 million dollars in indirect aid from the EER" (ibid.: 72) between April 1948 and June 1950. In fact, "the U.S. policymakers claimed that the Marshall Plan sought to inject Europe's "democratic" (a codeword for non-communist) forces with a similar sense of optimism and direction" (Kakridis 2009: 252). Thus, some scholars argued that "its psychological significance may have outweighed its direct economic impact" (ibid.: 252).

After the Turkish proposal for a Mediterranean Pact had failed in 1947 (Athanasopoulou 1999: 69), Greece developed this idea further and proposed an enlarged regional pact including Greece, Turkey, Italy, and all Arab countries in March 1948. Because of the lack of an American security guarantee in this region and of the weakness of those countries' militaries, Turkey abstained from joining this entente. When the American administration did not support the idea, this initiative also failed.

In July 1948, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs again suggested a Mediterranean Pact to Britain. It was to be composed of Britain, France, Greece, and Turkey, and excluded the Arab states that had been included in the Greek proposal. After the negative response of the British, Turkey aimed to be included in the Brussels Pact in September. In this

attempt, Turkey again wanted to guarantee its security. The country saw membership in the Western European Union, which seemed to transform into an Atlantic Pact with the inclusion of the United States and Canada, as a good opportunity.

Throughout 1948, civil war in Greece intensified, which led Turkey to increase its interest in defence agreements. While the Americans and the British expressed the strategic importance of Turkey and Greece, they “stressed that Turkey did not belong either to western Europe or the Atlantic and consequently ... could not join the North Atlantic regional group” (ibid.: 117). “The Turkish interpretation of the American response was that the United States was going to contemplate some other security arrangements into which Turkey could fit” (ibid.: 118). Consequently, Turkey was admitted as a member of the Council of Europe just after its establishment in August 1949. This revised the previous statements by the United States and Britain that Turkey did not belong to Europe. After the inclusion of the country in the European Community, Ismet Inonu, the National Chief, stated that the Council of Europe membership meant that “Turkey, from its isolation in 1945, had risen to the rank of a respected member of the civilized world” (quoted in ibid.: 130).

In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. It established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which became one of the most important inter-governmental organizations in the world. Being a member of this organization implied increased power in conflicts with third parties. Therefore, Turkey and Greece aimed at inclusion into the NATO from this time on.

In May 1949, the U.S. government urged Turkey to reorganize the position of high-ranking Turkish military officers. The Chief of the General Staff of Turkey had been made directly responsible to the President in the 1924 Turkish Constitution. In 1944, this law had been amended; the Chief of the General Staff was then made responsible to the Prime Minister. Finally, with the law of 1949 resulting from the American threat to withdraw financial aid, the Turkish military came under civilian control.

The Chief of General Staff was made responsible to the Ministry of Defence. “In theory at any rate, the civilian government acquired full constitutional powers over the armed forces” (Hale 1994: 313). “This was the last attempt of the RPP government to press the western powers for Turkey’s inclusion in some form of regional arrangement backed by an American security guarantee” (Athanassopoulou 1999: 161). With the May 1950 elections, the Democrat Party won the majority of votes. It established government under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Menderes, who was more insistent on the integration of Turkey into a regional security organization than the former RPP’s single-party governments.

When communism began to spread through the Asian countries with the establishment of a communist government in China at the end of 1949, the American administration feared Soviet dominance in the region. When Soviet-controlled North Korea attacked South Korea in late June 1950, the United States decided to supply military aid to South Korea with the help of United Nations member countries. The DP government saw a chance for Turkey’s integration in the North Atlantic Pact and announced that it would send a 4500-man brigade to Korea (ibid.: 163). One week after the Turkish troops were sent to Korea, Turkey formally applied for inclusion in the NATO and expected that membership would be given easily as a reward for its assistance.

The British authorities however still rejected the inclusion of Turkey in the NATO because for them, this meant that the alliance would expand to the Mediterranean countries. Thus, Greece would also have to be accepted as a member. The Americans and the British argued that with the acceptance of Turkey and Greece, the NATO would stop being a political and economic alliance and instead turn into a military alliance against the Soviet Union. This annoyed the Scandinavian countries of the organization.

As a result, the NATO decided to invite Turkey and Greece to their association in September 1950. After Turkish and Greek disappointment, the Americans and the British finally agreed in September 1951 at the North Atlantic Council meeting on the formal invitation of Turkey and Greece to

membership in the NATO. Eventually, Turkey and Greece became NATO members on February 15, 1952 at the same time as the “Siamese twins” (ibid.: X). These accessions were called the First Enlargement of the NATO. Turkey and Greece realized that they could benefit from NATO membership for the economic recovery of their countries. According to Vetsopoulos, “the Marshall Aid and the membership of the NATO helped Greece to facilitate economic recovery by participation in international trade, increasing production which reduced imports, and the reconstruction and development of the infrastructure of the Greek industrial sector” (2009: 294-295). Similar improvements took place in the Turkish economy. Therefore, the two countries continued to seek inclusion in other international institutions for further financial assistance. Hence, two years after the establishment of the European Economic Community with the signing of the Treaty of Rome on March 25, 1957 Turkey and Greece applied for associate membership in the EEC in the summer of 1959.

## **4.2 Association Agreements with the European Economic Community**

### **4.2.1 Greece’s Association with the EEC**

After the Greek application for association with the EEC on June 8, 1959, negotiations for the accession of Greece to the Community began on September 10, 1959. The Association Agreement, called Athens Agreement, was signed on July 9, 1961. It entered into force one year later on November 1, 1962 and “made Greece a privileged associate member of the EEC under the provisions of Article 238 of the Rome Treaty” (Kalamotousakis 1976: 141). According to the agreement, the EEC aimed at developing the Greek economy by preparing short- and long-term development plans and even giving financial aids in order to have the country enter into a Customs Union. If everything went well, Greece would become a full member of the Community in 22 years.

Before the Greek association with the EEC, the country demanded to join any of the existing regional alliances to secure its economic and military growth. In this context, before the application to the EEC, Greece

“took part in the lengthy negotiations (1957-8) of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which at that time considered a British proposal for a European free-trade area embracing all Western European countries – an alternative to the Common Market” (ibid.: 150). At the end of these negotiations, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was formed under the leadership of Britain. Even though Greece was also invited for membership, it refused this proposal. After some time, however, Greece regretted its rejection, as it felt isolated in the region. It thus started to seek for ways to associate with the EEC. According to the Greek administration, an association with the EEC would develop the Greek economy on the basis of trade with other EEC countries and strengthen Greek politics in regional conflicts. During the negotiations with the EEC, Greece chose an associate membership, although it could have applied for full membership. According to Kalamotousakis (ibid.: 151), this was a good choice because

if Greece had opted for full membership, it would have been risking catastrophic consequences because (a) direct and unconditional membership would have meant acceptance of the accelerated time-table among the Six for the complete abolition of all tariffs and quantitative import controls, and (b) the geographic orientation and composition of Greek exports, consisting largely of few agricultural products having a low price and income elasticity of demand and a high elasticity of substitution, were substantially tied to the EEC countries.

When the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis signed the Association agreement with the EEC on July 9, he gave a speech which showed that Greece aimed at both economic and political improvements through EEC membership given its weak economy and instable politics during the post-Second World War era. Karamanlis aimed at being close to Western countries, thus gaining a European identity like other member states. However, the EEC seemed to have only economic aims concerning the country. Nevertheless, this was a relevant decision of Greece: if the country

had not joined the EEC, it would have been isolated politically and economically in the European continent.

Why the Community offered a preferential status for Greece is another issue. The EEC aimed at the harmonization of Greek agricultural and financial policies in order to develop its economy throughout the 22 years leading up to membership and tried to assume the protector role of the United States and Britain.

After the Athens Agreement entered into force in November 1962, the relationship between Greece and the Community stayed problem-free for only five years - until Greek Colonels staged a coup d'état in April 1967. During these five years, Greek exports to EEC countries increased significantly. "Western governments were encouraged to establish industries in Greece which accelerated the revival of the economic activity since the U.S. civil aid came to an end during 1962" (Woodhouse 1991: 282). Because Greek Colonels had rapidly transformed the military government into a military dictatorship, the dialogue between Greece and the EEC stalled. The relations were resumed when Greece applied for full membership in 1975, one year after the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship. Negotiations lasted from 1976 to 1979. On January 1, 1981 Greece became formally a member of the EC (Pagoulatos 2002: 3).

#### **4.2.2 Turkey's Association with the EEC**

After having become members of the NATO in 1952, Turkey and Greece turned to another powerful Western Cold War institution, the European Economic Community (EEC). When Greece applied for membership in the EEC in June 1959, Turkey also initiated a contractual association one month later on July 31, 1959 due to political and economic reasons (Saracoglu 1992: 8). The EEC approved the Turkish application on September 11, 1959 and decided to start the negotiations (ibid.: 9). However, because Turkish democracy was interrupted by a coup d'état on May 27, 1960 and one year later three politicians were hanged, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen. In contrast, Greece succeeded in signing the Athens Agreement on July 9, 1961. Then, "[t]hough there was a

domestically troubled situation after the coup and the Turco – EEC relations were quite tensed after the Athens Agreement, in July 1962 the talks between Turkey and the EEC were resumed” (Riemer 1999: 6). Finally, the EEC accepted to sign the Association Agreement, called Ankara Agreement, on September 12, 1963 in Brussels.

In the evening of the same day, Prime Minister Inonu interpreted this association as follows:

In my opinion, throughout the history of mankind, the most daring works of the human mind are brought into the body, the European Economic Community. With this Agreement, Turkey will be forever connected to Europe (Cumhuriyet 13 September 1963).

When the Association Agreement came into force on December 1, 1964, the relationship between Turkey and the European Community officially commenced. The agreement divided the membership period of Turkey into three parts: the preparatory, transitional, and final stages.

After the signing of the Association Agreement, the Second and Third Financial Protocols were accepted in 1970 and 1977. On November 23, 1970, an Additional Protocol was signed which aimed at the completion of a Customs Union between the two sides within 22 years. However, these protocols were cancelled when the Turkish government decided to freeze the relations with the EEC in 1978, “referring to Article 60 of the Additional Protocol, the Self-Protection clause” (Riemer 1999: 6). After the military coup of 1980, the dialogue between Turkey and the EEC was severed and the Ankara Agreement was suspended in 1982 for five years.

Ironically, although Turkey signed an agreement “the content of which was purely economic, the main driving force behind the Turkish application for the Associate Membership was mostly political rather than economic” (Sozen 2005: 3-4). The reasons, according to Hale, were “to gain easier market access to the EEC, to avoid being outflanked by Greece, and to be internationally recognized as a member of the Western Community of nations which had been an objective of Turkish leaders” (2000: 175) since the early days of the Tanzimat period. In turn, the Community had also

fulfilled its objective by “bringing one of the strategically most important states in the boat” (Riemer 1999: 6).

#### **4.3 The First Military Intervention in Turkey on May 27, 1960**

From the foundation of Turkey in 1923 until 1946, the country was governed by a single party, the Republican People’s Party. On January 7, 1946, a powerful oppositional party, the Democrat Party, was constituted by four former MPs of the RPP: Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Fuat Koprulu. Gradually, this party came to represent all the opposition and popular discontent among the public which had been cumulating until then. Therefore, the DP gained popular support and won the 1950, 1954, and 1957 elections. As a result, the party governed the country for a decade, from 1950 to 1960.

Like the earlier opposition parties, the DP was established as an anti-RPP party. Because it was founded with the aim of securing fundamental rights and freedoms of the nation, the party adopted some liberal policies. It was a supporter of a laissez-faire economy and tried to bolster both national and foreign private sectors (Erogul 2003; Kasaba 1993).

After the DP came to power in 1950, the members of the party elected Celal Bayar as the new president. He further was elected chairman of this new party. Thus, for the first time since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a civilian president came to power. This showed that the DP had the potential to make important changes in the current system of the country. Every time Bayar was asked about the difference between the RPP and his party, he answered that they were like cooks preparing Turkish sweet ‘helva’ with different recipes (Ahmad 1994: 156). While both Democrats and Republicans aimed at creating a ‘small America’ with one millionaire in each neighborhood, their methods for reaching this goal differed (ibid.: 156).

As Zurcher notes, “under the RPP the state apparatus and the party machine had been merged (even officially) to the extent that one could say that the party was just one of the instruments through which the state controlled and steered society” (2004: 221). Likewise, in the first years of

the DP government, the party abandoned its libertarian policies and began to put pressure on leftist ideas, just as the RPP had done with the right-wing, which had been heavily criticized by the DP MPs. As the DP governed the country as a single-party during a decade, the tradition of the RPP continued, and the Democrat Party rule became a state-party-government.

Whereas the RPP started to lose popular support, especially after the establishment of the Democrat Party, “the DP felt that it represented the majority, and in its vision of democracy this majority gave it absolute power and legitimacy to do whatever it deemed necessary” (ibid.: 222).

At the same time, the country faced growing economic problems. Since the Truman Doctrine was implemented in Turkey in 1947, a liberal economy had been slowly introduced to the country. In spite of the RPP’s insistence on statism, the Democrats supported a free market economy for Turkey. Thus, after the DP came to power in 1950, it rapidly implemented liberalization policies. In the first years, these liberal policies combined with U.S. financial aid had positive effects in terms of a growing national economy. However, when American aid ceased, the DP’s heyday ended. Because they did not have any development plan for solving Turkey’s financial problems, the new Turkish liberal economy began to collapse. This meant that Turkish people began to get poorer, just as in RPP times. In July 1958, Menderes personally visited the U.S. and German Presidents concerning recovery programs. The two countries accepted to give financial assistance to Turkey in return for the devaluation of the Turkish Lira. Menderes did not accept but turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.

Despite its success in the 1957 elections, as people voted for Menderes rather than for the party, the DP started to lose power and popular support - it had become too authoritarian, too much like the RPP during the single-party period. In fact, “the Democrats’ basic problem, pointed out by many foreign observers at the time, was that they tried to do too much too quickly and with insufficient means at their disposal” (ibid.: 228). Because the DP had gained the majority of votes in the 1954 and 1957 elections, it thought that it was justified in acting in an authoritarian manner.

However, the authoritarian activities of the DP had sparked discontent among some parts of society. First of all, peasants were affected negatively by the DP's support for the mechanization of agriculture between 1950 and 1960. When the number of tractors and harvesters sharply increased, the peasants got poorer. This initiated the process of migration to big cities and the building of shanty towns (see Karpat 1976).

Moreover, since the DP wanted to control the bureaucracy, military, and academia, it reduced the salaries of these professions more than others. Their annoyance increased in the late 1950s when the DP attempted to seize RPP property, to punish newspapers which did not support the government, and to penalize academics and judges who were not pro-government.

In addition to the discontent among peasants, the military, bureaucracy, and academics, minority groups whose votes had given the DP the majority in 1950 gradually became dissatisfied with the DP government.

After the DP won the elections in 1950, minorities expected from the government improved minority rights protection, but the party maintained the tendency of discrimination of non-Muslims. Because the DP aimed at creating a conservative-religious-traditional society, it emphasized respect for paternal authority, love of younger people, obeisance of societal rules, patience, beware of the illicit and the permissible, refraining from alcohol, gamble, and dissipated and deluxe life, hiding female sexuality, and adhering to clothing rules for women and men (M. Demirel 2005: 522-523). In this way, the DP tried to create similarity among members of society, which led to increased intolerance of differences. This became apparent on September 6-7, 1955 when hyper-nationalist university students, trade unionists, and workers attacked and plundered, with government support, shops and houses of non-Muslim minorities, using the Cyprus problem as an excuse. In fact, this pogrom was not exclusively linked to the Cyprus issue, as the aggressors attacked not only Rum citizens but also Jews, Armenians, and some foreigners (see Guven 2005). The DP government planned this event for the further deportation of minorities, but it did not predict its dimensions. Once again, non-Muslim minority citizens of Turkey lost their

trust in the state. Many of them, especially from the big cities of Istanbul and Izmir, decided to emigrate.

As last authoritarian attempt of the party, Democrats established a Commission of Inquiry in April 1960 in order to investigate the RPP's plans, contrary to the Constitution. The Commission of Inquiry tried to reveal whether or not there was a plan for a coup d'état being made. In response, students and university academics began to demonstrate on the streets of Ankara. The DP government responded with martial law but could not end the expression of popular discontent. Its announcement of the abolition of the Commission on May 24 came too late. The foundation of the Commission had emphasized the DP's authoritarianism, which brought about the first coup of the country.

On May 27, 1960 Turkish army officers staged a coup d'état, arguing that the Democrat Party had acted against the Turkish Constitution. This coup was made by ratings and thus differed from the 1971 and 1980 coups that had been staged by high-ranking military officers. At three o'clock in the morning, Colonel Alparslan Turkes read a declaration on the radio in which the Turkish military explained the reasons for the coup. "The statement announced that the Turkish armed forces had taken over the administration of the country 'to prevent fratricide' and to 'extricate the parties from the irreconcilable situation into which they had fallen'" (quoted in Zurcher 2004: 241).

After the coup, the National Unity Committee (Milli Birlik Komitesi / NUC), headed by General Cemal Gursel and composed of 38 members, took over and formed the government. General Gursel immediately closed down the Democrat Party and banned it from politics. He then arrested the leading members of the party, including President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes. General Gursel rapidly obtained all authority and governed the country until 1961 when he transferred the government to civilians.

Several days after the coup, the military government charged five law professors of Istanbul University, under the leadership of Siddik Sami Onar who was the then rector of the university, with preparing a new

constitution. This 1961 constitution provided legitimacy to the coup and the NUC itself. All decisions regarding the country were to be made by the Committee. The constitution entered into force after a referendum on July 9 with a rate of acceptance of 62 percent.

The new, liberal 1961 Constitution differed from the 1924 Constitution in some aspects. In order to prevent one-party governments like the ones of the RPP and DP in the past, the Senate (Senato) was established as a second elected chamber that possessed veto power in order to balance the decisions of the assembly. Moreover, the Constitution for the first time introduced civil rights. Furthermore, the constitutional court was established as an independent body of judiciary that was to ensure that new legislation conforms to the Constitution. General Cemal Gursel became the new President of the Turkish Republic.

The new constitution established a legal basis for the formation of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu / NSC). The NSC was established in March 1962 and consisted of the Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff, some MPs, and commanding officers of the army. Only these full members had the right to vote.

The main duty of the Council was to advise the government on internal and external security (ibid.: 245). Consequently, the NSC visibly, and sometimes invisibly, legitimated military interventions in Turkish politics.

For the trial of arrested DP politicians, a special court was founded in Yassiada, an island in the Sea of Marmara. In the end, “123 people were acquitted, 31 were sentenced to life imprisonment and 418 to lesser terms, while 15 were sentenced to death” (ibid.: 248). The NUC mitigated the death penalty of eleven people, but not of President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rustu Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan. Thus, the NUC rapidly passed a law which suspended the execution of the death penalty for those above 65 years of age. This law was adopted for the former President of the Turkish Republic, Celal Bayar. Hence, the death penalty of Bayar was annulled and

he was deported from the island. Zorlu and Polatkan were executed on September 16, 1961 and Menderes the next day. After these executions, Menderes became a martyr in the eyes of the majority of society and his memoir was used by DP's successor politicians (Ahmad 1994: 192).

#### **4.4 The EEC's Reaction to the May 27, 1960 Coup d'État**

After the Turkish application for the associate membership in the EEC in July 1959, the Community decided to start negotiations in September 1959. Even though negotiations between Turkey and the EEC continued for several months, with the May 27, 1960 coup d'état the relations were strained. When the three DP politicians were executed in September 1961, the dialogue with the EEC was frozen.

The then President of France, General de Gaulle, strongly opposed to these executions. Because the three politicians were hanged despite his reaction, the Turkish association with the EEC was delayed for two years (Ozer 2009: 91). Although the relations between Turkey and the EEC worsened after Greece signed its association agreement in July 1961, the dialogue between Turkey and the Community was resumed in July 1962 with the special effort of Tevfik Saracoglu, the Turkey's permanent representative in the EEC. Thus, negotiation talks were re-started for the Turkish association with the EEC. Finally, Ankara Agreement was signed in September 1963 and Turkey became an associate state of the Community.

In my opinion, the EEC's reaction to the 1960 coup of Turkish colonels was not severe. While England, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied for the membership in the EEC in 1961, negotiations with these countries were stalled in January 1963 due to General de Gaulle's veto (Ozer 2009: 92). Despite this, the EEC signed the association agreement with Turkey in September 1963. Thus, it can be said that Turkey was not reacted severely by the EEC compared to the frozen relations between the major Western European countries and the Community until 1967.

#### **4.5 The Colonels' Dictatorship in Greece (1967 – 1974)**

The civil war in Greece ended in 1949, while martial law was lifted and new elections were held in 1950. After a short-lived government,

another election was held in 1951, but the result was again a short-lived government. Marshal Alexandros Papagos, who was a resigned Commander-in-Chief and the leader of a right-wing party, the Greek Rally (Ellinikos Synagermos / GR), emerged as the winner of the new elections held in 1952. “Now a period of right-wing rule began that maintained until 1963” (Clogg 1992: 147).

Papagos continued to govern the country until his death in 1955. Konstantinos Karamanlis succeeded him and renamed the party the National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis / NRU) in February 1956.

Because Karamanlis' NRU was successful in the 1958 elections, he called for an early election in 1961 in order to guarantee his rule for the next four-year term. However, the result fell short of his expectations because a high percentage of votes were given to a new party, the Centre Union (Enosi Kentrou / CU). The CU was constituted by Georgios Papandreou, who combined all of the center parties. Although Papandreou's CU gained popular support in the elections, Karamanlis' NRU was announced as the winning party. Thus, Karamanlis established a government which lasted until 1963. However, the two opposition parties, Centre Union and United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera / UDL), declared the 1961 elections null and void, accusing the NRU of fraudulence. In fact, they suspected that an external power had intervened in Greek domestic politics. That is, “the opposition parties claimed that the army had implemented a NATO-plan, code-named Pericles and designed to deal with threats to internal security, to preserve the right's hold on power” (ibid.: 155).

After elections, Karamanlis' NRU started to lose popular support. Discontent among the public had increased due to his personal conflicts with the royalty, especially with Queen Frederica, and the assassination of an MP of the United Democratic Left. The Greek economy gradually deteriorated and unemployment and under-employment increased. Thus, strikes by workers, public servants, and teachers became frequent, which often led to clashes with the state's security forces (Gallant 2001: 195; Woodhouse 1991: 283). Then, “huge protests by supporters of Papandreou's

Centre Union party shook Athens and other cities, forcing new elections in 1963” (Tsarouhas 2005: 9). Consequently, Karamanlis had to resign and the Centre Union won the 1963 elections under the leadership of Papandreou. Nonetheless, he could not be successful in internal and external politics because of conflicts in Cyprus which led to the demise of the Republic of Cyprus that had been established in August 1960 after the signature of the Zurich Agreement in 1959 in London between the British, Turkish, and Greek Prime Ministers.

Moreover, Georgios Papandreou’s son, Andreas Papandreou, became an MP during his father’s government. He was accused by the right-wing parties of being the leader of ASPIDA (Shield), a left-wing assassination group of the army. “The word means ‘shield’, but it was also an acronym standing for ‘Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy’” (Woodhouse 1985: 5). This led Papandreou to lose further power when young Constantine II was to succeed his father King Paul in 1964. In May 1965, Papandreou dismissed his Minister of Defence and demanded to be his replacement. King Constantine II, who only had the right to appoint the Minister of Defence, did not accept. From then on, an enduring conflict between the King and Papandreou senior developed in which the former aimed at the latter’s resignation and the splitting of his party. In July 1965, King Constantine II succeeded in forcing Papandreou’s resignation despite widespread demonstrations by the supporters of the CU. They later called this royal intervention into politics *Apostasia* (renegade). They also named the CU politicians who replaced Papandreou by appointment of the King *renegades*. The dissatisfaction of the military was apparent at the time. Therefore, Papandreou tried to get the army officers on his side before his resignation. “He tried to reorganize the armed forces along lines more sympathetic to his government and to encourage the promotion of low-rank officers that were disadvantaged by the political environment after 1949” (Tsarouhas 2005: 9). Nevertheless, high-ranking military officers were not pleased with this effort and opposed Papandreou.

Both the American and British administrations were aware of a coup plan in Greece, because the King had visited them to obtain their advice. General Kardamakis, the Chief of the Greek National Defence General Staff, confirmed to the Americans that “the decision for a coup d’état has already been taken, that it is no longer a question of whether, but when” (quoted in Maragkou 2006: 430). However, the British and Americans later realized that they were informed about a different coup plan.

Subsequently, the leaders of the Centre Union and of the National Radical Union called for early elections to be held in May 1967. The NRU’s new chairman became Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, the successor of Karamanlis. However, two colonels and a brigadier - Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikoalos Makarezos, and Stylianos Pattakos - staged a coup d’état on April 21, 1967 just before the elections would have been held. They aimed to end the political instability in the country that predominated during the post-Second World War period. In addition, they honored their intervention as ‘revolution’.

The Colonels’ coup d’état on April 21, 1967 led “an authoritarian no-party system of government in Greece which resisted internal and external pressures for a change toward a multiparty system” (Xydis 1974: 507). After the intervention, “Papadopoulos pronounced the Greek nation ‘diseased’ and in need of a ‘plaster cast’” (Pedaliu 2007: 188).

A Greece ‘in plaster-cast’ meant that Greeks had to live under a regime that derived its power from naked repression and those who resisted or were suspected of resistance to the “revolution”, or even gathered together in numbers exceeding five persons, or grew their hair long or listened to proscribed music, or ate Russian caviar or even read Aeschylus, Sophocles, Mark Twain or Shakespeare, were subjected to show trials, incarceration, widespread torture and banishment to concentration camps in arid and scorpion infested islands (ibid.: 188).

The Colonels’ dictatorship was led by a rightist secret organization, EENA (National Union of Young Officers), under the leadership of Papadopoulos

who was in cooperation with KYP (Greek Central Intelligence Agency), composed of rightist army officers (Couloumbis 2004: 308). Under the leadership of Papadopoulos, this military coup d'état was transformed into a military dictatorship which was established against all political parties from right to left. The symbol of his dictatorship was a phoenix with a soldier's shadow in front of it. "Including Papadopoulos, the leading members of the junta were mostly officers from lower-class backgrounds who had achieved career advancement through the armed forces" (Gallant 2001: 197). The difference of the 1967 junta regime from Pangalos' and Metaxas' dictatorships was that this coup was staged by ratings, while the latter had been staged by high-ranking military officers. Thus, in the first years of the junta, ratings pushed the high-ranking military officers to retire. As a result, "over 2,700 army officers were retired by April 1972" (Close 2002: 115).

Because King Constantine II attempted a counter-coup against the Colonels' dictatorship in December 1967, he was sent into exile. One year later, on October 29, 1968, a new authoritarian constitution was accepted by a plebiscite. At the time, Papadopoulos had extended his power by simultaneously becoming the King, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Education, and Government Policy. The Junta took "the armed forces, police, civil service, judiciary, universities, schools, the Church, as well as local authorities, the trade unions and agricultural cooperatives" (ibid.: 115) under direct or indirect control. Moreover, Papadopoulos introduced martial law, banned and suspended political parties, trade unions, newspapers and ancient works, arrested all communists, "condemned long hair on boys and mini-skirts on girls" (Woodhouse 1991: 290), ordered "church parades on Sundays and flag-raising ceremonies each morning; while forbidding mixed-sex social events" (Close 2002: 117). Thus, the junta regime and Papadopoulos personally became all-powerful. "Owing to the fact that the society was put under restraint by the Junta, political discussions in public – or for that matter over the phone or by mail – were generally regarded as risky" (Close 2002: 115). However, "[t]he extent of opposition to the regime was firstly

manifested by the attendance of several hundred thousand people at Georgios Papandreou's funeral in November 1968" (ibid.: 119), which was transformed into a demonstration for democracy.

Until the end of the 1950s, "a sizable middle class had been formed in Greece and was increasingly involved in the political process; therefore, the army's influence in politics would have been expected to gradually diminish" (Tsarouhas 2005: 3). However, on the contrary, the army launched a coup in April 1967 which lasted until 1974. "[B]ecause the military rulers failed to transform and modernize the administrative apparatus which they had targeted as one of their main objectives, they could not establish a good relationship" (Danopoulos 1988: 229) with the civil bureaucracy, even though the junta seemed to cooperate with them.

Like in other countries of the world, mass student demonstrations emerged in the end of the 1960s as a resistance to the Junta. "In September 1969 one student [K]osta[s] Yorgakis, committed suicide in public in Genoa by setting fire to himself" (Close 2002: 122). Because this irritated the Colonels, they started to toughen restrictions. In response, students occupied the Law Faculty of the University of Athens in March 1973. "They held protests, boycotted classes and in other ways disrupted the higher education system" (Gallant 2001: 202). Papadopoulos therefore declared the 'coup from above' on June 1, which gave the signal to a presidential parliamentary republic of Greece whose symbol became only the phoenix (Xydis 1974: 509). Moreover, on July 29 a new constitution was accepted by another plebiscite and a puppet civilian cabinet was set up on October 29 by Spyros Markezinis until the elections were held one year later. However, it did not last long because students revolted and organized a sit-in at the Athens Polytechnic in November. In response, Brigadier-General Dimitris Ioannidis, the head of the Military Security Police (ESA), made a coup d'état on November 25, 1973, which led to an armed conflict between students and police troops. The result was thousands of arrested, wounded and even dead people. "Now, President Papadopoulos was replaced by another military man, enjoying more limited powers" (ibid.: 509). This time

the shadow of a soldier was reinstated in the front of the phoenix as the symbol of the Greek military junta. However, it was not difficult to predict at the time that the end of the dictatorship came closer.

In the international arena, Greece had been gradually weakened during the post-Second World War era. After the Great Depression in 1929, the world went into a huge crisis in October 1973 when OPEC announced an increase in the oil price because the USA gave military support to Israel during the Yom Kippur war between the Israeli and Arab people. All NATO members were first affected by this oil crisis and their economies deteriorated. Greece, a NATO member since 1952, was also affected by this worldwide economic crisis. Coupled with high inflation in the country, the Greek economy came to the brink of demise. Moreover, the Junta spent most state money on the construction sector, which led to foreign debt. Since the EEC suspended development loans due to the dictatorship, Greece started to suffer from money shortage.

The ongoing conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots furthermore reached its peak in 1974. Therefore, Brigadier Ioannidis sent Greek army officers to the island in order to provide stability, despite the reluctance of Greek Cypriot President Makarios. Then, Makarios wanted Brigadier Ioannidis to remove the Greek army officers from Cyprus and “protested that the junta was trying to destroy the state of Cyprus, [but] Brigadier Ioannidis’ mindless response was to launch a coup against the president, who was forced to flee the island” (Clogg 1992: 168). In response to the Greek coup, Turkey intervened in Cyprus on July 20, 1974 for three days and the two countries came to the brink of war. However, this catastrophic event caused the end of the seven-years-long military dictatorship as well as of the Kingdom of Greece. Then, Turkey intervened in the island on August 14 for the second time and seized 40 percent of the island.

On July 24, 1974, the day after the end of Turkish intervention, the military government was abolished in Greece. Civilians and retired military members were called to form the new government, the ‘National Salvation’

Council, and Konstantinos Karamanlis was invited from his exile in Paris to be the head of the government of the Third Hellenic Republic (Woodhouse 1985: 157-166). Karamanlis established a civilian coalition government, suspended martial law and the Constitution, and lifted the ban on former politicians.

#### **4.6 The EEC's Reaction to the Greek Dictatorship**

The signing of the Athens Agreement initiated the associate relationship between Greece and the European Community. However, it did not last long. On April 21, 1967, six years after the Agreement had come into effect, three colonels made a coup d'état and briefly established a dictatorship. This interruption of democracy suspended the ongoing relationship. The EEC pressured Greece to restore democracy or it would limit the tariff reductions that were promised in the Association Agreement.

During the military dictatorship in Greece, the relations between the country and the EEC were frozen. The EEC indeed limited the tariff reductions and financial aid until the junta government ceased to exist.

The Greek Colonels' coup changed the attitudes of the EEC member countries which had seen ancient Greece as the cradle of democracy. At the time, the Community had only six members - West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) countries - which cooperated in the non-recognition of the Greek Colonels' junta regime. On May 8, 1967, the European Parliament initiated a debate to evaluate the military intervention in Greek politics. Three days later, the Parliament arrived at a decision about the situation in Greece (JOCE 16 May 1967):

The Parliament expressed its concern over the suspension of democratic life in Greece; declared its solidarity with the Greek people; stated that the association could not be applied in its various facets unless the democratic institutions and civil liberties were restored in Greece; considered that the suppression of the Greek Parliament made impossible the functioning of the mixed Parliamentary Association Commission and estimated that until this

Commission could function again the practical application of the association agreement would be delayed; expressed hope that Greece would soon return to normal democratic life; underlined the prime need that Greece respect the European Covenant of Human Rights; demanded that the civil rights of political prisoners be restored, and charged the appropriate organs of the EEC to follow all developments in Greece and inform the Parliament of all developments (Coufoudakis 1977: 117).

According to this early decision of the European Parliament, the EEC was against the junta in Greece early on. One year later, West Germany's Bundestag decided on April 2, 1968 "to grant no further governmental credits to Greece until parliamentary democracy had been restored" (Xydis 1974: 517).

The European Parliament adopted a resolution on May 7, 1969, in which it "reserved its right to have the association agreement revised or suspended" (ibid.: 519). Furthermore, at the time of the second anniversary of the Colonels' coup, the EEC condemned on May 28, 1969 with another resolution the interruption of Greek democracy and the martial law in force. The second article of the resolution stated that unless democratic and parliamentary structures were established, the Association Agreement would not be implemented, and that under these circumstances, future membership would become unrealizable (JOCE 28 May 1969: 16). Thus, the EEC froze the association relations with Greece.

In fact, the EEC had not established written rules for freezing the association with a country. Because the Community experienced a military intervention in politics of one of its associate states for the first time since its foundation, it used Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome, the Birkelbach report, and the Italian memorandum (Coufoudakis 1977: 120-121). According to these documents, associate countries also had to fulfill the political criterion of the Community, namely adherence to parliamentary democracy. That is to say, if a country did not have a democratically elected parliament, it could not be an associate or a member state.

Thus, the European Parliament of the EEC decided to suspend the Athens Agreement. The EEC stated that the EEC-Greece Joint Parliamentary Committee could no longer work with members of the junta for further development. Consequently, the Community stopped giving financial aid to Greece and discussing agricultural policies of the country.

After the freezing of the relations with the EEC, the Greek junta rapidly felt isolated in the international arena. Greek Colonels reacted to the decision of the EEC by claiming that the Community tried to stop financial assistance to Greece, which was only beneficial for the country but not for the Community, during the five-year association period. After a while, “Greek officials admitted that Greece could not win such a challenge, while the domestic political consequences of such an action could potentially be serious” (ibid.: 126). Despite the fact that the Greek Colonels decided to withdraw from membership in the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969, just before the eleven members of the CoE suggested excluding Greece from membership due to human rights violations, they insisted on maintaining the associate membership in the EEC.

The Greek junta also faced reactions from special interest groups among the Greek people. Workers, trade unionists, journalists, and academics were presenting the conditions in the country under the junta regime to the world through their national and international organizations. Thus, one of the major NGOs in the world, Amnesty International, published reports concerning human rights violations under Greek dictatorship and condemned the junta.

The combined pressure of the European Community, the Council of Europe, the ILO (International Labour Organization), and to a lesser extent of the NATO and the UN, as well as “the complete diplomatic isolation from individual Western democratic European states, reinforced the Greek public’s passive resistance to the junta” (ibid.: 131). The Colonels’ junta regime in Greece ended in July 1974 after the crisis in Cyprus. Elections were held and a government was established by elected civilian politicians. Karamanlis became the new Prime Minister of the Third Hellenic Republic

and re-applied for EEC membership in 1975. At the time, the relationship between the EEC and Greece had been reconstituted, which resulted in EEC membership of the country on the first day of 1981.

#### **4.7 The March 12, 1971 Memorandum to the Turkish Government**

When the 1961 Turkish Constitution was accepted, the ban on politicians was lifted and the NUC gave permission to establish new parties for the upcoming elections. Consequently, eleven new political parties were formed besides Inonu's RPP and Osman Bolukbasi's Republican Peasants' Nation Party (Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi / RPNP). The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi / JP) and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Turkiye Partisi / NTP) were established as successors of the Democrat Party. The JP was headed by Ragip Gumuspala, a retired general, who worked hard for good relations with the NUC, as the Committee was prejudiced against the party due to its connections with the DP. The NTP was established by Ekrem Alican, who had left the DP in 1955 and formed the Freedom Party. In the elections held on October 15, 1961, the RPP gained the majority of votes. However, the combination of the votes for the JP, the NTP, and the RPNP exceeded those for the RPP. "Taken together, the parties that were considered heirs to the Democrats were clearly still the strongest force in the country" (Zurcher 2004: 246).

President Gursel could not give the task of forming the new government to the neo-DP coalition, as this could provoke another military intervention. Hence, he gave this duty to Inonu (Ahmad 1994: 192). A coalition government was founded by the RPP and JP which lasted for only one year. In June 1962, Inonu established another coalition government with two small parties, the RPNP and NTP, and independents. The coalition government ended again one year later when local elections were being held and the JP became the most popular party throughout the country (ibid.: 193). Gumuspala, the leader of the RPNP, could not form the next government; hence, this task was once again given to Inonu. This third Inonu coalition government was a minority government composed of the

MPs of the RPP and the independents. When the civil war between Turkish and Greek Cypriots began in Cyprus in 1964, this government started to lose power. Thus, Inonu resigned in February 1965. “A caretaker cabinet headed by a former diplomat and independent deputy, Suat Hayri Urguplu, then ruled the country until parliamentary elections were held in October” (Zurcher 2004: 249-250). Because the leader of the Justice Party, General Gumuspala, had died, a crisis occurred as regards the election of the new chairman. Eventually, 44-year-old Suleyman Demirel, candidate of Cevdet Sunay and the Chief of General Staff, was elected head of the JP. In the October 1965 elections, the Justice Party obtained the majority of votes. This showed the voice of opposition from former DP supporters among the public. In fact, Demirel was very successful in his first elections due to the fact that he could easily communicate with the residents of the countryside, something that the RPP elites did not manage to do. He successfully used his peasant past while communicating with the population in rural and slum areas, giving them the sense that he was one of them and a self-educated man. Hence, the country was governed by Demirel for the next four-year period.

When the next elections were held in 1969, Demirel’s JP once again gained the majority of votes. Even though he founded a new cabinet, factions developed within the Justice Party one year later. Right-wing members of the party pushed Demirel to resign from his post. He resigned, but formed another government some months later. The dissatisfaction of the right-wing members of the party however remained and they left the party. After 41 representatives and senators had left the JP in December 1970, Ferruh Bozbeyli established the Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti), “its name, of course, recalling the banned Demokrat Parti of Menderes and Bayar” (Zurcher 2004: 252).

Just as leftist ideologies and anti-Americanism were on the rise in European countries during the 1960s, so was the Left in Turkey. Many intellectuals, academics, journalists, and especially university students started to support the Left. They started to run leftist newspapers and formed

political debating societies with the support of the Workers' Party of Turkey (Turkiye Isci Partisi / WPT), founded by Mehmet Ali Aybar in February 1961 in line with the new constitution, and the support of the political science faculty of Ankara University. Moreover, "from 1968 onwards, student movements in Germany, the United States and especially France (where students had come close to launching a revolution and toppling General de Gaulle in May 1968) influenced the youth movement in Turkey" (Zurcher 2004: 255).

The Turkish governments started to sign agreements with the USA with the initial attempt of Menderes and after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and Marshall Aid in 1949 and the membership in NATO in 1952. An important decision among the fifty agreements total was the decision by the Turkish government to let the USA establish its military base in Turkey in the mid-1950s. Gradually, U.S. influence on Turkish politics increased, which created discontent among the Left. Thus, starting from the early 1960s, anti-Americanism increased among the left-wing intellectuals.

When the Greek and Turkish Cypriots clashed in December 1963 after President Archbishop Makarios attempted to change the Cypriot Constitution in such a way as to limit the rights of Turkish Cypriots, the Inonu government decided to intervene in the island with the UK and Greece. U.S. President Johnson sent a letter to Inonu on June 5, 1964 stating that the latter must not intervene in the island using imported American military equipment and that he would not have NATO support if he did do so. Consequently, Inonu withdrew his intervention plans and the crisis ended despite the continuing conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. "The impact of the Johnson letter was so powerful that most Turks considered it a solemn indication that the US controlled everything in Turkey, and that it even directed Turkish foreign policy" (Bolukbasi 1993: 506).

The left-wing intellectuals became more and more critical of this relationship and expressed this in newspapers columns - a right given in the

1961 Constitution. The leftist youth organized and made demonstrations when the American Sixth Fleet visited Turkey in July 1968. The level of opposition grew the following year when the Fleet revisited Turkey in February. The demonstrations transformed into a guerilla war between extreme leftist and rightist youth, called the Bloody Sunday (Kanli Pazar) in Turkish history.

Between 1968 and 1971, guerrilla wars were led by the abovementioned left- and right-wing groups on the streets and in the campuses of the universities. Every day, tens of civil people died in this conflict. Universities stopped functioning while students began to rob banks, attack American bases, and kidnap American officers. The houses of leftist university professors were bombed by the hyper-nationalist activists. Factories were on strike.

When this chaotic atmosphere reached its peak, the Chief of General Staff gave a memorandum on March 12, 1971 to President Cevdet Sunay, who had been elected after the death of Gursel in 1966, and to the presidents of the two assemblies, in order to have the Prime Minister resign and overthrow the government. "It demanded that a strong and credible government be formed that would be able to end the 'anarchy' and carry out reforms 'in a Kemalist spirit'" (ibid.: 258). The army threatened to otherwise make a coup d'état and to take over the government. Demirel resigned immediately and Inonu presented his close friend, Nihat Erim, as the RPP's candidate for the new government. The non-party politician Erim then established the new government. However, the guerrilla wars in the streets did not end. Thus, the NSC declared martial law at the end of April. The Council used its power under martial law to take most of the leftists under control. Thus, thousands of people - intellectuals, trade unionists, and members of the WPT - were arrested.

The Erim government could not become powerful because it remained in the shadow of the NSC. Because the NSC was displeased with the liberal features of the 1961 constitution, the Erim government worked to amend several articles in order to strengthen the role of the military in

politics. Consequently, 44 articles were altered in 1973. With these amendments, the power of the Constitutional Court was diminished and the autonomy of the universities was terminated. In turn, the NSC's role was expanded, that is, its recommendations to the government were made binding. In addition, the duties of the Minister of Defence and the General Chief of Staff were determined, and the latter became autonomous in several realms.

Finally, Nihat Erim resigned from the government in April 1972 and was replaced by Ferit Melen, who was one of the leaders of the Reliance Party. One month later, Bulent Ecevit was elected for the chairmanship of the RPP and Ismet Inonu resigned after this defeat. One year later, in March 1973, the seven-year-term of President Cevdet Sunay ended and a crisis occurred as regards the election of his successor. In the end, retired admiral Fahri Koruturk became the sixth President of the Turkish Republic. He quickly chose a non-party economist, Naim Talu, to form a caretaker government in April 1973 until free elections were held in October.

#### **4.8 Comparison of the European Communities' Reactions to Turkish and Greek Coups d'État**

During the early Cold War era, while two coups d'état had been staged in Turkey in 1960 and 1971, Greece was governed by a seven-years-long military dictatorship from 1967 to 1974.

After Turkish and Greek applications for EEC membership in 1959, Association Agreements were signed with Greece in 1961 and with Turkey in 1963. These Association Agreements aimed at the improvement of the Turkish and Greek economies through financial assistance and at eventual EEC membership for integrating the two countries into Europe.

On May 27, 1960, Turkish colonels made a coup and ruled the country until 1961. This interruption of democracy led to a delay of the Turkish association with the EEC. Even though relations between the Community and Turkey were strained during the military government, the EEC entered into the relationship with Turkey by signing the Ankara Agreement in 1963 after the government was left to civilians. Moreover,

Turkey signed an Additional Protocol in 1970 with the Community. Although another coup d'état was made on March 12, 1971 by Turkish generals who continued to govern the country until 1973, the EEC did not suspend the Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

In turn, Greece had initiated a relationship with the EEC by signing the Athens Agreement in 1961. However, the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967 and constituted a dictatorship. At first, just as in the Turkish case, the EEC applied a wait-and-see policy. However, at the time of the second anniversary of the Greek military junta, the EEC declared the freezing of relations with Greece and suspended the implementation of the Association Agreement. Moreover, it stopped giving financial assistance and limited tariffs due to the continuation of the dictatorship. Consequently, the country had to make efforts to re-constitute the relationship with the Community after the end of the junta regime in 1974.

Besides, Turkey and Greece had become members of the CoE in 1949. The Council was founded in order to safeguard human rights and freedoms on the European continent. Hence, the European Convention on Human Rights was formed within the CoE in 1950 and Turkey and Greece became parties of it. While in the Turkish case, the CoE did not react strongly to the 1960 and 1971 coups, it suspended the membership of Greece after the 1967 coup and condemned human rights violations in the country.

To sum up, the EEC and the CoE responded more severely to the Greek military dictatorship than to the Turkish coups. In my opinion, the EEC and the CoE did not suspend the relationship with Turkey because of the short-lived quality of the military governments in contrast to the seven-years-long junta of the Greek Colonels. Both European institutions froze their relations with Greece until the long-lived junta regime was replaced by a civilian government.

## **Chapter 5: Turkey's Troubled Decade: 1973 to 1983**

### **5.1 The Third Turkish Coup d'État on September 12, 1980**

When elections were held in Turkey in October 1973, the military's effect on politics since the 1971 coup came to an end. During the military regime, Bulent Ecevit became the voice of the opposition within the RPP. According to him, the RPP found society ignorant and this elitist perception should be changed (Ahmad 1994: 221). Finally, Inonu resigned from the RPP chairmanship in May 1973 and Ecevit was elected new party leader. Because no one predicted the defeat of Inonu, the shock transformed Ecevit into a charismatic figure (ibid.: 225). Consequently, Ecevit's RPP won the elections, but it took several months to negotiate the coalition government. Surprisingly, Ecevit formed a coalition government with Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi / NSP) in January 1974.

After the establishment of the RPP-NSP coalition, rightist violence increased. Rightist activists were fighting with leftists who had anti-European and anti-American views. Anti-Americanism was reinforced when the RPP-NSP coalition government allowed opium plantations in six cities in March.

In order to prevent Ecevit's RPP to come into power solitarily, the right-wing political parties came together and participated in the elections. "After months of rather undignified haggling, and the installation of a caretaker cabinet under Professor Sadi Irmak, Demirel was finally able to put together a coalition", called 'Nationalist Front' (Milliyetci Cephe) (Zurcher 2004: 261). The second term of Demirel continued until the June 1977 elections. Within the Nationalist Front the political parties did not get along well during the two year period. New elections were held in June in a

chaotic context, that is, economic crisis and violence on the streets since the early 1970s. For the first time in his career, Ecevit received about 41 percent of the votes. He tried to form a coalition government with independents but failed. Thus, Demirel established the second Nationalist Front in which the NSP and the NAP became more preponderant compared to the first one. This time again, the Nationalist Front government did not work well. In January 1978 Ecevit therefore formed a coalition government composed of the RPP and independents. This government also did not last long because Ecevit could not work effectively due to the enduring debate with Demirel. Thus, in November 1979 Ecevit had to resign. Demirel constituted a minority government composed of the JP and independents in November 1979, which was ended by the military coup on September 12, 1980.

During the period of 1973 to 1980, from the end of the military influence on politics in 1973 until the third military coup d'état of the Turkish army in 1980, the established governments could not last long and be operative. The main conflict and contest took place between the two main political parties, the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party, especially on the level of their leaders Bulent Ecevit and Suleyman Demirel. Because both of them believed that they could obtain the majority of votes in any upcoming election and form a majority government, they did not want to establish a coalition with each other. Therefore, they paid attention to the small ideological political parties, which hence became powerful. Suddenly, they had a voice in every coalition government established either by the RPP or the JP.

In addition to political polarization, the Turkish economy continued to deteriorate during the 1970s. Due to the economic crisis, both the unemployed leftist and rightist youth stood to lose nothing and continued their guerrilla war on the streets and in the campuses of the universities. The right-wing activists had the advantage because during the two Nationalist Front governments the police and other security forces were replaced with supporters of the NAP who protected the members of the Hearths of the Ideal.

In the end of the 1970s, political violence increased with the murder of mostly leftist politicians, trade unionists, and intellectuals by the members of extreme rightist organizations. “The number of victims of political violence rose quickly: from around 230 in 1977 (39 of them the victims of unknown gunmen who opened fire on a 1 May demonstration organized in Taksim Square in Istanbul)” (Zurcher 2004: 263) to around 1500 in 1979.

The polarization in the society deepened when PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan) was established in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan, a student of the faculty of political science at Ankara University. Ocalan aimed at establishing a socialist Kurdish state in the southeast of Turkey and started to organize and militarize Kurdish people in the southeast.

Armenian terrorism was another problem the Turkish governments had to deal with during the 1970s. In 1975, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was established by hyper-nationalists in order to take revenge for the Armenian forced migration in 1915. Thus, the members of the ASALA started to attack and kill more than thirty Turkish diplomats throughout the world (Gunver 1989: 40-41).

Besides the domestic factors, there were also international conditions which paved the way for the September 12, 1980 coup. With the first OPEC oil crisis in 1973 and the second one in 1979, the Turkish economy deteriorated because of the gradual increase in oil prices. Like other European countries which were dependent on oil for energy, Turkey suffered from paying for the oil bills. “Oil for industry and for generating electricity became increasingly scarce and by 1979 power cuts of up to five hours a day were the rule, even in mid-winter” (Zurcher 2004: 267). Throughout the 1970s, the country faced enduring high inflation and repeated devaluation of the Turkish Lira. In order to counter this, the last Demirel government before the 1980 coup charged Turgut Ozal with preparing a new development plan. Ozal met with high-ranking military officers to explain the situation of the Turkish economy and the measures that had to be taken. With the permission of the army, Ozal declared the

Decisions of January 24, which aimed at the reconstitution of the Turkish economy as an open market. It was obvious at the time that the Armed Forces wanted Ozal to execute financial affairs and recover the Turkish economy (Barlas 1994: 8-9). However, the generals were also suspicious of Ozal because he was the right hand of the Demirel government (ibid.: 14).

The Decisions of January 24 were reacted against by trade unionists with rebellions on the streets during the spring of the same year. The decisions included privatization of the Turkish economy, encouragement for foreign capital investment and for the import and export of goods, and the use of low-interest credits from banks for investment. However, these low-interest credits led to the bankruptcy of banks, which increased discontent among the public. Opposition parties blamed the government and proposed an investigation of the Minister of Finance, Ismet Sezgin, which was rejected (Interview with Ismet Sezgin).

Ozal knew that he could not improve the Turkish economy in the context of the ongoing party politics and opposition (Ahmad 1994: 249). The 1980 coup created the atmosphere desired by Ozal. It also aimed at the depoliticization of the people, which would create long-term stabilization (ibid.: 249).

In January 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran transformed the polity of the country into theocracy, religious rule. The ideas of the Revolution quickly spread to other Muslim countries, first of all to Turkey. Erbakan's NSP in cooperation with other extreme Islamist groups were influenced by the revolution and tried to bring the rule of Islamic law to Turkey. The last event that encouraged the Turkish army to intervene in politics was the revolt in the beginning of September 1980 by fundamental Islamists in Konya who called for a theocracy.

On December 27, 1979, a letter signed by the Chief of General Staff General Kenan Evren, the Commanders in Chief of the Turkish Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Commander of Gendarmerie was submitted to the President. The NSC stated in response:

‘The Opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces’ with the objective of ‘warning all constitutional institutions and political parties once again’, should be carefully read in order to better evaluate the behavior and attitudes of constitutional institutions, particularly of political parties, certain trade unions, associations and some press organs following the submittal of this letter (quoted in The General Secretariat of the National Security Council 1982: 159-160; for the whole text, see *ibid.*: 160-161).

Evren was in favor of waiting until the last second because he predicted that the civilian politicians would gradually get stuck in adverse conditions. Thus, when the NSC staged a coup d’état, neither internal nor external reactions were to be expected. After this letter, Demirel got anxious and thought about resigning. However, Ozal resisted this and told him that “if I were you, I would immediately sack those who gave this letter” (quoted in Barlas 1994: 7).

When the crisis as regards the election of a new President broke out in April 1980 after the presidency of Fahri Koruturk, the government was faced with chaos, just as Evren wanted. Therefore, he took preparations for the coup and set the date for the start of the ‘Flag Plan’ for July 11. Nevertheless, he delayed the coup again because he wanted the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) Debt-Deferral Negotiations on July 22 to pass and arrive at a conclusion in favor of Turkey. Then, August 22 was recommended by the military, but because of the August 30 Victory Day, Evren delayed the date again. Finally, he decided to stage the coup on September 12. He liked the date because it fell on a Friday like the two previous coups.

Because the Turkish Armed Forces believed that the government could not end the chaotic atmosphere, it overthrew the government and seized power under the leadership of General Kenan Evren at 04:00 o’clock in the morning of September 12, 1980 (for the entire text of Evren’s speech, see The General Secretariat of the National Security Council 1982: 221-222). General Kenan Evren declared that “the take-over had been carried out

in accordance with Article 34 of the military by-law, ... and that it was an act taken on behalf of the entire nation, a claim given substance by later acts” (Karpaz 1988: 149). He justified his action with the claim that “if we had still waited for the politicians to save this country, a civil war might have occurred in the near future” (quoted in Cemal 1992: 82-83).

After the coup d'état, Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, the Commanders in Chief of the Turkish Army Nurettin Ersin, of Navy Tahsin Sahinkaya, of Air Force Nejat Tumer, and the Commander of Gendarmerie Sedat Celasun established their junta, called the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Konseyi / NSC)<sup>2</sup>, which was authorized with both legislative and executive powers.

In a short period of time, the National Assembly was suspended, leaders of the political parties were arrested, and trade unions and newspapers were closed down. Evren notably tried to break the connections of former politicians with politics as well as to erase the past of the former political parties by damaging their archives. Martial law was established throughout the country. Compared to the previous two coups d'état, the army, especially the NSC, this time concentrated power solely in its own hands. It seemed that it would make radical changes during the military regime. One week later, on September 20, five generals of the NSC appointed retired general Bulent Ulusu for the establishment of a military government. Because their relations with Ozal had been moderate since the Demirel government, they offered Ozal the position of Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs. According to Ozal, it was difficult to work with five generals in the absence of the Assembly, but he was happy with the problem-free implementation of the Decisions of January 24 throughout the next 22 months (Barlas 1994: 18-19).

Western European countries supported the September 12 coup from the first day on through broadcasting because they calmed down with the

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<sup>2</sup> Hereafter, when I use the abbreviation “NSC” in this chapter, I refer to these five commanders’ council, which was abolished on November 7, 1983 after the general elections. If I want to mention about the NSC that was established with the 1961 Constitution, I write it in Turkish in parenthesis.

establishment of the authoritarian military regime in Turkey. This meant that Turkey would not be influenced by both the Islamic revolution in Iran and the war between the USA and Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which started the Second Cold War era. The newscaster of the BBC presented it as a success of the Turkish Armed Forces and stated: “Eventually, it has happened. Tonight, Demirel, Ecevit and other Turkish politicians are living their first night under the guarantee and supervision of the army” (quoted in Arcayurek 1986: 398). The United States was accused of having known about the coup beforehand, because U.S. television was the first among all countries to transmit the news from Turkey. This however was rejected by both General Evren and the U.S. authorities based on time difference.

In October 1980, the former party chairmen were released. One year later, in October 1981, Evren decided to close down all political parties. “The closure of the RPP ended the phase of modernization that had begun with the founding of Committee of Union and Progress during the Young Turk era” (Karpas 1988: 157).

The NSC argued that it aimed at dissolving the chaos in the streets, so it started to implement strict regulations. The military government arrested everyone, from politicians to academics, who they thought to be dangerous. With the NSC’s order, detention time increased from 15 to 30 days in the first week and to 90 days in the following year. Consequently, the number of arrested people reached about 40,000 at the end of the year. One year later, at the first anniversary of the coup, more than 100,000 people were kept in custody. Moreover, “at the second anniversary of the coup, 80,000 detainees were still in prison among which 30,000 of them waited for trial” (Zurcher 2004: 279). Detention time was then diminished first to 15 days; in 1989 it was set at only 24 hours in order to prevent torture under police custody.

In addition, leading members of the NSC decided to approve death penalties in October. Consequently, “approximately 3600 death penalties were inflicted from which only 20 were actually carried out” (ibid.: 280).

As was the tendency of the previous two coups d'état, the NSC aimed at changing the constitution. On November 7, 1982, a referendum was held for the new constitution. However, the referendum was problematic because voting in the affirmative meant voting at the same time for a seven-years-long presidency of Kenan Evren. "Voting was made compulsory and anyone who chose not to vote, on the one hand, had to pay a fine, and on the other hand, lost his or her right to vote for five years" (ibid.: 281). Just before the referendum, Evren carried out an order in which he banned any objection to the Constitution as a whole. In the end, the new Constitution and the new President were accepted by the public with an affirmative vote of 91.4 percent. The new 1982 Constitution increased the power of the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) and of Evren and furthermore limited civil rights and liberties of the Turkish people. "While it did add precision to the composition of the NSC [Milli Guvenlik Kurulu] ..., the main change to previous practice was to specify that 'decisions of the Council ... are to be given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers'" (Article 18, quoted in Harris 1988: 194). "That strengthened the language inserted in 1971 providing merely for the NSC [Milli Guvenlik Kurulu] to 'recommend' its fundamental views to the Council of Ministers" (Article 111, quoted in ibid.: 194). Moreover, according to the Constitution, State Security Courts (Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemeleri) were opened which brought thousands of people to trial before being closed down in 2004.

As provisioned in the new constitution, the Higher Education Authority (Yuksekk Ogretim Kurulu / YOK) was established to control the universities by appointing rectors and deans and discharging hundreds of academics. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Ust Kurulu / RTUK) was also established to control all radio and TV broadcasts, such as the mass media, the news, movies, or soap operas. After the establishment of YOK and RTUK as control mechanisms for education and broadcasting, the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) established a connection with civilian bodies by placing army officers as members of these authorities. Thus, the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) could

place restrictions on the social life and education of the Turkish people through these boards.

At the beginning of 1983, the NSC started to take strict measures before leaving the government to civilians. As first measure, former party politicians were banned from politics for ten years. Nevertheless, the NSC gave permission to establish new political parties upon its approval. “Students, teachers and civil servants were prohibited from party membership and the new political parties were not allowed to found women’s or youth branches, to develop links with trade unions or to open branches in villages” (Zurcher 2004: 282). Until the November 6, 1983 elections, fifteen new political parties asked for the NSC’s permission but only three of them were allowed: the Populist Party (Halkci Parti / PP) from the RPP tradition under the leadership of Necdet Calp, the Party of Nationalist Democracy (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi / PND) established by the retired general Turgut Sunalp, and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi / MP) under the chairmanship of Turgut Ozal (Turgut 1986). General Evren thought about a two-party system in the Assembly where the ruling party should be on the right while the opposition party should stay on the left (Barlas 1994: 29).

With the free elections of November 1983, the Turkish military under the leadership of the National Security Council left the government to the civilian politicians. Ozal became the Prime Minister. His party’s ideology differed from the former two schools in Turkish political life, that is, the right and left wings of the Committee of Union of Progress, the statist Republican People’s Party on the one hand and the liberal Democrat Party on the other hand (ibid.: 43). Except for the Motherland Party, parties placed between the two schools in terms of their ideology did not last long (ibid.: 43). Ozal formed the government with new MPs who did not have a relation with the former political parties. In this way, he tried to cut all ties with Turkish politics before the September 12 coup. “Even though he was a major beneficiary of the military’s behavior, he tried hard, both as Prime

Minister and [later] as President, to reduce the officers' traditional political supremacy" (Karabelias 2008: 459).

## **5.2 The EEC's Reactions to the September 12, 1980 Coup in Turkey**

During the transitional period the relationship between Turkey and the EEC was interrupted first in 1974 at the time of the Cyprus crisis. Europe received the first military operation in July favorably because they thought that Cyprus and Makarios were saved (Gunver 1989: 14). However, the second operation in August was protested against by the European countries. On September 19, 1974, the Greek Cypriot government brought Turkey before the ECtHR, claiming that the Turkish government had violated some of the articles of the ECHR. Western European countries supported the Greek Cypriots and did not recognize the Turkish Federative State of Cyprus established on February 13, 1975. The EEC made a decision about Cyprus on October 21, 1977 in which the Council of Ministers asked both sides to solve their problems and to establish a peaceful atmosphere within nine months (*ibid.*: 57). Turkey regarded this decision as a victory because the EEC accepted that both sides rather than Turkey alone had violated human rights.

In 1978, the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit froze relations with the Community. Consequently, the EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee did not operate for more than one year. However, on January 20, 1979, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided in favor of Turkey as regards the Cyprus issue (*ibid.*: 90-91). It declared that complaints of Greek Cypriots were one-sided and that the problem therefore had to be solved through international negotiations. Thus, the Committee closed the Cyprus issue in early 1979 and left its solution to the UN Secretary General. The European Parliament in turn adopted a resolution on April 9, 1979 upon the recommendation of the EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee on October 27, 1978 (see European Parliament Working Documents 7 March 1979). In this resolution, the Parliament recognized "the extraordinarily difficult economic problems, especially the

balance of payments problems of Turkey, and its support of the call made by the Joint Parliamentary Committee to implement an emergency aid program to help solve Turkey's foreign payments problems" (OJEC 9 April 1979). Thus, "the European Parliament was satisfied with the signature of the Third Financial Protocol in 1977 which would provide for a sum of 310 million EUA to Turkey in order to consolidate the country's economic development" (ibid.).

At the time of the military intervention on September 12, 1980, relations worsened. The European Parliament discussed the situation in Turkey for 45 minutes on September 17, 1980 (Gunver 1989: 115). In the first weeks, the EEC implemented a wait-and-see policy concerning the Turkish military coup, because General Evren announced at every opportunity that they would leave the government to civilian politicians as soon as possible. On October 13, 1980, the European Parliament carried a resolution in which it "condemned the military take-over in Turkey and reaffirmed that the respect for internationally recognized human rights, as laid down in the European Convention, was an essential condition for dialogue with a European State associated with the EEC" (OJEC 13 October 1980). Because Evren did not keep his promise, the Fourth Financial Protocol was suspended and the Association Agreement was frozen by the EEC. In contrast to the American authorities who were tolerant toward every military intervention in Turkey, the EEC opposed the military regime and its restrictions (Belge 1993: 23).

Likewise, the Council of Europe condemned the coup and the military government of Turkey. In the middle of 1981, the CoE still maintained a moderate attitude towards Turkey. Turkey's turn for the Deputy Chairmanship and the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers was to be in May and in November 1981. The Turkish government requested to delay it to a later date because democracy was not yet reconsolidated in the country. Otherwise, Turkey would have had to wait for another ten years. Consequently, the CoE decided in favor of Turkey on May 11, 1981. However, the Pope plot of Mehmet Ali Agca, hijacking of

leftists, and ASALA's bomb attack and assassinations occurred throughout May 1981. In addition, the NSC banned speech and writing of former politicians on June 2 (Gunver 1989: 170-171). These developments provoked the discontent of both the EEC and the CoE. Thus, the European Parliament adopted a resolution at the beginning of May 1981 in which it "condemned the continuing political violence with the backing of the regime, despite the expressed aims of the military regime" (OJEC 4 May 1981). It also "warned the Turkish military regime of the fact that the association between Turkey and the European Community would be suspended with immediate effect unless democratic institutions and practices are reinstated within two months" (ibid.).

On July 2, a message from Turkey stated the request of the death penalty for 52 members of the DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions / Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu), one of the leading two trade unions of Turkey. At that time, the CoE warned Turkish delegates that it would expel Turkey in January 1982 unless the conditions in Turkey returned to normal. The EEC also declared that it was disturbed by the news coming from Turkey. The European Parliament carried a resolution on February 15, 1982 in which it stated that after the coup d'état of September 12, 1980 "the Turkish military regime had shown no serious desire to restore civil and democratic freedom" (OJEC 15 February 1982). Moreover, it "called for the immediate release of the political detainees, the re-establishment, in full freedom, of the democratic and trade union organizations and the restoration of the Turkish democratic institutions" (ibid.). The European Parliament also reiterated its request to the Commission and the Council to "suspend the Community's financial aid to Turkey until such time as respect for human and civil rights and democratic liberties was once again assured in Turkey" (ibid.). Finally, it decided "not to renew the mandate of its members on the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association until such time as the Turkish Grand National Assembly had been freely elected in a secret ballot by direct universal suffrage" (ibid.).

General Evren's decision on the abolition of political parties in October 1981 further worsened the relations. Several member states of the CoE also accused Turkey of violating the ECHR and decided to bring Turkey before the court in early 1982. Despite this, the CoE did not expel Turkey. After the free elections in November 1983, good relations between Turkey and the CoE started to be built up again.

The European Parliament in turn adopted a resolution regarding the political situation in Turkey on September 13, 1982 in which it recommended that

the Council would adopt the Fourth EEC-Turkey Financial Protocol as soon as the various stages of the return to democracy had been finally completed, and it also decided not to renew the mandates of the members of its delegation to the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association until secret, free, and direct general elections had been held to the Turkish Grand National Assembly and until the latter had been convened (OJEC 13 September 1982; for further information see European Parliament Working Documents 7 June 1982).

In early 1983, the EEC increased its pressure on the Turkish military regime to hold free elections. Until the November 1983 general elections, the EEC tried to keep relations with Turkey distant. For example, in March 1983, Turkey requested the extradition of more than 100 Turkish citizens living abroad. The European Parliament decided to resist this demand because it believed that "these political criminals escaped from actual or feared persecution but they also had the right to seek political asylum in the Member States" (OJEC 14 March 1983). After the November 1983 free elections, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on July 2, 1984 in which the EEC noted that "the election of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the local elections were held with which Turkey had taken its first steps towards the re-establishment of pluralistic democracy" (OJEC 2 July 1984a). However, the de facto martial law continued to prevail in the country.

Although the EEC welcomed the steps taken by the Turkish authorities to set up committees to investigate allegations of torture and ill-treatment in prisons, it reiterated its urgent desire to see an end to torture in the country, the re-establishment of the rights of justice and the release of political prisoners detained because of their opinions or because of their nationality (OJEC 2 July 1984a; OJEC 2 July 1984b).

Finally, the European Parliament emphasized that “only measures leading to the re-establishment of democracy and respect for human rights could bring about a normalization of relations between Turkey and the European Community and guarantee the resumption, ... of the work of the EEC-Turkey Association institutions” (OJEC 2 July 1984a).

On October 9, 1985, the European Parliament of the EEC prepared its Working Documents about the human rights situation in Turkey. In this report, the Parliament criticized the imprisonment of intellectuals and trade unionists, torture and death sentences, and discussed the fate of Kurdish people on the fifth anniversary of the military regime in Turkey (European Parliament Working Documents 9 October 1985).<sup>3</sup> The EEC believed that the Kurdish prisoners, punished due to attacks of the PKK on civilian people, faced human rights violations. Thus, it demanded from Turkey to release them and to regard them as a minority group.

Lastly, the EEC evaluated all of the problems in Turkey after the September 12, 1980 coup on December 31, 1985. Since the establishment of the military regime in Turkey, the European Parliament had adopted about 11 resolutions concerning the human rights situation in Turkey while there existed more than 20 motions for resolutions. “The Political Affairs Committee under the authority of the Bureau of the Parliament appointed a rapporteur who visited Turkey to prepare a report on the human rights situation” (OJEC 31 December 1985). “The Parliament welcomed the

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<sup>3</sup> For the detailed list of political prisoners who died in detention places or prisons and who disappeared between September 12, 1980- September 12, 1995, see Human Rights Foundation of Turkey 1996; for the specific events of human rights violations, see Tusalp 1989: 168-223.

rapporteur's finding that some progress had been made towards the restoration of human rights in Turkey and that there appeared to be a widespread recognition of the need for further such reforms" (ibid.). Furthermore, it welcomed

signs of relaxation in the strict and repressive censorship of writing and publishing, and the freedom of association and the right to engage in democratic politics, the holding of local elections in 1984 for the first time since the coup d'état, with a wider representation of political parties than had been permitted in the general election of 1983 (ibid.).

The Parliament recalled that the Turkish Assembly had to be elected through free elections, "restrictions on the trade union rights had to be removed, martial law, which still remained in force in some areas, had to be lifted, the death penalty had to be abolished, and the rights of minorities had to be protected" (ibid.).

### **5.3 Comparison of the EEC's Reactions to the Greek Colonels' Coup of 1967 and the Turkish Military Intervention of 1980**

When the Turkish generals took power on September 12, 1980, the EEC first waited and tried to understand the aims of General Evren before adopting severe decisions concerning the country. During the first months, General Evren did not close the parties and declared that he would leave government to civilian politicians as soon as possible. However, he also declared martial law and started to impose restrictions. Thus, on October 13, 1980, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it condemned the military rule in Turkey. Due to the fact that Evren did not intend to give the government to civilians, the EEC reacted to the military regime by threatening it with suspending the Fourth Financial Protocol and with freezing the Association Agreement. Throughout the following year, the EEC accused the Turkish government of human rights violations, political detainees, and the closure of political parties. Finally, on September 13, 1982, upon one of the European Parliament's resolutions, the EEC decided to suspend the Community's financial aid to Turkey and the work of the

Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association until the Turkish Grand National Assembly had been constituted through free elections.

When the Greek Colonels had launched a coup d'état on April 21, 1967, the EEC had reacted to Greece in a manner similar to its reaction to the later Turkish generals' coup of September 12. On May 11, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which the Greek government was condemned due to its take-over and its human rights violations. In this resolution, the Community threatened Greece with suspension of the association. In fact, even the wording of the resolutions concerning Greece and Turkey resemble each other. On the second anniversary of the Colonels' coup, another resolution was passed by the Parliament on May 28, 1969. In this resolution, the EEC froze the association with Greece by stating that the Association Agreement would not be implemented until democratic institutions were established in Greece, thus full membership of the country in the EEC would become impossible.

At the time of the Greek Colonels' take-over, the EEC had not yet experienced a military intervention in one of its member or associate states' politics. Therefore, lack of experience led the Community to behave roughly towards the Greek junta, more severely than towards the Turkish military regime. When General Evren overthrew the government in September 1980, the EEC had experience with a seven-years-long Greek junta between 1967 and 1974 and a short-lived memorandum to Turkish politicians in 1971. Thus, the Community acted towards Turkey in the light of its past experiences: milder than towards Greece but with an effort at equal treatment.

In addition, the CoE reacted to Greece in a stronger manner than to Turkey. While it decided to expel Greece from membership in December 1969, the CoE only threatened Turkey with expulsion. As a result, Greece was expelled from the CoE in 1969 and its associate membership in the EEC was suspended, whereas Turkey could remain a member of the CoE during the three-years-long military regime due to the successful diplomacy

of Semih Gunver, who was the Turkey's permanent representative in the CoE. Nevertheless, both association agreements of Turkey and Greece were suspended in the second year of their military regimes and the relations were frozen until the military officers were replaced by civilian politicians. With the suspension of the associations, financial aid ceased as well. The Greek economy suffered more than Turkey's because the Colonels' junta lasted seven years, five of which Greece tried to survive without any European support, while the Turkish military regime continued for three years only, one of which it did not receive any assistance from the EEC.

Greece's full membership in the EEC in early 1981 and its veto power actually played a big role in the reactions of the EEC to Turkey. At the time of the September 12 coup, Greece had already signed the full accession agreement (in May 1979). Thus, Greece was closely involved in the decisions concerning Turkey. PASOK came to power after Greek membership in the EEC and its leader, Papandreou, did not have good relations with Turkey in the beginning. The tense relations between Turkey and Greece were easily reflected in the decisions of the EEC.

If Greece had not become the tenth member of the European Communities, would the EEC have frozen relations with Turkey after the coup? Would it have suspended the Additional Protocols and financial aid? Probably, yes. The EEC declared at the time of Greece's admission that it would not involve in and try to solve problems between Turkey and Greece. And because of its democratic principles, the Community could not overlook the interruption of Turkish democracy. It had to react somehow.

## Chapter 6: Civilianization in Greece<sup>4</sup>

### 6.1 Democratic Consolidation and Exclusion of the Military from Politics in Greece since July 1974

After the fall of the Colonels' dictatorship in Greece, a civilian government was established as soon as possible. Even though it was to be a civilian cabinet, there were some retired military men included. That is, Greece could not immediately exclude members of the army from politics. Therefore, in order to consolidate democracy in the country, Greek government started to work towards the devolution of the military's role in Greek politics after the end of the dictatorship in July 1974.

Konstantinos Karamanlis established his new party, New Democracy (Nea Demokratia / ND), on September 26, 1974. It was to be a right-of-center party and represented the orthodox or traditional Right of society. Thus, the process of democratization started, because this party represented an initiative of the establishment of democratic institutions. Elections were held on November 17, 1974. Under the leadership of Karamanlis, New Democracy won and formed its government with elected politicians. On December 8, 1974, a plebiscite was held on the future of the monarchy. 70 percent of the voters were against the restoration of the monarchy. This was a turning point in Greek history: the monarchy was abolished and the Third Hellenic Republic founded.

When the military dictatorship was founded in Greece in April 1967, "aside from the extremists on the right, who cheered as the tanks rolled into Athens, many Greeks had accepted the 1967 army take-over as a panacea for the political instability of the previous two years" (Evriviades 1979: 163). "The majority, though heartily disliking military rule, became

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<sup>4</sup> See Duman & Tsarouhas 2006.

resigned to it and did nothing to undermine it” (ibid.: 163). Yet, after a seven-years-long dictatorship, opposition against the Greek military developed among the public. In the general elections, this opposition was harnessed by Karamanlis’ New Democracy party with the slogan “Karamanlis or the tanks”.

In January 1975, “the Greek Parliament determined that the Army’s action had been a coup d’état and not a revolution: it was therefore illegal” (Woodhouse 1991: 310). Papadopoulos and other interventionists, 24 persons in total, were prosecuted in May. The court convicted 18 of them and inflicted the death penalty on the three Colonels, Papadopoulos, Pattakos, and Makarezos. “They were immediately reprieved by the President on the government’s recommendation” (ibid.: 310-311) because the conviction coincided with the Greek application for full membership to the EEC and might have negatively affected the process.

Before the dictatorship, the Chiefs of Staff of Army, Navy and Air Force were governed by Law 2387 of 1953 according to which “each Chief of Staff was separately responsible for his own branch to the Minister of Defence who was vested with the highest authority over military matters” (Veremis 1983: 180). “The General Staff of National Defence coordinated the activities of the three services without, in fact, having any authority over them” (Veremis 1997: 156). During the dictatorship era, the 1952 Constitution was replaced with the 1968 Constitution, which did not include civil rights and opened the way for Papadopoulos to bring several ministries under his person. The Chiefs of Staff were furthermore made dependent on him. The 1968 Constitution moreover served the military with its pension law for army officers, leading to a great increase in retirement of military officers.

In the post-dictatorship era, the 1968/73 Constitution was first replaced with the restored 1952 Constitution. Then, in 1975, a new constitution was adopted by the ND government. While this constitution took measures for the civilianization of the army it also insulated army officers from public investigation. According to Article 68 paragraph 2 of

the 1975 Constitution, “Parliament can constitute committees of enquiry with a two-fifths vote in the assembly on all matters except those of a military nature which require an absolute majority” (Veremis 1983: 181). Moreover, according to Law 660 of August 1977, the government alone was to be responsible for national defence, but the army, navy and air forces were left autonomous under the top authority of the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff. Therefore, the Supreme Council of National Defence (earlier ASEA, later KYSEA) was established, which was headed by the Prime Minister and further included the Deputy Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defence, National Economy, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Public Order, and the Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff. “The decisions of the ASEA were based on suggestions of the Minister of Defence, who in turn was advised by the Chief of the General Staff” (ibid.: 180). “Since the Minister had no experience of the problems of the armed forces, his decisions were obviously influenced by his military advisers, i.e., the Chiefs of Staff” (ibid.: 180).

In the New Democracy period from 1974 to 1981, the party initiated the democratization process in a top-down manner. Karamanlis stopped using communism as a threat and allowed the establishment of leftist parties, i.e. PASOK (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima / Panhellenic Socialist Movement), and their legalization, i.e. KKE (Kommounistiko Komma Elladas / Communist Party of Greece). The party further dealt with retirement and promotion issues of military officers and recalled some army officers to active duty. Thus, Karamanlis on the one hand tried not to challenge the military’s interests and on the other hand began to take government control of all the military branches. Thus, the military was progressively controlled by civil authorities and integrated into civil society. However, because these attempts did not occur in a bottom-up manner, civil society remained weak. When Greece became a member state of the European Communities in 1981 and was under pressure by the EC to enhance civilianization, the country began to create a strong, reactive, and effective civil society.

In May 1980, Karamanlis became the President of Greece and Georgios Rallis succeeded him as the new Prime Minister until the new elections. The elections on October 18, 1981 were won by PASOK, which had been founded in September 1974 by Andreas Papandreou. This became a turning point for the Greek democratization process because it was the first time that a left-of-center party governed the country. Furthermore, because right-wing parties stopped using the anti-communism threat, PASOK, which possessed leftist, but non-communist and nationalist attitudes, rapidly gained popular support.

Like New Democracy, PASOK tried to establish good relations with the military and not to challenge their interests. Like New Democracy, it continued to pay attention to retirement, pension, and promotion issues of army officers. PASOK also carried on the ND's initiative of recalling retired army officers to active work, especially to the Ministry of Defence. This created dissatisfaction among some acting military officers because of promotion issues.

In 1993, PASOK government adopted and "passed a law allowing the recall of retired officers to active duty within six months of its publication in the Government Gazette (Law 2171, 6 December 1993)" (Veremis 1997: 178). As soon as the law was passed, almost all of the members of the army were replaced by recalled retired officers. Gradually, the party increased the salaries of military officers and began to gain support of about half of the officers of the army, navy, and air forces. In addition, PASOK passed a law in 1995 which replaced the 1977 law and made the Minister of Defence responsible for all military issues. That is, the PASOK government tried to centralize the army and to exert direct government authority over all the branches of the military. Hence, military forces were to be gradually incorporated into civil society. Furthermore, the Council of Defence continued to implement national security policies with its mixed membership of both military and civilian origin. The General Directorate of Armaments (GDA), later General Directorate for Defense Investment and Armaments (GDDIA), was established in order to deal with procurement

programs. It was responsible to the Ministry of Defence and also consisted of both civilians and military advisers.

All of these improvements were made gradually since 1974 through the implementation of different laws in order to exclude the military from politics and to incorporate them into civil society. Consequently, the number of members with military background in the cabinets decreased since 1974. Currently, the Greek political system does not allow retired military officers to interfere in politics via membership in the parliament. Since 1974, the country has entered an era of democratization and civilianization. Newly established civil governments tried to prevent military interference into politics by keeping military under the authority of the government. After many amendments, the Minister of Defence has since the late 1990s the last word concerning national security policy of Greece. With the Greek governments' efforts to integrate the military into civil society, Greece joined the European Communities in January 1981. From then on, the country has tried to fulfill the obligations of the Community.

Nowadays, both high-ranking and low-ranking army officers have been changing their mentality due to modern education in the Military Academy. "Although little information is available concerning the present state of mind of the armed forces, there is no indication that Greek officers are not happily occupied with the exclusive task of protecting the homeland from external threats" (Veremis 1983: 181). Thus, gradually, the interventionism of the military has been abandoned and any possibility of military intervention in politics has been eliminated.

## **6.2 Europeanization of Greece and the EEC Membership**

Until 1974, Greece was an economically poor and politically weak country which was afflicted by several armed interventions and dictatorships, a destructive civil war, and almost every international war in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Especially after the Second World War, Greece was supported financially and politically by the USA with the implementation of Marshall Aid. However, during the dictatorship, anti-Americanism rose among the Colonels. After the dictatorship, Karamanlis maintained this

policy and withdrew from NATO's southeast flank (Iatrides 1983: 168-169) as a reaction against the United States and NATO. Yet, Greece turned entirely towards Europe.

After the Colonels' dictatorship was abolished in July 1974, "the Council of Europe welcomed Greece back and the EEC unfroze the Treaty of Association in December" (Woodhouse 1991: 308). Because Karamanlis wanted Greece to integrate into Europe, as shown in his famous speech 'Greece belongs to the West', the country applied to the European Communities for full membership on June 12, 1975 one year after the consolidation of the civilian government in Greece. Upon the Greek application, the European Commission prepared and delivered its opinion to the Council of Ministers of the EEC on January 29, 1976. According to the Commission, the consolidation of Greece's democracy, which was "a fundamental concern not only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its Member States, was intimately related to the evolution of Greece's relationship with the Community" (<http://www.ena.lu/>). Thus, "the Commission recommended that a clear affirmative reply be given to the Greek request and that negotiations for Greek accession be opened" (ibid.).

At the time, Karamanlis' New Democracy was in power and the left parties were in opposition. The left-of-center PASOK and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) reacted against the Greek application for EEC membership. They opposed basing the integration into Europe solely on political concerns and opening the country's market to the EEC member states because of expected adverse economic effects. Mainly, the PASOK and the KKE aimed at democratic socialization of the country and they opposed "Greece's planned association to the EEC and to Greece's political or military association with NATO and the United States" (Evriviades 1979: 164). Nevertheless, Karamanlis, who initiated the Greek association agreement with the EEC himself in 1961, precipitated "Greece's full accession into the European Economic Community by the early 1980s rather than later in the decade, as had originally been planned" (ibid.: 164). According to Karamanlis, Greece's full membership in the EEC meant to

become connected to a strong Europe on equal basis with the nine members of the Community. After the seven-years-long isolation of Greece, it would help develop the Greek economy and politics. Moreover, “membership [would] also consolidate Greek independence by freeing it from the restraints of external (that is, American) patronage and [would] protect the country from external threats (essentially from Turkey), and from internal threats from either extreme of the political spectrum” (ibid.: 165).

The Community formally opened accession negotiations with Greece in 1976. These negotiations were difficult for both Greece and the EEC. While Greece insisted on full accession, the Community hesitated that the integration of Greece would weaken the EEC “because by accepting Greece with her nine million, the EEC knew that it would soon accept Spain and Portugal (both of whom had applications pending), with their 40 million” (ibid.: 165). Nonetheless, after months of negotiations, the EEC reached a decision for full membership of Greece on December 21, 1978. The European Parliament adopted a resolution on April 9, 1979 in which it “welcomed Greece’s becoming the full member of the Community by January 1, 1981 at the latest” (OJEC 9 April 1979). Moreover, the European Parliament recommended “a transitional period of at least five years to allow the Greek economy to be integrated into the Community economy, progressively and to the advantage of both the present Member States and the applicant country” (ibid., for detail see European Parliament Working Document 9 March 1979). Finally, Karamanlis signed the accession treaty with the Community on May 28, 1979.

Eventually, the country became the 10<sup>th</sup> member state of the European Communities on January 1, 1981 under the New Democracy government. At that time, Greece was unique among other member states due to Orthodox Christianity and its relatively poor economy and relatively weak democracy. Moreover, the country’s foreign policy had been traditionally shaped in view of possible external threats coming from near neighbors. Therefore, most Greek governments had adopted the principle of defensiveness against its enemies. It was obvious that the country had

moved backward during the Colonels' junta. Thus, the new democratic regime had to improve the country politically, economically and culturally. In this regard, European integration through membership in the EC appeared as the most suitable choice. Therefore, since the mid-1980s, majority of political parties and Greek people have supported "the process of Greece's multidimensional integration into the mechanisms and institutions of the Western family of nations" (Couloumbis 2003: 35).

The membership of Greece in 1981 started a Mediterranean enlargement wave, with Spain and Portugal obtaining full membership in 1985. "All three new members had experienced a return to democratic regimes in the 1970s and their entry into the EEC was equally based on political as well as economic justifications" (Oltheten, Pinteris & Sougiannis 2003: 2). Because Greece, Spain, and Portugal were newly established democracies at the time of entry to the EEC, Greece, as the first among the three, became an example for Eastern European countries which constituted new democracies after the end of the Cold War.

After the country's entry to the EEC in January 1981, PASOK took office under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou. "PASOK's rise was of historical importance as it meant incorporating the losing side of the civil war, thus healing the entire post-civil war trauma and putting an end to the sense of social disenfranchisement of left-of-center citizens" (Pagoulatos 2002: 4). In the first period of the government from 1981 to 1985, the relationship of PASOK and the EEC was problematic. As a left-of-center party, PASOK espoused an anti-capitalist, anti-EEC, and anti-U.S. ideology. However, the relationship improved during the second period of the PASOK government 1985-1989. Gradually, the party developed a pro-European view. It adopted the Single European Act in 1986, implemented the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and finally signed the Maastricht Treaty and joined the European Monetary Union (EMU).

When Greece entered the EEC, the GDP of its agricultural economy was only higher than Ireland's. That is, as non-industrialized country,

Greece could not compete with other EEC member states' industries. Greece however was lucky insofar as other EEC member states were also adversely affected by the 1973 OPEC oil crisis, the effects of which were felt until the early 1980s.

The initial outcome of the Greek accession to the EEC "was political and psychological: Greece became part of Europe" (Oltheten, Pinteris & Sougiannis 2003: 9). Greek society also developed a positive view on membership. According to Eurobarometer surveys since 1981, "the Greeks have changed their attitude toward accession, moving from a rather negative view to an extremely positive one" (Panagiotopoulou 1997: 355). "In 1981, only 38% believed that accession would be a good thing while in 1993 this positive view was expressed by 74% of the respondents" (ibid.: 355). "In 1983, 44% stated that their country had benefited from membership whereas more than 70% held the same view ten years later" (ibid.: 355).

The EEC helped to improve the Greek economy with the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since the late 1950s. The CAP was mentioned in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 as a policy that aimed at increasing agricultural productivity and at providing heavy crops to the consumers. Spain, Portugal, and Greece benefited with their agricultural economies from this policy since their membership in the EEC. Nowadays, CAP is criticized by some EU member countries which argue that the policy led to overproduction of agricultural crops and price increases. Moreover, "since the poor tend to spend a larger proportion of their income on food, the burden of the CAP is regressive: poorer people and poorer countries carry a larger burden of the CAP" (Oltheten, Pinteris & Sougiannis 2003: 11).

At the time that the Single European Act was adopted in 1986 for the 'economic and social cohesion', the EEC revised its regional policies (ibid.: 36). Thus, a new regional policy was introduced, the Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMP), which consisted of financial aid to Greece. In the late 1980s, the EEC decided to give further financial assistance to Greece via the Community Support Frameworks (CSF) both during 1989-

1993 and 1994-1999. That is to say, Greece was the biggest beneficiary country from EEC/EU funds during the first and second decade of its membership. The EEC/EU learned from the Greek experience and revised and improved its regional policy during the 1980s and 1990s.

The ND government, which ruled after the second term of PASOK between 1990 and 1993, gradually diverged from the EEC/EU under the leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis. This was due to the fact that in the early 1990s, the nationalistic ND government objected to the name 'Macedonia' adopted by its neighbor country after the demise of Yugoslavia, arguing that it could lead to nationalist movements among its citizens and the Greek region of Macedonia. Hence, Greece preferred to name the country the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Even though court cases concerning the name have lasted for a long time, the issue has not yet been resolved.

The relations with the European Union were restored by successive PASOK governments between 1993 and 1996 under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou and, after his death in 1996, two Kostas Simitis governments, 1996-2000 and 2000-2004.

After entering the EEC, Greece had the Presidency of the Community in 1983, 1988, 1994, and 2003. Especially after joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001, the country became a mainstream EU member.

## **Chapter 7: The European Union and the Military's Diminishing Role in Turkish Politics**

### **7.1 The 'Post-Modern' Coup d'État on February 28, 1997**

When the Turkish military left the government to civilians after free elections on November 6, 1983, a process of democracy consolidation in Turkey began. The National Security Council was transformed into the Presidential Council as effect of the consolidation of democracy. However, it did not stop controlling politics, especially active politicians.

The first democratization attempt of the newly established Ozal government was to give permission to new political parties. Hence, in the end of 1983, the Social Democracy Party (Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi / SDP) was established under the chairmanship of Erdal Inonu, the son of the RPP's former chairman Ismet Inonu. At the same time, the Party of the True Path (Dogru Yol Partisi / PTP), successor of the Justice Party, was founded (unofficially) by Suleyman Demirel who could not act officially until the lift of political bans. In addition, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi / WP) was constituted as the successor of the NSP. Like Demirel, Erbakan could become the leader of the party once the political ban was removed.

Besides, a new inheritor of the old RPP emerged with the establishment of the Party of the Democratic Left (Demokratik Sol Parti / PDL) "which was led from behind the scenes by Bulent Ecevit, but fronted by his wife, Rahsan, who became party chairwoman" (Zurcher 2004: 284).

On September 6, 1987, Prime Minister Ozal held a referendum in order to learn the public opinion on the barred politicians' return to politics. Because the affirmative votes surpassed 50 percent, he had to reluctantly lift the ban. The barred politicians, in particular Ecevit, Demirel, and Erbakan, returned to politics and began to head their newly established political

parties. Ozal had to call for an early election from which he emerged as the winner at the end of November.

The relationship between Ozal and the military started to worsen when he appointed Necip Torumtay, who had less seniority than Necdet Oztorun, as the new Chief of General Staff in June 1987.

One year later, in June 1988, at the time of the party congress of the MP, an assassination attempt was made on Ozal, which he survived with minor injuries. This showed that discontent among the public with the MP government had been increasing. Ozal further understood that popular support for his party had declined from the decreased number of votes his party received at the local elections of March 1989. Therefore, he became a candidate for the Presidency in November when Kenan Evren's seven-year term ended. Despite objections from the assembly, Turgut Ozal replaced Kenan Evren in November 1989 as the second civilian President of Turkey after Celal Bayar and the eighth overall.

Even though Ozal entered politics with the support of the NSC, he did not have good relations with the high-ranking army members. When he broke the tendency of hierarchical appointment in the military by making Torumtay the Chief of General Staff, the relationship between the Turkish Armed Forces and the government became strained. Moreover, when Iraq occupied Kuwait in August 1990, member states of the United Nations under the leadership of the United States attacked Iraq in cooperation with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During this First Gulf War, President Ozal cooperated with the USA to occupy Mosul and Kirkuk, which was objected to by the Chief of General Staff Torumtay. Therefore, General Torumtay retired from his duty before his term had ended - clearly in reaction to Ozal. On the other hand, "his resignation was also seen as the military's warning to Ozal, whose plans were not implemented" (Ozcan 2001: 15).

Since Ozal's MP had come into power in December 1983, Islam had been playing a major role in the MP's activities until the 1991 elections. This could be easily seen "in the building of new mosques, the enormous growth in number of imam-hatip (preacher) schools, ... the growing

religious content of school books and of the state-controlled radio and television, [and] the growing number of Islamic publications and bookshops” (Zurcher 2004: 289). Islamic mentality had also penetrated the public. For example, people began to assault those who were eating, drinking, or smoking during Ramadan (Ramazan), the fasting month. All of this broke with the secular characteristic of the Turkish Republic.

Furthermore, in the early 1990s, Fethullah Gulen formed the ‘Gulen Movement’ as the successor of the sect of Said-i Nursi, the ‘Nurcu Movement’, that had maintained good relations with the Democrat Party during the 1950s. Gulen spread his ideas by setting up high schools and universities throughout Turkey and abroad and through publication of his newspaper *Zaman* (Time) and via broadcasting through his TV channel *Samanyolu* (Milky Way) (ibid.: 291). However, after the post-modern coup d’état in 1997, Gulen fled abroad and settled in the USA. He has been continuing to head his movement until today.

In the October 1991 elections, Demirel’s PTP won the majority of votes. Hence, he established for the fifth time a coalition government with the SDP, under the leadership of Inonu, and became the Prime Minister of Turkey. Demirel’s government carried on the liberalization attempts of the MP. Starting with amendments to the constitution, the government promised more freedoms and civil rights to the people. In fact, the impact of President Ozal on Demirel’s government was felt because Ozal could not get along well with the liberal chairman of the MP, Mesut Yilmaz.

On April 17, 1993, President Turgut Ozal died from a heart attack. One month later, former Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel succeeded Ozal as the ninth President of the Turkish Republic. During the power vacuum, Inonu’s SDP led the government until the new chairman of the PTP was elected. After a fierce competition for the leadership of the PTP, Tansu Ciller was elected as the new chairwoman of the party. She was an MP in Demirel’s last cabinet and reduced - together with another young politician, Mesut Yilmaz, who was the new chairman of the MP - the average age of high-ranking politicians. Ciller was a liberal politician who was close to

Ozal in terms of ideology. She became Prime Minister in June 1993. “Just as the relationship of Ozal and Yilmaz had worsened after the chairmanship of the latter, her relationship with president Demirel quickly deteriorated” (ibid.: 295).

Ciller’s government aimed in particular at the liberalization of the country by liberalizing the constitution and improving relations with the European Union. Therefore, many changes were made in the constitution during 1995. At the end of the year, the Customs Union was established between Turkey and the EU.

Finally, on December 24, 1995, elections were held from which Erbakan’s Welfare Party emerged as the winning party. The MP and the PTP took the second and third places respectively, and Ecevit’s PDL and Baykal’s RPP followed them. However, neither the military nor the businessmen wanted the WP to form a government (Bayramoglu 2007: 54-55). The businessmen demanded a Mother-Path coalition (from MOTHERland Party and True PATH Party) “but the personal differences between the leaders Yilmaz and Ciller rendered it extremely difficult” (Zurcher 2004: 298). Even though President Demirel gave the first chance to form a government to the WP, no party could come into an agreement with this Islamist party. As a result, a short-lived Mother-Path coalition was established in March 1996 under the leadership of Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz. After disagreement between Yilmaz and Ciller, the coalition came to an end in June. Then, Erbakan formed a coalition government with Ciller’s TPT, called ‘Welfare-Path coalition (RefahYol)’, and became the new Prime Minister of the country.

After the establishment of this coalition government, the Chief of General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi was asked for his view on the Welfare Party in power. He answered: “We as the Turkish Armed Forces are outside politics. In democratic countries, governments are both established and made to fall with the elections. Turkey is a democratic country and it is not possible to relinquish democracy” (quoted in Arcayurek 2003: 17). The Armed Forces seemed to respect democracy for only one year.

When Prime Minister Erbakan visited Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria in October 1996, military and opposition parties reacted against the WP. In particular Erbakan's meeting with Kaddafi, the President of Libya, provoked discontent among the opposition parties, especially from Yilmaz's MP. Thus, the army, media, and civilian bureaucracy cooperated against the WP and informed the public of the preparations for a coup d'état against this coalition government (Arcayurek 2003: 273-274).

One month later, on November 3, a car accident in Susurluk, a district of Balıkesir, showcased relations between the mafia, politicians, and the police. In this 'Susurluk Accident', an MP of the PTP, Sedat Bucak, a director of a police school in Istanbul, Huseyin Kocadag, an ultranationalist suspect of several murders, Abdullah Catli, "who had killed seven leftist students before 1980 and had been indirectly involved in the assassination attempt on the Pope" (Zurcher 2004: 322), and a young woman were found in the same car. Only Sedat Bucak survived the accident. An intercepted telephone call of Bucak showed that the Minister of the Interior, Mehmet Agar, member of the PTP, was also involved. Agar had to resign because of strong reactions, and the retired academic Meral Aksener replaced him.

Critique of the coalition government continued when Erbakan had dinner with sheikhs and leaders of sects on January 11, 1997. Furthermore, relations between Erbakan and the military worsened when the Sincan Municipality of Ankara organized a Jerusalem Night where a theatrical performance portrayed the jihad, Islamic religious war, in order to support Palestinians in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The military soon reacted and claimed that the Welfare Party tried to install Islamic Law in Turkey. Eventually, the State Security Courts opened an inquiry against the WP on the issue of the Jerusalem night.

As a consequence, President Demirel sent letters to Prime Minister Erbakan and warned him. Then, the Turkish Armed Forces sent tanks to the streets of Sincan on February 4 to intimidate the WP. Finally, on February 28, 1997, the National Security Council held a meeting for nine hours under the chairmanship of President Demirel and with the participation of Chief of

General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Commanding Officers of the Army, the General Commander of Gendarmerie, and the NSC General Secretary. It ended with the NSC issuing 18 recommendations, which aimed at preventing the rise of Islam in Turkey, to the cabinet as a memorandum. This intervention of the military was called a post-modern coup d'état by Cengiz Candar (2001), the then journalist of the Turkish newspaper *Sabah*. After Erbakan's resignation in June, Candar mentioned this post-modern coup in his column on June 28, and the foreign press then used the term.<sup>5</sup> It was a post-modern coup because "its application was different than the previous military coups" (McCombs & Yuksel 2004: 382). That is, "the operational organ in this coup was the NSC, which is a constitutional institution" (ibid.: 382). In fact, the term 'post-modern coup d'état' implies in Turkey the intervention of the military into politics by dictating what the government should or should not do, whereas it has been used abroad to indicate a challenge of an authoritarian government by the public, supported by the NGOs of that country.

The 18 recommendations<sup>6</sup> of the NSC were "designed to stem the perceived growth of Islamism in Turkey as seen in the attempt to impose Shari'a (Islamic Law) on all aspects of public life" (ibid.: 382). The NSC argued that the government had to respect the Turkish Constitution and the principles of the Turkish Republic, in particular as regards secularism. Moreover, sects had to be closed down, private religious schools and Koran courses had to be taken under the control of the Ministry of Education, and compulsory eight-year primary education had to be implemented throughout the country. According to the NSC, "this compulsory continuous education would lead to the closure of the middle school sections of preacher training schools which were believed being used to inculcate anti-secularist values" (Jenkins 2001: 34).

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<sup>5</sup> See for full text; <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/1997/06/28/>.

<sup>6</sup> See for full text; <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri1997/28subat1997.htm>.

In contrast to the previous three coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, the United States did not welcome this military intervention. The U.S. administrators stated that they opposed any kind of military regime in Turkey and demanded the continuation of the democratization process (Candar 2001: 112-113). Likewise, the European Union maintained its position on military interventions into Turkish politics. Thus, Turkey stood alone in the international arena, lacking external support in contrast to the previous coups d'état (ibid.: 113).

Several months after the post-modern coup, a prosecutor of the Supreme Court asked for the abolition of the Welfare Party. Prime Minister Erbakan resigned in June 1997 and President Demirel allowed the chairman of the MP, Mesut Yilmaz, to establish the next government. Yilmaz founded a coalition government on June 30 with Ecevit's PDL and Husamettin Cindoruk's Party of Democratic Turkey (Demokrat Turkiye Partisi / PDT). Just before the February 28 coup, Cindoruk had left the PTP and formed a new party, the PDT.

The new coalition government was welcomed by the Turkish Armed Forces. It had to adhere to the army's abovementioned recommendations despite the demur of the leaders of the coalition parties about the influence of the army. "The educational reform issue appeared on the NSC agenda at the April, May, June and July 1997 meetings" (McCombs & Yuksel 2004: 386). Consequently, a new law for compulsory eight-year primary education, with a 'five-plus-three formula', was passed in July. Throughout 1998, Yilmaz and Ecevit continued to be irritated about the ongoing interference of the army into politics. But whenever they expressed their objections, "the Chief of the General Staff General Karadayi rebuked them and they were forced to express their support for the army publicly" (Zurcher 2004: 301).

On January 16, 1998, the Welfare Party was closed down by decision of the Constitutional Court. Its chairman Necmettin Erbakan was banned from politics for five years and received a life sentence.

## 7.2 Primacy of Security Issues

Starting from the mid-1980s, the primary issue in Turkish politics became the security problems in the southeast of the country due to the PKK and the conflict with Greece in the Aegean. In Turkey, the NSC used these security issues in order to strengthen the role of the military in politics.

The legal problems between Turkey and Greece as regards Cyprus had remained a hot issue on their agendas after the Cyprus catastrophe in the summer of 1974. “While Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis proposed that the two countries take the question of the continental shelf to the ICJ (International Court of Justice) in the early 1975” (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 20), Turkish Prime Minister Demirel preferred to solve the issue through bilateral negotiations.

A decade later, an oil exploration issue caused a crisis in the Aegean Sea. In early March 1987, the Greek government decided to purchase the North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC). This nationalization attempt was regarded by Turkey as intention of the Greek government to send a survey ship to Turkish territorial waters. Therefore, Turkey sent a survey ship for seismological work. As a response, the Papandreou government threatened Turkey with armed intervention. The Turkish Chief of General Staff replied that Turkey would also use military force if Greece prevented the work of the survey ship. Once again, the two neighbor countries were on the brink of war. The crisis was solved by an U.S. initiative.

In addition to these problems, Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war in early 1996 because of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the most serious conflict between the two countries since the Cyprus event. When the Turkish ship *Figen Akat* was struck on the islet *Imia* (in Greek)/ *Kardak* (in Turkish) on December 26, 1995, “the captain of the ship refused help from the Greek authorities, arguing that the islet was in fact Turkish” (ibid.: 29). In response, the Greek government declared that the islet belonged to Greece and that the country was responsible for saving the ship. Subsequently, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated in a memorandum to the Greek Ambassador that the islet was under the authority of Turkey. “Wary

of the implications of the message, the Greek Defence Ministry decided to increase naval patrols around the islet” (ibid.: 29). At that time, the conflict seemed to have ended.

However, the issue was re-awakened on January 20, 1996 when an unauthorized Greek journalist raised a Greek flag on the islet. A Turkish journalist responded by taking down the Greek flag and replacing it with a Turkish flag. “In the days that followed several groups of Greek and Turkish journalists landed on the islet to plant their respective national flags” (ibid.: 29). Because these events were broadcasted alive on television, the Turkish and Greek governments as well as both societies reacted severely. The Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis sent their respective navies to the islet. In the end, the conflict between the two countries was resolved with UN and NATO involvement on February 1. Once again, a conflict between Turkey and Greece was brought to the international institutions to be solved. However, the maps of both Turkey and Greece even today claim the Imia/Kardak islet for their own respective territories. That is, the islet has remained as a ‘grey zone’.

After the end of the Imia/Kardak crisis, the Prime Minister Simitis removed the Chief of General Staff from his office because of miscommunications between military and civilian leaders (Hickok 1998: 133). This shows the control of civilian politicians over high-ranking members of the military. Because the Greek public was also against army intervention, Simitis was elected new Prime Minister in the September elections after the death of Papandreou (Verney 1997: 197).

The Imia/Kardak crisis “paved the way for the 1997 Madrid Declaration where the two states committed themselves not to use violence and undertake unilateral actions” (Rumelili 2004: 4). However, today, daily dogfights over the Aegean Sea continue because of unresolved legal issues regarding the demilitarization of the Aegean islands and the continental shelf, territorial waters, and the FIR issues.

Besides the security problems with Greece, Turkey has dealt with the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK since its establishment in 1978. Under

the leadership of Ocalan, the PKK increased the level of attacks on civilians in southeastern Turkey in 1984. From then on, the PKK increasingly gained popular support from Kurdish people. Supporters of the PKK have been trained in the camps of the PKK in the mountains of the southeastern cities of Turkey. Because of the PKK's attacks, the military increased its control in this area. Thus, the budget of the military increased to buy military equipment to be used in the clashes with the PKK. As a result of the ongoing fighting between the Turkish army and the PKK, hundreds of Turkish soldiers have died since the early 1980s.

Turkish police sought the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, since the foundation of the organization in 1978. When Ocalan was captured in the Greek Embassy in Kenya on February 15, 1999, the Turkish government thought that the Greek government had helped the terrorist to hide there. This led to strained relations between Turkey and Greece. "The capture and the trial of Ocalan, on the prison island of Imrali, also tensed the relations between Turkey and the EU which repeatedly warned the Turkish government that executing Ocalan would further ostracize Ankara from Europe" (Jenkins 2001: 19). Consequently, "despite the objections among public, the Turkish government announced on 12 January 2000 that it would postpone Ocalan's execution pending a ruling by the ECtHR" (ibid.: 20).

### **7.3 The Full Membership in the EU and the Diminishing Role of the Military**

Starting with the signature of the Ankara Agreement until the 1990s, the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association had first worked for Turkish inclusion into the Customs Union and then for European Union membership. While the relations with the EEC were frozen for three years because of the 1980 coup, Prime Minister Ozal applied for full membership in the EEC on the grounds of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty on April 14, 1987 after the establishment of the civilian government. The article "stipulated that any 'European country' that wished to do so could submit an application whereupon, following normal procedures, the Council would ask the European Commission to issue an advice on the question"

(Brusse & Griffiths 2004: 22). However, the Commission was not willing to give a positive answer. In the end, “the EEC Commission politely rejected Turkey’s application in December 1989 and based its decision on the ‘substantial economic and developmental gap between the Community and Turkey’” (Grigoriadis 2003: 2). That is to say, according to the Commission’s report, Turkey’s weak economy could not compete with other members of the Community and the country furthermore did not yet fully respect human rights. However, in order to dispel Turkey’s discontent about the rejection, “the European Commission initiated a renewed effort to accomplish a customs union between Turkey and the European Economic Community, ... and release the funds provided for in the Fourth Financial Protocol” (ibid.: 2). However, these initiatives were vetoed by Greece.

Relations between Turkey and the EU<sup>7</sup> started to improve in the early 1990s. On June 7, 1990, the Commission adopted the Matutes Package, which included “completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 1998: 5), but it was rejected by the Council.

At the EU Lisbon Summit of June 1992, “the EU leaders agreed that the Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance, and negotiations on achieving Turkey-EU customs union were resumed in November 1992” (Grigoriadis 2003: 2).

In June 1993, criteria for EU membership were determined at several meetings of the European Commission in Copenhagen, known as the ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. It was stated that associate countries “could join the European Union if they wish to, provided they meet the economic and political conditions set forward by the European Union” (Berument, Malatyalı & Neyaptı 2001: 53). In terms of economic conditions, applicant countries should have a functioning market economy that is able to cope with the economies of the other member states. In terms of political

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<sup>7</sup> With the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht on February 7, 1992, the European Economic Community was transformed into the European Union.

conditions, they should have achieved democracy with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights. In addition, the applicant country has to align its law and administrative bodies with the European Community legislation, the *acquis communautaire*. From then on, Turkey has tried to fulfil these political and economic conditions and to initiate democratization attempts in order to become a full member of the EU.

Turkey established a customs union with the EU under the Tansu Ciller government after it had passed the preparatory and transition stages and the final stage had ended on January 1, 1996. “Greece did not apply its veto to commencement of a Turkish customs union in exchange for a commitment to a date for the start of Greek Cypriot accession negotiations, which applied for full membership in 1990” (McDonald 2001: 129). Even though the general opinion among the Turkish public was that the establishment of the Customs Union would pave the way for full membership of Turkey, the EU did not accept such a provision.

The European Union was not willing to integrate Turkey into the European continent at that time because Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war in the Imia/Kardak conflict. In response to the crisis, “Greece blocked the meeting of the Turkish-EU Association Council and also backtracked on its commitment to lift its veto of the Fourth Financial Protocol, which would otherwise have released 600 million euros of aid to the country” (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 31). It was obvious that the EU’s decision was in favor of Greece in this crisis, since the Union recommended the countries to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for its solution.

Starting from mid-1996, Turkey had domestic problems because of the radical-Islamist activities of the coalition government at the time. Therefore, the military made a ‘post-modern’ coup d’état on February 28, 1997. At the end of the coup, the Islamic Welfare Party was abolished. The European Union condemned this break to democracy in the country. Thus, the relationship between Turkey and the Union became strained.

On July 15, 1997, the Commission published the Agenda 2000 which “made proposals for Turkey’s progression to the European Union with respect to various sectors and extending the Customs Union to cover the services and the agricultural sectors” (Berument, Malatyali & Neyaptı 2001: 52). Nevertheless, the two enlargement waves decided on at the Luxembourg European Council on December 12-14, 1997 excluded Turkey, even though “Turkey had the longest-standing application and Association, and was the only applicant country that had realized a Customs Union” (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 19). According to the decision, eleven states would become new member states of the Union during the 2000s. Turkey and TRNC were especially displeased about the fact that the EU opened negotiations with Greek Cyprus for full membership at the same summit. The exclusion of the Turkish part of the island annoyed Turkey and strained its relations with the EU. In addition, the ‘European Strategy for Turkey’ as regards its EU membership was devised and then published. Subsequently, Turkey however “declared to discontinue its political dialogue with the European Union, arguing that the decision was discriminating against Turkey vis-a-vis the other applicant countries” (Berument, Malatyali & Neyaptı 2001: 52). Turkey also declared that it would exclude the European Union from issues between Turkey and Greece, especially as regards Cyprus.

At the EU Cardiff Summit of 1998, “the European Council asked the European Commission to prepare Progress Reports for Turkey as it does for all the candidate countries, even though Turkey was not then a candidate” (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 19). Therefore, since 1998, the European Commission annually prepared Regular Progress Reports for Turkey in order to evaluate developments in the country. After the post-modern coup d’état in 1997, the Commission stated in its 1998 Progress Report that the military was still dominant in politics through the NSC. Therefore, the EU insisted on the urgency of minimizing the power of the NSC. In addition, the Commission condemned the closure of the WP in January 1998, stating that “the European Union is concerned at the implications for democratic pluralism

and freedom of expression” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 1998: 10).

The relations between Turkey and the EU started to improve with the improvement in the relations between Turkey and Greece in mid-1999. On August 17, 1999, a destructive earthquake occurred in Istanbul and Kocaeli at three o'clock in the morning. Thousands of houses collapsed and people were buried under the ruins. Turkish units could not manage the situation on their own. The first international aid came from Greece with twenty-five emergency rescue teams and abundant equipment for saving Turkish earthquake victims. “While official assistance continued to flow across the Aegean, the Greek public also started to get to work raising money and collecting food, medicines, and other desperately needed items to help the victims of the quake” (Ker-Lindsay 2007: 58). Turkey welcomed both governmental and societal assistance and responded in kind when an earthquake occurred in Athens one month later, on September 7, 1999. Although “the scale of the earthquake in Greece was far smaller than the one in Turkey and eventually resulted in around 140 deaths, as opposed to [the tens of thousands] in Turkey, the offer of support was received with gratitude in Greece” (ibid.: 69). Thus, a natural disaster led to the restoration of good relations between Turkey and Greece both on the level of governments and societies, which was the only positive result of the earthquakes.

In fact, the reliable friendship between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries, Ismail Cem and Georgios Papandreou, also brought about closer relations. Ismail Cem became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ecevit government formed in January 1999. Georgios Papandreou was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Simitis government in February 1999. Because they were close friends since they came into office, Cem and Papandreou prevented the escalation of the Ocalan crisis by the two governments in February. Furthermore, during the earthquakes in August and September, Turkey and Greece became helping hands to each other on incentive of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

As a result, the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ of the two countries led to the improvement of Turkish-Greek relations - called ‘rapprochement’- from mid-1999 on. The rapprochement also affected Turkey-EU relations in a positive way. This became apparent first in the 1999 Progress Report of the Commission and then at the Helsinki European Council at the end of the same year.

The European Commission’s 1999 Regular Progress Report first critiqued that the NSC continued to play a major role in politics. Therefore, the EU demanded the exclusion of the NSC from political life. However, the Commission welcomed the amendment of the law on State Security Courts which decided to replace military judges with civilian ones.

The EU immediately reacted when Ocalan was sentenced to death on June 29 after a trial before the Ankara State Security Court from May 31 on. In its declaration of June 29, 1999, the EU Presidency expressed “the hope that Turkey will follow what has invariably been the practice for the last fifteen years and not carry out the death sentence passed on Ocalan” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 1999: 6). Due to this pressure, the death sentence of Ocalan was appealed, which was welcomed by the EU. Consequently, the Commission stated that despite some improvements, there were still some shortcomings in Turkey in terms of human and minority rights, torture, the NSC, and the State Security Courts.

The Helsinki Summit of December 10, 1999 constituted a turning point in Turkey-EU relations with the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate state of the European Union. The Helsinki European Council however also emphasized that Turkey could only become a full member of the EU after the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Importantly, Greece did not use its veto power against Turkey at the Helsinki Summit for the first time in the triangular relationship of Turkey, Greece and the EU. Thus, Turkey went one step further in its difficult process of EU integration. From then on, “instead of threatening Turkey to veto its EU membership aspirations, the new Greek strategy emphasizes the point that Greece would actively support Turkey’s EU membership prospects should the latter show more

accommodating and cooperative stances over the bilateral disputes” (Oguzlu 2003: 47-48). At the same time, after Greece stopped vetoing against the Turkish candidacy, it left other EU members alone, “who had previously hidden behind Greece’s veto, to acknowledge their own reservations openly about Turkey’s candidacy, thus casting less of the blame on Greece for Turkey’s problems with the EU” (Larrabee 2001: 236).

In its 2000 Progress Report, the Commission “welcomed the launching in Turkish society of a wide-ranging debate on the political reforms necessary with a view to accession to the EU” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2000: 20). Even though two important initiatives had been taken in this context, “the signing of several international human rights instruments and the recent endorsement by the government of the work of the Supreme Board of Coordination for Human Rights, the Commission stated that Turkey still did not meet the political Copenhagen criteria” (ibid.: 20-21).

In order to start accession negotiations with Turkey, the EU still insisted on the country’s fulfillment of the political criteria decided upon at the Copenhagen Summit. Therefore, the European Council adopted an Accession Partnership Document (APD) on March 8, 2001 which stated Turkey’s short- and long-term objectives. “Its purpose was to set out in a single framework priority areas for further work, the financial means available to help Turkey implement these priorities and the conditions applying to that assistance” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2001: 8). If the country fulfilled the objectives, negotiation talks would start. As a response, Turkey adopted its National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) on March 19, 2001 in which future activities of the country were juxtaposed with the EU’s demands. The NPAA was prepared by the European Union General Secretariat (EUGS), an institution established by the Turkish government just after the Helsinki Summit in order to direct relations between the EU and Turkey with the collaboration of the Foreign Ministry. The main aim of Turkey stated in the NPAA was the harmonization of domestic laws with the EU’s acquis

communautaire. Although it was made clear at the EU Helsinki Summit that “Turkey’s accession negotiations could begin only when Turkey fulfilled the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey began its major political reforms only towards the end of 2001” (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 21). This delay was due to the financial crisis, the clash between Prime Minister Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, and the disagreement among the coalition parties (the PDL, MP, and NAP) concerning the political reforms. Therefore, they were delayed until the end of 2001.

On October 3, 2001, a Constitutional Reform Package was adopted which made important changes to the 1982 Constitution. “Because the 1982 Constitution was prepared under the influence of the military rulers, its various articles reflected the authoritarian attitude of the National Security Council regime” (Yazici 2004: 93). The 1995, 1999, 2001 and later 2004 reforms were to change this. “Especially the reforms of 2001 significantly reinforced constitutional safeguards of fundamental rights and liberties” (ibid.: 94). Moreover, Article 118 which organizes the NSC was amended: the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Prime Ministers now also became members of the NSC. Thus, the number of civilian members of the NSC exceeded those of the military members. “The advisory character of the NSC decisions has also been explicitly underlined” (ibid.: 98). Furthermore, “the constitutional reforms of 2001 made the prohibition of political parties more difficult” (ibid.: 96).

In spite of these amendments, the NPAA did not meet the expectations of the EU as laid down in the APD. In the 2001 Progress Report, the Commission stated that “despite the constitutional changes and the basic features of a democratic system, a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military and a number of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms, remained to be effectively addressed” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2001: 31-32). That is to say, Turkey still had to abolish the death penalty, diminish the power of the National Security Council and eliminate military men from politics, and give the right to broadcast and educate in languages other than Turkish,

especially in Kurdish. Nevertheless, the NPAA entailed important development in terms of the democratization of the country by bringing about significant changes in the constitution in a short period of time.

In 2002, Ecevit's coalition government ended because of his health problems. Elections were held in November 2002 and the newly established Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi / JDP) won 34 percent of votes. After the JDP came into power with its single-party government, Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, and one year later Recep Tayyip Erdogan, focused their attention on bringing the country into the EU.

In the 2002 Progress Report, the Commission critiqued the frequency of the (monthly) meetings of the NSC. Because the NSC released its opinions and recommendations through the mass media after every meeting, the Commission argued that it affected public opinion in this way. In turn, "the Commission welcomed the increase in the number of civilians of the NSC from 5 to 9 compared with 5 military members" (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2002: 24). In addition, the EU appreciated the complete lift of the state of emergency in Southeastern Anatolia, which had been in force for fifteen years. The August 2002 reforms were in particular welcomed by the Commission. At the same time, the Commission stated that they "denoted the need for further improvements to strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights in law and in practice" (ibid.: 47). As a result, "in December 2002, in its Copenhagen Summit, the European Council decided to review Turkey's candidacy two years' hence while ten of the candidate countries concluded their accession negotiations in 2002" (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 20).

In order to satisfy the EU's expectations, the Turkish government made important changes in the Constitution in a short period of time. The approval of the Seventh Harmonization Package on July 30, 2003 entailed a sharp change in Turkish civil-military relations. The package dissolved the executive powers of the Secretary General of the NSC, replaced the appointment of the Secretary General from among high-ranking army officers with high-level civilian bureaucrats, and brought his actions under

the control of the Prime Minister. “In August 2004, the government appointed a former ambassador to this post, as the first civilian Secretary General of the Council” (Yazici 2004: 99). Moreover, the Deputy Prime Minister was given the right to supervise the implementation of the decisions of the NSC. Furthermore, the number of civilian working people in the NSC was increased and the frequency of the meetings of the NSC was decreased to every two months. Finally, the law on judging civilians in military courts was annulled. As a result, the extended power of the NSC was diminished with the Seventh Harmonization Package and it became civilianized.

In its 2003 Regular Progress Report, the European Commission welcomed the constitutional changes in Turkey with the approval of the Reform Package. However, the Commission criticized the informal influence of the NSC on politics through media declarations of their positions and the invisible impact of “the representatives of the NSC in civilian boards” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2003: 43), such as the RTUK and YOK.

On May 7, 2004, the Eighth Constitutional Package was adopted which gave supranational treaties priority over domestic law and abolished the State Security Courts (see Table 7.1). On June 24, 2004, the Ninth Constitutional Package was adopted which abolished the death penalty. It further broke the link between the NSC and civilian bodies by expelling the representatives of the NSC from the Higher Education Authority and the Radio and Television Supreme Council.

The Commission also welcomed the removal of the representatives of the NSC as a big improvement in reducing the impact of the military through civilian bodies. The 2004 Regular Progress Report also approved of the appointment of a retired diplomat as the first civilian Secretary General of the NSC in August 2004. It also welcomed the abolition of the death penalty and the State Security Courts. Nevertheless, the Commission stated that “the armed forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of informal mechanisms” (European Commission Regular Progress

Report 2004: 53) and that its power would not decrease until the Turkish government changed Article 35 and Article 85/1 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Internal Service Law, which provided the military with a wide sphere of influence.

Since the Commission stated in the 2004 Regular Progress Report that Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria and recommended to start the accession negotiations, it was decided at the Summit of the EU Heads of State or Government in December 2004 that the negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU could start in October 2005.

Table 7.1 (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 22)

## Turkish Political Reforms, 2001-2004

Date	Type	Major Changes
3 October 2001	1 <sup>st</sup> Constitutional Package	34 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution
November 2001	New Civil Code	Gender equality in marriage
February/March 2002	2 <sup>nd</sup> Constitutional Package	Constitutional amendments
2 August 2002	3 <sup>rd</sup> Constitutional Package	Abolish[ed] death penalty/revised anti-terror law, allowed broadcasting in languages other than Turkish
3 December 2002	4 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Operationalize[d] previous reforms/revise[d] Penal Code for torture
4 December 2002	5 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Retrial of all cases decided in State Security Courts
May 2003	6 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Adopt[ed] Protocol 6 of the ECHR, convert[ed] all death sentences to life imprisonment/repeal[ed] Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law
July 2003	7 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Revise[d] the National Security Council
7 May 2004	8 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Ten amendments of the Constitution, freedom of press, and gave priority to supranational treaties over domestic law, abolish[ed] State Security Courts
24 June 2004	9 <sup>th</sup> Constitutional Package	Change[d] Article 46 of the Penal Code, revise[d] the Higher Education Board and the Censure Board
25-26 September 2004	New Turkish Penal Code	Revise[d] laws on violence against women and children/change[d] the penalties for various offences and redefine[d] offences

In the 2005 Progress Report, “the Commission welcomed the important legislative reforms but criticized that the implementation of these reforms remained uneven” (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2005: 41). According to the Commission, “reforms concerning civil-military relations had continued, but the armed forces still exerted significant influence by issuing public statements on political developments and government policies” (ibid.: 41).

Furthermore, when a bomb explosion occurred in front of a PKK supporter’s bookstore in Semdinli, a district of Hakkari (a city in Eastern Anatolia), in November 2005, residents of Semdinli rebelled on the streets and clashed with the police. In response, the Turkish government set up the Semdinli Investigation Commission, which applied to a secret protocol upgraded by the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of Interior in July 1997. According to this secret protocol on Security, Public Order, and Assistance Units, called EMASYA (Emniyet-Asayis-Yardimlasma), military operations were allowed without supervision of a civilian body in times of internal security problems. The European Commission consequently criticized Turkey in its 2006 Regular Progress Report and demanded the change of the secret protocol.

When the seven-year term of the tenth President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, ended in 2007, a crisis occurred as regards the presidential elections. The leading Islamist JDP presented Abdullah Gul as its candidate for the presidency, which sparked ‘Republican Demonstrations’ in big cities. The Turkish Armed Forces also objected to this candidate in an e-memorandum to the government on April 27, 2007 just before midnight. “This e-memorandum was a press statement of the Chief of General Staff Yasar Buyukanit which was a blatant example of the continuing political role of the armed forces” (Karaosmanoglu 2009: 40). After this intervention, general elections were held on July 22, 2007 in which the JDP increased its votes up to 46%. That is, as a response to the military intervention, Turkish people showed their reactions with voting for the JDP. Thus, Abdullah Gul became the eleventh President of Turkey in August 2007.

Because the military intervened in the presidential elections with the abovementioned e-memorandum, the European Commission criticized the NSC's continued influence in its 2007 Regular Progress Report. In addition, the Commission critiqued that Article 35 and 85/1 of the Internal Service Law and the secret protocol of 1997 had not been changed. Lastly, the Commission demanded that the government diminish the power of the Gendarmerie. In turn, the Commission was satisfied that "the total staff of the NSC decreased from 408 to 224, and the number of military personnel from 26 to 12" (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2007: 9).

The 2008 Regular Progress Report stated that Turkey had to make further improvements in order to become a full member of the EU. That is, the conflict between the leading parties, the RPP and the JDP, had to be solved. The right to freedom of expression had to be extended by making an amendment to Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code which forbids insulting Turkey and Turkish ethnicity. According to the Commission, the revision of Article 301 that was made in April 2008 was insufficient and did not prevent the misuse of the Article.

Moreover, "on 18 August 2008, the government released a draft national program regarding EU accession which provides for significant additional reforms in Turkey's civil-military relations" (Karaosmanoglu 2009: 41). "The new program increases the power of the Court of Audit to control all military spending" (ibid.: 41). While the program aimed at bringing the gendarmerie under civilian control, it also increased the jurisdiction of the civilian courts which could now judge both military and civilian officers in civilian issues. These improvements were also welcomed by the Commission, which drew attention to them in its progress report. However, the Commission criticized that no change had been made to the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, the Law on the National Security Council, the 1997 EMASYA secret protocol, and "to enhance civilian control over the Gendarmerie" (European Commission Regular Progress Report 2008: 9).

In its 2009 Regular Progress Report, the European Commission approved of the 'Ergenekon Case', arguing that, for the first time in Turkish history, a coup attempt was being judged. The Report welcomed the amendment on the Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Gendarmerie in March 2009 and its adoption of a new law in June 2009 which abrogated the trial of civilians in military courts.

On February 4, 2010, the EMASYA Protocol was abolished. This change is likely to be approved of by the Commission in its next progress report, since it had put pressure on the JDP government to lift this secret protocol since 2005. The Turkish government has also worked on further constitutional reforms in the spring of 2010. While these improvements have been welcomed by the EU, their impact on Turkey-EU relations in terms of Turkey's full membership remain to be seen. Time will show whether or not "the European 'Christian club' welcomes Turkey as a member and integrates a Muslim community within itself in the future" (Volten 2009: 15).

## Chapter 8: Conclusions

Because of the historical legacy of military dominance in politics stemming from Ottoman rule, the Turkish and Greek nation-states were established by the generals of their armies.

In the Turkish case, during six centuries, from the foundation of the Ottoman Empire till its demise, a military nation was created due to the power of the military. According to Altınay, the idea that “the Turkish nation is a military nation (*ordu-millet* or *asker-ulus*)” (2004: 13) is one of the foundational myths of Turkish nationalism. This military nation was rewarded with the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the War of Independence.

After its establishment, the country was governed by single-party governments of the RPP until 1950. This authoritarian regime resulted from both the common fascist trend among several European countries and the military past of the politicians. Afterwards, the one decade long rule of the opposition party, the DP, was interrupted by the Turkish military on May 27, 1960. The military regime lasted for one year, during which a new constitution was prepared. With the new 1961 constitution, the power of the military was increased, the coup d'état was legitimized and a constitutional body of the army officers, called the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*), was established with a provision. Then, during the next decade political instability had been lived in the country due to the short-lived coalition governments. Hence, the military intervened in politics on March 12, 1971. While an authoritarian government was established to give an end to the political instability, the conflict did not end on the streets and tens of leftist politicians, university students and trade unionists continued to die every day due to the rightist terror. Because the military saw itself as the highest authority and had great power, ensured in the constitution through

changes by the coup-makers and increased after every military intervention, it did not give civilian politicians the chance to deal with the internal problems. Therefore, Turkish generals again intervened into politics on September 12, 1980. This intervention resulted in the most authoritarian military regime in Turkey when compared to the previous two coups. While previous military regimes after the 1960 and 1971 coups d'état - 1960-1961 and 1971-1973 – were short-lived, General Evren this time governed the country until 1983. During these three military regimes, many restrictions were implemented and the power of the military was increased through the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu). Because of the rise of Islamism in politics, the military staged a post-modern coup d'état on February 28, 1997. This intervention consisted of the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) dictating recommendations to the government. Likewise, the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu) published an e-memorandum to the government ten years later on April 27, 2007 in order to prevent the election of the JDP's candidate as the new president of Turkey. As a response to this intervention, the JDP increased its votes in the general elections and afterwards, Abdullah Gul became the new president.

After every coup d'état, new constitutions reinforced the power of the Turkish military. Thus, the dominant role of the military in politics gradually increased. Ironically, the modernization movement in the Ottoman Empire had started with modernizing the army. However, the powerful military under the leadership of the NSC (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu), strengthened after every military intervention, gradually became the cause for breaks to democracy. This led to reactions of the EEC/EU, to which the military replied with an anti-EU attitude.

As a result, the military, which was seen as a modernization instrument that aimed at greater closeness to the West during Ottoman times and early years of the Turkish Republic, now distances the country from the West. Unless its powerful role in politics is overcome, the West seems unlikely to include Turkey into the European Union.

In the Greek case, the independent Greek Kingdom was officially established in 1832. From its foundation on, the Greek nation-state was afflicted by political instability. Between 1909 and 1936, Greek generals made several coups d'état in the context of the conflict between royalists and anti-royalists. In addition, Metaxas established his personal dictatorship in 1936, which lasted until 1941, in line with the authoritarian trend throughout the world. This dictatorship ended because the country was occupied by Germany at the beginning of the Second World War. The fact that Greece had fought since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century in the Balkan wars, the First World War, the Turkish-Greek war, and finally the Second World War, resulted in a poor economy, instable politics, and a chaotic atmosphere in the country. When the civil war between communists and anti-communists broke out at the end of the Second World War, Greece was further weakened and found itself in ruins at the end of the civil war in 1949.

When the Greek Colonels made a coup d'état on April 21, 1967, their leader Papadopoulos did not intend to leave the government for a long time. Thus, he established his military junta, which continued for seven years. This Colonels' dictatorship caused the suspension of the relations with the EEC. The Community withheld the implementation of the Association Agreement and stopped giving financial aid to the country. The CoE also suspended the membership of Greece because of human rights violations occurring under the Colonels' dictatorship.

A turning point in Greek history occurred when the Greek junta made a coup d'état against the Greek Cypriot government. The Turkish government responded to this intervention with a military operation in July 1974. After the Greek defeat in Cyprus, the dictatorship in Greece ended. The Third Hellenic Republic was established with the aim of consolidating democracy. The first task of the civilian government was to eliminate the military from politics in order to establish a strong democracy and to become a member of the EEC. After several amendments to the laws on the role of army officers, Greece applied for membership in the EEC in 1975. Then, the relationship between the country and the EEC was reconstituted.

After a period of negotiations, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC on January 1, 1981. From then on, Greece has been benefiting from its EEC/EU membership in terms of financial assistance, while the country in turn has improved its political system.

After analysing the military interventions in Turkey and Greece and the EEC/EU's reactions to them, I conclude that the Community reacted to the Turkish coups of 1960 and 1971 more positively than to the Greek military dictatorship of 1967. Because Greek membership in 1981 coincided with the Turkish coup of 1980, the strained relations between Turkey and Greece led to more difficult relations between Turkey and the EEC: Greece used its veto power several times against the candidacy of Turkey. "Through centuries, the whole Turkish relationship with Europe is evaluated in terms of 'winning' and 'losing': to win is to achieve recognition; to lose is to fail to do so" (Deringil 2007: 718). Thus, "when it is told that, for whatever reason, its entry into Europe is being delayed, Turkey feels spurned and rejected" (ibid.: 718).

Even though Turkey-EU relations have been improving since 1999, Turkey should still fulfill the requirements for EU membership. It seems that Turkey cannot be a member of the EU unless it overcomes entirely the power of the military in politics. Nevertheless, as "the popular saying 'Her Turk asker dogar' (every Turk is born a soldier) is repeated in daily conversations, school textbooks, the speeches of public officials and intellectuals and is used as a drill slogan during the military service" (Altınay 2004: 13), Turkish youth grows up giving high value to the military. Thus, this understanding leads Turkish people to early on accept the dominance of the military in politics and to tolerate past and possible future military interventions into politics. Thus, if Turkey is willing to exclude the military from politics, it should start with education, such as making changes to school textbooks. Only after a marked change in the attitudes of Turkish people concerning the military can Turkey be governed by completely civilian rule.

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