

ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS MASTER'S DEGREE PROGRAM

ÖZAL ERA: CONSTRUCTION OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND
NEO-CONSERVATISM IN TURKEY

BURÇAY ALKAN
114633014

Advisor: Associate Prof. Dr. Ömer Turan

İSTANBUL
2017

ÖZAL ERA: CONSTRUCTION OF NEO-LIBERALISM AND
NEO-CONSERVATISM IN TURKEY

ÖZAL DÖNEMİ: YENİ-LİBERALİZMİN VE YENİ-
MUHAFAZAKÂRLIĞIN TÜRKİYE' DE KURULMASI

BURÇAY ALKAN

114633014

Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ömer Turan

Jüri Üyesi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Cemil Boyraz




Jüri Üyesi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Güven Gürkan Öztan

Tezin Onaylandığı Tarih:

Toplam Sayfa Sayısı:

Anahtar Kelimeler :

- 1) Neo-liberalizm
- 2) Yeni-muhafazakarlık
- 3) Popülizm
- 4) Pragmatizm
- 5) Politik kültür




19.06.2017

92

Keywords:

- 1) Neo-liberalism
- 2) Neo-conservatism
- 3) Populism
- 4) Pragmatism
- 5) Political culture

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I want to thank my advisor Ömer Turan for his great help during all the processes of my thesis. Also I should thank to my thesis jury members as Cemil Boyraz and Güven Gürkan Öztan for their great advices and critics about my thesis. Without these helps, advices and critics, this thesis would not be in this form.

Actually I returned to university after nearly 15 years from my bachelor graduation. So my master's adventure was surprising for me. I hope I could do my best.

Also I have to thank my family for their great patience and help during writing my thesis and reading about my thesis.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	iii
Table of Contents.....	iv
Abbreviations	vi
Abstract.....	viii
Özet.....	ix
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Short Summary of ANAP-Özal Period.....	3
1.3 Research Question and Methodology.....	8
1.4 Concepts for Understanding Özal Era.....	8
1.5 Conclusion.....	10
CHAPTER 2: INTELLECTUAL ROOTS.....	12
2.1 Panorama of Turkey`s Right in the 1970s.....	12
2.2 Post-Coup Period of 1980-1983.....	16
2.3 Intellectuals Hearth and Turkish-Islam Synthesis.....	18
2.4 Conclusion.....	26
CHAPTER 3: POLITICS OF MOTHERLAND PARTY.....	27
3.1 Tradition of Turkey`s Right Wing.....	27
3.2 Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey.....	31
3.3 Life of Turgut Özal.....	35
3.4 Turgut Özal`s Prime-Ministry Period.....	37
3.5 Turgut Özal`s Presidency Period	43
3.6 Conclusion.....	44
CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MOTHERLAND PARTY	47
4.1 Economic Legacy of 60s and 70s Era.....	47
4.2 Neo-Liberalism Concept.....	54
4.3 Political Economy of 1980s and Early 1990s.....	58
4.4 Conclusion.....	69
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	71

5.1 Concluding Remarks.....	71
5.2 Debate on Further Research.....	77
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	79

Abbreviations

- ANAP - Motherland Party
AKP – Justice and Development Party
AP - Justice Party
BTP – Great Turkey Party
CHP - Republican People's Party
CKMP – Republican Peasants and Nation Party
DİSK - Revolutionary Workers' Union Confederation
DP - Democrat Party
DPT - State-Planning Organization
DYP - True Path Party
GNP – Gross National Product
HP - People's Party
IMF – International Monetary Fund
İTÜ – Istanbul Technical University
KDV – Value Added Tax
MESS - Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries
MDP – Nationalist Democracy Party
MGK - National Security Council
MHP - National Action Party
MİSK – Turkey Nationalist Workers' Union Confederation
MNP - National Order Party
MSP -National Salvation Party
OECD - The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
RP - Welfare Party
SODEP – Social Democracy Party
SHP – Social Democrat People's Party
TİSK – Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations

TRT - Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TÜSİAD – Turkish Industry & Business Association
YÖK - Higher Education Council

Abstract

This thesis is mainly about the Motherland Party and Özal era which could be described as the construction of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in Turkey in the period of 1980-1993. This thesis will try to help us to understand this period in an inter-disciplinary approach by using political science, economics and political sociology. Basically, this thesis will try to identify this period's intellectual roots, politics and political economy and make a critique of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism by the help of the Motherland Party-Özal and 1980s Turkey. In the ideological and ideational sources of Özal, Turkish-Islam synthesis and Intellectuals Hearth will be discussed. In the political aspects of Özal era, tradition of Turkish Right, army-civil relations, Özal's political life and Özal's prime-ministry and presidency period will be discussed. In the political economy part, legacy of 1960s and 1970s economics of Turkey, 24 January 1980 economic decisions, neo-liberalization, financial liberalization and political economy of 1980s and early 1990s Turkey will be discussed. Therefore, this thesis will try to show how this period constructed neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in Turkey. Also concepts such as populism, neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism will be used to understand the Özal era.

As the basic argument of this thesis, Özal era was politically illiberal and conservative, but as economically, it was a liberal or neo-liberal period.

Özet

Bu tez genel olarak Anavatan Partisi-Özal dönemi ve bu dönemde Türkiye`de neo-liberalizmin ve yeni –muhafazakârlığın 1980-1993 arasında kurulması üzerinedir. Bu tezin amacı, bu dönemi siyaset bilimi, ekonomi ve siyaset sosyolojisi olmak üzere disiplinler arası bir yaklaşımla anlamaya çalışmaktır. Temel olarak, bu dönemin entelektüel kökenlerini, siyasetini, politik ekonomisini tanımlamaya çalışmak ve Anavatan Partisi-Özal ve 1980`ler Türkiye`si yardımıyla neo-liberalizmin ve yeni-muhafazakârlığın bir eleştirisi yapılmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu tez, entelektüel kökenleri tarafında Türk-İslam sentezi ve Aydınlar Ocağı`nın rolünü ele almaktadır. Siyaset tarafında ise, Türk Sağ geleneğini, asker-sivil ilişkilerini ve Özal`ın politik yaşamını ve Özal`ın başbakanlık ve cumhurbaşkanlığı dönemini tartışmaya açmaktadır. Politik iktisat bölümünde ise, 1960`lar ve 1970`ler Türkiye`sinin ekonomik mirasını, 24 Ocak 1980 kararlarını, neo-liberalleşmeyi, finansal liberalleşmeyi ve Türkiye politik ekonomisinin 1980`ler ve erken 1990`lardaki durumu tartışmaya açılacaktır. Dolayısıyla Özal döneminin nasıl yeni-muhafazakârlığı ve neo-liberalizmi Türkiye`de kurduğu gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Ayrıca popülizm, yeni-muhafazakarlık, neo-liberalizm kavramları kullanılarak Özal dönemi anlaşılmasına çalışılacaktır.

Bu tezin temel önermesi, Özal döneminin politik olarak anti-liberal ve muhafazakâr, ama ekonomik olarak liberal veya neo-liberal bir dönem olduğudur.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Importance to study Özal period in Turkish politics in 2017 lies at the fact that this period was a turning point in the world that neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism emerged. Therefore, we saw the reflections of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in Turkey. 24 January economic program was a neo-liberal economy program and it was the reflection of neo-liberalism. Özal's support and relationship with Intellectuals Heart and Turk-Islam synthesis were the indicators of neo-conservatism. Also 1980 military coup and the ban of old politicians and their parties in Turkey created the conditions of Özal and ANAP's synthesis of four political movements (nationalism, liberalism, Islamism, social democracy). Özal identified himself and his party as a new party and new politics. This new politics was a combination of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism.

Actually the thought of looking to the Turkish right from the perspective of left side directed me to write this thesis. Especially I influenced from Tanıl Bora, Ruşen Çakır and Professor Yüksel Taşkın who tried to look at the Turkish Right from the left side. Mostly right thinkers study right side and left thinkers study left wing. Also social sciences students make the same attitude of just learning their own ideologies. This is the main tradition in political science or in other social sciences. This thought of looking at right side from left side (or vice versa) breaks down this tradition. At this point, important publications such as Yeni Gündem and Birikim magazine tried to make connection between civil left and political Islamists. That experience is important and this experience can give us the tips of understanding the other political movements and may help us to learn the culture of 'how to live together'.

Another point that directed me to write this thesis was the great dominancy of Turkish Right in Turkish political history until nowadays and by looking at the Özal era, this will help us to see the continuities-ruptures and tradition of Turkish

right. Therefore, we can make connections between Özal era and current political-economic paradigm in Turkey.

This thesis is about the ANAP's Özal era. Why just this period in ANAP? Because this period in ANAP made a mark on Turkish intellectual, political and economical history of Turkey. This thesis's main target is to look at the ideological bases (intellectual roots), political and economical aspects of Özal era. These three aspects will give us a total view of this era. The research question of this thesis is 'How Özal era constructed neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism in Turkey?'. This study will start with the establishment of ANAP and will go on with the prime ministry and presidency of Özal and will end with the death of Özal as chronically. Actually this thesis will try to give the background information (legacy) of intellectual roots, politics and political economy by looking at 80s and early 90s.

This study will use literature review as methodology. This thesis will use books, articles, memoirs, magazines as sources. Also this study will benefit from political science, economics and political sociology.

Intellectual roots and politics of ANAP chapters will try to answer the question of how Özal era constructed neo-conservatism and political economy chapter will help us to answer the question of how Özal era constructed neo-liberalism. Second chapter as intellectuals roots will concentrate on Intellectuals Hearth, Turk-Islam synthesis and ANAP and Özal's organic relations with Intellectuals Hearth. This chapter shows us that Turkish-Islam synthesis became the official ideology of the state and we see the implementations of this ideology in ANAP- Özal government. Also this chapter will look at the panorama of Turkish right in 70s in order to make connections with 80s ANAP- Özal period. 1980-1983 post-coup period will give us the emerging conditions of ANAP- Özal period. Third chapter as politics of ANAP will concentrate on the tradition of Turkish Right in order to see the continuities and ruptures in the tradition of especially in center-right. This chapter will also look at the military-civil relations in Turkey that Özal was mostly afraid of military's power in politics. Also this chapter will look at the Özal's life and personality in order to see the reflections of

his hybrid-pragmatic personality on his political mentality. Furthermore, this chapter will look at the politics of Özal in his prime ministry and presidency. Fourth chapter as political economy of ANAP will concentrate on economic look of 1960s and 70s, neo-liberalism concept and political economy of 1980s and early 1990s. This chapter summarizes the neo-liberal turn in world economy and its reflections on Turkish economy on 1980s by the transformation of import-substitution economy to export based economy.

In order to understand this period, it is important to look at the political, economical, intellectual roots of this period. It is better to make a short summary of this period as chronically so we can see what is on the ground. Then I will give details of the period (as political, economical and intellectual) in the other chapters.

1.2 SHORT SUMMARY OF ANAP-ÖZAL PERIOD

ANAP (Motherland Party) has been established by Turgut Özal at 20th of May 1983 (Cemal, 1986; Çavuşoğlu, 2009, p. 170). There were Özal's bureaucrat friends in the party as the founders of the party, so they formed the image that this party was not a party that have relations with an old party (Doğan, 1985; Yücel, 2006). This image was important because this period was a post-12 September military coup period so military was still effective on the political arena in Turkey. ANAP was a consequence of the 12 September military coup. At 1983 general elections, ANAP took 45 percentage of the votes and became the ruling party. ANAP had a difficulty in its conservative identity that the party had four different political movements in itself so there were ex AP, MHP and MSP member of parliaments. By the way, these four different political discourses visible in ANAP were liberal, nationalist, political Islamist and social democratic as also represented by the elites of the party (Erol, 1997). With this representation of four

political trends, ANAP aimed to get the votes of AP, MHP, MSP and CHP (Sakalliođlu, 1996).

The generals of 12th September military coup tried to develop the Islamist conservatism in the society and this was adopted as an attitude in ANAP (Ahmad, 2002; Özder, 2006, p. 126). Intellectual's Hearth (*Aydınlar Ocađı*) which was a group of nationalist-conservative intellectuals, has formulated-formed 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' and this conservative discourse and conservative structure became dominant after 1980 military coup. By the way, 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis' was effective in political Islamist MSP and nationalist MHP but also in ANAP (Zürcher, 2015). ANAP's view was different than the other two parties that this synthesis was a great belief to technological innovation in order to reach West. ANAP and Intellectuals Hearth had an organic relationship (Özder, 2006, p. 132). Nilüfer Göle pointed out that ANAP formed a synthesis of liberal market ideology and Islamist conservatism and this was the main identity of the party (Göle, 2002). Also ANAP elites described themselves as modern conservatives and so they had Islamist conservative values that coming from their families but also had rational values coming from their engineering formation. Levent Köker mentioned about the politics of ANAP as liberal conservatism which is closer to liberal side (Köker, 2003, pp. 288-289). He gave examples for this process as; the combination of economical liberalism with political liberalism and cultural liberalism, strengthening of local authorities, more privatization, respect to the religious beliefs of the society like headscarf. ANAP and Özal's liberal conservatism approach was in that sense, parallel to American (Reagan) and English (Thatcher) models.

At 1984, there had a local election and ANAP had 41.5 percentage of votes and so, got a slow decrease but got successful again (Zürcher, 2015, p. 408). At 1987, ANAP decided to make a referendum for overturning the ban on pre-coup period's politicians and the result was 50.16 percentage of votes for Yes and 49.84 percentage of votes for No (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 357). So old politicians like Demirel and Ecevit could start to be in politics again (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 358). Also Özal's campaign for No vote, showed us the anti-

democratic view of Özal. Özal could overturn this ban by the parliament but he did not use that way and he decided to go to referendum. Özal saw this result of the referendum as a great success because this showed the power of ANAP against the old politicians and so old politics. There had a huge polarization between ANAP (new political mentality) and old political leaders-parties, so Özal wanted to use this advantage and decided to make the elections earlier as in 1987 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 359). ANAP got 36.3 percentage of votes in this 1987 early elections and got the absolute majority in the parliament (Zürcher, 2015, p. 410). At 1989 local elections, ANAP got 21.9 percentage of the votes and became the third party in the elections after SHP and DYP (Zürcher, 2015, p. 412). This 1989 local elections were a disaster for Özal and ANAP because the party's votes or popularity decreased from 45 percentage to 22 percentage in five years despite the populist policies of ANAP elites (Ahmad, 1993, p. 198). Özal understood that his prime ministry was in danger so he decided to stand for the president election instead of Kenan Evren. Özal was selected as second civil Turkish president in 1989. With the presidency of Özal, 'Holy Alliance' group in ANAP, which was a kind of union containing the Islamists and the Nationalists in the party, had a chance to control the party. By the way, after Özal was selected as president, Özal selected Yıldırım Akbulut as prime-minister (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 372). At the party congress which was held on June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz became the ANAP leader and also became the new prime-minister (Zürcher, 2015, p. 413). Mesut Yılmaz decided to have early elections in October 1991 and ANAP got 24 percentage of votes in this elections and ANAP became the opposition party, DYP and SHP formed a coalition (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, pp. 380-382). Özal died at April 1993 because of a heart attack.

Özal's economic policies (like 24 January 1980 economic decisions) and politics could not be implemented in a normal democratic country, so it has been realized after 12 September military coup (Ahmad, 1993, p. 193). Özal was one of the architects of the 24 January 1980 economic reform package (Zürcher, 2015, p. 440). 12 September 1980 military coup banned the trade unions and left wing politics, so this economic package could be implemented easily. This economic

program was designed for the cure of balance of payments, fighting with inflation and creating an export oriented free market economy. Before 1980s there was an import substitution for industrialization but with Özal, there emerged an export oriented industrialization (Zürcher, 2015, p. 442).

Çağlar Keyder mentioned that after the 1960 military coup, government, military and their supporters as intellectuals and bureaucrats started to implement this import substitution for industrialization (Keyder, 2011, p. 178). Import substitution for industrialization has been described as the production of commodities (which have been imported before) by local industry and the protection of this local industry by the tariff walls. Import substitution for industrialization was successful until 1980. This production type (accumulation model) was suitable for industrial bourgeois, bureaucracy and labor class. In this type of accumulation model, industrial bourgeois would get favor from the allocation of foreign currency and credits (with the help of DPT) and also there would emerge a domestic market which the revenues would be redistributed (Keyder, 2011, p. 181).

Murat Koraltürk and Cem Çetin mentioned about ANAP's economic view that there had new economic decisions like changes in import regime, liberalization in foreign-currency transactions, new tax implementations (like KDV-VAT), new funds (Koraltürk & Çetin, 2005). Also there had new investments in communication, transport and electric industries. Turkey became a convenient country for foreign capital. Also these economic policies formed a negative effect on income distribution especially on the middle class.

Korkut Boratav described ANAP's economy policies as war against trade unions and so, trade unions became ineffective and real wages decreased (Boratav, 1997, p. 164). 1988 real wages were less than 1983 real wages. Furthermore, Boratav mentioned about 1984-88 period as economically populist years (Boratav, 1997, pp. 164-165). ANAP's economic distribution strategy-policy was to block or avoid the class based demands like unionist associations, wages, subvention payments to peasants. On the other hand, these classes have been seen by ANAP as just 'citizen, slum resident, poor and consumer' and so

ANAP just tried to satisfy them with their above mentioned properties. There implemented exemptions on corporate taxes (Boratav, 1997, p. 166). Government removed property declaration (servet beyannamesi) on 1984 and activated VAT (KDV) on 1985. So tax system has been on the shoulders of wage earners and consumers. This implementation was on the side of capitalist class. This situation was unfair obviously, because VAT is an indirect tax which is implemented on commodities and services, so this tax is independent from the consumer's revenue.

With the effect of high inflation, freezing of wages and high interest rates, most of the wage earner's purchasing power between 1979 and 1989, has decreased between 40 and 60 percentage (Zürcher, 2015, p. 441). Export between 1980 and 1987, has increased with the average of 22 percentage (Zürcher, 2015, p. 444). The share of agriculture in the exports, was 60 percentage in 1979 but this changed to 20 percentage in 1988. In this same period, the total of industry commodities' share in the exports increased from 45 percentage to 72 percentage. In other words, with the 1980s, Turkey started to transform from an agricultural society to industrial society.

1980s economic policies have really changed the income distribution between rich and poor (Zürcher, 2015, p. 447). A new too rich entrepreneur class has emerged and this class was from the import, export and construction industry. On the other side of the picture, there were many poor and unemployed people. At the end of the 1980s, Turkey had high inflation, unemployment and budget deficit (Zürcher, 2015, p. 448).

The average growth rate, between the years 1980 and 1988, was 4.6 percentage (Ahmad, 1993, p. 205). This average was less than the average growth rate between the years 1963 and 1977.

In the 1980s, working class of Turkey was terribly beaten and also young workers and students were put in prison and tortured (Ahmad, 1993, p. 211).

Anti-labor economic distribution policies have been implemented in 1980s until 1989 (Boratav, 1997, p. 208). At 1989, anti-labor policies failed and labor class was active in 'spring demonstrations' and these demonstrations effected the

1989 local elections. With the help of these demonstrations; labors, civil servants, peasants have gained their losses in their wages, salaries until 1993.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY

My research question will be 'how ANAP-Özal era constructed neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in Turkish politics, economics and society?'. I will try to explain this construction process in political, economical and intellectual arena. So, Özal era will be the case study for this research question and chapters will be the answer to the research question.

This thesis will use literature review as methodology and this study will use books, articles, memoirs, magazines, newspapers, speeches as resources. Another important thing is that, I will try to look at ANAP-Özal period in an interdisciplinary way. This will help us to understand the social reality better or in a wider perspective. So I will benefit from political science, economics and sociology (mostly political sociology).

1.4 CONCEPTS FOR UNDERSTANDING ÖZAL ERA

I will refer to some concepts such as populism and neo-conservatism in order to understand Özal era. Neo-liberalism concept is more related with economics, so it will be discussed in the political economy chapter. Why this study concentrates on these concepts? The reason for using populism concept is that Turkish Right had a property of right populism which stands for the 'national will', based on the majority. This issue will be discussed more detailed in the chapter of politics of ANAP and sub-chapter of Özal's prime-ministry and presidency period. The reason for using neo-conservatism is that this concept has emerged in world countries such as America, England and Germany and this new wave had reflections on countries like in Turkey.

Populism concept is an important issue to understand Özal era. Peter Worsley identified populism as 'an emphasis, a dimension of political culture in general, not simply as a particular kind of overall ideological system or type of organization' (Taggart, 2000, p. 15; Worsley, 1969, p. 245). So we can understand

that populism is not an ideology and we can see its implementations in left or in right.

In populist politics, there emerges 'us' and 'them' categories or discourses (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 2; Laclau, 2005; Fella & Ruzza, 2013). This 'us' and 'them' conceptualization is mostly used in Turkish right traditional discourse for inventing inner and outsider enemies. Populist politics is not a new issue and so this populist politics appeared in different historical times like beginning in the farmers movement in Russia, in the USA at the late 19th century, in the mid 20th century in Latin America, recent times in Europe, USA and Latin America (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 4; Taggart, 2000; Jansen & Walgrave, 2007; Roberts, 2010; Levitsky & Roberts, 2011; Rosenthal & Trost, 2012). Taggart stated that populist parties are known as the parties which have a centralized organizational structure and also a charismatic leader (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 12; Taggart, 1995; Pauwels, 2011). Here we remember Özal as a charismatic and populist leader of ANAP.

Worsley described four properties of a 'third world' type of populism (Worsley, 1969, pp. 229-230). First was that societies were seen as essentially homogeneous and anti-antagonistic elements in it. This meant that there were pretended to be no classes, ethnicities in that society. Second feature was the real antagonism came between the society or nation and the outer world like colonial countries. Here we may remember the anti-imperialist discourse of the Turkish right and left politics. Third was that there had a dominant party which represents the society or nation. Here we may remind ANAP again as the dominant party of 1980s. Fourthly, this dominant party appeared as a representative of liberation and a power for economic development. Here we remember that Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın emphasized the period of 1983-1991 of ANAP as Özal's quote "First economy and then politics" (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014). This also explains and shows us the populism and economism of ANAP in this period.

Ernesto Laclau had an argument about populism that the mainstream ideas of dominant or hegemonic class have neutralized the other different ideas by seem to give them permission to state their expressions only as a different idea not as an

antagonistic sense (Taggart, 2000, p. 17; Laclau, 1977, p. 173). Laclau so explained populism as ideology of elites. This situation mainly occurred when this hegemonic class tried to put its hegemony over others but if it could not then it 'made a direct appeal to the masses'. Here, 24 January economic decisions could be an example for this, because with the help of 1980 military coup and ANAP government, bourgeois class put their hegemony over the labor class and these decisions were seem to be taken for the goodness of 'the people' or 'masses' as their discourse.

Furthermore, neo-conservatism concept was also essential to understand ANAP period. According to Helmut Dubiel, neo-conservatism is a reaction process against the political and social problems of liberal crisis and the lack of authority in bourgeois value system (Dubiel, 1998; Güler, 2007, p. 147). For this reason, child education, general education, women and family, sexual life, the practice of the religion have been the most important issues of neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatism especially made a combination of economic liberalism and conservatism itself (Güler, 2007, p. 151). Simply neo-conservatism can be defined as the combination of neo-liberalism and conservatism (Bora, 2015, p. 69). Özal explained his conservatism mentality that his conservatism approach was not a fanaticism or a classical conservatism, his conservatism could be described as a new-conservatism which would defend- conserve today's 'good' national, traditional values and family values could be mentioned as a good example in this issue (Özal, 1989; Türk, 2014, pp. 137-138).

1.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter's one of the aims was to mention about writer's motivation for writing a thesis in this subject and explain why is it important to study this subject in 2017. Another purpose was to give chronicle information about this era for the readers and give information about the research question-methodology and concepts which writer concretes on.

Firstly, ANAP and Özal had a vision of new party and new leader mentality on the eyes of the society and political-economical arena. This was

realized by the help of discourse of four political movements (liberal, nationalist, political Islamist, social democratic). ANAP and Özal were the products of 12 September regime and they were some kind of a synthesis of liberal market ideology and nationalist-Islamist conservatism. Özal's engineering background and so rationality mentality formed this liberal market ideology and his family background formed this nationalist-Islamist conservatism.

I used or borrowed some concepts for understanding Özal era. These concepts were populism, neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism. Populism has been identified with a charismatic leader (read as Özal) and a centralized organizational structure (read as ANAP). Laclau (Laclau, 2005) described populism as the ideology of elites which needed to put its hegemony over the masses. Neo-conservatism or new right concept was also important to understand Özal era. Neo-conservatism has been described as the combination of economic-liberalism (neo-liberalism) and political conservatism (Bora, 2015; Dubiel, 1998; Güler, 2007).

CHAPTER 2

INTELLECTUAL ROOTS

2.1 PANORAMA OF TURKEY'S RIGHT IN THE 1970S

It is important to look at the 1970s Turkey's Right legacy to understand the base of 1980s ANAP. This will help us to see the background of the ANAP period. Why to mention about central-right party AP (Demirel), nationalist party MHP and political Islamist party MSP? As we remember, ANAP had a discourse of combining four political movements (liberalism, nationalism, political Islam, social democracy) and there had nationalists (like Mustafa Taşar) and political Islamists (like Mehmet Keçeciler) in the party (also remember Holy Union as a group consisting of nationalists and political Islamists in ANAP). Also Özal was a nominee from MSP on 1977 elections for being member of parliament. Furthermore, Özal worked for Demirel government while preparing 24 January economic program. So Demirel and Özal had a close relationship and it might not be wrong to say that what made Özal as Özal was Demirel. So it will be meaningful to have a quick look at these parties.

AP (Justice Party) was an important center-right political figure. AP had an unprogressive and anti-communist mentality. This anti-communist mentality is important because this property was a tradition in Turkish right as we see in ANAP. More information will be given about this anti-communist mentality in the sub-chapter of Tradition of Turkey's Right Wing. At 1964, Süleyman Demirel was elected as the leader of the party at November 1964 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 132; Zürcher, 2015, p. 363). By the way, Demirel was a successful engineer in the private sector and he had a background coming from rural area. At this point, we may remember Özal as a successful engineer and he also worked in private sector. It should be added that these engineer based politicians as Özal and Demirel had a pride of constructing bridges, dams and highways while speaking in front of the public and they told to the people that by their implementations Turkey became modern (Türk, 2014). This situation also gave us the populist mentality of these politicians of Özal and Demirel. Also Demirel had an image

that he was Westerner, civilized, rational as an engineer who army and Kemalists liked but on the other hand, he was good at nationalism and conservatism so he was liked by the majority of the society (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 133). AP had a mentality of modernism which was actually just economic development and increase of welfare, a populist economic policy which tried to satisfy nearly all segments of the society, a religious conservatism, a westerner approach which took the role model of America rather than Europe (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 141). At this point, we may remember the Özal's similar mentality of populist policy to reach at all segments in the society, religious conservatism coming from family background, a westerner approach closer to America and enthusiasm to America. Another thing that Demirel used as a concept was 'national will' concept against the military power on politics. By this concept, Demirel had an easy conversation-communication with the society and also he was giving the message to the military that democracy's legality source was the elections, parliament and so the public-society. Özal also used this national will concept against military in the 1983 elections when Özal's party won the elections. This concept was used in Turkish right tradition even in AKP which saw themselves as in the tradition of Democrat Party, AP and ANAP. Also this was a populist concept and this concept was used to influence the society whenever they want.

Demirel mentioned about his views about 'overall development' concept in a speech in Intellectuals Hearth on 1975 (Demirel, 1975; Turan, 2016). He stated that development was just not an economic development, it was the journey of going from economic development to social and cultural development. This overall development had four properties such as social justice, social security, economic growth and 'protecting national and moral values'. So by this way, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy would be cured. By using the concept of 'protecting national and moral values', he was inspired by Turkish nationalism (Turan, 2016, p. 489). At this point, Özal had also a discourse of economic development and he, as a neo-conservative, mentioned about 'protecting national and moral values'. This economic development was a characteristic of center-right

that gave people optimism about future (Taşkın, 2009). This issue will also be discussed in the politics of ANAP chapter.

When we look at the nationalist right, we see CKMP (Zürcher, 2015, p. 371). At 1965, Alpaslan Türkeş who was a former soldier, joined to CKMP and became the leader of the party in a short time. This conservative party turned to an ultra nationalist party by Türkeş. Party's basic factors were nationalism in a violent type which had a mission to unify Turks in Asia and anti-communism (Zürcher, 2015, p. 372). Party's name was changed to MHP at 1969. Furthermore, MHP had a pan-Turkism view that there had to be close relations with the Turks outside Turkey especially in Soviet Union and China Republic and so these Turks had to be independent from these countries in order to form a bigger Turkish state (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 176). In other words, this project had an imperialist and pan-Turkist mentality. Özal had also close relations with the Turkic Republics that at his last days of presidency, he was visiting these countries for this nationalism mentality and economic pragmatism. Also MHP's nationalism had a point of view that state concept comes first, state has to be protected and has to be strengthened. So this kind of nationalism was a totalitarian nationalism which was fighting for its state but had no relations with citizens. In other words, MHP's nationalism was against a democratic-civic nationalism. Özal's nationalism was a positive nationalism (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014) which would be proud of present time art people but not with the historical Ottoman Empires (Barlas, 1994). So Özal's nationalism was more pragmatic than MHP's nationalism. Also it should be added that Özal used the discourse of MHP's nationalism and MHP's staff as a central-right party.

Another important party in Turkey's right was MNP as a political islamist party. Erbakan resigned from AP and at 1970, he established MNP (Ahmad, 2002, p. 172). At 1972 a new party called MSP opened (Zürcher, 2015, p. 375; Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 249). As we mentioned above that Özal was a nominee from MSP at 1977 elections but he could not be succeed. This incident also helped Özal not to be vetoed by the National Security Council for the government right after the 1980 military coup and also for the ANAP. Also it should be added that Özal's

brother Korkut Özal became a member of parliament and minister from MSP until 1980 military coup. So Turgut Özal had an organic relationship with MSP because of his brother. MSP presented its program to the public with a topic of National Outlook and so National Outlook movement started in Turkey. Erbakan described his National Outlook movement as a development related with industrialization and a moral renewal (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 248). This development issue was an important point for Turkish right and we saw the development issue in ANAP too. At the last years of 1970s political polarization and so violence increased. MSP had a big mass demonstration in Konya at 6 September 1980 for protesting Israel's decision for declaring Jerusalem as their capital city (Zürcher, 2015, p. 387; Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 319). At these years MSP was influenced by the Iran Islamic revolution which occurred at January 1979. This demonstration was a kind of call for changing democracy to the Sheri`a-Islamic law in Turkey. This demonstration was interesting that, although the Turkish national anthem's text was written by a pan-islamist poet Mehmet Akif Ersoy, the mass rejected to sing the Turkish national anthem. This demonstration was also one of a reason for the 12 September 1980 military coup. By the way, Mehmet Keçeciler, who was an important figure in ANAP, was at that moment Konya's mayor from MSP. He was the representative of political Islamists in the ANAP. This showed us the organic relationship between ANAP and MSP that there were ex-MSP members in ANAP.

Furthermore, the Nagshbandi Order was also active in MSP policies (Toprak, 2013). MSP leader Erbakan and party elites were known as the followers of the Nagshbandi Order leader sheikh Mehmet Zahid Efendi (Toprak, 2013; Algar, 1981). This detail was important because Özal was also a follower of Nagshbandi Order leader sheikh Mehmet Zahid Efendi. This showed us another organic relationship between ANAP and MSP.

2.2 POST-COUP PERIOD OF 1980-1983

At 12 September 1980 morning, military announced that they intervened to the democracy in order to protect the republic (Zürcher, 2015, p. 401). The parliament and the cabinet have been abolished and the member of parliaments' privilege of immunities have been revoked. All the parties and two trade union confederations as DISK and MISK have been closed. All party leaders have been arrested except Türkeş, but two days later Türkeş has been arrested. State of emergency has been announced. At 14 September, chief of general staff Kenan Evren became the president and the power has been controlled by the National Security Council (MGK) which just had members of military officers and Kenan Evren was the president of this council (Zürcher, 2015, p. 402). By the way, Murat Belge asked the question of what was the characteristics of Turkey so Turkey experienced an incident like 12 September 1980 military coup and his answer to this question was about the character of Kenan Evren (Belge, 1992, p. 27; Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 327). Kenan Evren was a leader that ordinary people would love and Evren was like the ordinary people that you could find in any café that would talk like 'We have to hang them'. The tragic thing that we experienced, Evren had the chance to hang people and he did. One week later, National Security Council appointed a cabinet which contained bureaucrats and retired military officers. The president of the cabinet was Bülend Ulusu who was a retired admiral. Cabinet had just a function of giving advices to National Security Council and implement the decisions of National Security Council. National Security Council had the right to change the cabinet members-ministers. Evren assigned Turgut Özal as the deputy prime minister responsible for the economy in order to give the image to IMF and World Bank that economic stability would be gained. Özal and his crew were the founders of 24 January 1980 economic decisions so Özal's role in the cabinet also gave the good impression to capital class in Turkey who supported the military coup. Özal used this chance and he was 22 months in charge as deputy prime minister responsible for economy in 12 September governments.

Kenan Evren declared that there would be no place for old politicians (Zürcher, 2015, p. 403). Demirel and Ecevit were released, Erbakan and Türkeş have been judged but at last they have been acquitted. At 1982, with a National Security Council decision, old politicians have been banned from politics. At the end of 1980, 30.000 people have been arrested, at September 1982, 80.000 people have been in prisons and 30.000 of them have been waiting to be judged in prisons (Dood, 1983, p. 45).

At July 1982, a new constitution draft has been prepared by a constitution committee which contained 15 members (Zürcher, 2015, p. 405). In this constitution, there were more power in executive organ and also more powers have given to president and National Security Council. Also there were restrictions in freedom of press, freedom of trade unions, personal freedoms and rights in this constitution. New constitution has been put in a referendum on November 1982 and if this constitution was accepted then Kenan Evren would be the president of the republic. At the end, this constitution has been accepted in the referendum by 91 percentage of yes votes (Zürcher, 2015, p. 406). By the way, Evren was supported by the people because they believed that he stopped the anarchy in the country.

After this acceptance period of the new constitution, a new political party's law has been announced and old politicians, who were active in politics before the 12 September 1980 military coup, were banned from politics for 10 years (Zürcher, 2015, p. 406). New parties could be established but their founders had to get approval from National Security Council. Students, teachers and civil servants were forbidden from being a party member. Also new parties were forbidden from opening women and youth branches of their parties and so no permission would be given to have relationship with trade unions and no permission would be given to party branches in villages. Military rejected and closed BTP, DYP and SODEP because they were seen as the representatives of AP and CHP.

Also we may add that Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın identified 12 September Kemalism as a project which modernization legacy has been left and

this project has been renewed with a conservative content (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 340). This approach has been put in the 1982 constitution in the name of Kemalist Nationalism. Furthermore, anti-communist reflexes which belonged to cold war times, overlapped with 1980s new right values, so right Kemalism had a new content (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 341). Right Kemalism, while 12 September period, got closer to Özal's economic views and also economic issues-areas have been left to conservative staff. So in this mentality, it was not surprising that there were supporters in the 12 September executive team for 24 January economic decisions and Özal (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 342).

When we look at the society, with the 12 September 1980 military coup, two problems have been solved (Dilek, 2014, p. 364). Firstly, after the coup, labor class could not be strong as before as means of organizational base. So, the tradition of personal contract has been institutionalized instead of trade agreement (Dilek, 2014, p. 365). Secondly, Gramsci's "cultural hegemony" (Gramsci, 2009) concept (which identified that working class accepted the ideology of capitalist class) has been strengthened.

This post-coup period created a background for the Özal years that with the help of 1980 military coup, 24 January economic program, as a reflection of neo-liberalism, could be implemented. This issue will be discussed in detail in the political economy of ANAP chapter. Another issue was that 1980 military coup crashed the parties and a ban on pre-coup politicians was implemented. So this situation also helped ANAP (as a new party and new politics) to emerge. After 1980 military coup, there emerged 1982 constitution that institutionalized Turkish-Islam synthesis and this helped Özal and ANAP as a neo-conservative leader and party. This issue will be discussed in detail in the next sub-chapter.

2.3 INTELLECTUALS HEARTH AND TURKISH-ISLAM SYNTHESIS

Actually, in order to understand the intellectual roots of Motherland Party and its era, we need to look at Intellectuals Hearth and the ideology of Turkish-Islam Synthesis. This sub-chapter is essential because Intellectuals Hearth and Turkish-Islam synthesis were the reflections of neo-conservatism in Turkey.

Turkish-Islam synthesis became the official ideology of the state after the 1980 military coup, therefore this will give us a clue about ANAP's ideology in 1980s. Also we know that ANAP members like Özal were also members of Intellectuals Hearth. So there had an organic relationship between Intellectuals Hearth and ANAP. Therefore, there is a need for looking at Intellectuals Hearth and Turkish-Islam synthesis.

Ahmet Kabaklı, who was one of the members of Intellectuals Hearth, described this association as a group which was consisted of Muslim-Turk mentality against Westerner-materialist line (Kabaklı, 1985; Taşkın, 2013, p. 243). So, Ahmet Kabaklı emphasized on the duality of east-west, material-religion.

Intellectuals Heart had its roots in 1960s (Taşkın, 2013, p. 245). Firstly, Intellectuals Club was established by Süleyman Yalçın, Asım Başer, Faruk Kadri Timurtaş, Ayhan Songar and Ismail Dayı on 1962 (Ceyhun, 1993). These young nationalist founders were the students or followers of nationalists like Ali Fuat Başgil, Nihat Sami Banarlı and Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. There had some conferences and so, important nationalists came together at this club. At 1967 and 1969, nationalist academics like Mümtaz Turhan, Nihat Tarlan, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Nihat Sami Banarlı formed nationalists seminar and congress. Finally, at May 1970, Intellectuals Hearth was established and Kafesoğlu became the first president of the association (Taşkın, 2013, pp. 245-246). Intellectuals Heart was a reaction, at the second half of 1960s, against the left activism at universities and on streets (Taşkın, 2013, p. 246). This reaction was a kind of reflex for the 'continuity of the state' against the threat of left (Bora & Umur, 1987, p. 11). Intellectuals Hearth's purpose has been identified as spreading the Turkish nationalism idea in society, fighting against anarchy and strengthening national values (Taşkın, 2013, p. 246; Ocağı, 1970, p. 3). Intellectuals Hearth's name was given by poet-writer Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. Also Intellectuals Hearth's mission has been described as fighting with westerner side and at the same time, being on the side of the state (Ocağı, 1985).

According to Prof. Süleyman Yalçın, 12 September constitution was same as nearly 75 or 85 percentage with Intellectuals Hearth's constitution draft (Bora & Umur, 1987, p. 13; Taşkın, 2013, p. 262). Yılmaz Altuğ and Şener Akyol were the two members of 12 September constitution committee. These members were also members of Intellectuals Hearth. As we mentioned above, these realities showed us that Turkish-Islam synthesis became the state's official ideology and Intellectuals Hearth became an important actor in the state. An important debate about the constitution was the use of word 'özgürlük' (liberty) instead of the word of 'hürriyet' (freedom) (Taşkın, 2013, p. 263). 'Liberty' was mostly used in 1961 constitution and this word was more familiar with personal rights and so left wing, but 'freedom' word was a restriction of personal rights and so this word was more familiar with conservative environments. Finally, 'freedom' word has been accepted in the parliament (Tercüman, 1982). Another debate about the constitution was about putting the word of holly god (Allah) in the introduction part of the constitution and saying that this expression was not against secularism (Taşkın, 2013, p. 264). The spokesman of the constitution committee and also a member of Intellectuals Hearth, Professor Şener Akyol mentioned about this debate. By this view, he actually defended the stabilization which was the combination of Islam's Sunni interpretation with the official ideology. This view was one of the important doctrines of Intellectuals Hearth. Finally, this view on the constitution was rejected.

The identification of nationalism in the constitution was also a debate. Intellectuals Hearth group defended the 'Turkish nationalism' concept instead of 'Ataturk nationalism' concept (Taşkın, 2013, p. 265). According to them, 'Turkish nationalism' concept could be used in the relationships with the Turks in Middle Asia and this concept was more ethnicity related and essentialist. Also they believed that 'Turkish nationalism' concept contained 'Ataturk nationalism' in itself. On the other hand, 'Ataturk nationalism' concept was against the religion based nationalism and imperial type (Turancı) nationalism and so more related with Misak-ı Milli borders mentality. Finally, with the effect of National Security Council, 'Ataturk nationalism' concept has been used in the constitution. I

mentioned about these debates of Intellectuals Hearth on the 12 September constitution, so these debates gives us details of Intellectuals Hearth's doctrines.

12 September 1980 military coup's ideology had a harmony with the Intellectuals Hearth's Turkish-Islamic synthesis doctrine (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 148). Islam was adopted to an official authoritarian –fascist ideology, so this situation overlapped with 12 September military coup's international political (neo-conservatism) and economical (neo-liberalism) aspects. MHP vice president Agah Oktay Güner had a slogan of `nationalists are physically in prison but their thoughts are in power` for 12 September, so nationalists were supporting this Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 149). Fascist intellectuals had a thesis that Ataturk was a great Turkish nationalist, a great anti-communist and a real Turancı (imperial nationalist) (Tanyu, 1981). So, fascist intellectuals used this Ataturk argument for emphasizing the harmony with the military's official ideology. Before 12 September, intellectuals who supported MHP and the nationalists had important differences as political, social class, ideology (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 150). These intellectuals were from high bureaucracy and bourgeois, city based, elite circle. They had organic relations with the big capital class and as economically they support status quo. These intellectuals were against the fascist solidarity based and corporative discourse of MHP and nationalists. They supported `strong state` ideal and two basic fundamentals were important for them as anti-communism and blessing of state authority. These properties made them closer to high military and civil bureaucrats. These intellectual's only expectances from nationalists were to fight against communism and to prevent the radical opposition which was against the state authority (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 151). Fascist intellectuals thought that MHP and nationalist movement were not a must. So, fascist intellectuals had a common point with the Kemalist military-civil bureaucracy as changing the process of societal and political environment from up to down. This common mentality helped 12 September to form a unity with these fascist intellectuals. These fascist intellectuals were active in Tercüman newspaper and Intellectuals Hearth. Intellectuals Hearth, at first step, politically tried to form a bridge between AP and

MHP (Bora & Can, 1994, pp. 152-153). Intellectuals Hearth put and presented itself on a position of above of the parties and as a committee full of elites and experts (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 154). In some way, Intellectuals Hearth had a mission of serving to its state and helping to its state. Intellectuals Hearth had a Kemalist discourse and had a positive relation with Ataturk (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 155). According to Intellectuals Hearth, Ataturk years were the best years for the Turkish Republic and Ataturk was the most progressive Turkish nationalist. Intellectuals Hearth, after the 12 September coup, emphasized the Turk's characteristics of being 'military-nation' and supported the military government unconditionally and formed a strong relationship with the military (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 156).

Intellectuals Hearth's Turkish-Islamic synthesis doctrine was an attempt to find a common point between MHP-MSP based political practice and official ideology (official synthesis) (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 161). This synthesis was not a totally theory, it was rather an eclectic and vulgar discourse but its success came from the 12 September regime's ideological support and the legality need of the 12 September regime. The official name of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was Turkish-Islamic-West synthesis. 'West' word was in the synthesis as its technology, economy, political and military alliance with Turkey. In this context, this doctrine was closer to MHP, rather than MSP.

Muharrem Ergin, who was the vice-president of Intellectuals Hearth at 1980s and also a Turcology professor, mentioned about the reasons of 12 September in his book (Ergin, 1988) that there had no national culture policies, so this caused the collapse of the state before the 12 September military coup (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 164). He argued that 12 September could be a great chance for locating national culture as dominant ideology and after Ataturk's renaissance, this era could be a second Turkish renaissance (Ergin, 1988, pp. 211-213). According to Ergin's summary of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, 'Turkey would not be an Islamic fundamentalist country but always remain as a religious country' (Ergin, 1988; Bora & Can, 1994, p. 173). So, it was not surprising that Kenan Evren was giving references from the Quran so frequently in his public talks

(Bora & Can, 1994, p. 175). This was a kind of supportive issue for this Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The State supported the view of Intellectuals Hearth as 'Turkey would not be an Islamic fundamentalist country but always remain as a religious country'. 12 September regime accepted this view but actually ANAP institutionalized this view (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 178).

At 1983, YÖK has been established by the 12 September regime and the members of Intellectuals Hearth became executives in YÖK organization (Bora & Can, 1994, pp. 185-186). Also 12 September regime has established Atatürk Principles and Revolution History Institutes in universities such as Hacettepe, İstanbul, Boğaziçi, Atatürk and 9 Eylül at 1983 (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 187).

ANAP was closer to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis doctrine which was supported by the MHP intellectuals and ANAP was the party that maintained the Turkish Right's national agreement (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 203). By the way, this national agreement's most important issue was the 'survival of the state' in the context of Cold War's anti-communism circumstances and this issue's importance has been emphasized by the 12 September discourse of 'Turkey was surrounded with its enemies' (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 163). This discourse was effective in Turkey's right wing and always used in their discourse. So this discourse helped Turkey's right wing parties to legalize their political violence against Turkey's left wing, non-Muslims, Alevis and Kurds.

The founders of ANAP such as Veysel Atasoy, Kazım Oskay, Mustafa Taşar, Vehbi Dinçerler, Ercüment Konukman were the members of Intellectuals Hearth. Özal and other ANAP elites had a strong-organic relationship with the Intellectuals Hearth since 1970s (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 203).

ANAP had an average 'nationalist-conservative' discourse that ANAP would have an economic development model which was influenced by the Japanese capitalist economic development model with a perspective of protecting intangibles and traditional cultural structures (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 203). Also this economic development ideal would make Turkey a big-super-strong state, so all these perspectives made ANAP as an attractive party in the eyes of nationalists. This also showed us the support of nationalists to ANAP and this

support realized as the nationalist group (Hareketçiler) in ANAP. Furthermore, this average 'nationalist-conservative' discourse, which can be described as also 'modernization process in a traditional way', served to right populist politics mentality (Bora & Can, 1994, p. 243).

Intellectuals Hearth's ideology has influenced Özal and ANAP's elites (Zürcher, 2015, p. 414). Intellectuals Hearth's another mission was to change the monopoly of left wing intellectuals on the Turkey's political, cultural and societal debates. İbrahim Kafesoğlu, who was an important ideologue in Intellectuals Hearth, formed a system called 'Turkish-Islamic Synthesis'. This synthesis had a basic fundamental that Islam had a special attraction for Turks, because there had similarities between Islam civilization and Turk's culture before accepting Islam. These similarities were equity, monotheism, believing on the mortality of the soul and importance of morality in family life. According to this theory, Turkish culture had two basic fundamentals as one component of being Turkish for 2.500 years and another component of believing on Islam religion for 1.000 years (Zürcher, 2015, p. 415).

At the end of 1970s, this ideology was mostly supported by MSP and MHP but more by Türkiye's MHP (Zürcher, 2015, p. 415). Also this Turkish-Islam synthesis was supported by Kenan Evren. Military saw socialism and communism as Turkey's great enemies, so they supported this synthesis which consisted of a great nationalism and Islam version which was friendly with the state. 'Religion and moral' course became mandatory course in Turkish educational system after the 1980 military government. This 'religion and moral' course had a content of Sunni version of Islam and nationalism, family values, love for state and military were the main issues in this course. This synthesis was also effective after 1983 at Özal's ANAP period. The synthesis was to reach the West and at the same time a great belief for making the technological renovation in Turkey (Poulton, 1997, pp. 184-185).

Emin Alper and Özgür Sevgi Göral argued that Turkish-Islamic synthesis was once mostly concerned about Turkish nationalism, but later with the middles of 1970s, it made peace with Islam and developed in that way (Alper & Göral,

2003, p. 583). Intellectuals Hearth's original thesis was that, Islam was an important component of Turkish identity, Turks accepted Islam with their own demand and by Turks, Islam experienced its golden ages. So this synthesis's target was to make peace between Turkish history thesis and Ottoman history. Also there was an intention to rescue Kemalism from the hegemony of left wing.

Intellectuals Hearth was just not an opposition to the emerging left wing hegemony, but also an opposition to the emerging national left line that was active in youth and also had relationships with the army (Alper & Göral, 2003, p. 583). Furthermore, Intellectuals Hearth was trying to get the army to its own side against a left coup threat. With the 12 September military coup, Turkish-Islamic synthesis became not just the thesis of Turkey's right but also it became the official thesis of the state (Alper & Göral, 2003, p. 586).

Özal was one of the members of the Intellectuals Hearth and he was participating to the meetings regularly (Alper & Göral, 2003, p. 587). When Özal established his party and started to rule the country, he for example, made Kazım Oskay enter politics. Özal made some of the members of Intellectuals Hearth enter politics and put some of the members of Intellectuals Hearth into the bureaucracy who did not want to enter politics. So in a short time, lots of members of Intellectuals Hearth were put into universities, YÖK and TRT.

Intellectuals Hearth was effective on Turkey's 1980s but at the end of 1980s, this effect lost its power (Özder, 2006, p. 132; Alper & Göral, 2003). At the end of 1980s, military was unhappy with the situation of Islamic ideas in the state, so military stopped its support to Intellectuals Hearth (Alper & Göral, 2003, p. 588). Also ANAP, with the reflex of center right, preferred a more pragmatic and eclectic ideological stance instead of a rigid conservatism, so Intellectuals Hearth's power has declined. The reasons for loosening its power, were military's changing position against Intellectuals Hearth and ANAP's position moved to a more liberal side.

2.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter's one of the aims is to understand organic relations between AP (Demirel), MHP and MSP in 70s and ANAP. This will help us to see the panorama of Turkish Right in 70s and will give us the clues for the groups in ANAP as nationalists and political Islamists. Another aim is to look at the post-coup period in order to understand the bases of ANAP in 1980s. Furthermore, another aim is to look at the Intellectuals Hearth and Turkish-Islam synthesis. This is essential because ANAP and Özal had an organic relationship with Intellectuals Hearth and Turkish-Islam synthesis became the official ideology of the state.

The main intellectual roots of Özal era were the Intellectuals Hearth and their ideology of Turk-Islam synthesis. Intellectuals Hearth was a nationalist-conservative group that had a target for struggle with left activism on universities and on streets, also they tried to spread the idea of Turkish nationalism in the society (Taşkın, 2013). ANAP and Özal had an organic relationship with Intellectuals Hearth. Military regime had a harmony with the Intellectuals Hearth's Turk-Islam synthesis ideology. Agah Oktay Güner has summarized the 1980s Turkey as 'nationalists are physically in prison but their thoughts are in power' (Bora & Can, 1994). Intellectuals Hearth really supported 12 September military regime but also military regime supported the Turkish-Islam synthesis. Actually 1982 constitution was very similar to the Intellectuals Hearth's constitution draft. Also Muharrem Engin (Ergin, 1988) described the Intellectuals Hearth's ideology as 'Turkey would not be an Islamic fundamentalist country but always remain as a religious country'. This mentality was accepted in 12 September regime but this mentality institutionalized in Özal era (Bora & Can, 1994). Turk-Islam synthesis was an ideology which found similarities between being Turkish and Islam and Islam had a special attraction for Turks (Zürcher, 2015). Intellectuals Hearth and Turk-Islam synthesis were effective until the end of 1980s. Then military stopped to support them and also ANAP moved to a more liberal side (Alper & Göral, 2003).

CHAPTER 3

POLITICS OF MOTHERLAND PARTY

3.1 TRADITION OF TURKEY'S RIGHT WING

In order to understand the politics of Motherland Party, we need to look at the tradition of Turkey's right wing. Also it is better to make a quick look at what we understand from right and left as general and so look at the right politics implementations in Turkey. So, I will give some writer's thoughts, which will give Right's universal properties and Turkish Right's properties, in a method of literature review as I mentioned before in the first chapter.

With the 1980s, globally there emerged a new-right which had three significant properties (Bora, 2016, p. 24). First one was the neo-liberalism which had no liberalism's political freedom and had just rationality concept in it, second one was an intellectual trend and discourse which seemed to be defending freedom, change and revolution. Biological racism has been changed to cultural and economical racism and so this could be an example for the second one. The third one was the right populism which gave support to the angriness against foreigners, the others, intellectuals, migrants, bureaucracy, politicians. In that sense, Motherland Party was a typical new-right party (Bora, 2016, p. 25).

According to Norberto Bobbio, left is identified with the values of equality, freedom, solidarity with the oppressed and the convertibility of mankind, world and the society (Bobbio, 1999; Bora, 2016, p. 10). Right is identified with the values of essentialism, tradition, the established regime, the thought of elitism.

Tanıl Bora mentioned that one of the universal properties of the right was to try to close the left-right argument (which seemed to be a shameful thing) (Bora, 2016, p. 11). In that sense, this showed us the anti-politic trend of the right. Right sees politics as a technique of management rather than seeing politics as an antagonistic dynamic for changing society or people. We saw the same mentality of seeing politics as a technical issue in Özal's political mentality that his quote 'First economy and then politics' (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014) meant that politics is a secondary technical management issue coming after economics.

Yüksel Taşkın argued that, including Bobbio, right wing was described with the most significant property as being on the side of capitalism and system (Taşkın, 2009, p. 451). So right-wing, somehow naturalizes the capitalist system and conserve it and so it differs from left wing by this characteristics. As we know that Özal was on the side of capitalism and capitalist class as we will see its details in the political economy of ANAP chapter.

Tanıl Bora described that Turkey's right mainly consisted of anti-left reactionary discourse and the core of this anti-left manner was anti-communism (Bora, 2016, p. 14). The party programs of Turkey's right were mostly about being awake against the communist threat. Actually anti-communism was an ideological base for Islamists, conservatives, liberals and nationalists in order to communicate with Kemalism, state and state intellectuals (Bora, 2016, p. 15). Also Turkey's right used anti-communism for its political view which we mentioned before as a technique of management. Furthermore, when anti-communism started to be popular, it helped religious conservatism, because communism was identified with atheism, so in order to fight with anti-communism people needed more religious conservatism (Bora, 2016, p. 21). This anti-communism mentality helped Turkish Right to implement their politics and in this issue especially after the 1980 military coup, army supported Turkish Right and conservatives as we will mention in the sub-chapter of army-civil relations.

İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu argued that nationalists, liberals, conservatives formed an alliance as right-wing (Kerestecioğlu, 2016, p. 29). With the help of obedience and agreement in the political culture, this alliance got its power and continuity. Also this alliance needed another thing in order to be in power and this was 'inventing fear' in the society and political culture. So, with the appearance of fear and having enemies, this alliance (nationalists, liberals, conservatives) could be stronger. Also it is not important that this fear has an objective reality or not. This fear could be an exaggerating of a reality or it could be a totally fiction issue. Turkey's right mostly invented fears in society, political culture and the famous invented fears were 'communism fear' and 'Zionism fear' (Kerestecioğlu, 2016, p. 30).

When we look to the Turkey's right, anti-communism and anti-liberalism were the common points between Turkish nationalists and Kemalists (Taşkın, 2009, p. 455). Anti-liberalism or the allergy for liberalism in Turkey shaped in 1930s and became one of the characteristics of Turkey's right. This anti-liberal manner was partly changed in Özal period but actually liberalism was not a characteristics of Turkey's right in the Turkish political history. Until the 1950s, right wing terminology was not used commonly and also was not popular, but with the leader of Democrat Party, Menderes, a strong anti-communism discourse, which was a significant property of Turkey's right wing, started (Taşkın, 2009, p. 456).

Again when we look at Turkey's right wing, we mainly understand nationalists, Islamists and center-right. This center-right side gained its power from giving people the thought of optimism and hope under the circumstances of capitalist transformation (Taşkın, 2009, p. 458). Also center-right's strength did not come from tradition or being modern, actually it came from being in the middle of them and being hybrid. Furthermore, center-right side had a conservative modernization (Demirel, 2002) project strategy that reinterpreted nationalism and Islamism and put these social movements in its own monopoly. These arguments makes sense when we look at the Motherland Party's struggles between nationalists, Islamists and liberals. Also when we look at the leaders of center-right parties, they consciously stayed away from the doctrines like nationalism, Islamism and liberalism (Taşkın, 2009, p. 459). So this process explains us the reason for center-right party's pragmatism. Also this skepticism against doctrines was one of the important reasons for seeing DP, AP, ANAP, DYP and AKP in the same basket as center-right tradition (Taşkın, 2016, p. 414). Although nationalism and Islamism were the most authentic and essentialist representatives of Turkey's right wing, center-right side tradition had a claim that they were the real representatives of 'national will'. Center-right leaders since DP, tried to avoid nationalists and Islamists not to form their independent and autonomous representation of Turkey's right, but also at the same time, center-right leaders used these group's sensitivities in their discourses. On the other side

of the coin, nationalists and Islamists tried to be dominant against center-right side and for this reason Menderes, Demirel and Özal used these group's discourses and staff for their own political and ideological autonomy. Menderes and Demirel were the perfect representatives of conservative modernization that they gave the society (which had great diversity in it) a modernist hope under the concept of development and these leaders were more suitable than the others for the sake of the society which had a shared benefit.

Tanel Demirel explained this conservative modernization as a tradition that criticizes the dominant westernization practice but it could not easily put into the Islamist or authoritarian –conservative category (Demirel, 2002, p. 218). Also conservative modernization shared the idea of republican modernization project which had an ideal of westernization by the help of nation-state and capitalist economy. We may add that this concept did not have an opposition against republican regime and the implementations of national state and secularism. This tradition had differences than the authoritarian conservative trend which sanctified Turkishness and defended the mentality of only taking West's science and technique. Also it had emphasized on the enlightenment values such as freedom and constitutional state. It gave an importance on national state so it differed from Islamist tradition but also it saw Islam as a significant part of Turkish culture and tradition. On the other way, it did not take Islam as a reference point on societal life (Demirel, 2002, pp. 218-219). Also anti-intellectualism, which was peculiar to conservative modernization and center-right, put left intellectuals on the target during Cold War and the tradition of anti-intellectualism continued during Özal and Erdoğan period as a characteristic of center-right (Taşkın, 2016, p. 409).

Right concept in Turkey has become popular in the period of struggle between Ecevit's CHP and Demirel's AP which created polarization in the society (Taşkın, 2009, p. 462). Süleyman Demirel had an interview in the 1990s and he explained that until 1965 there was no right-left polarization but actually there was a polarization between 'CHP and the ones against CHP' and when CHP declared their political position as 'left of the center' AP expressed their political position as right wing (Taşkın, 2009, p. 463; Demirel, 2009; Demirel, 2004). Also

in another interview on 1991, Süleyman Demirel expressed himself towards a question of how he described himself;

“We find suitable for describing us in an appearance of defending Turkey’s undividable unity, nationalist, conservative, modern, development supporter, welfare supporter, innovative” (Çakır & Göktaş, 1991).

The interesting thing is that, these definitions could be also accepted by Menderes, Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Taşkın, 2009, pp. 463-464). In that sense, we can see the continuity in the Turkey’s center-right side tradition.

What was peculiar to Turkey that, Kemalist modernism was so effective on Turkey’s center-right side and also on nationalist traditions, so when we looked at the leaders of center-right side we did not see too much difference from the westerner, secular elites (Taşkın, 2009, p. 469). With Özal, center-right leaders started to have a more Islamic identity. Although Özal got an Islamic identity in himself, he mostly implemented a balance-politics between liberal (westerner, secular) side, nationalist side and conservative side. In most critic times, he supported liberal side which was a minority group in the party, so in that sense he did not change the tradition of the center-right tradition.

Also it should be added that, Turkey’s right integrated with the world capitalism’s values and organizations with the same time of western world and Turkey’s right successfully popularized this process (Taşkın, 2009, p. 471).

3.2 ARMY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN TURKEY

These army-civilian relations were always an important issue in Turkish politics and it may not be wrong to say that this issue was Ottoman Empire’s legacy to Turkish Republic. In that sense, we may say that there was continuity in this issue. Especially, in order to understand the period of Motherland Party and Özal, we have to look at these army-civilian relations. As we know, 1980 military coup conditions created and helped ANAP and Özal to emerge in political history of Turkey. Also military implemented the ban for pre-coup politicians and this condition helped Özal to win the 1983 elections. Furthermore, military was a

dominant actor in Turkish politics while the years of Özal. Therefore, there is a need to mention about army-civil relations in Turkey in order to understand Özal era.

Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu mentioned that Ottoman Empire had a political culture which centralized the security of the state and this political culture was the legacy of Ottomans to Turkish Republic (Karaosmanoğlu, 2016, p. 129). Ottoman Empire had to implement military and administrative reforms to save the state and catch Europe. Military was the first institution which was reformed and so military became the guard of the reforms and modernization. Military accepted this mission and whenever they saw a threat, they intervened into the democracy. With time passes, this mentality became a state ideology and military, political elites and also opinion leaders internalized this process.

It will be better to look at the short history of military-civilian relations in Turkey and then we can give some important details about the issue. The history of army-civil relations is essential because army's dominancy in politics came from the history of Turkey.

From 1920 till 1924, the general staff was a ministry who was appointed by the president of republic (Karaosmanoğlu, 2016, p. 130). On 1924, the general staff institution became a presidency and the chief of general staff had no responsibility against any place, so it was in an autonomous statute. On 1944, autonomous statute of chief of general staff has been removed from the law and the chief of general staff became responsible to the prime-minister and he would be appointed by the cabinet. On 1949, the general staff became responsible to ministry of defense but this process disrupted by the 27 May 1960 military coup and so with the 1961 constitution, the chief of general staff again became responsible to the prime-minister. Also after the 1960 military coup, with the 1961 constitution, an important institution has been established and that was the National Security Council (MGK) and MGK became a constitutional organ (Bayramoğlu, 2004, p. 77). National Security Council 's duty was 'advising to the cabinet about national security issues'. National Security Council was consisted of military and civil representatives such as prime-minister, ministers, chief of

general staff, representatives of air forces, ground forces, naval forces (Bayramođlu, 2004, p. 78). With the implementation of National Security Council, national defense approach has been changed to national security approach. After the 1971 military coup, National Security Council `s structure has been changed and instead of representatives of all forces, commanding officers would participate to the National Security Council (Bayramođlu, 2004, p. 80). So, military side of National Security Council has been strengthened. With the 1980 military coup, army became the legislator power of Turkey (Bayramođlu, 2004, p. 82). Furthermore, with an arrangement, National Security Council `s civil members could not be more than military members (Bayramođlu, 2004, p. 84). National Security Council decisions would not be in a situation of `advice` anymore, it became a `declaration`. So, the decisions of National Security Council have become more powerful and more functional. It should be added that national security concept has been enlarged to domestic politics and foreign policy. With the 1982 constitution, National Security Council`s mission has been identified as `protecting society`s security and peace` so military totally became hegemonic on the political arena (Bayramođlu, 2004, p. 85). Why we mentioned too much about National Security Council? This organ was the most powerful institution on the political arena of Turkey in Özal era. Therefore, there is a need for the history of National Security Council. Until 2000s, military was one of the important figures in Turkish political life like as we experienced in military coups as 1971 and 1980 (Karaosmanođlu, 2016, p. 133). When we look at the Özal period, defense industry became more open to national and foreign investors and also to technology transfers (Karaosmanođlu, 2016, p. 136). Government established Undersecretary of Defense Industry and Defense Industry Support Fund and this fund has been out of the parliament`s audit. This processes mostly satisfied the military. By the way, Özal may had to make these implementations after the 1980 military coup because of the military`s power and also Özal`s pragmatism worked here, by these implementations he would be the good guy on the eyes of the military.

Ömer Laçiner argued that from the establishment of the Turkish Republic, military embraced the role of being the only actor of the modernization project of Turkey (Laçiner, 2004, p. 18). So, military put the ones, who was opponent to military's modernization project, into 'anti-modern' category. Military accused bourgeois class (who was ally with the anti-modern movements or with foreign powers) and saw labor class and socialist movements as an inner enemy and this politics of the military could be identified as ideology of Kemalism. Turkish militarism's first phase, which was the period until 1970s-1980s could be identified as the rejection of the 'traditional' and the dissolution of the 'traditional' (Laçiner, 2004, p. 19). Kemalism also accused all demands and arguments of religion and tradition as 'anti-modern' (Laçiner, 2004, p. 22). With 1980 military coup, military and bureaucratic elites quitted from their mission of 'modernizing the society'. Also it should be added that this was the starting point for supporting conservatives and nationalists because of the threat of communism and army supported Turkish-Islam synthesis and Intellectuals Hearth as we mentioned in intellectuals roots chapter. So Turkish-Islam synthesis became the official ideology of the state with the support of military. Also 1980 military coup was significant for the starting point of a Kemalism which only relied on obedience and loyalty to the state and so, an authoritarian regime (Laçiner, 2004, p. 23). With the 1982 constitution, military became the monopoly power in the society and politics as a sovereign and as a controller mechanism.

Ahmet İnsel mentioned that the founders of Turkish Republic as Atatürk and İnönü were military-based, so there emerged legitimacy on the military (İnsel, 2004, p. 43). Military played a central figure in an ideology which got its power from the phobia of a country full of inner and outer enemies. After the period of 1980 military coup, military became the dominant figure of the national security regime and also Turkey's patriarchy had a harmony with the military's role in society and politics. He described Turkey's regime as a praetorian republic which was a mixed structure containing of totalitarian state and democratic state (İnsel, 2004, p. 44). In this type of regime power, privilege and hegemony rights were partly based on laws and some were based on actual rights and all these were

accepted by the society. Also these rights were not for personal actually they were for a social group. So, after 1980 military coup, military officers became an administrative social group who tried to find solutions for the problems which were other than the military's profession (İnsel, 2004, pp. 44-45).

3.3 LIFE OF TURGUT ÖZAL

Turgut Özal was born in Malatya on 1927 (Zürcher, 2015, p. 542). He graduated from Istanbul Technical University electrical engineering department and also he studied economics in the USA. While he was in the USA, like other engineers in his generation, he influenced by the success of technology in this country and this impression effected his political views. Also he observed in the USA that political conservatism and economic modernism could fit together. Güneş Taner supported this argument and stated that Özal had always America in his mind for reforms in Turkey, he simply wanted Turkey to be like America (Birand & Yalçın, 2015, p. 339). Hasan Cemal also highlighted Özal's enthusiasm to America (Cemal, 1990). Furthermore, Özal was close to the Naqshbandi religious order leader Mehmet Zahid Kotku while he was a student in Istanbul Technical University. He worked as a technical advisor under Süleyman Demirel on 1965 and he was appointed to the presidency of the DPT (State Planning Organization) on 1967. While he was working in DPT, he was criticized for being conservative. After 1971 military coup, he went to the USA for working in World Bank and he worked in private sector between 1973 and 1979. His private sector experience helped him giving the background of becoming an important figure in economic management issues. On 1977, he was a parliamentary candidate from the political Islamist party MSP, but he could not be selected. On 1979, he became the under secretary of the prime-minister about the economic issues and he was responsible of the 24 January economic reform package. He worked as the deputy prime-minister responsible of economic issues on 1980-1982 period under the management of generals. By the way, Özal had good relations with Turkish private sector and also with World Bank and IMF, so these reasons helped him to be the deputy prime-minister. Also it should be added that

although he was criticized as to be conservative on 1971, by the effect of these good relations, he was not seen as an old politician by the 1980 military coup leaders. Furthermore, these good relations helped him to enter the elections with Motherland Party on 1983. Özal's success was coming from his 'hybrid' identity. Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın identified this 'hybrid' identity firstly as being in state bureaucracy with a private sector experience and Özal selected people like him in state bureaucracy (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 350). Secondly this 'hybrid' identity meant that Özal was between the cultural center and periphery like working in Sabancı Holding and at the same time, he was one of the members of Intellectuals Hearth. He established Motherland Party on 1983 and became the prime-minister between 1983-1989 period. Then on 1989, he was selected as the president of Turkish Republic and worked there until his death on 1993. While he was president, sometimes he exceeded his powers and Turkey's political system became some kind of semi-presidential system (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 351).

Özal was described as a businessman rather than a statesman by Hüsamettin Cindoruk and according to him, Özal was focusing on his own success rather than the state's success and he was a 'practical man' (Türk, 2014, p. 124).

Korkut Özal mentioned about Turgut Özal that his family was a little-bourgeois family who supported DP and he was active in politics while he was studying in İTÜ (Birand & Yalçın, 2015, pp. 14-19). He worked for AP while the foundation period of the party.

According to Atilla Yayla, he was a conservative who was influenced by liberalism (Yayla, 2005, p. 588). Kaya Erdem described Özal as a man who was so smart, hard-working, not that much conservative, out of ideology and close to everyone (Erdem, 2016, pp. 319-320). Emin Çölaşan described Özal as a perfect marketing man who was always on the side of sovereign powers (Çölaşan, 1989, pp. 248-249).

Tanıl Bora stated that Özal had some views such as seeing foreign policy as an opportunity for trade, 'imperial vision', anti-intellectualism, seeing democracy as an economical-rational management system and belief on the

ideology of economics (Bora, 2005). These were the basic elements of his political profile. According to Bora, Özal modernized nationalism and conservatism in Turkey and he could do this by the help of neo-liberalism (Bora, 2005, p. 594). According to Cengiz Çandar, he was so curious and had no taboo concept in his mind (Birand & Yalçın, 2015, p. 25) and he was known as a taboo-breaking man.

3.4 TURGUT ÖZAL'S PRIME-MINISTRY PERIOD

Firstly, I will try to give brief information about historical events, because I mentioned about them in the introduction part of the thesis. Also I will look at the most significant events, implementations, discourses in order to understand the characteristics of this period.

After 1980 military coup, at 1983 there emerged an election with only three parties such as MDP, HP and ANAP (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, pp. 346-347). By the way, BTP and SODEP parties were vetoed by National Security Council (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 345). BTP had a relationship with AP and SODEP was already being watched by the military. ANAP was the only civil party (established by Turgut Özal) inside of these parties and the other ones were closer to the military. MDP stood for the right-wing, HP stood for the left-wing and ANAP stood for the center (with the claim of representing four trends) (Ahmad, 1993, p. 189). It has to be added that Özal has been supported by the West and he had good economic relations with the Western world. Kenan Evren supported MDP for the elections in a television program and this action also helped ANAP for its victory in the elections on 1983. ANAP won the elections with 45 percentage vote. We could say that the ban for BTP and SODEP also helped ANAP to win the elections. Turgut Özal became the prime-minister of Turkey (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 348). The cabinet was known as the 'engineers cabinet' (Zürcher, 2015, p. 407). Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın described the period of 1983-1987 as 'low-intensity democracy' because military banned the old parties and old politicians (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 345).

Özal mentioned in his speech that Turkish nation was mainly dependent to their national, historical, moral values and they hardly worked to protect these values (Özal, 1985, p. 220). Also Turkish nation conserved the values which were good and precious, at the same time they were open-minded and they were tolerant. So Özal added that ANAP and himself were nationalist and conservative. Here from this discourse, we can see the new-right discourse which uses pragmatism and populism. Then Özal described ANAP as the ruling party as nationalist, conservative, believing on social justice, economically liberal (Türk, 2014, p. 138). Furthermore, Özal mentioned his conversation with Adnan Kahveci on 1983 about how would they select the member of parliaments and Adnan Kahveci stated that they actually needed seventeen technocrats who would be ministers and the rest would just raise their hands as member of parliaments (Cemal, 1990, p. 128; Doğan, 1988). This showed us Özal and ANAP's democracy mentality. Another important issue was that, before the 1987 general elections, one of ANAP's elites advised Özal some intellectuals and academics as nominees for member of parliaments and Özal replied that these intellectuals, academics would soon create problems and they would be in a discussion, so it would better to have member of parliaments just to raise their hands (Cemal, 1990, p. 129). This showed us Özal's view for intellectuals and also his view of anti-intellectualism.

Özal declared his three basic freedoms as 'freedom of thought', 'religious freedom' and 'freedom of enterprise' (Özal, 1993, p. 19; Özal, 1993, pp. 161-162). When we look at Özal era, in the 'religious freedom' issue, we just see this freedom for Sunni Muslim society. We may remember the mandatory 'religion and moral' courses in schools after 1980 military coup (which we mentioned in the intellectuals roots chapter) were just for Sunni Muslim students and not for Alevis, Atheists or non-Muslims. Therefore, we cannot say that there was a 'religious freedom' in Özal era. Özal removed the articles 141, 142 and 163 of Turkish Criminal Code related with 'freedom of thought' but on the other hand, 'struggle with terror act' law has been emerged in Özal era. So it is hard to say there was a 'freedom of thought' or not in Özal era. When we come to 'freedom

of enterprise' we can say that this issue was totally right because economy became totally liberalized by Özal and we saw the neo-liberalization process in the economy that really helped capitalist class. Therefore, there was a 'freedom of enterprise' in Özal era. This issue will be mentioned in detail in the political economy of ANAP chapter.

With Özal and ANAP, ideology of economics became the dominant ideology in the society (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 352). So, as newspapers stated that everybody became economist and economy took the place of politics (Kibar, 1984). Also on the mid of the 1980s, some fresh, colorful newspapers occurred in this mentality that these had 'life style' parts and also had economy pages that did not have any news about trade unions. Sabah newspaper was the famous one (Kozanoğlu, 1994, p. 113). Also English language became important for a successful career and even advertisements for some jobs were published in English in Turkish newspapers and this meant that if you cannot read this advertisement do not even try to apply for this position (Ahmad, 1993, p. 210). Can Kozanoğlu argued that there were four keywords for understanding Özal period (Kozanoğlu, 1994, p. 14). They were English, computer, fear and hope. English and computer were important for finding a good job and make a perfect career, fear was important for people that if people vote for another party instead of ANAP then bad-anarchy days would come like before 1980 military coup. Hope was important for 'turning the corner' or becoming rich and for this process, you needed English and computer (Kozanoğlu, 1994, pp. 15-16). This 'turning the corner' mentality in the society was the representation of Özal's pragmatism.

Furthermore, after ANAP became the ruling party in Turkey, elites were speaking only about how can they make money and consume better. Özal was seen as a salesman rather than a statesman (Ahmad, 1993, p. 209).

Another important issue of Özal period was the 'Princes' who were 'bright young men' coming from Reagan's time of America (Ahmad, 1993, p. 193). They knew how to make quick and easy money and they were familiar with computers. These Princes or Turkish yuppies (young urban professionals) have been appointed by Özal to the top of some state institutions. They were graduated from

prestigious universities and they knew at least one foreign language. They mainly worked in export, banking, finance, public relations industries (Kozanođlu, 1993, p. 12).

Yüksel Taşkın and Suavi Aydın argued that Özal period was a rupture of two kinds of populism in Turkey (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 362). First type of populism was the CHP's populism that wanted to see the Turkish nation as a 'classless, coherent and a nation that has no privilege'. Second type of populism was Turkish Right's populism which based on majority and emphasized that national will is only central Turkish Right. Both of these populisms had in common as one nation or one state thought. Özal implemented the Turkish Right's two nation project. First nation was the middle class and the second nation was left-wing people, poor people of cities and villages which were influenced by left-wing people, trade unions, Alevis and Kurds (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 363). Özal's success was that he persuaded the society that the second nation as a threat for the security and welfare of first nation. So the second nation became the other and got criminalized and because of these reasons, first nation was persuaded by the state that second nation could be easily beaten by the state. Finally there emerged separation in the society rather than cohesion. Also it should be added that according to Taha Akyol, Özal and ANAP's success was the acceptance of the concept of 'individual' in the society, intellectuals and so to everyone (Çakır & Gökteş, 1991).

Another important issue was Özal's implementation of some kind of positive nationalism (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 367). Özal summarized his positive nationalism view as to be proud of Turkey's present time artists, politicians, businessman competing with the world, so not to be proud of the past time sultans (Barlas, 1994, p. 123).

Furthermore, Özal period supported popular culture against a didactic national culture and this popular culture was harmonious with anti-intellectualism (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 364). 1980s were the years that a new-right was rising everywhere and anti-intellectualism was used by politicians with a great success. Kenan Evren's manner of opposition against intellectuals changed to 'entel'

concept in Özal period which refers to a humiliation against intellectuals in Turkish language (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 365).

At 1984 local elections, ANAP got 41.5 percentage of votes and became the first party in the local elections (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 354). Also SODEP, DYP, HP, MDP and RP participated to these local elections and by this success, ANAP proved itself to the other parties (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 353). At 1985, Özal forced ANAP minister İsmail Özdağlar to resign because of bribery and this showed the extent of the fictitious export (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 355). This fictitious export was an important issue in economy of Özal era that, this was a result of an export-oriented economy of Özal era that will be mentioned in detail in the political economy of ANAP chapter.

Another important development was that, at 1987, Özal gave the right for personal application to European Court of Human Rights (Özel & Sarıkaya, 2005, p. 465). That right might be the only politically liberal implementation. Then Özal applied to European Community for full membership on 1987 and this action was important for the future relations of Turkey and EU. His aim was to increase the export potential on the economic side (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 356). On 1988, Özal government signed European Treaty and UN Treaty against torture (Cemal, 1990, p. 315).

Also another important issue was the civil-army relations. Özal selected full general Necip Torumtay instead of full general Necdet Özturun. This action has been seen as a reform in civil-army relations but also there were arguments that Kenan Evren and other high degree military officers supported Necip Torumtay (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 356).

By the way, ANAP had the argument for uniting 'four trends' and there were groups such as nationalists, conservatives and liberals in the party and the struggle between these groups never ended (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 356). Feroz Ahmad described ANAP as conservative as AP, as traditionalist or Islamist as MSP, as nationalist as MHP and had a belief of social justice like social democrats (Ahmad, 1993, p. 192). Left side was never seen in the party. Actually Özal was using these groups for his own purposes. Liberal side was different than

the conservatives by their life-style, dress style, drinking habits and also liberal-westerner side was closer to the capital groups in the cities. Mesut Yılmaz and Bedrettin Dalan were on the liberal-westerner side, Mehmet Keçeciler was on the conservative side and Mustafa Taşar was on the nationalist side (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 374).

Özal mostly blamed Ecevit and Demirel because they caused the terrorism on 1970s and wanted the voters not to select them (Ahmad, 1993, p. 195). Özal saw the 1980s as the time of struggle between old and new and his party was representing the new. Here we see the tradition of the polarization mentality of Turkey`s right or central-right.

ANAP decided to go to referendum for overturning the ban for the old politicians on September 1987 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 357). This also showed the democracy mentality of ANAP and Özal. Özal campaigned for no vote but also added that if people would vote for yes, then this would mean that Turkey would return to anarchy, chaos and so to old days of violence (Ahmad, 1993, p. 196). Result of the referendum was; yes votes as 50,16 percentage and no votes as 49,84 percentage. So, the ban for the old politicians was overturned. Actually, these results were a success for ANAP to have that percentage of no votes and Özal decided to have early member of parliaments elections to use this vote potential (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 359). ANAP got 36 percentage of votes and became the first party in the elections on 1987. Özal wanted to make the local elections earlier, so there needed an amendment on the constitution but this process resulted with a referendum and on September 1988 there emerged a referendum and with 65 percentage no votes realized (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 370). Here, Özal stated that there would be no problem for breaching the constitution for once (Cemal, 1990, p. 117).

On 1989, local elections have been held and ANAP got 21,8 percentage and became the third party after SHP and DYP (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 371). 1989 local elections were a great disaster for Özal and ANAP (Ahmad, 1993, p. 198). In five years time, the votes decreased from 45 to 22 per cent despite populist policies. By the way, Özal was an electoral system engineer that he

changed the electoral system eleventh times in the period of 1983-1989 (Cemal, 1990). This again shows us Özal's democracy and pragmatic mentality.

3.5 TURGUT ÖZAL'S PRESIDENCY PERIOD

Özal declared that he wanted to be president of republic. He was selected as the president of the republic with the help of the majority of his party in the parliament on 1989 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 372). Then Özal appointed Yıldırım Akbulut as the prime-minister and then on the November 1989 party congress Yıldırım Akbulut was selected as the leader of ANAP with the help of Özal. Özal's choice of Yıldırım Akbulut meant that he still wanted to control the party. Yıldırım Akbulut was a weak and colorless leader under the control of Özal (Ahmad, 1993, p. 199). With Yıldırım Akbulut, Turkey became politically inconsistent. By the way, Mesut Yılmaz resigned on February 1990 from foreign ministry position because of Özal's working style and one-man manners (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 374).

While Özal was the president of the republic, he forced his position like he was in a semi-presidency system (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 374). Özal was like one-man during August 1990 Gulf War so opposition against Özal increased in the party. Also Özal forced the party to make his wife-Semra Özal the Istanbul provincial chairman and on the April 1991 party congress Semra Özal became the Istanbul provincial chairman. This was Özal's another mistake and also showed us the democracy view of Turgut Özal.

On June 1991 party congress, Mesut Yılmaz became the leader of ANAP. Also Mesut Yılmaz became the prime-minister and his government escaped from the aura of Özal and so Mesut Yılmaz formed his cabinet mainly from the liberal-westerner side and excluded conservatives from the cabinet (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, pp. 376-378). Then Özal forced conservative side of the party for organizing an irregular party congress and finally conservatives organized an irregular party congress on November 1992 (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, pp. 378-379).

Conservatives' nominee was Mehmet Keçeciler, but Mesut Yılmaz won the congress against Keçeciler.

Mesut Yılmaz decided to have early general elections October 1991 for his political legitimacy (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 380). After the elections, ANAP's ruling party period ended and DYP-SHP coalition occurred under the leaders Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 382). Özal was mostly intervening and preventing the cabinet, so the cabinet could not work properly (Zürcher, 2015, p. 422). Also he was rejecting to sign the new laws and decrees and so he prevented the parliament's and cabinet's decisions.

On April 1993 Özal died because of a heart attack (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014, p. 390). This was an end of an important period of Turkish political history.

When we look at the Özal era, Tanıl Bora (Bora, 2017, p. 553) argued that personal application to European Court of Human Rights, removal of 141,142 and 163 articles of Turkish Criminal Code which were related with freedom of thought, 'even federation could be an debate' argument in the Kurdish issue were known as the attempts for developing the freedoms in Turkey. On the other side, Özal's support on the ban of old politicians (on the referendum on 1987), appearance of a de facto state of emergency in the southeastern of Turkey on 1990, emergence of 'the struggle with terror act' law (which made more than 2,000 people to be prisoners). These preventions of freedoms have balanced Özal's political freedoms. Therefore, it is hard to say Özal was a democrat person or not.

3.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter's one of the aims is to understand the general view of Right and the properties of Turkish Right. This will give us the clues for the similarities between world right view and Turkish right view. Also another aim is to understand the Turkish right tradition by looking to the continuities in the Turkish right the political history of Turkey. This can also give us clues for the connections of Özal era and today's Turkish right implementations. Another aim

is to look at the reality of military-civil relations in Turkish politics coming from the history. As we remember the dominance of military in Özal era, so there is a need for look at the civil-military relations in order to understand Özal era. Another aim is look at the personality of Özal, so we can see his character's reflections on his politics like pragmatic manner and being hybrid. Furthermore, looking to the prime ministry and presidency period of Özal will give us total overview on the Özal era.

When we look at the descriptions of right wing, the common points could be described as being on the side of capitalism, system (Taşkın, 2009). Right wing had political culture of 'inventing fear' (like communism fear) in the society, obedience and agreement mentality as a political culture (Kerestecioğlu, 2016). Also right and so Turkish right had an anti-left (anti-communist) discourse and right somehow described itself as the anti of left-communism.

Actually in order to understand Özal era, Turkish center-right has to be identified. Turkish center-right gave people an optimism and hope under the circumstances of capitalist transformation (Taşkın, 2009). Turkish center-right had its power from being between tradition and modern and also center-right leaders were skeptic against doctrines like nationalism, Islamism and liberalism. This skepticism was the most important point for the center-right and this point had implementations in DP, AP, ANAP, DYP and AKP. This situation also shows us the pragmatic manner of Turkish center-right. Also anti-intellectualism property was important in the Turkish center-right as we see in ANAP and AKP. Furthermore, with Özal, there emerged more Islamic identity based leaders in center-right.

Military was always in our political culture as a guard of reforms and modernization project of Turkey. Modernization reforms started with the military in Ottoman Empire and so there was a legacy of that political culture in Turkish Republic. This base came also from the army's position in the Turkish Independence War and the establishment of Turkish Republic by the army (Karaosmanoğlu, 2016). So when a threat appeared against republic, state, modernization project, democracy, military intervened to the democracy. With

1980 military coup, army became the legislative power of Turkey with the help of 1982 constitution. Also after 1980 military coup, there emerged a Kemalism which depended on obedience and loyalty to the state and authoritarian regime (Laçiner, 2004). So, military's national security concept enlarged to domestic politics and foreign policy in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, 2004).

Özal's personality was also an important indicator to understand Özal era. His political conservatism and economic modernism thought came from his America years (Cemal, 1990). He was a hybrid person that he was a member at Intellectuals Hearth but at the same time he was working in Sabancı Holding (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014). He was a businessman rather than being a politician. One of his success was the modernization process of nationalism and conservatism in Turkey with the help of neo-liberalism (Bora, 2005).

When we look at the general view of Özal era, we could say that there emerged a liberal (neo-liberal) economy but there was no political liberalism. There was mostly a nationalist and conservative discourse. Ideology of economy became dominant in the society and it replaced politics. Everybody became economists in the society. Özal's success was that he created a two-nation project in the society. First society was the middle class and the second class was the left wing people, poor people (in cities and villages), Alevis and Kurds. Second nation became the Other in the society and got criminalized. So second nation became a threat on the eyes of first nation. Özal persuaded the first nation that second nation has to be beaten (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014; Taşkın, 2013). Özal's another success was the acceptance of "individual" concept in all the society (Çakır & Göktaş, 1991). Özal put popular culture against a didactic national culture, so there emerged "entel" concept. This concept showed us the anti-intellectualism of the era. One of the most important democratic implementation was the right to apply personally to the European Court of Human Rights (Özel & Sarıkaya, 2005). On the other hand, Özal's No campaign at the referendum on 1987 showed us his democracy mentality. Furthermore, he changed the electoral system eleventh times in the period of 1983-89 (Cemal, 1990). So, this mentality showed us his democratic view and pragmatic manner.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MOTHERLAND PARTY

4.1 ECONOMIC LEGACY OF 60S AND 70S ERA

It is important to look at the economic legacy of 1960s and 1970s in order to understand what has changed in the political economy of 1980s and early 1990s. This is the same mentality, which we have made in the politics of ANAP chapter that we first looked at the previous period for understanding the change between these periods.

Oktaç Yenil described 1960-1980 period as mixed economy years (Yenil, 2010, p. 109). When 1960 military coup happened, economy was gotten over the 1958 recession and the macro-economic indicators were better (Yenil, 2010, p. 112). At the end of 1950s, planning approach again became popular for the solution for economic problems such as disequilibrium in the balance of payments and public finances. DPT (State Planning Organization) became law and planning was put into the constitution as an approach of state's economic management. At the end of 1960, DPT started to work as an important factor in economy (Yenil, 2010, p. 113). The most important contribution of planning experience was that it formed the infrastructure of the economic management (Yenil, 2010, p. 115). DPT was a kind of secretariat of economic management which audited and kept the state's accounts together. In the 1970s, DPT became an economic rent based place which favored private sector by their incentive department (Yenil, 2010, p. 116). At this point, we may remember that Özal worked at DPT as we mentioned in the life of Özal sub-chapter and he was familiar with the private companies at DPT because he worked there in the incentive department (Çölařan, 1989). Like the end of 1950s, at the end of 1960s, there emerged some factors that affected the equilibrium of the economy. There was the fact that state's expenditures were more than its incomes and also political populism based subventions were effective in the economy. So, budget deficits were formed by the government and these all reasoned the same situation like at the end of 1950s (Yenil, 2010, p. 121).

According to Yenel, there were three significant points about the economical history of 1970s (Yenal, 2010, p. 122). First one was that these years were the times of unstable coalition governments (Yenal, 2010, pp. 122-123). Also military operation to Cyprus on 1974 and American embargo (which was a reaction against this operation) got this situation worse. Second point was that there emerged a huge amount of immigrant's remittances. Great number of Turkish labors went to European countries for working there and they started to send their savings to Turkey. At 1963, the amount of immigrant's remittances were nearly zero but at 1970, it became 273 million dollars, and at 1972, it increased to 740 million dollars (Yenal, 2010, p. 123). There was a tradition that there was mostly balance of payments deficit in the economy but with these immigrant's remittances, there emerged balance of payments surplus in the Turkish economy after a long time. Third point was that energy crisis affected all the world. OPEC countries created this crisis and this crisis also affected Turkey which was a country of importing petrol. Turkey was in loss because of high petrol prices and also because of decreasing amount of immigrant's remittances (Yenal, 2010, p. 124).

Inflation increased and exchange reserves decreased, so at 1975, World Bank put Turkey in a position of moratorium countries. On the middle of 1977, Turkish economy was on the edge of bankruptcy, annual inflation was increased to 50 percentage and external deficit increased to 7 percentage of the gross national product (GNP) (Yenal, 2010, p. 125). On 1978 and 1979, government was insufficient and late about the stabilization programs (Celasun & Rodrik, 1980). Government called IMF for help but two standby agreements failed and government could not lessened public expenditures. On 24 January 1980, a more serious economic program (which was prepared by Turgut Özal) has been announced, devaluation and huge price increases on public commodities and services realized. On June 1980, a standby agreement with IMF and a payment moratorium agreement with OECD have been signed (Yenal, 2010, p. 126).

When we look at the economic crisis period of 1977-1980, the main reason of the crisis was the unsustainable position of import substitution for

industrialization especially on production and distribution (Turan, 2013, p. 18). Crisis decreased the production, political violence has been increased and black market condition became dominant in the domestic market. The shortage of foreign currency (because of trade deficit) was one of the reasons for the crisis of import substitution for industrialization. Çağlar Keyder mentioned that under the circumstances of import substitution for industrialization, current foreign currency amount or import capacity would determine the speed of industrialization (Keyder, 2011, p. 201). Therefore, finding foreign currency was essential for the balance of this system and for the continuity of union of classes (industrial bourgeois and labor class) in the Demirel and Ecevit governments (Keyder, 2011, p. 227). Also the crisis of foreign currency would destroy the continuity of the union of classes. Another reason of the crisis was the struggle of labor class. Furthermore, shortage of petrol and its derivatives emerged and when these commodities could not be found, production stopped but capitalist class had to pay the wages and fixed production expenses (Keyder, 2011, p. 231). Also shortage of financial sources was another reason for the crisis.

Melda Yaman Öztürk and Fuat Ercan argued that the indicators of 1979 crisis were the huge increase in foreign trade deficit, accumulation of foreign debts and unemployment (Öztürk & Ercan, 2009, p. 70). Foreign trade deficits were approximately 360-500 million US dollars on the first years of 1970s, on 1974 this increased to 2.2 billion US dollars, on 1977 this became 4 billion US dollars and on 1980 it was 5 billion US dollars (TÜSİAD, 1981). Exports did not have a significant increase but imports had a huge increase and this resulted with these increasing foreign trade deficits (TÜSİAD, 1979). Another important point for understanding the 1979 economic crisis was the change in the composition of production (Öztürk & Ercan, 2009, p. 73). Basic consumer commodities (like food and drink industries) production has been changed to the production of production means (like chemical industry, machinery production). Therefore, this situation needed more import based inputs. So, most industries (that needed import based inputs) stopped. On the other side, especially on 1977, labor strikes increased and this was another indicator for the crisis.

Also it should be added that capitalist class wanted the transformation from the import substitution for industrialization to the export led economy since the second half of 1970s (Öztürk & Ercan, 2009, p. 75). Koç Holding had an annual report on 1978 that economy had to integrate with the world economy, industry had to work as full capacity and economy had to become an export-led economy in long period (Haberler, 1979). TÜSİAD highlighted on their 1979 report that labor strikes, labor demonstrations were the real obstacles on the production rather than increases on wages (TÜSİAD, 1979). So, capitalist class needed financial liberation in economy and wanted to break down the organized labor class in order to exist in these crisis circumstances (Öztürk & Ercan, 2009).

Ebru Deniz Ozan mentioned that since the second half of the 1970s, crisis of world capitalism, changes in the conjuncture of world economy, foreign source problem of Turkey resulted with the crisis of import substitution for industrialization in Turkey (Ozan, 2012, pp. 52-53). MESS (Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries) had an evaluation on 1979 that there came an end for this import substitution for industrialization and populist policies (MESS, 1999). Therefore, there needed an open-economy, export-led economic model. By the way, it is important to remind that the president of MESS on 1979 was Turgut Özal. Here we see the support of Özal to the capitalist class against labor class. After the 1980 military coup, there emerged the possibility to implement 24 January 1980 economic decisions. TISK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) 's leader Halit Narin mentioned that 'Labor class laughed for 20 years, we cried, but now it is our turn to laugh' (Koç, 1998, p. 124; Ozan, 2012, p. 146). So, we can see the support of capitalist class to the 1980 military coup and 24 January economic program because of their economic benefits.

Korkut Boratav described 1962-1976 period as introvert and economic expansion period which was dependent to outside (Boratav, 2015, p. 119). Also he called the 1977-1979 period as new economic crisis period. After 1962, economic policies were launched as planning mentality (Boratav, 2015, p. 120). With the year 1963, five-year development plans were started to be implemented and these plans were effective on investment policies. This 1962-1976 period was a

protectionist, domestic market based period and also had a view of import substitution for industrialization. In these economic conditions, city and provincial bourgeois classes increased their income level and so the consumption preferences of these classes had an effect on resource allocations. So the classes in the state could not be insensitive against these consuming demands (Boratav, 2015, p. 121). But at the same time, there was a foreign trade deficit problem in the economy, so these luxury commodities could not be imported and also foreign currency could not be used for these luxury commodities. This process was not possible in the 1960's multi-party democracy conditions. Hence, these commodities had to be produced in the country with the help of foreign capital. At first stage, this process started as a montage industry especially in durable consumer goods but then this process developed supply industry branches and became like a modern industry. But this production conditions also resulted with the condition of dependency to outside because of technology and basic inputs of production. These durable consumer goods (radio, refrigerator, television etc.) were also attainable by labor and middle classes because there emerged a quick growth in the economy and so their income level increased. This import substitution for industrialization was seemed to lessen the dependency of the economy to outside, but on the contrary, economy's import dependency more increased (Boratav, 2015, p. 122). Although there was high import dependency and low export condition between 1962 and 1976, high growth rates were sustainable because some sources coming from outside helped this process (Boratav, 2015, p. 124). These sources were long and short term loans coming from outside and the other was the immigrant's remittances. Rising prices of petrol in the world at 1974, affected Turkish economy but government tried to postpone this crisis condition. Government did not much change the prices of petrol and its varieties in Turkey and they actually used populist economic policies for postponing the crisis. But finally, at 1977, the crisis emerged in Turkish economy (Boratav, 2015, p. 131). It should be added that, since 1963, labor movements and trade union activities were popularized and spread to all country and so labor wages increased in this period (Boratav, 2015, pp. 140-141).

1977-1979 period was the time which people were all on the lines to buy basic commodities like margarine, petrol and there were black market conditions (Boratav, 2015, p. 143). Since 1977, devaluation operation became normal as more than once in a year. Foreign sources were blocked and import really decreased, growth slowed and a slow increase in export realized in this period (Boratav, 2015, p. 144).

Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk mentioned that 1960-1980 period's most important point was the import substitution for industrialization or domestic production (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 144). They added that this economic policy was implemented consciously. At the end of 1950s, economy and politics were in a crisis and then planned economy has been implemented until the end of 1970s and then again a crisis emerged. In those days, planned economy was more suitable for the military-civil bureaucracy's aims (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 145). Economic depression lessened the income level of the bureaucracy and also bureaucracy was worried about the capital classes increasing power in the politics. With the help of planned economy, bureaucracy would again be strong in economy and politics. Also with the import substitution for industrialization, internal market would be protected from foreign competition and there would be a possibility for a profitable industry inside. At the same time, this economic policy would help to solve the problems of foreign payments. So bureaucracy's aims and new developing industry's aims collided with one another. Furthermore, the import substitution for industrialization and planned economy would increase domestic production, this would solve the problem of trade balance deficit and economy's dependency to outside would decrease (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 149). Increasing the domestic production was the main goal for this period. But on the contrary, economy's dependency increased like as the same argument as Boratav mentioned. Since 1977, there emerged a blocking on foreign sources and this caused moratorium condition on foreign debts and hence this reasoned some negotiations about postponing these foreign debts (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 176). Actually, the crisis of 1970s in Turkey emerged because of some reasons. First reason was; OPEC increased the petrol prices and this caused an increase in

energy and input costs. Second reason was Cyprus issue and this operation increased defense expenses and caused embargo on foreign aids. Third reason was that, there emerged an economic recession, unemployment and inflation problems in the countries which Turkey had important economic relations (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 196).

Erinç Yeldan mentioned that import substitution for industrialization was implemented intensively in the period of 1970-1976 (Yeldan, 2001, p. 38). Since 1977, these economic policies and accumulation model caused a foreign currency financing crisis. 1977-1980 crisis caused also a blockage in democracy and the gains of the labor classes have been quickly reversed (Yeldan, 2001, pp. 38-39; Boratav, 1983; Boratav, et al., 1984; Çeçen, et al., 1990; Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005; Celasun & Rodrik, 1980).

Gülten Kazgan argued that after the 1974 petrol crisis, all countries tried to save from the petrol consumption, but on the contrary, Turkey gave subventions about petrol and so petrol consumption boomed in Turkey (Kazgan, 2002, p. 104). Also petrol's percentage became nearly 50 percentage in the energy consumption. At 1978, there emerged debt payment crisis and some economic measures have been taken but these were not successful to solve the problem. So the characteristics of 1978 were energy problems like blackouts, heating problems in buildings, black market prices, under the counter sales, black money and underground economy. Also societal conflicts in the streets and universities were attending to this economic crisis (Kazgan, 2002, p. 115).

Also it should be added that Galip Yalman emphasized the bourgeois (especially big bourgeois) became a real class in the 1970s especially after the establishment of TÜSİAD on 1971 after the military coup (Yalman, 2009, p. 306). So, big bourgeois started to act in their class roles, felt themselves belonging to their classes and began to identify their political and economical interests against other classes (Thompson, 1978, p. 51; Sayer, 1987, p. 107).

On 1978, Turkish finance minister Ziya Müezzinoğlu explained that Turkey had an increasing amount of foreign debts, rising inflation, condition of uncertainty and lack of confidence, shortage of goods. Also Turkey's nearly 20

percentage of the population were unemployed (official and unofficial) (Sönmez, 1984, p. 10).

4.2 NEOLIBERALISM CONCEPT

It is critical to understand neo-liberalism concept for understanding 1980s and early 1990s in the world and so its reflections on Turkey. So we can make connections between the world and Turkey's experience.

David Harvey pointed out that the years of 1978-80 were described as the revolutionary turning point in the world history (Harvey, 2005, p. 1). On 1978, Deng Xiaoping in China took some important steps for the liberation of a communist economy. In Britain, Margaret Thatcher was elected as prime-minister in May 1979 and she began to take the power of trade unions and tried to end the inflationary stagnation. In America, Ronald Reagan was elected as the President of USA in 1980 and he started to get in a fight with labor, deregulation implementations on industries and agriculture, gave power to the finance sector for the liberation of USA and world.

Neo-liberalism has been identified as practices of liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms, strong private property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). State interventions on economy had to be in minimum level. The common characteristics of neo-liberalism in countries were deregulation, privatization and state's withdrawal from most industries (Harvey, 2005, p. 3).

Neo-liberalism thought has been constructed by the political ideas of human dignity and personal freedom and these ideas have been seen as 'the central values of civilization' (Harvey, 2005, p. 5). Neo-liberal state supported the ideas of private property owners, multinational companies and finance capital (Harvey, 2005, p. 7). Also on the economical side, neo-liberalism was related with Chicago boys and Milton Friedman's economical views (Harvey, 2005, p. 8). This economic view privatized public places, opened natural resources to private companies, privatized social security, gave opportunity to foreign direct investments and made trade more free. In this mentality, export-led growth was

better than import substitution. At this point, we may remember the export-led economy practices in 1980s Turkey.

Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy mentioned that since the starting point, neo-liberalism was a project to be successful on the restoration of class power (Dumenil & Levy, 2004). Furthermore, neo-liberalization process was a utopia which tried to achieve to reorganize international capitalism, so redesign the conditions for capital accumulation and recreating the power of economic elites (Harvey, 2005, p. 19).

Neo-liberalization has been implemented in countries like Chile and Argentina in the 1970s in a brutal way and with the background of military coups (Harvey, 2005, p. 39). At this point, we may remember 1980 military coup in Turkey and then the implementations of 24 January economic decisions. Labor and urban social movements and their solidarity group's power has been lessened because their power was a threat to neo-liberalization. Neo-liberal revolution was mostly known as Thatcher and Reagan's implementations in the USA and Britain as democratic means. Thatcher was continuing to say 'there is no alternative' (Harvey, 2005, p. 40). This discourse was similar to Özal's discourse used for 24 January economic program that without this program there would be no solution for economic crisis, so this meant in other words 'there is no alternative'.

Neo-liberal rhetoric emphasized on individual freedoms, identity politics, multiculturalism and narcissistic consumerism (Harvey, 2005, p. 41). Neo-liberalism had a practical duty that gave importance to freedom of consumer to choose whatever she/he wants, respect to lifestyles, expressions and cultural practices. Actually, neo-liberalization needed a neo-liberal market-based populist culture which would be constructed by economy and politics (Harvey, 2005, p. 42). At this point, we may remember Özal's support to popular culture. Also this populist culture was consisted of differentiated consumerism and an individual libertarianism. Neo-liberalization had a mask that was full of superb words such as freedom, liberty and rights to hide the reality of restoration-reconstruction of international and local class power, but actually this was seen in the main financial centers of global capitalism (Harvey, 2005, p. 119).

Erinç Yeldan pointed out that there were actually two globalization periods in world's capitalism history (Yeldan, 2001, p. 14). First period was between 1870 and 1914 and the second period was on since 1970s until today. The common point of these two globalization periods was that they both got huge economic growth ratios (Yeldan, 2001, p. 15). This second globalization period was constructed on inequality and this was the process of the ideology of development and underdevelopment (Yeldan, 2001, p. 16; Collins & Williamson, 1999; Caporaso, 1981; Landes, 1969). This period's most characteristic point was that the capital's profitability was the only success indicator (Bourdieu, 1998). Also the societal, cultural and administrative threats against the realization of economic profit, were seen as 'non-rational' and 'non-modern' (Yeldan, 2001, p. 24; Bourdieu, 1998). So capital had a desire to put all world economies into a one-market place in order to increase its profitability (Yeldan, 2001, p. 25). Thus, capital had two strategic targets such as the limitation of nation-state's auditing power and the removal of the gains of labor class. So, 'financial deregulation', 'elasticizing of the labor market' and 'globalization' concepts have been invented for the ideology of neo-liberalism.

Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü mentioned that in the five hundred years of historical capitalism history, there were two main periods such as classical liberalism and neo-liberalism (Köse & Öncü, 2003, p. 114). Classical liberalism was the period of England's hegemony and neo-liberalism was the period of America's hegemony which was started on the last quarter of 20th century and also called as the 'globalization'. The common point of these two period was that both in these times, the capital state's class based state qualification gained power (Dumenil & Levy, 2001). In that sense, in the era of hegemony of liberalism, politics' discourse became the economy and the state moved away from the nation-state qualification and became directly a servant of hegemonic capitalist classes. The process on the 1980s was not the internalization or the globalization of the economy, actually it was the capital's change in its global existence (Holloway, 1996). This globalization or neo-liberalism was a period that there had alliances between capital, politics and economy (Köse &

Öncü, 2003, p. 132). So these alliances resulted with the interest relationship between American state and multinational companies. With the 1980s, America had alliances with capital blocs and thus capital's nation-state qualification has been eroded and capital had to be global. One of the most characteristics of this period was that financial capital has been concentrated on the multinational capital blocs which we did not see up until that time (Köse & Öncü, 2003, p. 137).

Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho argued that neo-liberalism was a new stage in capitalism especially with its property of financialization (Fine & Saad Filho, 2016). Also Dardot and Laval added that the original point of neo-liberalism was to form new kind of rules for defining not just different type of a 'regime of accumulation' but also a different type of society (Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 14; Fine & Saad Filho, 2016, pp. 3-4). Furthermore, neo-liberalism created its own material culture which could be called the neo-liberalization of everyday life (Fine & Saad Filho, 2016, p. 27). Everything in life such as education, health, housing, consumption, transport became a commodity in the process of financialization in this era of neo-liberalism (Fine & Saad Filho, 2016, p. 29). Dardot and Laval explained neo-liberalization of everyday life as:

“Neo-liberalism is not merely destructive of rules, institutions and rights. It is also productive of certain kinds of social relations, certain ways of living, certain subjectivities ... This norm enjoins everyone to live in a world of generalized competition; it calls upon wage-earning classes and populations to engage in economic struggle against one another; it aligns social relations with the model of the market; it promotes the justification of ever greater inequalities; it even transforms the individual, now called on to conceive and conduct him- or herself as an enterprise. For more than a third of a century, this existential norm has presided over public policy, governed global economic relations, transformed society, and reshaped subjectivity. The circumstances of its triumph have often been described – in its political aspect (the conquest of power by neoliberal forces), its economic aspect (the expansion of globalized financial capitalism), its social aspect (the individualization of social relations to the detriment of collective solidarities, the extreme polarization between rich and poor), and its

subjective aspect.” (Dardot & Laval, 2013, p. 8; Fine & Saad Filho, 2016, pp. 29-30)

4.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 1980S AND EARLY 1990S

I will try to look at the political economy of 1980s and early 1990s and keep in mind its relations with the economic legacy of 1960s and 1970s and neo-liberalism concept.

Korkut Boratav described 1980-1988 period as ‘the counter attack of capital’ (Boratav, 2015, p. 147). Özal prepared an economic report on the last days of 1979 for Demirel which later it would be called as 24 January economic decisions (Boratav, 2015, p. 149). This report’s one of the most significant point was that Turkey could not export with these high wages, somehow some methods had to be found and wages had to be disciplined. 24 January 1980 decisions as a program had implementations such as devaluation, price increases on public commodities and services, take away the process of auditing prices and these implementations were a part of a ‘shock treatment’. Also these implementations were the things that IMF wanted from Turkey for three years and actually Turkey gave more than what IMF wanted from Turkey. Furthermore, 24 January decisions were not just a stabilization program, but also these decisions had a perspective of a ‘structural adjustment’ (Boratav, 2015, p. 150). This structural adjustment program actually served to strengthen the international and local capital class against labor class and also this program was marketed especially by World Bank for the aim of freedom of markets in local and against world economies. Also Demirel government was aware of the implementation of this program because of its anti-labor property. 1980 military coup changed this situation and helped the government to implement this program properly. 12 September 1980 regime made Özal the boss of the economy and on three and a half years, ‘counter attack of capital’ economic policies realized with the help of military control on labor markets. It was so interesting that Kenan Evren complained about the high wages in his first public speech. 24 January decisions

actually continued as economy policies until the end of 1988 and also became richer with some new components. These 24 January decisions were not original for Turkey or the world, it was actually a neo-liberal model economic program and it was the combination of IMF's standard stabilization program (which IMF imposed to most countries on 1970s) and World Bank's typical structural adjustment program. The basic components of this program were foreign exchange policy with real devaluations, liberation of an import regime, expensive foreign currency, priority of export (with the help of cheap credits, tax refunds, promotions, subventions), canceling the price controls and subventions to basic commodities, macro-economic policies aiming decrease on the domestic demand (Boratav, 2015, p. 151). This program's significant point about the distribution policies was that it was in favor of the capitalist classes and so against the labor classes (Boratav, 2015, p. 152). As an example for 24 January economic program's anti-labor property was the real wages growth rates which is shown below. This was an important proof that 24 January economic program was against labor classes.

Table1.1 Real Wages Growth Rate

Years	Private Manufacturing	Public Manufacturing
Post-Crisis Adjustment 1981-82	0.4	-0.4
Export-Led Growth 1983-87	-1.5	-5.9
Exhaustion 1988	-5.7	-7.8
Unregulated Financial Liberalization 1989-93	10	20.3
Financial Crisis 1994	-30.1	-18.1

Sources: (Boratav, et al., 2000), under secretariat of Foreign Trade and Treasury Main Economic Indicators

When we look at table 1.1, on 1983-87 period wages started to decrease because of the governments pressure on labor class and wages. We saw the effects of 24 January 1980 economic program. On 1988, wages decreased more. When we come to 1989-93 period, wages had a huge increase because of populist policies of ANAP. We may remember that ANAP lost the local elections on 1989. Also there emerged labor spring demonstrations. On the crisis year of 1994, wages had a huge decrease.

1980-88 period could be divided into two phases such as 1981-83 years and 1984-88 years (Boratav, 2015, p. 152; Boratav, et al., 1995). 1981-83 years were called as 'liberal economy under the rule of military regime' and 1984-88 years were called as 'ANAP years'. 1981-1983 years were characterized as blocking of trade union activities, ban of strikes, and determination of wages by supreme council of judge instead of labor agreement. So real wages could be easily depreciated. 1982 constitution had laws against labor class, so labor market has been disciplined easily by these laws. Price controlling system has been taken away on the following years of 1980 (Boratav, 2015, p. 153). Financial liberation started with the liberation of credit interests and bank deposit interests on July 1980. With little banks and emerging lots of brokers, this liberation of interests caused an interest competition and so on 1982 there emerged a financial anarchy. Lots of brokers and some little banks collapsed and this collapse caused Özal's leave from the government. 1984-88 years which called as ANAP years could also be separated as golden years of ANAP period (1984-87) and 1988 year as the stagnation year (Boratav, 2015, p. 154). Özal governments used the anti-labor laws which were in the 1982 constitution against the trade unions and labor classes. Until 1988, trade unions became ineffective. 1984-88 years were populist years and this mentality's main target was the poor people living in cities. By this approach, ANAP's aim was to make this mass aware of class conscious and let them obey the program and ideologies of the party and capital (Boratav, 2015, pp. 154-155; Boratav, 2016). On 1984, nearly all municipalities were taken by ANAP and the government gave registered title-deeds to slum houses and this was a part of populism (Boratav, 2016). On 1985, with the help of increase of state

expenditures, domestic demand and liberation of import, all classes had a feeling of living in abundance (Boratav, 2015, p. 155). This feeling was harmonious with populism. Government was against class based economic demands, trade unions, subventions to the farmers but on the other side, government saw these masses just as 'citizen, slum house owner, poor and consumer'. This approach was ANAP's distribution policy. Property declaration implementation has been canceled on 1984 and VAT (KDV) system has been accepted on 1985 (Boratav, 2015, p. 156). There were increase in state expenditures on 1985-86 period and this caused an expansion conjuncture in economy until the ends of 1987. On 1988, inflation started to rise and this system got into a stagnation period. Labor movements started on spring 1989 and this incident affected all political arenas, ANAP loosed local elections and so again traditional populist policies have been used in economic policies (Boratav, 2015, p. 175). There emerged price increases on the wages (Boratav, 2015, p. 177). Also it should be added that on 1989, capital movements have been liberalized and this was another step of the neo-liberal structural adjustment policies (Boratav, 2015, p. 176). On the following years of 1989, populist policies caused quick rise in public sector deficits (Boratav, 2015, p. 179). Public sector deficits share in national income, increased from 4,8 to 12,1 percentage between 1988 and 1993 (Boratav, 2015, p. 185).

Oktay Yenal pointed out that Özal's successful reforms in the political economy were consisted of foreign trade, foreign exchange and financial issues (Yenal, 2010, p. 131). Foreign trade, foreign exchange and capital market have been freed by Özal and he opened Turkey's economy to the world. So, Turkey started to be in a process of a serious industrialization and joined into a world competition. On the other side, Özal continued deficit budget economic policy, paralyzed administrative accounting and budget accounting. So, state's financial administration has been corrupted in a way that never seen before. Import substitution policies, strict foreign exchange and strict credit policy rules have been taken away, but on the other hand, state's irresponsible and arbitrary interventions on the economy increased. The undisciplined state expenditures and financial irresponsibility have been strengthened.

On January 1980, with the stabilization program, devaluation realized, price increases have been made on public commodities and services and there emerged reductions on some state expenditures (Yenal, 2010, p. 131). After a few years, the system has been changed to floating rates of exchange (Yenal, 2010, p. 132). Also it should be added that military banned labor strikes and so labor wages became less than inflation and real wages decreased (Yenal, 2010, p. 134). On the middle of 1980s, bank's interest rates about deposits and commercial credits have been freed. The one of the most important development issues for this period was that there emerged a boom of export. On 1979, export was 2,3 billion dollars which was 3,2 percentage of GNP, when we came to 1985, this figure increased to 8 billion dollars which was 14,9 percentage of GNP (Yenal, 2010, p. 135). Also we saw similar increase in import with the liberation of import regime. The reasons for the increase in exports were the cheap Turkish Lira, freezing of wages (so decrease in the costs), promotion program for export, cheap credits, tax refunds. Furthermore, on the demand side of exports, while energy crisis period, OPEC countries increased their incomes because of rising petrol prices, and also these countries increased their imports from Turkey because of Iran-Iraq war. So these reasons also helped to the boom of export in Turkey. The foundation of capital market, increasing of Turkey's financial prestige in the world, implementations of infrastructure investments and a sustainable growth were the great successes of Özal period (Yenal, 2010, p. 136). There emerged two adverse events of Özal period on the mid of 1980s. First one was the budget deficit economic policy and the second one was that the government did not bother the laws and the judiciary. This second event caused the corruption of financial institutions and there appeared an arbitrary financial administration (Yenal, 2010, p. 137).

On the second half of 1980s, inflation had a rise (30 percentage on 1986 to 68 percentage on 1988), growth rate slowed (3,7 percentage on 1988 to 1,7 percentage on 1989) (Yenal, 2010, p. 137). With the cancellation of ban on labor strikes, labor wages increased more than the inflation and wages of private and public sector workers quickly increased.

During the Özal's period, state budget system has been weakened and an important step for this process was that most of the state incomes and expenditures were put out of the budget system. Actually the real attempt was the implementations of funds which were out of the budget (bütçe dışı fonlar) (Yenal, 2010, p. 141).

Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk mentioned that after 24 January economic decisions, the significant property of the economic policies was the determination of economic decisions by the prices and supply-demand rules as in market economies (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, pp. 199-200). Prices would be formed freely by the market conditions and also prices would depend to supply-demand rules. Also 24 January decisions had another characteristic that wages and interests would be determined by market conditions (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 202). There were three main reasons for putting the wages lower in the context of 24 January decisions. First one was that, there needed high profit rates in order to increase investments (low wages meant high profit rates), second one was that, low wages meant low expenses for domestic production and this would cause cheap prices of commodities which could easily be exported, third one was that, low wages would cause low demand in domestic market so export would increase. Another purpose of these economic policies was that, government wanted to increase foreign capital inflows (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 207). In order to increase foreign capital inflows, government implemented legal and administrative arrangements. Even IMF could not find any positive impact on economic development of Turkey for this program, it just helped Turkey to postpone problems of external deficits and made Turkey credible for borrowing money from outside (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, pp. 210-211).

On 1989, liberation of foreign capital inflows decision has been taken and this decision just not liberalized foreign capital inflows, but also people and institutions could use foreign currency for economical transactions in the domestic market (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 213). On 1990s, in Turkish economy, interest payments share in state expenditures got higher, so this showed us the overleveraged position of the economy and this situation caused higher interest

rates for the debts and this made a vicious circle in the Turkish economy (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 220). It should be added that, after this 1989 transformation period and with the hot-money entrances to Turkey, this situation had negative effects on external balance, public sector deficit, balance of money market, balance of interest-savings (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005, p. 221).

Erinç Yeldan pointed out that Turkish economy started to be an open-economy on 1980-83 period and on 1989-90, this process has been finished (Yeldan, 2001, p. 25). 1980 transformation was actually a change in the qualification of economical surplus and also state had a regulator role in this new accumulation and growth model.

1981-87 period could be described as the years which import protections have been taken away and Turkish economy integrated to world economy. The aims of 24 January decisions were that, national economy's accumulation and resource allocation mechanism would be determined by market prices and also state would support export strategy of commodities and services (Yeldan, 2001, p. 39).

When we came to 1988, reforms years were gone or slowed down and economy got into a blockage (Yeldan, 2001, pp. 39-40). Following years of 1988, Turkish economy's priorities were not real production sectors, instead of them, they were the economic policy changes about financial and foreign exchange services. The most important change in these policies was the liberation of capital inflows on 1989. 1980s were the years which export-oriented growth strategy has been implemented with the help of putting pressure on wages (Yeldan, 2001, p. 71). Also previous crisis period's (1970s) idle capacities have been used for the economic growth rather than creating new capacities in economy. When we came to 1988, this process was unsustainable because there were no new industry investments and there were no rise in wages (Yeldan, 2001, p. 75). On 1989-91 period, there emerged a 'new populism' wave and so quick rises implemented on wages and this caused high expenses. 1989-93 period could be called as 'financial liberation' period and this liberation of capital inflows and foreign exchange controls resulted with the crisis of 1994 (Yeldan, 2001, p. 84). This liberation in

1989 also made Turkish economy open to short-term hot-money speculations (Yeldan, 2001, p. 135). Also it should be added that, this liberation (without any controls) process was the main reason for Turkish economy's unstable structure (Yeldan, 2001, p. 142).

Gülten Kazgan mentioned that America (Reaganomics) and Britain (Thatcherism) had a financial liberation movement on 1980 and this movement with the support of IMF and World Bank, advised 'liberation for the export-oriented growth' model for the developing countries which had a situation of moratorium (Kazgan, 2002, p. 119). This wave's reflection on Turkey was actually the 24 January decisions (Kazgan, 2002, p. 121). In this financial liberation period, Turkey's main aim was to earn foreign currency at any price and so all domestic and foreign economic policies were adapted to this mentality. Actually this transformation included not just economic policies, but also this liberation movement all affected total society. The reason for this transformation of Turkey was that Turkey again had to be a credible customer who could borrow money and pay its debts regularly. In this period, 'human' concept has been taken only as a consumer and the aim of the economy became only free market economy and globalization at any price (Kazgan, 2002, p. 124). In order to increase the exports, government gave promotions and so these promotions caused fictitious exports (Kazgan, 2002, p. 126).

Turkish economy totally became liberalized as commodities and capital movements on 1990s (Kazgan, 2002, p. 155). Government used this liberation movement for overcoming the stagflation on 1988-89 period by foreign capital inflows and also government wanted back the black money which was gone outside (Kazgan, 2002, p. 163). Furthermore, hot money was a real problem for Turkish economy that, this hot money was generally huge amounts for the economy and when this money comes to the country it causes growth in the economy, but when this hot money quickly escapes from the country, it causes real huge damages in the economy (Kazgan, 2002, p. 167). So this situation showed us the speculative dangers of hot money and also this caused the fragility

of the Turkish economy. This is important that Özal era was the starting point for the fragility of Turkish economy.

Galip Yalman mentioned that 24 January decisions were more than a standard stabilization program, so they had a characteristic of structural adjustment program that changed the development mentality which Turkey used for a long time (Yalman, 2009, p. 4). In the first half of the 1980s, Turkey had significant properties such as export-oriented economy, development strategy as neo-classical economic approach of comparative advantages and a market-oriented resource allocation (Baysan & Blitzer, 1990; Turan & Krueger, 1993). This program was a radical change in the relationship between Turkish economy and world economy, also a change in the relationship between state and economy. Yalman also pointed out that the 1980 military coup was not just a change in the politics but also it was a change in the state's structure which was constructed by the 1982 authoritarian constitution (Yalman, 2009, p. 298). He meant the important change in the class forces in society and so their reflections in the state (when we see state as a place of class relations). Therefore, 1980s period was a period of important political and institutional changes as part of 'restructuring of the state' (Yalman, 2009, p. 299). This state's restructuring process which was implemented by military and civil regimes in 1980s could be seen as a part of new hegemony (Yalman, 2009, p. 305). So, Özal had a discourse of 'there is no alternative' which was actually borrowed from Thatcher in Britain and this discourse was used to make people believe that, without these economic policies, there could be no solution to economic crisis (Yalman, 2009, pp. 310-311). Also Özal used 'ortadirek' (Özal, 1993, p. 86; Parla, 1995, p. 151) (middle classes) term in his party's election manifesto which showed the social basis of his party and also this term was used to get more votes as possible from more classes (Yalman, 2009, p. 311; Gevgilili, 1990; Vergin, 1985; Ulagay, 1987). Neo-liberalism had an argument of putting an end to class-based politics and this mentality was implemented by Özal and ANAP as a new hegemonic strategy and so restructuring the state (Yalman, 2009, p. 350). So, Turkey's experience in the 1980s was that, there emerged a new class (bourgeois) hegemony under an

authoritarian state and also with the help of a market-based economy (Yalman, 2009, p. 351).

Ziya Öniş argued that 1980s political economy of Turkey had a paradox in itself (Öniş, 1998, p. 194). There were liberalizations in the economy but on the other hand, especially after 1983 period, there emerged a fast growth strategy which supported by the expansion of public sector. So, actually there was not the process of state's withdraw from the economy totally. Instead of the state's withdrawal from the economy, state became more centralized. The properties of import substitution for industrialization, such as a huge and economic rent based public sector still continued after 1980, although its structure changed.

Öniş advised 'neo-liberal populism' term, which was used for the developing countries, to understand Özal's economic legacy (Öniş, 2004, p. 126; Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 1996; Weyland, 1999). This 'neo-liberal populism' was different than classical populism that, new one was supporting neo-liberalism which had a goal of eliminating protectionism and state interventions into the economy like in import-substitution economy (Eder, 2004). This type of populism could be found in Latin American countries such as Carlos Menem in Argentina, Carlos Salinas in Mexico, Fernando Collor in Brazil, Alberto Fujimoro in Peru. The common points of this neo-liberal populism were that, reforms were implemented in a top-down manner and without any participation of social classes. These neo-liberal populism policies were mostly realized by autocratic, powerful, charismatic leader types and often these policy decisions were taken without the interest groups' views. When we think about Özal period, this 'neo-liberal populism' term, argument makes sense. Özal was a charismatic and powerful leader who implemented his reforms in a top-down style and there were no consensus in the classes of the society for these reforms.

It is meaningful to look at the basic economic indicators of this period in order to understand the Turkish economy for this period.

Table1.2 Economic Indicators (1980-1994)

Years	GROWTH RATE/GDP (based on 1998) %	IMPORT Million\$	EXPORT Million\$	EXPORT/IMPORT %	EXPORT-IMPORT Million\$	CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE Million \$	CPI* END-YEAR %
1980	-2.4	7.909	2.910	36.8	-4.999	-3.408	93,7
1981	4.9	8.933	4.703	52.6	-4.230	-1.936	27,1
1982	3.6	8.843	5.746	65.0	-3.097	-952	26,3
1983	5.0	9.235	5.728	62.0	-3.507	-1.923	37,1
1984	6.7	10.757	7.134	66.3	-3.623	-1.439	49,7
1985	4.2	11.344	7.959	70.2	-3.385	-1.013	44,2
1986	7.0	11.105	7.457	67.1	-3.648	-1.465	30,7
1987	9.5	14.158	10.190	72.0	-3.968	-806	55,1
1988	2.1	14,335	11.662	81.4	-2.673	1.596	61,6
1989	0.3	15.792	11.625	73.6	-4.167	938	64,3
1990	9.3	22.302	12.959	58.1	-9.343	-2.625	60,4
1991	0.9	21.047	13.593	64.6	-7.454	250	71,1
1992	6.0	22.871	14.715	64.3	-8.156	-974	66,0
1993	8.0	29.428	15.345	52.1	-14.083	-6.433	71,1
1994	-5.5	23.270	18.106	77.8	-5.164	2.631	125,5

Sources: <http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,7045/ekonomik-gostergeler-1950-2017.html>,
<http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr>, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>, <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/>,
<https://www.hazine.gov.tr>

Note *: Customer Price Index

When we look at the table1.2, we can see that, growth rate started to rise with the year 1981 and on 1988, growth rate began to decline and on 1994 we see the crisis and recession. Import figures had a general increase starting from 1980 to 1994 crisis. Exports again had an increase but after 1988, it accelerated more slowly. Rate of exports meeting imports generally increased after 1980 until 1990 and with the year 1990, it had a decline trend. Trade deficit figures mainly had a decline trend until 1989, but with this year trade deficit got into an increase trend

until the 1994 crisis. Inflation figures began to slow down until 1987, but after this year it had an increasing trend until the 1994 crisis.

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter's one of aims is to look at the Turkish economic legacy of 1960s and 1970s in order to understand what was the transformation in the economy of 1980s and early 90s of Turkey. So we can see the preparation of 1980s and early 90s by looking to the economic legacy of 1960s and 1970s. Another aim is to look at the neo-liberalism concept and then make a connection with world implementations and Turkey. So we try to look at the Turkey's case as a reflection of neo-liberalism. Also another aim is look at the economic policies and implementations of Özal era in 1980s and early 90s for giving the answer of question of 'how neo-liberalism was constructed in Turkey?'.

The main characteristics of economic legacy of 60s and 70s were that these years were planning years and DPT was an important actor in this period (Yenal, 2010). Also economic crisis in the 1970s had reasons such as unstable coalition governments, Cyprus operation and embargo, OPEC's petrol crisis (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005). Furthermore, this period's main economic policy was the import substitution for industrialization and this policy resulted with increasing import dependency (Boratav, 2015).

Neo-liberalism concept was an important issue to understand Özal era. Neo-liberalism has been identified as more free markets and more free trade (Harvey, 2005). Another characteristic of neo-liberalism was that it was a new stage in capitalism and financialization was the most significant property of neo-liberalism (Fine & Saad Filho, 2016). Also we may add that neo-liberalism was not just an economical issue, it was more than that, it formed its culture and there emerged a neo-liberalization of everyday life as we can see its implementations on everything like in education and health (Dardot & Laval, 2013).

The main characteristic of economic policies of 1980s and early 90s was that export-led economy was the dominant economic policy in this period. 24 January economic program was the main economic program for this period. This

economic program was against labor classes and this program was supported by military and capitalist class (Boratav, 2015; Yalman, 2009). 1980s can be described as the 'restructuring of the state' and there emerged a new hegemony of bourgeois class over labor classes with the help of an authoritarian state and market economy (Yalman, 2009). 1989-1993 period was known as the financial liberalization period that there emerged a liberalization of capital inflows and foreign exchange controls (Yeldan, 2001). This period also formed the fragility of Turkish economy because of speculative hot money transactions (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Firstly, this thesis tried to answer the research question of 'how Özal era constructed neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in Turkish politics, economy and society?'. As methodically, I used literature review and tried to benefit from political science, economics and political sociology disciplines to understand this Özal era's social reality. This inter-disciplinary way gave us a more wider look to the social reality and also gave us the chance from escaping the trap of orthodox Marxism's economism that explains everything with economics (means of production). Therefore, there are chapters like intellectual roots and politics of ANAP other than political economy of ANAP. There are generally thesis's about this era just about its economics, politics or international relations. This thesis had an argument of looking to this era in a total view. So, in that sense, this thesis has a strong point because of this, but at the same time, this property is its weak point because this is a master thesis so it cannot be too much concentrated like a PhD thesis.

At this chapter, I will try to make connections between these chapters and try to give the total picture of Özal era. As we mentioned before that, Özal era was time of a construction of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. Therefore, Turkey experienced neo-conservatism in this era and this neo-conservatism had a harmony with neo-liberalism. In order to understand neo-conservatism's reflections on Turkey we have to look at the intellectuals roots of Özal era, so at this point, we see the Intellectuals Hearth and Turk-Islam synthesis. As we mentioned before that Özal and some of the ANAP members were also members of Intellectuals Hearth and they had organic relations with them (Zürcher, 2015). After 1980 military coup, Intellectuals Hearth and Turk-Islam synthesis became dominant in the state as we see its reflections in the 1982 Constitution (nearly 75 or 85 percentage same with the Intellectuals Hearth draft) and this synthesis became the official ideology of the state (Bora & Umur, 1987). Military and civil elites, as the representatives of right Kemalism, supported Intellectuals Hearth,

Turk-Islam synthesis and also conservatives like Özal because of the communism threat and Cold war years (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014). Özal could be the boss of the economy in the military regime and started to implement 24 January decisions by this support. 1980 military coup and its product of 1982 Constitution helped Özal and ANAP to implement neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism. By the way, military had a mission of modernization project in Turkey until 1980s, but with the 1980s and communism threat, military stopped this modernization project and supported Intellectuals Hearth, Turk-Islam synthesis and conservatives like Özal (Laçiner, 2004). Therefore, in our case, Turkey went on the road of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism with the help of the military (fascist) coup and political violence like in the some of the Latin American countries (like in Chile and Argentina) while this transition was realized democratically in England (Thatcher) and the USA (Reagan).

When we look at the politics of ANAP and Özal, we see that ANAP and Özal had a discourse of containing four political movements in their party and identified as themselves as new party and new politics. ANAP and Özal could emerge in the political arena with the help of 1980 military coup, ban on pre-coup politicians. First, party's discourse of containing four political movements showed us that ANAP and Özal were populist and pragmatic. While there had a ban on pre-coup politicians, Özal used this chance and used the discourse and recruited the staff of nationalists, political Islamists and liberals in his party as a tradition of Turkish center-right. ANAP was a populist party that used populism as a political attitude and implementation (Worsley, 1969; Taggart, 2000) like in Özal's quote 'First economy and then politics'. When Özal identified his party and political mentality as new party and new politics, this meant creating 'us' and 'them' (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013; Laclau, 2005; Fella & Ruzza, 2013) argument which related with populism, creating inner enemies as we see in Turkish right tradition. Actually Özal's real success in this populism was that his populism was a rupture of two type of populisms in Turkey (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014; Taşkın, 2013). First populism was CHP's populism (halkçılık) which saw the society as classless and without ethnicities. Second populism was the Turkish right's

populism which is related with 'national will' which was accepted as the majority of the society. These two types of populisms were based on a one-nation mentality but Özal created the fact that there were two nations which consisted of middle classes as first nation and poor people, left wing people, Kurds, Alevis as the second nation. This second nation became the other and got criminalized and became a threat to the first nation. So Özal persuaded first nation to accept state's political violence over the second nation. 1980s era was the time which districts of poor and wealthy people were totally differentiated, there had no common places (such as shopping malls, entertainment places, working places) for the possibility of meeting of different classes in the society (Gürbilek, 1993, p. 71). So Özal's success was that he separated the society as we mentioned before as like two nations. Also in Özal era there had reforms which were implemented in a top-down manner by an autocratic-charismatic leader and without any consensus of social classes. In that sense, Özal era had neo-liberal populism (Öniş, 2004; Weyland, 1996; Weyland, 1999) in it.

ANAP was a typical Turkish center-right party that gave society optimism and hope, which were related with capitalist transformation or economic development (Taşkın, 2009). We have to admit that giving hope to the society was always effective on votes for elections. This also gives us the power of populism and pragmatism. Turkish center-right tradition had its power from being in the middle of modern and tradition or being hybrid. So, Turkish center-right parties generally put distance with the doctrines or had skepticism against doctrines and this showed us their pragmatic mentality that they used the discourses and staff of these doctrines in their parties like in ANAP. In that sense ANAP was a typical Turkish center-right party. Also ANAP was a typical new-right (neo-conservative) party with its properties that it had neo-liberalism and rationality but without political liberalism in it (Bora, 2016). On the other hand, it used right populism which supported the hate against others (as we mentioned before as two nations project), foreigners, intellectuals (as we mentioned before as the property of anti-intellectualism of Turkish center right), migrants, bureaucracy (populism's

property of being against elites) and politicians (as we mentioned before that creating inner enemies in the country).

Özal's character was important to understand his era. Özal was a hybrid (Aydın & Taşkın, 2014), practical, pragmatic person. He was a member of Intellectuals Hearth and also he was working for Sabancı Holding. So his hybrid personality gave him a great advantage in political arena. Another important issue was that Özal explained his three basic freedoms as 'freedom of thought', 'religious freedom' and 'freedom of enterprise' (Özal, 1993; Özal, 1993). When we look at the 'freedom of thought', removal of articles 141, 142 and 163 of Turkish Criminal Code (related with freedom of thought) was an important positive implementation. On the other side, 'struggle with terror act' law was the negative implementation. So it is not easy to say there was a 'freedom of thought' or not in Özal era. When we come to 'religious freedom', this freedom was just for Sunni Muslims and not for non-Muslims, atheists or Alevis. For example, 'religion and moral' courses in school was just for Sunni Muslims and not for non-Muslims, atheists or Alevis. So, we cannot say that 'religious freedom' was in Özal era. When we look at 'freedom of enterprise', we can say that this freedom was totally in Özal era because there was a construction of neo-liberalism in this period. Also it should be added that ideology of economics (read as neo-liberalism or capitalism or 'freedom of enterprise') became dominant in the society instead of politics. This 'freedom of enterprise' was an indicator of ideology of economics. So, 'turning the corner' mentality spread in the society. This was a great transformation in society. Özal's another success was that he also persuaded CHP voters (especially city based voters of CHP) to include in ANAP by the hopes and gains of globalization and consumption society (Taşkın, 2013). Özal signed the right for personal application to European Court of Human Rights on 1987. This might be most important implementation for Özal as political liberalism. On the other hand, Özal decided to go referendum about the ban on pre-coup politicians on 1987 and also supported no campaign in this referendum. He could solve this problem in the parliament but he did not and went to referendum. He tried to negotiate in Kurdish issue, but on the other side, a de

facto state of emergency emerged in the southeastern Turkey in his era. Therefore, it is hard to say Özal was a democratic leader or not. We have to be deliberate about this issue.

When we look at the political economy of Özal era, we can see the construction of neo-liberalism in Turkey. From 1960s to 1980, there had an accumulation model of import substitution for industrialization and planning (DPT) was effective in these years. This model had an aim of decreasing the dependence on imports and domestic production would increase. On the contrary, with this accumulation model, import dependency increased in Turkey because production needed import-based inputs (Boratav, 2015; Kepenek & Yentürk, 2005). There had a union of classes on 1960s until the end of 1970s as industrial bourgeois class and labor class (Keyder, 2011). Labor class gained power from the 1961 constitution and this protective accumulation was in favor of industrial bourgeois. At the end of 1970s, this union started to collapse because of foreign currency crisis, lack of foreign financial sources and the struggles (labor strikes, labor demonstrations) of labor class.

I think it will not be wrong to say that 24 January 1980 economic program was the starting point of neo-liberalism in Turkey. This program was not just a stabilization program but also a structural adjustment program (Boratav, 2015). So this meant that this program was a long term program to transform the economy to a neo-liberal economy. 24 January could be implemented with the support and help of 1980 military coup and coup's product as 1982 constitution. This program could not be implemented in those years because of increasing political violence atmosphere in Turkey on the end of 1970s. Capitalist classes became happy about the 1980 military coup that 24 January economic program could be implemented. Halit Narin's quote after the 1980 military coup as 'Labor class laughed for 20 years, we cried, but now it is our turn to laugh' (Ozan, 2012; Koç, 1998) was so clear to understand the social reality. As we know that, capitalist classes wanted the change the accumulation model of import substitution for industrialization to export led industrialization since the second half of 1970s (Öztürk & Ercan, 2009). TÜSİAD (TÜSİAD, 1979) explained with their class conscious that the

real problem was the labor strikes, not the increases on wages. 24 January economic program was in favor of capitalist classes and it was against labor classes. This program had a general aim of increasing exports and put pressure on labor class. When we look at the table of reel wages growth rate, we can see the decrease on wages as years. This was an important proof that there had pressure on labor classes and their wages. Also with 1980 military coup and its product of 1982 constitution, labor classes lost their gains. Furthermore, it should be added that 24 January economic program radically changed the relationship between Turkish economy and world economy and there emerged a change in the relationship between state and economy (Yalman, 2009). 1980 military coup not just changed the politics but also there emerged a change in the state`s structure ('restructuring of the state'). Therefore, 1982 authoritarian constitution changed the structure of the state with the help of military and civil regime elites. So, finally a new class (bourgeois) hegemony has been constructed with the help of an authoritarian state and neo-liberal economy.

Another important issue is neo-liberalism concept to understand Özal era. Neo-liberalism is a new period in capitalism and its financialization property is important (Fine & Saad Filho, 2016). Also neo-liberalism is just not about economics or economical issues, it creates its own culture (different type of society) on everything like health, education and so. Therefore, there is fact of neo-liberalization of everyday life (Dardot & Laval, 2013) and this approach will help us again to escape from the trap of Marxist economism. We mentioned about the dominancy of the ideology of economics before and we said that 'turning the corner' mentality (as a culture) spread in the society. This mentality could be an example for neo-liberalization of everyday life. Also neo-liberalism had an argument of putting an end to class based politics (Yalman, 2009). This type of politics was owned by ANAP and Özal and this was called as new politics and new politician.

When we look at the distribution policy of ANAP, we can say that Özal`s main target was the poor people in the cities. Özal tried to prevent them from class conscious and make them obey the program and ideologies of the party and

capitalist class (Boratav, 2015; Boratav, 2016). Therefore, Özal saw these poor people just as 'citizen, slum owner and consumer' rather than seeing them as labor. For example, Özal gave these people title-deeds for their slum houses and this was a part of populism.

Another important issue about the economy of Özal era was the financial liberation process. This was an indicator of neo-liberalism as we mentioned before. This financial liberation period was between 1989 and 1993. Also this process gave us the risk of hot money speculations (fragility problem of Turkish economy) and this process resulted with the 1994 crisis (Yeldan, 2001). This also showed us the relationship between capitalist system and economic crisis and capitalist system had a nature of consisting crisis in it.

Finally, we can say that in this construction process of neo-liberalization and neo-conservatism, labor classes became the losers (decrease on wages, ineffectiveness of trade unions and loss of labor rights) and capitalist classes became the winners (24 January economic program, financial liberalization). Özal and ANAP constructed this process with the help of an authoritarian state (support of military, Intellectuals Hearth, neo-conservatism, a nationalist-conservative ideology) and a neo-liberal economy (24 January economic program, financial liberation, export led economy). We must not forget that this neo-liberalism was just not about economy, it created its culture in the society. Therefore, there emerged a neo-liberalization of everyday life in Turkey like in the world. There had a great transformation in the society such as 'turning the corner' mentality and ideology of economics became dominant in the society.

5.2 DEBATE ON FURTHER RESEARCH

When we look at the books on Özal era, we can see that these books are written by journalists and therefore there is a need for books about Özal era which should be written by academics. This is a great loss to have no academic books about Özal era. There are important books about 1980s Turkey written by Nurdan Gürbilek and Can Kozanoğlu but these books are not academic books. As we mentioned before, this era is very important to understand today's politics,

economics and culture in Turkey. This era gives us the clues for today. This thesis has a weakness of not having in-depth interviews with the people in the party organization. Therefore, there is a great need for in-depth interviews with former ANAP member of parliaments, ministers or people in the party organization for further thesis, books or articles. This will give us more clues about Özal era and about the transformation in politics, economics and society. So, more books, articles, thesis's, memoirs about Özal era will guide us to understand today and see the ruptures-continuities in Turkish center-right tradition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad, F., 1993. *The Making of Modern Turkey*. 1st ed. London and New York : Routledge.

Ahmad, F., 2002. *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. 2nd ed. Ankara: Doruk Yayınları.

Algar, H., 1981. *The Nagschbandi Order in Republican Turkey*. Berlin, Berliner Institut für Vergleichende Sozial Forschung.

Alper, E. & Göral, Ö. S., 2003. " Aydınlar Ocağı ". In: A. Çiğdem, ed. *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce Muhafazakarlık Cilt 5*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 588-589.

Aydın, S. & Taşkın, Y., 2014. *1960'dan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi*. 1st ed. İstanbul: İletişim.

Barlas, M., 1994. *Turgut Özal`ın Anıları*. s.l.:Sabah Yayınları.

Bayramoğlu, A., 2004. Asker ve Siyaset. In: A. İnsel & A. Bayramoğlu, eds. *Bir Zümre , Bir Parti Türkiye`de Ordu*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, pp. 59-118.

Baysan, T. & Blitzler, C., 1990. Turkey's Trade Liberalization in the 1980s and Prospects for its Sustainability. In: D. Rodrik & T. Arıcanlı, eds. *The Political Economy of Turkey*. Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 9-36.

Belge, M., 1992. *12 Yıl Sonra 12 Eylül*. İstanbul: Birikim.

Birand, M. A. & Yalçın, S., 2015. *The Özal Bir Davanın Öyküsü*. 14th ed. İstanbul: Doğan.

- Bobbio, N., 1999. *Sağ ve Sol : Bir Politik Ayrımın Anlamı*. Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları.
- Bora, T., 2005. Turgut Özal. In: M. Yılmaz, ed. *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 7 Liberalizm*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 595-599.
- Bora, T., 2015. *Türk Sağının Üç Hali Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*. 9th ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bora, T., 2016. Türk Sağı : Siyasal Düşünce Tarihi Açısından Bir Çerçeve Denemesi. In: İ. Ö. Kerestecioğlu & G. G. Öztan, eds. *Türk Sağı : Mitler, Fetişler, Düşman İmgeleri*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 9-28.
- Bora, T., 2017. *Cereyanlar Türkiye`de Siyasi İdeolojiler*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Boratav, K., 1983. Türkiye`de Popülizm 1962-76. *Yapıt*, 46(1), pp. 7-18.
- Boratav, K., 1997. `İktisat Tarihi : 1981-1994`. In: B. Tanör, K. Boratav & S. Akşin, eds. *Türkiye Tarihi cilt 5 Bugünkü Türkiye 1980-1995*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
- Boratav, K., 2015. *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009*. 21th ed. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
- Boratav, K., 2016. *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm*. 3rd ed. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
- Boratav, K., Keyder, Ç. & Pamuk, Ş., 1984. *Krizin Dinamikleri ve Türkiye`nin Alternatif Sorunu*. Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları.

- Boratav, K., Türel, O. & Yeldan, E., 1995. " The Turkish Economy in 1981-1992 : A Balance Sheet, Problems and Prospects". *METU Studies in Development*, Issue 22/1.
- Boratav, K., Yeldan, E. & Köse, A. H., 2000. *Globalization, Distribution and Social Policy: Turkey, 1980-1998*. New York, Center for Economic Policy Analysis New School University.
- Bora, T. & Can, K., 1994. *Devlet Ocak Dergah 12 Eylül`den 1990`lara Ülkücü Hareket*. 3rd ed. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Bora, T. & Umur, M., 1987. " Aydınlar Ocağı 12 Eylül`den Sonra Doludizgin : Türk-Islam Masonları". *Yeni Gündem*, 22 February, pp. 10-18.
- Bourdieu, P., 1998. ` The Essence of Neoliberalism ` . *Le Monde Diplometique*, Issue December.
- Caporaso, J., 1981. `Industrialization in the Periphery : The Evolving Global Division of Labor` . In: L. Hollist & J. Rosenau, eds. *World System Structure, Continuity and Change*. London and California: Sage Pub., pp. 140-171.
- Celasun, M. & Rodrik, D., 1980. Debt, Adjustment and Growth : Turkey. In: J. Sachs & S. Collins, eds. *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 643.
- Cemal, H., 1986. *12 Eylül Günlüğü Demokrasi Korkusu*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Cemal, H., 1990. *Özal Hikayesi*. 8th ed. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.

- Ceyhun, U., 1993. *The Intellectuals Hearth and the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis*. İstanbul: Bogazici University Unpublished Master Thesis.
- Collins, W. & Williamson, J., 1999. 'Capital Goods Prices, Global Markets and Accumulation'. *NBER Working Papers*, Issue W7145.
- Çakır, R. & Göktaş, H., 1991. *Vatan , Millet , Pragmatizm : Türk Sağında İdeoloji ve Politika*. İstanbul: Metis.
- Çavuşoğlu, H., 2009. Party Formation In The Centre Right After May 27 And September 12. *Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Aralık, 12(22), pp. 165-178.
- Çeçen, A., Doğruel, S. & Doğruel, F., 1990. *Türkiye`de Ekonomik Büyüme, Yapısal Dönüşüm ve Kriz*. İstanbul: Ege.
- Çölaşan, E., 1989. *Turgut Nereden Koşuyor ?*. 28th ed. Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi.
- Dardot, P. & Laval, C., 2013. *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society*. London: Verso.
- Demirel, S., 1975. *Siyasi İstikrar ve Topyekun Kalkınma*. İstanbul: Aydınlar Ocağı Yayını.
- Demirel, T., 2002. Cumhuriyet Döneminde Alternatif Batılılaşma Arayışları : 1946 sonrası Muhafazakar Modernleşmeci Eğilimler Üzerine Bazı Değerlendirmeler. In: U. Kocabaşoğlu, ed. *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 3 Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 218-238.
- Demirel, T., 2004. *Adalet Partisi İdeoloji ve Politika*. İstanbul: İletişim.

- Demirel, T., 2009. 1946-1980 Döneminde " Sol " ve " Sağ ". In: T. Bora & M. Gültekingil, eds. *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 9 Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 413-450.
- Dilek, O., 2014. Türkiye Kapitalizminde Zorun Rolü : Rızasız Bir Toplum Sözleşmesi Olarak 12 Eylül Askeri Darbesi. In: G. Çeğin & İ. Şirin, eds. *Türkiye'de Siyasal Şiddetin Boyutları*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 347-368.
- Doğan, Y., 1985. *Dar Sokakta Siyaset (1980-1983)*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
- Doğan, Y., 1988. *Ankara'dan yazısı*. s.l.:Cumhuriyet.
- Dood, C. H., 1983. *The crisis of Turkish democracy*. Beverley: Eothen.
- Dubiel, H., 1998. *Yeni Muhafazakarlık Nedir ?*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Dumenil, G. & Levy, D., 2001. *The Nature and Contradictions of Neoliberalism`*. London: Socialist Register The Merlin Press.
- Dumenil, G. & Levy, D., 2004. *Capital Resurgent : Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Eder, M., 2004. 'Populism as a Barrier to Integration with the EU: Rethinking the Copenhagen Criteria'. In: M. Uğur & N. Canefe, eds. *Turkey and European Integration: Prospects and Issues in the Post-Helsinki Era*. London: Routledge, p. 49-74.
- Erdem, İ. K., 2016. *Demokrasinin ilk 50 yılı (12 seçim, 37 Hükümet , 4 Darbe)*. 1st ed. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap.

- Ergin, M., 1988. *Türkiye `nin Bugünkü Meseleleri*. 4th ed. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü.
- Erol, H., 1997. *Türk Siyasal Partilerinde Örgütlenme ve Liderler Oligarşisi*. İzmir : Dokuz Eylül University Unpublished Master Thesis.
- Fella, S. & Ruzza, C., 2013. `Populism and the Fall of the Centre-Right in Italy : The End of the Berlusconi Model or a New Beginning?`. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Issue 21(1), pp. 38-52.
- Fine, B. & Saad Filho, A., 2016. *Thirteen Things You Need to Know About Neoliberalism*. [Online]
Available at: <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22614/>
[Accessed 1 May 2017].
- Gevgilili, A., 1990. *Türkiye `de Yenileşme Düşüncesi, Sivil Toplum, Basın ve Atatürk*. İstanbul: Bağlam.
- Gidron, N. & Bonikowski, B., 2013. *Varieties of Populism : Literature Review and Research Agenda*, Cambridge: Harvard University Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
- Göle, N., 2002. *Melez Desenler İslam ve Modernlik Üzerine*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Gramsci, A., 2009. *Hapishane Defterleri*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları.
- Güler, Z., 2007. Muhafazakarlık Kadim Geleneğin Savunusundan Faydacılığa. In: B. Örs, ed. *19.Yüzyıldan 20.Yüzyıla Modern Siyasal İdeolojiler*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, pp. 115-162.

- Gürbilek, N., 1993. *Vitrinde Yaşamak 1980' lerin Kültürel İklimi*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Haberler, B., 1979. *Koç Topluluğu- Nisan*, İstanbul: Koç Topluluğu.
- Harvey, D., 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
- <http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,7045/ekonomik-gostergeler-1950-2017.html>
- <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr>
- <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>
- <http://www.tcmb.gov.tr>
- <https://www.hazine.gov.tr>
- Holloway, J., 1996. 'The Abyss Opens : The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism'. In: W. Bonefeld & J. Holloway, eds. *Global Capital, National State and the Politics of Money*. London: MacMillan Press.
- İnsel, A., 2004. Bir Toplumsal Sınıf Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri. In: A. İnsel & A. Bayramoğlu, eds. *Bir Zümre , Bir Parti Türkiye`de Ordu*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, pp. 41-57.
- Jansen, J. & Walgrave, S., 2007. Populism as political communication style : An empirical study of political parties` discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, Issue 46(3), pp. 319-345.
- Kabaklı, A., 1985. " Aydınlar Ocağı 15 yaşında, 1970-1985". *Boğaziçi Dergisi*, July, pp. 1-16.

- Karaosmanođlu, A. L., 2016. Siyaset ve Ordu. In: M. Kabasakal, ed. *Türkiye`de Siyasal Yaşam Dün , Bugün , Yarın*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, pp. 127-153.
- Kazgan, G., 2002. *Tanzimattan 21. Yüzyıla Türkiye Ekonomisi*. 1st ed. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Kepek, Y. & Yentürk, N., 2005. *Türkiye Ekonomisi*. 18th ed. İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi.
- Keresteciođlu, İ. Ö., 2016. Korku ve Siyaset : Türk Sağının Ezberlerini Çözümlemek. In: İ. Ö. Keresteciođlu & G. G. Öztan, eds. *Türk Sağı : Mitler, Fetiřler , Düşman İmgeleri*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 29-43.
- Keyder, Ç., 2011. *Türkiye`de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. 17th ed. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Kibar, O., 1984. s.l.:Tercüman.
- Koç, Y., 1998. *Türkiye`de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi*. İstanbul: Gerçek.
- Koraltürk, M. & Çetin, C., 2005. Türkiye'de Liberal İktisadi Düşünce. In: M. Yılmaz, ed. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 7 Liberalizm*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 316-355.
- Kozanođlu, C., 1994. *Cilalı İmaj Devri 1980`lerden 90`lara Türkiye ve Starları*. 7th ed. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Kozanođlu, H., 1993. *Yuppieler , Prenslar ve Bizim Kuşak*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim.

- Köker, L., 2003. Liberal Muhafazakarlık ve Türkiye. In: A. Çiğdem, ed. *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce cilt 5 Muhafazakarlık*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 274-290.
- Köse, A. H. & Öncü, A., 2003. İktisadın Piyasası , Kapitalizmin Ekonomisi. In: A. H. Köse, F. Şenses & E. Yeldan, eds. *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar 1 Küresel Düzen: Birikim,Devlet ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 93-141.
- Laclau, E., 1977. *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory*. London: Verso.
- Laclau, E., 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.
- Laçiner, Ö., 2004. Türk Militarizmi 1. In: A. İnel & A. Bayramoğlu, eds. *Bir Zümre, Bir Parti Türkiye`de Ordu*. İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, pp. 13-28.
- Landes, S., 1969. *The Unbound Prometheus : Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, S. & Roberts, K. M., 2011. *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- MESS, 1999. *Gelenek ve Gelecek, MESS` in 40 Yılı*. İstanbul: BZD..
- Ocağı, A., 1970. *Aydınlar Ocağı Ana Nizamnamesi*. İstanbul: Özal Matbaası.
- Ocağı, A., 1985. " On beş Yıldır Sönmeyen Ocak ". *Boğaziçi Dergisi*, pp. 1-16.
- Ozan, E. D., 2012. *Gülme Sırası Bizde 12 Eylül`e Giderken Sermaye Sınıfı Kriz ve Devlet*. 1st ed. İstanbul: Metis.

- Öniş, Z., 1998. *State and Market : The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press .
- Öniş, Z., 2004. Turgut Özal and his Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40(4), pp. 113-134.
- Özal, T., 1985. *ANAP Birinci Büyük Kongresi`nde Yaptığı Konuşma*. s.l.:Başbakan Turgut Özal`ın Konuşma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mülakatları : 13.12.1984-12.12.1985 , 6 Ocak 1985 , 13 Nisan 1985.
- Özal, T., 1989. *ANAP Yeni Genel Merkez Binası Açılış Töreninde Yaptığı Konuşma*. Ankara: Başbakan Turgut Özal`ın Yurtiçi-Yurtdışı Konuşmaları 13.12.1988-31.10.1989.
- Özal, T., 1993. Anavatan Seçim Beyannamesi 6 Kasım 1983. In: T. Özal, ed. *Değişim Belgeleri 1979-1992 Turgut Özal Mart 1993*. İstanbul: Kazancı Matbaacılık, pp. 75-144.
- Özal, T., 1993. Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal`ın III. İzmir İktisat Kongresi`ndeki Konuşmaları 4 Haziran 1992 İzmir. In: T. Özal, ed. *Değişim Belgeleri 1979-1992 Turgut Özal*. İstanbul: Kazancı Matbaacılık, pp. 145-162.
- Özal, T., 1993. Kalkınmada Yeni Görüş` ün Esasları Nisan 1979. In: T. Özal, ed. *Değişim Belgeleri 1979-1992 Turgut Özal*. İstanbul: Kazancı Matbaacılık, pp. 11-45.

- Özder, F., 2006. *1980 Sonrasında Türkiye 'de Muhafazakar Kimliğin Gelişimi ve Siyasi Partiler*. İzmir: Dokuz Eylül University Unpublished Master Thesis.
- Özel, S. & Sarıkaya, A., 2005. Türkiye 'de Liberalizmin Prangaları. In: M. Yılmaz, ed. *Modern Türkiye 'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 7 Liberalizm*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 452-472.
- Öztürk, M. Y. & Ercan, F., 2009. 1979 Krizinden 2001 Krizine Türkiye 'de Sermaye Birikimi Süreci ve Yaşanan Dönüşümler. *Praksis*, Issue 19, pp. 55-93.
- Parla, T., 1995. *Türkiye 'nin Siyasal Rejimi 1980-1989*. 3rd ed. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Pauwels, T., 2011. 'Measuring Populism : A Quantitative Text Analysis of Party Literature in Belgium'. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, Issue 21(1), pp. 97-119.
- Poulton, H., 1997. *Top hat, grey wolf and crescent : Turkish nationalism and the Turkish republic*. London: Hurst.
- Roberts, K., 2010. 'Latin America's Populist Revival'. *SAIS Review*, Issue 27(1), pp. 3-15.
- Rosenthal, L. & Trost, C., 2012. *Steep : The Precipitous Rise of the Tea Party*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Sakallıoğlu, Ü. C., 1996. "1983-1994: Siyasal Parti Topoğrafyası". In: *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 1249-1251.

- Sayer, D., 1987. *The Violence of Abstraction : The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism*. s.l.:Basil Blackwell.
- Sönmez, M., 1984. *Özal Ekonomisi ve İşçi Hakları*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları.
- Taggart, P., 1995. 'New Populist parties in Western Europe'. *West European Politics*, Issue 18(1), pp. 34-51.
- Taggart, P., 2000. *Populism*. 1st ed. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Tanyu, H., 1981. *Atatürk ve Türk Milliyetçiliği*. Ankara: Töre Devlet Yayınları.
- Taşkın, Y., 2009. Türkiye'de Sağcılık : Bir Kavramın Yerleşme Tarihini Anlamak. In: Ö. Laçiner, ed. *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 9 Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 451-473.
- Taşkın, Y., 2013. *Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına Milliyetçi Muhafazakar Entelijansiya*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Taşkın, Y., 2016. Türk Sağı ve Aydınlar: Bir Aşk ve Nefret İlişisini Anlamak. In: İ. Ö. Kerestecioğlu & G. G. Öztan, eds. *Türk Sağı : Mitler, Fetişler , Düşman İmgeleri*. İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 407-421.
- Tercüman, 1982. İstanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi.
- Thompson, E., 1978. *The Poverty of Theory*. s.l.:Merlin Press.
- Toprak, B., 2013. Dinci Sağ. In: I. C. Schick & E. Tonak, eds. *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*. İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, pp. 359-385.

Turan, I. & Krueger, A. O., 1993. "The Politics and Economics of Turkish

Policy Reforms in the 1980s,". In: R. Bates & A. O. Krueger, eds.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS IN ECONOMIC

POLICY REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM EIGHT COUNTRIES. Oxford:

Basil Blackwell.

Turan, Ö., 2013. Alternatif tahayyüller, devingenlik , popülizm : 1970'ler için

bir çerçeve denemesi. *Toplum ve Bilim*, Issue 127, pp. 3-25.

Turan, Ö., 2016. Kudretli Devlet, Manevi Kalkınma, Ağır Sanayii : Türk Sağı

ve Kalkınma. In: İ. Ö. Kerestecioğlu & G. G. Öztan, eds. *Türk Sağı Mitler*

, *Fetişler , Düşman İmgeleri.* İstanbul: İletişim, pp. 459-505.

Türk, B., 2014. *Muktedir Türk Sağ Geleneği ve Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.*

2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

TÜSİAD, 1979. *1979 Yılıının Ortasında Durum*, İstanbul: TÜSİAD.

TÜSİAD, 1979. *The Turkish Economy - 1979*, İstanbul: TÜSİAD.

TÜSİAD, 1981. *The Turkish Economy-1981*, İstanbul: TÜSİAD.

Ulagay, O., 1987. *Özal Ekonomisinde Kim Kazandı Kim Kaybetti.* Ankara:

Bilgi Yayınevi.

Vergin, N., 1985. Komuta Ekonomisinden Liberal Ekonomiye Geçiş

Deneyimi. *İktisat Dergisi*, Issue January.

Weyland, K., 1996. 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin

America: Unexpected Affinities'. *Studies in Comparative*

International Development, 31(3), p. 3–31.

Weyland, K., 1999. 'Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe'
. *Comparative Politics*, 31(4), p. 379–401.

Worsley, P., 1969. The concept of populism. In: G. Ionescu & E. Gellner,
eds. *Populism : Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 245.

Yalman, G. L., 2009. *Transition to Neoliberalism The Case of Turkey in the
1980s*. 1st ed. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press.

Yayla, A., 2005. Özal, Özal Reformları ve Liberalizm. In: M. Yılmaz, ed.
Modern Türkiye `de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 7 Liberalizm. İstanbul: İletişim,
pp. 584-588.

Yeldan, E., 2001. *Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye Ekonomisi Bölüşüm, Birikim
ve Büyüme*. 2nd ed. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Yenal, O., 2010. *Cumhuriyet `in İktisat Tarihi*. 1st ed. İstanbul: Türkiye İş
Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Yücel, S., 2006. *Türkiye `nin Siyasal Partileri (1859-2005)*. İstanbul:
Alfa Yayınları.

Zürcher, E. J., 2015. *Modernleşen Türkiye `nin Tarihi*. 31th ed. İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları.