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UNCONVENTIONAL RESPONSE TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: MOROCCAN COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

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Unconventional Response to Unconventional Warfare: Moroccan Counterterrorism Strategies

Konvansiyonel olmayan Savaşa Konvansiyonel Olmayan Yanıt: Fas'ın Karşı Terör Stratejileri

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Abstract

In this study we will examine how conventional strategies against unconventional global terrorism failed in the context of understanding the nature of the threat, and how Kingdom of Morocco's multi-faceted unconventional counterterrorism strategy succeeded. In accordance with this purpose, Al Qaeda which global system encounter with will be assessed in terms of tactics, ideological motivations and its sui generis features which set apart from conventional terrorist organizations. It must be highlighted that Al Qaeda will not be evaluated as an organization, rather Al Qaeda will be considered as the "idea" which is quite innovative and flexible, Jihad franchisor in various part of the World, launched institutionalization of Jihad, and organized self-contained hard-to-detect network based system. Therefore changing strategies of Al Qaeda in due course will be examined in the context of different generations. USA-led Global War on Terror against Al Qaeda and its stalemates will be assessed and Kingdom of Morocco will be studied as a successful case study due to her legal-military, socio-political and religious strategies following 2003 Casablanca Attacks. In parallel with this purpose, we had privileged, within the body of Al Akhawayn University, to make interviews, visit institutions which have symbolic importance, and talk numerous nationals regarding counterterrorism strategies.

Key Words: Global Terrorism, Jihad, Al Qaeda, GWOT, Morocco

Özet

Bu çalışmada konvansiyonel olmayan küresel terörle mücadele uygulanan konvansiyonel stratejilerin, tehdidin doğasını anlama bağlamında başarısızlığa uğramalarını inceleyeceğiz ve tehdidin doğasını anlamada başarılı olan Fas Krallığı'nın uyguladığı çok yönlü konvansiyonel olmayan karşı terör stratejisini inceleyeceğiz. Bu doğrultuda küresel sistemin karşı karşıya olduğu tehdit olan El Kaide uyguladığı taktikleri, ideolojik motivasyonları ve onu konvansiyonel terör örgütlerinden ayıran nevi şahsına münhasır özellikleri ele alınacak. Burada altı çizilmesi gereken bir mesele El Kaide'nin yalnızca bir örgüt olarak değil, bunun çok daha ötesinde oldukça yenilikçi ve esnek, cihat kavramını kurumsallaştıran, dünyanın

değişik coğrafyalarında şirket gibi franchising dağıtan ve tespit edilmesi oldukça güç olan kendine yeterli hücre sistemiyle örgütlenen bir "fikir" olarak ele alınacağıdır. Bu sebeple El Kaide'nin zaman içinde değişen stratejileri ve taktikleri farklı jenerasyonlar halinde incelenecektir. El Kaide'ye karşı ABD öderliğinde yürütülen "küresel terörle savaş" ve başarısızlıkları incelenerek başarılı bir örnek olarak 2003 Kazablanka saldırılarından sonra uygulamaya başladığı yasal-askeri, sosyo-politik ve özellikle dini stratejileriyle Fas Krallığı vaka olarak incelenecek. Bu amaçla Fas'ta Al Akhawayn Üniversitesi bünyesinde üç ay kadar değişik şehirlerde mülakatlar yapma, sembolik öneme sahip bazı kurumlara ziyaretler gerçekleştirme ve çok sayıda vatandaşla bahse konu olan karşı terör stratejilerini konuşma ayrıcalığı elde ettik.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel Terörizm, Cihat, El Kaide, Küresel Terörle Savaş, Fas

Introduction

International community has to cope with paradigmatic shift which occurred in security-oriented world politics following the 9/11 attacks. In the wake of the collapse of USSR and almost six-decades-old Cold War-oriented security paradigm in early 90s, as realist scholars called “international system” appeared as more-less unipolar structure. Thus, Cold War security paradigm became outdated, and new paradigm would soon rise. This paradigm shift has begun right after a devastating event, just like 30 Years War, World War I and II. Although it was not a new phenomenon, terrorism and its international version began to dominate world politics following the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. 9/11 attacks were the signal of how international community will be threaten in the new millennium.

9/11 and its perpetrators, planning and their organizational scheme, in every respect, were unconventional. Until 2001 commercial airplanes have only been hijacked for terrorist purposes, September 11, 2001 for the first time commercial airplanes with full of passengers have been used just like Japanese kamikazes. Even this performance gives a clue regarding how new security concerns would be shaped unconventionally. Nevertheless State response, on a large scale, remained intact. The winner of the Cold War and the target of the 9/11 attacks, USA unsurprisingly took the initiative of war on terror immediately. Therewithal, US response was formulated in accordance with conventional security concepts; the country of origin (in this case it was Afghanistan) was destroyed by American outstanding fire power and two years after Afghanistan, Iraq has been chosen as the new country of origin in terms of rising Al Qaeda threat and their possible reach of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Iraq also was not able to escape to suffer same fate. Yet the threat was not demolished but deepened.

Al Qaeda as the new enemy demonstrates its vision and abilities in several occasion. 1998 Mombasa and Darussalam simultaneous attacks on US embassies, Al Qaeda simply said: “I may conduct simultaneous multiple attacks in different

countries where there were 500 km in between" and in 9/11 attacks "foreign missions are not the only target; I may hit you wherever I want, just as I did to the symbols of your prosperity in your homeland". Unfortunately US decision makers focused on killing the leader and disrupt the organization, in spite of understanding the context and scope of the threat, and they failed to notice how Al Qaeda poses *unconventional* threat to them.

Despite terrorism is not a new phenomenon, Al Qaeda represents the paradigmatic shift in terrorism concept, in terms of its attacks, organizational scheme, and funding. As the roof organization, Al Qaeda *franchises* the Jihad which is recreated by them as an *idea* or a *methodology*, to local Islamist groups. The term franchising is frequently used within the studies related to Al Qaeda, because in terms of organization there are no substantial differences between Al Qaeda and contemporary companies that plan to expand their business through *budget-friendly* franchising. In Al Qaeda case, it works in mutual benefits; local groups receive more financial and public support through their affiliation with Al Qaeda which is *the leader of Islamic revival*, and Al Qaeda gains more and more reputation together with the attacks of her affiliated and inspired movement. Moreover although Al Qaeda is assumed as the anti-modernity movement, it is using any and all available products of the modernity in her *hybrid war* which makes Al Qaeda an unconventional. On the other side of the coin, as a result of Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Al Qaeda lost many of her training bases in Afghanistan, Iraq and somewhere else. States were not willing to tolerate Al Qaeda businesses in their homeland due to American GWOT. Thus Al Qaeda changed its modus operandi thanks to its flexible discipline and in line with the rise of the Internet; homegrown and electronic Jihad which are carried out by lone wolves are the newest phenomenon that security apparatus had to deal with. Despite lone wolves' effects are comparatively less in terror attacks; it symbolizes how Al Qaeda poses innovative threats as counterterrorism measures remains intact on a large scale.

Despite the predicaments on war on terror, scholars are not so willing to establish a new way of meeting this problem. There are few reasons; firstly negotiating with global terror organizations is contradiction with states' own principles. States are cursing them and labeling *few mad and bad guys* so somehow states have constructed *dangerous, crazy and non-negotiable terrorists who only kill the people living in modernity and prosperity*, and negotiation in order to solve this problem, is seen as the collapse of the state's credibility in the presence of their public and even other states. Secondly, states believe in 'longest way round is the shortest way home'. This shortest way to solve terrorism is literally to fight against it, due to the relative success against local terror groups in the Cold War. Finally international terrorism is a result of globalization which made people closer and affairs easy, the same way as terrorists. As Huntingtonian paradigm asserts, new concept of the conflicts will be defined as *inter-civilizational*, so both parties have their own values and visions to shape the world. Thus, if this conflict is considered as the war of ideas, values or civilizations, better and realist understanding will be ensured within the path of the solving this problem. Although Huntingtonian paradigm naturally increases the tension among two rival parties, for our perspective Huntingtonian paradigm only provides better understanding to locate the existing situations, rather than to exacerbate the tension.

It cannot be said that there is no way to fight against this newly emerged terrorism. Morocco as our case study wisely understood the threat with its nature, features and the context. In 2003 religiously motivated terror squads hit the four main locations in Casablanca. These attacks forced the Kingdom to accelerate their already planned policy shifts. Nevertheless what Morocco, as it will be discussed in related chapters, has done was not brand new policies. Their strategy actually ensured *revitalization, reorientation, and reassertion* of her historical and traditional background. While Morocco was planning her strategy, sui generis traditional and religious values, doctrines have been taken into consideration. In other saying Morocco aimed to *bring back to good old days* through their

multifaceted counterterrorism (or more generally counter radicalization) strategies.

In sum, current methods based on military or intelligence measures are unfounded and outdated against Global Jihad. Homegrown terrorism is the key factor to consolidate this point. States can prevent implicit or explicit attacks against their homeland, through increasing border, maritime and airport security. Intelligence is also useful to prevent attacks. Yet, neither method is applicable to Homegrowns. They are already living between us, perhaps in the next door. Even they are not supporters of Global Jihad; people can change their minds in accordance with Jihadi ideas that are being spread through internet and publications. To cope with Global Jihad, first thing is people need to understand those terrorists are not mad. Rather they are excluded from society or even included but believing that they got less than what they deserved. Therefore their integration to the society through winning their hearts and minds must be accomplished.

This study aims at finding an answer the question; '*how states must fight against the idea or methodology of global terrorism as an unconventional threat in an unconventional ways'*. As a qualitative research which we have aimed at conducting, conceptualization of this study provides literature review, and specifically in *Jihad* sub-chapter primary sources have been used in order to create first-hand pure Jihad concept with reference the holy texts and the writings of leading scholars as well as the leaders of Global Jihadi Organizations. In other words Jihad will be assessed as Jihadi eyes rather than commentators' or academics'. As the second and third sub-chapters, Terrorism and Al Qaeda will be reassessed in accordance with experts' opinion through avoiding mainstream populist rhetoric. Second chapter of this study, Global War on Terror was revisited in more technical way; so to speak second chapter which answered '*what is global war on terrorism*' is one of the few parts of this study which employed quantitative methodology. As the peak of this study, case of Morocco constitutes a main body. Field researches, using numerous informants and participatory observation have been used in order to draw a frame for understanding what has

made Morocco unique. Aware of the unconventional nature of Al Qaeda-led Global Terrorism which is simply the idea and the methodology, there must be employed unconventional methods to respond in our perspective, and through this methodology, hypothesis below will be tested throughout following chapters.

Hypothesis: Counter terrorism strategies which assume the ideology and methodology as major threat and are planned having regard to the local conditions brings to a successful conclusion.

Organization of this study is as follow; the first chapter of this study was dedicated to conceptualization of the essential terms regarding to context that we planned to create; Jihad, (International) Terrorism and Al Qaeda. According to our perspective, Jihad and Terrorism concepts are in fact the different expression of the same notion. It will be discussed how they are perceived by different eyes. As the last concept of the chapter, Al Qaeda is considered as the combination of these two concepts. It must be noted in here, according to our point of view, Al Qaeda is a roof organization, an idea, symbol of global Jihad, therefore it will be assessed in different generations rather than specifying the name of local organizations or popular groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq or al-Dawla-Islamic State-Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. US-led GWOT will be mentioned, in terms of its philosophy *preemptive war doctrine*, in the second chapter. Up to the present what sorts of methods have been employed and how they failed will be simply evaluated within the context of preemptive war doctrine. As well as its critics regarding why they reached a stalemate. The third chapter will provide an answer for how states might unconventionally respond to this unconventional threat, in Moroccan case. This chapter constitutes the most substantial point of this study, because perhaps Morocco is the only country that employed counterterrorism strategies having regard to the essence of the threat and in line with their own specific needs and available means. How history, tradition, leadership, and professionalization of security forces of Morocco have not been neglected while multifaceted counterterrorism, more generally counter-radicalization strategy was being planned will be discussed in detail. Moreover in

the scope of our case study, we have experienced the privilege of being visiting international researcher at Al Akhawayn University in Morocco, as well as personal observation related to Moroccan counterterrorism strategy in daily life and in the eyes of everyman will be evaluated.

Theoretical Perspective

Science as a social practice requires consensus on objects regarding analysis, otherwise how different scientists can verify, falsify or check the results of the same research? Nevertheless in terrorism case, as a social phenomenon which is the object of scientific researches unfortunately it is not easy to say that we have a consensus related to its definition. There are hundreds of terrorism definitions which were made by lawyers, experts, academics and state officials, yet none of them brought full universal approval, because those involved in the definition process are mostly prone to dictate their moral judgments and political interests. Since terrorism is constructed concept, it is hard to reach a consensus on its definition. There is only broad concept of terrorism which cannot be denied by majority of scholars and experts. According to this broad definition, terrorism includes indiscriminate offense against civilians and properties in order to spread politically originated fear. Even this approach is problematic in some ways, because it stresses *civilians* or *civilian targets*. In that case the attack targeting to Pentagon in 9/11 was not terror attack due to Pentagon's status as the military target.

In parallel with the lack of definitional consensus, theoretical progress has been retarded in terrorism studies. Since there are numerous types of terrorism, widely approved theories are not in question. Most of the existing theories can only address one type of terrorism. Theories of terrorism originate from a highly diverse background. As Schmid notes (2011, p. 202) this background is comprised of international relations, political and military science, criminology, law, psychology, sociology, victimology, and communication studies.

Theories of terrorism must be comprehensive enough to include various types of terrorism and must be specific enough to evaluate every single specific aspects of the case. Nevertheless due to its variations, vagueness, and specific features of different cases it is almost impossible to create theories and hypothesis with broad validity (Schmid, 2011, p. 202)**.**

On the other hand, we, terrorism students can turn this *ontological crisis* into an opportunity. Lack of specific and internationally approved definition of terrorism ensures wider space for us to benefit from multidisciplinary approaches while we are maintaining our research. It releases the imagination and ability to use analogy and metaphors that the intention is to use more innovative and suitable form of study. Therefore in different cases terrorism was and is studied within the scope of different fields. In this study we use metaphor and analogy with respect to the counterterrorism in line with the principals, conditions and simply nature of the terrorism.

Despite decades old terrorism experience, state and security officials, as well as people are still not accustomed to this concept. Policy makers and counterterrorism units do no more than blaming terrorism and also fight back in warlike means. It is an undeniable fact that there are some groups that consider terrorism is a new strategy to reach political ends, although people still do not tend to evaluate as this way. In this study, as it will be mentioned following chapters, Al Qaeda aims at destroying any and all secular systems, in order to release people's conscious to choose divine order. This strategy is called Jihad, and the Terrorism is Jihad's modus operandi. So it is prudent to say that although terrorism and politics cannot be at the same room at the same time, Al Qaeda simply employs terrorism to reach political ends. It must be noted Colin Wight's (2015) point of view in here that the states' tendency to blame arbitrarily all sorts of political oppositions as terrorism. Once it is labeled as terrorism and approved, no one strive for understanding root causes of terrorism, rather as Benjamin Netanyahu claims it is simply confronted.

In this case, we must penetrate to the essence of the so-called *international* or *Islamist terrorism* which finds its moral and intellectual ground on an Islamic notion; *Jihad*. Main purpose of Jihad is to overthrow all secular systems and orders which distract people's minds, and let people alone with their moral compasses to choose divine order. In other words, Jihad is virtual concept. There is no single type of Jihad which we may point out. Since it aims at overthrowing the systems and the orders, any and all available means can be used in Jihad. Thus, Jihad is considered as the concept which is waged by most innovative means. Throughout the history Jihad has been waged by armies or weapons but it does not mean that it will be waged in the same way in contemporary world. The only principle which has not been changed in Jihad is to replace secular orders with divide order. In this sense, Jihad can be assumed as one of the tools of Islamic *alternative* modernity.

Salman Sayyid (2003) emphasized the modernity and Islam relations. Although Iranian revolution was revisited with the main lines in relevant chapter in this study, Sayyid stressed the importance of Iranian Revolution and Khomeini as the symbol of Islamic modernity. According to him, Islam was the only opposition movement which has not organized in line with Western-oriented ideas, and Khomeini was the breaking point as he has never referred to the Western values in his modernization project. He never mentioned harmony of Islam-democracy or socialism. He did not attempt to make a dialogue with Western discourses; rather he focused on virtues of Islam. According to Sami Zubaida (1989), Khomeini's Islamic modernity separates Modernity and West, as oppose previous attempts for modernization which were assumed as *Westernization* by majority of the reformers. In other words, from then on Khomeini-led Islamic modernization was the main challenge to the hegemony of Eurocentrism.

Although we have no intention to engage the details and discussions regarding to modernism, together with modernization issues there is another concept must be stressed in here. Following the end of the Cold War, World has

met the new concept; *Globalization*, as the victory of *free world* of the Cold War. The rise of the Internet and mobility were the key element of Globalization within the scope of our study. Globalization has made the world more connected big village. Augmentation of technology, diversification of communication channels, and easy access for transportation has been praised by people and states and as well as by Al Qaeda as the founder and executive body of Global Jihad.

Former CIA Bin Laden Unit director, Michael Scheuer should be regarded at this point. He is maybe the first person who perceives that Al Qaeda poses more different threat than ever before. In his various books, '*Through Our Enemies' Eyes (2002)*', '*Imperial Hubris (2004)*' and interviews he insistently asserts that Al Qaeda must be thought not as a terrorist organization, rather it must be assumed as an *ideology or methodology* which is incarnated as the most innovative corporation of the millennium. This is because various parts of this study, specific local organizations' names were not be emphasized; rather *Al Qaeda* as an idea was insistently stressed in line with our perspective. He claims that Bin Laden institutionalized the idea of *Jihad* which has been being evolved by various Islamic scholars in time. Despite Bin Laden was the founder and the leader of Al Qaeda, he was actually the re-founding father of the idea of Global Jihad through his strategic and intellectual formulations. Therefore in case defeat of Jihad in anywhere in the world would not cause the demise of Jihad. So long as the idea of Jihad maintains its presence in intellectual and methodological level, public support as the most important requirement would never be diminished. Scheuer (2002; 2004) innovatively asserts that real success of Al Qaeda originates from their harmony and consistency on their ideas as well as their flawless way of expressing these ideas and their *casus belli* which is propounded in order to realize their holy mission. It seems reasonable because in various textbooks, publications, speeches and magazines, majority of leading Jihadists call the faithful to attack the *systems* of Zionist and Crusaders. In other words it must be emphasized that the war of ideas is the form of this unconventional warfare. This vision is also echoed by Walid Phares. In his book titled '*The War of Ideas:*

Jihadism against Democracy (2008)' he evaluates global terrorism as the new way of politics. Jihad and democracy are assumed as antithesis of one another. Yet his ideas is the same of which were criticized by Scheuer due to its Islamophobic and demonizing orientations. In Scheuer's view, recreating Islamophobia and demonization of Muslims in the Western World would cause more and more free space for Jihad, because Al Qaeda intentionally points out that how Muslims suffer from Crusaders and Zionists, and lead them the way for participation to Jihad.

Al Qaeda indeed does not only target people or properties but also perhaps more importantly they directly hit the philosophy of the modern liberal nation state through using its benefits such as open society, freedom of expression and free roaming of people, products and thoughts. Al Qaeda as a methodology, attacks to the raison d'être of nation states which is protection of her citizens from external attacks. It is undeniable fact that Al Qaeda hit the civilians with several reasons such as revenge and retaliation. As opposed to popular belief, Al Qaeda does not only attack to civilians in order to compel their states to change their foreign policies. Rather, more importantly they attack to civilians to force them to question their states' own existence. Why should they pay taxes, obey the rules and vote for the government if the state is not able to provide a better conditions and security? Or what is the point of respecting existing order so long as they keep asking 'am I the next'. In other saying, apparently Al Qaeda paid attention to ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu's advices saying that attack to the heart of the enemies' philosophy by his weapon.

Another worth mentioning point is the flexible nature of Al Qaeda within the scope of Globalization. Al Qaeda-led Global Jihad wages hybrid war against existing socio-economic international order. While doing this, Al Qaeda has to cope with different sorts of threat including military intervention to the countries where they may find safe heaven. Accordingly they enjoy the benefits of Globalization. Al Qaeda quickly turned the crisis of loss of Afghanistan into an opportunity. They began to operate internet more effectively. Even it can be said

that Al Qaeda is the first and foremost non-state armed group that has used internet in the most effective ways from conveying messages to the recruitment campaigns. From then on, Global Jihad is not conducted by visible and central headquarter in anywhere in the World. Now liberal nation states have to face a threat from within.

Loss of Afghanistan proved that USA still had military supremacy, yet with reference to Charles Darwin, those creatures with adaptation would have been better suited to the natural conditions. Al Qaeda was not an exception and they quickly adapted themselves into the actual conditions. Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstorm mentioned the importance, potential and proven success of *leaderless* movements in their book named '*The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations (2006)*'. As it can be understood by the name of the book, their major point lays the differences between spider and starfish. Spider as an insect has eight legs which are controlled by the one head, it lives until it loses the head. On contrary starfish has no head with five legs, and chopping off one of the legs does not affect starfish vitally. They simply underline the significance of decentralized organizations. According to them, people have enough ability to maintain their affairs, missions and plans without any leaders to lead them. In their argument Wikipedia is one of the best examples. Everyone can input content whatever they want, and others can change it too, and Wikipedia has already proven its success as the biggest 'free encyclopedia'. Just like internet as a whole, there is no central unit on internet which manages it, on contrary it works as decentralized networks. According to Brafman & Beckstorm, Bin Laden has created internet-like, decentralized movement, in line with the requirements of the modern world. Al Qaeda better suited than states' security concepts.

Some scholars like Asafa Jalata (2016) are prone to label terrorism as "millennium's social cancer". Although this statement contains demonization of a certain group of people and it annihilates the opportunities to negotiate, in some respects cancer analogy provides a perfect point to draw a comprehensive understanding of the scope of the contemporary threat. In other words cancer

analogy can destroy mental and moral barriers and through materialization of terrorism it can provide crystal-clear view regarding the threat.

According to leading medical book, Robbins Basic Pathology, cancer is a genetic disease which is caused by DNA mutations that have been occurred dependently of acquired or environment-led traumas (Kumar, et al., 2012, p. 161). These genetic mutations are transferred to hereditarily daughter cells through *cytokinesis* (cellular division) and this sort of mutant cells behave in accordance with natural selection. Thus, as their outstanding ability to accommodate themselves into existing environment, they dominate the population. When these mutations are accumulated, cancer's distinctive characteristics are possessed by mutant cells/tissue. These characteristics are as follows; growth signals are become self-contained and they grow autonomously regardless of physiologic patterns, *growth inhibitors* are denied, due to the avoidance of *necrosis* (cell death) they are able to live under apoptosis conditions, by virtue of *unlimited replicative* (self-aligning) potential they are so to speak immortal, *angiogenesis* is cultivated in order to maintain the growth of cancer cells, growing ability to invade local tissues and further cells. This process resembles to contemporary terror threats on a large scale. Nevertheless considering terrorism as the cancer inevitably brings some other mental and moral barriers to penetrate the reasons and motivations of terrorism. Yet it does not mean that cancer metaphor must be quitted in order to abide authenticity of our perspective. Since this study is actually pertaining to counterterrorism, we can adjust cancer metaphor between *cancer treatment* and *counterterrorism.*

On the ground that cancer as a disease needs unconventional treatments as opposed ordinary diseases that can be treated and prevented by antibiotics such as typhus, tuberculosis, anemia and bacterial contaminations. Unconventional treatments such as *radiotherapy* and *chemotherapy* which are not only proper but also extremely harmful for those who fight against conventional diseases are applied in cancer cases. Global Jihad or Global Terrorism which have been similarly organized as unconventional concepts must be responded by

unconventional methods. In addition to this, as different types of cancer require different types of treatment, we cannot assert that one single type of counterterrorism strategy can defeat terrorism in anywhere in the World.

According to this approach, GWOT-like holistic and also reductionist counterterrorism campaigns cause more instability in the regions where terrorism is the major concern. Of course we do not reject the importance of global cooperation on terrorism, but it must not to reach the level of military intervention. In many Jihadi publishing, Muslims are called for duty in order to save Muslim land where is occupied by Crusaders and Zionists. In other saying military intervention legitimates Global Jihad in the eyes of Muslims whom are called for defending the realm. Non-interventionism, as Scheuer claims, would not end terrorism but it can diminish one of their reasons to call for Muslims to Jihad. Unconventional method on fighting against terrorism must consider the threat as an idea and find a solution to disrupt them. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom have done more harm than good; Al Qaeda lost her nest, safe heaven and training bases, but together with the destruction of the beehive (ironically Jihadi publications also use the same metaphor for the USA) Jihad spread across the world in different formations. Also these two huge operations destroyed central governments and ensure ungoverned zones and security vacuum for Jihadi groups.

The only mistake has been done by governments and people is not only blaming terrorism regardless its motivation and root causes. Moreover reductionism is another mistake that made counterterrorism efforts unfounded. As it was discussed in Chapter I, terrorisms and terrorists occurred in different contexts and even they differentiate as unique as fingerprints. Thus a successful counterterrorism strategy cannot be always feasible in anywhere else. For instance Moroccan religiously oriented successful counterterrorism strategies possibly are not applicable in another country. There are different components which are sui generis to the Kingdom. King and his talent and success to impose his hegemony, local religious axis, successfully maintained divide and rule politics, longevous

monarchy, deep Sufi tradition, and its geographically isolated location. Therefore what made Moroccan counterterrorism strategy successful is not promotion of Sufism, and endeavors for spreading tolerant values or preventing Salafi-Wahhabi ideas. Rather, Moroccan *way of thinking* made them prospering. Morocco assessed the threat together with its origin. Since Jihadi threat was naturally fed by Islamic notion of Jihad, the first and the most logical response was to understand what Jihad is. By doing so, it is prudent to avoid rhetorical discourses such as; '*this is not real Islam*', '*Jihad must be waged against our own nafs (self-desire) rather than killing people*', and '*they are not Muslim, rather they are someone's proxies'*. These are *ostrich-like* attitudes which ignore the reality. In order to create reasonable counterterrorism strategy, first thing is to perceive '*how they see themselves*', rather than '*how we see them'*. In many parts of the world, Jihad considered as the terror tactics; in certain degree it might be correct. Jihad is being conducted through terror tactics which aimed at spreading the fear within public sphere. Yet Jihad as a strategy for ultimate Islamic order is much more than this. Hence understanding the nature of Jihad, principles and its motivation must be stressed before launching a potentially successful counterterrorism strategy.

We might use theories originating from Jihadists' views. Yet this kind of theory making process will inevitably fail, because Jihadi literature is mostly based on ideological and religious matters in order to spread Jihad and recruit more and more *mujahedeen*. Considering current threat as an ideology and methodology provides more realist and rationalist view. Fighting against ideology and fighting against terrorists require different instruments and different strategies. In ideology case, we have almost five decades old Cold War experience; although USSR has been dissolved in 1991, there are still millions of people define their political view as socialism and even some states are still socialist. It means, just as it was stated in the famous movie named '*V for Vendetta (2005)*', "Ideas are bullet-proof". In order to fight against ideas we have to possess more attractive one. Yet in terrorism case, having more attractive idea does not sufficient. According to ordinary people in the Western World, their

political, social and moral values are the best for everyone. This is literally Eurocentrism or as Scheuer (2004) named imperial hubris. Al Qaeda turned into an invincible movement since their efforts for institutionalization and globalization of Jihadi methodology. There is no Islamist non-state armed group in the world without allegiance or reference to Al Qaeda. This is new way of modernization without materialism and the Western values.

CHAPTER 1

SUSBTANTIAL CONCEPTS

1.1) GLOBAL JIHAD

In order to draw a comprehensive framework and understanding pertaining to the global rising threat of Global Terrorism, it is important to profoundly discuss the definition, motivations and importance of Jihad. Known as an essential and controversial concept of Islam, Jihad will be revisited throughout this chapter and subsequent sub-chapters. This will be done by referring to works written by foremost Islamic scholars and ideologues who have been internalized by Jihadi groups, such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Abul A'la Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan Al Banna and Abdullah Azzam, as well as leaders of Jihadi organizations including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Suri. Our main goal in this chapter is to delineate what Jihad is and what it is not, what the basic assumptions are and how Jihad is identified as a lasting mission for all Muslims, through revelation of the ideas and interpretations that are framed and shaped by those most cited and inspired Islamic scholars mentioned above. Yet, due to the complexity of Jihad in terms of Islamic jurisprudence, this chapter is dedicated only to reveal limited number of Islamic scholars' and ideologues' vision on Jihad, rather than evaluating diversity of the works dealing with Jihad.

Despite numerous ongoing debates on Jihad, its nature, features and frames have already been defined and acknowledged by actively fighting groups in the field. Therefore, by describing Jihad similarly as Jihadi groups, it is

substantial to think in the same way and see the world through the same lens. The point to consider here is first to reckon jihad as a *strategy* to achieve eventual goals of Islam rather than a *tactic*. The second characteristic is its holistic, universal and abysmal approach and its last quality is its endless nature until all goals are fulfilled.

As a substantial concept of Islam, Jihad has gone through phases ever since the early years of Islam, and this evolution is still ongoing due to the flexible nature of Islamic principles and conjuncture**.** Islam allows for adjustment of its principles in line with current needs. For instance, despite "Greater Jihad" (striving against self-desires) remains unchanged, "Lesser Jihad" (striving against earthly systems through literally fighting), has been continuously reformed since its first application. So to speak, Jihad in the Soviet-Afghan War and Jihad in Syria are dramatically different. The most credible and recent proof of this evolution is in "electronic" and "individual" mediums of Jihad, which security institutions and decision makers have had to deal with recently. It is for this necessary reason that the evaluation of Jihad, its historical evolution, contributions and leaping events that have shaped global Jihad will be addressed in following sub-chapters.

1.1.1) Jihad: Motivation and Evolution

Jihad is one of the basic obligations of Islam which has been emphasized by Holy Qur'an and Prophet's *Sunnah* (prophetic tradition). As a *fardh* (inexcusable religious duty), Jihad was rendered as an obligation for all Muslims in 164 *ayah*, (verses) in Holy Qur'an (Islam-tr, 2007), such as:

"Indeed, those who have believed and those who have emigrated and fought in the cause of Allah - those expect the mercy of Allah. And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful." (Holy Qur'an, 2; 218)

"Or do you think that you will enter Paradise while Allah has not yet made evident those of you who fight in His cause and made evident those who are steadfast?" (Holy Qur'an, 3; 142)

"O you, who have believed, fear Allah and seek the means [of nearness] to Him

and strive in His cause that you may succeed." (Holy Qur'an, 5; 35)

These verses above indicate that not only is Jihad an essential and inexcusable duty for all Muslims but also it, as a religious duty, has supremacy over other religious duties. Besides those verses quoted above, Surat at-Tawbah and Surah al-Anfal were completely dedicated to portray Jihad and its principles.

Due to this crucial nature of Jihad which has been highlighted through 164 verses, all Islamic scholars explain and interpret Jihad differently. Nevertheless, in order to avoid unnecessary discussions to this study, only a limited number of scholars and their arguments will be discussed. For instance, it is an obligation to include Ibn Taymiyyah and his ideas regarding Jihad to depict how people find a cause to fight and die in the way of God.

Ibn Taymiyyah occupies an important position in the idea of Jihad as well as its history. He is one of the first *re-founding fathers* of this concept. There are several reasons that put him into the center of Jihad; he was born and grown up in a society where everyone neglects the realities; *bid'ah* (heresy) became the prominent characteristic of the era; Muslim lands were being attacked and invaded by Crusaders and Mongols; the existence of alliance between Shiite and invaders, and the corruption of administrators were threatening the unity of Islamic nation. In sum, his era was and is described as the most catastrophic period of Islam (Lewis, 1991). There was no independent and preponderant Caliph to organize resistance against those infidel invaders. Therefore, by means of his endeavors, he has been attributed as "a shining star into the sky covered with black clouds" (Vehdan, 2014, pp. 21-22). Until the invasion and collapse of Islamic Lands, Muslim nature could be defined as meek and obedient. Yet, following the collapse, this Muslim nature has been reshaped by a voluntarily coordinated resistance movement. The ideologue and the commander of this movement was Ibn Taymiyyah (Shahzad, 2011, pp. 221-222).

According to Shahzad (2011; p. 224) the ideological discourse of Al Qaeda begins with Ibn Taymiyyah's interpretations. His opinions have been

acknowledged as a resistance model in all of the Islamic World. He is the first person who carried out *Takfir* (excommunication) principles against Mongols aggressively, although they had already embraced Islam. However, Mongols decided to execute the dual judicial system; for individual affairs *Sharia* (Islamic Law); for economy, politics and public laws *Yasa* (Traditional Law) was operated (Zehra, 1988; Shahzad, 2011, pp. 222-223). It is for these reasons that Ibn Taymiyyah declared them infidel, and he pursued to organize armed resistance against any deviant rulers.

Taymiyyah focused on the explicit and implicit meaning of Jihad. Although classical Arabic has the concept of "Holy War" (حرب مقدسة), Jihad was not designated as Holy War (Lewis, 1991, p. 109). According to him, Jihad comes from the word stem *Juhd* which means struggle, power and strength. Consequently, Jihad intrinsically necessitates the conflict among two sides. Besides etymological perspective, Jihad has two main senses. The first one approves Jihad as a means for revealing power to replace falsity with the truth. The second one basically refers to the comprehensive nature of Jihad as well as what other Islamic scholars have corroborated: "amr bil maroof nahi anil munkar", enjoining good and forbidding wrong (al-Maududi, 1979, 1980; Shariati, 1993; Qutb, 2010, 2014a, 2014b; Taymiyyah, 2012; Vehdan, 2014; al-Suri, 2014; al-Zawahiri, 2015a; Qutb, et al., 2016; Laden, 2016).

Although Ibn Taymiyyah has turned to a new phase of Islamic movement in terms of Jihad, this concept has not been portrayed only by him. His prominent ideas served as a revival to Jihad in the form of a resistance movement in an era when *collapse* was the main characteristic. Yet, Jihad still needed new contributions to reach contemporary meaning, through ideas of the founding father of Jemaah Islamiyah in South Asia; Al-Maududi and the ideologue of Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood); Sayyid Qutb, as well as Palestinian Islamic Scholar Dr. Abdullah Azzam. They all have made contributions to Islam as a concept and Jihad in particular, by means of reconsideration of Jihad, Islam and the way of God.

Al-Maududi and Qutb, as scholars living in the same period, have focused on the social and political dimensions of Jihad. They literally transformed the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah into contemporary Islamic thought, and through their contributions Islamic discourse, could able to contain socialism, secularism and democracy (Shahzad, 2011, p. 224). Despite Al-Maududi's peaceful struggle in the way of God, his ideas about Islam are comprehensive and holistic. Al-Maududi's most substantial contribution to the literature is to reformulate the relations among religion and Islam. He has rejected the postulated concept of Islam, which was mostly referred to as a Western way of understanding of religion (al-Maududi, 1979). According to him, Islam is completely different from other religions that were considered as the compilation of religious rituals and spiritual values. Just as Ibn Taymiyyah had done with Jihad, Al-Maududi has also performed in-depth analysis of the word *Deen* (religion) in line with Arabic grammar. Referencing his findings from related verses, *Deen* has been used in compatible with four basic means (al-Maududi, 1979, pp. 37-39):

1) Dominance and Sovereignty
2) Obedience
3) Intellectual and practical order under the sovereignty
4) Reward and punishment given by the order.

In al-Maududi's interpretation, *Deen* is "the supreme dominance that is embraced, submitted and obeyed by people" (al-Maududi, 1979, p. 40). In sum, his concept for Deen includes sovereignty, submission, rules and order, and judgment and punishment. Therefore, Al-Maududi's Deen corresponds with more than a religion which was accepted as compilation of rituals and spiritual values. Although his view resembles the concept of *State*, even Deen is much more than State, because state as a modern secular institution does not contain religious dimensions.

Al-Maududi's Deen requires rebellion against established order(s) except Islam. Considering Islam as an *order* rather than *worships* legitimizes and necessitates the *revolutionary struggle* to reach an ultimate goal: setting up Islam

as the only supreme order (al-Maududi, 1980). Therefore, Islam first and foremost wants to destroy all systems that were established by people, in order to fulfill the divine order described in the Holy Qur'an: "And fight them until there is no fitnah and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah (8; 39)" (Qutb, 2010). In accordance with this verse, Islam or in Al-Maududi' words, revolutionary movement, rejects all geographical and national borders. The world belongs to God and the order must be God's. Jihad is the strategy of this revolution, in compatible with its meaning, "struggle" (Qutb, et al., 2016, pp. 241-242).

As the strategy to carry into practice *the revolution*, Jihad only aims at revolutionizing existing orders, rather than individuals or nations, because what really matters in Islam is Faith. *Millah* (Nation) is constituted by those who embrace Islam and pursue the way of God (al-Maududi, 1979, 1980; Qutb, et al., 2016). Jihad is conducted only against *Taghut* (cross the limits, overstep boundaries of God's order), and Taghut is any and all systems and orders that do not recognize the principles and borders designated by Islam (Qutb, et al., 2016, p. 88). Whoever resists against Jihad becomes a potential target engaged in violence, regardless of being an individual or non-combatant, because Jihad as a strategy is aimed at destroying anyone who tries to stop Islamic advancement (Taymiyyah, 1999, p. 159). Since Jihad is waged only against systems and/or orders, it was not allowed in the years of Mecca because Muslims had been tortured by their own families and Meccan elites, rather than by established orders whom have practiced suppression. Jihad has been allowed and ordered by God, only after *Hijrah* (emigration) (Vehdan, 2014). In other words Islam and its revolutionary strategy, Jihad, are not incarcerated in between God and believers within the wall of the mosques. Rather, Islam is claimed to designate daily life as a whole; including political, social and economic dimensions. Since Islam is the order, Jihad does not target individuals or nations to be demolished, so long as they maintain their neutrality.

In parallel with al-Maududi's anti-system-based Jihadist perception, Sayyid Qutb has also underlined the anti-system nature of Islam and Jihad. Islam

rejects all earthly systems and orders but itself (Qutb, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, Qutb, et al., 2016). As a mean for reaching the ultimate objective of Islam, Jihad does not having the aim of exploitation of resources, so-called colonial enthusiasm or expanding the geographical borders. The only condition to pursue Jihad is to be dedicated to the victory of God. According to him from the early beginning, Islam has had only one aim and one way to pursue: rescuing people from tyrannies in favor of God's will. In other words, Islam and its mean Jihad are aimed at destroying all systems that are defined as tyranny in the world, in order to create the right path of God. In doing so, it targets only systems rather than people and this struggle will last until the only system in the World is for Islam (Qutb, 2010).

In addition, Sayyid Qutb has clinched an argument on the defensive-oppressive side of Jihad. According to him (2016, pp. 37-38), dividing Jihad into defensive and oppressive side is completely anomalous in its nature. Since Jihad strategically reaches the ultimate goal of Islam, which is to destroy all systems and orders, it inevitably carries a revolutionary side against established orders. Since Islam is not a dull cult of rituals, it cannot be shuttered into nation-based borders (Qutb, et al., 2016, p. 146). Only if Islam is considered as religion in sense of western terms, Jihad can be counted as a form of defensive war.

Ibn Taymiyyah, Sayyid Qutb and al-Maududi are re-founding fathers of Jihad, yet only Ibn Taymiyyah was able to engage Jihad in terms of actual fighting. Al-Maududi and Qutb were only ideologues and galvanizers for Jihadi groups by readjusting the concept of Jihad. As it will be analyzed in the next chapter, 1979 is the most crucial year of Jihadi thought. Until 1979, Islamic scholars and ideologues were mostly deprived of observing battlefield and its requirements. Unlike others, Dr. Abdullah Azzam is the first scholar who has personally experienced Jihad by serving on the front line in Afghanistan in modern times (McGregor, 2003, p. 98).

Dr. Abdullah Azzam contributed a militant and international interpretation

of Jihad and was the ideologue and commander of Afghan mujahedeen against Soviet invasion in the 1980s. Moreover, Dr. Azzam personally inspired Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to establish the future group, Al Qaeda (Scheuer, 2002). He underlined the prophet's process which leads to Jihad; *Hijrah*, *Ribat* (deployment of the front-lines of Islamic Lands) and *Jihad* (Azzam, 2001). This drafted process has been mentioned in Osama bin Laden's book, '*On Way of Jihad (2016)*'. His legacy is to globalize Jihad through re-emphasizing the principles of Jihad: rescuing Muslim lands by Muslim hands from infidel's domination (Azzam, 2008). According to Azzam (2001), currently Jihad is fardh 'ayn, therefore every Muslims should engage in Jihad until the Muslim lands are rescued. In other words, there is no difference between fasting, praying and Jihad. In a nutshell, Azzam's perspective on Jihad has been broadened towards praising its transcendent importance, such as prioritizing Jihad over other religious duties, and globalization of Jihad through neglecting nation-based borders.

1.1.2) the Year of Watersheds: Significant Cases in 1979

Islamic Revival and its fructus, Jihad, are not recent phenomena. There are several periods when Muslims stand and fight against Taghut, in accordance with their beliefs. As it was mentioned previously, Ibn Taymiyyah was the pioneer of Jihad in the 13-14th century. The other significant year regarding Islamic Revival and Jihad is 1979, due to the occurrence of three symbolic events that have shaped modern Islamic Revival and Jihad to certain dimension. These consist of the Iranian Revolution, the Afghan-Soviet War and the Grand Mosque Seizure in Mecca.

Although Islamic Revival is a matter of Sunni tradition, the Iranian Revolution, as a revolutionary movement, constitutes the most dramatic milestone of Islamic Revival in modern history (Antoun, 2001, p. 94). Broad political dissent ranged from the extreme left to religious elements that have coalesced to take over the Shah Regime. These anti-Shah forces were mobilized and led by Ruhollah Khomeini, who was an exiled Iranian cleric living in France (Halliday, 2009). Following two conflicting and bloody years, anti-Shah forces took control

of the state. Nevertheless, Islamist elements could be able to override others and the revolution was caused by the declaration of Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the most important cases in the late 1970s. It caused so many substantial reformations in inter-bloc relations, that even its effects can be witnessed today (Newell, 1982). The presence of a tribal and feudal-based social structure had created a turbulent, political atmosphere in Afghanistan. Therefore, especially in the 1970's, there were a lot of coups and foreign interventions to affect politics in the country. Following the fall of Mohammed Zahir Shah, Mohammed Davud, Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal came into power through Soviet assistance and support. These included the Soviet armed forces against Muslim guerilla fighters, who stood against Soviets and the current Afghan regime (Sander, 2012, pp. 563-565).

The Soviet-Afghan war is considered as the first Jihad in the modern World history (Azzam, 2008; al-Zawahiri, 2015a; Laden, 2016). For the first time, a Muslim nation stood against infidels in a decade-old war, providing a base for Islamic Revival. The Soviet-Afghan War was also a useful mean for Muslim States that were already suffering from radical Islamic threats within their homeland. Moreover, these states arranged cheap flights to Pakistan for their radical elements who aimed to join Jihad (Scheuer, 2002). According to Scheuer (2004), these states planned to purge radical elements from within their borders and were also expected to be on the side of the USA, which rivaled the Soviets.

Another significant event that shaped the Islamic Resistance was the Grand Mosque Seizure, which was mostly overlooked. Ostensibly, this case is a matter of the Muslim World, rather than an incident affecting the general globe. However, its reasons, ways of solving the problem and outcomes have influenced the World. However there are very few academically oriented sources on the Seizure of *Qaba,* (Grand Mosque). The rest of the sources were published by Muslim dissidents, and those publications either praise as *Holy Mutiny* or curse as

Khawarij (the Outsiders). The Wall Street Journal's columnist and senior correspondent, Yaroslav Trofimov's '*The Siege of Mecca; the 1979 Uprising at Islam's Holiest Shrine (2007)*' is the most comprehensive book regarding this case. Therefore, his book is considered as the main resource for this particular incident in this study.

Juhayman al-Otaibi was a former Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) which was not connected to chain of command under the General Staff, and they were incompatible with military discipline. Therefore, soldiers had more free times as opposed to military forces. Juhayman attended Islamic lectures by Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, who defended the idea of not only the purification of Mecca and Medina, but also the **"**purification of entire Arabic Peninsula from infidels." These ideas created and defended by him have provided a basis for bin Laden's Al Qaeda. In the following years, Juhayman was able to advance in the movement called Salafiya al Mohtasiba. Yet he was not satisfied with the current situation in the Muslim World in general. He shaped his ideological dimensions through ibn Baz's thoughts but he could not perceive the huge gap between "what it should be and what it is". Herewith Juhayman created his own fraction and began to reject the legitimacy of the Saudi Kingdom since 1977, because Saudi family was not fulfilling the conditions to undertake the holy mission, which is leading the Muslims (Trofimov, 2007, pp. 40-43).

November 20, 1979 is marked as Juhayman and his followers' so-called *holy raid to Qaba*. This date was deliberately chosen, because it was the day of the New Year the in Islamic calendar, Muharram 1, 1400. Juhayman and his followers suddenly appeared with a so-called *Mahdi* (rightly guided one) in Qaba' and seized control of the complex for two weeks. They were heavily armed and conducted their flawlessly planned raid. Saudi Arabian authorities locked down communication between the country and the World, which is the reason why there are not many reliable sources present regarding this issue. Nevertheless, the Kingdom had to have religious permission to use force in the holy complex. They negotiated with Ulama and Ulama addressed the *Fatwa* (legal opinion) to allow

the Kingdom to use violence. According to Trofimov (2015, p. 109), this negotiation has been concluded with the Kingdom's compliance with Juhayman's ideas, because Juhayman has been indoctrinated by ibn Baz who was actually a member of Ulama. Those propounded conditions included banning women on TVs, halting liberalization process, and spending Saudi petro-dollars to spread Islamic values across the globe.

Saudi Arabian security forces were not prepared for such an uprising. Therefore, they needed to be assisted. Saudi officials immediately asked for professional assistance from the French GIGN (Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale), and the uprising was quashed in cooperation with their equipment and instructions (Trofimov, 2007, pp. 197-206). Despite Trofimov's and GIGN members' allegations, almost all websites acknowledge that the foreign armed forces' direct involvement in Holy places was actually forbidden for non-Muslims. According to another contradictory and humiliating claim, Saudi Arabian and foreign security forces, including CIA and GIGN, pumped water into the compound and then electrocuted it (Oruç, 2013).

Besides the controversial nature of the course of events, this incident had irreversibly damaged the reputation of the Saudi regime. Consequently, a lot of emotional youngsters, including Osama bin Laden, began to lose their loyalty to the Kingdom. Thus, two decades later, Osama bin Laden demonized the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia due to their tolerance of the presence of non-Muslim forces in Saudi Arabian land.

In sum, the year of 1979 constitutes as the most significant date in the history of Islamic Revival and Jihad. Although one of them is not pertaining to Sunni tradition-based Islamic Revival, using these three cases as an archetype symbolize three different scenarios in the context:

1) The Iranian Revolution symbolizes seizing control from a state by Muslims through an uprising. In other words, Islamic principles came into power at a state level for the first time in modern history.

2) The Afghan-Soviet War constitutes as the first encountering of Muslim forces and infidels, based on religious reasons. Jihadists coming from all over the World have created Jihadi networks in Afghanistan (Scheuer, 2002; Byman & Williams, 2015).
3) The Grand Mosque Seizure, though it caused crucial disagreements, demonstrates how individuals can rebel against their deviated leaders. In other words, it is the first example of questioning the limits of obedience to the leader in modern history.

In conclusion, although it has a synonym in classical Arabic language, Holy Qur'an did not prefer to use "Holy War" instead of Jihad (Lewis, 1991, p. 109). Seeing Jihad as a Holy War is a mistake according to Jihadi scholars. Jihad does not only literally mean fighting to the victory, but it is also defined as an everlasting struggle to establish Islamic order through the destruction of other established systems (al-Maududi, 1980). Jihad has a complex history, which reflects that it evolved in accordance with the changing socio-political necessities of the actual World (Euben, 2002, p. 21). The Qutbian interpretation of Islam and Jihad was caused by the devastating cases, which took place in the 1960s (Knudsen, 2003, p. 2). In line with the latest political developments, Muslims today are rereading and reassessing the textual sources of Islam in the new conjuncture (Mandaville, 2001). For instance, Jihad has been declared fardh 'ayn for all Muslims, not only because of Islam's dual worldview, *Dar al Harb* (Land of War), and *Dar al Islam* (Land of Peace/Islam) (Lia & Skjølberg, 2001, p. 14), but because there is also an ongoing war between Muslims and infidels in every single inch of the World (al-Zawahiri, 2015b). For this reason, to properly understand Jihad, it is an undeniable fact that Jihad should be taken into consideration in the same way as those of Jihadi groups, rather than those of mediate Islamic Scholars.

1.2 TERRORISM

Terrorism has been shaping the national and international security environment, in accordance with the rise of non-state armed groups' threats as opposed to previous era's state-centric threats. Security concepts in the Cold War were quickly reformed based on new striking events. The September 11th attacks, which were staged by Al Qaeda, have not only rendered a more restrictive security environment, but they also marked a key turning point in international politics (Carpenter & Wiencek, 2005, p. 5; Bellamy & Bleiker, 2008; Duyvesteyn & Malkki, 2012). Following the 9/11 attacks, the US National Security Strategy (2002) clearly indicated that the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries must be adapted. In other words, existing security concept were profoundly changed (Lang, 2009). As Brian Jenkins (1980, p. 1) asserted in his report for RAND Corp., terrorism has become part of our daily news diet. Indeed, the most outstanding threat is the institutionalization of terrorism for the era we live in (Napoleoni, 2014). Terrorism in the contemporary world is far more global, brutal, mortal, well-motivated, organized, reckless and imminent than terrorism in previous periods.

Terror, although used as a modus operandi, dates back to Zealots, Sicariis, and Hasan-i Sabbah and his followers. The term was used for the first time in post-French revolution period among 1793-1794, also known as *La Terreur* (Laqueur, 1974). During La Terreur, Terrorism was practiced by the state (Blöcher, 2011), as opposed to contemporary widespread tendencies claiming terrorism as a weapon of non-state elements (Sandıklı, 2015, p. 122), and *weapon of weak* (Crenshaw, 1981; Bergesen & Lizardo, 2004; Goodin, 2006; Schmid, 2011).

In Jerrold Post's (2007, p.10) words, we, as the target of terrorists, are not able to deter them; at least, in a basic level, terrorists must be understood in terms of their motivations and psychology. In order to understand and defeat terrorism, the definition of terrorism is remarkably substantial. Despite great efforts being

dedicated towards terrorism studies, there is no consensus about the most crucial issue that has to be dealt with: how to define terrorism (Jenkins, 1980; Jenkins, 1985; Tacar, 1999; Crenshaw, 2008; Sinai, 2008, p. 9; Wight, 2015). Additionally, this issue has boomed so much for years that academic literature has been created about it. Currently, in terms of terrorism studies, there is an independent research field based on definitional problem, e.g. (Ruby, 2002; Garrison, 2004; Novotny, 2004; Schmid, 2004). However, having no internationally agreed upon definition of terrorism does not indicate an absence of terrorism definition. States, including different branches of the states, NGOs, Regional and Global Organizations, academics, and experts have created their own definitions in accordance with their needs, priorities and worldviews. In order to indicate how various definitions of terrorism have already been delineated, Alex P. Schmid (2011, pp. 99-148) provided a compilation of more than 250 different definitions in his book. Usually, these descriptions are either too general, or lack historical specificity, and they are not comprehensive enough to include the essence or features of all sorts of terrorism (Jalata, 2016, p. 11) or they are as specific as to overlook the other details. There is another fact that the grey zone issues, different types of terrorism have no strict borders that clearly separate them from another. Although there lacks a precise and comprehensive definition of terrorism, all sorts of terrorism have some characteristics in common: political purpose, awe, threat, widespread negative effects on public, anarchism, organized actions, seeking international support, and fundraising (Ganor, 2001; Carpenter & Wiencek, 2005; Fletcher, 2006; Sinai, 2008; Onay, 2009; Sandıklı, 2015).

Lack of precision of universally accepted definition sparks off liberal construction in terms of meaning therefore terrorism is sometimes treated as an ideology like anarchism or psychopathologic disorders like sadism (Goodin, 2006, p. 32). It must be noted that the definition of terrorism, although it has scientific dimension, is highly hinged on the definer's political and moral background, the same prevailing in certain degrees for international relations as a whole

(Arıboğan, 2007). In terrorism, there is an idiom formulated by Menahem Begin and used by almost everyone: “one man’s terrorist, another man’s freedom fighter”. As it was mentioned before, the lack of consensus on definition is the biggest hurdle for decision makers. If we consider terrorism as not something to be negotiated but rather something to be defeated (Netenyahu, 1995), then agreeing upon definition would not be necessary, despite the persisting existence of the *fighting against what or who* question. However, there is still another issue regarding the definition terrorism: who will have the defining power? Will it be the terrorists themselves, the victims, the media, governments, or regional and international organizations? Or, as Schmid asks (2011, p. 41), “religious leaders who claim to be in possession of truth?”. Schmid (2011) emphasizes the subjectivity of the terrorism definitions through the use of quotations from J. V. Witbeck and J. Bowyer Bell: “Perhaps the only honest and workable definition of terrorism is an explicitly subjective one: violence I do not support” and “Tell me what you think about terrorism, I will tell you who you are.”

It is an undeniable fact that the lack of a precise definition creates some benefits for politicians, in addition to maleficence. Just like using *security* as a concept, elusiveness provides additional room for maneuver. Moreover, yesterday’s terrorists can become future political leaders or presidents, just like Nelson Mandela (Tacar, 1999; Onay, 2009).

Brian M. Jenkins (1980), Kapitan & Schulte (2002) and Colin Wight (2015) laid emphasis on the importance of political nature of the utilization of terrorism on the ground that the use of the term terrorism is as powerful as political weapon as terrorism itself. According to Jenkins (1980), Kapitan & Schulte (2002) and Wight (2015), to impeach someone of terrorism not only specify the sort of political violence, but it also stigmatizes and de-legitimizes motivations, reasons and methods that led to terrorism. Eventually, this remark leads to a theorem’s well-accepted claim: terrorism cannot be explained or negotiated but simply has to be confronted. The reason behind this theorem is the idea of the modern state itself, because according to Wight, (2015) terrorism

cannot be perceived without considering the modern state, political violence and alternative forms of non-violent demonstrations against the modern state. These phenomena are correlated to one another and stem from the birth of the modern state- "every constitutional order provoke an unprecedented form of violence," just like terrorism as the output of a modern political system (Onuf, 1989; Bobbitt, 2002, p. 548).

At this point, it is important to discuss what is political violence and to what extent it resembles terrorism. Wilkinson (1997, p. 63) claims that violence targeting the state is political violence. Decision makers, experts and academics are therefore usually prone to describing terrorism as political violence. However, despite the correlation among terrorism and political violence, the latter is much wider than the former (Tacar, 1999; Schmid, 2011). Political violence includes hunger strikes, looting, internment, hate crimes, vigilantism, rioting, violent repression of peaceful demonstrations, warlordism, arbitrary arrests, mutilation, assassination, invasion, interstate aggression, ethnocide, civil war, et cetera. Although those are also within the scope of terrorism, it is not sufficient and wise to equate terrorism to political violence (Schmid, 2011, pp. 5-6). Moreover, defining terrorism which is narrow concept with a political violence which is broader concept is not methodologically feasible and reasonable.

It can be claimed that the modern state emerged from violence. From a Weberian state perspective, the unique and legitimate monopoly on violence belongs to the state which is derived from violence (Weber, 1965). In other words, violence and the modern state are inextricably tied (Wight, 2015). Thus, states tend to stigmatize any kind of use of violence perpetrated by non-state elements as terrorism, and consider that these violent acts are to challenge the state. In order to remain as state, those have to be perished (Jenkins, 1980).

Following the collapse of the USSR, terrorism and its ontology have been transmuted. On contrary to previous époques of terrorism, the importance and decisiveness of ideological confrontations has lost its respectability (Khan, 2006).

According to Asafa Jalata (2016, p. 10) the new nature of terrorism entails a "self or group centered, narrow perspective by ignoring reality that terrorism is a social cancer". The cancer metaphor is highly relevant at this point. As it was discussed in the theory chapter, terrorism in our world resembles cancer in terms of origin, organization, induction, function and effects on the body.

While Jalata was describing the new nature of terrorism, he also contributed to the debates on the so-called *new terrorism*, which is already drawing attention among terrorism experts (Duyvesteyn, 2004; Crenshaw, 2008; Bolanos, 2012; Duyvesteyn & Malkki, 2012; Wight, 2015). According to Duyvesteyn (2012) and Wight (2015), in case of the lack of widely accepted definition of terrorism, debating on new terrorism is not reasonable. However it is an undeniable fact that terrorism, in line with its nature, changes over time and its last transformation dates back to the early 1990s. In this study, we are prone to call it as *international terrorism* or *internationalization of terrorism*, rather than *new terrorism*. Yet, the meaning of international terrorism has tremendously changed itself. In his report prepared for the US Air Force, Brian M. Jenkins (1985, p. 4) stated that international terrorism is simply cross-border terrorism. Yilmaz Altuğ (1989) assumed the presence of three pre-conditions in international terrorism: violence against foreigners, violence perpetrated by external cliques and states, and violence perpetrated in order to affect International Organizations' decisions. Suat Ilhan (2000) emphasized five dimension of international terrorism. According to Ilhan, international terrorist organizations are operating in more than one country, can be different organizations having same purposes in the same country, might be operating in one country due to its effects of terrorist actions' global impact, target humanity, and finally receive support from abroad. On the other hand, as time went by, international terrorism has found its current meaning, in Scheuer's (2002; 2004) and Sandler & Enders' (2011) holistic and comprehensive view. International terrorism should be considered like the international business sector, as terrorism is incorporated and globalized. Therewithal, international terrorism, in line with the view of the author's of this

study, is in fact an idea that keeps people together, and inspires and trains them against the common enemy. This enemy does not necessarily have to be a person, state or organization, but rather a system and order. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, international terrorism seems and works as *franchisor multinational companies*. Just as what the explicit and broadly accepted definition of terrorism lacks, there is no international consensus on the definition of international terrorism and who are these international terrorists. Yet, through the reemergence of political Islam (Wight, 2015), specifically the rise of Islamic State, Al Qaeda and its affiliate organizations (Cockburn, 2015), the international community tends to define Jihadi groups as international terrorist organizations and their campaigns as international terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Perlmutter, 2003; Stern, 2004).

Regarding international terrorism, another issue worth mentioning is the debate in respect to the role of religion. Juergensmeyer (2003), Jones (2008) and Selengut (2008) consider that religiously motivated terror is the dominant form of contemporary terrorism. On the other hand, some other experts do not prefer to attach particular importance to this concept (Pape, 2006; Jackson, et al., 2011). While they believe that the religion is the most substantial motivation in international terrorism, religion also cannot be the only one cause of violence.

Five major waves of terrorism can be assumed in world history, although it is not reasonable to distinct one wave another due to the intertwined nature of contemporary terrorism (Tacar, 1999; Rapoport, 2004; Onay, 2009; Sandıklı, 2015, pp. 122-126). The first wave, also known as the *Anarchist Wave*, begun in the post-industrial revolution period in light of anarchist ideologues such as Bakunin, Nachaev, and Kropotkin in Russia. The most famous victim of this wave is US President, William McKinley, who was shot dead by Leon Czolgosz in 1901. Throughout this wave, terrorists strived to destroy established order. The second wave of terrorism, the *Ethnic Wave*, was fed by the ideas of the French Revolution as well as nation state and anti-colonial movements originating from World War I. In this period, terrorist organizations used the terms freedom wars

and guerilla fighters in order to hide their modus operandi and bring political legitimization to terrorism. The third, *Ideological Wave* or *New Left Wave*, was sourced from the Cold War, which was divided into socialist-liberal ideas, states and non-state groups. The Vietnam War, 68 Movements, and the USA and the USSR assistances enabled them to grow, spread and rise (Rapoport, 2001). Specifically, as Jerrold M. Post (2007) highlights, Frantz Fanon's book named '*The Wretched of the Earth (1961)*' ensured ideological and intellectual background for leftist terrorist organizations. Through courtesy of the ideological wave, terrorists proposed an alternative order against established order. Besides, in this period, terrorist incidents sharply increased in quantities and casualties because both Camps employed them as *proxies* in order to avoid the unbearable costs of conventional and eventually unconventional wars under the Mutually Assured Destruction (Pinker, 2011). The *Religious Wave* arose following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Yet, the Religious Wave does not only signify Islam as the unique religion that relies on terrorism, despite the most significant leaping performance belongs to Islam. In this period, religious-based Aum Shinrikyo of Japan staged the Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack. In this wave, terrorists were proposing alternative global orders. Finally, the fifth wave of terrorism is *Cyber Wave*, which dates back to the rise of technology in our daily lives. Rising communication technologies, specifically the internet, help exacerbate the terror risk. Al Qaeda associated/affiliated/inspired groups or individuals are to operate the internet as a channel for conveying their messages, indoctrinate their recruits and know-how sharing regarding explosive materials, just as Aum Shinrikyo did (Onay, 2009, p. 57; Jenkins, 2011; Byman, 2015). Nevertheless, assuming Cyber Wave as the fifth may be deceptive, because it is a far more auxiliary trend in terrorism rather than an independent wave.

Terrorism is not a static strategy or tactic, it changes along with the course of events, as well as the change of social and political events. Therefore, forming typologies of terrorism which has already no widely accepted definition, seems impossible. In addition to lack of consensus on definition, there are three potential

drawbacks indicated by Colin Wight (2015). First of all, once typologies are developed, it brings a tendency to tailor every reality into these patterns. Secondly, since typologies ease the complicated issues, decision makers may exploit them as an academic justification in order to reach their political purposes. Finally, besides typologies' roles as facilitator in complicated issues, they also can cause oversight and distort our understanding. Despite the very existence of these drawbacks, in order to form clear perception, it may be mentioned that several typologies of terrorism exist. According to Schmid (1983), terrorist organizations might fit into one of these typologies, as well as be categorized into a combination of a few. In his book, Alex P. Schmid (1983) indicated these typologies as it was shown below:



Figure 1

Also Terrorism, as a concept, can be evaluated and interpreted in various categories such as crime, politics, warfare, communication, and crusade/jihad (Schmid, 2004). Yet, according to Schmid (2004, p. 2), these views do not necessarily have to be strictly separated from one another, so a certain act of terrorism can bear resemblance to both state supported and religious versions.

Terrorists' motivations are various, just as there are different types of

terrorism. These inclinations include revenge, threats, propaganda, overreaction, disruption of peace process, martyrdom, elimination of dissidents, and so on (Schmid, 2011). Terrorists employ numerous tactics in order to pursue their purposes. These have been reckoned in Schmid's Terrorism Research Handbook (2011) as follows: revealing of death lists, punishment and mutilation, sexual assaults against the women in opposite camp, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, assassination, indiscriminate assaults on people, beheading, arson, vehicle and suicide bombing, mass poisoning and the use of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear).

It was said that terrorists were *mad-men* following the September 11th attacks due to the broad traumatic effect of the attacks on the public. However, many experts and academics assert that this approach to terrorism and terrorists were originated from fallacy, e.g. (Crenshaw, 1981; Wilkinson, 1997; Bjørgo, 2004; Carpenter & Wiencek, 2005; Post, 2007). According to Jerrold M. Post (2007, p. 4) terrorist organizations are rational actors and terrorists, on contrary to general opinion, are not mentally or psychologically unstable. Terrorist organizations regularly screen out their members' mental conditions, because they might pose threats to their own group. Moreover terrorist organizations pursue well-planned road maps which take them to success. On the other hand, Max Abrahms (2008), in his article named '*What Terrorists Really Want?*' contributed to the debate of *terrorists as rational or irrational actors*. He asserts seven point puzzles against the *terrorists are rational* argument. According to these counter arguments, terrorists, despite never having achieved their political goals through attacking non-combatant, continue to attack them. Terrorists do not employ terrorism as the last resort. Rather, they prioritize attacking civilians. They reflexively refuse compromise proposals offered by the states. Terrorists groups have a protean nature; they change their demands over time. Terrorists conduct anonymous attacks in order to prevent the target state's political concessions. They are mostly fratricide; they fight one another more than they fight against the target state. Terrorist groups resist resolving after they failed or succeeded; never

ending terrorism is employed by them (Abrahms, 2008, pp. 89-93).

Terrorism relies mostly on countries and regimes where legal propaganda methods are forbidden or restricted (Tacar, 1999; Schmid, 2011). In line with this claim, Schmid (2011) asserts that terrorism might be used as a communication channel to impress one audience or reach others who otherwise would not pay attention to peaceful demonstrations. Therefore, it can be said that terrorism is not only killing civilians because terrorists generally are not aware of whom is going to be killed and there is no formal link between purpose of terrorism and victims (Tacar, 1999). Nonetheless, terrorism is also an intrusion of menace into daily life, the insecurity of public spheres, and an endless coerciveness of preventive measures, to reach its targeted political goals (Walzer, 1988; Netenyahu, 1995).

The literature on terrorism studies, unfortunately, does not focus much on terror as a state of mind. Before anything else, the act of terror is a collective and individual threat which causes strong emotional reactions. Besides, its psychological result aims at creating deep fear (Schmid, 2011, pp. 2-3). Interestingly enough, terrorism has wider psychological dimensions than a warlike or political one. Terror is a natural phenomenon and terrorism deliberately exploits it (U.S. National Advisory Committee, 1976, p. 3). In Schmid's (2011) view, terrorists are playing with our deep fears originating from our animal instincts, and they seek to increase our concerns that are evoked by uncertainty. How is the success of this method monitored? In Schmid's words, the answer is if people ask will I be the next, it indicates that terror has succeeded. In order to support this view, terrorism experts and academics formulated the first *pillar of terrorism* which dates back to early ages: Kill one, frighten ten thousand (Schmid, 2011; Prunckun, 2014).

In conclusion, terrorism is an act of political violence that is planned clandestinely, performed publicly. Terrorism aims at not only damaging security forces and state institutions in general, but also provoking deep fears through directly and indiscriminately attacking civilians. The State, in principle, has to

protect its fellow citizens in line with its *raison d'être*. Yet, terrorism directly targets at the heart of its philosophy just as Sun Tzu advised in his famous '*Art of War*'. Through the use of violence, those who employ terrorism aim not only at damaging the state militarily or politically, but also affecting the community psychologically. If daily routines are changed due to the terror threats, it simply means the terrorists have succeeded and terrorism is a useful mean in reaching political goals.

1.3 Al QAEDA

Following the brief assessment of Jihad and Terrorism concepts by means of pioneering and frequently cited works in these fields, now Al Qaeda and its associated organizations, as well as individuals, will be perceived accurately, and their markedly different natures from other non-state armed elements. This chapter is vital because Al Qaeda has been posing its sui generis newly emerging threats to the international security for almost two decades. It is unique because since this organization is not necessarily an organization, rather a methodology or an idea (al-Suri, 2014). It has an extremely flexible nature as opposed to other kind of terrorist organizations, which have top-down and strict hierarchical structures. The Al Qaeda-led new form of war is well-stated in the title of the book which was written by Walid Phares: '*The War of Ideas (2008)*'. Therefore, in this chapter and throughout most of the parts within this study, the term *Al Qaeda* will be run as an *idea* or *methodology* for individuals or groups who have been inspired by the idea of Global Jihad and employed methods of terrorism, rather than only a bin Laden-led organization.

Besides its structural contrasts from *conventional terrorist organizations*, Al Qaeda is able to adapt itself into actual conditions. It is for this reason that evaluating Al Qaeda into several generations provides better understanding rather than focusing on it from an organizational dimension. All of these generations have been caused by significant events in modern World History. Following the

inception of each generation, Al Qaeda re-adjusted its modus operandi to reach its ultimate goal, in compliance with new conditions. These strategies will be mentioned within Al Qaeda generations, yet our intention will be focused on threats posed by third generation, including homegrown terrorism, lone wolf terrorism and electronic/online Jihad.

Al Qaeda, as the most fearful and powerful terrorist organization by its operational skills, poses an unconventional threat to international security due to its tendency to officially reveal its own strategies and foretold operations (Scheuer, 2002; Nelson & Sanderson, 2011, p. 3). Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein clarified the master plan of Al Qaeda in his book named '*Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al Qaeda (2005)*', through outlining the seven-staged plan up to 2020 (Geller, 2015). His views and stresses are notable because he had an opportunity to speak directly al-Zarqawi in his restriction in Jordanian prison. He also has contacted Saif al Adl through al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper and demanded to write his remarks regarding al-Zarqawi.

1.3.1) The Master Plan of Al Qaeda

In his book, Hussein (2005) revealed Al Qaeda's 20-year master plan based on interviews with Saif al-Adl, strategic planners and operational chief of Al Qaeda, who is also an inner circle member and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jordanian leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (Wright, 2006; Zelin, 2013; Hoffman, 2016). Following the assessments of Al Qaeda's strategists and ideologues with respect to *why Islamic movements have failed*, Al Qaeda decision makers concluded four reasons why previous Islamist movements failed. First of all, Islamist movements differed from one another with regards to diagnosing the actual situation of *Ummah* (Muslim Community), and therefore they failed to create a solution for actual problems. Secondly, there was no convenience among goals, methods and means within the framework of their so-called plan. The third reason is the Islamist movement's' reluctance to undertake the role of the leadership of Ummah. Finally, these movements could not able to utilize

individual and material sources of the Ummah (Hussein, 2014, p. 239). In line with these shortcomings and failures, Al Qaeda declared its manifest highlighting four main points. First, Mujahedeen, who are fighting for freedom, and second, the sacred assets of Ummah are the real leaders of Ummah. The last two points include the contemporary situation in the World contradicts with Sharia and Deen. Thus, we need an explicit plan in terms of purposes, methods and means and this plan must be drafted in concern with the nominal and practical needs of Ummah. Finally, the transformation of humanity should be based on intellectual and spiritual realities (Hussein, 2014, pp. 202-213).

Al Qaeda's master plan hinges on enhancing Islamic Jihad efforts quantitatively and qualitatively. This plan has been separated into seven well-defined stages (Musharbash, 2005; Wright, 2006; Geller, 2015). These are (Hussein, 2014, pp. 241-252):

1) **The Awakening**: This phase comprises the 2000-2003 period, from the planning of the September 11 attacks to the beginning of the Iraqi invasion. In Hussein (2005, p. 241) words: "Ummah is fasting asleep never-seen-before, and only way to wake them up is to beat to the head of the serpent, in order to provoke it to set against randomly". This phase aimed at compelling the USA to fight in the open fields of Muslim lands where the Muslim fighters could attack them directly. Also, this phase was the advertising of Al Qaeda, despite their presence dating back to 1988. After September 11, there is no one in the World who is not well aware of Al Qaeda.
2) **Eyes Opening**: Between 2003 and 2006, Al Qaeda aimed at promoting anti-American and anti-Western ideas across the world. Regardless of the results, maintaining the battle was the primary focus. Hence, Al Qaeda was able to transform itself from an organization towards an idea or a methodology, which is hard to be destroyed.
3) **Arising and Standing Up**: The 2007-2010 years were planned in accordance with Al Qaeda's interests over Syria. He mentioned literally

Sham with reference to Prophet's hadith, and also its proximity to Israel. In line with the Islamic-Jihadi methodology, the apostate Syrian regime must be weakened so that the Syrian regime loses control of domestic issues. At the end, domestic instability will provide a security vacuum for Al Qaeda, whom works effectively in instability.

4) **Toppling Hated Arab Regimes**: Compromising the years of 2010-2013, Al Qaeda focused on overthrowing Arab Regimes through engaging tough conflicts. While regimes were weakening, the USA would not able to support all these regimes that are being attacked at the same time, because of Al Qaeda's wide front wars. In this stage, Al Qaeda aimed to hit the international economy by targeting oil trade and also replacing the dollar with gold. In other words, Al Qaeda damaged the international economy and indirectly, alliances of Crusaders and Zionists.
5) **Declaring Islamic Caliphate**: According to the master plan, this stage comprises the years of 2013-2016. In this period, Western grasp in the region will be diminished. Due to Al Qaeda's optimal working conditions being one of chaotic atmosphere which follows the security vacuum, the changes in the region will be appreciated by Al Qaeda. They will reach one more step to their strategic goal: declaring the caliphate. Through the State, Al Qaeda will be able to control leadership of Ummah, reformation, individual or general sources, and the new international order.
6) **Total Confrontation**: From 2016 onward, there will be a total war between Islamic Caliphate and global infidels, and this confrontation will begin right after the declaration of the Caliphate.
7) **Decisive Triumph**: According to Al Qaeda strategists, total war will take only few years and at the end Islamic Caliphate will arise and Israel will yield. The whole World will be terrorized in case of attacking Muslims or defenseless people.

When this book was written in 2005, this master plan seemed lunatic and absurd (Musharbash, 2005) for many. Nevertheless, in the contemporary World, many Arab regimes have been toppled and Syria is facing an ongoing civil war

(Geller, 2015). Oil trade has been disrupted by the Islamic State (IS, and currently al-Dawla) in Iraq, for self financing. Moreover, Islamic Caliphate was declared in 2014 by Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) in accordance with well-scheduled step 5th. It must be noted in here that the declaration of Caliphate was not predicted by Al Qaeda, at least in foreseeable future, and Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) (former ISIS/IS/Dawla) was enthusiastic to declare Islamic Caliphate in order to monopolize Jihad. Nevertheless, their attempt caused substantial dichotomy between Al Qaeda, al Nusra (local franchise of Al Qaeda) and ISI. It is simply said that the declaration of Caliphate ensured the split of Jihadi groups. Following the self-proclaimed Caliphate by IS, step six's total confrontation, The Global Coalition against Daesh, is now ongoing as Hussein (2005) revealed.

1.3.2) Al Qaeda 1.0

As it was mentioned before, the Soviet-Afghan War was one of the most important turning points in World History. Yet, the real significance, in accordance with this study, is the accelerator effect it had on Global Jihad by providing a backdrop for Jihadists from all around the World. In a world without Twitter, Facebook or forum pages, the only way to communicate and spread the ideas is to come together and Afghanistan, therefore, provides a miraculously suitable platform for Jihadists (Scheuer, 2002; Shahzad, 2011; Watts, 2013; al-Suri, 2014; Hussein, 2014; Byman, 2015).

In 1988, the first generation of Al Qaeda was declared officially based on *Maktab al-Khidamat* (Service Office, MAK), which had been established by the co-operation of Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 1984 in Peshawar. This was done due to the necessity of coordination, funding, training and arming of foreign fighters, also known as *Arab-Afghans* (Scheuer, 2002; Shahzad, 2011; Watts, 2013; Cinoğlu & Özeren, 2014; Sandıklı, 2015). Until the early years of the 1990s, Al Qaeda was in Afghanistan to coordinate Afghan fighters against USSR, and literally fight against them with the aid coming from their future enemy: USA. When civil war broke out among Afghan

mujahedeen, Al Qaeda left Afghanistan until their return in 2001 by invitation from the Taliban (Scheuer, 2002; Byman, 2015, pp. 8-9)

Despite the widespread tendency to specify the period of the first generation in between 1988-2001 (Keck, 2013; Chasdi, 2014; Munnich, 2014), the 9/11 attacks are not the finish line of Al Qaeda's first generation. This breaking point might be launched in 1996, the year of '*Declaration of War against Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places*' (Laden, 1996) and Bin Laden's moving to Sudan. On the other hand, 1998 might be the year of the final curtain of Al Qaeda 1.0, because for the first time, Al Qaeda demonstrated its outstanding ability to conduct simultaneous terror attacks at USA Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The reason is that Al Qaeda had experienced a *mental* transformation in 1996-1998. For the first time, Al Qaeda called all Muslims for duty through means of the declaration in 1996, and in 1998 they performed simultaneous attacks in two different countries against the US embassies which had been declared as the legitimate target. Following these attacks, Al Qaeda became an international organization which can carry out attacks by its own autonomous groups in different countries. In other words, Al Qaeda began to pose an unconventional threat to international security by promoting Jihad awareness, preparing jihadist cadres, and coordinating them to create a unified international jihadist movement (Byman, 2015, p. 13; Byman & Williams, 2015).

In this period, Al Qaeda shaped the way to pursue their ultimate goal - Sharia-based World order- not Islamic State. Al Qaeda's major contribution to Jihadi idea, despite the presence of broad opposition among other Jihadi leaders (Shahzad, 2011; Byman, 2015), is to gather all regional militant groups around the idea to focus on the *far enemy* which is USA, instead of *near enemy*, local Muslim regimes enjoying support of the USA (Scheuer, 2002; Reynolds, 2004; Kilcullen, 2009; Keck, 2013). This unique and reoriented international strategy rendered Al Qaeda distinct from previous religious-based non-state armed groups. Before Al Qaeda, all Islamic armed organizations such as Hezbollah, Abu Nidal, Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and etc, were focused on overthrowing their

own countries' leaders and regimes in order to form a Sharia-based State. Yet, Al Qaeda gave them a reason to fight in a different way to reach the same destination: attack to the USA and its assets, and see how your apostate rulers are toppled (Scheuer, 2002). This holistic strategy separates the world into two camps: us and them. This separation is seen not only in Islam's binary world view but also Marxist dialectic. While Marxist dialectic is defined as class conflict, Islamist dialectic is polarizing the society in terms of faith and belief (Shahzad, 2011, p. 19).

Al Qaeda's charismatic and multi-millionaire leader, Osama bin Laden, has targeted not only Crusaders and Zionists by Jihad but also near enemies like the Saudi regime because of their support through financial and religious corruption, billions of dollars for western-origin weapon trades and adjustment of the oil prices in line with their Western allies' interest (Fisk, 1996) as well as Saudis' request for US troops to "defend the realm" during the First Gulf War (Fisk, 1997; Ambah, 1998; Scheuer, 2002, pp. 180-188).

In June 2001, the merger of Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad Organization was led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Following the merger, the new organization altered the name to *Jamaa'at Qa'idat al-Jihad*, yet still Al Qaeda is widely known name of this new organization (Sageman, 2004; Wright, 2006). By courtesy of this merger, Al Qaeda could expand its intellectual capital due to Ayman al-Zawahiri and the contributions of his squad.

1.3.3) Al Qaeda 2.0

The September 11 attacks unsurprisingly brought a military campaign against Afghanistan on the grounds of assisting and harboring Al Qaeda cadres and camps. After the United States' massive strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda, as well as the final blow in Tora Bora Mountains along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Al Qaeda and Taliban lost their sovereignty in the region and they had to flee towards the mountains in the borderline. Nevertheless, despite approximately losing 80% of its cadres, the Al Qaeda leadership and its inner circle were able to

survive and change its strategy to reach the ultimate goal. From 2001 onward, Al Qaeda had to maintain their operations without physical camps or only in temporary camps in the mountains. In addition to this, for the first time, local affiliates gained more importance and autonomy than before. The rise of Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) coincided with the new era of Global Jihad.

There are two main figures and two main events that have rendered this generation special: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI and Abu Musab al-Suri, strategist and a member of Al Qaeda's inner circle. The two important events are the proliferation of the Internet and the Iraqi War (Watts, 2013). Al-Suri is the most important figure because he has 25-years experience in the battlefields (al-Suri, 2007) and also he had the willingness to contribute new approaches to Global Jihad. Following the fall of Afghanistan (al-Zawahiri, 2015a), al-Suri has written his 1600 pages, '*Global Islamic Resistance Call*', indicating the strategy of the next decade (Lister, 2015). Al-Suri's world view resembles to Qutb and Ibn Taymiyyah's world which was divided into infidels and pseudo-Muslims. Real Muslims *have to* fight them all until the decisive victory of Sharia-based order. There would be no compromise but untargeted killing against pseudo-Muslims and infidels regardless if they are women, children or elders (Shlapentokh, 2012, p. 304). This binary Worldview of Islam, which also neglects nationalism, becomes concrete in al-Suri's way of thinking. He totally rejects racial, national or geographical boundaries because of the existence of holistic and comprehensive approaches to Islam. He has echoed his vision in the cases of major conflicts among Muslims and others, such as "Umayyad vs. Romans" or "Ottomans vs. Romans", rather than war among nations, because there is only one falsehood just as truth (al-Suri, 2014, p. 697).

According to al-Suri, open enemies of Islam rarely attack Muslims. Rather, they prefer to employ *proxies* which are pseudo-Muslims and their states (Shlapentokh, 2012). Therefore, attacking local Muslim regimes, without restraints, through proven success *terror cells* seems rational and reasonable. This

new modus operandi was created along with the fall of Afghanistan, which was the backdrop for fighters who were exiled from their homelands in the 1990s (al-Suri, 2014, pp. 709-710). As a result, all *true Muslims* should focus on near enemy for a while, rather than a far enemy. Together with this new approach, the World divided into two camps: attacking real Muslims in various forms and everywhere else in the World. Therefore, the Earth is considered as a Jihad front, and no one has to wait to receive an invitation to wage their own collective or individual Jihad. In other words, there are no borders and races in the *World of Allah*. If one Muslim is being attacked, 1.5 billion Muslims have to join Jihad in order to save him and her, or the occupied lands (al-Suri, 2014, pp. 182-190).

In this generation, Al Qaeda decision-makers were well aware that they all were in a long-running battle. Afghanistan fell right after the Battle of Tora Bora and Iraq was invaded by Coalition of Willing. Many Jihadi fighters were exterminated and there was a widespread tendency among all states to join or support the Global War on Terror (GWOT) at a certain level. In this atmosphere, Al Qaeda re-adjusted itself again, in accordance with actual conditions. Ever since the power of media was proven after September 11, al-Suri (2014, pp. 45-46) emphasized the necessity of maintaining Jihad by modern means, such as through the media and internet. In addition to this, the hierarchical centralized structure of the organization had to be transformed due to the power loss of Al Qaeda Central as well as the necessities of post-Cold War period, into a decentralized "three-circle" system. This new structure is comprised by three circles. The first is "the innermost circle", which include putative Caliph and his advisors. The "centralized unit" is allowed to campaign like an ordinary organization. The "Da'wah circle" includes inspired individuals, groups or organizations that carry out attacks (al-Suri, 2014; Rej, 2016, pp. 12-14). Along with this new structure, al-Suri's organizational vision was completed, because he observed that world would change and that Jihadi groups cannot solely rely on power struggles among the Cold War blocs (Shlapentokh, 2012, p. 309). Additionally, since all Muslim lands and people were tortured, everyone must wage a Jihad as fardh 'ayn, either

joining the battlefield collectively or individually.

Al Qaeda 2.0 did not evolve only one way that was indicated by al-Suri. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of AQI, employed his own hybrid strategy which was based on extreme interpretation of al-Suri's vision. He focused on the *far enemy coming to near*, since the US troops had already been deployed in Iraq. Nevertheless, his major contribution to Jihad, despite bin Laden and Zawahiri's major fear (Scheuer, 2002), was to drag people into sectarian conflict in order to force them to choose side through targeting Shiite population in the Middle East (Keck, 2013). Hence, Jihadi ideas would spread along the Middle East and at the end *Malhama al Kubra* (Armageddon), would be waged (Hussein, 2014). Although there were calls from Zawahiri for Zarqawi to reduce his harsh behaviors on Iraqi Shiites and to stop executing hostages, Zarqawi preferred to implement his own strategy, waywardly. Zawahiri reminded him: "…And more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media." (Wright, 2006) However, executing Muslims publicly were not beneficial for the idea of Global Jihad. In the wake of Zarqawi's death, Al Qaeda Central and specifically Zawahiri maintained their stances regarding popular support to avoid civilian casualties (Muslims and non-Muslims) and dragged people into sectarian wars in order to keep all Muslims' moral and material supports around the Global Jihad (al-Zawahiri, 2015b).

In line with Zawahiri's vision in the early 2000s, Al Qaeda 2.0 has highlighted the importance of media and especially internet. Following the fall of Afghanistan, where it had been operated as recruitment base, training camps and safe heaven, Al Qaeda had to turn this situation into an advantage, and they did this by having their own media corps (Scheuer, 2002; Watts, 2013). In Patrick Cockburn's (2015, p. 127) words for Jihad in Syria with reference to some Jihadi websites, "Half of the Jihad is media". Despite the foundations of Jihadi media being laid in this period, it reached its optimum usage, publicly, in the latest generation, through the means of ISIS.

1.3.4) Al Qaeda 3.0

The inception of the third generation of Al Qaeda is broadly assumed in 2011 (Kershner, 2012; Keck, 2013; Watts, 2013; Riedel, 2012; Riedel, 2013a; Riedel, 2013b; Chasdi, 2014; Munnich, 2014). In the wake of killing bin Laden in 2011 by the US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Al Qaeda has faced new challenges. A loss of financing, leadership and cohesion of alliances among different organizations has caused a blurred line in Jihadi Groups, in terms of power, aim and motivation for attacking the far enemy (Kershner, 2012).

While bin Laden's death did not spark off any mass anger, together with the Arab Spring, Al Qaeda has enjoyed newly emerging conditions in the Muslim World and has augmented its operational capacities and skills. Although the Arab Spring, in principle, saw the demise of Jihadi-based fundamentalist oppositions (Riedel, 2013b; Coffey, 2015), the fall of regional leaders consecutively, and unfinished democratic revolutions together with ongoing conflicts have created the security vacuum with optimal conditions for Al Qaeda to spread. These are unstable, leaderless or ungoverned territories such as in Mali, Sinai Peninsula, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya (Kershner, 2012; Riedel, 2013b; Coffey, 2015). People under normal circumstances do not have a revolutionary political agenda, therefore fundamentalists who already have a revolutionary political agenda and intellectual basis for almost three decades, could be able to hijack the ordinary people's struggle (Riedel, 2013a; Coffey, 2015).

Al Qaeda 3.0 poses far more different threats than it was before and after the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda as a term meets indeed more than terrorist organization which was founded and led by bin Laden and al-Zawahiri in 1988 in Pakistan. The term must be used in line with the context, because Al Qaeda could mean several different things (Nelson & Sanderson, 2011). Therefore when Al Qaeda 3.0 is considered, it must be noted that it is a complicated, penetrated and ambiguous phenomenon. There is a *five pillar* structure in question, unlike it had before. The first pillar is Zawahiri-led *Al Qaeda Central/Al Qaeda al Um/Al*

Qaeda Core/Al Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL), which conducts Global Jihadi idea. The second is comprised of *affiliated groups* such as AQAP, AQI, AQIM, and Al Shabaab. The third is *allied groups* such as Laskar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). The fourth pillar is *allied networks*, including remnants of the foreign Jihadi groups. The last pillar is composed of *inspired individuals* through internet sources (Munnich, 2014). Hence it is better to name this newly emerged unusual artifact as Al Qaeda and Associated Movements or *AQAM*.

In his article, Keck (2013) claimed that Al Qaeda would lose its global reach due to the existing open Jihad in Syria. Nevertheless, Keck failed to notice the rise of the lone wolf and homegrown terrorism through Al Qaeda's advanced internet usage. Threats emanating from AQAM are excessively diversified, in terms of intenseness and effect (Nelson & Sanderson, 2011, p. 23) and its new multifaceted strategy has strengthened AQAM's hand in both attacking the near enemy in open jihad and the far enemy by courtesy of internet and inspired individuals.

1.3.5) Internet and Homegrown Terrorism

Since the Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts, as its outcomes have deepened, Al Qaeda central called Muslims from all around the World to participate in open Jihad fronts in several lands. Syria is the most certain destination for these calls. Thousands of foreign nationals are fighting in Syria in order to defeat the enemies of Islam. Yet, it is not prudent to say that Al Qaeda-central has given up its Global Jihad purpose a reason. The idea of Global Jihad keeps Muslims awake and even if Jihad is defeated somewhere, this idea would be revived anywhere in the World.

After the wars in Afghanistan which took place in 1979 and 2001, and Iraq in 2003, these battlefields turned into *quagmires* and cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives for USSR and USA. These wars maybe were not concluded by victories of USA and/or USSR, yet they cost a fortune to Jihadi movements in terms of neutralizing professional, trained and flawlessly indoctrinated fighters as

well as leaders and ideologues. Therefore, Al Qaeda's engagement on only local wars keeps US and Western homelands in safety (Keck, 2013). In other words, Jihad would not be reached towards infidels' land so long as Al Qaeda maintains its operation against the near enemy. Nevertheless, Al Qaeda 3.0 keeps this dilemma in mind and found a way out through, so to speak, *unexpected Jihad*.

There are several terms which correspond with one another that must be emphasized in this new approach to Global Jihad: homegrown, lone wolf, do-it-yourself and 24/7 terrorism as well as electronic or online Jihad. When Al Qaeda-central has called Muslims to join Jihad in Syria, it had also called some others who were not able to go to Syria, just as Zawahiri (2015) and al-Suri (2014) recommends, waging an individual Jihad by all available means. Also Sheikh Nasser al-Anisi (2016) highlighted the importance of the lone Jihad in his article, "this is tactical change in accordance with existing conditions".

The homegrown trend is not limited to one single country. From USA to Europe and Australia where radicalized resident Muslims, wannabes and converts dwell in, homegrown terrorism is on the rise as primary threat since the 2005 London Bombings (Crone & Harrow, 2011). Although many of the plots have been foiled, as a matter of fact that the rising trend of homegrown terrorism draws countries attention to this uncertain, unknown and sudden threat (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010).

Even if homegrown terrorism and lone wolf attacks seem to be generated by radical Islamic movements, Western countries, specifically the US, are not unfamiliar to these phenomena. From the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, to Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and Tyler poison gas plot in 2004, many lone wolf attacks were staged by the US citizens whom did not have any Islamic backgrounds (Reynolds, 2004; Burton, 2007). For that matter, the early samples of lone wolf terrorism date back to anarchist movements in the 19th century (Novak, 1954; Taylor, 1988). Lone wolf terrorism is defined, with reference to law enforcers and experts, as "terrorism that is carried out attacks by

independent individuals instead of terrorist organization; and is barely detected before their operations" (Spaaij, 2010, p. 854). Therefore, it is a major threat to national security since the 9/11 attacks (Bergen, 2016). Yet, their independent nature does not mean that neither they are sympathizers nor inspired from extremist organizations; either they have affiliated with radical groups or organizations in their own past (Alakoç, 2015). Following the loss of their safe haven, Afghanistan, the de-centralized version of Al Qaeda has overruled the organizationally-led Jihad (Jenkins, 2011). Rather, clandestine cell-based small groups and independent individuals who are increasingly involving in lone wolf attacks will dominate security concerns in the Western World, specifically in the US (Hoffman, 2003; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Especially after the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, incumbent US President Barack Obama highlighted the necessity of profound analysis regarding this new threat (Danzell & Montanez, 2015, p. 135). In the wake of the declaration of Islamic State in 2014, their leaders have been encouraging Muslims living in Western countries to wage lone wolf attacks, in line with Al Qaeda 3.0's master plan (Khalilzad, 2016). When it is considered with the San Bernardino shooting in 2015, the Orlando night club shooting in 2016, the Berlin Lorry Attack in 2016, the Terror attacks to Israeli tourists in Istanbul in 2016 and Westminster, London Bridge and Manchester Attacks in 2017, these prove how incumbent president Obama's concerns over Al Qaeda's new tactic were reasonable.

Two main features distinguish homegrown terrorists from other terrorists: "belonging" (to the west) and "autonomy" (from foreign armed groups). In addition to this approach, homegrown terrorism might be categorized into four elements in two groups: "internal autonomous, internal affiliated" and "external autonomous, external affiliated" (Crone & Harrow, 2011, pp. 524-525). The foremost ideological motives of lone wolf terrorism are white-supremacy, Islamism, nationalism and anti-abortion movements. The methods of lone wolfs are differentiated but mostly firearms, explosives, armed hijacking, and arson (Spaaij, 2010, pp. 861-864). Even though our primary aim in this chapter is not to

perform an in-depth analysis over all dimensions of homegrown terrorism, it must be noted that, at least superficially, the main reasons of it. According to Githens-Mazer (2008, p. 22), the story behind why individuals may come to be extremist is as unique as fingerprints. Therewithal, there are three main factors agreed upon western radicalization: "socio-political alienation, deepening religious identity, and anger over a state's foreign policy" (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p. 38).

Nearly all of the homegrown terrorism plotters who were inspired by Al Qaeda or AQAP were men who converted to Islam or already Muslims (Alexander, 2011, p. 475). Homegrowns do not have organizational patterns and behaviors, hence these unaffiliated individuals or small groups are not able to perform sophisticated attacks, such as those performed on 9/11 (Alexander, 2011). Although lone wolf terrorists are known as "motivated to risk everything without restraint," (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 73) their operations cause relatively less damages in terms of casualties and fear, than organizationally planned suicide bombings (Alakoç, 2015). This rationale is seen in Crone and Harrow's (2011, p. 522) explanation that "self-recruited, self-trained, self radicalized, and self-started" individuals are mostly deprived of high level trainings (Alexander, 2011).

The homegrown terrorism concept might not be comprehended regardless of several facilitating factors: internet (Stenersen, 2008), popular support for terrorism (AIVD, 2006), external assistance, socio-cultural facilitation of violence, impotent counterterrorism measures (Schuurman, et al., 2016), and higher degree of political access (Eyerman, 1998).

In our point of view, the Internet is the most crucial facilitator of Global Jihad in terms of accessibility. As it was mentioned before, Al Qaeda, especially after the loss of Afghanistan, had to cope with new challenges coming from dichotomy, especially with necessities of waging a Jihad against near enemies and in line with principles hitting the head of the big serpent. Indeed, the loss of Afghanistan gave Al Qaeda a chance to renovate itself through using high-tech

methods. They had to abandon their local training bases which can be accessible only by a limited number of people, yet they reached limitless virtual training bases, also known as the Internet (Scheuer, 2002). Al Qaeda and Associated Movements were, are, and will be able to disseminate its ideology hand in hand through the Internet (Nelson & Sanderson, 2011).

Almost all terrorist organizations are operating the Internet, yet Al Qaeda provides the most outstanding example by emphasizing the role of electronic Jihad within its 20 year master plan (Hussein, 2014, p. 244). The Internet strategy serves three purposes. Firstly, some websites publish the messages and calls from the leaders. Secondly, there are websites hosting the Jihadi discussions of well-known Jihadi figures. Third, these websites are operated for recruitment through chat-rooms (Jenkins, 2011). In other words, the Internet is not only one of the most useful means for Al Qaeda to convey its message, but also for recruiting potential jihadists. Therefore, despite that many of these websites are ephemeral, their numbers are constantly increasing, particularly in the English language. Since Al Qaeda strategists assume that 90% of Jihad is communication (Jenkins, 2011, p. 1; Cockburn, 2015), they mostly prefer to employ native born jihadists in their online magazines and websites, in order to reach local people by their own citizens who were able to convey messages in accordance with their cultural codes. For instance, several prominent foreign figures have published their articles on Inspire Magazine (publishing by AQAP) online. Anwar al Awlaki (New Mexico born), Adam Pearlman/Adam Yahiya Gadahn (Oregon born) and Al Shabaab's Omar Hammami/Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki (Alabama born) were recruited in order to reach local people in the US.

At this point, *Inspire* Magazine serves as the primary and the most intellectual mean using by Jihadi organizations. Despite its recent fame, Dabiq Magazine of ISIS does not serve as the best example of electronic Jihad. When Dabiq is read profoundly, it is perceived that it says nothing but making propaganda. On the other hand, Inspire of AQAP contains and conveys significant articles, messages and interviews regarding contemporary issues of the World,

current jihad fields, as well as post-modern ideas. Above all, there is a section called *Open Source Jihad* (OSJ) which is prepared by *The AQ Chef*. It shows how to make a bomb by stealth, through the use of ordinary kitchen materials (The AQ Chef, 2010; 2014; 2016) In addition to practical information, it also provides an ideological and religious justification of why individual attacks must be performed. Hence, Inspire Magazine is the most influential and dangerous means for lone wolf and homegrown terrorism.

In sum, Al Qaeda is a pioneer organization in Jihadi idea, unlike previous models of jihadi organizations. It has an international world view to shape the world as a whole, as well as granting international access through its holistic strategy. Al Qaeda, in principle, avoids engaging sectarian wars among Muslims, yet today Al Qaeda's local affiliates are fighting in sectarian wars, specifically in Syria and Iraq. In addition to these, Al Qaeda has adjusted itself into actual conditions by means of its flexible nature. There is only one strict target for Al Qaeda: destroying human-based secular order to establish Sharia-based world order. In order to do this, all available means must be employed, just as AQAM do now. Nowadays, it is not prudent to say that Al Qaeda is only an organization lead by al-Zawahiri; it is bigger than this, as it was mentioned previous paragraphs. There is a structure of five pillars that were inspired by Al Qaeda to carry out their plans in highly sophisticated means. It renders GWOT to be failed, because all of these pillars require a different strategy and tactics to be defeated. As Bruce Riedel noted, the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda seems to be the merest chance by this GWOT (Riedel, 2013a).

CHAPTER 2

2) GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Throughout the Cold War, rival parties, threats and targets were explicit, yet in contemporary world neither rivals nor threats and targets are as clear as in the past. Thus nuclear deterrence and containment which were the major reasons and instruments for "long-term peace" under the offense-defense strategy could be

maintained well (Gupta, 2008), because how states would respond to any sort of attacks were clear just as enemies and/or rivals were. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, security and threat concepts have deeply changed. Security concerns which were state-based and nuclear-bound originated have replaced by local conflicts, migration flows, cyber threats and global terrorism. All these concerns, terrorism in particular, despite state involvements, became visible as non-state actors or groups' attitudes. Previously, international politics has been considered stable and peaceful so long as limited number of actors, just as bipolar world system, is maintained (Mearsheimer, 1990). Although states are still the most powerful and important actors in the world politics, regional and global actors, groups and/or organizations are participating in the decision making process. Global non-state armed groups as newly emerged actors, also known as international terrorist organizations have distinct nature. On contrary to previous rivals/enemies, very existence of lack of rational and predictable character of the current enemies, state-centric strategies became old-fashioned and it was an undeniable fact that this unconventional enemy which cannot be deterred and contained by five decades-long nuclear deterrence strategy (Lebovic, 2006).

As security threats differentiated considerably, Western beliefs about the theory and practice of security that can also be considered as being based on the Cold War, outdated and improper with recent requirements have been strongly challenged in the wake of New York and Washington attacks in September 11, and alternative ways were searched (Bellamy & Bleiker, 2008) and it was found eventually. Regularly planned and published *'the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)'* pioneered the new security paradigm in accordance with -already emerged but- newly targeted threats to the USA. Despite the new US-based security concept and its outcomes are contradictive among different scholars and experts, it brings global and holistic as well as vague security strategy based on preemption (Goede, 2008).

Preemptive War Doctrine, also known as Bush Doctrine, in line with theory that based on an assumption "good offense makes for a good defense".

Preemptive war doctrine simply means to lead a military operation against a target which is incontrovertibly about to attack, the reason behind to carry out preemptive strikes is being the first prior to enemy to do so (Mueller, et al., 2006; Barnes & Stoll, 2007; Gupta, 2008; Goede, 2008). Preemption was not a new concept to international politics; there are many examples of it, such as US intervention to Spanish Florida, Six-Day War, US attacks to Libya in 1986, and US missile attacks to Sudan. Yet, what is new in contemporary preemption doctrine is that it reserves the right to carry out attacks against target country, in the absence of imminent threat (Gupta, 2008, pp. 182-183). This new face of preemption has been formulated as "one percent doctrine". According to this doctrine US should act to halt security threats even if there is only a 1% chance of it, in other words GWOT is guided by actionable suspicion (Suskind, 2006, p. 166).

For the great majority of the World, neither terrorism nor Islamism was major threats in the years of declaring new security concept. Although for some part of the World such as Israel, Algeria and South East Asia, Islamist non-state armed groups' rage was the main security concern prior to 9/11, however none of them who have been suffering from terrorism for years have globalized the notion, despite the application of their own anti and counter terrorism strategies (Bellamy & Bleiker, 2008, p. 2). Yet, together with President George W. Bush's addresses, this notion was globalized as GWOT through these words: "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: either you are with us or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2002; Podhoretz, 2002).

It is an undeniable fact that Bush administration has been looking any connection with the attack to rogue states such as Iraq (Woodward, 2002), Iran and North Korea (Lebovic, 2006). The reason behind was to ignore non-state actors' roles and their capabilities, because invisible enemies or rivals are not preferred to fight rather than the states which are rouge, visible and defended by concrete massive armies (Scheuer, 2002). James Lebovic (2006) formulates the US national security strategy after 9/11 in his book. His formulation and

capsulation are useful to overview the new security concept that has been planned to defeat Global Terrorism.

According to Lebovic (2006) US national security policy has established on the presence of two main enemies; rogue states and terrorists. Under the Cold War circumstances, nuclear deterrence could be assumed as the most effective and deterrent strategy, yet since the lack of first condition of nuclear deterrence, rational deterrable actors, and since the presence of prejudgment regarding the leaders of rogue states are not rational rivals, old-fashioned nuclear deterrence strategy could not be primary component of the new security concept. Therefore meticulously, at least in a theory, planned new security doctrine has been declared.

George W. Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS) can be basically characterized in the context of three pillar system (Seger, 2003): missile defense (defensive measures), preemption (offensive measures), and homeland security (to minimize loss of life and properties), all of them are the component of higher plan, also known as GWOT. However the new security strategy was not that simple, rather it was intertwined and more complicated. In practice, there are two implementations on this concept; Offense and Defensive-Denial Strategies. Furthermore these two strategies differ from the targets; Offensive and Defensive-Denial Strategies against "rogue states" and/or "terrorists" (Lebovic, 2006). Nevertheless, in line with primary purpose of this study, these branches of the new security concept will not be profoundly analyzed, but some basic principles and characteristics.

Offensive strategies against rogue states basically have aimed at to staunch their ongoing threats, such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea have already maintained. The first branch of this strategy is *punishment*, in other words counter-value executions. The second branch is "denial", also known as "preemption", in order to limit the potential damage. Denial strategies are for those who recently became nuclear power. It includes preemption and prevention. In the wake of 9/11,

preemption concept has been dominating the US official security documents. Preemption includes two different implementations; “surgical strikes”- practicing knockout blow in order to prevent proliferation or eradicate imminent WMD threats, and “internal intervention” -it is carried out through either territorial intervention or propping up local suppressed dissent, just as the USA did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The third branch is “punishment and denial” which is preferred by the states that are reluctant to be engaged in costly preemption strategy. In punishment and denial strategy, through imposing embargo and blockade, proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states can be prevented.

Another effective measure against rogue states is “Defensive-Denial Strategies” which were for the rogue states that cannot be punished or deterred by punishment and denial strategies. National Missile Defense Systems (NMD) is the last resort to avoid the potential damage originating from rogue states. NMDs are effective means to convey a message to rogue states that ‘those threats will not compromise our security’, besides the USA and her huge nuclear arsenal menace them by second strike capacities.

On the other side of the coin, terrorists are the rising threats that the US has to deal with. Same strategies are applied for the terrorists in differently. For instance punishment and denial execution on terrorists in the context of “Offensive Strategies” are formulated and implemented based on three perspective; terrorists as rational and coherent actors, political context that is incarnated as state supporting terrorism, and finally organizational elements pertaining to vertically and horizontally organized non-state armed groups (Lebovic, 2006, pp. 105-143).

Defensive-Denial Strategies are also put into practice against terrorists. Since 9/11 threatens US homeland, security measures inevitably have to take homeland security into consideration. Homeland security measures were formulated based on deterrence through primarily prevention and, if not possible, reducing the effects of their operations. These effective measures are as follows;

limited defense, partial defense, flexible defense, selective defense, forward defense, defensive screening, triggered defense, random defense, spatial defense, defensive uncertainty (Lebovic, 2006, pp. 170-176). If profit and loss analysis denotes that a certain terror attack does not bring anticipated and psychologically effective results such as dissemination of menace in public and forcing people to change their daily routines as well as forcing governments to chose either security or freedom, terrorists as *rational* and *coherent* actors are inextricably deterred rather than engaging redundant operations.

It is an undeniable fact that military option based on preemption was used as the major instrument of GWOT (Tujan, et al., 2004). It was in fact US decision makers and neo-con intellectuals' expectations that emphasizing the US global preponderance by using destructive military force (Clarke & Halper, 2005). Despite military options fulfill a certain and short term achievements (Silke, 2003), it also causes significant unexpected circumstances. According to Enders & Sandler (2006) military options against terror groups as the primary tactic, have not been concluded in terms of reduction in terror incidents in previous two decades. Furthermore, following the military strikes, terror incidents either remain at original level or increase strikingly in several months, and eventually turned to original level. Besides, there is no guarantee that annihilation of personnel and resources of terror groups will bring final and decisive triumph (Silke, 2003, pp. 216-231). In addition to this, failed retaliations can cause revenge, just as happened Gaddafi's Libya in 1980s (Lebovic, 2006). On the other hand, collateral damages are not always bearable; human rights violations aside (Tujan, et al., 2004), target country which was invaded by the party that was carrying out retaliation or preemptive strike can be turned into ungoverned, destabilized, and conflicting spaces. In other words, military option can breed optimum ambience for future problems in "interfered zones". Afghanistan and Iraq are two application of GWOT and as two failed states, they prove that how GWOT does not work. In line with this view, James Lebovic (2006) claims that preemptive doctrine occurred as the bad example as opposed the one was expected; "bad

offense made for bad defense", following Afghanistan and Iraq invasion. Practical applications of GWOT have sparked Islamic radicalization off, as more groups emerged across the world through cell-based structure (Wight, 2015, p. 220). Specifically Iraq has provided an environment for rising of Al Qaeda 2.0 and also Al Qaeda 3.0, also known as AQI and finally ISIS/IS/al-Dawla. It is prudent to say that failed counter terrorism strategies; revenge, resentment and financial hardships as the consequences of it, create and feed recruitment campaign of terror groups. Furthermore, ironically these warlike counterterrorism strategies frequently serve for terror groups' purposes. The rise of Islamophobia across the Western World is welcomed and even provoked by these groups (Wight, 2015). Moreover Francis Fukuyama asserts in his book named '*State Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (2004)*' that instability and failed states bring along terrorism. Namely, terrorism does not target only individuals, strategic targets or military installations and personnel but also, even more importantly, raison d'être of *nation state*. There is no harm in repeating that terrorism is more political issue than warlike issue, and unfortunately contemporary GWOT, according to Wight (2015) represents an existing rencontre regarding "who legitimately may use terror and who may not". There is another proof that GWOT is more political than effective counter terrorism strategy. As it has been mentioned earlier, GWOT is vague and it can be seen how vague it is in the words of President Bush "Our war begins with Al Qaeda but it does not end there, it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001). Declaring war on specific terrorist group would provide less flexible room for maneuver in dealing with the perpetrators of 9/11. In addition, not declaring war on specific groups by the USA makes those groups criminals, on contrary to war prisoners (Hiebert, 2012, p. 4). There is another point that must be stressed in here. Following the declaration of GWOT and Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, the USA built or reorganized secret interrogation facilities across the World, such as Guantanamo Bay Military Base, "Safe-Houses" in Ramadi and Mosul for detaining terrorism suspects. In these camps the USA security forces have employed advanced interrogation techniques which

were not even thinkable in the USA homeland. In other words US decision makers bypassed their domestic laws through having these interrogation camps where terror suspects were tortured.

Terrorists in contemporary world are living within target country or community. Even people are radicalized by themselves, no need to join squads or go to Iraq and Afghanistan or Syria. The Internet as the network-based and global reach instrument, is the most common and effective way to pursue this process. Senior advisor to the president of the RAND Corp., Brian M. Jenkins noted that terrorists do not free fall from the sky. They emerge from a set of strongly held beliefs. They become terrorists right after they radicalized (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 7). Therefore, as Brian M. Jenkins (2017) asserts that travel ban or restrictive migration policies are vain to prevent terror threats, unconventional strategies must be employed against this unconventional threat (Blöcher, 2011).

Terrorism works in contemporary World, because it is clandestine, indefinite, brutal as well as imminent. Since terrorism poses different sorts of threats (Bellamy & Bleiker, 2008), it is almost impossible to predict where terror threats are coming from but can be contained through comprehensive and a full knowledge of the threat. In order to create and successfully employ effective anti and counter terrorism strategies, planners and strategists must note the culture, history, and mindset of the terrorists. They must learn to think like them (Seger, 2003, p. 264). The reason behind this view, terrorism must be considered as not only security and warlike issues, but also political, religious and psychological issues. In 9/11 was a function of people's behavior, not buildings or planes, because terrorism and its nature always seek to use new, unexpected and undeterred ways and instruments. No one has ever expected to see planes as missiles. Therefore psychological aspect of the terrorism should not be neglected (Carpenter, 2001). As well as it has to take nature of new terrorism / international terrorism which is cell-based, global reached, horizontally organized and religiously motivated and trained groups and/or individuals into consideration.

In addition to lack of comprehensive and holistic anti and counter terrorism policies, there are 10 major factors encourage future terrorism (Alexander & Alexander, 2003) and those must be considered while unconventional counter terrorism strategies are planned. These are; the absence of international consensus on the notion of terrorism, discrepancy on root causes of this phenomenon, rising fundamentalism, abusing of media, hypocrisy on moral values, governments' inabilities to force effective measures, non-deterrent punishment, state sponsored or harbored terrorism, sophisticated nature of modern societies, and considerably high costs of security measure in Western democracies.

As a matter of fact, just as terrorism has been adapting itself into the actual conditions, US-led counterterrorism bloc has experienced the shift in GWOT. It was actually an obligation, because as it was discussed above; terrorists conduct their operations not only against US forces or allies in quagmires of the Middle East, but also they successfully attack to Western capital and significant cities. In other words, threat is not far from the homeland. Yet, drone strikes or invasion seemed impossible to be carried out in homeland; hence new way of fighting against terrorism was inevitable. "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) has four major goal as these were pointed out in the '*Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*' which was published by US Department of Homeland Security. According to this document, the Internet and social networks exacerbate the threat which was originated from international terror groups, lone wolves and homegrown terrorists. Therefore, Goal 1 is dedicated to "improve understanding of the evolving violent extremism threat and develop efficient ways to counter it". Within the scope of this goal, US Government will support and encourage internal and external research in order to understand the nature of the violent extremism. CVE Strategy document assumes that community partners across the country are the major component of the strategy, therefore Goal 2 aimed at to enhance community awareness by spreading information to the other federal partners and improving coordination. Goal 3 has

been planned for supporting community-based endeavors to counter violent extremism. In order to fulfill this purpose social inclusion, non-discrimination, and respect will be promoted. The last goal has been projected by the CVE Strategy Document is to enhance oversight and coordination of Department of Homeland Security's CVE activities which was simply to improve the coordination among bodies within DHS pertaining to CVE (Department of Homeland Security, pp. 4-14, 2016).

CSIS report, '*Turning Point: a New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*' put forward the multi-step strategy in order to achieve these goals mentioned within DHS CVE Document. Since extremist ideologies are penetrating into the society, the first measure that must be taken is to "strengthen popular resistance" to these extremist ideologies. Nevertheless government or state institutions unsurprisingly are not sufficient to meet this challenge, thus the second step aimed at to invest and mobilize "community-led prevention". Violent extremist groups or individuals consistently stress the huge social and economic gap between *us* and *them*. According to the report, narratives which were echoed by violent extremists must be absorbed through counter narratives, creating alternative opportunities. As for the fourth step, CSIS report advised to ensure "cohesion between policies and values" via rule of law, human rights, and protection of civic space. Despite the remarkable emphasis on soft methods, "military and law enforcement means" have not been overlooked. This step is consisted of improvement and utilization of counterterrorism operations, and rapid response teams (Green & Proctor, 2016). In addition to these, the USA predicts to spread CVE models across the globe in line with the new awareness regarding violent extremism. According to this awareness which was concreted as CVE, new way of fighting terrorism has to be the composition of hard and soft methods. Although CVE seems promising in many ways, according to many scholars CVE is incomplete, for instance Alex P. Schmid (2012) criticizes CVE due to its ongoing reliance on military measures.

In a nutshell, despite significant shifts on fighting against terrorism, it cannot be said that there is observable success on it. As Patrick Cockburn (2015) emphasized that Global Jihad is more concrete, extended and powerful than prior to GWOT or CVE. Although it was changed following the coalition strikes, IS had controlled a land the size of Great Britain. Paradigm shift on fighting against terrorism, however, is still missing. Despite the *promising* changes on strategies, there are still terror attacks in Western cities as well as the other parts of the world. It means just as GWOT, CVE is not as unconventional as Global Terrorism.

CHAPTER 3

MOROCCO: UNCONVENTIONAL RESPONSE

3.1) INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the Kingdom of Morocco, one of the most stable and powerful states in terms of establishing authority over the institutions, groups, and people, in the MENA region, will be revisited with respect to their comprehensive anti *and counter-terrorism* efforts in the light of their multifaceted strategies. Despite its remote location from contemporary conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria, Morocco's *terror-proof* situation is still praiseworthy in a world of post-modern security threats, which has been reshaped and dominated by international terrorism.

The 9/11 attacks have not only affected the USA but have also influenced the world at large. This event was vitally important, so much so that the term 9/11 is now used for crucial breaking points. From 9/11 onwards, all critical incidents tend to be described by officials or journalists, as "the 9/11 of the Country X", such as the Paris attacks (Panfili, 2015) and the failed coup d'état attempt in Turkey (Akyıldız, 2016). In line with this trend, the Casablanca Attacks in 2003 can be defined as the 9/11 of Morocco insofar as the 9/11 attacks brought important transformations with them. In this context, this chapter is dedicated to evaluating Moroccan anti and counter-terrorism efforts which were determined by

historical facts, uniqueness, and necessities, as well as how successful they have been.

3.1.1) How safe is Morocco in terms of Terrorism?

According to the Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT) in 2015 published by the US State Department, Morocco employs comprehensive, vigilant and successful security strategies to take measure against terrorism by effective legislative, religious and militarily actions (CRT, 2016). Although the US State Department skeptically warned their citizens who planned on visiting Morocco (2016), the foreign travel advice that was revealed by the British Foreign Office indicated that the Kingdom of Morocco was one of the safest countries to travel as indicated by its higher rank in the list of "safest countries in the world" (Dieseldorff, 2015).

According to some, the Kingdom of Morocco is, so to speak, the "Counter-Terror Leader" as determined by its unique, domestic and all-encompassing anti-radicalization programs (Piser, 2016). There are several quantitative datasets which prove this *daring* statement. The first of which is the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) launched by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). According to the GTI, Morocco's position on the ranking list is getting better over the years, in line with the success of the country's security measures. Within the list of 162 countries, Morocco was 40th (GTI-12, 2012), yet its rank gradually decreased inversely correlated with the threat of terrorism. Following the years, Morocco has occupied the 67th (GTI-14, 2015), the 92nd (GTI-15, 2016) and finally the 95th rank (GTI-16, 2017). In addition to the GTI, there is one more reliable dataset for our research. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is a quantitative dataset conducted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (also known as START), states that there were only 49 violent incidents regarding terrorism that have occurred between 1970 and 2015 (GTD, 2016). In order to clarify, it is fruitful to make a comparison between Morocco and a few other countries. As the most similar case (in terms of geography, demography, history, and economics), Algeria had to

resist 2792 attacks (GTD, 2016), and as the most different case, France had to confront 2786 attacks (GTD, 2016) within that particular time period. In addition to these datasets, the '*Annual Report for Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2016*' prepared by Yonah Alexander (2017, p. 8) reveals that 2392 terror attacks had to be confronted in North Africa and Sahel region between 2001-2017 and only nine of them have taken place in Morocco, while there were 1329 in Algeria, 578 in Libya, 218 in Mali, 78 in Chad, 72 in Niger, 27 in Mauritania, and 81 in Tunisia.

It is an undeniable fact that it is not possible to make a reference to a single determinant factor that renders Morocco such a relatively safe country. In addition to successful and effective anti and counter-terrorism programs, the historical development process of the country, colonial period, geographical location, the lack of fossil resources, almost 400 years lasting stable and powerful dynasty, unique state system, and sui generis religious rituals and approaches are components of the essential success of Morocco. These all will be mentioned and analyzed throughout the next chapters.

3.1.2) History

Historiography inextricably comes along with selectivity; some events, despite their importance in the past, are excluded and some others are emphasized. Nevertheless, the selectivity is produced mostly based upon ideological concerns and priorities, but in this study, some parts of the history of Morocco are excluded not because of ideological concerns and priorities but because of the primary purpose of this chapter; revealing the dual nature of Moroccan politics which despite seeming disadvantageous is actually quite opportunistic by creating more rooms for political maneuver. Therefore this duality in Morocco's politics, society and religious interpretation is considerably substantial in order to comprehend the nature of this study.

The name of the country that used by Westerners derived from the city of *Marrakech*, which was built in the 11th century. The Arabic name of the country,

Maghreb (the land of the West) is used with reference to its geographic location, although it includes Algeria, Tunisia and Western half of Libya in addition to Morocco. Just like Westerners, Turks named the country *Fas*, which was derived from the city of *Fes* (Pennell, 2003). Abdallah Laroui (2005) asserts that *Maroc est une île* (Morocco is an island), due to its exceptional location; detached from neighbors by mountains and flanked by deserts and ocean (Pennell, 2003). Therefore, Morocco was capable of creating unique traditions and institutions as opposed its neighbors.

Indigenous people in Morocco are *Amazigh* who speaks the language named *Tamazight*, also known as *Berber*. This term Berber was popularized by Ibn Khaldoun (1375) in his masterpiece, Muqaddima, while he was writing the History of the Berbers (Pennell, 2003). Ibn Khaldoun divided the Amazigh people into three large sections with geographical reference; the High Atlas, the Souss and the Rif (mountainous areas).

Modern Morocco had hosted many states in the past. Despite the ancient rulers of Morocco such as the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Mauretania Tingitana, and even early Muslim rulers such as the Kingdom of Nekor, the Kingdom of Sijilmasa, and the Idrissids, the Moroccan modern political and social systems were largely shaped after the 11th century in which the Arab (Hilalian) surge had reached the land. Along with this *Arabization* of the land, the state building process-which was quite strange for the Amazigh tribes- had begun. Having said that, the only major cities where they had been established in the lowlands were Arabized, whereas the mountainous areas remained intact despite the Amazigh people having embraced Islam (Willis, 2012, p. 12). In other words, the partly-failed Arabization launched the duality of Moroccan politics, as two main power groups emerged in the country. Since then, Moroccan politics can be best perceived by focusing on the religious, ethnic and linguistic rivalry. The crystal-clear duality of Morocco is physically observed through modern and traditional governmental establishments, as well as within cities, as the presence of *ancienne medina* (old city) and *ville nouvelle* (new city) (Sater, 2010). For

many foreign students, including the author of this study, it is hard to perceive the Moroccan state formation process while studying Moroccan politics. The word *Makhzen* is seen in many publications, yet a universal definition has not been made. Throughout the period I stayed in Morocco, the question "what is Makhzen?" was asked to more than a hundred well-educated and ordinary people in major cities of Morocco, as well as in several little cities. The answers varied more than I had imagined; according to these answers, Makhzen is simply the state as a whole, Malik (King), police, military, and even the head of DGSN. In fact, the word Makhzen (Warehouse) refers to the traditional tax collecting mechanism (Traub, 2012); taxes, which were not only gold or silver but also grains, were gathered in warehouses to keep them safe. However the contemporary meaning of Makhzen is the corps, which includes the King and his advisors. In addition to components of Makhzen, the same notion was recreated by French ethnographers as the directly controlled land in the past; "Bled el Makhzen". On the other side, the mountainous lands and deserts which the King was not able to impose taxes were referred to as "Bled es Siba" where Amazigh tribes were the dominant actor (Deeb, 1996, p. 277; Sater, 2010). According to Waterbury (1970) Makhzen is the stable system of organized violence with reference to the King's monopoly on violence. Meanwhile, James Sater (2010) quoted Hammoudi's definition, which refers to the abstract notion of *Dar al Mulk*, accordingly, Makhzen is Dar al Mulk and possesses a religious dimension. Ironically, while Bled es Siba was refusing the secular authority of the King, they all referenced his religious authority on the grounds of his Sharifian status.

C.R. Pennell (2003) assesses Moroccan history in the scope of ethnic identity. According to him, pre-colonial Morocco must be evaluated as *Tribal Morocco* which consisted of Amazigh dynasties and *Sharifian Morocco* which consisted of Arab-Sharif dynasties. For tribal Morocco, there were two main dynasties that forged the Maghrebi identity, desert-born al-Morabitoun (Almoravids 1069-1147) and mountain-born al-Muwahhidun (Almohads 1147-1269). They were reinforcing their central powers mainly through Jihad, which

depended on coercive acts. These two dynasties were crucially important in two senses; first of all, they had largely indigenous origins and secondly for the first and last time they ensured the unity of entire Maghreb region (Laroui, 1982, p. 15). Both dynasties had underpinned religion for their legitimacy; so were other Amazigh dynasties, Marinids (1258-1420) and Wattasids (1472-1554). Marinid dynasty in Morocco had chosen softer ways to mobilize their population rather than through violence and rigid dogmas. Due to lack of human resources, Marinids had to make an alliance with two religious groups; Ulama and Sharifs. For Sharifian Morocco, it is prudent to say that Sa'adis (1548-1641) and Alaouites (1666-present) have put the last touches on Islamic Morocco. Islamization of politics in Morocco has been launched by Sa'adis through using Sharifian status, and Alaouites have maintained and also reinforced the status (Willis, 2012).

During the Sharifian period of Morocco, Islam emerged as the main determinant of the political field and has dominated simply everything; society, politics, and tradition since then. Islam has been used for legitimacy and sometimes employed against other challenging religious movements and groups (Maghraoui, 2009b). In so far as three main factions of Islam (Sharifian monarch, urban-based Ulama and rural Sufi brotherhoods-Tariqa and Zawiya) were striving for the domination of religious field and ultimately political field. Thus, this *tug of war* over Islam, in the words of Kalpakian (2008b) was inevitable. Kings were supporting all of these strands that were in a conflict against one another, in order to subdue them; by this means Kings were able to consolidate their religious authority (Geertz, 1968, p. 72). This was the reason why popular political Islamist movements such as Moroccan equivalents of Ikhwan al Muslimin or Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) or al-Nahda were not in question until the 1990s (Amghar, 2007). What made this ironic situation is a 1000 years old blend of Islam and Monarchy in the kingdom; despite the fact that from time to time, Salafi movements emerged, they were never able to impose religious dominance over the Monarchy (Combs-Schilling, 1999). As a matter of fact, the Monarchy has never left blank space in the religious field for other power groups to fill in. The

colonial period and independence process were not an exception. *Résidents général de France* has mostly been in an alliance with the *Sharifian King*, so anti-colonial movements were, because nationalism alone was not sufficient to mobilize people in Morocco, as opposed other MENA countries (Mansour, 1996).

Although Morocco is the last and least affected country of colonialism in the region (44 years), even as early as the 1920s and 1930s, several movements emerged and sought independence as two main currents in line with the widespread duality of Morocco: first, the Rabat-oriented Western-inspired, graduated in France elite institutions, also known as Kutlat al Amal al Watani (National Action Bloc) and the Fes-centered Salafi-led Ulama and traditional power groups (Mansour, 1996; Sater, 2010; Willis, 2012). As for the independence, several points must be stressed. The different fraction of anti-colonial movements demonstrated their vision; secular nationalists who were led by Mehdi ben Barka, Mohammed al-Hassan al-Wazzani were influenced by the Turkish Constitutional Revolution in 1908 and the War on Independence in 1919-1922 and even referred to the *Jeune Turc* movement, they called themselves the *Young Moroccans*. On the other hand, Allal al-Fassi led the Salafi-oriented current, which was seeking independence. Maybe the most interesting common ground of these two nationalist blocs is their Salafi-oriented religious discourses for their political ends. Since the Salafi discourse had already been employed against the Amazigh-Sufi alliance against the Makhzen since the reign of Moulay Slimane, and their *Free School Movement* brought prestige to Salafism, this was practiced again in the 1930s against the French-supported Zawiyas by nationalists (Maghraoui, 2009b). Although secular nationalists were seeking a Western model state, they have used Salafi discourse, just like Islamist movements; in order to draw public attention and mobilize them. This *ménage à trois* is best understood by el Mansour's words (1996, p. 63): "While Allal al-Fassi considered the central issue to be how to modernize Islam, al-Wazzani estimated that how to Islamize modernity". Even following the independence, both sides have referred to Sharia and monarchy regarding the source of sovereignty. Dominant status of Islam has

been maintained itself even after independence. King Hassan II has desired to maintain the image of “monarch-saint” a fusion of holy-strong man (Geertz, 1968, p. 88). It is prudent to assert that King Hassan II was the first monarch who formally invented the dual nature of the King and as well as launched the process of institutionalization of religion as the main determinant.

As the main source of power and legitimacy, Islam is fed by two main factions; state Islam (learned in Quaraouiyine and politically represented by PJD) and Sufi-based local Tariqa and Zawiyas (Sater, 2010). Although several groups that shaped the way of Islam, the King-led Makhzen is the supreme, and thus Makhzenite Islam seeks an alliance with other Islamist movements, such as Makhzen-Salafi alliance against Sufi-Amazigh axis and currently the Makhzen-Sufism alliance against Salafi movements. Ulama has been excluded from this equation through bureaucratization processes via the 1962 constitution when the King embraced the title of Amir al-Mu'minin, in other words, Ulama was subdued and lost their autonomy.

In addition to the sources of Islam in Morocco, three main Islamist strands challenge the Makhzenite Islam (Munson, 1993); the *ex-Sufi brotherhood members*; they criticize the Kingdom on the grounds of socio-economic reasons such as unequal distribution of wealth and lack of reforms to that matter, the *mainstreams* ; they are sort of Ikhwan such as Abdesselam Yassine-led JCM (Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane-Justice and Charity Movement), they not only call for reforms but also seek to create a state which is ruled by Islamic principles, and *radicals*; al-Shabiba al-Islamiya-led currents are looking for a revolution against the existing state by violent means. As for these groups, radicals and mainstreams are considered dangerous. Interestingly, the JCM poses a more serious threat than the radicals because the latter are at least known and monitored. Yet the self-isolated political stance of the JCM appears as the blind spot for Makhzen, since they refused to participate in the elections. In other words, the number of people ready to follow the JCM’s orders is uncertain. Although as the most critical movement against King’s Amir al-Mu'minin title, the JCM (because of the former leader,

Abdesselam Yassine embraced also a prophetic lineage) is tolerated but carefully monitored (Amghar, 2007).

In a nutshell, there are several reasons in question regarding the status of Islam as *the leading actor* in Morocco; first of all, Islam can be assumed as a kind of "social cement" which has kept people from different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Secondly, Morocco's location as the far western outpost of the Islamic World has historically lent Jihadi impetus to the people of Morocco, and finally, through monarchical establishments, Islam was reinforced within the socio-political field (Mansour, 1996, p. 53). As for the last factor, Islam has been produced by monarchy over time. As opposed other neighboring nations which modernized into the Western-Secular model, Morocco has never let Islam out of socio-political space. Thus, international Islamist movements such as the Ikhwan al Muslimin or Salafi strands could not dominate society and politics (Combs-Schilling, 1999); although from time to time they gained more room to maneuver with the help of the Monarchy. Islamist movements were not the only axis that was affected by Makhzen's *divide and rule* strategy. Makhzen stirs up disputes among political parties. According to Kalpakian (2008b), politics in Morocco is literally a tug of war; the King is on the one side of the rope and another side there are numerous political fractions which all try to challenge the King and each other.

3.2) RADICALISM IN THE KINGDOM

3.2.1) The Rise of Radicalism

Radical thoughts can be observed in all Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia) throughout history and even up until now. Almost all countries in this region had and have to confront their own radical Islamic militant oppositions, such as Algeria since the mid-1970s (Echeverria, 2004, p. 352). Morocco was not an exception. Despite the Moroccan authorities' rejections regarding the connection between terrorism and country's poor socio-economic conditions (Miller & Bower, 2010, p. 500), there is an

undeniable reality which indicates that the country has turned into a terrorist hub over the last decade, as it provides more than 1500 fighters in Syria (Masbah, 2015). Even three Moroccan Guantanamo detainees—Abu Ahmad al Maghribi, Abu Ahmad al Muhajir, and Ibrahim Benchekroune—have founded the "Harakat Sham al-Islam" in Syria as part of the AQAM (Roggio, 2016).

On the eve of the millennium, the situation that drives people towards radicalization deepened, such as the high level of illiteracy. Specifically, illiteracy rate among women was strikingly high; 42% in urban, 82% in rural zones (Bordat & Kouzzi, 2004). Furthermore, the growing unemployed masses, increasing inequality of income, corruption in administrative bodies, social exclusion in urban areas which were densely populated, and lack of political participation along with a lack of civil society that prevented active political participation may be considered as socio-economic reasons for Moroccan radicalism which ensure a *breeding ground* for extremism in the Kingdom (Martin-Munoz, 2000; McDermott, 2005). Considering that all these hardships with King Hassan II's effective use of his political power, there was a common expectation that the situation would eventually lead to huge civil commotion and unrest. Along with this concern regarding mass protests, after 9/11, the conventional wisdom in international politics claimed that rise of radicalism inevitably brings about terrorism (Echeverria, 2004, p. 359).

Despite the existence and dominance of the Moroccan interpretation of Islam, which was indeed revolving around Maliki School, Ash-ari Doctrine and Sunni-Sufism (Kalpakian, 2008a) this country has also experienced an extremist interpretation of Islam and it has turned the country into a harbor for radicalization. Ironically the spread of extremism has coincided with the rising of the regime's support in favor of Wahhabism in order to take advantage of their strong and passionate religious background, principles, as well as methodology (Alonso & Rey, 2007, pp. 572-573). The Salafi Movement in the Kingdom was influential for a long time, due to their refusal of the French Administration's education enforcements and the inauguration of their own school based on

religious education within the scope of “Free School Movement” (Damis, 1975, p. 81). Throughout the Cold War, ideological clashes among the two blocs have been witnessed in almost all countries in the world, in a form of leftist-rightist division. Besides the Cold War’s division, after the Iranian Revolution, Afghan-Soviet War in 1979 and Holy Qaba Occupation led by Juhayman al-Otaibi in 1979 (Shahzad, 2011), international community and Muslim countries in particular have realized that they had to face the rising new threat against their regimes: political Islam which aimed to overthrow the incumbent regimes and to seize the power. Despite the religious ideas originating from the Iranian Revolution were bound up with the Shia School, which constitutes approximately 10-13% of the entire Muslim population in the World (Pew, 2009), Muslim regimes have begun to resist the spread of the Shia's effect towards their homelands just as King Hassan II claimed that the ideas coming from revolution were the potential threat to the stability of the Kingdom (Maghraoui, 2009b). King Hassan II has already aimed to promote relations with Saudi Arabia which was the bastion of Salafi-Wahhabi thought, not only to halt the Cold War’s demolisher effects upon domestic politics but also to foil the spreading of Shia thought. Even philosophy departments at the universities had been shut down and replaced by theology departments in order to fight against socialism and Shiism. In return for promoting Wahhabism in the country, Morocco was able to receive financial assistance from Saudi Arabia. In sum, Wahhabism has been allowed and embraced by the monarchy as an ideological tool in favor of halting the spread of Communism and Shia thought as well as enjoying financial assistant from Saudi Arabia (Alonso & Rey, 2007).

In addition to official support to Wahhabism in the late 1970s onward, Morocco and the Moroccan people were not complete strangers to Salafism and Wahhabism. During the reign of Moulay Slimane (1792-1822), the first Wahhabi thoughts had spread to the country courtesy of Moulay Slimane’s policies. Throughout the early period of Moulay Slimane, Morocco has had to endure drought, plague (Mansour, 1990) as well as the ruinous effects of the French

Revolution. European maritime trade interdiction had been officially declared by the King, in order to prevent spreading plague and also the ideas rising from the French Revolution. Nevertheless, the biggest threat that Moulay Slimane had to deal with was coming from inside the country. Amazigh Tribes led by Abou-Bakr Mhawesh had begun an uprising against Moulay Slimane in the Atlas Mountains. In so far as Abou-Bakr has embraced Sharifian descendant, just as Moulay Slimane did, rebels were able to receive the supports from Zawiyas. Eventually, this confrontation led to Moulay Slimane's anti-Amazigh and Zawiya policies, because this uprising has gradually turned into a political movement that stood against Makhzenite state formation (Geertz, 1968). Moulay Slimane's first reaction was to turn back to the years before his reign. He had studied theology in *Tafilalet*, before he ascended a throne (Combs-Schilling, 1989) and he has embraced (methodologically) the teachings of Mohammed ibn abd al-Wahhab by coming into contact with pilgrims from Mecca, although he was remaining loyal to Ash-ari doctrine (Mansour, 1990, p. 138).

Moulay Slimane has taken advantage of the anti-saintly attitudes of Wahhabism, against Zawiyas that were recognized as *chief bid'a* by Wahhabism, and also which were major ally of the Amazigh Tribes against Makhzen. In other words, Moulay Slimane's attacks against the saintly institutions meant attacking Amazigh revolts. In conclusion, Wahhabism was an opportunistic mean for Moulay Slimane and his anti-Amazigh policies due to its anti-saintly stance against Zawiya-Amazigh Tribes settlement, which was evolving toward military alliance.

3.2.2) Terror Groups

Religiously motivated terrorism was not a new phenomenon in Morocco; there have been always pro-violent factions of Islamist movements in the Kingdom since the mid-1970s. Prior to the Casablanca Attacks, members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) shot two Spanish tourists in Marrakech in 1994. In addition, the group of radical Islamists who called themselves as "Moroccan-Afghans" conducted several attacks in various cities

and targets in the Kingdom throughout the early 1990s, the targets have included a McDonald's in Casablanca, and a bank in Oujda (Echeverria, 2004, p. 358).

AQAM cells internationally have directed their attacks to so-called apostates, following the declaration of War on Terror in 2001. Morocco was not an exception and figures indicated that even as early as between 2002 and 2004 there were 166 civilians killed in the attacks performed by individuals or small squads against tourists, Jewish and so-called apostates (Belaala, 2004).

Although Morocco has appeared safe from terrorism since 2011, it is still, in fact, home to a huge source of Jihadi individuals. In parallel with contemporary trends, numerous Moroccan extremists are self-radicalized and self-trained, also known as homegrown (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 453), and considering that the third largest group of foreign fighters in Syria has Moroccan origin, this assertion sounds reasonable. Moreover, news sources constantly report *dismantled terror cells* news in the country. According to Mohamed Moufakir, Moroccan official, 168 terror cells have been foiled by the security forces since 9/11 (AsharqAlAwsat, 2016; Igrouane, 2017).

There were three main terror groups in the wake of Casablanca Attacks in question; (US Department of State, 2006; Alonso & Rey, 2007; Kalpakian, 2008a, pp. 460-471; Kalpakian, 2016)

- **The Ansar al-Mahdi Organizations (2006):** The name of the organization was derived from the messianic figure in Shia tradition; Mahdi (meaning 'the rightly guided one'). Hassan Khattab, leader of the Ansar al-Mahdi, was arrested within the scope of the counterterrorism campaign following the Casablanca attacks; he possibly chose his *radical* way during his restriction in prison. He and his followers were members of the wealthy and military class, on contrary to the most depressed part of society. At least five military members and four women from *Anfa* -a high-class district in Casablanca- including two *Royal Air Maroc*-state's airline company-pilots' wives were in the cadre of Ansar al-Mahdi.

- **Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain/Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (2007):** The Sa'ad al-Husseini led group espoused the same ideology as Al Qaeda and the cell which conducted the 2003 attacks. Therefore, this group can be assumed as AQAM and specifically connected with the AQIM. Al-Husseini radicalized during his long journey in Spain and Afghanistan from 1995 until 2001. He was accused of being involved in the Casablanca and Madrid bombings on the ground that his field of expertise as a chemist and physics graduate (Institute, 2015). Security forces were able to thwart the attacks planned by this cell through a days-long siege following the execution of wire-tapping provisions of the counterterrorism law.
- **The Belliraj Organization (2008):** This dates back to the al-Shabiba al-Islamiyah (Islamic Youth). It was divided into several factions. The first of these factions is the current ruling party PJD and another one became the Belliraj in his leader's exile in Belgium but it was inspired more by the armed wing of the al-Shabiba Islamiyah, Jund al-Islam. Belliraj officially formed in 1992 by the Belgian-Moroccan citizen Abd-el-Kader Belliraj. When Belliraj and other member were arrested, the profiles of the accused terrorists were quite shocking. Only four of them were working in traditional or low-profile jobs, while the rest of them were professors, teachers, merchants, journalists, managers, and so on. In other words, the most distinctive feature of this group is their high level of education and good social standings. Robbery and smuggling made the organization self-contained. They have conducted attacks on leading Moroccans and Jewish community members. Belliraj has attempted to connect with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Algerian Group for Preaching in Algeria and, for sure, Al Qaeda. Besides, Belliraj himself was an important informant for Belgian security forces, and, with his help, one major terror attack was thwarted.

Al Qaeda franchises in Morocco were in touch with Al Qaeda Central and/or other franchises, just as any and all local Al Qaeda organizations would be. For

instance, Mohammed Fezazi was in contact with the Hamburg cell, and Sa'ad al-Husseini has been in several countries where he possibly got in touch with other Jihadi circles (Kalpakian, 2016).

Along with these groups, many groups have conducted radical discourses, which made them *suspect*. For example, another offshoot of al-Salafiya al-Jihadiya, as-Sirat al-Mustaqim (The right path) is also under the security body's investigation. Even today, *dismantling terror cells* themed news are not rare, and dismantled terror cells' characteristics and their detected equipment indicate how the threat is getting more and more dangerous. According to writer Charlotte Beale of The Independent (2016), one of the terror cells, recently dissolved by security forces, had been planning an attack via chemical materials. In parallel with other 35-years old real estate agent-led cell have composed of 10 members including French National and Graduated members, as opposed to poorer, unemployed groups of people.

3.3) PLANNING AND PERPETRATORS PROFILE

The planning phase of the 2003 attacks started in Karian Toma/ Sidi Moumen, *bidonville* in the most depressed district of Casablanca, six months before the multiple attacks. Karian Toma provided a backdrop for the perpetrators due to its features which were almost impossible for the local police to control, such as the highest rates of unemployment and illiteracy, as well as serving as host to some of the most senior terrorists (Kalpakian, 2005). 14 young men who had been recruited several weeks prior were trained in gradual training. All these recruits had left school at early ages and lived in dense, unfortunate conditions; despite the fact that some of these recruits had been working in extremely low level jobs, the majority of them were unemployed.

The training of these perpetrators consisted of two phases; ideological and physical. The ideological training phase consisted of lectures given by leading Salafi theologians who were interpreting Salafi-Wahhabi thoughts in a rigorist way, among these leading theologians were Mohammed Fezazi, Omar Hadoushi,

and Abd el-Karim al-Shadili (Alonso & Rey, 2007, pp. 572-575). Recruits were trained to fight against apostate Moroccan society and State. In the physical training phase, fitness training was conducted by Rashid Jalil, martial art expert, in a camp located in *Oued el-Mellah*, near Karian Toma, 30 km away from the Casablanca downtown area (Kalpakian, 2016). In the wake of training, relevant information about bomb making was downloaded in a nearby cybercafé and translated into English by volunteer members of the cell. As a matter of fact, the 14th of May was chosen for multiple suicide attacks, due to its significance as the anniversary of the Moroccan Armed Forces. However, due to a delay, they chose the 16th of May to strike (Attaoui, 2003; Kalpakian, 2016).

On the 16th of May, the squad split into four teams to attack previously selected places; the first team, comprised of Mohammed Hasouna, Mohammed el-Arabaoui, Elarousi Mohammed and Khalid Benmousa, headed to *Casa Espana*-the Spanish cultural center, the second team, comprised of Said Ubaid, Yousef Kawthari, and Adel el-Tay'yia, headed to *Bouziatno Restaurant*-located opposite of the Belgian Consulate and owned by a Jewish businessman, the third team, comprised of Mohammed Mehni, Khalid el-Tay'ib, Abdel Rahim Oulad el-Dower, and Rashid Jalil, headed to the *Jewish Community Center* yet they planned on attacking the Jewish cemetery 50 meters away from the JCC, and the fourth team, comprised of Hassan Taoussi, Hassan Asmar, Mohammed el-Omari, and Abdel Fatah Bouqaidan, self-proclaimed leader of the cell headed to the *Farah Hotel* (currently known as Tulip Farah Casablanca)-commonly used by tourists and businessmen. At the end of the day, 41 people including the perpetrators were killed and dozens of them were wounded (Bright & Harris, 2003; Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 576).

The Al Qaeda link to these multiple attacks was in question for a long time. General Hamidou Laanigri, head of the former Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST)—now Direction Général de Surêté Nationale (DGSN), claimed that Al Qaeda and its inner circle had assisted in these attacks by means of financial support and in aiding the planning phase via a meeting held

in Istanbul (Aujord'hui, 2004) Despite the strong and verified links between the Casablanca-Madrid attacks and the Al Qaeda connection (Schweitzer & Goldstein-Ferber, 2005), given the fact that Al Qaeda is an umbrella organization that led the way and allowed locals to wage their own Jihad, it can be understood that Al Qaeda does not need to have direct involvement in these attacks to still be connected. Also as Kalpakian (2005, p. 120) says there is a remarkable difference between Al Qaeda and Al Salafiya Al Jihadiya's actions in terms of scale, tools, trainings and targets.

According to three arrested perpetrators who fled during the last minute of the attacks, targets that were seen as apostate and corrupt against the Moroccan State had been deliberately selected (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 577). On the other hand, all targets were places popular with international tourists (except the Jewish Community Center). Since tourism is one of the main engines of their economy, targeting tourism inextricably affects the economy of the Kingdom (Kalpakian, 2016).

In March and April 2007, a sequence of relatively unsuccessful terror attacks had taken place in Casablanca. Perpetrators had been influenced by bin Laden's criticism against Arab rulers, and King Mohammed VI in particular (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 580). As the leader of the GICM cell which is one of the two offshoots of Al Salafiya Al Jihadiya, Sa'ad al-Husseini who was the chemist in charge of the Casablanca and Madrid bombings were arrested in a cybercafé in Casablanca in February of 2007. As a result of his interrogation, the cell under his supervision was dismantled. Abd al-Aziz Benzain who was acting as a courier between al-Husseini and the cells was arrested shortly after al-Husseini. Abd al-Fatah al-Riadi panicked and blew himself up with homemade explosives in Sidi Moumen after a cautious cybercafé owner noticed his nervous attitude (FDD, 2008). On the 23rd of March, advanced investigations reached Abd al-Aziz Rakesh, and he surrendered. In the second wave of *failed* attacks in 2007 took place during April 9th through the 11th. Mohammed Mantala was shot dead by police in front of his house. Shortly after, Mohammed al-Rashdi blew himself up

on a roof. Ayoub al-Riadi, brother of Abd al-Fatah al-Riadi, pulled the pin of his suicide belt next to a police officer and the explosion killed both. Said Belwad planned to attack the head of the security forces which were laying siege to terror cells, but he failed. Samir al-Shami was captured by locals after two days of hiding. Yet two more members of the cell were missing. Mohammed and Omar Maha brothers headed to the American Consulate in Casablanca, but when they detonated their bombs they only killed themselves without causing any casualties (Kalpakian, 2008a; Kalpakian, 2016).

As opposed the perpetrators' profile in 2003 bombings, these seven members all were employed and did not suffer from a lack of economic opportunities. They were all members of the entrepreneur class, small businessmen and self-employed.

Top seats of the organizations were occupied by people who were well-educated, well-travelled, and maintained international connection. As opposed to the leaders of the organization, the foot-soldiers were mostly from disadvantageous strata in a larger society, not necessarily the bottom side of the society but on the lower end of the economic and cultural spectrum. Most of them who were arrested following the 2003 bombings were either unemployed or working low-level irregular jobs in the urban area, in other words, they were a component of the informal economy of the country (Kalpakian, 2016). Yet it was different from the context of the 2007 bombings.

However, according to Kalpakian (2016) following the 2003 and 2007 terror attacks, AQAM cells in Morocco had lost their ability to attack first, rather their first mission—even before waging Jihad—was to keep their cells intact. In other words, it was prudent to say that the counterterrorism law and its provisions that allowed wire-tapping were effective in dissolving terror cells before they could attack.

3.4) STATE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

3.4.1) Changing Security Policies

The Casablanca Attacks tarnished the country's reputation, which had been viewed as more moderate and tolerant, and Morocco immediately took measures to reassure the reputation of the country and stabilize the situation (Kalpakian, 2005; Maghraoui, 2009b). Although the physical damage of the attacks in 2003 was relatively minor in comparison with the terror attacks in neighboring countries in terms of scale, sequence and density; the consequences had still affected the judicial, socio-political and religious fields thoroughly.

Since the Casablanca bombings were perceived as the challenge to the King's indisputable religious preponderance, the incident had caused profound changes on the government's views on terrorism and radical Islamism (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 453). Moroccan State discourse on terrorism evolved to define terrorism as the acts of religiously motivated violent movements, which were obviously Islamist terrorism (Bartolucci, 2014).

It must be noted that in here, as Kalpakian (2016) emphasized, the rising radical Islamic threat was not only challenging the monarchical establishment but also posed a threat to the tourism industry upon which millions of Moroccans deeply depended on. A few days after the Casablanca attacks, ¼ of all hotel reservations were canceled. As a result, the general public was strongly in favor of a government response towards this threat to their lives and their livelihoods. Therefore, the Moroccan government was able to gain public support in parallel with her counterterrorism measures. Research conducted by the Al Akhawayn University indicates that the great majority of people in Morocco were in favor of the government's counterterrorism strategies (Hamelin, et al., 2010). Thus, all counterterrorism measures must be considered in line with economic concerns beside highly political issues such as the King's supremacy on politics.

Morocco's changing views on terrorism and radical Islam inevitably determined the priority of effective measures that would be taken following the

attack. Due to this challenge to the King's religious authority, the first vital step was to reassert the religious leadership of the King, prior to addressing the political and socio-economic problems (Wainscott, 2015, p. 642). King Mohammed VI launched a multifaceted strategy against terrorism and more general *radicalism*, yet what makes his counterterrorism strategy unique is the decision to wage an *intellectual war* against radicalism (Charai, 2015a). As opposed to GWOT, Morocco's counterterrorism strategy was an amalgamation of secular and religious *voluntas*.

The first reaction of the Kingdom consisted of two logical instruments; in order to address the terror incident they developed a security apparatus and since it was conducted by religiously-motivated people, they launched several reforms in religious fields. Furthermore, they also reassessed the socio-political issues, which had served as the catalysts for radicalization (though not a direct cause). These are a rearrangement of the legal arsenal as well as a reorientation of the socio-economic and political field. Yet, the Islamization of the politics by all sorts of non-violent Islamist parties and movements would not be welcomed because according to Moroccan decision-makers this would possibly challenge the society, which certainly hinged on the preeminence of the King (Albrecht & Wegner, 2006). In other words, the real threat is the weakening of the regime through the rise of peaceful opposition that challenges the King's full political preponderance, and inevitably encouraging the radical Islamist fractions to follow suit (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 583). Despite the State's harsh and unflinching attitudes against Islamists, there were indeed political integration policies in place for Islamists. PJD-led integration was formulated in accordance with a two-sided strategy; firstly non-radical Islamists were dragged into a legal political arena where they could easily be controlled, and secondly, the Islamist movements that were engaged in politics were used as leverage against politically self-isolated movements like JCM (Malka & Alterman, 2006). Country's multidimensional counter radicalization strategy was echoed by the King's speech in 2003. Tri-columned strategy which aimed to form a "good citizen" has political,

socioeconomic, and religious focus (King Mohammed VI, 2003). However religious focus was far more substantial, since the radicalization process was strongly relied on “marginal interpretation of Islam” (Wainscott, 2015, p. 641).

At this point it should be noted that Morocco’s counterterrorism strategy was not a“one-shot” project, rather it was an evolvable process. The creation of the BCIJ (Bureau central d'investigation judiciaire-Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations) was one of the most significant pieces of evidence regarding this claim. The BCIJ, as the Moroccan equivalent of the American FBI, was established as the armed branch of the DGST (Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire- General Directorate for Territorial Surveillance) in 2015, in line with current needs related to the rise of global terrorism. Although counter radicalization strategy has accomplished many missions, there is still grave concern pertaining to clandestine terror cells across the country, thus the BCIJ was created for early detection through human and technical intelligence (HuffPostMaroc, 2016).

Morocco assumes security as a collective phenomenon, therefore, they did not only rely on counterterrorism measures domestically but also focused on strengthening international cooperation (AfricaResearchBulletin, 2014). Following the Casablanca, Madrid and London bombings, European security awareness has also been oriented towards international cooperation and North African countries-Morocco in particular-have gained importance due to the rise of AQIM in the region (European Council, 2004; The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, 2008, p.10; Miller & Bower, 2010). Hence, the EU and USA have been encouraging Morocco, which was considered as the gateway to Europe, in her counterterrorism strategies that were religiously oriented and multifaceted. Moreover, the EU and USA improved their bilateral and multilateral relations, as evidenced by their signing free trade agreements and the declaration of Morocco as a preferential non-NATO ally (Sendagorta, 2005; NATO, 2017). In addition, close cooperation, in terms of intelligence sharing and judicial procedures, and social development programs specifically among Spain, France, and Morocco

have been launched and augmented, and institutional know-how transfer processes were started such as the modernization of the Moroccan Royal Gendarmerie and police forces by Western allies of the Kingdom (Echeverria, 2004; Miller & Bower, 2010; Tamek, 2014).

In summation, Moroccan decision-makers were well aware that the damage had already been done. However, they concluded that adopting a prudent and comprehensive approach might at least contain it. They simultaneously launched several, well-connected reforms aimed at the root causes of these demoralizing events. In 2003, Morocco did not anticipate these multiple attacks, therefore the devastation was considerably high in terms of psychological effects to both the decision-makers as well as the civilian population as a whole, yet in 2007 thanks to this new approach, and the watchfulness of the government, the perpetrators of the attacks were not able to harm any more people (and, in some instances, only ended up hurting themselves). Nevertheless, the major shifts in policies and policy-making are the overall change of perspective regarding religious extremism and the confidence of being immune to radical political problems, which were the main concern in the region. Also, despite the accusations of some prominent Islamist politicians regarding increasing coordination with Spain, France, USA, UK, and Belgium rendered the country as a legitimate target for Jihadi groups (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 587), Moroccan decision-makers have already predicted that without international cooperation, fighting against terrorism would meet the same fate as the American GWOT.

3.4.2 Reforms in Legislative and Military Field

Following the Casablanca Attacks, the first thing that the government did was to start the decentralization of police forces and the professionalization of the security forces. Accordingly, the presence of professional security forces in public, especially in the most depressed areas was increased. Furthermore, the security in potential targets, such as hotels, clubs, airports, and diplomatic buildings were consolidated (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 584). This was later institutionalized under the name of *Operation Hadar* which was employed

alongside with the main security strategy. Operation Hadar is mainly conducted by patrolling squads in strategic locations, in order to protect civilians and deter terrorists (Vásquez, 2015). Hadar squads are comprised of three heavily armed members of Royal Gendarmerie, Royal Armed Forces, and Police Forces, members of which were trained in the purpose of counterterrorism missions. In major cities, Casablanca, Marrakech, Rabat, Fes, Agadir, Meknes, Tangier and Tetouan-Martil Hadar security forces are seen in strategic locations such as town squares, governmental buildings and even beaches and clubs to serve as watchdogs. Morocco also ensured the enrichment of the legal arsenal in order to reinforce security apparatus such as DGSN.

Today in Morocco, all of the banks lock their doors, even during the daytime. The security guard unlocks the door in case anyone needs to get inside of the bank in order to run his/her financial affairs. This implication launched after these counterterrorism measures. This practice ensures that the banks can maintain secure operations. Specifically against the Belliraj organization, since this group finances their terrorist operations via bank robbery.

The most palpable step was the Counterterrorism Bill No 03.2003 which was unanimously adopted by the Parliament and come into force following the attacks that occurred on the 29th May 2003 by the Dahir (Royal Decree). This bill can be regarded along the same lines as the US Patriot Act. It was seen as potentially the most successful means of fighting against terrorism. The Counterterrorism Bill resulted in a tough counter and anti-terrorism campaign which brought a widespread crackdown in which approximately 5000 people who had been associated with the Saudi-inspired Wahhabism were arrested as potential suspects (Blanche, 2007; Maghraoui, 2009b). However, human rights activists came out strongly against this law (HRW, 2005). Islamists also opposed the law, due to its potential arbitrary enforcement of the law (Kalpakian, 2011a). The reason why the Counterterrorism Bill draws attention in negative ways is its broad definition of terrorism; the “main objective is to disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror” (HRW, 2005, p. 12; Bartolucci, 2014,

p. 13). In other words, Bill 03.2003 is prone to define and include all sorts of political violence as terrorism. Besides, critics targeting Bill 03.2003 go along with the grave concerns that the possibility of reversing this public reconciliation as well as the recent acquisition of human rights. Despite the fact that Bill 03.2003 does not allow its security apparatus to torture, solidarity associations for terror-related prisoners denounce the videos and interviews that provide proof that prisoners had been tortured (Erlanger, 2009). Specifically, many reports and cases made note of the notorious compound in Temara, Rabat that was used by CIA and Moroccan security institutions to interrogate suspects (AmnestyInternational, 2004; Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 584; Alami, 2010).

However, it is an undeniable fact that the Bill 03.2003 has proven the effectiveness of strengthening its investigatory power as a preventative measure, and its usefulness as a deterrent against terrorism. This partially because of the fact that this bill sets penalties for terror involvement, ranging from two years in prison to a life sentence and even capital punishment. Involvement in terror includes terrorist propaganda in sermons or speechmaking in public, in publishing and distributing materials, displaying them into public places and meetings, as well as on social media (Kalpakian, 2008a; Kalpakian, 2011b). Despite the fact that capital punishment has been dormant since 1986 (Kalpakian, 2011a, p. 3), considering the high level of public outrage following the attacks, it should not be a surprise for anyone to see the implementation of capital punishment. Also, Bill 03.2003 extended the duration of detention from eight days to twelve days with two days without recourse to a judge, in the case of terrorism involvement (HRW, 2005; Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 584; Kalpakian, 2011b, p. 125). Moreover, Bill 03.2003 states that all assets and properties of those who have involved terror-related crimes can be frozen or confiscated by the state (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 458).

In addition to the measures taken as mentioned above, the Bill 03.2003 includes a controversial wire-tapping provision. This point is vital because, in terms of de facto effects, wire-tapping strengthens the security forces' hand in

dismantling terror cells which had remained intact even after the investigations following the 2003 Attacks. In fact, wire-tapping foiled the Casablanca attacks in March and April of 2007 that possibly would have caused a high death toll otherwise. Security forces captured the Sa'ad El-Husseini-led AQIM cell through utilization of Bill 03.2003, which permitted them to launch this wire-tapping process (Kalpakian, 2011a, p. 3; Kalpakian, 2011b, p. 125).

3.4.3) Reforms in Socio-Economic and Political Field

As Francis Fukuyama emphasizes in his book '*State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*', the best way to fight against terrorism and other sorts of *evils* are to ensure a stable, well-governed, and self-contained state (Fukuyama, 2004). Although there is no causal relationship between terror and poverty, in order to keep people away from radicalism (which poverty certainly helps breed, at the very least), they must be rescued from the grip of poor living conditions through the implementation of socio-economic and political reforms.

These serious socio-economic hardships facilitate radicalization of the people who have been suffering from the lack of acceptable economic and social conditions. In other words, this process provides the backdrop for Salafi-Jihadi ideas that targeted the "apostate" (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 574). Many have already blamed poverty and frustration as the reason for the series of attacks in the first place. Tangier and other northern cities, as well as Casablanca -specifically some districts such as Beni Makadah, Al Daraib, Kastia, Hay Ben Salah, Sidi Moumen and Hay Saddam- are regarded as the strongholds of radicalism in the Kingdom. Although it cannot be emphasized enough that the only reason of radicalization is poverty, there is a consensus that the rampant level of unemployment and the depressed conditions that the youth endure provides fertile ground for extremist leaders' recruitment campaigns. For instance, martyrdom becomes an attractive reward for those who have been living an underdeveloped life, just as it occurred to the 2003 Casablanca bombers. Under these circumstances, 53% of the youth planned to emigrate because the overall unemployment rate had increased to 15% and, in particular, the youth

unemployment rate had increased to almost 24% (TheWorldBank, 2017; TradingEconomics, 2017). Viewed through this lens of poverty, suicide could be seen as encouragement to reverse their destiny, if they could not succeed in the poverty-stricken conditions of their regular lives, they could at least be winners in heaven (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 575).

Morocco's reforms in the political field have been highly influenced by the Algerian experience, while it was redeveloping. Following the 1991 elections, the previous government did not acknowledge the Algerian Islamists that won the election and tension between the Islamists and the Algerian Army began to rise. Moroccan decision-makers watched this tension-filled process and took lessons from this experience and thusly shaped their dual strategy. According to this strategy, non-violent Islamists were going to be contained through the promotion of their participation in legal political process, along with this; radical fractions were going to be suppressed via counterterrorism measures, or as Albrecht & Wagner (2006) claims "politics of protracted mutual challenge".

Despite the socio-political development programs that were already in the State's agenda, the Casablanca Attacks accelerated the need for their implementation (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 460). Morocco's socio-political reforms include an *advanced regionalization* program in terms of empowerment of local administrations, in order to prevent the exclusion and marginalization of various communities and groups (Tamek, 2014). Local administrations were not the only actors empowered by advanced regionalization, local security forces were reinforced in terms of legal and professional aspects as well. It was aimed to reach locals whom mostly maintain lower levels of interaction with the State. Another benefit of this advanced regionalization strategy is that it provides more eyes and ears for the BCIJ**.**

One of the most symbolic reforms takes part in the *Moudawana* (Civil Code). The King ordered Parliament for the reformation of the Moudawana in 2003, several months following the Casablanca Attacks (Echeverria, 2004, p.

360). Although reformation of the Moudawana was already in question -in line with King Mohammed VI's reform agenda- due to widespread Islamist and official clergy opposition, it was delayed until the breaking point of the Casablanca Attacks. Together with the reforms in the Moudawana, human rights -and women's rights in particular- were empowered. For example, the age of marriage was increased to 18 from 15 and unilateral divorce was made difficult (Kingdom of Morocco, 2004). While the reformation of the Moudawana was a praiseworthy step forward; nevertheless, according to Maghraoui, the implementation of the Moudawana is still not compatible with equality in terms of marriage, divorce, and inheritance (Maghraoui, 2009a).

The national reconciliation process was another symbolic but important initiative that was applauded by Morocco's European partners (Malka & Alterman, 2006). As a unique body in the region, the IER (instance équité et reconciliation-Equity and Reconciliation Commission) was established in order to observe human rights abuses in the wake of terror investigations as well as abuses that occurred in previous decades (Harter, 2005).

Aside from political reforms, there is another aspect of Fukuyama's advice to take into consideration regarding social development. With development of social infrastructure in mind, King Mohammed VI announced on May 18th 2005, the creation of the INDH (initiative nationale de développement humain-National Human Development Initiative), created with the intent of fighting against poverty and deprivation through the actualization of capacity-building, socio-cultural animation, basic infrastructure projects and job-creating activities in 360 urban areas and 250 rural areas. The INDH planned on two stages of development; the first of which would take place in 2005-2010 and the second in 2011-2015. In these stages, they would focus on fighting against rural poverty and social exclusions in urban areas, as well as ameliorating the conditions of disadvantageous groups in the Kingdom (INDH, 2017). The total budget of the INDH was estimated at roughly 30 billion Dirhams (approximately 3 billion Euros) in both stages. The Kingdom provided 60% of funding, another 20% of the

funding came from local administrations and the rest came from foreign donors (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 460; TheWorldBank, 2017). There are also independent, rural and urban development programs in terms of targeting housing conditions. In order to eradicate slums, there is another independent program called the *Ville sans Bidonvilles* (VSB-Cities without slums), which was declared in 2004 and initially included 56 cities out of a total of 85 targeted cities across the Kingdom and planned to affect 380.714 households. The total cost of the program was estimated at 32 billion Dirhams (approximately 3.2 billion Euros) (MHPV, 2017). In another type of social development implication, the *Dar el Muwateen* (Home of People) must be made note of here. It was created by the Ministry of Social Development in Sidi Moumen to fight against public depression, which was a result of a lack of social development and poor economic conditions, through organizing cultural events, developing literacy programs and providing micro-credits (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 585).

Despite the fact that criticisms against the VSB project and its characteristics that resemble "central economic planning" (OPIC, 2006, p. 6)—as well as the wikileaks revealing of the US embassy's assessment of the "corruption" of this project (Kalpakian, 2011a, p. 4)—the project fulfills urgent needs as the most visible instrument that officials have on hand, just as Kalpakian underlines (Kalpakian, 2011b, p. 126). The INDH and VSB are accepted as successful social development programs; although they were put in place and designated in order to enrich some specific construction companies, in addition to their failure to fully achieve every aspect of their missions (Malka & Alterman, 2006). Specifically, literacy programs across the Kingdom were fruitful in order to fights against illiteracy, as the UNDP's Human Development Reports demonstrate, the illiteracy rate among adults in Morocco decreased consistently. For instance, in 2011, the literacy rate was 67.1 % and by the end of 2015, the adult literacy rate increased up to 72.4 % (UNDP, 2016).

Morocco achieved many of its socio-political goals, including the enhancement of human rights and reconciliation. These programs and

achievements have also been encouraged by the EU and USA. as substantial partners of Morocco in fighting against global terrorism (Miller & Bower, 2010). However, it still cannot be claimed that the level of human rights is at the anticipated or acceptable level. The '*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015*', prepared by the US Department of State, indicates that Morocco still needs to improve its human rights conditions (U.S. Department of State, 2016). Nevertheless, human right abuses are not a catalyst to change the future of the Western strategic partnership, so long as their main concern is stability and security in the region.

3.4.4) Reforms in the Religious Field

Along with the multifaceted counterterrorism strategy which can be defined as the composition of reforms to law enforcement agencies and statutory measures, as well as socio-political reforms following the Casablanca Attacks, reforms in religious field was far more substantial for the Kingdom, since the State discourse underlines, in parallel with Olivier Roy's *Islamization of Radicalism* (2016), a focal point of the counterterrorism strategy was the *reforms in the religious field*. In addition to the state discourse, Morocco is a country which undeniably embraced Islam as the major source of legitimacy; accordingly, the religious field cannot be immune of these reforms.

The Kingdom drew a circular path as they planned reforms in the religious field. According to this circular path, which aimed at creating and emphasizing a national denominational line, all reforms must revolve around the Maliki School, Ash'ari doctrine and Sunni-Sufism (Kalpakian, 2008a; Maghraoui, 2009b). In order to create a moderate and tolerant Islam as well as the reassertion of the *professionalization of religion*, or in more general terms; *the state monopoly on religion*, reforms aimed at promoting a more traditional, moderate and tolerant version of Islam in the Kingdom. Through this, it will prevent *vacant spaces* in the religious field that could potentially be filled by distractive and destabilizing streams or groups which promote a more radical interpretation of Islam. With this in mind, Morocco launched religious reforms built upon two main pillars; first, to

ensure full control over religious education and also the inclusion of women into religious processes. The involvement of women should be emphasized because it makes Moroccan religious reforms unique in the MENA region.

Religious reforms were taken into consideration as a component of a larger series of reforms that were intertwined with one another. These include reforms designed to address the issues of human development, media, education, and the civil code. These reforms are better referred to as “a process of reorientation and restructuring” rather than deemed secularizations (Maghraoui, 2009b, p. 202).

GWOT brought about a vilification of Islamic education, which has been regarded as the main engine of radicalism for quite a long time. This point of view has forced governments and institutions across the world to reassess the effects and the values of Islamic education (Wainscott, 2015, p. 635). In a different case, journalist Sabrina Tavernise's fruitful article regarding the role of uncontrolled religious education in causing significant instability in Pakistan evaluated this dynamic's role (Tavernise, 2009). Concurrently, Morocco was at stake too, and thus religious education was reassessed in accordance with this newly emergent trend.

However, even before the Casablanca Attacks, Morocco was planning on undertaking a reorientation of religious education; the terror attacks provided the impetus that was needed to fully take on this task (Wainscott, 2015). In 1999, the *Charte Nationale d'Education et de Formation* otherwise known as the National Charter for Education and Training which had been initially prepared under the rule of Hassan II but was more fully realized under the rule of Mohammed VI, was declared and it indicated that large-scale reforms must be accomplished in parallel with the State’s own interests and needs. The major goals of the reforms were to make sure that the Islamic faith was at the center of education, to form a decent citizen, and to spread open-mindedness, tolerance and to ensure creativity (Royaume du Maroc Ministère de l'éducation Nationale, 1999). In conjunction

with the Charter, His Majesty delivered a speech to Parliament and outlined a definition of “a decent citizen” as confident, patriotic in terms of embracing his identity, and well-aware of civic obligations and local facts (King Mohammed VI, 1999).

Reforms in the religious arena might be categorized into two sections; reforms that were physically observable in the short-term, and the more abstract, middle-to-long-term reforms which aimed at ensuring the reorientation of the religious space at an intellectual level. The latter long-term reforms include the ones aimed at emphasizing the national denominational line, the promotion of traditional values, as well as the reorganization of religious and even secular education in accordance with liberal, traditional, and tolerant values. The short-term reforms are still apparent even today in Moroccan daily life. The physically observable regulations were the first resort of the government. Along with the mass arrests of suspected Salafists, Habous (Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments) started to operate two new branches with the aim of observing mosques and religious education provided by non-state groups or foundations in poor and marginalized districts where the regime and the King’s religious authority had been criticized severely (Maghraoui, 2009b), as well as closely monitoring Moroccan students abroad. The government enforced a strict closing time for mosques, keeping in mind the hardships of observing more than 30.000 mosques across the Kingdom. As a matter of fact, according to some State officials, observations of the mosques may not avert the spread of radical thoughts (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 586), but it at least prevents conveying of such ideas in general public places.

The reorientation of the public sphere in terms of forbidding radical religious speechmaking was not neglected. Formerly, religious speechmaking in public was a very popular practice in Morocco. However, soon after the Casablanca Bombings and its link to extremist Islamist groups, all instances or versions of this speechmaking -which were assumed to be propaganda- were banned. Even religious textbooks or any sort of religious publications were

subjected to State observation, in order to maintain a tolerant Islamic interpretation in public (Alonso & Rey, 2007).

The State can reach believers directly, in part, through controlled and official religious speechmaking. Thusly, the waves of reforms have influenced the practice of Friday Sermons. Habous began to issue guidebooks for imams and preachers on how to conduct their Friday sermons. The quarterly guidebook named *the Nashrat al-A'imawa al-Khutaba* (The Imams and Preachers Publications) aimed at spreading the official religious view to the public through the imams and preachers. Take this as an example of how this guidebook would spread official views; in the April-June 2005 issue of the guidebook described Jihad -as the most significant and controversial concept- and its dual nature; only the *greater jihad* must be performed by individuals, as opposed to the *lesser jihad* which was best left to the Amir al-Mu'minin and governments (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 459). As it can be seen, the guidebook was perfectly matched with the official religious ideology that strongly tried to monopolize religion.

As for the intellectual middle-long term reforms in the religious field, education led the way as the main priority. Reforms of Islamic education in Morocco had been formulated to be compatible with liberal values, multiculturalism, tolerance, and peace (Wainscott, 2015, p. 637). In Wainscott's words (2015, p. 649) with reference to Lahouaichri's similitude, Islamic education does not cause extremism, but rather causes the vaccination of people against "malign" ideas that were not controlled by the State and inevitably leads to instability. Religious education was not the only education that was affected by the reform programs. Even secular schools were a target of the Ministry of National Education in terms of the official curriculum. Accordingly, the reformed curricula would be comprised of "Islam, nationalism-patriotism, human rights values as well as values of modern identity" (Wainscott, 2015, p. 646). In other words, a new curriculum was aiming at creating a good citizen as the King had proposed in his various speeches.

The closing of the Salafi Quranic schools named *New Morabitin* was one of the most important steps in this process. So long as non-governmental Salafi Schools operated, it was out of the question that the state could possess a monopoly over the religious arena. Moroccan policymakers subtly waited for an opportunity and it finally came in August of 2008; the Salafi cleric Mohammed el-Maghraoui, issued a famous fatwa no: 371 allowing the marriage of 9-year-old girl, and, in response, mass protests were organized by civil society groups which included secular people, liberals, and women's rights activists. El-Maghraoui was condemned by the State's religious institutions and after that, all Salafi Quranic schools were shut down and replaced by state-led religious schools which aimed at spreading the official view on Islam, with the purpose of realizing a "state monopoly on religion" (Kalpakian, 2011b, pp. 125-126; Kalpakian, 2016).

However, there is another substantial matter that must be considered; although Salafi Schools are not allowed today, the Salafi-Wahhabi methodology has been used since 19th century in the Kingdom due to their analytical benefits regarding religious education. Metaphorically speaking -with reference to Kalpakian's analogy- using the Salafi-Wahhabi methodology in religious education is not different from the Marxist methodology utilized by political-science students at Harvard insofar as using the Marxist methodology does not turn any Harvard students into Marxists, utilizing the Salafi-Wahhabi methodology does not make Moroccans Salafi. The question is -in the context of the new religious reforms- to what extent should Salafi-Wahhabi hermeneutics be allowed (Kalpakian, 2011b, p. 126).

Reforms in religious field have gone beyond education, it also affected the media domain, which includes Islamic radio and TV channels (Maghraoui, 2009b; Wainscott, 2015, p. 637). Specifically, the Kingdom targeted the Salafi-Wahhabi satellite channels, *Iqra*. The government quickly launched a national Islamic satellite broadcast, which promoted official views on Islam that was basically "Sufi-Maliki-Ash'ari" (Alonso & Rey, 2007, p. 586; Kalpakian, 2011b, p. 125). Following the creation of the Fatwa Council in 2005, the State embraced

a monopoly on the right to issue a fatwa, in other words, Salafi-Wahhabi clerics would not only be merely unofficial but also illegal so long as they continue issuing fatwas. Moreover, the government created toll-free phone lines and they operated these lines in both Arabic and in the Amazigh language, with the purpose of providing legal religious counseling (Kalpakian, 2008a, p. 460).

As a result of the religious reforms, Habous applied counter-radicalization strategies via religious counseling and supervision (Tamek, 2014). The reason behind this supervision process was to prevent radicalization in prisons through personal interaction among terror-related prisoners and petty-crimes convicts. The situation in Iraq after the USA invasion proved how prisons, which mixed terrorist-affiliated inmates with non-terrorist-affiliated inmates, could turn into *Jihadi Universities* for ISIS (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Thus, Morocco did not neglect its prisons. Another program that should be mentioned here was dedicated to the reintegration of prisoners into regular society. Despite the critics of the prisons in regards to the public-private partnership, providing jobs for former prisoners upon their release among other methods are still remarkably good practices. Consider the case of Mohammed Fezazi who, following his imprisonment because of his link with 2003 bombings, was asked to lead the Friday sermon before the presence of the King, due to a significant change in his radical religious discourses (Tamek, 2014).

Maghraoui argues that reforms in the religious field are basically the revitalization and empowerment of traditional religious roles and institutions against the rise of Islamist forces, and radical streams in particular (Maghraoui, 2009a). Especially, the promotion of Sufi Islam is praiseworthy, because it had been historically neglected due to political concerns, during the Moulay Slimane and King Hassan II's reign in particular. In the next chapters, the institutions and roles will be emphasized.

3.4.4.1) Revitalization and Fortification of Institutions and Roles

The Moroccan tripartite counter-radicalization strategy resembles the Salafi doctrine's basic principle of *turning back to the good old days*. As a matter of fact, the counter-radicalization strategies that aimed at fighting against terrorism are based on the empowerment and revitalization of already existing traditions and institutions. In other words, with reference to founding father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk's speech to the youth of the Republic: "The strength you need is in the noble blood in your veins", Moroccan decision-makers presupposed that what they needed to deal with the rise of the terrorist threat, was already in their own history and tradition.

Throughout this chapter, reforms within the legislative, law-enforcement, socio-political and religious fields have been discussed in different aspects and capacities; nevertheless, the reorientation of the religious field deserves still more attention, because thanks to the religious platform of the Moroccan tripartite strategy significantly differentiates Morocco from other countries which have also had to cope with the threat of terror. In other words, with reference to Ahmed Charai (2015a), King Mohammed VI's intellectual war renders Morocco unique in the GWOT. Thus the following chapters will be dedicated to assessing the *weapons of intellectual war*; the revitalization and reinforcement of institutions and roles pertaining to counter-radicalization strategies. These institutions and roles are as follows; King, Rabita, Sufism, Zawiyas and Quaraouiyine, Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulama, and Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imam and Morchidate.

3.4.4.1.1) Emphasizing the Role of the King

As one of the oldest monarchies in the world (since 1666), the Moroccan throne remains the mightiest component of Moroccan society. Yet, the throne has never been solely a political establishment in Morocco, but also served as a highly-reputable religious institution. It can be said that the King is the face of Islam there; the secular arm through which God rules the faithful. In addition to

this, Islam was and is always the most reliable ally regarding political issues for the King and Makhzen in general. In other words, the King operates under the dual nature of the throne containing both religious and secular puissance on politics and society.

Moroccan Constitutions have protected the King since 1962 as indicated in related articles; “The person of the King is inviolable, and respect is due Him”. This statement remains valid even up until the latest reformed version of the constitution in 2011 (Constitution of Morocco-2011, 2017). King Hassan II provided this protection, in line with his desired plan to make a “king-saint”, or a kind of strongman piety (Geertz, 1968, p. 88). However, the sacredness of the Sultans/Kings is neither a recent nor constitutional phenomenon. Rather, it is a centuries-old tradition.

The religious legitimacy of the Kings lays in their Prophetic lineage; the Monarchy in the Kingdom enjoys its religious standing due to their Sharifian status, which became the most dominant element of society during the period of the 16th Century Saadi Dynasty (1554-1659), although the Sharifian Idrissids ruled Morocco as early as 789-985 (Combs-Schilling, 1999).

However, their Sharifian claim alone was not sufficient to mobilize the nation and rule the land effectively. In order to use the Sharifian title effectively, it must be nurtured by symbols within the public sphere. The Prophet’s birthday, which was celebrated for first time in 1593 by King al-Mansur in Palais El Badiî (El Badii Palace), Marrakech, was an important attempt to publicize this *prophetic lineage*. In Combs-Schilling’s (1999) depiction, various parts of the country hosted the celebrations and women -as the complementary other- were not included. At the celebration night of the prophet’s birthday, King al-Mansur was sitting on his throne with his pure white robe (Jellaba); he was reborn as the emblem of the nation, and this white-robed King emblem was the reason why the Monarchy survived for centuries. Despite the palaces, castles and dynasties collapsing, the white-robed King and the Prophet’s birthday celebration were able

to maintain their existence. In order to prove this statement, consider the 400th anniversary of the first celebration in Marrakech. King Hassan II, who was criticized over centralizing state power on his own, as the referee of his loyal subjects (Sater, 2010), launched the building of the Grand Mosque of Casablanca, *the Hassan II Mosque*. The opening day of the mosque deliberately was chosen in 1993: the 400th anniversary of the first Prophet's birthday celebration. During this remarkable celebration, the King and his loyal subjects appeared wearing their symbolically white robes, and through this mimesis, the unity of King and his people was performed. In other words, the King's body became Everyman's body through wearing same white jellaba (Combs-Schilling, 1999, p. 177).

Despite the fact that the King's title of *Amir al-Mu'minin* (Commander of the Faithful) dates back to the Almohad Dynasties, which competed with the title of *Amir al Muslimin* that was conferred by the Baghdad Caliphs (Sater, 2010), King Hassan II had consolidated this title in terms of religious and political means through reproduction of religious concepts. For instance, the historical *Bay'a* ceremonies (act of allegiance of Ulama, political, tribal, military and technocratic establishments to Amir al-Mu'minin) are organized every year. Bay'a ceremonies consolidate the King's constitutional supremacy in the eyes of his loyal subjects. Another religious reinforcement for the throne is *Baraka* which assumes the Sharifian family of the King is endowed with forms of a crucial aspect (Sater, 2010). The story of Baraka dates back to the protracted famine and drought period in the city of Tafilalet, seven or eight centuries ago. Local Moroccans sent delegations to the *House of Ali* in Mecca, following God's order, which came in the form of a dream. Descendants of Ali and Fatima hosted the delegation, and while they were coming back to Tafilalet, the youngest son of the family, Hassan al-Dakhil, accompanied the Moroccan delegation. In the wake of his arrival, rainfall had increased and harvest was abundant for many years (Kalpakian, 2008b, p. 122; Daadaoui, 2011). Therefore, the Alaouites (Hassan al-Dakhil's offspring) were considered blessed. The royal sacredness of the King is repeatedly displayed all around the country; Bay'a ceremonies, the Prophet's birthday and in

Eid el Kebir (the Great Sacrifice) (Combs-Schilling, 1999; Sater, 2010). Even during the post-colonial period, the King-Sultan legitimized his power with reference to two components; firstly as maraboutic idea of Baraka could grant certain degree of protection in parallel with *charisma* and the second component was the direct lineage to Prophet Mohammed (Geertz, 1968).

When his majesty, King Mohammed VI acceded, the international community -Europeans in particular- had already expected fresh liberalization process after King Hassan II's reign. At 36 years old, "His MaJetski" as he had been nicknamed (McGirk, 2008), King Mohammed VI immediately promised liberal reforms and left a positive impression on the Europeans (Macleod, 2000). King Mohammed VI came to be known as *the King of the poor*, following his social reforms and thusly increased his popularity in the eyes of his people. Hence, in the wake of the demoralizing Casablanca Attacks, everyone anxiously waited for the young King's response. Since the King is viewed as a descendent of the Prophet, he took religiously motivated threats seriously. Yet interestingly, King Mohammed VI continuously referred to the rule of law, and the continuation of socio-political reforms in his various speeches, rather than exalting the military apparatus (Bartolucci, 2014). What makes his strategy unique is his ability to wage an intellectual war against terror and its instruments of radicalization (Charai, 2015a); he relied upon both secular and religious sources to lead this fight. The details of the intellectual war are deferred, since the next chapters are dedicated to evaluating how he fought against radicalism through intellectual means.

With reference to King Hassan II's *referee* image, the Kings of Morocco use their Amir al Mu'minin title smartly and effectively (Berman, 2010). The King as referee could be seen in his political moves. In addition to divide-and-rule politics, the King always stresses the cultural, regional and religious differences, and that he was the man who could unite and manage all of them in peace (Sater, 2010). King Mohammed VI did not sidestep this strategic heritage. When the Arab Spring spillover effects came to Morocco, under the *20th February*

Movement in 2011, King Mohammed brought his wisdom forward, addressed a speech indicating the country's socio-politic problems and launched political reforms including the reformation of the constitution (King Mohammed VI, 2011; Kalpakian, 2013; Wainscott, 2015). Together with these reforms, the King agreed to share his political power but did not relinquish his religious power. The King no longer had the power to dissolve the Parliament (Broder, 2015), yet still retained the power to dismiss prime ministers and appoint new ones.

Morocco's immunity from the effects of the Arab Spring is due to its King's ingenious strategy, which aimed at isolating him from daily politics as a buffer, thus he is perceived as the facilitator of progress, rather than an actively engaged political component (Charai, 2015c). Also, the King has encouraged Islamists for greater legal, political participation. Thus, they would be engaged with the existing order, which already assumes the King's supremacy.

Abdesselam Yassine, the spiritual leader of the JCM, must be noted here. He delivered a letter named '*L'islam ou le deluge*' (meaning '*Islam or deluge'*) to King Hassan II and he was imprisoned for three and a half years. Even now, after his death in 2012, he and his movement are considered the most important and suspected Islamist movement in Morocco. The reason behind this is in his letter; he refused to use King Hassan's Sharifian titles, which rendered him supreme authority, as Yassine also had his own prophetic lineage dating back to the Idrissid dynasty that had claims on Moroccan throne.

3.4.4.1.2) Rabita Mohammedia of the Ulama

In line with the new religious approaches of the State, existing institutions were also reshaped and strengthened. One of the most influential steps was taken by revisiting *Rabita Mohammedia of the Ulama* (الرابطة المحمدية للعلماء / Rabita Mohammedia des Oulémas), which was linked directly to the King. Despite the fact that the presence of Rabita dates back to the early years of Independence, February 14th of 2006 was the most substantial date in the history of Rabita. By the Dahir no.1-05-210 (Arrabita, 2006), Rabita evolved in a more powerful and

operative way, in parallel with the new policies regarding the religious field. A member and follower of Tariqa Boutshishiya, Dr. Ahmed Abbadi was appointed as Secretary General of Rabita by King Mohammed VI.

Rabita officially includes three main branches; the Executive Board, the Academic Council and the General Secretariat. In addition to these main branches, fourteen research centers have been founded in different Moroccan cities and dedicated to different fields of expertise, falling under the umbrella of the Academic Council. These research centers are; Studies and Research Center and Heritage Revival (almarkaz)-Rabat, Center for Quranic Studies (alquran)-Rabat, Thresher bin Ismail Center to Bring Faith, Doctrine and Behavior (derrass)-Fes, Ibn Abou Sabti Linguistic and Literary Studies (assebti)-Tetouan, Abou Amr Center for Studies and Research Literacy Specialist (addani)-Marrakech, Ibn al-Qattan Center for Studies and Research in the Hadith and Prophet's Biography (alquatan)-Larache, Center for Studies and Research in Values (alqiam)-Rabat, Center for Studies and Research on Woman's Issues in Islam (annisae)-Rabat, Ibn al-Banna Center for Studies and Research on History of Science in Islamic Civilization (albanna)-Marrakech, Uqba for Studies and Research Center at the Esteemed Companions and Followers (oqba)-Tangier, Imam Junaid Center for Research and Studies Sufi Specialized (aljounaid)-Oujda, Abu Al-Hassan Al-Ash'ari Center for Studies and Research (achaari)-Tetouan, Center for Studies in the Jurisprudence of al-Maliki (alfiqh)-Kenitra, Science and Omran Center for Studies and Research and the Revival of Desert Heritage (saharaomran)-Rabat (Arrabita, 2011).

The primary objective that Rabita wishes to carry on can be summarized with the following statement: "to present and promote efficient, functional and moderate explanations of religious texts" (Roudaby, 2015), in other words "to give a good image of Islam" (Qacimi, 2015). In order to reach this purpose, Rabita makes the most of technological opportunities, such as organizing and presenting internet courses and conferences as well as publishing internet sources

related to moderate Islam and religious knowledge, in Arabic, French, English and Spanish (Arrabita, 2011).

In addition to these activities, Rabita also possesses a more concrete academic dimension that trains religious workers. By the end of 2015, there were more than 1,000 religious workers, who have been trained by Rabita (Qacimi, 2015). These trainings are regulated in accordance with the moderation of Islam, the scientific vanguard at the global and local level, effectiveness, the opening of various disciplines and the interactive integration of diverse scientific approaches, contributions toward answering contemporary questions, facilitating constructive dialogue to address curricula of science, and providing an alternative path for young people (ArrabitaAcademy, 2015). This initiative -as a platform for the dissemination of moderate Islam- is co-operating with universities and other institutions at home and also abroad, including the National Human Right Council (CNDH), İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (ISAM), The Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad (CCME), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the Institute of Arabic Manuscript in Cairo and University of Abou Chouaib Doukkali.

In addition to this higher level of academic effort, Rabita also publishes books for children. These books intend to teach the comprehensive history of Morocco; including narratives of notable persons, civilization and scientific developments in its history. These books are delivered to public libraries, schools and bookshops. In addition to books for children, Rabita publishes books aimed at an adult popular audience, in both Arabic and French, along with Arabic-French translations. Rabita significantly pressed the translation issue, because Moroccan elites mostly speak French (Houte, 2013, p. 22). To only publish in Arabic would come at the cost of ignoring elites and inevitably causing more alienation within their own society, history and even civilization. By means of this translation policy, Rabita aims at preventing further alienation of the elites (Bammi, 2016).

In order to better understand the strategy and the role of Rabita, the author of this study was able to contact Rabita Mohammedia of Ulama and had a talk with Dr. Jamal Bammi, the Director of the Research Unit on Science and Civilization in this initiative. Through this fruitful talk, we have found an opportunity to collect substantial information regarding and clarifying Rabita's philosophical role in Morocco's religious policies. As a religious establishment, Rabita has distinctive features such as the practice of operating Internet courses, the publishing and translating of relevant texts, as well as organizing training programs for religious workers. As Rabita uses every available means to fulfill its mission, it does not leave a void for extremist trends to fill in the wider intellectual religious field. According to Dr. Bammi, the reason behind the rise of extremism in Europe is the lack of an intellectual background and theological context for Muslims in Europe. In his interpretation, they live in peace and have full freedoms in terms of religion in Europe, yet their Islamic intellectual background is highly superficial. This superficiality inevitably makes them open to or sympathize with extremist thoughts.

In Dr. Bammi's words, Rabita's primary goal is not only to promote a moderate and tolerant Islam but also to build an intellectual basis for Muslims through revealing the vivid relationship between religion and civilization. These two concepts are inseparable, specifically in Morocco, because in the past -and to a certain degree, up until the present- Morocco suffered from extrinsic ideas and trends that made Moroccans alienated from their homeland.

Following the 2003 Casablanca attacks, new religious policies aiming at reshaping and controlling all of the spiritual fields in the country had been launched in a multifaceted approach. In order to reshape this field, inter-agency collaborations were indispensable. Habous (Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments) and Rabita built strong relations and cooperation in practice, nevertheless, the nature of the relations are not certain at a formal level. Although Habous is officially entitled to religious policies and their implications, Rabita also has an essential role in determining religious policies on certain points.

Rabita designates intellectual dimensions of the religious policies through determination of the philosophy of education, religion, values and ethic rule, and Habous is the executive body, which is entitled to implement the designated philosophical frames (Bammi, 2016).

3.4.4.1.3) Sufism and Quaraouiyine

As the major resort of Moroccan Islam, Sufism means "prefer to live in immaterial and spiritual life". Annemarie Schimmel (2011) defines Sufism as "the mystical dimension of Islam". In fact, the term Sufism was invented by Western scholars, due to their misaligned analogy between western *mysticism* and Islamic *tasawwuf* (Öngören, 2011).

Although Sufism is not one of the Islamic sects, as opposed to Salafism and does not even ignore Sharia Law, both have controversial relations for a long time on the grounds that West-Sufi alliances, as well as the mindset of Sufism (Rabasa, et al., 2007, p. 73; Muedini, 2015). The main debate is on the nature of Jihad; while Salafism encourages believers in the pursuit of world domination, Sufism promotes the idea of spiritual purification (Baran, 2004).

As much as Sufism has sometimes been considered as a main threat to monarchy's claim to the religious field (Broder, 2015), a deep Sufi tradition in Morocco dates back to the first generation of Muslims in the11th century. People - in a country where natural borders, linguistic and ethnic differences set them apart- found their identity in Sufism, thanks to its inclusionary stance toward all sections of society. In other words, according to Ghambou (2011) Morocco owes its image of a modern and stable Muslim nation to Sufism. Nevertheless, as it was mentioned numerous times within previous chapters, *Zawiya* (Sufi lodges) and *Monarchy* relations were ambivalent over time. Yet following the 2003 Attacks, Sufism was praised and promoted along with new security strategy.

Sufism can be seen as a response to tragic events, which hurts a certain nation's feelings. It provides solace through religious inspiration (Joseph, 2017). Thus, King Mohammed VI insistently mentions reorientation of religious field by

promoting Sufism in his various speeches, as parallel with the rise of a radical-tolerant Islam dichotomy after 9/11 (Muedini, 2015). Sufism is generally known for their involvement of Sharifian politics. According to Maghraoui (2009b), Sufism and its flexibility, which is contrary to radical Islamic interpretation, are one of the most suitable tools for countering religious violence.

The appointment of one of the members and followers of the Boutshishiya Sufi Brotherhood, Ahmed Toufiq following the Abdelkebir M'Daghri Alaoui -seen as a Salafi sympathizer- as the head of the Habous, symbolizes how Sufism is essential in the new era. Tim McGirk referred to Ahmed Toufiq's interview "… All we can do is to find immunity within the body". According to Toufiq, the country's deep-rooted Sufi tradition is the immunity that brings art, tolerance, and philosophy (McGirk, 2008). Following the religious reforms that reshaped the religious field, Sufism experienced a substantial revival in society. So much so that a good citizen can be rebuilt only by Sufi principles, which consist of tolerance, love, interfaith dialogue, peace, and universalism (Maghraoui, 2009b). In a manner of speaking, Morocco re-launched the nation-building process in terms of religion.

Sufism and Zawiyas were not the only components of Moroccan Islam. Quaraouiyine University (and Mosque) is also another significant component of this strategy. In a manner of speaking, every single step of the research undertaken in the process of writing this thesis, we have come across Quaraouiyine in certain degrees. The Quaraouiyine compound (Mosque, University and Library) was built as the first university in the world with the assistance of the daughter of a rich merchant, Fatima al-Fihri from Qairouan, Tunisia, in 859 in Fes. Numerous leading scientists and philosophers are alumni of the university, such as Ibn al-Arabi, Ibn Khaldoun and Maimonides. During the colonial and post-colonial period, Quaraouiyine was also influenced by the institutionalization of Islam. King Hassan II declared Quaraouiyine as the independent university by his Dahir, in the wake of Quaraouiyine crisis in 1957, which was basically Quaraouiyine's resistance to integration with Mohammed V

University (Sater, 2010). Along with the revitalization of Moroccan Islam strategy, the restoration of the Library began in 2012, supervised by Moroccan-Canadian architect Aziza Chaouni. By the end of 2016, the Quaraouiyine library served as home to rare collections including the original *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldoun, reopened for researchers (Shaheen, 2016). We have enjoyed the privilege of talking about Quaraouiyine and its role in Moroccan Islam and politics in its compound. According to a professor employed there, Quaraouiyine University constitutes one of two strands in Moroccan Islam; Quaraouiyine-led Makhzenite Islam and local Zawiya-based Sufism. Therefore, religious policies have found their ground upon Quaraouiyine's intellectual heritage.

In an article published in Foreign Affairs, Fait Muedini (2015) noted that Sufism, which is defined as a spiritual journey in which between God and the faithful does not praise the engagement of worldly affairs, such as politics. Yet the author of this study's impressions following a visit to the *Tariqa Tijaniyya* (Tijani Brotherhood) in Fes demonstrated the other way around. Tariqa Tijaniyya is one of the most leading Sufi brotherhoods such as Tariqa Qadiriya Boutshishiya and Tariqa Shadhiliyya in the Maghreb region, and Morocco in particular. Tariqa Tijaniyya was founded by Sidi Ahmed al-Tijani, who was born in Ain Madhi, Algeria and welcomed by Moulay Mohammed III ben Abdallah in Fes in 1782. Currently as the Tariqa, which have 300 million followers, Tijaniyya spread beyond the Maghreb region; Sub-Saharan countries like Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger and Chad are considered as the Sub-Saharan stronghold of Tijaniyya (Dahmani, 2015; Idriss, 2016) as well as in Western Europe and Canada. The most spectacular part of our interview with Imam Idriss, the Imam of Tariqa Tijaniyya, was hearing his words regarding Sufism and politics. According to Imam Idriss, contrary to what is believed, Sufism is *not* an evasion of worldly affairs, rather Sufism and Islam can be viewed as *twins* and are encouraging believers to participate and represent Islam in daily life. The Prophet Mohammed was not only a holy man but also a successful businessman, righteous political leader, and beloved husband and father (Idriss, 2016). According to him, the

Islam-Politics distinction is grotesque; Islam and Politics constitute two sides of the same coin, which are not separable. Though, he still noted that Sufism does not encourage believers to be obsessed with the material world.

According to Western media commentators, Sufism must be used in order to cope with violent fractions of Islam. Hence, Sufi groups must be considered the best ally to the West. According to Ali Eteraz (2009) if Muslims are indoctrinated with another interpretation of Islam, radical elements will vanish. State-sponsored Sufism (Sufi Advisory Council) was applied in Pakistan at the request and encouragement from USA think tanks. Even the leader of Pakistan People's Party, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari stated, "Sufism is the first defense against terrorism" (Dawn.com, 2017). Nonetheless, Sufism alone was not a sufficient vaccine to fight against radicalism. However, although South Asia is another bastion of Sufism for centuries, it did not even reduce the tension among Islamist movements in the region, Pakistan, in particular. Since according to Eteraz (2009), Americans insist on describing GWOT in religious terms, they are prone to exacerbating sectarian divisions in Muslim countries, like Pakistan. Nowadays, *faith war* between state-sponsored Sufism and angry Salafism would simply drag people toward radicalism. In other words, the promotion of Sufism in an inappropriate way causes more radicalism as a result of the subsequent rage.

Morocco relied on Sufism as a means of returning back to tradition. The deep Sufi heritage in Morocco has been shaping the life of the everyman there for centuries, although the Throne and Sufism has had ambivalent relations from time to time. It must be noted that the monopolization of the religious field shall include all of the different strands of Moroccan Islam the brought success. It is reckless to say that only Sufism pulled Morocco out of radicalism, rather it was achieved by the holistic and more comprehensive approach in which every available mean were utilized.

3.4.4.1.4) Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imam and Morchidate

Moroccan policymakers are well aware of the fact that having a comprehensive and successful counter and anti-terrorism strategy requires cross-border cooperation and coordination. Therefore, the Kingdom planned to expand and export its counter-radicalization strategy through cultural, strategic and educational institutions. Education, and its religious version in particular, is the most crucial strand of this counter-radicalization strategy that the Kingdom pursues. Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imam and Morchidate (MITIM) is the most concrete step to *touch people and religious workers*.

Rabat-centered Institute was created by Dahir No. 1.14.103 in 20th May 2014, and through another Dahir (No. 1.15.71) it has been attached to Quaraouiyine University, under the authority of Habous. The declared missions of this Institute which admits 250 male and 100 female student per semester both from Morocco and abroad are as follows; basic training of Imams and Morchidates (vocational duties), re-qualification of foreign students, organization of short training courses, organization of conferences and workshops for religious workers, improvement of trainings of religious workers, eliciting professional advice and expertise. This initiative's curriculum consists of sophisticated and complementary parts in line with modern requirements as well as their religious duties. These parts are (Habous, 2016);

1. **Theoretical Teaching**: This part is divided into three different components; *Muslim Theology* such as Quranic Sciences, Tradition and biography of the Prophet, Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) and its foundations, purposes of Islamic jurisprudence, dogma and Sufism, contemporary currents of Islamic thought, astronomy and lunar calendar, History of Islam. Secondly *Introductions to the Human, Legal and Economic* Sciences such as Economy, History of Religions, Hebrew Heritage, Science of Dialectics and Eloquence, Psychology and Mental Health, History of France, Geography of France, French Institutions and Human Rights, Introduction to Legal Studies, Philosophy, Sociology. Finally *Languages and Communication* such as, Arabic and rhetorical language,

French language, Techniques of expression and communication, Translation, Information and Communication Technologies.

2. **Practical Lessons:** Preaching and Religious Awareness, Memorizing and Exegesis of the Holy Qur'an, and Memorization of traditional fundamental texts.
3. **Cycle of Thematic Conferences:** Including Salafism, Terrorism and Radicalism, Concept of the Bid'ah, and Concept of Ijtihad (judicial opinion).

There are several outstanding and distinctive features of this institution. In the first place, female students were not excluded, in line with the vision and goal of female empowerment (Berman, 2016). As a matter of fact, this was not the first initiative targeting women's education. In 2006, Habous launched the Morchidate (female preacher) program, in order to fight against the misinterpretation of religion, also known as religious extremism, and this program had been maintained under the *Dar el Hadith el Hassania* (Maghraoui, 2009b; Harrington, 2013). Dar el Hadith el Hassania was established by the order of his majesty King Hassan II in 1964, yet his majesty King Mohammed VI reorganized it in parallel with the contemporary renovation of the religious field policy in 2005 (EDHH, 2017). While Morchidates are not allowed to lead Friday or daily prayers, they are on duty throughout the country for counseling and interpretation of religious texts. Having women religious workers on duty is a substantial development because following the social reforms such as amendment of Moudawana, women are starting to be viewed as equal components of the religious life across the Kingdom, which is unimaginable elsewhere in the MENA (Maghraoui, 2009b; Berman, 2016). Therefore, international experts describe the Moroccan religious experience as a *model* and a *beacon* for the Continent (Charai, 2015b).

Another distinctive feature of the institution is its international dimension. Despite the fact that majority of the students came from within the Kingdom, the exact focus of MITIM is international; MITIM admits foreign student from

Europe, Africa as well as Arab countries as Ahmed Toufiq indicated (LeMatin, 2015). There are currently more than 450 enrolled students (Charai, 2015b) coming from several countries; Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Nigeria, Chad, China, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Belgium and France (Allilou, 2015; RFI, 2015; AOAV, 2016; Berman, 2016). Moreover, MITIM maintains and even increases its reputation, Russian, Kenyan, Senegalese and Rwandese officials asked Morocco to train their religious workers in order to prevent religious extremism in their homeland (MoroccoWorldNews, 2015; Arbaoui, 2016; LeMatin, 2016).

In summary, Moroccan decision-makers have planned to control, revamp and adjust the religious field along with their comprehensive religious reforms, also known as counter-radicalization strategies. The creation of the MITIM which aims at reaching and moderating the religious field at home and abroad in particular provides powerful means against extremism, although it appears as an African and European experiment. It also ensures that religious professionalization, female empowerment, and tolerant teaching, three main constituents of Moroccan counter-radicalization strategy, served as the foundation for reform (Berman, 2016). Within several years, observers anticipate closely-watching how these students, trained in MITIM, will fight and win against radicalism in their homelands. It seems considerably cell-based non-state armed groups or individuals' network in terms of working principles. As these groups are trained in order to revive *real Islamic order*, religious workers studied in MITIM are trained in order to *real Islamic order*. It is an undeniable fact extremist religious/ideological resistance will challenge MITIM, yet Moroccan officials are optimistic about being fully prepared for it (Berman, 2016).

3.4.4.1.5) Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulama

Morocco has been implementing a multidimensional approach towards combating radicalism that eventually turns into terrorism, hereinbefore mentioned in several chapters. However, Moroccan decision-makers are well aware of the fact that terrorism in conjunction with radicalism is an international problem rather than just being restricted to a single nation. Therefore, Morocco has aimed

to promote moderate and tolerant Islam to her neighbors that were mostly suffering religiously oriented violence, such as Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania.

In accordance with the policies, which were aiming to ensure the reorganization of religious field, another institution that must be noted is the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulama. The successes of Moroccan reforms in religious field have rendered Morocco a model that shares her experience with other states which have to encounter with radicalism and this foundation is an example of the effects of these Moroccan endeavors (Lemag, 2016; Saad, 2016).

The Rabat-centered initiative had been established and chaired by King Mohammed VI by the declaration of Dahir no 1-15-75 in June 24 2015. The officially-declared purposes of this initiative are reckoned in article no.4 of Dahir; these are basically, unification and collaboration efforts of Muslim scholars; the promotion and dissemination of all sort of tolerant values; the revitalization of relations between Islam and intellectual, scientific and cultural actions; promotion of historical relations between Morocco and African States; the encouragement of the establishment of religious, scientific, and cultural centers and associations; working towards revival of common Islamic cultural heritage; and establishment of co-operations with organizations working for similar purposes (Dahir no.1-15-75, 2015).

To fulfill these objectives, which have been counted on article no.4, requires three main branches for the Foundation. These are *The Higher Council* which is in charge of general missions of the Foundation such as to define general orientations, to discuss the budget, and to determine annual program (Dahir no.1-15-75, Article no.12 , 2015), *The Executive Bureau* which is responsible to take all measures to guarantee the effective functioning, and to coordinate the committees. (Dahir no.1-15-75, Article no.19, 2015), as well as *The Vice Presidency*, which is in charge of the representation of the legal entity (Dahir no.1-15-75, Article no.23, 2015).

The members and the membership procedures of this Foundation are clarified by the article no. 5 to 10, with reference to these articles; members of the higher council are co-opted among Moroccan or the member African States' Ulama who have been recommended by The Higher Council or by President's own initiative (Dahir no.1-15-75, 2015).

The inauguration ceremony of the Foundation had been held under the leadership of the King Mohammed VI at the University of Al Quaraouiyine, which is one of the oldest universities in the World, in Fes, the spiritual capital city of Morocco. Moreover, the day of the opening ceremony also has been chosen deliberately, the day was July 13, 2016 corresponding to 26 Ramadan 1436, which is also known as *laylat al-qadr* and is one of the spiritual nights of the Islamic year (Habous, 2015).

120 people from Ulama, including 17 woman who were trained in the morchidate program from 31 African countries have attended a ceremony, in order to show their will to establish a tolerance of Islam facing Jihadi propaganda (Lamlili, 2016; Merran, 2016). In the opening speeches, the speakers, King Mohammed VI, Minister of Habous Ahmed Toufiq and *Alem* (scholar) of Burkina Faso Boubakar Doukoure made mention of the motivations behind this initiative and its goals: Amir al Mu'minin, King Mohammed VI emphasized in his speech that this initiative had not been commenced by neither narrow and ephemeral interests nor coincidences: "…Instead, it proceeds from an integrated approach to constructive cooperation and a willingness to effectively meet the demands of many African brothers in religious matters" (Habous, 2015). Ahmed Toufiq and Boubakar Doukoure also addressed their speeches in a way that revealed the role of this Foundation in line with the policies revivifying of the Islamic moderation, peacefully coexistence and tolerance in all Africa (Oudrhiri, 2016). Furthermore, participants from various countries stated, "total success is hoped to promote moderate Islam in everywhere" (Lemag, 2016).

Besides the preventive functions which stand against religious extremism and terror campaigns indigenizing the ideology of Al Qaeda or ISIS who "hijack the religion" (HuffPost, 2016), the comprehensive and multifaceted approach adopted by the Moroccan State must be stressed here. Another basis of this initiative is to revive strong spiritual bonds with African people who have been sharing the similar civilizational values and the same unity of the faith for centuries. In order that his "mediate and tolerant Islam" strategy is put into practice, King Mohammed VI inaugurated *Mohammed VI Institute for Training Imams and Morchidates*- a training center for religious officials including women, a year before this Foundation (Merran, 2016). It obviously indicates that narrow and ephemeral interests do not shape the Moroccan strategy, as the King had stressed in his speeches.

Fighting against radicalism is only one goal of this initiative. For many years, Morocco has come to be known as "the state operating diplomatic efforts based on religious means" (Tadloui, 2015). Moreover, Morocco diversifies her diplomatic channels through the creation of new institutions such as the Mohammed VI Foundation for African Ulama, and it is an undeniable fact that this Soft Power will help to expand Morocco's diplomatic influence in Africa. As it was emphasized in the historical context chapter, continuity and historical, cultural and religious accumulation are substantial for Morocco, and Africa as the continent which was Islamized mostly by Moroccan dynasties as well as sharing common heritage, are primary partners of Morocco in fighting against radicalism and spreading moderate and tolerant values. While this path is pursued, Morocco is extremely sensitive not to lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretations. For this reason, Mr. Ahmed Toufiq stressed that this foundation was not a source of concern for participant states, such as erecting an institution, which would interfere in domestic affairs (Oudrhiri, 2016).

Conclusion

This study is dedicated towards understanding the unconventional nature of rising international terrorism. It is unconventional because for the first time, in

the history of countering terrorism, States and their law enforcement agencies have to deal with the *idea* or *methodology* rather than with the mere physical presence of local terror groups, which aimed at realizing only limited political goals and conducted their campaigns in line with guerilla warfare. Nevertheless, the current threat is far from guerilla warfare tactics; because although tangible guerilla organizations can be defeated and the mission of these organizations can be disrupted, international terrorism might not be defeated or disrupted due to the existence of an idea of Global Jihad. On the other hand, defeating Global Jihad is not an impossible mission, just as Moroccan case indicated. Understanding the Moroccan case study provides a valuable window towards understanding the nature of this rise in international terrorism.

Within the main and sub-chapters, this study searched for answers to the research question *how must states fight against the idea or methodology of global terrorism as an unconventional threat in an unconventional way*? Since there are three main chapters and since all of them provided different aspects of the question, I used a multiple research methodology while I was conducting this research. In the conceptualization chapter, I stressed why Global Jihad is unbeatable strategically through the reevaluation of Jihad, Terror and Al Qaeda in the context of Global Jihad. Since the social science world and international community have no agreed-upon definition of terrorism, and since global non-state armed groups' ravishing flexibility and adaptation abilities dominate the security paradigm of today's world, the conceptualization of Jihad, Terrorism and Al Qaeda was indispensable. Deliberately-chosen primary sources from Jihadi scholars and even religiously motivated non-state armed groups' leaders and strategists publishing have procured meticulous ground for our primary assertion; current security concerns originate from unconventionally-organized and motivated members of the Global community. The term *unconventional* has been used deliberately in line with the purpose of indicating that how Global Jihad or Global Terrorism poses unconventional threat based on an idea or methodology which was not easily perished by only through conventional security measures.

The second chapter focused on the current war on terror that has lead the counterterrorism efforts of many countries across the world since 2001. The year 2001 had been chosen with a purpose; although Al Qaeda or Global Jihadi threat dates back to 1998, in 2001, international awareness reached its peak. The Afghanistan and Iraqi Wars were the main response to the rise of Global Jihad. Yet both of them have been planned in line with military purposes, rather than for religiously motivated, cell based non-state armed groups, which simply use the Jihadi methodology. Although there were significant shifts on countering global terrorism following the Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Syrian Civil War, we are far away from claiming that the international community learned properly how to cope with this threat. Fortunately there is a State that understood the nature of this threat; Morocco. The third and the last chapter profoundly analyzed Moroccan counterterrorism strategies, and we applied participatory observation methodology in order to fulfill the requirements of this study.

As it has been mentioned in many parts of this study, having no agreed-upon definition of terrorism and theory are the main handicap for terrorism studies. However having no universally approved definition and theory is highly beneficial for this study. It created more space for imagination during the *theory-making process*. Therefore, the unique and authentic approach could be managed; according to our theory, international terrorism resembles simply a *cancer*, in terms of organization and modus operandi. Despite the significant similarities between cancer and Global Jihadi organizations, the analogy was used only for counterterrorism methods. Since cancer treatment requires *unconventional* methods as opposed conventional viral diseases, international terrorism needs special and unconventional counter methods. What States and its security apparatuses do not still understand is the fact that Global Jihad is an idea or a methodology rather than concrete organizations that can be defeated by warlike measures. Counterterrorism methodology, which did not assume this fact, is doomed to fail.

So far now, on the other side of the equation of international and national security, nation-states in our global world miserably failed in responding to this unconventional threat. As we have demonstrated in the GWOT chapter, for a long time, military-oriented decision-makers have shaped the efforts countering global terrorism and the paradigm through which the world-community at large understands global terrorism. Preemptive War, also known as the Bush Doctrine appeared as the sword of Damocles over the Middle Eastern States due to the liberal construction of the doctrine. The One percent doctrine, as a variation of the Bush Doctrine has been threatening the regimes in the region. Moreover, invading and overthrowing regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq did not bring noteworthy accomplishments. Following these operations in two countries, USA and her allies in GWOT were not able to succeed in the destruction of safe heavens and training camps for radicalization and recruitment. On the other hand, these operations actually stirred up a hornet's nest but did not destroy the entire concept. Al Qaeda merely had to readjust itself, and then continue to wage Jihad. It is an undeniable fact that States did not understand or did not have the will to understand the real threat. Although re-naming of the war on terror from GWOT to CVE points out a remarkable strategic shift on State response, the paradigmatic shift on global terrorism is not even in question.

Ironically, Al Qaeda was able to shift its modus operandi in line with actual conditions of the political environment. On the contrary to what has been assumed regarding Al Qaeda, *enemy of the modernity*, it has been using modern means in its so-called *holy mission*. In the wake of fall of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had perceived that the traditional guerilla warfare would not be applicable in a new era. As a matter of fact, Al Qaeda strategists noticed that a unipolar world system was not promising for Al Qaeda, as opposed to the main characteristics of a bipolar Cold War system: power-struggles and proxy wars. Therefore, Al Qaeda transferred her businesses to *the blue oceans*, uncontested spaces such as the Internet and social media channels. Yet the Internet strategy was merely one of the applications of the Global Jihadi methodology. As it was discussed above, the

Global Islamic Resistance which was formulated by Abu Musab es-Suri aimed at internationalizing the Jihad in order to assure Global Jihad is self-contained and eternal. According to this goal, Global Jihad turned a methodology and publicized in line with the mission to attack common enemy. These loosely connected Jihadi groups and even individuals are attacking their common enemy wherever and whenever they find an opportunity. This modus operandi rendered the Global Jihad the most dangerous threat to international security. They are almost impossible to be detected and also defeated. Any and all Al Qaeda strategists praise the method of es-Suri due to its potential and existing success. Even today ISIS, IS or currently al-Dawla promotes this strategy, specifically spokesman al-Adnani's address which was encouraging Muslims to attack apostates in anywhere in the world is noteworthy, because he literally mentioned "cars and trucks to attack infidels", and tragically but unsurprisingly, the latest terror attacks in major western cities have been conducted by cars and trucks.

Although State responses, in certain degree, are being readjusted in accordance with Global Jihad's flexibility, western societies are being threatened by homegrown terrorism, which arose via the Internet. Uncontrolled social networks are used not only recruitment but also spreading the ideas related to Jihad and Jihadi methodology in abroad. Specifically, Twitter is the most chosen social media network with this purpose. On several occasions Twitter serves for recruitment and also conveying messages, just as ISIS used Twitter hashtags in 2014 World Cup. Ongoing military campaigns backed by coalition air and ground forces against al-Dawla in Iraq and Syria forced a change to al-Dawla's Internet strategy. Currently, numerous Jihadi social media accounts publicize the war crimes of coalition forces in the battlefield, as well as spreading their overall holy messages through the Internet.

USA executive branches declared a famous (or infamous) travel ban, which included terror suspects from seven countries, at the end of the January 2017. Electronic devices banned on a flight to USA and UK from 10 countries followed the travel ban in March 22. These unanchored responses to global

terrorism are not sufficient towards halting terrorism in the US or other participants' homelands. The first mission that must be accomplished by not only the USA but also all of involved states is to understand that the latest terror attacks' perpetrators were born in the USA, many of them second generation immigrants. In other words, these people both grew up and radicalized in the USA. So it is high time to change the perspectives on terrorism in parallel with the nature of the threat and its unconventional warfare, rather than engaging in vain and traditional counterterrorism measures.

With this in mind, Morocco provides an example for unconventionally formed counterterrorism strategies, which supports our hypothesis. The Kingdom of Morocco is not only relatively safe from terrorism but also safe from the disruptive effects of Arab Spring. As I have enjoyed the privilege of being a visiting international researcher under the supervision of Al Akhawayn University in Morocco, I was able to observe the social dynamics in different cities at first hand. At first sight, terror-proof status and stability of Morocco seem ironic due to the high level of poverty, corruption, illiteracy, and unemployment which were triggering factors in the Arab Spring and, inevitably, the rise of violent opposition. Nevertheless, Moroccan decision-makers analyzed the local conditions and opportunities profoundly, and launched their sui generis counterterrorism strategy through a unique blending of secular and religious measures. The deep Sufi tradition and the King's religious supremacy have been constituted a significant component of their strategy. Through establishing new religious schools and institutions, which were conducted by the Kingdom in line with the official denominational line, Morocco reasserted its monopoly on religion. In addition to the religious dimension of their counterterrorism strategy, Morocco sees the security as a collective issue rather than national. Therefore, Morocco called for other neighboring states to join her counter-radicalization programs. For instance, Mali is closely engaged in cooperation with Morocco. The reason behind it is possible AQAM penetration within the neighboring states and eventually the birth of new and proximate new failed states. Therefore, while Morocco was creating

her own security environment, she did not isolate herself, but rather created a wider perspective on the security phenomenon. Moreover, close cooperation in terms of security and King's prioritization for Africa in his foreign policy agenda render Morocco as rising regional power.

Despite this positive picture about Morocco and her counterterrorism-counter radicalization strategies, there is also another fact that cannot be rejected. Still, the third most-crowded group in Syria is Moroccans, and even since 2001, more than 169 cells have been thwarted across the Kingdom. Fortunately, they had been detected and foiled before they were activated. The point (and the question) remains though: should we consider foiled or failed terror attempts as existing or potential terror threat? However, the data indicates that the threat is not over yet. Moroccan counterterrorism and counter-radicalization strategies may work only to keep people away from extremist currents, but may not be able to reverse people who have already radicalized in the Kingdom. Despite the fact that deep Sufi tradition makes these policies easy to apply, on the other hand, Salafi tradition, which is the main motive of Jihadi thought, is also almost as deep as Sufism in the Kingdom. Morocco's tug of war on religion will shape the future of the success of Moroccan policies.

There is another issue worth stressing at this point. Our point of view is not to promote the Moroccan counterterrorism measures of fighting against global terrorism, rather it is toward the promotion of fighting against global terrorism as an ideology in an unconventional way, just as Morocco has achieved. The promotion of Sufi Islam has been tried in Pakistan, as it was discussed previously, it caused more violence in the country. The comparison and the results simply indicate that the key factor of the success is not Sufism. Sufism can better work under a religiously-oriented King figure, sui generis state building process, power struggle among different Islamist groups, and deep traditions. In our case, Morocco disrupted Global Jihadi training cycle through reconstruction of her monopoly on religion, religious education in particular. In other words Morocco provides an alternative *idea* or *methodology* for Islam in her own homeland, a

reorientation of its perspective on the engine of radicalization. Global terrorism enjoys local conditions, which naturally change from one country to another. Therefore States must employ a *tailor-made suit* in its counterterrorism strategies, rather than *prêt-à-porter*. What has made Morocco successful is her methodology on unconventional response to the unconventional threat.

Since this research comprised of limited aspect of the phenomenon, only the research question was taken into consideration while the research was being conducted. Yet there are more issues in question. When I was going for a walk at the Al Akhawayn University campus, I met a woman and she asked in astonishment, "Why did you choose Morocco? There is no terror in here; you should have preferred other MENA countries for your research". She missed the point I paid much attention to; the lack of terrorism in Morocco deserves to be studied further. For further studies, eager researchers may work on foreign fighters' issues. Although there are numerous remarkable reports and articles related to this topic, the question "does Morocco export her Jihadi elements of the society to the Open Jihad Fields". As well as security-freedom balance can also be studied, because also in security studies this balance were and are being evaluated within different frames. Last but not least, the power struggles among Islamist groups and the throne should be studied in order to perceive and predict further developments in the region in terms of radicalization, stability/instability and as well as terrorism.

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