

**THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-BUILDING:
THE
CASE OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS
(1960–1967)**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
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HAKAN ARSLAN

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
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(1960–1967)**

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- 1) Turkish Cypriot Politics
- 2) Taksim
- 3) Turkish Cypriot Economy
- 4) State Theory
- 5) Political Economy
- 6) State-building
- 7) Causality
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- 9) Unproductive Labour

ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STATE-BUILDING: THE CASE OF TURKISH CYPRIOTS (1960–1967)

Supervision: Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak

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This thesis is a theoretical narrative of the Turkish Cypriot (T//C) politics and economy, for the period of 1960–1967, from the point of view of Marxist theories of the state, and political economy. It rests upon two key observations as regards the state of studies on the T/Cs, firstly, the oversight of domestic dynamics, and particularly, of the economy and politics, and secondly, the oversight of theory and methodology. In so doing, it makes use of, and critically rethinks aspects of Bob Jessop’s theory of the capitalist state and economy, and the early Erik Olin Wright’s theory of causality, supplementing the two by Anwar Shaikh–Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak’s elaboration of the theory of productive and unproductive labour. Overall, the thesis distinguishes itself from the existing literature by its focus upon economy and politics, rather than identity; its attempt to model the relations between domestic dynamics, and inter-state politics and global political economy, and; its regard of the period of 1960–1967 as the critical episode to which the origins of the power relations and generalised crisis characterising today’s T/C society must be traced back. Methodologically, it proceeds by way of developing an historically and empirically grounded conceptual framework applied to the sub-periods of 1960–1963 (the common state of the Republic of Cyprus), and 1964–1967 (the first phase of enclave life). The key insight of the thesis is that there was a contradiction between the two sub-processes of the T/C nationalist project of *Taksim*, namely state-building and capital accumulation, which, amongst other things, sheds light onto the origins and causes of the patronage-based post-1974 state power and its current crisis. Theoretically, the T/C case supports key aspects of Jessop’s theory of the state (most particularly, relationality and strategicness), and Wright’s theory of causality (most particularly, structural limitation).

Key Words: *Turkish Cypriot Politics, Taksim, Turkish Cypriot Economy, State Theory, Political Economy, State-building, Causality, Determination, Unproductive Labour*

ÖZ

DEVLET İNŞASININ EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ: KIBRIS TÜRKLERİ ÖRNEĞİ (1960–1967)

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak

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Bu tez, 1960–1967 Kıbrıs Türk siyaseti ve ekonomisi üzerine, Marksist devlet teorileri ve ekonomi politik perspektiflerine dayalı bir teorik anlatıdır. Kalkış noktası, Kıbrıs Türklerine ilişkin çalışmalardaki duruma yönelik eleştirel iki gözlemdir. Bunlardan ilki iç dinamiklerin (ve özellikle ekonomiyle siyasetin), ikincisi ise, teori ve metodolojinin göz ardı ediliyor olduğudur. Tez, bu eksiklikleri ele almaya dönük bir çaba olarak, bir taraftan Bob Jessop’ın kapitalist devlet ve ekonomi teorisiyle erken Erik Olin Wright’ın nedensellik teorisine başvurmakta ve bu arada söz konusu teorileri yeniden değerlendirmekte, öbür taraftan ise, Anwar Shaikh ile Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak’ın üretken olmayan emek tartışmasına yaptıkları katkıdan destek almaktadır. Bir bütün olarak bakıldığında bu tez, kimlikten ziyade ekonomi ve siyasete vurgu yapmak; iç dinamikler ile devletler arası siyaset–küresel ekonomi politik arasındaki ilişkileri modellemeye çalışmak ve; bugünkü Kıbrıs Türk toplumunu tanımlayan iktidar ilişkileriyle genel krizin kökenleri ve nedenlerini açıklayacak kritik dönemi 1960–1967 olarak görmek suretiyle mevcut literatürden farklılaşmaktadır. Bu amaçla, metodolojik olarak 1960–1963 (Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ortak devleti) ile 1964–1967 (anklav yaşamının ilk evresi) alt dönemlerine uyguladığı tarihî ve ampirik olarak temellendirilmiş bir kavramsal çerçeve geliştirmektedir. Tezin ana içgörüsü ve iddiası, milliyetçi *Taksim* projesinin iki kilit alt süreci olarak gördüğü devlet inşası ile sermaye birikimi arasında köklü bir çelişki bulunduğu ve bunun da, 1974 sonrasındaki patronaj ilişkilerine dayalı devlet iktidarının ortaya çıkışıyla bugün içerisinde düştüğü krize ışık tuttuğudur. Son olarak ise, teorik olarak, Kıbrıs Türkleri örneği Jessop’ın devlet ve Wright’ın nedensellik teorilerine ait kilit öğeleri (diğerleri arasında, Jessop’daki ilişkisellik ve stratejilik ve Wright’daki yapısal belirlenim) desteklemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Kıbrıs Türk Siyaseti, Taksim, Kıbrıs Türk Ekonomisi, Devlet Teorisi, Ekonomi Politik, Devlet İnşası, Nedensellik, Belirlenim, Üretken Olmayan Emek*

IN LOVING MEMORY OF

Kemâlettin Savaş

(Kerim Özgür–Kemal Usta)

(1953–2013)

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This thesis could be marking the end of my long voyage as a student. Accordingly, I owe a great many teachers, not only intellectually, but for the moral training they have proffered. The fact is that this acknowledgment will probably fall too short of expressing my true gratitude. Nonetheless, I should like to extend my thanks

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So, I owe heartfelt thanks

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The days of the final editing of this thesis were sorrowful times of utmost grief, as I suffered the loss of one of the most loved ones in my life, my dearest brother-in-law ‘Kemâl Abi’. All I am left with now after his passing away is the little consolation that I was lucky enough to have shared 35 years of his beautiful short life. He was the true son, ‘the noble protagonist of the proletariat’...

This thesis, I humbly dedicate to his loving memory, as one last goodbye.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFU: Armed Forces Union

A.K.E.L./AKEL: *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú* [the Progressive Party of Working People]

AKP: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [Justice and Development Party]

AP: *Adalet Partisi* [Justice Party]

CD&W Act: Colonial Development and Welfare Act

CHP: *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People's Party]

CTP: *Cumhuriyetçi Türkiye Partisi* [Republican Turkish Party]

CTP–BG: *Cumhuriyetçi Türkiye Partisi–Birleşik Güçler* [Republican Turkish Party–United Forces]

DP: Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party (Turkey)]

DP: *Demokrat Parti* [(T/C) Democratic Party]

DPÖ: Devlet Planlama Örgütü [SPO: (T/C) State Planning Organisation]

DPT: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı [SPO: State Planning Organisation (Turkey)]

EEC: European Economic Community

ECHR: European Court of Human Rights

ECJ: European Court of Justice

EOKA: *Acronym for Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakou Agónos* [National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle]

EU: European Union

G/C: Greek Cypriot

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GKK: *Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı* [Command of Security Forces]

GNP: Gross National Product

IMF: International Monetary Fund

KİT: *Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsü* [Public Economic Enterprise]

KKTC: Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti [TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]

KTFD: *Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti* [Turkish Federated State of Cyprus]

MBK: *Millî Birlik Komitesi* [NUC: National Unity Committee]

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NUC: National Unity Committee [MBK: *Millî Birlik Komitesi*]

TBMM: *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi* [Grand National Assembly of Turkey]

T/C: Turkish Cypriot

TKP: *Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi* [Communal Liberation Party]

TL: Turkish Lira

TMT: Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı [Turkish Resistance Organisation]

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [KKTC: Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti]

UBP: *Ulusal Birlik Partisi* [National Unity Party]

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis rests, to a great measure, upon two key observations as regards to the state of Turkish Cypriots (henceforth, denoted by the customary acronym of T/Cs) studies. The first is the oversight of domestic dynamics, generally, and of the economy and politics, more particularly, and; the second, the oversight of theory and methodology, generally. As I see it, narratives of events supported by remarks upon observed connections between intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics, and economy and politics within specific contexts do not, by themselves, suffice to ensure a theoretically informed analysis. Thus, my first starting point was to write a ‘theoretical’ narrative of the economy and politics of the T/Cs, from the perspective of the theories of the state, and political economy, for the period of 1960 to 1983.¹ More particularly, it was my desire to elucidate the origins of the

¹ Accordingly, the basic unit of analysis of the present study is the ‘T/Cs’, or the ‘T/C community’—as they were called under the Ottomans, the British, or the Republic of Cyprus, or the ‘T/C society’—as they were called, particularly, following the foundation of the territorially separate T/C state, after the split of the Island in 1974. Therefore, the question that follows is one of analytically defining the ‘entity’ called the T/Cs, or the T/C community, or society. As I see it, there are two problems associated with this task: Firstly, one must discuss, as a problem which is particular to the case of Cyprus, the appropriateness of using T/C, as a noun, or epithet to tag the entity in question. It is important to note that this question concerns the politics of identity, underlying the deepest rifts within Cyprus. In Northern Cyprus, nationalists prefer ‘*Kıbrıs Türkü*’ (best translated as the ‘Turks of Cyprus’), putting the emphasis on ‘Turk-ness’, whereas the pro-Republic (implying the common Republic of 1960) and/or pro-unification Leftists and liberals prefer ‘*Kıbrıslı Türk*’ (Cypriot Turks), or ‘*Kıbrıslıtürkler*’ (Cypriotturks), as the more radical version of the latter, putting the emphasis on the common, Islander’s identity of Cypriot-ness. I will be addressing these debates in Chapter II below, and extensively. Secondly, there is the problem of generally defining the identity in question, as a society (or community), to be more exact, the problem of defining society, theoretically, i.e. as a concept. Clearly,

current crisis of the T/C society, through the elaboration of the connections between the first constitution and the further reproduction of the relations of political power, on the one hand, and the economy, on the other. However, in due process, there were two modifications—the first, suggested by the Advisor of the thesis, and the second by necessity:

- 1) From an historical narrative of the T/C society informed by theory, the focus shifted to the rethinking of specific theories using the historical–empirical material as relates to the T/C society, namely the state theory of Bob Jessop, and the theory of causality of the early Erik Olin Wright;
- 2) I ended up covering the period of 1943–1967, rather than 1960–1983, as I came to realise that, firstly, the coverage of the sub-period 1943–1960 was necessary to comprehend the two key sub-periods of 1960–1963 and 1964–1967, and; secondly, that I would not be able to cover the post-1967 sub-periods, as that would expand the volume far beyond the customary limits of a doctoral thesis.

different characterisations of identity are associated with different actors, contending for different projects of society, or societalisation. According to Jessop (1990: 4–5), ‘society’, in its unstated meaning, “... refers to the social processes in and through which ‘society effects’ are produced. The premiss of this approach is that the exercise of a ‘society’ cannot be taken for granted: it must be constituted and reproduced through more or less precarious social processes and practices which articulate diverse social relations to produce a ‘society effect’.” On the other hand, ‘societalisation’, in its generic use, “... covers the complex social processes in and through which specific institutional orders and their broader social processes are secured.” Furthermore, “... there is ample scope for conflict over societal projects that privilege radically different organisational principles as well as for conflict over rival projects based on the same principle.” (Jessop, 2005: 22) Nation-building (new nations), and capital accumulation (bourgeois societies) are two such principles. One of the basic ideas underlying this study is that the project of nationalist state-building encompasses the dual, sometimes contradictory, organisational principles of nation-building, and capital accumulation.

1.1. OUTLINES: BASIC PROBLEMATIC, METHOD, AND PLAN

Let me now try to clarify what I have said above, by briefly presenting the basic outlines of the thesis, in terms of its basic problematic, method, and plan.

Since the Helsinki Summit and the financial crisis of late 1999, the T/C society has been riven by what I have called a ‘generalised crisis of statehood’, i.e. a crisis encompassing all the basic properties and functions characterising the modern state. As it appears, it is difficult to attribute the origins of the generalised crisis to external dynamics alone—most notably, the process of Europeanisation. More specifically, domestic dynamics appear to have risen to prominence in the last two decades or so, and had major repercussions in the area of foreign policy. This is broadly, the historical background against which this thesis has been written. As a theoretically informed analysis of the deeper roots of the present crisis of the T/C society, and a theoretical narrative of thus far neglected a part of the T/C history, this thesis differs from much of the existing literature in a number of ways:

- 1) It focuses upon economy and politics, and the relationships between the two, from the perspective of the theories of political economy and the state, as opposed to the recent works focusing upon identity, from the perspective of the theories of nationalism and cultural studies;

- 2) it engages, theoretically, to expound and model the relationships between the level of domestic dynamics, on the one hand, and the levels of inter-state politics and global political economy, on the other, and, finally;
- 3) it regards the period of 1960–1967, as the critical episode to which the origins of the power relations and generalised crisis characterising today's T/C state and economy are to be traced back, as opposed to those studies bringing to the fore, as the decisive moment, the socio-economic arrangements of the immediate post-1974 years.

I must also note that, to the best of my knowledge, this thesis provides the first comprehensive survey of the literature on the T/Cs, and one of the few comprehensive narratives of the T/C economy and politics from the late 1950s, through the late 1960s. In so doing, it brings into the light, a number of interesting points which have thus far been neglected, e.g. the key role of the development planning in the British efforts to reform and stabilise Cypriot politics, the key role of economic considerations and (development) policies in the strategic calculations of the T/C leadership, the crisis dynamics underlying the enclave years of the T/C community, the mark of the enclave period upon the construction of the patronage relationships characterising the politics and economy of the post-1974 society.

One must point out that, much of the past literature on the T/Cs has typically treated the latter as the passive actors of a problem basically concerning the

field of inter-ethnic and inter-state relations. As a matter of fact, studies concentrating upon the domestic dynamics of the T/C society have only recently proliferated. Furthermore, much of this novel work tend to focus upon the question of identity, through the theories of nationalism and cultural studies. On the other hand, most students of the T/C nationalist politics emphasise the key role of the relationships between economy and politics as the key to comprehending the constitution of nationalist politics, the relations of power, and the generalised crisis now characterising the T/C society. As a matter of fact, one of my core critiques of the existing literature, and one of the key points of departure of this thesis is that, those scholars who argue for the centrality of the relationships between politics and economy tend to speak of the economy without recourse to political economy, and of politics without recourse to the theories of the state. Accordingly, in this thesis, I have tried to focus on the sub-processes of state-building and capital accumulation amongst the T/Cs, from the point of view of the Marxist theories of the state and political economy. Since nationalist politics aimed not only at the modernisation of culture, but also of politics and the economy, I would argue that my work usefully complements existing studies of nationalist politics treating the issue from the point of identity. Let me finally note that, the role of the economy in T/C politics has best been studied, theoretically, by the students of patronage theory. I believe that this thesis, by bringing into light how patronage networks were the key to the constitution of state power, has successfully placed the question of patronage—typically treated as the subject of a

‘middle range’ theory—into its right context, i.e. the theory of the capitalist state.

One of key concerns of the students of the T/C politics has always been the nature of the relationships between the T/Cs and Turkey—the ‘Motherland’. As a matter of fact, in the case of the T/Cs, this is the way that the broader question of the connections between the level of inter-state politics, and the level of domestic dynamics comes up. It is important to note that most students of the history of T/Cs and of the Cyprus issue tend to argue that the T/Cs, being politically and economically fully dependent upon Turkey, were simply the passive recipients and bearers of the consequences of the latter’s policy decisions. As I see it, this approach often leads to the theoretical error of minimising or totally ignoring the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, and, most importantly, the key role of the nationalist drive towards state-building. This thesis indicates that the relationships between domestic and external dynamics were far too complicated to fit into this image of one-sided dependency. Below, I engage the preliminary task of expounding and modelling the relationships between the level of domestic dynamics, on the one hand, and the levels of inter-state politics and global political economy, on the other.

The specification of the relationships between politics and economy as the key problematic of this thesis naturally led me into going back to and rethinking aspects of the Marxist debate on the capitalist state and Marxist political economy. It is only well too known that the distinguishment of the

spheres of economy (civil society) and of politics/state (political society), and the theorisation of the relationships between the two was the basic problematic driving Karl Marx's lifetime work. Theoretically, this thesis draws upon the state theory of Bob Jessop, and the theory of causality of 'early' Erik Olin Wright, complemented by the approach to the so-called problem of productive–unproductive labour of Anwar Shaikh and Ertuğrul A. Tonak. The original leitmotiv of the works of Jessop and Wright was the need to criticise and supersede the ossified ways of the old official Marxist school, as well as the limits of the Althusserian idea of the structured, overdetermined whole, dominating, in the 1970s, Western neo-Marxist thought. Thus, whilst Jessop challenged 'reductionist' approaches of all sorts to the problem of the capitalist state—comprising its finer variants as the Althusserian 'determination in the last instance', Wright challenged the 'obscure' and 'speculative' formulations of the relationships of causality between the economic structure and the other elements of the 'structured whole'. Methodologically, this thesis pursues a double strategy: a) It draws upon the theories of Jessop and Wright to build an historical–empirical framework to study the case of the T/Cs, and; (b) puts aspects of their theories to the test by making use of the historical–empirical material as relates to the economy and politics of the T/Cs. One of the key distinctions of the work of Jessop and the early work of Wright is that the former was basically inspired by Antonio Gramsci and the late, neo–Gramscian Nicos Poulantzas, whilst the latter, by Louis Althusser. Jessop's theory of the state basically relies upon two critical ideas, that of relationality, and

strategianness. As for (the early) Wright, his basic task was to break down the global concept of structural causality into its finer variants, namely, the six basic modes of determination—structural limitation, selection, reproduction *versus* nonreproduction, limits of functional compatibility, transformation, and mediation. Furthermore, he expanded the concept of structured whole into the various models of determination.

In the light of Bob Jessop's theory of the capitalist state and economy, and Erik Olin Wright's theory of causal determinations, I have formulated an historically and empirically grounded conceptual framework to study the successive episodes of the T/C history, with a view to lay bare, particularly, the relationships of causality between politics and economy. Looking vertically, the framework in question involves, using the International Relations terminology, multiple levels of analysis, more specifically, the inter-state (USA, GB, Turkey, Greece), and the global (International Political Economy) levels. Thus, I argue that, on a first level, the given conjuncture of world politics, political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, and the conjuncture of international political economy (dominant development strategies, policies and policy tools) together determine the externally-given constraints and possibilities faced by T/C nationalist leadership. On a second level, externally-given constraints and possibilities, *and* the domestically-given constraints together determine the range of the options for strategic choices regarding the problems of state-building and capital accumulation. However, despite the fact that it broadly suggests that the various inter-state and domestic political, and economic factors together

determine the range of options for strategic choices regarding state-building and capital accumulation, this conceptual framework does not make any *a priori* claims about the direction of causality, either between the various levels, or between politics and economy. Therefore, it is open, rather than being rigidly closed, in the sense of foretelling the results it purports to find out. As a matter of fact, the full implications of the framework as to the direction of causalities became clear, to myself, only after it was applied to the historical–empirical material of the T/C politics and economy. Furthermore, the framework in question temporally and dialectically links the successive stages of the T/C history. Overall, strategic choices reflect strategic constraints, possibilities, options, and policy (or, political) priorities. Each strategic choice gives way to a different set of relations, and modes of determination between politics and economy, and thus, each strategic choice brings about a new set of contradictions, underlying the politics of the sub-period under study. Such conflicts, together with the changes in the conjuncture of world politics and the political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, eventually lead to change.

The results of the study are given at the end of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, covering the two sub-periods of 1960–1963 and 1964–1967, respectively, and summarised, in toto, in the Conclusion. Accordingly, here, I will only highlight a number of key results. Firstly, any reductionist arguments as to the relationship of economy and politics, attributing, for instance, the policy decisions of the T/C nationalist leadership to capitalist class interests and/or the needs and requirements of capital accumulation appear to be difficult to

support. On the other hand, the relationships between domestic and the external dynamics appear to have followed a rather complicated, and somewhat cyclical pattern that clearly contradicts the linear view of one-sided dependency. Thus, despite the fact that external actors do often have the capacity to dictate the ground rules to which domestic actors are expected to obey, the latter, on their turn, generally prove, in due process, their ability to defy the rules and compel external actors to radical revisions.²

On the other hand, so far as the theories of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright are concerned, the following study of the T/C economy and politics gives support to a number of key ideas. As I see it, the major elements of Jessop's strategic-relational approach to the state theory—most importantly, his distinction of structural constraints *versus* conjunctural opportunities, provide a most suitable framework for the analysis of the T/C economy and politics. Furthermore, historical-empirical material appears to support several elements of his theory—for instance, his conceptions of interest, temporal and spatial horizons, of the society consisting of the sum of various autopoietic systems implying rival societal and state projects, and

² From another perspective, the Cyprus issue involves the asymmetrical relationships of power amongst, broadly speaking, three classes of states/societies—using the terms of William Hale the 'Great Powers', the 'Middle Powers', and the 'Small Powers'. Thus, "[m]iddle powers stand somewhere between the two extremes of the scale – that is to say, they have some ability to resist pressure from more powerful states, ... may sometimes be able to influence the policies of weaker ones, especially if they are geographically contiguous, ... [and] [t]hey may possess some regional power, but cannot expect to be able to influence global politics more than marginally." (Hale, 2002: 1–2) On the other hand, "[A]s Robert Rothstein puts it, 'the Small Power may move not from insecurity to security, but from insecurity to the status of a satellite.'" (Hale, 2002: 2). This thesis challenges 'Turkey's satellite' view of the T/C society and state.

the idea of the state as a site of strategy. On the other hand, Wright's idea of structural determination, namely, that some basic structure—the economy, for instance, puts limits upon or determines the forms of other structures is the key to understanding the critical role played by one specific type of constraint that will be brought up below, namely, the low capacity of the T/C society to generate the surplus product necessary for the success of the nationalist project of state-building. Incidentally, I must note that, in my analysis, I have brought together Wright's idea of structural limitation and Shaikh and Tonak's theory of unproductive labour, by arguing that the T/Cs low capacity to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of unproductive state activities constitutes a structural limit upon the politics of state-building.

As far as the relationships of between the two sub-processes of the nationalist project, namely, state-building, and capital accumulation are concerned, the results of this study tend to refute any reductionist theory, putting to the core class interests, and/or the needs and requirements of capital accumulation alone. As a matter of fact, the T/C case appears to support (1) the idea of a 'dialectical' relationship between economy and politics, (2) as two operationally autonomous but materially interdependent sub-ensembles of social relations, where (3) the economic structure puts limits upon the form of the state and politics. Thereby justified, respectively, are (1) Wright's conception of dialectics, (2) Jessop's idea of autopoiesis, and (3) Wright's idea of structural limitation. More specifically, in the case of the T/Cs, I argue that the historically given constraint of the low capacity

of the society to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state functions gave rise to a fundamental contradiction between the two elements of the nationalist project, namely, the politics of state-building, and the needs and requirements of capital accumulation. The nationalist leadership, being unable to supersede this contradiction on a permanent basis, resorted to ways that gave rise to today's heavily criticised and clearly unsustainable politics and economy. The process of state-building involves, as sub-processes, the production of ideology, the constitution of legitimate monopoly over the means of violence, the concentration of political power, the creation of economic policies and tools to ensure the capital accumulation, the construction of a centralised administrative apparatus, the creation of territory, and the institutionalisation of taxation and budgeting. State-building has positive and negative effects upon capital accumulation. On the one hand, the monopolisation of violence, the creation of territory, the constitution of economic policies and tools, and the institutionalisation of budgeting together directly and indirectly support the process of capital accumulation. On the other hand, the creation of army and police, and the bureaucracy expand the scale of unproductive activities, and constitute a drag on the process of capital accumulation due to its absorption of a considerable portion of the surplus product. A critical constraint faced by the nationalist leadership in its drive towards state-building was the low capacity of the T/C society to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state absorption. On the other hand, capital accumulation requires (a) the allocation of social labour primarily to productive activities,

and (b) political, administrative, geographical stability. However, the politics of state-building of the T/C nationalist leadership, namely *Taksim*, was based upon a strategy of political and, particularly, geographical (territorial) destabilisation, and required the allocation of critical portions of the total social labour to military activity, i.e. to non-production. According to the politics of *Taksim*, the co-existence of the two communities from the point of view of geography, demographics, and the various activities of social reproduction (production, distribution, and personal consumption) was a major obstacle to the process of state-building. Therefore, the politics of *Taksim* was based upon the strategy of the disruption of geographical- and demographic stability, having adverse effects upon the process of capital accumulation.

The full implications of the contradiction between the sub-processes of state-building and capital accumulation caused by the historical constraint of low surplus product became clear only after the retreat of the T/C community into the enclaves. As I see it, the origins of the rise of the post-1974 relationships of patronage, and the causes of their crisis can, to a large measure, be traced back to this fundamental contradiction. The contradiction in question, latent under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus (1960–1963), effectively became a source of crisis under the circumstances of the first phase of the enclave life (1964–1967). Furthermore, the resolution of this contradiction led the T/C nationalist leadership to laying down, as the basis of state power, the cultural and institutional foundations of a wide network of patronage relationships. However, the lack of necessary

resources was a major constraint prior to 1974 preventing the full-consolidation of the patronage network. This constraint could only be eased after 1974, largely thanks to the net transfer of wealth—means of production and means of subsistence—from the G/Cs to the T/Cs. Overall, *ganimet* [the loot, implying the expropriation of property left by the fleeing G/Cs], and extensive state employment, social policies, and the low level of extraction financed out of the fiscal transfers of Turkey, considered by the leaders and the populace at large, as rightfully earned (re)compensation for the hardships of the enclave life and the military labour of the populace, provided the material basis for the consolidation of the clientalist relations of power of the post-1974 years.

Below is the plan of the thesis:

- The first and introductory chapter is devoted to the exposition of the origins, the basic problematic, and the basic ideas of the thesis, as well as the problems of (a) the proper periodization of the T/C history, and (b) the all too important problem of small states and economies, and its implications for the thesis.
- The second chapter (CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON CYPRUS) of the thesis provides a critical review of the existing Turkish literature on the T/Cs. For reasons that should become clear in due process, part of this chapter comprises a treatment of the major aspects of the current crisis of the T/Cs, which I call, a generalised crisis of statehood.

- The third chapter (CHAPTER 3. OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ECONOMY AND POLITICS/STATE) is a critical review of the theories of the state, and political economy, with particular emphasis upon the state theory of Bob Jessop, and the theory of causality of Erik Olin Wright. At the end of this chapter, I suggest a model to test the two theories in the light of the empirical–historical material on the politics and economy of T/Cs.
- The fourth chapter [CHAPTER 4. T/C POLITICS AND ECONOMY, AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE PRIOR TO ZURICH–LONDON] is the first of the three empirical chapters, which provides an account of the dual nationalist strategy of state-building and capital accumulation of the pre-1960 period, of the genesis of the Cyprus issue, and a summary account of the conjuncture of world politics prior to Zurich and London Agreements.
- The fifth chapter [CHAPTER 5. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE COMMON STATE (1960–1963)] is the second of the three empirical chapters, which gives a chronological narrative of the world conjuncture, and the politics of and economy of the T/Cs, organised in accordance with the historically and empirically grounded conceptual framework expounded in Chapter 2. The basic goal of this chapter is to rethink the theories of Jessop and Wright, in the light of the historical–empirical material of T/C politics and economy, for the sub-period of 1960–1963, the Common state of the Republic of Cyprus.
- The sixth chapter [CHAPTER 6. REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, ‘ENCLAVE LIFE’,

THE PROTO-STATE (1964–1967)] is the last of the three two empirical chapters, which is a chronological narrative of the world conjuncture, and the politics of and economy of the T/Cs, now for the sub-period of 1964–1967, when the T/Cs lived estranged from the polity and economy of the Republic of Cyprus, inside the heavily fortified urban neighborhoods and large villages. The basic goal of this chapter is also to rethink the theories of Jessop and Wright.

- The CONCLUSION basically comprises a brief presentation of the overall results of this thesis as well as some key questions that are likely to guide my future work on the problem of causality, in the field of International Relations, and on Cyprus.

1.2. PERIODISATION AND THE CHOICE OF THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY

A note to clarify the rationale behind the choice of, specifically, the sub-periods 1960–1963, and 1964–1967 now seems to be in order. From the point of view of the core sub-processes of state-building, capital accumulation, and the patterns of the relationship between economy and politics/state, T/C history can be periodised as follows:

- (i) (1943–1960) De-colonisation, Intra-elite Power Struggle, *Taksim*;
- (ii) (1960–1963) Republic of Cyprus, the Common State;
- (iii) (1964–1974) “Enclave” Life, the T/C Proto-State;
- (iv) (1974–1983/1986) Consolidation of the T/C State, Foundation of the Independent State;

- (v) (1986–1999/2000) “First-wave” Neoliberal Reforms, and Generalised Crisis;
- (vi) (2000–Present) Anti-crisis Measures, Finance-led, Speculative Growth and Crisis; “Second-wave Neoliberal Reforms.

Note that, sub-periods i) through iv) cover the genesis, further evolution, and the consolidation of the post-1974 pattern of politics and economy. And, sub-periods v) and vi) cover the deconstruction, i.e. the crisis and the transformation of the post-1974 patterns of politics and economy.

(i) (1943–1960) *De-colonisation, Intra-elite Power Struggle, Taksim*

1943 bore the first signs of a political thaw on the Island, which opened before the T/C elites a window of opportunity for political mobilisation. Amongst the T/Cs, this marked the beginnings of an intra-elite struggle which led to the rise of the nationalist project of state building, as well as the emergence of the basic elements of future state structures, including the process of capital accumulation.³

(ii) (1960–1963) *Republic of Cyprus, the Common State*

While giving further impulse to state-building through the constitution of full-fledged parliamentary and administrative organs, the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus also obstructed the “separatist” project of state-building and capital accumulation.

³ See Arslan (2012).

Discursively, the Cyprus issue is posited by the nationalists of both sides as a question of the violation of rights, and a question of security. According to the Greek Cypriots (henceforth G/C) nationalists, the Zurich and London Agreements which led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus had violated the rights of the G/Cs. According to the T/C nationalists, the conflict triggered by the events of 23 December 1963 had given rise to the violation of their rights and raised a serious question of security. See Evre (2004: 29).

(iii) (1964–1967) “Enclave” Life, the T/C Proto-State (Phase I)

The “enclave” period witnessed to the emergence of the autonomous, T/C proto-state, and the constitution on a large scale of the distributive role of politics in the allocation of economic resources, largely financed by the fiscal transfers from Turkey.⁴ During the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, the T/C nationalist leadership only partly shared in the powers of the centralised state apparatus. In 1964, the TMT assumed the responsibility of all the centralised functions of the enclaved T/C proto-state. Therefore, to the separate functions of the communal–

⁴ This is a basic point where I differ from other students of T/C politics, except, perhaps—Salih Egemen and Yael-NavaroYashin—in that, I see the beginnings of the post-1974 relationships of patronage in the pre-1974 period, particularly, in the enclave period of 1964–1974. Thus, Navaro-Yashin similarly sees the dynamics of the enclave period as the key to understanding today's relationships: “To properly analyse Turkish-Cypriot attachments to civil service and the affects this engenders, we need to return to the period, in the 1960s, when Turkish-Cypriots were estranged from the Republic of Cyprus and first began to form their own separate state administration. In other words, we need to turn to the period when the structure for this specific unrecognised state administration was first set.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 285)

local state under the Republic, now added, were the functions of a central state apparatus.

(iv) (1968–1974) “Enclave” Life, the T/C Proto-State (Phase II)

The first phase of the “enclave” period concluded with outbreak of a violent triple crisis, (a) within the G/Cs, between the ‘anti-Enosis and/or independentist’ G/C nationalist forces of Makarios, and the pro-Enosis forces of Makarios; (b) between G/C–Greek nationalists and TMT, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on the other; (c) within the T/Cs, particularly, the fractions of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and Rauf R. Denктаş. The T/C proto-state, civil society, and economy were reformed and further institutionalised, and G/C–T/C bi-communal negotiations started.

(v) (1974–1983/1986) Consolidation of the T/C State, Foundation of the Independent State

The proto-state, modelled on the state of the Republic of Cyprus was greatly extended and partly remodelled after the state of the Turkish Republic. The distributive role of politics was further consolidated through the allocation of G/C property and state allocation financed by the fiscal transfers of Turkey. In 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [*Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti*—KKTC] came to replace the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus [*Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti*—KTFD]. This marked the transition from the principle of federation, to the principle of independence, based on the claim of

the right to self-determination, and thereby, the completion of the T/C nationalist project of state-building. From the point of view of development policies, the sub-period of 1974–1986 was one of Import Substituting Industrialisation (ISI).

(vi) (1986–1999/2000) ‘First-wave’ Neoliberal Reforms, and Generalised Crisis

In 1986, Turgut Özal introduced the first-wave of neoliberal reforms, namely, price liberalisation, trade liberalisation, and privatisation, which were given further impulse by Tansu Çiller, in 1996–1997. Together with the process of Europeanisation, this sub-period concluded with the banking crisis of 1999, depositors’ riots, and the outbreak of a massive wave of political contest, eventually forcing Denktaş to step aside.

(vii) (2000–Present) Anti-crisis Measures, Speculative Growth and Crisis, ‘Second-wave’ Neoliberal Reforms

This sub-period is one of generalised crisis in politics and the economy. In early 2000, the so-called “Economic Stabilisation Programme” was introduced. This was a prelude to the “good governance” reforms and IMF-style conditionalities of the second half of the decade. This sub-period also witnessed sharp reversals in the fortunes of political actors and parties, the prime example of which being the rise and fall of CTP, and the fall, rise and re-fall of UBP.

The sub-periods above can be partitioned into three:

- A. The sub-period of pre-Republic (of Cyprus) 1943–1960 covers the genesis of the basic elements of future state structures and basic policies of capital accumulation.
- B. The three sub-periods of 1960–1963, 1964–1974, and 1974–1983/1986 together cover the further evolution and completion of the T/C nationalist project of state building, and the consolidation of the distributive role of the state.
- C. The two sub-periods of 1986–1999/2000, and 2000–Present cover the neo-liberal era of the de-construction and reform of the post-1974 distributive role of the state.

Chronologically, this thesis covers aspects of “A” (1943–1969) and the first two sub-periods of “B” (1964–1967; 1967–1974) above.

1.3. THE PROBLEM OF ‘MICRO-STATES’ AND ‘MICRO-ECONOMIES’

Methodologically, one of the most disturbing/thought-provoking and challenging problems, on the part of a student of the T/C economy and politics, is that of “micro-states” and “micro-economies”. The very first question is the following: Are, the ‘grand’ theories of the state and political economy applicable to the tiny micro-society of T/Cs? From a theoretical point of view, I tend to think that the answer is affirmative. In other words, theories ‘as concepts and the relationships amongst concepts’ can be used to discuss and theorise the micro case of Cyprus. On the other hand, theories as

models of the purest, the most developed type of society, in the sense of Marx, or ideal-type models of society, in the sense of Weber, are less useful.

The problem of “micro-states” and “micro-economies” basically boils down to one of scales and scaling. As far as the economy is concerned, the limits to the development of the division of labour—in terms of the input–output economics, backward and forward linkages amongst industries— is one of the major constraints. As far as politics is concerned, the costs to a small society of financing a modern state constitute a major problem. Furthermore, the face-to-face closely-knit relationships of a micro society, leading to some kind of a merger between the political sphere, the public sphere, and the lifeworld, somewhat colors the dynamics of politics.

Let me start with the last and the third point. There is a beautiful letter, written and sent from İstanbul, by the noted T/C Dr. Hafız Cemal (also known as ‘*Lokman Hekim*’)—who was a great ‘celebrity’ of his times, and published in the 16 June 1934 (183rd) issue of the tabloid *Masum Millet* [*The Innocent Community*]. In his letter, ‘*Kıbrıs’ı göreceğim geldi*’, Dr. Hafız Cemal perfectly reflects the emotive state of nearly all T/C intellectuals towards their Island, their historical dilemma of ‘hatred and love’, of ‘leave or stay’, of ‘boredom and exhilaration’:

“... *Pek sevdiğim Kıbrıs’a karşı kalbimde beslediğim, ruhumda sakladığım muhabbet, gün geçtikçe arttı, şiddetlendi ve düs-sıla (sıla hastalığı) denilen pek üzücü bir hastalık, kalbimi işgal-i marazîsi altına aldı. ¶Kıbrıs’ta pek bereketli olan dedikodu âlemine! dalarak afakî (gelişigüzel) sözler dinlemeğe, hercaî-meşreb (çapkın) arkadaşlarla görüşmeye arzum arttı!*

¶*Büyük ve küçük lordları, kontları, paşaları, beyleri, efendileri ve saf kalbli ağaları göreceğim geldi! ... ¶Kıbrıs'ın ukalasını, ulemasını, sulehasını (akıllı, bilgili ve soylularını); ve kendi kendilerini dünyanın en akıllısı, dâhisi addeden zevat-ı kiramı (saygın beyleri) ziyaret etmeye ne kadar heveskârım!*” (Fedai, 1986: 185, 188)

As I see it, one of the most pervasive, but least problematised aspects of Cypriot politics, public life and lifeworld is the mental–emotive state of living in a small society, and on a small island—particularly, on the part of the intelligentsia. There have been many people who have just left, feeling torn, emotively and mentally, between the many wonders of the Island and the parochial lives of its inhabitants, and the petty squabbles of its town politics.⁵ Credit goes to Yael Navaro-Yashin for having brought up this issue, and it is to be hoped that, in Cyprus studies more progress will be made to theoretically link the study of emotive crisis to the those of political and economic crises.

The gist of the issue of the specificity of micro-states, and micro-economies boils down to the question of ‘scale’. It would be interesting to study how small scale affects the relationships between the different sub-ensembles of relationships, particularly, and using the terms of Bob Jessop, those between politics, the public sphere and the lifeworld. The point I have in mind is that, small scale can make it relatively more difficult to assign distinct spaces to

⁵ Writing this, I have in mind the broken lives of the late Özker Yaşın, poet and novelist, who spent the last years of his life in İstanbul; the late Dr. İhsan Ali, the great anti-nationalist, and pacifist–humanist of the T/Cs, who once said: “We have created a hell out of a paradise”; and his late nephew Özdemir Özgür, the gentle soul I have had the chance of knowing.

relationally different sub-ensembles, causing the sphere of politics, public sphere and the lifeworld to spatially collapse over one another, and share the same space. If true, this could make some types of power relations more likely than others, and some, completely unlikely. One key cause of this is that small space would compress the communicative sphere as well, making it directly accessible and/or observable. For instance, the idealisation of political leaders is likely to require a considerable physical distancing between leaders and the populace. Thus, speaking of the changes the establishment of the ‘independent’ TRNC has brought along in the dominant discourse, Ali Bizden recalls how the T/Cs now got a whole new flag, a new narrative of the war of independence, and a ‘cult of personality’, as Dr. Fazıl Küçük the leader and hero of the T/Cs war of liberation. However, Bizden also points out that, given the ‘smallness’ of Cyprus, and the ‘freshness’ of the community’s memories could not possibly let this story, this new mode of knowing take root. Dr. Küçük could not, in the minds of T/Cs, take the place of Atatürk so easily. The parents, older sisters and brothers of the TRNC knew Fazıl Küçük as ‘the Doctor’, and their most vivid reminiscences of him were his slurs. ‘Doctor’ was just another of the familiar faces of *Çarşı*, he was ‘Rahmetli Doktor’ [*the late Doctor*] (Bizden, 1997: 82–83).

The most popular application of the question of scale is, to the best of my knowledge, the study of the T/C economy as a ‘small-island economy’—to which many T/C economists are particularly attracted. Studying the dynamics of the T/C economy from the perspective of small island

economies, Mihçı and Karaman (2005: 22) point out that the origins of the field date back to the late 1950s, when the distinction between small and large economies was firstly made, contributing to the country typologies in the literature of development. Later on, focus upon the so-called small island economies, their basic difference with the small economies in general being their geographical isolatedness. Until the 1980s, the dominant view in the literature was that small island economies faced a number of structural impediments in their growth processes, originating in the scale diseconomies caused by their smallness, which, in turn, led to higher unit costs (Mihçı and Karaman, 2005: 21). One of the basic arguments concentrated on the impass faced by small island economies in terms of the two basic development strategies. Thus, they could not opt for import substituting industrialisation, because of the insufficiency of their domestic markets. On the other hand, there were serious constraints before export-oriented industrialisation, due to relatively higher costs of transportation and the instability of foreign demand (Mihçı and Karaman, 2005: 22). One of the interesting findings of the small-island economy studies was that the institution of competitive market structures seems to be very difficult for small islands. The small size of the domestic market constitutes a natural barrier to the entry of the new firms, thus making monopolistic and oligopolistic structures a distinct possibility for small islands (Mihçı and Karaman, 2005: 23). As a matter of fact, I tend to think that this point is critical to comprehending the G/C and T/C nationalist rivalry in the field of capital accumulation. Thus, in the case where the optimum scale of

efficiency was close to or roughly equal to the size of the market, there was room for only a few oligopolies or a monopoly. Thus, in the late 1950, the T/C nationalist leadership supported some investment projects to create private monopolies that would capitalise on the T/C domestic market. Monopolistic profit would both speed up capital accumulation, and the T/C nationalist leadership with new sources of public revenue. Such initiatives were strongly objected by the G/C nationalist leadership on the grounds that they violated economic rationality. Overall, it would not be too farfetched to argue that, in the small island economy of Cyprus, nationalist rivalry in the field of economy was about the ‘scramble’ for monopolistic markets.

It was the British who, during the post-war process of decolonisation, first took the question of small scale seriously, either because they were seriously concerned, or because they were appealed by its political uses, or both. In so doing, they focused, not so much on the scale diseconomies of production plants, but the scale diseconomies of the states. As noted above, the small economy argument is that the size of the domestic market is too small to ensure scale economies for production plants. Similarly, the British administrators argued that the geographical sizes of the so-called ‘small (island) colonies’ were too small to ensure scale economies for independent state apparatuses. Therefore, the best way out for some small colonies was to be ‘satisfied’ with self-government in strictly domestic affairs, and continued dependence upon the British in the areas of defence and foreign relations. Some others could become independent, and ensure scale economies, by means of getting together as a federated state of small

islands. On the other hand, they could enjoy their membership of the Commonwealth of Nations—the post-colonial heir of the British Empire, by taking advantage of the large market outlets the Commonwealth was expected to provide. Thus, this would also enable the small islands to overcome their constraint of small domestic markets.

The idea that small islands create scale diseconomies for modern state structures is, informally, if not formally, voiced by some T/C critics of ‘state hypertrophy’. Analytically, the weak point of the idea hypertrophy is its analytics—its definition in a functionally specified form, and its measurement. The idea of scale economies for a production plant is formally derived from the production and cost structures of the plant specified as a mathematical function—e.g. a Cobb–Douglas function. Therefore, the question is twofold: (a) How would one define and specify a similar function for state ‘services’? and, (b) how would one measure the variables of such a function? However, problems of specification and measurement may not necessarily deny the reality of state hypertrophy—but simply the difficulties involved in its precise formalisation and specification. It is true, after all, that for a society the size of a small town like the T/Cs, organisation as a central state rather than a local state, say a municipality, would necessarily imply a number of ‘central state’ functions that could cause considerable scale diseconomies.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON CYPRUS

As noted above, this thesis partly rests on two key observations as regards to the state of T/C studies. The first is the oversight of domestic dynamics, generally, and of the economy and politics, more particularly. The second is the oversight of theory and methodology, generally. Scholarly research studying Cyprus from the perspective of interstate politics, and the T/C nationalist discourse of ‘Cyprus the national cause’ typically divorce foreign policy from domestic whilst the converse is true of the self-taught historians of the T/C history, as they typically divorce domestic dynamics from foreign policy. As a matter of fact, actuality itself warrants a theoretically informed analysis of domestic dynamics, on account of at least two observations. Firstly, given the current crisis in the T/C society, and its repercussions on the Cyprus issue, the problem of connecting foreign policy changes to domestic dynamics acquires theoretical urgency. Secondly, given the widespread view that the key to understanding the nature, problems and current crisis of T/C politics is the economy, the problem of connecting politics and economy acquires theoretical urgency. On the other hand, during the last decade or so, there has been a surge of scholarly studies on the domestic dynamics of the T/C society. Most of such novel, theoretically informed work focuses upon the questions of identity, from the point of view of the theories of nationalism and cultural studies. My basic critique of the theoretical work concentrating upon cultural/identity politics, from,

amongst others, the various theories of nationalism is that, (a) it speaks of the state/politics, but without a theory of the (capitalist) state, and; (b) it speaks of the economy, but without political economy. Therefore, theoretical work on the processes of identity formation must be complemented by theoretical on the processes of state building *and* capital accumulation. Accordingly, this thesis is an attempt to approach the T/C nationalist project of modernisation in terms of its other two key sub-processes, from the point of view of two respective theories: (a) State-building, in the light of state theories, and; (b) capital accumulation, in the light of political economy.

2.1. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ON CYPRUS: INTERSTATE POLITICS, NATIONALIST DISCOURSE, HISTORIANS OF T/C POLITICS AND ECONOMY

The bulk of the Turkish literature treats Cyprus as a problem which simply belongs to the realm of interstate politics, part of which being the Turco-Greek, or T/C–G/C relations. As far as the Turkish foreign policy of Cyprus is concerned, there are a number of memoirs, written by former diplomats, which provide useful accounts of the history of conflicts, negotiations, and agreements with, sometimes critical revelations of past secrets.⁶ Clearly, most of this literature tends to treat the T/Cs just as a unitary actor, and ignore the significance of domestic dynamics (Arslan, 2012: 120).

⁶ See, Erim (1975), Esenbel (1993), and Yavuzalp (1994). As the General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Melih Esenbel participated the Turco-Greek negotiations at Zurich (5–11 February 1959), leading to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960. Nihat Erim was one of the Turkish jurists on the Joint Constitutional Commission set up under the London Agreements of 19 February 1959, and the Prime Minister of the government endorsed by the authors of the military coup of 12 Mart 1971. Ercüment Yavuzalp was Turkey’s Acting Ambassador to Cyprus from 1967 to 1974.

Fortunately, there are some exceptions which, albeit few, connect the level of interstate politics to domestic dynamics. For instance, Melek Fırat (2006a; 2006b), as one of the basic textbook readings covering the Cyprus issue, treats foreign policy issues in their relationships to the domestic dynamics of Turkey, and the T/C community/society—much in the spirit of the collective effort it makes part of.⁷ Melek Fırat’s study of the Turkish foreign policy and the Cyprus issue over the period of 1960–1971, as a fine piece of foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach to international relations, puts the emphasis upon Turkey’s domestic politics, particularly, to the transformative effects of the dynamics set loose by the *coup d’état* of 27 May 1960 (Fırat, 1997). On the other hand, Şükrü Sina Güler’s two volumes work on the history of Cyprus issue, remains, to this date, as the *pièce de résistance* of the Cypriot studies by Turkish scholars. Gürel (1985) brilliantly connects the inter-state politics of Cyprus to the forces of colonialism and nationalism, through extensive usage of British archives—particularly, the Colonial Office documents. One must also take note of two excellent books, on the Cyprus issue, written by T/C scholar. Hasgüler (2007) enquires the Cyprus issue from broader perspective of decolonisation, the Non-Aligned Movement, the politics of the Middle East,

⁷ See the methodological introduction by Baskın Oran, editor, to the first of the two volumes of the collection of articles called ‘*Türk Dış Politikası*’ (Turkish Foreign Policy). Oran (2006a: 13–14) puts the emphasis over economic structure, as opposed to superstructure—following, apparently, Marx’s 1859 Preface to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, and the connections between internal and external dynamics/politics. *Türk Dış Politikası* was intended to replace the somewhat out-dated *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events), the textbook of generations of international relations students. The chapter on Cyprus was written by A. Suat Bilge, who was one of the Turkish delegates on the Joint Constitutional Commission set up under the London Agreements to draft the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. See Bilge (1987).

and Arab nationalisms. In so doing, he both places particular emphasis upon the domestic dynamics of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and provides one of the most extensive overview of the various approaches to the Cyprus issue by the major sects of the Turkish Left.⁸ Kızılyürek (2005) enquires the Cyprus issue from the point of view of the ‘twin’, so to say, Greek and Turkish nationalisms,⁹ by placing particular emphasis upon the relationships between, respectively, what he calls the ‘periphery’ nationalism of G/Cs and T/Cs, and the ‘centre’ nationalism of Greece and Turkey.

Obviously, it is the nationalist authors who, writing on Turco–Greek, or T/C–G/C relations, are most disposed to featuring societies and states as closed boxes.¹⁰ As I see it, there are two good aprone to portray their own societies and states as unitary actors, whose interior differences hardly

⁸ See, particularly, Chapter 3, Sections I–III.

⁹ “*Milliyetçiliğin aklamacı aklı ile seçici hafızasını her gün yeniden yaşamak zorunda kalan birisi olarak, tarihsel ve coğrafi nedenlerle karşı karşıya gelen ama birbirleriyle ‘karşılaştırılmak’, yani yüzleşmek istemeyen ve ‘ötekini’ lanetleyerek verili iktidar yapılarını yeniden üreten milliyetçi özneleri aynı kitapta buluşturmaya karar verdim.*” (Kızılyürek, 2005: 15)

¹⁰ Conservative and/or nationalist authors generally neglect the very presence of the T/Cs, because they make sense of Cyprus from the point of view of the strategic interests of Islam and/or Turkey. For instance, Ali Bulaç, liberal Muslim journalist, attributes the causes of the great excitement roused by the Turks’ landing onto Cyprus, to the Arab–Israeli War a year ago, and its being the first territorial gain of the Muslim world from the Christian in three centuries. According to Mümtaz Soysal, laique and left–Kemalist professor of constitutional law, and a former advisor to Rauf Denktaş, as chief negotiator, the point is that G/Cs and the West simply could not accept the fact that Cyprus was where a two and a half centuries long expulsion and contraction was reversed. Finally, Ahmet Davutoğlu, former professor of international relations and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, claims that Turkey would strategically be interested in Cyprus, even if there were not a single muslim Turk left there (Kızılyürek, 2011: 70) As a matter of fact, many dissident intellectuals are also prone to ignoring the presence of the T/Cs. According to Yaşın (1998: 123–124), this is because the historical sensibilities of Turkish intellectuals were shaped by the *Genç Türk* [Young Turks]–*İttihat ve Terakki* [Union and Progress]–*Halk Partisi* [People’s Party] tradition, and because Cyprus, to Turkey, was but some desolate island, whose sole significance being its import for the goals of Turkish foreign policy. Yaşın (1998: 124) also argues that, this necessarily posed problems of congruence between T/Cs and Turkey, because to the former, Cyprus was a domestic problem with effects upon their very existence, rather than a sheer question of foreign policy.

matter, for so long as the twisted and quislings are sufficiently kept controlled. Secondly, the overriding impulse to represent other societies and states, *in toto*, as historical enemies requires the construction of stereotypes about ‘others’, antithetical to ‘us’, and thereby, the totalisation of others and us, together, as unitary actors.^{11, 12} As far as Turco–Greek relations are concerned, one is able to identify three—if not more, basic arguments in the works of the nationalist authors. The first is that ‘Greeks’ (or, Greek nationalists) are wrong, either because they are morally depraved and thereby have ulterior motives against the Turks, or because they ulterior motive—*Enosis*— is morally depraved, due to its expansionist character, reducing them into a state of depravity before the Turks.¹³ The second is that Turks are right, historically, and geopolitically.¹⁴ The third is the

¹¹ According to Oran (2006: 14), those in authority generally ignore the intrinsic dynamics, for pointing to the factor of extrinsic dynamics—such as the incitement of foreign elements, the commonplace rhetoric of so-called ‘*dış mihraklar*’—as the cause of given events enables them to wash their hands of their own faults.

¹² Methodologically, nationalist historiographies are holistic teleologies, cast in terms of the collective subject of the nation, governed by its own, preordained telos. Accordingly, the critique by Wright, et al. (1992: 113–115) of the radical holism plaguing Marxist historiography equally applies to nationalist historiographies: “Generally, ... non-elliptical treatments of collective subjects are linked to holistic teleologies of history: the objective purpose of history in the teleology is represented as the goal of a genuinely Collective Subject.” (Wright, et al., 2009: 114)

¹³ On one occasion, at least, İsmail Bozkurt tends to suggest that the ‘inhumanity’ of Greeks derives from the expansionist character of their *Megali Idea*, rather than their own characters. See Bozkurt (2001). Apparently, when it comes to relating the stories of Greeks and Turks as people, this becomes a not so tenable position. Thus, it is interesting to see that, in his ‘*Bir Gün Belki*’ (Some Day, Perhaps), the desperate story of two lovers, T/C Mehmet and G/C Nitsa, even a great novelist of Bozkurt’s calibre cannot stop himself from portraying the EOKA man Hristo, and Nitsa’s dad, as the personification of absolute evil. See, Bozkurt (2005). The poems of Behçet Kemal Çağlar, Arif Nihat Asya, Turkish nationalist poets, and of Özker Yaşın, ‘national poet’ of the T/Cs, were particularly effective in constituting stereotypes. Some of these poems were truly hideous. Consider, e.g. for one of the hideous examples of its kind, the poem written by Çağlar, on the occasion of the bombing of *Bayraktar* Mosque: “*Megalo ideanın akılsız avanesi ¶Söyle, Taştan hınç almak hangi derdin çaresi ¶Nedir tedirginliğin, bir yerine mi batıyor ¶Bayraktar caminin sivrilen minaresi*” (Manizade, 1975: 332).

¹⁴ See Manisalı (2000; 2002), Mütercimler (2000), and Cömert (2004) for a few expositions of the historical and geostrategic arguments in defence of Turkey’s claims over the Island.

centrality of a certain idea of power as the key to success in thwarting Greek schemes, where strong leadership, realistic assessment of the threats, awareness of the various stratagems of Greeks and the West, steadfastness, unity of the people, armed forces, etc. are told to be its basic sources. As a matter of fact, all the basic arguments of the nationalist discourse had already been produced by 1954, by people comprising Dr. Küçük, in Cyprus, T/C students at Turkish universities, members of the T/C diaspora in Turkey—particularly, Nevzat Karagil, editor of *Yeşilada* (Green Island) magazine, and Turkish nationalists—associations of Turkish university students, and particularly, Sedat Simavi of the daily *Hürriyet*, in their joint efforts to construct the Cyprus issue as Turkey’s prime national cause.^{15, 16}

Erol Manisalı is a prominent Left Nationalist (*ulusalcı*). See, for a critical review of his understanding of the Cyprus issue, Hasgüler (2007: 76–83). I do not engage a very exhaustive overview of the nationalist literature. For one thing, its arguments are so very repetitive that the incremental benefit of extra coverage is almost certainly nil.

¹⁵ See Arslan (2012: 122–124), for details. One of the very first basic documents was produced at the general congress of the National Youth Committee of Turkey (*Türkiye Millî Gençlik Komitesi*), which convened on 12 September 1952. Upon the motion of the National Student Federation of Turkey (*Türkiye Millî Talebe Federasyonu*), the Congress made a pronouncement on Cyprus, claiming that Cyprus was Turkish, for she was geographically tied to Asia Minor, and also, by right of conquest. Amongst the signers, was the noted Professor Dr. Orhan Aldıkaçtı, then President of the Turkish Students Association of Lausanne (*Lozan Türk Talebe Cemiyeti*), Cyprus negotiator on behalf of the Turkish Government in the 1970s, one of the authors of the T/C Constitution of 1975, and the author of the infamous 1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, commissioned by the military *régime* of 12 September 1980. See, Manizade (1975: 259–264). See, also, for a full text of the report submitted, by the Congress, to the Turkish Government, Kaymak (1968: 69–97).

¹⁶ Incidentally, geographical arguments customarily advanced to defend nationalist claims to territory as a natural right went a bit ‘deeper’ in the specific case of Cyprus, and into geology, involving the ‘tectonics’ of the Island. In 1969, G/C Society of Cypriot Studies organised in 1969, in Nicosia, the First International Congress of Cypriot Studies, with the inaugural address of President Makarios. Apparently, the point of the Congress was to highlight the Greek origins of Cyprus, to which, a select group of Turkish geographers, historians—including, reputed Ottoman historian Halil İnalcık, historians of arts, philologists, ethnologists, and historians of culture decided to attend, in order to oppose Greek claims by way of demonstrating the various ties between T/Cs and the Turks of Turkey. (Amongst those attending the Congress, also was, from the T/C side, Judge Mehmet Zekâ.) A paper to the Congress by Ordinarius Professor Dr. Hamit N. Pamir (1971) argued, that tectonically, and thus scientifically, the Island of Cyprus was the farthest convolution to the South of the Southern Taurus mountains. Contrariwise, Criton

Yet, the foremost ideologue of the Turkish nationalist discourse of Cyprus rose, not from Turkey, but Cyprus. Son of the late Judge Mehmet Raif Bey, Rauf Raif Denktaş became barrister-at-law, in 1947, served on the so-called ‘Committee for Turkish Affairs’ (*Türk İşleri Komisyonu*), established by Lord Winster, in June 1948, and became Junior Crown Council, in 1949. Although he kept his distance from active politics until he became the President of *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* (Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions) in October 1947, he discreetly contributed to Dr. Küçük’s daily *Halkın Sesi* (People’s Voice) on a regular basis, and composed its English version almost entirely by himself. Trained in law, Denktaş had a keen mind, and, was truly sedulous. As a matter of fact, reading, and the writing of polemics, political analyses, intelligence reports, etc. probably took the best part of personal and political life. Intellectual authority was one of the personal traits which lied at the basis of his rise to prominence, as the leader of the T/Cs. It is Denktaş who, before anyone else, must be credited with giving the nationalist discourse of Cyprus the prime nationalist cause, consistency and breadth. He constructed self-enclosed, self-righteous chronicles of the Turco–Greek, and T/C–G/C conflict over Cyprus.¹⁷

G. Tornaritis, Q.C., Attorney-General of the Republic argued that Cyprus made part of the ‘Hellenic’ Alps: “*It is considered that the structures found in the northern Cypriot range are typical of the Alpine orogenic movements. The conclusion, therefore, of Professor Alagoz that ‘l’île de Chypre, est physiquement dépendante de la Turquie’ owing to the similarity of the structure of the Taurus mountain in Asia Minor with the northern range of mountains in Cyprus does not seem to be well founded as it appears that such range is the most external part of the external zones of the Hellenic Alps which extend from New Yougoslavia, western Albania, western Greece, Peloponnesos Crete, Rhodes, Taurus and Amanus.*” (Tornaritis, 1977: 5).

It is important to note that the foregoing critique must not be construed as the absence, to any degree, by nationalist and other authors, of works treating the domestic affairs of the T/Cs. It simply points to the widespread failure of connecting the Cyprus issue to domestic dynamics. As a matter of fact, one of the most useful sources documenting the domestic dynamics of the T/C community is Denктаş's 10-volume memoirs, based upon the personal journals and archives he laboriously kept over the years. Covering the period of 1967–1974, Volumes IV through IX, comprise a wealth of documents—letters, reports, minutes, etc. which are the key to shedding light upon the connections between the domestic economy and politics of T/Cs, and foreign policy outcomes, as well as the origins of today's 'statehood crisis', to be shortly explained, below. The two biggest problems one has to tackle with when one addresses domestic dynamics is the scarcity of the works over the domestic life, economy, and politics of the T/Cs, and the lack of reliable data. For one thing, T/C leaders were generally not very prolific—Denктаş excepted, save the articles they wrote for the tabloids,¹⁸

¹⁷ Denктаş's chronicles are self-enclosed and self-righteous, because, where arguments are susceptible to possible objections on the basis of 'historical facts', facts are selected and deselected in a way to support the arguments. See, for two examples, his addresses to the Security Council of the United Nations, on 28 February 1964, and 5 August 1965 (Denктаş, 1996: 135–153; 1996b: 291–301). As a matter of fact, putting the blame upon the other for all the sins—particularly, the original one, and absolving oneself of any, is the common mark of all nationalisms, which also applies to G/C and T/C nationalisms. As Kızılyürek (2005: 14) eloquently puts it, "[k]ısr bir döngü içine yuvarlanan Kıbrıs'ta, kendi haklılığından hiç şüphe duymayan iki milliyetçi toplum oluşmuştu. Birbirlerini 'aynı günahı' işlemekle itham eden, seçici hafızalarla donatılmış, kendilerine yapılanları 'unutmamak'ta direnen ama, kendi yaptıklarını hiç 'hatırlamayan' iki toplum..." As a part of his rise to prominence, Denктаş replaced Dr. Küçük as chief ideologue and chronicler of the national cause. See for a chronicle of the Cyprus issue as written by Dr. Küçük, his letter to the October 1964 Cairo Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (Hasgüler, 2007: 111–117).

which represented the views of different groupings of the elite.¹⁹

As I see it, there are, particularly, three well-defined birth cohorts of leaders—corresponding, as they are, to different conjunctures of mass politicisation and mobilisation, which are the key to understanding post-war T/C politics. The first is the birth cohort of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, corresponding to the phase of politicisation following the defeat of the Greek army, the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, and the modernisation of Turkey by the Kemalists, as well as Turkey’s recognition of British sovereignty over the Island under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This cohort comprised, most importantly, Fadıl Niyazi Korkut (b. 1887), Necati Özkan (b. 1899), Chief Judge Mehmet Zekâ (b. 1903), Ahmet Faiz Kaymak (b. 1904), and Dr. İhsan Ali (b. 1904), Dr. Fazıl Küçük (b. 1906). Of these, the last three only wrote books, whilst biographies were posthumously written for Necati Özkan, Fadıl Niyazi Korkut, and Zekâ Bey. The second is the birth cohort of the mid-1920s, corresponding to the phase of post-war mobilisation and the resurgence of Enosis under the conditions

¹⁸ See Azgın (2009), for a good, historical overview of the political affiliations of the T/C tabloids. See, also, İsmail (1988).

¹⁹ Thus, the four volumes biography of Necati Özkan, written by Ergin Birinci, basically tries to track his political career, through his newspaper—particularly, *İstiklâl* (Independence)—articles. See particularly, Birinci (2001a; 2001b). Chief Judge Mehmet Zekâ’s biography, written by Harid Fedai, comprises, most importantly, the full text of the Interim Report of the ‘Committee for Turkish Affairs’, presided by Zekâ Bey. The Interim Report, based upon officially compiled data, was the most comprehensive study, to date, of the T/C community. See Fedai (2002: 173–237), for the Report. Faiz Kaymak wrote a book which relates his personal observations as head of the T/C missions to Turkey, Britain, and the United Nations, prior to the Tripartite London Conference of 1955. Although he was the President of *Federasyon*, from its foundation on 8 September, 1949, to 27 October 1957, one finds nothing about its activities. Furthermore, despite his claim to laying bare the causes of the dire straits of the T/C community of the late 1960s, Kaymak provides only a very cursory critique of the nationalist leadership—which was positively dangerous, anyway, under the circumstances. Dr. İhsan Ali’s ‘memoirs’ are more of a chronicle of the Cyprus issue, sympathising with the pro-independence stand of Makarios. See, Ali (2002).

of British leniency on the Island as a part of the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter (Arslan, 2012: 123). This cohort comprised, most importantly, Nevzat Karagil (1920), Rauf R. Denktaş (b. 1924), Osman Örek (b. 1925), Burhan Nalbantoğlu (b. 1925), and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu (b. 1925), and Nejat Konuk (b. 1928). Of these, Denktaş only wrote his autobiography, besides the aforementioned, 10-volume memoirs, whilst biographies were written, posthumously, for Nevzat Karagil, Osman Örek, and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu.²⁰ The third cohort is that of the late 1930s, and early 1940s, who were the secondary school students of the eventful years of the late 1950s, including, amongst others, Hakkı Atun (b. 1935), İsmet Kotak (b. 1939), and İsmail Bozkurt (b. 1940). Of the three, Bozkurt (2002; 2012) is the author of useful articles on T/C politics, covering political parties, the party system, and the process of state-building, whilst interviews were conducted with all three.²¹

Besides the fact that nationalist leaders were mostly not quite prolific, save for newspaper polemics, the biggest problem for students of T/C politics and economy is the scarcity of empirical data of all sorts. Activities reports

²⁰ Denktaş's biography, written by Nur Batur (2007), is a very useful companion to his autobiography, and memoirs. Özker Yaşın's two volumes biography of his close friend Nevzat Karagil is one of the most important sources on T/C politics, and the political activities of the T/C diaspora. See, Yaşın (1997). Note that Karagil donated his extensive archive of nearly 10 thousand books, documents, and photographs to the library of the Eastern Mediterranean University (*Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi*). There are two books written for Osman Örek. The first, mostly a compilation of his newspaper articles, is apparently a homage to the first Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, by the TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence (KKTC Dışişleri ve Savunma Bakanlığı: 2000). The second, written by Yeşim Örek (2010), his daughter, posthumously, comprises the minutes of the meetings with the United Nations mediators over the period of 1964–1966, reports, and analyses of the state of the T/C community in the late 1960s.

²¹ See Satan and Şentürk (2012: 179–200; 357–372), for interviews with İsmet Kotak, and Hakkı Atun, respectively, and Besim (2011: 149–184), for a fairly long interview with İsmail Bozkurt.

and budgets of *Federasyon*, *Evkaf*, and of the T/C cooperatives, of the Turkish Communal Chamber, the budgets of the General Committee (*Genel Komite*), the Turkish Transitory Administration of Cyprus (*Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi*), Turkish Administration of Cyprus (*Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi*), and the Turkish Autonomous Administration of Cyprus (*Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi*) were not officially published, and are yet to be made readily accessible.²² Official data relating to economic and other variables can only be found, on a regular basis, for the period after 1976.²³ Furthermore, monographic and oral history works, which could be used as substitutes, are also very scarce. The 1949 ‘Interim Report’ of the so-called ‘Committee for Turkish Affairs’, as by far the most systematic study to date, under the British, of the conditions of the T/Cs, covered, those issues concerning their statutory rights as a community—*vis-à-vis*, particularly, the G/Cs, rather than their socio-economic problems.²⁴ Through 1961–1963, Kutlu Adalı,

²² *Evkaf* and the Federation, particularly prior to 1960, and the cooperatives, particularly after 1960, were the public vanguards of the T/C economy, and accumulation of capital. *Genel Komite* (21 December 1963–27 Aralık 1967), *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi* (27 December 1967–21 April 1971), *Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi* (21 April 1971–1 October 1974), and *Otonom Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi* (1 October 1974–13 February 1975) were the successive T/C administrative, or ‘proto-state’ structures after the estrangement of T/Cs from the Republic of Cyprus, and before the establishment of the Turkish Federate State of Cyprus on 13 February 1975. As a part of the reorganisation of public administration under *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi*, a consultative planning office was established in 1968, a law regulating the collection and analysis of economic and demographic statistics, and a bye-law regulating fiscal processes were promulgated in, respectively, 1970 and 1971. See, Plümer (2008: 160–164; 171–187).

²³ Under *Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti* [The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus], the State Planning Organisation [*Devlet Planlama Örgütü*—DPÖ] was established, in 1976, as a miniature of the Turkish State Planning Organisation [*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*], plus the State Institute of Statistics [*Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü*]. National income accounts are being regularly published by DPÖ, since 1976.

²⁴ Issues covered mostly concerned the modernisation of the old Ottoman canonical laws and institutions—the Family Law [*Aile Kanunu*], and the Sheri Courts [*Şeriye Mahkemeleri*], together with the control of *Evkaf* (the umbrella organisation of pious foundations) and its vast property, and the reform of education [*maarif*]. The Turkish

then Cabinet Secretary of the Turkish Communal Chamber, published the Village Reports [*Köy Raporları (1961–1962–1963)*], which vividly depicted the conditions of the T/C peasantry.²⁵ The scarcity of research on the economy of the T/Cs poses a particularly great problem. It is only recently, that the economic history of the very critical period of 1960–1974 has been written, for which Aytuğ P. Plümer—economist and a foreign affairs officer of the Republic of Cyprus, and subsequently, of the various T/C administrations—deserves full credit. See, Plümer (2008). Finally, the problem of the scarcity of empirical material is further amplified by the neglect of oral history, given the fact that, with the passing away of each leader of the cohort of the mid 1920s, and of the late 1930s and early 1940s, significant portions of the past get for ever lost.²⁶

As a matter of fact, most of the T/C would have been lost, without the contributions of a number of self-taught historians, including, most

version of the Interim Report of 1949 of the Commission has been reproduced by Harid Fedai (2002: 173–237). More on the background to the works of the Committee, later.

²⁵ See also, the two volumes of his *Dağarcık*, involving the journals of his village visits (Adalı, 1997b; 2000). As, firstly the President of *Federasyon*, then the President the Turkish Communal Chamber, Denktaş tried to reinforce the ties between the urban elite and the peasantry, for the forging of a strong alliance between town and country was the key to the success of a nationalist movement, as the British administrators and G/C nationalists also knew only too well. Thus, upon the instructions of Denktaş, 69 T/C small and large villages were visited and reports were written by Adalı, containing a wealth of valuable data on the conditions of the peasantry (Adalı, 1997b: 9–10; Plümer, 2008: 23–24).

²⁶ For instance, with the passing away, on 12 September 2011, of İsmet Kotak, the first Minister of Labour and Co-operatives (15.02.1969–05.07.1970) under *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi*, and the chief ideologue of the co-operative movement, any efforts at writing a complete history of nationalist co-operatism have now greatly been hampered. *En passant*, one must give credit to Paul Nicholas Strong, student of the late Peter Loizos, who has rescued critical parts of the T/C economic history, by means of interviews with a number of key bureaucrats, including, most importantly, the late Özalp Sarıca—the first Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, former Director General of *Evkaf* from 1964 to 1968, founder of the T/C planning organisation, and founder of *Eti Holding*. See, Strong (1999). Özalp Sarıca, one of the staunchest defenders of co-operatism, was the son of Turgut Sarıca, noted nationalist teacher, Denktaş so fondly remembered.

importantly, Haşmet Muzaffer Gürkan, Harid Fedai, Ahmet C. Gazioğlu, and Ahmet An. Of the above, Gürkan generally wrote about the towns, the people, and on the history of Cyprus.²⁷ Harid Fedai, a truly meticulous researcher, must, *inter alia*, be credited for his study of *Masum Millet* [the Innocent Community] newspaper,²⁸ and his biography of Chief Judge Zekâ Bey.²⁹ Ahmet C. Gazioğlu's four-volume study of the history of T/Cs is a key source for the students of T/C politics, whilst its fourth volume, particularly, covering the economic policies of the nationalist leadership over the pre-Republic period of 1958–1960, was indispensable to back up the basic arguments of this thesis (Gazioğlu, 2000a). Probably, the most prolific of this class of historians is Ahmet An, who wrote, extensively, of some of the key episodes of T/C politics, of the T/C labour and Left movements.³⁰

Thus, scholarly research studying Cyprus from the perspective of interstate politics, and the T/C nationalist discourse of 'Cyprus the national cause' typically divorce foreign policy from domestic dynamics. And, the converse

²⁷ See, for instance, the third of his four-volume collected works, about the Nicosia of a bygone age (Gürkan, 1996). He was the brother of Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan, opponent of the nationalist leadership, who, in 1962, was assassinated by, most likely, TMT (acronym for *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı*—Turkish Resistance Organisation).

²⁸ *Masum Millet* was published by the nationalist lawyer Cingizzade Mehmed Rıfat (Con Rıfat), from 11 April 1931 through 29 August 1934, defending the communal rights of the T/Cs, during the repressive times which followed the G/C riots of 1931. See, for details, Fedai (1986: 13–49).

²⁹ See, Fedai (1986; 2002), respectively.

³⁰ An (1996; 2002) probes some of the darker sides of T/C politics of the 1942–1962 period, such as the repression of the labour and Left press—the stories of *Şaşmaz* and *Birinci Perde* magazines, and *Emekçi* and *İnkılapçı* newspapers, the critiques of *Cumhuriyet* newspaper, TMT executions of labour leaders, and liberal opponents. An (2002) also explores various aspects of the T/C of the late 1990s, and early 2000s. An (2011) sheds light over the lives and the views of the labour leaders of the 1940s and 1950s. An (2006) is a very useful compilation of newspaper articles treating the question of the economic backwardness of the T/C community, covering the period of 1892–1962.

is true of the self-taught historians of the T/C history, as they typically divorce domestic dynamics from foreign policy. Credit should be given to the latter, for having supplied significant empirical information on the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, and pointed out critical of causal connections amongst a variety of key events. Yet, methodologically, and from a non-positivistic point of view, the identification of causalities between single events, and even, of empirical regularities, does not, by itself, imply a theoretically informed analysis. Wanting in the works of those approaching the Cyprus issue from the perspective of interstate politics, the nationalist discourse, and of the historians of T/C politics and economy is exactly this, a theoretically informed analysis which brings together domestic and external dynamics, and economy and politics.

As a matter of fact, actuality itself warrants a theoretically informed analysis of the sort above, on account of at least two observations. Firstly, given the current crisis in the T/C society, and its repercussions on the Cyprus issue, the problem of connecting foreign policy changes to domestic dynamics acquires theoretical urgency. Secondly, given the widespread view that the key to understanding the nature, problems and current crisis of T/C politics is the economy, the problem of connecting politics and economy acquires theoretical urgency. These two remarks are further expounded, respectively, in the following two sections.

2.2. THE ACTUALITY OF UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF THE T/C SOCIETY

Since the late 1990s, the T/C society has been going through a ‘generalised crisis’, i.e. ‘a generalised set of systemic failures in politics and the economy.’³¹ As I argue below, the current crisis of the T/C society is a systemic one, which I call a ‘crisis of statehood’, for it practically covers all the basic state functions.³² And, if this is true, it is, by implication, the historical crisis of the nationalist drive towards state-building, the failure of all efforts to finalise that process by the foundation of a definitively stable, separate T/C state, namely, KKTC.³³ It is important to note that the generalised crisis of the T/C society has also had, and is further bound to have repercussions upon and implications for the Cyprus issue at large.³⁴

³¹ The foregoing definition was inspired, as a first approach, by Anwar Shaikh’s definition of (general) crisis, who distinguishes between generalised crises arising from the systemic character of the process of capital accumulation, and partial crises triggered by exogenous shocks. In his seminal article on the history of crisis theories, Shaikh (1978: 219) notes that, “... the crises we seek to examine are those towards which the system is internally driven, by its own principles of operation. ... [I]t is in the nature of capitalist production to be constantly exposed to a variety of internally and externally generated disturbances and dislocations. But only at certain times do these ‘shocks’ set off general crises. When the system is healthy, it rapidly revives from all sorts of setbacks; when it is unhealthy, practically anything can trigger its collapse.” Devine (1987: 19) notes that the distinction between short-term, cyclical crises and long-term, structural crises ‘often leading to political and social stalemates’ is common amongst Marxists. However, it is wrong to conflate cycles with short-term fluctuations alone. As a matter of fact, the theory of economic crisis, in its relationship to wider political and social crises, finds its full expression in the so-called theories of ‘Long (Kondratiev) Cycles’. See, for a brilliant treatment of the alternate theories of long cycles Goldstein (1988).

³² The term ‘crisis of statehood’ was suggested by Galip Yalman, over a private conversation.

³³ Acronym for *Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Devleti*—Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Founded on 15 November 1983, KKTC was officially claimed to signify the close of the T/C struggle for national independence. Yet, continuing negotiations with G/Cs cast doubt upon such closure claims (Bizden, 1997: 83).

³⁴ According to Mustafa Semih Mehmetçik, economic, political and democracy crises of the 1998–2002 period led to the overall transformation of the society. Furthermore, ‘domestic dynamics’, which hitherto were ineffectual, became rather momentous, with domestic politics now ultimately determining foreign policy (Mehmetçik, 2008: 194–195, 216–217).

2.2.1. A ‘Generalised Crisis of Statehood’

Generalised crisis broke out as the 1990s came to a close³⁵, whilst its early indicators were fairly patent, by the mid-1990s,³⁶ notwithstanding that some T/C analyses of its past causes somewhat tend to be overly deterministic. Be that as it may, early indicators of the crisis pointed to emergent problems of systemic stability, and sustainability. Furthermore, one can hypothesise that the crisis was the consequence of a set of interacting, domestic and external factors. As of the mid-1990s, the process of Europeanisation, due to the Greek and G/C strategy of opting the European Community/Union as the appropriate platform to internationalise the Cyprus issue, seriously began to destabilise the T/C economy, polarise society and politics, rousing, particularly, the youth to opposition. As of the mid-1990s, T/C politics began to polarise around three basic options: 1) the maintenance of KKTC; 2) full integration into Turkey, i.e. *Taksim* (as *ilhak*), and; 3) accession to the EU, by unifying with G/C society as a federal state. Accordingly, Bizden (1997) notes the differences within the nationalist elite, between the young cadres, led by Serdar Denktaş, and supporting (the autonomy of) KKTC,

³⁵ One can probably date the precise onset of the crisis to 1999. Thus, according to Kızılyürek (2012: 180), “[t]he year 1999 was a milestone for the Turkish-Cypriot community.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 180)

³⁶ According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 149), to roots of the crisis date way back to the foundation of KKTC: “... [T]he previously hegemonic conception of a Turkish identity, which had been constructed and sustained in the struggles against Greek-Cypriot enosis (union) with Greece, began to decay with the very achievement of Turkish Cypriot independence. Especially since the declaration of “sovereignty” in 1983, a gradual disenchantment with their state and a growing sense of Turkish-Cypriot cultural distinctiveness have undermined the political and cultural bases of Turkish nationalism in North Cyprus.”

and the old guard, supporting full integration into Turkey.³⁷

Furthermore, the crisis of the official claim to the eternity of KKTC seems to have given rise to serious confusion in the ranks of younger generations as to what the future would bring. According to Mehmetçik (2008: 192), the process of Europeanisation and the looming G/C accession to the EU, together with old guard's riposte of full integration into Turkey—and, the presumably linked murder of pro-unification journalist, Kutlu Adalı,³⁸ were the key to the realisation that the way to escape the woes of being the citizen of a country only recognised by Turkey was the resolution of the Cyprus, and the ensuing rise of opposition. One must also note the concomitant rise of the so-called Cypriot, or the Cypriottürk nationalism (*Kıbrıs/Kıbrıslıtürk milliyetçiliği*), within the ranks of the opposition, and, particularly, amongst the younger generations. According to Bizden (1997: 90), the basic determinants of the rise of Cypriot nationalism were, the dwindling of the benefits of the motherland–infantland [*anavatan–yavruvatan*] discourse, the

³⁷ Apparently, the process of Europeanisation gave rise to a discursive crisis, apropos of the formal rhetoric of 'eternal KKTC', as the culmination of the struggle for national liberation [*ulusal kurtuluş mücadelesi*] (See, Bizden, 1997). As a matter of fact, with the hopes that the fall of the Soviet Union would prompt the formation of a commonwealth of Turkic states offering a solution to the double problems of diplomatic recognition and exports markets for KKTC products quickly fading away, the old guard, led by Rauf Denktaş, start to prioritise full integration, i.e. *Taksim* (Bizden, 1997: 83–85). On the other hand, integrationist ideas—together with the presence on the Island of Turkish nationalists (*ülküçüs*), rushed to clash with G/C nationalist protesters during the 'border' events of late 1996, led to reaction from younger generations of the nationalist elite, whom Ali Bizden calls 'the children of the Republic' (i.e. KKTC). On 23 September 1996, Serdar the press office of Serdar Denktaş's Democratic put out the manifesto of 'Turkish Cypriot' nationalism [*Kıbrıs Türk milliyetçiliği*], distinguishing itself from the Turkish nationalism [*Türk milliyetçiliği*] of the motherland, adding, thereby, a new cleavage to the rhetoric of 'nationalists versus Greekists' (*milliyetçiler ve Rumcular*) (Bizden, 1997: 85). Far from being a dismissal of Turkish nationalism, the Turkish Cypriot nationalism of junior Denktaş put at the core of its arguments, the sustenance, institutionally, of the separate entity of KKTC, for full integration, according to Bizden (1997: 86–88).

³⁸ More on the Adalı murder, below.

charge of the Turkish media, led by Sabah newspaper, that T/Cs lived luxuriously, despite all their idleness, with the taxes of the Turks of Turkey, and, the presence on the Island of the *ülküciis*.

Also, one must note the ‘emotive’ aspect of the crisis, namely, the feelings of stasis, stall, and paralysis, of melancholy (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 117, 121; 2009: 4); and, content [*kanaatkârlık*], fatalism [*kadercilik*], victimhood [*mağduriyet*], and orphanhood [*öksüzlük*] (İnatçı, 2003: 189). As it seems, the various emotions evoked by the (disciplinary) bounds entailed by particular configurations of space, objects, temporality, etc. set by the power relations of specific political regimes lay the ground for the public outbursts characterising the rising tides of political contention. Thus, Yael Navaro-Yashin points to the emotive effects of the territorially bisected space of the KKTC;³⁹ of the lack of change, politically;⁴⁰ and of the moral–emotive effects of the objects of ‘loot’ [*ganimet*], and of the ‘economy of loot’ [*ganimet ekonomisi*], i.e. the relations of production, distribution, and redistribution, based upon publicly and privately possessed G/C property

³⁹ “Many of my informants would say that the Cyprus problem was the condition which produced ‘maraz’ in them, historically locating or situating their state of inner lack of calm and happiness. As context for their feelings of ‘maraz’, they referred specifically to their state of confinement in Northern Cyprus with checkpoints closed and access to the south denied, the economic blockade and political stalemate, as well as the lack of resolution of the Cyprus problem ... This was a historically specific and subjective interpretation of an inner state of being and feeling.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 4)

⁴⁰ “Disruption, since 1974, since 1963, appears permanent to those caught in Northern Cyprus. In fact, there is now what could be called a culture of disruption or interruption. ... It is not ... possible to write yet another anthropology of ‘life cycles’ or ‘of death’, here. ... This disruption, arguably like others, undermines any structuralist and/or culturalist rationalizations of concepts of life through death. There is, once again, no space here (in war or under ceasefire) where death is not tangled with ‘the political’. The life cycle does not turn. Neither is it linear. Life is kept on hold.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 121)”

(means of production and subsistence).⁴¹ Similarly, Ümit İnatçı points to the pathologies—feelings of disempowerment, of disembeddedness and alienation, ontologically—evoked by the T/C nationalist discourse, centered around culture and identity, rather than territory.⁴²

Now, politically, the generalised crisis manifests itself as: (a) Drastic shifts in power; (b) loss of legitimacy, and; (c) estrangement from Turkey.

(a) It is important to note that the representative politics of the last decade or so is characterised by drastic shifts in power in the form of sharp ups and downs in the fortunes of political leaders and parties. Firstly, Rauf Denктаş chose not to run for the presidential elections of 2005, marking the end of his long political career as community leader, since 1957, and

⁴¹ “In fact, it could be argued that the Turkish-Cypriot community recreated itself as a ‘community’ by (literally and metaphorically) garbing itself in the other (Greek-Cypriot) community’s clothes, creating an ‘economy’ significantly out of the objects and properties belonging to the Greek-Cypriots, and a political system that would not only gloss over but also explicitly organize, administer, and support such misappropriation and possession. ... “The word they use to refer to ‘loot’ in the Turkish-Cypriot idiomatic sense is ‘ganimet’. ... This is no neutral or apolitical term for an ‘object’ or ‘thing’. There is a self-critical moral commentary in Turkish-Cypriot uses of the term *ganimet* where there is an element of regret or reflexive ethical evaluation. ... They also critique themselves and their own community more generally, by saying ‘Everyone’s hand has been dirtied by plunder’.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 3)

⁴² İnatçı (2003: 109) perceptively argues that, the substitution of the nationalist ideals of existence for authentic existence (... [*v*] *aroluş yerine ‘var olma idealleri’* ...) alienates people from their land ([*k*] *endi ülkemizin insanı olmayı beceremiyoruz* ...), causing feelings of contented, fatalistic, victimised weakness. The problem is that ethnocentric obsessions with the motherland, arguing that the T/C is a purely cultural extension of the greater nation of Turks, ontologically sever the ties between the people and the land, and emotively cause pathologies of identity: “*Aslında anlatmak istediğim şu: Kıbrıslı Türk toplumu kendi olma anlayışında etnosantrik eğilimleri ve anatoprakçı saplantıları sonucu zaten kendi bulunduğu yerden kendini aciz kılmıştır. ... Bulunduğu yer ontolojik açıdan kendini ifade etmiyor. ... Yapılan araştırmalarda bile hep varılmak istenen nokta: Kıbrıslı Türk toplumunun bir uzantı kültür toplumu olduğunu kanıtlamak.*” (İnatçı, 2003: 111) Be that as it may, the relationship of T/Cs—including the nationalists—to land, and, to the ‘Island’, is rather complicated. It is important to note that the politics of *Taksim* meant dramatic demographic shifts, and thereby, the estrangement of, particularly, Southern sectors of the T/C society from their native lands.

chief negotiator, since 1959.⁴³ Secondly, the political landscape of KKTC was greatly transformed, with party performances becoming exceedingly unstable. As of 1992, the party politics of KKTC was based upon four major parties: UBP and DP—a breakaway from the former, on the right, and CTP and TKP, on the left ends of the spectrum.⁴⁴ At the parliamentary elections of 6 December 1998, the votes of CTP and the broader left hit a record low (13.4 %—down from 24.2 % in 1993, and 31.2 %, respectively), whilst the power of DP and the Right now seemed deeply entrenched (40.4 % and 68.7 %, respectively). (See Appendix 1.)⁴⁵ On the other hand, “[t]he run-up to the 14 December 2003 elections saw a reconfiguration of the political landscape ... [with] ... [t]he opposition set out to take control of the assembly, to oust the ruling coalition, to replace the chief negotiator with one of its own, to resume peace negotiations, to finalize a deal on the basis of the Annan Plan, and to secure accession to the EU of a united Cyprus in May 2004.” (Hatay, 2005: 40) To this end, left opposition parties transformed themselves into fronts—partly, in the case of CTP, as a party—front,

⁴³ In 1957, Denktaş became the *President of Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* [Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions], the flagship of the T/C nationalist movement. Following the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959, he effectively emerged as chief negotiator on behalf of the T/C community. In 1973, he replaced Dr. Fazıl Küçük as community leader.

⁴⁴ UBP is the acronym for *Ulusal Birlik Partisi* [National Unity Party] (founded 1975); DP for *Demokrat Party* [Democratic Party] (1992); CTP, for *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi* [Republican Turkish Party] (1970); and TKP, for *Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi* [Communal Liberation Party] (founded 1976). See Hatay (2005: 16–20), for details of the T/C political parties.

⁴⁵ According to Sonan (2007: 8), “the election campaigns of the Turkish Cypriot parties revolved around economic issues rather than the Cyprus problem. ... Particularly, UBP leader and Prime Minister Eroğlu exhorted the voters to support him on the grounds that his party was the one most favoured by Turkey and hence could secure more Turkish aid than the others.

namely, CTP–BG [*Cumhuriyetçi Türkiye Partisi–Birleşik Güçler*—United Forces], or fully, as in the case of TKP, as a front, namely, BDH [*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*—Peace and Democracy Movement], to reach out beyond their core constituencies (Hatay, 2005: 41). CTP, reaping the benefits of alliance politics, scored all-time highs of 35.2 % and 44.5 % in the parliamentary elections of, successively, 14 December 2003, and, 20 February 2005, whilst in June 2005, Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of CTP, received % 55.6 of the total votes to become the second president of the KKTC. The reconfiguration of the landscape of political parties was largely symptomatic of new fragmentations and crevasses within the T/C society. As far as the core constitutions of political parties are concerned, one must note that, whilst scores of native T/C electors defected from UBP, CTP was able to raise votes amongst the ranks of the so-called ‘settlers’.⁴⁶ Furthermore, DP taking a soft stand before the 2004 referendum, “... explained both the pros and cons of the Annan Plan and let its supporters decide at the polls, unlike the other parties, which took part decisions either for or against the Plan.” (Sönmez, 2005: 469)

Fragmentation and new crevasses were conspicuous amongst the cadres of political parties, between the proponents and exponents of

⁴⁶ Speaking of the 2003 elections, Hatay (2005: 43) notes: “This time, ... the ‘native villages’ deserted the UBP, giving it only 33.7% support. This was a big decline from the 1998 result of 53.1%, and it seems to indicate that those who had voted UBP in 1998 in the ‘native villages’ were ... favourably inclined towards the Annan Plan ... It is noticeable that the CTP, a heavily pro-Annan Plan party, succeeded in getting as much as 14% in the ‘settler villages’. This was not only a tremendous increase from the 3.4% the CTP had got in the 1998 elections, but was also the highest it had ever received from this section of the population.”

reunification under the EU, and amongst the ranks of elite. Thus, “[d]ue to the rising tension before the April 2004 referenda, almost every party had problems in imposing party discipline on its MP’s with regard to either the Yes or No vote ...” (Sönmez, 2005: 469). Against the alliance of 41 civil society organisations, ultra-nationalists founded *Ulusal Halk Hareketi* [UHH—People’s National Movement], which, sanctioned by Rauf Denktaş, identified the former as the ‘enemy within’ [*iç düşman*] (Çağlar, 2003: 183).⁴⁷ On the other hand, one of the most interesting splits occurred within the ranks of the bourgeoisie. According to Tufan Erhürman, Ali Erel’s replacement of Salih Boyacı as the new president of *Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası* [KTTO—Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce] signified the chasm between the new bourgeoisie, which demanded a rule-governed, open and competitive economy, and the old, monopolistic layer of the bourgeoisie, which most capitalised on the post-1974 economic structure. With Erel subsequently founding *Çözüm ve Avrupa Birliği Partisi* [ÇAP—Solution and EU Party], the new bourgeoisie clearly distanced itself from the nationalist Right, approaching the (liberal) Left (Erhürman, 2010: 59–60). Finally, a number of business people rose to key positions within CTP, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, revoked socialist politics, and replaced Özker Özgür by Mehmet Ali Talat as its new president,

⁴⁷ The founding proclamation of UHH stated: ‘*Kıbrıs Türkü’nü anavatandan kopartarak yalnızlaştırmak ve AB çatısı altında ENOSİS’i gerçekleştirmek, içimizdeki işbirlikçiler ve dış destekçilerinin ana hedefidir ... Anavatan’la bağı daha da kuvvetlendirmek direniş ruhunu temel alan örgütlü ve dinamik bir yapı oluşturmak kaçınılmaz bir görev haline gelmiştir.*’ (Çağlar, 2003: 183) More on UHH, below.

preparing the way for the adoption of the ‘Third Way’ (Erhürman, 2010: 60).

In the early general elections of 20 February 2005, CTP secured 44.5 % of the votes, and came to power, and in April, Mehmet Ali Talat secured 55.6 % of the votes, to become the second president of KKTC. “The losers this time were the BDH, the TKP and other small parties on the left. By contesting the elections separately rather than forming a united force, these all ended up being marginalized within a polarized political atmosphere. The BDH itself only barely managed to pass the threshold: with 5.8% of the votes it managed to secure just one seat (Mustafa Akıncı).” (Hatay, 2005: 45)⁴⁸ On the other hand, CTP, now the senior partner of the coalition government (with DP), found itself in a full quagmire. A party entertaining hopes that membership and adjustment to the EU would save itself the burdens of formulating proper economic policies and finding financing, and betrayed by AKEL, its alter ego, CTP now faced the problem of tackling with the various problems of KKTC.⁴⁹ Furthermore, help, promised by the EU never materialised.⁵⁰

But, CTP leaders were true believers of globalisation, so they thought

⁴⁸ As a consequence, TKP dissolved, and joined *Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi* [TDP—Communal Democracy Party] to reunite with BDH.

⁴⁹ Mehmetçik (2008: 217) notes that, the turndown of the Annan Plan by the 76 % majority of G/Cs greatly dismayed CTP, which—as a party that had, from the outset, stood for the ‘unified Cyprus’ (the Republic of Cyprus)—found itself at a loss.

⁵⁰ “On 26 April, the EU commission prepared two draft regulations, on Direct Trade and Financial Aid, in order to help the Turkish Cypriots to integrate with the EU. However, these regulations have been blocked in the EU Council by the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus. This has proved a major frustration for the Turkish Cypriots, who feel that the EU has not delivered on its pre-referenda promises to end their unnecessary isolation.” (Sözen, 2005: 465)

opening up the T/C economy any way they could still automatically ensure growth. On the other hand, CTP found itself between the Scylla and Charybdis of either embracing the stabilisation and restructuring program endorsed by AKP [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—Justice and Development Party], or shunning the program at the cost of alienating AKP.⁵¹ Also, the realisation of its claim to put the T/C economy on its feet required the taxation of business people, and sacrifices by middle and lower classes, its historical constituency, which could well endanger the alliance (BG) its electoral success was based upon (Erhürman, 2010: 61–62). Under the circumstances, they engaged the most uncontrolled elements of globalisation, by taking advantage of the expectations raised by the Annan Plan, and, the speculative bubble of finance–cum–real-estate in world markets.⁵² Obviously, the material basis for the

⁵¹ Although lip service was often paid to IMF–type ‘conditionality’ in all previous protocols and programs, it was the Protocol of 20 July 2006—as the basis of the 2007–2009 ‘middle term plan’ [*orta vadeli plan*] of Support Programme for Sustainable Development and Restructuring [*Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma için Yapılandırma ve Destek Programı (2007–2009)*—that signalled that it would, henceforth, be taken more seriously. And, with the 2010–2011 middle term plan of the Programme to Raise the Effectiveness of the Public and the Competitiveness of the Private Sector [*Kamunun Etkinliğinin ve Özel Sektörün Rekabet Gücünün Artırılması Programı*] (2010–2011)], it practically became a ‘hard-constraint’—to borrow the noted term of János Kornai’s. This, far from being simply a plan for privatisation, was a complex programme based upon good governance reforms, following in the footsteps of AKP’s reform bills during the parliamentary years of 2003–2004 and 2004–2005. See, for more details, Hakan Arslan, “*Neo-liberal Bakışın Tahakkümü Altında Bir Yeniden Yapılandırma Sürecinden Geçen Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun Siyasal İktisadına Dair Bazı Tespitler...*”, *gaiLe*, 17 July 2011.

⁵² Apparently, despite its rejection by the G/C side, the Annan Plan, by bringing some measure of certainty and predictability to the relations property, raised the expectations of speculative actors. Thus, Yorucu and Keleş (2007: 77–78) argue that “[t]he immediate dominant factor for the current construction boom is ... the Annan Plan ... One of the most significant provisions of the plan relates to property claims. For the first time since 1974 when Greek Cypriots were displaced in the North and similarly Turkish Cypriots in the South, these counter claims are defined and codified for settlement ... [and] [t]he rights of original owners and current users are carefully balanced.” Yorucu and Keleş (2007: 79) also note that “[s]peculative demand also played a significant role. ... [T]he Annan Plan did not only increase the demand for construction volume, it also attracted the interest of speculators looking for a quick windfall gain in the real estate market in North Cyprus. This

speculative activities was, generally, the re-loot of G/C property. Construction-led growth gave rise to tremendous accumulation of capital, and the birth of ‘big’ bourgeoisie, whose taxation, CTP, one way or another, ducked.⁵³ Economic boom ended, as the GNP’s rate of increase sharply from declined from 13.2 % in 2006, to 1.5 % in 2007, turning to the negative, to –1.9 % in 2008. Finally, the early general elections of 19 April 2009 brought the end of the CTP power, with its share falling to 29.3 % (from 44.5 % in 2005), and UBP’s rising to 44.1 % (from 31.7 % in 2005).⁵⁴ Interestingly, it was not long before UBP fell into disrepute, due to corruption, and chaos, due to factional scission. After a prolonged conflict between the UBP Mayor of Nicosia, Cemal Bulutoğulları, and the Union of Municipality Labourers [BES—*Belediye Emekçileri Sendikası*] over the non-payment of salaries and the ensuing refuse collection crisis [*çöp krizi*] of several weeks, UBP lost

fact automatically pushed the prices and wages upwards toward levels in South Cyprus. There are some rumours that the Greek Cypriots are purchasing properties in the North through intermediaries. Proxy purchases of real estate for British or other foreign nationals is rumoured to be widespread. The solicitors are also believed to be acting behind the scenes arranging the legal documentation for these speculative deals. (Yorucu and Keleş, 2007: 79)”

⁵³ Failure to tax the new, big bourgeoisie led to a total crisis of tax. Thus, although the ratio of total tax revenues to GNP rose from an average of 18.9 % for the period of 1990–2003, to 19.9 for 2004–2007, the absolute level of the ratio is way too low. Furthermore, this slight improvement is due to the ‘automatic’ rise in indirect, and particularly, imports taxes. On the other hand, the ratio of indirect to direct taxes has simply collapsed, from an average of 122 % for the period of 1990–2003, to 73.1 % for 2004–2007.

⁵⁴ According to Tufan Erhürman, after the crisis broke out, Turkey resolved to enforce austerity measures to privatise state enterprises, cut down the salaries and benefits of public employees, tax pensions, revoke shorter summer shifts for public employees, etc. So, despite the fact its ally, the new bourgeoisie came out in favour of the austerity programme, CTP–BG shied away from adopting it, lest strict measures alienate its middle class constituency, opting to go for early general elections. CTP–BG’s relations with trade unions and its traditional constituency were greatly deteriorated, and it apparently lacked the wiles to convince Turkey to give more money. Furthermore, several of its ministers and leaders were allegedly involved in corruption, which CTP had, in the past, identified with UBP (Erhürman, 2010: 63–64).

the municipal by-election of 7 April 2013, to CTP–BG. On the other hand, the factional strife between Prime Minister İrsen Küçük, supported by Turkey (or, AKP), and Ahmet Kaşif, supported by President Derviş Eroğlu, and the resignation of dissenting UBP deputies, Küçük Government fell on 5 June 2013, after a vote of no confidence.⁵⁵ Overall, KKTC politics of the last decade or so is characterised by sharp ups and downs in the fortunes of political leaders and parties.

- (b) One of the key aspects of generalised crisis is the underlying loss of legitimacy of the current regime, due to its failure to ensure political equality and liberty, and, distributive equality (or, distributive justice). The first relates to the concentration and centralisation of power in the hands of the few, as well as its locus, since the 1950s, and the second, to the unjust distribution of property, and all other resources, after, particularly, 1974.

“Historical inquiry indicates that the genesis of elementary state structures actually dates back to the elite struggles for political representation and the constitution of Cyprus as Turkey’s prime national cause, between the commencement of political thaw in 1943, and the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.” (Arslan, 2012: 132)

Political power got concentrated and centralised, via a complex of

⁵⁵ Nephew of the late Dr. Fazıl Küçük.

institutions, involving, domestically, TMT itself, and externally, the Turkish government, Chief of Staff [*Genelkurmay*], and the corps diplomatiques [*Hariciye*]. So, the true locus of political power, which spanned the TMT (or, Rauf Denktaş)–Chief of Staff–Corps DiplomatiqueTurkish Cypriot–Turkish nexus, lied largely without. This whole setting gave rise to two concomitant questions of legitimacy. The first is caused by the conflict between the selective processes of centralised, concentrated power, and the elective processes of parliamentary politics, giving rise to the problem of democracy. The second is caused by the conflict between the T/C polity, and the Turkish state, giving rise to the problem of sovereignty.

According to Ergün (2004: 60–61), the post-war chaos of 1974 was characterised by all sorts of loot, where people, possessed by desires of limitless acquisition, had turned to theft. Ergün (2004: 61–62) also argues that, with words of the governing party’s favouring of its own members, and no one being happy with the Ministry of Housing [*İskân Bakanlığı*], there began widespread uneasiness as to the distribution of G/C property, and of the various jobs and posts. Arguably, T/Cs were no longer who they used to be, for material interests had triumphed over authentic feelings and values of intimacy, compassion, trust, and amity, leading to complete moral depravity, politically, economically, and socially (Ergün, 2004: 63). On the other hand, after 1974, “[a]lthough Turkish-Cypriots ... made a fresh and enthusiastic start, there were heated debates about the ownership of the property of the Greek-

Cypriots ... [and] ... [t]he ‘unjust’ and ‘unequal’ distribution of this property in particular and the ‘distribution of pillages’ in general created a wide mass of ‘displeased’ people. Most of those who felt offended went to the opposition parties.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 175) Apparently, disenchantment and discontent surfaced at the general elections of 1981, when the left (i.e. TKP, plus CTP) received 43.6 % of the votes, which, spectacularly exceeded UBP’s 42.5 % Furthermore, during the presidential elections of 1981, Denktaş fell down to 51.7 % of the votes, from 76.5 % in 1965, against the TKP candidate Ziya Rızk1, formerly Limassol’s TMT commander [*Limasol Serdari*]. Both elections witnessed the first explicit intervention of Turkey into T/C politics after 1974, evincing the twin problems of democracy and sovereignty. See, Kızılyürek (2012: 175–176). “Meanwhile, the clientele-patronage system established in the northern part of the island reached such a scale that even the Turkish settlers, who in general were loyal to the existing system, began to complain.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 176–177) On the other hand, after the general elections of 1990, 12 deputies from DMP, affiliated with CTP and TKP, accused Turkey of intervening into the election, and withdrew from the Assembly of the Republic [*Cumhuriyet Meclisi*]. According to Kızılyürek (2012: 177), “[t]his was the first ‘civil disobedience’ against Turkey ..., [and] ... it became clear that it was impossible to forge a functioning democracy in northern Cyprus ... unless a settlement over the Cypriot problem was reached.”

(c) Another key aspect of the generalised crisis is the widespread

estrangement of T/Cs, from Turkey, and the Turks of Turkey, caused by the often domineering approach of Turkish authorities, cultural confrontations, and economic rivalries.

According to Ergün (2004: 69–70), ever since the 1950s, T/Cs have been trying to simply survive on lands which are the site of a host of strategic calculations, and the key element of Turkey’s strategic interests, after 1974. During all this time, no one cared about the feelings, opinions, desires, culture, style of life, grieves, and customs of the native people, whilst they were always asked to care about, serve, make sacrifices for others. When they refused, they were scorned and criminated, by all means possible. Mahide Ergün’s account reflects how numerous T/Cs are feeling, with respect to Turkey’s control over their domestic affairs and the presence of Turks of Turkey on the Island. Turkey’s interventions into T/C politics are rather well documented. Successive governments, the Chief of Staff, and *corps diplomatique* upper-handedly supported, Fazıl Küçük against Necati Özkan (Mısırlızade), Rauf Denктаş against Faiz Kaymak, in the 1950s; Fazıl Küçük against *Başhâkim* [Chief Judge] Zekâ Bey, in the 1960s; Rauf Denктаş against Fazıl Küçük, and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu, in the 1970s; Rauf Denктаş against Ziya Rızkî, in the 1980s; and, Rauf Denктаş against İsmail Bozkurt, and Derviş Eroğlu, in the 1990s, etc., in the struggles for communal leadership.

Furthermore, the state structure founded after 1974 apparently rendered

the existing conflict between the selective processes of centralised, concentrated power, and the elective processes of parliamentary politics, on one hand; and, the T/C polity, and the Turkish state, on the other, even more patent. Thus, Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 156) perceptively argue that, “... the key result of the development of [new] administrative institutions was unintended. For this state generated its own expectations both among its personnel and citizens. Whereas elite circles around Denktash always regarded “independence” as second best to the North’s incorporation into Turkey, the promise of “sovereignty” was taken more seriously by some bureaucrats and administrators. Their experience of the real limits on the autonomy of the TRNC’s administration created awareness of an increasingly obvious discrepancy between reality and the rhetoric of “sovereignty”. This related not only to policy, but also to the administration’s top positions, some of which (such as the head of the Central Bank) were reserved for citizens of Turkey; the TRNC’s police remains under the control of the Turkish army.”

On the other hand, cultural differences, conflicts of distribution, and the intersubjective encounters of the lifeworld,⁵⁶ between T/Cs, and,

⁵⁶ Consider Kâzım’s encounter with the veiled, obnoxious old Turkish lady at the Ercan Airport in Özker Yaşın’s *‘Kıbrıslı Kâzım’* (1978). Arguing not be charged for her overweight luggage—and one can distinguish the Turks from the T/Cs from their many suitcases, thinks Kâzım, “*Siz Kıbrıslılar,*” she screams, “... *Mehmetçiğin döktüğü kan haramdır size... Siz Müslüman değilsiniz ki... Siz İslâmın beş şartını bilmezsiniz. Sizi boşuna kurtardık zaten... Siz camiye gitmez, oruç tutmaz, namaz kılmazsınız ki... Siz kim oluyorsunuz da benim elimdeki çantayı tartacaksınız ...*” (Yaşın, 1978: 14). Ex-TMT warrior, journalist, and former delegate of Nicosia, etc. Kâzım seems to be the personification of Özker Yaşın, himself.

particularly the post-1974 ‘settlers’ from Turkey, together bred one of the most critical chasms in Northern Cyprus. On the one side, Mahide Ergün argues, were T/Cs who, economically depended upon Turkey, considered as those who live off others [*hazır yiyiciler*—literally, eaters of ready food], saved from the enemy by shedding blood; and, on the other, the Turks of Turkey, who came there to save the Turks of Cyprus, settled, and subjected the latter to material and moral oppression. And, whilst T/Cs were accused of idleness, goes on Ergün, local politicians and Turkey actually did aim at creating this sort of society, by cutting T/Cs off from production, and turning them into salary earners and traffickers. On the other hand, the greatest of all injuries inflicted upon the T/Cs, was being accused of treason. Furthermore, the Turks of Turkey coming to Northern Cyprus somehow think that they have the right to lecture and sermonise T/Cs, that they themselves alone are true patriots, that they care about Cyprus more than T/Cs. Such attitudes are the source of the distance (Ergün, 2004: 76, 79–81).

It is important to note that the top-down, domineering approach to T/Cs seems to be equally shared by Turkish socialists, as well. According to Mehmet Yaşın, Turkey’s socialist parties have tried to patronise democratic organisations and left parties of Cyprus. And, this is because the Turkish intelligentsia has never come to terms with the adverse effects of its own nationalism on other peoples (Yaşın, 1998: 122–123).

The latest episode of the estrangement of the T/Cs from Turkey was the

libelous response of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to the protest of 28 January 2011—the so-called Meeting for Communal Existence [*Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingi*]⁵⁷—against the austerity measures of the UBP Government, and AKP.⁵⁷ Erdoğan first openly asked T/C authorities to prosecute some of the protesters for the banners carried, and shortly thereafter, replaced Turkey’s Nicosia Ambassador Kaya Türkmen, with the President of the Republic of Turkey–Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Technical Committee [*TC–KKTC Teknik Heyeti*]⁵⁸ Halil İbrahim Akça as a collective punishment (Kızılyürek, 2011: 71). I tend to see this replacement as the logical end of a long-term trend. As far as the relationship between Turkey and T/Cs is concerned, giving the priority to fiscal as opposed to foreign policy concerns was started, as a trend, by Turgut Özal, who introduced, in KKTC, through the Economic Cooperation Protocol [*Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolü*], stabilisation and restructuring measures along the lines of the 24 January (1980) measures in Turkey. And, after the introduction of the Economic Measures Application Plan of 5 April 1994, in Turkey, Tansu Çiller, through the Economic Cooperation Protocols of 5 December 1996, and 3 January 1997, similar measures of austerity and privatisation, in KKTC. As a part of this, two new bodies, i.e. the

⁵⁷ Days before the Meeting, Cemil Çiçek, then Deputy Prime Minister, had scorned the protestors as ‘*Rum*’ [Greek]. And, some of the expressions used by Erdoğan were: ‘*Sen kimsin be adam ...*’; ‘*... provokatif eylemler ...*’; ‘*Güney’le beraber eylem yapıyorlar*’; ‘*Ülkemizden beslenenlerin*’; ‘*Beyefendi 10 bin lira alıyor ...*’),

⁵⁸ This is the joint body coordinating the economic and fiscal relations between Turkey and KKTC. Its basic function is the coordination of the economic aid, of public investments projects, as well as the IMF-type close monitoring of the KKTC Government’s economic policies.

Monitoring Committee [*İzleme Komitesi*], and the Privatisation Unit [*Özelleştirme Birimi*], under the auspices of Turkey's Presidency of Privatisation Administration [*T.C. Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı*] were established. As a consequence, the Turkish Corps Diplomatique in KKTC acquired, besides its customary functions of coordinating foreign policy and interfering into domestic politics, the management of neo-liberal reforms. The carriers of this function were a new breed of economic technocrats, now added to the old school of diplomats, of which the new ambassador is the quintessence.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See, Hakan Arslan, “*Neo-liberal Bakışın Tahakkümü Altında Bir Yeniden Yapılandırma Sürecinden Geçen Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun Siyasal İktisadına Dair Bazı Tespitler...*”, *gaiLe*, 17 July 2011, and, Hakan Arslan, “Gezi Parkı Direnişlerinden KKTC Seçimlerine”, *Birgün Pazar*, 9 June 2013.

In the economy, generalised crisis manifests itself as: (a) Erratic growth, characterised by speculative bubbles and bursts, and; (b) the fiscal crisis of the state.

(a) The performance of the KKTC economy is characterised by low growth since the 1970s, a falling trend since the 1980s, instability since the early 1990s, and speculative bubbles and bursts since the late 1990s. Over the period of 1977–2000, KKTC GDP increased by a yearly average of 4.1 %, with a falling trend after the 1980s. Over those 23 years, the yearly average of per capita GDP was 2.2 %. Furthermore, the low growth performance was accompanied by instability (Türel, 2002: 81). Instability can be explained by fluctuations in the elements of aggregate demand, particularly, by the invisibles component of the rest of the world, and, by the elements of public expenditures and public income transfers (Türel, 2002: 82).⁶⁰

In the late 1990s, finance and speculative capital emerged as the major factor destabilising the KKTC economy. The financial crisis of 2000–2001 was the crisis of the banking system, with the GDP of financial institutions falling by 6.8 %, 18 % and 10.1 % for the three consecutive years of, respectively, 2000, 2001, and 2002.⁶¹ Turkey's response to

⁶⁰ Oktar Türel's 2002 article is the single best macroeconomic treatment of the KKTC economy.

⁶¹ As of January 2001, the KKTC banking system dually consisted of 37 savings and 45 off-shore banks. (Besides, there were 24 cooperative savings banks, and 86 cooperative credit companies.) One of the factors driving the establishment of off-shore banks was the expectation that Cyprus's accession to the EU, as a reunified whole, would precede that of Turkey. In the aftermath of the crisis, *Kıbrıs Yurtbank*, *Kıbrıs Finansbank*, *Everestbank*, *Kıbrıs Hürbank*, *Kıbrıs Kredi Bankası*, and *Kıbrıs Endüstri Bankası* were turned of to the

the crisis was to introduce the so-called *Ekonomik İstikrar Programı* [Programme for Economic Stability] (2000), which was revised as *Ekonomik İstikrar ve Büyümeye Dayalı Geçiş Programı* [Programme for Economic Stability and Growth-based Transition] (2001). The basic goals of the 2000 Programme were the cutting down of public deficits to the lowest level possible, and structural reforms based upon liberalisation and privatisation to, arguably, ensure sustainable growth in the medium term. See, Arslan (2000: 13).

The 2002–2006 upswing was particularly led by the rapid expansion of construction sector, and associated activities.⁶² The speculative bubble in real estate burst in 2007, with the rate of growth in GNP falling to 1.5 %, and –1.9 %, the next year.

- (b) Since the late 1970s, the KTFD/KKTC economy has been running colossal (for its scale) fiscal deficits. This is widely attributed to the hypertrophy of the state, as the basic instrument of the distribution by representative politics, amongst the populace, of economic resources (G/C property and Turkey’s fiscal transfers), towards the reproduction

Savings Deposits Insurance Fund [*Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu*— to first five for liquidation, and the last one for restructuring. As of 1999, the share of public sector in total banking sector placements was % 56.8, implying that the sector basically functioned to finance public deficits. See, Şahinkaya (2002: 269, 271, 287, 292). Also note that the KKTC banking system served to divert domestic savings to the money markets in Turkey. See, Yılmaz (2004: 8).

⁶² Construction sector scored record growth rates of 15.9 %, 30.8 %, 5.3 %, 18.9 %, and 68.1 % through the period of 2002–2006—except the year 2004. By 2006, the share of construction in overall GNP had reached 14.2 %. Also, “[i]n 2003, the building boom in the northern part of Cyprus led to construction becoming the largest sectoral employer in the northern part of Cyprus with 20 percent of employment, replacing the public sector for the first time as the single largest employment sector.” (World Bank, 2006b: 14)

of existing relations of power.

According to the World Bank (2006b: 11), “... in 2004 public expenditures amounted to 51 percent of GDP, while the budget deficit (with the inclusion of foreign grants) was equal to 8.8 percent of GDP (or 17.4 percent without grants). The high overall fiscal deficit is above average in comparison to the European Union, where fiscal balances in 2004 ranged from minus 6.6 percent of GDP in the country having the worst fiscal performance (Greece) to surpluses in countries such as Estonia, Finland and Denmark.” As of 2004, approximately half of all public expenditures went to wages and pensions—current and ex-public employees, which was way higher than the EU average of approximately 15 %. Social security and pensions-related deficit amounted to 10.4 % of GDP. As of 2003, the share of the public sector in total employment was 19 %. Finally, as of 2004, Turkey’s aid to KKTC—mostly, non-repayable, equalled to 26 % of total central public expenditures, and to 15 % of GDP (World Bank, 2006b: 12–14).⁶³ According to Oktar Türel, whilst KKTC’s public consumption/GNP rates approximate those of developed welfare states, they point to the problems of over-employment and low productivity in the public sector, rather than extensive and effective social services.

Accordingly, the gist of the question is the do away with the

⁶³ As Türel (2002: 97–98) puts it, the difference between net public revenues and public current and investment expenditures is, by definition, identical to the public sector’s savings/investment deficit, this is met by domestic or external borrowing. Since, in KKTC, governments do not, generally, resort to domestic borrowing, and since, they hardly have any other creditors than Turkey, public sector’s savings/investment deficit and Turkey’s credits and aid are expected to be very closely correlated.

inefficiencies in public sector's use of resources. Effective use of consumption and investment expenditures will not be enough, for one must also consider the social utility to be derived transfer payments (Türel, 2002: 95–96, 98).

Public deficits provide the objective ground upon which the discourses of privatisation and good governance thrive. For instance, the Economic Stability Programme of 9 October 2000, diagnoses the ills of the T/C economy, as (1) domestic (structural), and (2) exogenous (economic and political) factors. The exogenous factors are, politically, the non-recognition of KKTC, embargoes, Court of Justice of the European Union decisions, etc., and, economically, the economic crisis of Turkey, and the 'import' of inflation from Turkey due to the use of the TL as currency. On the other hand, the basic domestic factor is the problems of the public sector, which can be divided into four, namely, problems with production, expenditures, employment, and productivity/efficiency. The dependence of the economy upon the public sector crowds out the private sector and impedes growth.⁶⁴

Generalized crisis appears to have been triggered by, or be the immediate effect of the conjunction of a number of new trends and events. Kızılyürek

⁶⁴ Similarly, the World Bank (2006a: 7) argues that "... [t]he lack of a shared vision for economic development combined with a soft budget constraint (due to generous financing from Turkey) has led to large transfers to various economic actors, expansion of public sector employment, and high wages and benefits for public sector employees. This has diverted attention away from quality of services or accountability in the distribution and use of funds." Socially and politically, this has led to "state capture" by various interest groups including unions and producer associations — that is, that a few gain undue influence and hence benefits to the detriment of the welfare of the population." (2006a: 3)

(2012: 180) argues that, “[t]he year 1999 was a milestone for the Turkish-Cypriot community.” According to Erhürman (2010: 57–59), the ‘ten years that shook Cypriot politics’ were triggered by the following four events between late 1999 and early 2003: 1) The Millennium Declaration of the European Council Summit in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, concerning amongst things, the enlargement process; 2) the banking crisis erupting some 15–20 days thereafter; 3) the coming to government of AKP, as a consequence of the general elections of 3 November 2002, with its positive outlook on the Annan Plan; 4) the consequences of the *Loizidou v Turkey* case, namely, the easing, in 2003, by the KKTC Government, of travel restrictions across the Green Line, by opening four crossing points, and, Turkey’s consent, in 2003, to pay Ms. Loizidou, the compensation ruled by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).⁶⁵

1) In the late 1990s, the process of Europeanization seriously began to destabilise T/C state, economy and society.⁶⁶ As Greece, in 1981,

⁶⁵ There are others as well, who, closely agree with Erhürman’s list of events. Thus, according to Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux (2005: 65), “[l]a crise économique et l’usure politique ouvraient désormais la voie à l’opposition, préludant aux grands changements de 2002-2004.” Similarly, Mehmetçik (2008: 194–195) argues that, the economic, political and democracy crises of the period between the 1998 elections and the presentation, on 11 November 2002, of the Annan Plan, together with the EU perspective, led the T/C society to some sort of a self-confrontation, starting, the process of societal transformation. Finally, Sonan (2007: 6–7) attempts “... to complement ... [prior] studies by elaborating on the politico-economic dimension of this transformation, within a limited time period of three years between November 1999 and November 2002, and with an emphasis on the “catalyst effect” of the EU, the banking crisis and the intra-nationalist rivalry in north Cyprus. The latter of these dates marks the introduction of the UN’s peace plan. The former on the other hand is significant for two reasons: firstly, due to the banking crisis, which triggered a chain reaction in the north, and secondly, because of the decisions of the Helsinki Summit of the EU, which in practice, set the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 as the final deadline for a political settlement of the Cyprus conflict.”

⁶⁶ In their excellent treatment of the impact of the process of Europeanisation upon the Cyprus issue, Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2003: 281) argue that, overall, “... the EU was involved in the conflict through the following mechanisms: first, the Association

became the member of the European Economic Community (EEC), she began to use the process of Europeanisation as the new leverage to internationalise the Cyprus issue, as a substitute for the now largely feeble Third World factor.⁶⁷ Furthermore, on 3 July 1990, the Republic of Cyprus applied to the EEC.⁶⁸ Turkey and KKTC responded by arguing that the application of Cyprus was illegal, on the grounds that the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (and the stipulated that Cyprus could not join any international organisation of which Greece and Turkey are not the members of.⁶⁹ Economically, the single most important consequence of the EEC/EC/EU leverage was the Court of Justice of the European Union decision, on 5 July 1994, of banning the export of citrus fruit and potatoes from KKTC to European states.⁷⁰ “In

Agreement signed with Cyprus in 1973, second the leverage of its two members the United Kingdom and Greece, and third, trade and financial aid packages and finally Cyprus’s membership of the EU.”

⁶⁷ According to Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 285), “[G]reek membership meant that Greece would use the EU institutions in two distinct ways: one was to prevent the recognition of Turkish Cypriots inside the EU economic framework, and the second was to link all new developments between Turkey and the EU to the resolution of the Cyprus problem.”

⁶⁸ According to Ulusoy (2008: 89–90), with the application of G/C Government’s, the agenda Turkey–EEC/EC/EU came to be dominated by the Cyprus.

⁶⁹ See, Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 286). Also see Bıçak, et al. (1999: 429–430), for a full list of T/C counter-arguments. Article 8 of the Basic Structure of the Republic, agreed upon at Zurich, and enforced, as it was, by the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, reads as follows: “The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.” On the other hand, Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, also enforced, by the Basic Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, reads: “The Republic of Cyprus ... undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.” On the other hand, Article II reads: “Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.” (Ertekün, 1981: 131, 146)

⁷⁰ “The important factors behind these two decisions were the Greek claims that these exports originated from confiscated property of Greek Cypriots and therefore had to be

1994, the EU included Cyprus along with Malta in the next enlargement, justified as an attempt to reunify the European family. The EU in 1994 was arguing that a political settlement on the island in accordance with the UN resolutions was a precondition for Cyprus's accession to the EU." (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 286) Turkey's response was to claim that "... Turkey ... [would] be left with no option but to take steps towards achieving a similar integration with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."⁷¹ On the other hand, "[i]n 1995, two linkages were developed between the Cyprus conflict and Turkey's relations with the EU, one was the Customs Union with the EU—as foreseen by the Turkish Association Agreement of 1963—the other was Turkey's membership of the EU." (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 287) Despite the pressure, Turkey went ahead, and Turkey and KKTC, on 27 January, 4 and 20 July, and 6 August 1997, together took steps towards integration in the fields of, particularly, economy, defence and foreign affairs.^{72, 73}

'certificated' by the Republic of Cyprus. This decision also partly legitimized the Greek Cypriots' claim on property rights on the island which still remains one of the major obstacles to a settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots." (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 285). The Court of Justice ban, as well as the economic crisis and the ensuing, dramatic devaluation of the TL, notes Yılmaz (2004: 2), led to the slump of 2004, when GNP fell by 3.7 %.

⁷¹ See, the "Statement by Murat Karayalçın, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, on the Greek Cypriot Application for EU Membership, during the EU-Turkey Association Council Meeting in Brussels, 6 March 1995" (Government Documents: The Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, 5/3–4, 1999, p. 175). Turkey also claimed that the UN, rather than the EEC/EC/EU was the appropriate platform to resolve the Cyprus issue, and, that Turkey's accession to the EEC/EC/EU and Cyprus were two separate issues to be kept apart (Ulusoy, 2008: 90).

⁷² See the "Joint Declaration by the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 20 January 1997"; "Joint Statement by the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 4 July 1997"; "Joint Statement by the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", 20 July 1997; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Turkish Republic of

As Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 287–288) argue, “[t]he European Council’s Luxembourg summit of [12 and 13] December 1997, where the Commission’s Agenda 2000 was adopted for EU enlargement, turned out to be the major turning point for the Greek–Turkish–Cyprus triangle ...where ... Turkey was the only applicant country that was not accepted as a candidate for EU membership even though it was deemed eligible ... [whilst] ... Cyprus, on the other hand, became an official candidate ...” See, also Kızılyürek (2009: 89). Furthermore, the so-called ‘Presidency Conclusions’ declared, under the sub-heading of ‘A European Strategy for Turkey’, that “[t]he European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey’s links with the European Union also depends ... the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.”⁷⁴ Turkey’s response was the reiteration of its position since 1995, namely, that

Cyprus on the Establishment of an Association Council, 6 August 1997” (Government Documents: The Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, 5/3–4, 1999, respectively, pp. 178–181; pp. 188–189; pp. 192–193; and, pp. 194–195).

⁷³ According to Ulusoy (2008: 90), upon thinking that the EC had critically transformed the nature of Turkey–EC relations, the Turkish political and bureaucratic elite began to move from the customary federalist perspective, towards the confederalist perspective, long advocated by the KKTC leader Rauf Denktaş.

⁷⁴ See, “Luxembourg European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 12 and 13 December 1997” (European Documents: European Union—European Parliament Documents, *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, 5/3–4, p. 404) “These statements implied that the Cyprus problem was Turkey’s responsibility to resolve, overlooking the Greek role in its creation and perseverance.” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 288)

“[t]he decision taken at the Luxembourg Summit constitutes a violation of the 1959–60 Agreements.”^{75, 76} The Conclusions of the Luxembourg Summit; the launching of accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus on 31 March 2008, and of substantive negotiations on full membership on 9–10 November 1998; and the G/C Government’s plan to deploy S 300 missiles on the Island further strained the relationships between Turkey, on the one side, and, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and the EU, on the other (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 288; Sonan, 2007: 7). Meanwhile, on 26 February 2008, Turkey and KKTC signed a treaty of trade and economic cooperation with a view to follow up their prior declarations towards political, and economic integration.^{77, 78}

⁷⁵ Thus, Turkey claimed that “the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements stipulate that Cyprus cannot join international organisations or pacts of alliance of which both Turkey and Greece are not members; and ... [that] [t]he 1960 Treaty of Guarantee contains the provision that Cyprus cannot participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.” See the “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey concerning the EU Luxembourg Summit Conclusion on Cyprus, 14 December 1997” (Government Documents: The Republic of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, 5/3–4, 1999, pp. 198–199)

⁷⁶ Note that, the late Bakır Çağlar, professor of constitutional law, and defence lawyer for Turkey in the ECHR for seven years, categorically disagreed. Speaking of the National Security Council [MGK—Millî Güvenlik Kurulu] *communiqué* of 29 May 2001, which confirmed Turkey’s resolve to continue with ‘Cyprus Plan of Action’ [*Kıbrıs Eylem Planı*] of integration, in accordance with the ‘concept of national security’, Çağlar (2003: 181–182), argued that integration was a violation of not only the Zurich and London Agreements, but the Constitution of KKTC, as well.

⁷⁷ See, “*Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti Arasında Ticaret ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşması*” in İsmail (2001: 442–444). As I see it, from the economic point of view, this document was and proved to be of little significance. The key policy document of any economic consequence is “*KKTC ile TC Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolü*”, dated 3 January 1997, further extended by the supplementary protocols of 4 December 1999 (*TC ile KKTC Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolü’ne Ek Protokol*), and of 15 February 2000 (*TC ile KKTC Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolüne İkinci Ek Protokol*). See İsmail (2001: 366–370; 495; 501), respectively.

⁷⁸ According to Kızılyürek (2009: 89), following the Luxembourg Summit, the confederalist thesis—i.e. the idea of a loose confederation predicated on the presence of two equal, sovereign states, long advocated by Rauf Denktaş, now became the formal thesis of Turkey.

According to Müftüler-Bac and Güney “[t]he second major turning point in the EU–Turkey–Cyprus/Greece triangle came with the European Council’s Helsinki summit in December [10–11] 1999.” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 289) As Ulusoy (2008: 91) points out, only days before the Summit, Turkey was still trying keep up the argument that the Cyprus issue fell out of the jurisdiction of the EC/EU, that she would not, under any circumstances, accept any preconditions concerning Greece and Cyprus. Müftüler-Bac and Güney (2005: 289) note that, “Greece, which opposed Turkey’s candidacy in Luxembourg, gave in at the 1999 Helsinki summit partly because the EU inserted in the Helsinki conclusions that Cyprus’s membership does not necessitate a settlement over the division of the island. ... [Furthermore, by] ... elevating Turkey’s status from an applicant to a candidate country in Helsinki in 1999, the EU might have aimed at increasing the means of persuading the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots into a negotiated settlement on the island. [Finally,] Turkey’s candidacy was clearly tied to Cyprus’s membership of the EU and with Helsinki decisions, and the EU has committed itself to Cyprus’s accession independent of a resolution of the conflict with the Helsinki decision of 1999.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Article 9(b) of the Presidency Conclusions, concerning Cyprus, reads as follows: “The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” On the other hand, Article 12, concerning Turkey, reads: “... Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit

The Helsinki Summit had two critical consequences: 1) With the announcement of Turkey's candidacy, a day before the Presidency Conclusions, entirely revoked destroyed the claim, to date, that, according to the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, Cyprus could not join international organisations or pacts of alliance of which both Turkey and Greece were not members, and, that the de facto state of affairs in Cyprus was fine with the T/Cs (Erhürman, 2010: 57; 2) after Helsinki, Turkey came under the pressure of strict time constraints (Ulusoy, 2008: 84).

“The negotiations with Cyprus were concluded in December 2002 with the Copenhagen summit of the European Council and on 16 April 2003 Cyprus was one of the ten candidates to sign the Accession Treaty with the EU.” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 289) Although, towards the end of 2001, Rauf Denктаş and Glafcos Clerides resumed direct talks, on 11 March 2003, Annan declared that the negotiations had come to a stall

from a preaccession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular emphasis on the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 [the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the UN Charter, and through the International Court of Justice] and 9(a) [the launch, by UN Secretary-General, of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem]. See, “Helsinki European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999”, (European Documents, European Union—European Parliament Documents, *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, 5/3–4, 1999, p. 413–415). Kızılyürek (2009: 92) notes that the Presidency Conclusions aimed at putting pressure upon both sides. Thus, the Council's decision on accession would be made without political settlement being a precondition, aimed at putting pressure upon Turkey and T/Cs. On the other hand, that the Council would take account of all relevant factors aimed at signalling G/Cs that they should not be bearing the responsibility of non-settlement.

with no settlement in sight (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 289–290). Meanwhile, in Turkey, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [AKP—Justice and Development Party], which swept the general elections of 3 November 2002, had come to the government. “Thus, in Turkey a new hope emerged that the new government might not have the old guard’s conservative views on Cyprus.” (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 2005: 290). On 8 November 2001, Rauf Denktaş, writing a letter to Glafcos Clerides, suggested face-to-face negotiations, which the latter accepted on the condition that they be under the roof of the UN, paving the way for the so-called Annan Plan. Overall, the AKP factor, together with the comprehensive settlement plan of 11 November 2002, suggested by the UN Secretary-General,⁸⁰ days before the Copenhagen Summit, led to a breakthrough in Turkey’s Cyprus policy (Ulusoy, 2008: 95; Kızılyürek, 2009: 93–95).

As a matter of fact, the impact of the UN upon domestic actors became most patent, between November 2002, and the referenda of April 2004, when T/Cs strongly supported the Annan Plan, and reacted to Rauf Denktaş’s dragging of his feet to stall the negotiations (Ulusoy, 2008: 97). According to the original timetable, the parties would, from 18 November to 12 December 2002—the date of the Copenhagen Summit, negotiate over, and, hopefully, accept the Foundation Agreement and its Annexes, involving, the basic, constitutional structure, a map, and the

⁸⁰ Note that the gist of the Annan Plan was the compromise of ‘land for political equality’ (Mehmetçik, 2008: 198).

arrangements on residence and restitution of property. Thus, Cyprus's accession to the EU would be on the basis of the newly founded Partnership State. And, negotiations over other issues and the final agreement would have to be completed by 28 February, and, submitted to referenda, on 30 March 2003, on both sides (Mehmetçik, 2008: 196; Dodd, 2010: 221).

Yet, it became clear, at once, that the original timetable was overly optimistic, given the intransigence of Rauf Denктаş. Meanwhile, G/C accession to the EU, and the window of opportunity offered by the Annan Plan, together, led to a wave of mobilisation amongst the T/Cs. See, Kızılyürek (2009: 95). The so called 'Common Vision' [*Ortak Vizyon*], a group of 91 trade unions, associations of professionals, of business people, etc. moved to organise a series of great meetings. The first was on 27 November 2002, days before the 12 December deadline (Mehmetçik, 2008: 198). The second, on 26 December 2002, showing that the struggle for the resolution of Cyprus issue and accession to the EU was far from over, gathered a crowd of 50 to 60 thousand—nearly a quarter of the entire T/C population (Mehmetçik, 198, 200). The next deadline being 28 February 2003, there were two more meetings, the first on 14 January, the second on 27 February (Mehmetçik, 2008: 200). As a further consequence of the EU factor, the general elections of 14

December 2003 carried the pro-solutionist, pro-EU CTP to victory.⁸¹

- 2) In the late 1990s, acts of terror, namely, summary executions and persecutions aiming at outspokenly critical opponents increasingly more frequent. On 6 July 1996, Kutlu Adalı,⁸² editor of *Yeni Düzen* [New Order], the daily tabloid affiliated with CTP, was murdered. According to the media accounts, prior to the murder, names affiliated with the ‘*Susurluk*’ scandal had, which revealed the criminal activities of Turkey’s ‘deep State’, had often frequented Cyprus. Also reported, Tarık Ümit’s partnership to the First Merchant Bank, accused of money laundering, as one of the darkest figures of Turkey’s ‘dirty war’ against the Kurds, as well as Ömer Lütfi Topal’s buy-outs of the Jasmine Court Hotel, as a leading figure of Turkey’s gambling mafia, who was later killed by the *Susurluk* gang (Mehmetçik, 2008: 192–193).

As a matter of fact, the resurgence of state terror in the late 1990s, seems to be closely related to the process of Europeanisation, and the proliferation of pro-EU critiques of the ‘status quo’.^{83,84} Ali Bizden

⁸¹ “The electoral campaign concentrated on acceptance or rejection of the Annan Plan, and on the issue of international recognition of the TRNC before signing up to any agreement.” (Dodd, 2010: 238)

⁸² Once the ultra-nationalist editor of the TMT tabloid *Nacak*, which in the early 1960 viciously attacked upon pacifist opponents, and a close aid to Denktaş, Adalı later turned to a liberal pacifist, pro-unification stand. Adalı was also a literary figure, best known for his travel journals, stories. His story ‘*Çirkin Politikacı Pof*’, where he portrays the corrupt politician Pof, who is the quintessence of clientalist–favourist politics, is one of the earliest—if not the first—examples of political satires in T/C *belles lettres*. See, Adalı (1997a).

⁸³ A couple of years before the Adalı murder, TİT [*Türk İntikam Tugayı*–Turkish Troops for Vengeance], the obscure, ultra-nationalist organisation that had murdered several Turkish leftists before 1980, distributed leaflets, claiming that it would take over the legacy of TMT, and threatening the opponents of Turkification (Bizden, 1996: 96).

argues that, the existing semblance of democracy was tolerated, as long as opposition voices were not heard without. In the face of the increasing weight of the EU, domestic politics of KKTC quickly polarised between the nationalist followers of integrationist politics,⁸⁵ and the leftist, unificationist proponents of Cypriotification [*Kıbrıslılaşmak*], and the EU. Apparently, from the point of the former, the Europeanisation of the Cyprus issue now led, potentially, to the opening up of liberal and left opponents to the world, and particularly, to Europe, endangering their previously unchallenged control over foreign policy. See, Bizden (1996: 97–99). One of the basic leverages used by the integrationists was the *ülküci* students from Turkey, at T/C universities. Furthermore, there was a significant proliferation of *ülküci* organisations—notably, the *ülkü* houses, and symbols, including the tri-crescent [*üç hilâl*] flags of the old Ottoman Empire, openly supported by the authorities.⁸⁶ On the other hand, Kutlu saw Turkification as the road leading to dependency and the estrangement of T/Cs from their own, true history, and opted for Cypriotification, which asked for the joint

⁸⁴ According to Sonan (2005: 15), ‘status quo’ defines “... an all-encompassing social, cultural, political, economic and geopolitical structure.”

⁸⁵ Bizden (1996: 100) claims that the basis of integrationist politics was basically *Çarşı*’s [the Turkish marketplace]—i.e. the T/C commercial bourgeoisie’s—efforts to supersede the crisis of the status quo. See, Arslan (2012: 120–124) for the historical role of *Çarşı* in T/C politics and economy.

⁸⁶ As Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux (2005: 64) point out: “*Les autorités sont très indulgentes à l’égard de leurs hommes de main, dont l’activité a culminé en 1996: Kutlu Adalı est mort sous leurs balles en juillet, et ses assassins courent toujours; le 11 août, les ülkücü ont battu à mort un manifestant sud-chypriote dans la zone tampon, mais les agresseurs n’ont jamais été inquiétés, bien que l’événement ait été abondamment photographié et filmé par la presse. A fortiori, les auteurs d’agressions monins dramatiques, comme ceux qui ont tenté d’empêcher le concert de Burak Kut le 19 mai 1997, ou ceux qui ont attaqué les Kurdes établis à Zodeia (Bostancı) en juin 1998, n’ont pas été poursuivis.*”

power of T/Cs and G/Cs. To that end, the resolution of the Cyprus issue required its globalisation by effective opposition with a voice that could be heard without. This, argues Bizden (1996: 99–100) turned Adalı into a potentially dangerous actor, and its execution was meant a warning to the entire opposition.

According to Murat Metin Hakkı (2006: 93), the greatest support to Rauf Denktaş came from the Bülent Ecevit’s 57. Government. One of the most dramatic episodes of this support was when Prime Minister Ecevit and State Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel publicly supported the Rauf Denktaş, against Derviş Eroğlu, in the presidential elections of April 2000. Apparently, Eroğlu was scared, by the Turkish intelligence, and forced to back off, after which the UBP–TKP Government was brought down, by means of a variety of economic and political crisis, to be replaced by a UBP–DP Government (Hakkı, 2006: 93).

According to Kızılyürek (2012: 180), “[t]he year 1999 was a milestone for the Turkish-Cypriot community.” Under the circumstances of the window of opportunity offered by the process of Europeanisation, two specific events triggered to the mobilisation of T/Cs against the existing order. In late June 2000, Mustafa Akıncı, Vice-President of the UBP–TKP Government, argued that, democracy requires that the Police should be controlled by the Ministry of the Interior, rather than the Command of Security Forces [GKK—*Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı*], directly affiliated to the Turkish General Staff—which

required the amendment of the Constitution. The Turkish Commander of GKK, Brigadier-General Ali Nihat Özeyranlı,⁸⁷ reacted violently, by accusing Akıncı of traitorship and of knowingly diverting public attention from economic problems.⁸⁸ In early July, The dispute further escalated, when, following the orders of Özeyranlı, T/C police detained Şener Levent, editor of the daily newspaper *Avrupa*, three fellow journalists, and a petty officer [*astsubay*], and his wife on charges of espionage on behalf of G/Cs (Kızılyürek, 2012: 181). “Avrupa was a staunch critic of the regime—and one of the champions of Cypriot identity—and heavily criticized Ankara’s proposed economic austerity package and the Turkish commander’s meddling in the internal affairs of north Cyprus.” (Sonan, 2007: 15)⁸⁹

As the foregoing events caused unrest amongst the T/Cs, a platform consisting of 41 NGOs and opposition parties, self-baptised as ‘*Bu Memleket Bizim*’ [This Country is Ours],⁹⁰ was founded, targeting, the Turkish Brigadier-General, Turkey, and the Denktaş regime

⁸⁷ Unfortunately, Özeyranlı’s end proved very tragic. On 7 November 2010, he committed suicide, at age 60.

⁸⁸ Özeyranlı’s acts demonstrated just how blatantly could Turkish authorities intervene into the domestic affairs of the T/Cs: “Tensions between the TKP leader and Deputy Prime Minister Akıncı and Özeyranlı peaked when the latter, during an opening ceremony, stated that the special conditions on the island made it impossible to transfer control of the police department to civilian authority. Akıncı left the ceremony in protest. The next day, the General made a statement that criticized Akıncı in a humiliating manner and accused him of treason. The General also demanded that Prime Minister Eroğlu sack the directors of BRT (the public broadcasting corporation) and TAK (the public news agency), as these two institutions were, he claimed, censoring his statements. He also called on parliament to start an investigation against Eroğlu, should he not sack the directors.” (Sonan, 2007: 14)

⁸⁹ *Avrupa* was eventually shut down, in December 2001, to later reappear, as *Afrika* [Africa] (Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux, 2005: 64).

⁹⁰ ‘*Bu Memleket Bizim*’ is the very popular verse of Nazım Hikmet’s beautiful poem, by the same title.

(Kızılyürek, 2012: 181). The platform, reacting upon the arrests of the journalists of *Avrupa*, called for a meeting at the İnönü Square in Nicosia, set for 18 July 2000. The meeting proved a huge success, and demonstrators included not only liberals and Leftists, but right-wing people as well (Kızılyürek, 2012: 181).⁹¹

Apparently, the case of Şener Levent brought down the psychogenic barrier of the untouchableness of the symbols of political power, whilst Turkey and the Denktaş regime suffered a huge loss of legitimacy. As a consequence, belief in the legitimacy of state (or, Turkey's) monopoly over the means of violence, and the fear of state violence greatly eroded, creating a power vacuum, which further begot centrifugal forces of opposition.

- 3) Ensuing the banking crisis of December 1999, and less than a week after the great, *Bu Memleket Bizim* meeting of 18 July 2000, was the riot of aggrieved bank depositors.

Days after the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit of 10–11 December 1999, a banking crisis of unseen proportions broke out in KKTC, with grave economic and social consequences. According to the

⁹¹ Sonan (2005: 15) gives a slightly different account than that of Kızılyürek's: "With a view to translating the community's accumulated anger and frustration into political action, the leftist parties, the trade unions, and NGOs called on the Turkish Cypriots to demonstrate against the 'imposition of an economic package of destruction', against 'the intervention of the military in civilian life', and to protest 'the imprisonment of journalists on false charges'. ... The banners at the rally proclaimed that 'This Country is Ours', a clear message to Ankara; it proved to be a huge success and its organizers came together to form a platform under the same slogan, which constituted the backbone of the opposition movement that would challenge the regime in the following years."

computations of Okan Veli Şafaklı, “... the banking crisis in the TRNC has resulted in liquidation of ten banks and ended up with economic losses of approximately 200 trillion TL that almost equivalent of 50 % of GNP for 1999 (or 250 million USD which is a third of year 2000 GDP).” (Şafaklı and Altuner, 2009: 2575) Deposits in the failing banks amounted to \$ 163 million US, in 58 thousand accounts, affecting more than 30,000. As all deposits were insured by the State, a deal was struck between depositors and Government authorities, for the payment of compensation in 18 monthly instalments. However, the critical question of how that operation would be financed simply hanged in the air (Sonan, 2007: 12).

“Less than a week later, another demonstration was organized, this time by the bank depositors to protest the government, which had ceased to pay the monthly compensations. The demonstration ended in the storming of the parliament by angry demonstrators. The police used tear gas and sound bombs to disperse the furious crowd, and arrested around 60 demonstrators. This was unprecedented for the Turkish Cypriots since the 27-28 January 1958 demonstrations against British colonial rule.” (Sonan, 2005: 15)

The presidential elections of April 2000 witnessed a power struggle between the incumbent candidate Rauf Denktaş, and his opponent, Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu. Turkey’s Government decided to side with Denktaş, and used its economic, diplomatic and military influence

to force Eroğlu to withdraw.⁹² Yet, whilst its “... making the continuing flow of financial aid subject to implementation of a rather unpopular economic austerity program ... decisively weakened Eroğlu, ... [the latter’s] resistance perpetuated the crisis to the extent that not only his government, but the legitimacy of the post-1974 regime as a whole came under scrutiny.” (Sonan, 2007: 11) Apparently, despite Eroğlu’s pulling back from the race before the second round, Ankara continued to play the disciplinary card of conditionality, tying the desperately needed fiscal aid to the strict implementation of a set of austerity measures, destined to drastically reduce the incomes of the salaried and pensioners—the major clientele of the UBP (Sonan, 2007: 13). And, as it failed to implement the necessary measures on time, due to massive opposition, Eroğlu Government was compelled to pay the salaries of public employees with a week’s delay, and stop, altogether, the payment of bank depositors’s compensations (Sonan, 2007: 4)

T/C Government’s insolvency triggered, on 24 July 2000, the riot of thousands of enraged bank victims [*bankazedeler*], who first marched to the palace of the President, then stormed the Assembly of the Republic (Mehmetçik, 2008: 204; Kızılyürek, 2012: 181) Apparently, in the subsequent period, the bulk of Turkey’s fiscal transfers went to pay the compensations of bank depositors, considerably squeezing salaries and

⁹² “Allegedly, this was also made clear to Eroğlu: In late 1999, Turkey’s Minister of State responsible for Cyprus Affairs, Şükrü Sina Gürel had asked Eroğlu not to run against Denktaş albeit to no avail. Under these circumstances, Denktaş predicated his election campaign on portraying Eroğlu as carrying sole responsibility for the banking crisis. Denktaş’s campaign was not limited to the Turkish Cypriot electorate; it also addressed public opinion in Turkey.” (Sonan, 2007: 12)

pensions. “As a result, salaries and pensions declined considerably: in 2001 and 2002, in average real terms, salaries and pensions were 30% less than what they were in 2000.”

Apparently, the case of Şener Levent brought down the psychogenic barrier of the untouchableness of the symbols of political power, whilst Turkey and the Denktaş regime suffered a huge loss of legitimacy.

Depositors’ riots had three consequences of key import:

- Along with the case of Şener Levent, they brought down the psychogenic barrier of the untouchableness of the symbols of political power, and cost Turkey and the Denktaş regime a huge loss of legitimacy;
- The fiscal crisis of the state and the ensuing riots dealt a serious blow to the clientalist relations of state power, which depended on distributive practices as the basis of integrationist, pro-Taksim politics. With the collapse of clientalist networks, the majority of T/Cs now turned towards the EU for a remedy (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 150; Sonan, 2007: 17);
- As noted before, Turkey’s response to the fiscal crisis was to introduce the so-called *Ekonomik İstikrar Programı* [Programme for Economic Stability] (2000), which was revised as *Ekonomik İstikrar ve Büyüme Dayalı Geçiş Programı* [Programme for Economic

Stability and Growth-based Transition] (2001).⁹³ Surely, the Programmes of 2000 and 2001 prepared the ground for the Protocol of 20 July 2006, the 2007–2009 ‘middle term plan’ [orta vadeli plan] of Support Programme for Sustainable Development and Restructuring [*Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma için Yapılandırma ve Destek Programı (2007–2009)*], and, the 2010–2011 middle term plan of the Programme to Raise the Effectiveness of the Public and the Competitiveness of the Private Sector [*Kamunun Etkinliğinin ve Özel Sektörün Rekabet Gücünün Artırılması Programı*]” (2010–2011)]. It is important to note that the subsequent protocol and programmes also proved conducive to serious conflicts between T/Cs, generally, and Turkey, and Turkey-backed governments.

- 4) Only days before the Annan Plan was announced (11 November 2002), AKP came out victorious from the general elections of 3 November 2002. As it signalled that it would favourably respond to the Plan, the majority of T/Cs came to think that the now clearly untenable status quo could be changed using the leverage of the UN, and AKP (Erhürman, 2010: 58). After, especially, the foundation, on 18 March 2003, of the new cabinet—59th Government— under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the AKP Government became more determined to resolve the Cyprus issue (Mehmetçik, 2008: 201–202). In response, Rauf Denktaş

⁹³ See, Arslan (2000: 13). See, for the full text of “*Ekonomik İstikrar Programı*”, (TAK) Haber Bülteni, sayı 9597, yıl 26, 9 Ekim 2000. For the electronic copies of the various economic reports and protocols covering the post-2001 years, refer to web site of the Presidency of Aid Committee [*Yardım Heyeti Başkanlığı*] of the Nicosia Embassy of the Republic of Turkey: <http://www.yhb.gov.tr>.

tried to form a closer alliance with all sorts of nationalists, including the so-called left nationalists [ulusalcılar], and all those who equated Kemalism to anti-Occidentalism, and those who saw the Cyprus issue—Turkey’s prime national cause—as a good opportunity for the Army to remove AKP from the government (Kızılyürek, 2009: 95). Under the pressure of nationalist actions and covert Army pressure, the AKP Government backed off, during the period of 2002 and 2003, and the resolution of the Cyprus issue was obstructed. By early 2004, AKP was once more trying to take the initiative, by giving full support to the Annan Plan and the holding of the referenda (Kızılyürek, 2009: 96).

AKP has come a long way since 2004. As a consequence of the shifts in the balance of forces in domestic politics, and as a part of the shifts in its foreign policy priorities, it seems that accession to the EU is now of a lesser importance. And, as far as Cyprus and KKTC is concerned, AKP seems to have converted to a new type integrationist politics, where the covert goal seems to increase its influence over T/C politics, economy and lifeworld. Therefore, there is growing concern amongst pro-unification T/Cs about AKP’s Cyprus policy, and its presence in KKTC.

- 5) Against the background of the destabilising effects of the Helsinki Summit, and the banking crisis, the ECHR cases of *Loizidou v. Turkey* and of *Ahmet Cavit An v. Turkey* triggered two new developments, in 2003. Together, they were perceived, by the majority of T/Cs, as the definitive proof of the fact that the status quo was no longer sustainable

(Erhürman, 2010: 60).

On 18 December 1996, the ECHR had ruled that Turkey committed a continuing violation of the rights of Mrs. Titina Loizidou, by preventing her from going to her property located in Kyrenia. Furthermore, on 28 July 1998, the Court ordered Turkey to pay approximately \$ 915,000 US in damages and costs, due 28 October 1998. Turkey declined to comply, by arguing that the land in question did not belong to Turkey, but KKTC.⁹⁴ On 20 February 2003, the ECHR ruled that Turkey committed a violation of the rights of Ahmet Cavit An, by refusing the latter permits to cross the Green Line and thereby restricting the applicant's exercise of his freedom of peaceful assembly (with G/Cs), and ordered Turkey to pay € 19,715 in damages and costs. Once more, Turkey's claim before the Court was that the issue belonged to the jurisdiction of KKTC, as a state.

Thus, firstly, on 23 April 2003, after a nearly 30 years ban on crossing, Turkey and T/C authorities were compelled to ease restrictions across the Green Line, allowing T/Cs and G/Cs to cross at the Ledra Palace Crossing. According to Mehmetçik (2008: 204), the first cause of 'the opening of the doors' was the apprehensiveness of Rauf Denktaş, and Government authorities that new riots—the memories of bank victims storming of the Assembly being still alive— could follow, in view of the great public disillusionment and anger about G/Cs accession to the EU,

⁹⁴ See, for a review of the 'politics of property', including the Loizidou case, Gürel and Özersay (2006).

as the Republic of Cyprus, and on behalf of the entire Island. The second, was the impossibility of further restrictions on free movement, due to the An case.

Secondly, on 2 December 2003, Turkey was compelled to pay Ms. Loizidou € 1.120 million as compensation as stipulated by the ECHR. One must note that, Turkey's compliance necessarily implied that the property regime of KKTC, as specified by Article 159 of the Constitution, was thenceforth, null and void, from the point of view of international law.⁹⁵ According to Mehmetçik (2008: 205), underlying the payment, were two causes. The first was the presence of some three thousand applications before the ECHR, following the precedent case of *Loizidou v. Turkey*. The second was the authorities increasing apprehensiveness that Turkey's accession to the EU could be jeopardised (Mehmetçik, 2008: 205).

All this signalled, to T/Cs, that Turkey would no longer allow the Cyprus issue get into the way of her plans to join the EU; that the status quo, based upon the proposition that 'non-solution is the solution', was no longer sustainable. As a matter of fact, the property regime, and the

⁹⁵ Also see, Erhürman (2010: 58), and Mehmetçik (2008: 205). According to the late Bakır Çağlar, what the *Loizidou* case had effectively put on trial was Article 159 of the KKTC Constitution, which regulated the state's right to property. As a matter of fact, the Constitutional Court's ruling of 21 April 1987 interpreted the term 'derelict property' [*terk edilmiş mal*] used in the second paragraph of Article 159, as property that used to belong to G/Cs, and as property that, upon the latter's leaving of the area, counts as state possession" [*'Bu mallar, Kıbrıslı Rumlar'a ait olup, 1974 Harekâtı sırasında sahibinin bölgeyi terk etmiş olması sonucu tasarrufu devlete ait sayılan mallardır'*]. The property in question was used to give 'equivalent property' to those T/Cs who had left property in the South, in accordance with the Law on Housing, Provision of Land and Equivalent Property of 1997 [41/1977 sayılı *İskân, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası*] (Çağlar, 2003: 178).

territoriality of the state of KKTC had seriously been challenged. Under the circumstances, T/Cs felt impelled to embrace the perspective of unification and the EU (Mehmetçik, 2008: 202). See also, Erhürman (2010: 60).

It is important to note that the generalised crisis of the T/C society is a crisis of statehood, and of existence, for statehood is, *par excellence*, the claim of a state to its capacity to ensure, over a territory, stable conditions of existence for its citizens.⁹⁶ I define the crisis of statehood as a generalised crisis which encompasses all properties and functions that belong to the state, comprising, *inter alia*, legitimacy, sovereignty, as well as the regimes of territory, property, and citizenship.

For instance, as Navaro-Yashin (2006a: 291) keenly puts it, despite the fact that everywhere, the “... emblems and props [of independence and sovereignty] for statecraft abound, the civil servants who inhabit this administration’s milieu do not have full faith in its legitimacy, nor a belief in its actual ‘sovereignty’, given its dependence on Turkey. Complaints about the state are characteristic and common in state offices of the

⁹⁶ The idea of a crisis of statehood and existence is to be found in various authors. Thus, Kızılyürek (2005: 388–389) argues that, “[t]he transformative process that was set in motion with these events cannot be grasped in economic terms alone. As Yücel argues, the series of developments outlined above were the manifestation of an ‘economic-political-social chaos’ that was posing an ‘existential threat’ to the community ... This chaos clearly demonstrated that ‘neither democracy, nor a sustainable economy, nor a state in a real sense could be formed,’ despite the thirty years that had passed since the division of the island” (Kızılyürek 2005, 388-9). Similarly, Sonan (2007: 18) points out that, “[t]he project of taksim had failed to realize most of its promises and was virtually bankrupt. As Lacher and Kaymak suggest: ‘the TRNC is a ‘failing state’; its legitimacy has eroded as more and more Turkish Cypriots question whether this state actually reflects their political will ... it is not just an increasing dissatisfaction with the failure to gain external recognition, but wide-ranging skepticism as to the quality of the TRNC’s internal sovereignty that prevails’ ...”

‘TRNC’, as well as, more generally, throughout Northern Cypriot society.”

As far as territory is concerned, despite its long quest for territory, i.e. the pursuit of *Taksim*, the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building has utterly failed to stabilise the borders, and the territory of KKTC. Ali Bizden points out that the narrative of the T/C struggle for ‘national liberation’ claims the close of that very struggle, with the establishment of KKTC as its culmination. Now, the T/Cs have a free, independent state of their own, whose borders were drawn with the martyrs’ blood. Yet, each time Denktaş returned from New York, maps came out, showing that the borders were not so sacrosanct after all, that concessions could be made on the borders, provided that the considerations of economic efficiency, etc. were observed (Bizden, 1997: 83).

National territory is the very basis of the rights of citizens to private property. Nationalised G/C lands and property were used to build, irrevocably, a new regime of property, through the practice of the so-called equivalent property. To T/Cs, G/C property was allotted, on condition that they forsook the property they had left in Southern Cyprus, by transferring all their rights to the T/C state. The logic of all this was to lay the ground for a collective solution to the property issue, by a global land and property exchange between T/Cs and G/Cs. Yet, all those efforts to create a stable regime of property eventually came to a naught. As a matter of fact, persistent price differentials arose, in the real estate market, between the lands with T/Cs deed, and those Turkified after 1974. See, Bizden (1997:

89). During the general elections of 14 December 2003, the fact had transpired that the issue of immovables was of the key importance in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, since just about anyone had goods of G/C origins, which caused great concern amongst the populace. The payment of compensation to Loizidou and An also demonstrated that Turkey could offer no viable alternative to the resolution of the Cyprus issue through the EU. See, Mehmetçik (2008: 211). Yet, more was in store for the T/Cs. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling 28 April 2009 at the case *Apostolides v. Orams*, effectively carried the issue of immovables from the realm of public law and communal–collective solution, to that of private law personal solutions.⁹⁷ The Orams case greatly panicked foreign investors and buyers, and dealt a truly devastating blow to KKTC’s real estate market and construction sector.

Amongst other things, the efforts of the T/C nationalists to create a stable regime of citizenship have also failed, utterly. Whilst native T/Cs have, by getting Cypriot passports, de facto adopted double citizenship, to be able to

⁹⁷ Meletios Apostolides, the displaced owner of a property in Lapithos, sued, David Charles and Linda Elizabeth Orams, who acquired the land from a third party who claimed to have acquired it from KKTC. The Orams couple, who had constructed a villa on the premises, were asked to vacate. Since the Nicosia District Court’s ruling in favour of the plaintiff as the court of first instance was not practically enforceable, by using the EU regulations, of which Cyprus was now a member, Mr Apostolides took the case to the UK, to apply the judgement against the Orams’ assets in the UK. Eventually, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ, as the last resort, ruled that the British courts were able to enforce the judicial decisions of the courts of the Republic of Cyprus. KKTC President Mehmet Ali Talat said the following of the ECJ ruling: “*ABAD, 28 Nisan 2009 tarihinde almış olduğu kararda, Orams Davası’nın iki özel kişi arasındaki bir özel hukuk davasından ibaretmiş gibi değerlendirmek ve Kıbrıs’ın iki yanında iki ayrı hukukun yürürlükte olduğunu dikkate almamış olmak suretiyle ciddi bir hata yapmıştır. Kıbrıs’taki olağandışı durumu görmezden gelen bu kararın kabul edilmesi asla mümkün değildir. ... Uluslararası kamuoyu, BM, AB ve Kıbrıs Rum tarafı bilmelidir ki, Kıbrıs’ta mülkiyet sorununun çözümü konusunda sadece bireysel tercihler dikkate alınarak ve iki kesimlilik ilkesi sulandırılarak üretilecek yöntemleri, Kıbrıs Türk tarafı hiçbir hal ve şartta kabul etmeyecektir.*” See, Kıbrıs Gazetesi, 30 April 2009.

have access to the social services of the Republic of Cyprus, and the various means of the EU,⁹⁸ ‘settler’ T/Cs of the post-1974 years have been stuck and trapped inside Northern Cyprus. As a consequence, and, particularly after the easing of crossings in 2003, existing divisions between the two sectors of the populace have become even sharper. As a matter of fact, prior to the early general elections of 2005, the leader of New Party [*Yeni Parti*], Nuri Çevikel—the son of a Turkish settler family, “...harped on the fact that since the opening of three checkpoints between the two sides, native Turkish Cypriots could work in the South and become EU citizens by getting Republic of Cyprus identity cards and passports ..., [and, that] although they were TRNC citizens, the Turkish immigrants had become second-class citizens and were isolated in the North.” (Sözen, 2005: 470)

Conceptually and empirically, it is difficult to clearly demarcate the boundaries between exogenous and endogenous, domestic and foreign dynamics. Be that as it may, the examination of the immediate causes of the crisis in relation with the longer-term, structural causes requires a multi-level analysis, putting greater focus on domestic dynamics, and on, particularly, T/C economy and politics.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ To stop the embarrassment of T/Cs from getting Cypriot passports *en masse*, the T/C authorities brought heavy penalties of imprisonment, and pecuniary fines, all to no avail—as illustrated by, even Rauf Denktaş’s grand-son getting a passport. “... Ceza Yasası’nda da değişiklik getiren Pasaport Yasası’nda; ‘Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlarından sözde Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ve/veya Kıbrıs Rum Yönetim ve/veya bu makamların yetkili kıldığı herhangi bir makam tarafından verilen ... pasaportları almaya teşebbüs edenler veya bu belgeyi tasarrufunda bulunduran ya da seyahat edenler bir suç işlemiş olurlar ve mahkûmiyetleri halinde iki milyar Türk lirasına kadar para cezasına veya 5 yıla kadar hapis cezasına veya her iki cezaya birden çarptırılırlar’ kuralı getirildi.” (Çağlar, 2003: 185)

⁹⁹ The field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) criticises orthodox international relations theory for black-boxing the state as a unitary rational actor and positing a billiard ball

2.2.2. Theoretical–Methodological Lacuna

The idea that the key to understanding the nature, problems and current crisis of T/C politics is the economy is commonplace amongst T/Cs of all political creeds. This basically refers to the distribution by representative politics amongst the populace of economic resources (G/C property and Turkey’s fiscal transfers) towards the reproduction of existing relations of power. Dependence on Turkey, politically, and thereby economically, as the argument goes, causes economic stasis, political hypocrisy and apathy, society-wide loss of self-esteem, corruption of work ethics, and a class-free, hedonistic culture of leisure. Amongst the T/Cs, there has, from the outset, been a wealth of popular critiques of the phenomena above, variously called as ‘*ricayla yaşama düzeni*’ [to live with suppliance] (Raif Denктаş), ‘*himayecilik sendromu*’ [syndrome of tutelage], ‘*şükran ekonomisi*’ [the economics of thankfulness] (Çetin Uğural), etc.

The societal ills caused by dependency upon G/C property, and Turkey’s aid, the hypertrophy of the public sector, etc. are seen by many as a conscious scheme of the Denктаş–Turkish deep state complex, to exact from the T/Cs strict compliance with nationalist politics. For instance, An (2002:

model of state interaction. In Turkey, nationalist authors typically treat the Cyprus issue typically from an international-relations perspective which focuses, exclusively, on inter-state politics (Turco–Greek, T/C–G/C relations). Thus, the basic critique of Foreign Policy Analysis would justly apply to most of this literature. In response, FPA advocates, a multifactorial, multilevel analysis, and an agent-oriented, actor-specific theory. Following this line of thought, this thesis attempts at a multi-factorial, multi-level analysis, by decomposing the unitary actor of the T/C state (and, equally, the unitary actors of the T/C nationalist movement, and the T/C society). In so doing, it puts the emphasis on domestic dynamics, and particularly, on the sub-processes of state building and capital accumulation.

237–238), speaking of the hypertrophy of the public sector, claims that the very increase in the sheer number of those who were rendered economically dependent upon the quasi-state of KKTC demonstrates that the self-same dependency was consciously created by the ruling elite [*egemenler*]. On the other hand, economic dependency causes ideological dependency and petty-bourgeois, conformist attitudes, as is the case with the (bureaucrats of the) public sector unions which have adopted a narrowly economic union politics.

One of the earliest and direct critics of the phenomena was the late Raif Denктаş, the older son of Rauf Denктаş, who tragically perished at a car accident in 1985, at a young age. According to Raif Denктаş, the turning point in the relations of Turkey and T/Cs was the so-called Cyprus Peace Operation of 20 July 1974, when the non-recognition, looking down and disempowerment of T/Cs by the Turkish authorities first started.¹⁰⁰ Key to the present ills of the T/C society was its being kept away from production, along with the overextension of the state with ever expanding fiscal and economic resources.¹⁰¹ The key consequence of the overextended state was the rapid upward mobility of a new group of political and administrative elites, who established clientalist relationships with the citizens. Speaking

¹⁰⁰ “Coşkunun tepeden inme moral çöküntüsüne dönüştürülmesi. Gerçekteki özıyla tanınmak istenmeyen Kıbrıs Türkü’nün horlanması. Tanınmadık bir türlü; yanlış önyargılara mahkûm olduk.” (Denктаş, 1997: 24)

¹⁰¹ “Bu toplum menfaatçi değildir, özde paracı değildir. Tüccar bir toplum da değildir, o korkunç talep olmasa. ¶Eğer üretime yöneltilseydi, bugün üretici bir toplumdur. ‘KİT’ dendi, ‘Holding’ dendi; Kıbrıs Türkü’ne kendi kendine sahip çıkma fırsatı verilmedi. ... ‘Hayır’, ‘Siz ne anlarsınız’ dendi... Alın size tepeden inme bakanlar, tepeden inme formüller, uygulamalar. KİT çöplükleri mi istersiniz? Muvazaa şirketleri mi?” (Denктаş, 1997: 25)

of the elite as a category of political sociology, and of the T/C elite, more particularly, Raif Denктаş argued that this new ‘order of living with suppliance’ [*ricayla yaşama düzeni*] gradually reduced the citizen’s view of politics to a purely personal question of take and give [*kişisel bir alıp verme meselesi*] with the elite, rather than the society’s way of collectively solving the problems of politics, foreign policy, society, economy and culture (Denктаş, 1997: 112–113). Furthermore, the mediating role played by the close relatives and proponents of those in power to access state resources has led to a climate of instability, and disorder, by preventing the institutionalisation of a proper political culture (Denктаş, 1997: 113) From a historical point of view, what is in question is the transformation of the elite, from traditional aristocrats to, firstly, communal leaders, and recently, the new bourgeoisie with UBP, as its party. The new, bourgeois elite, have been plundering, not only the T/C state, but its fiscal supporter, the Republic of Turkey as well, by means of the capital accumulated due to the loot of G/C property, and using insiders’ advantages (Denктаş, 1997: 115). Socially, one of the saddest consequences of the new order is the moral depravity of the T/C society.¹⁰² Overall, the original sins of Turkey after 1974 have led to the present economic structure which is the basis of all sorts of societal disintegration (Denктаş, 1997: 169–171) Raif Denктаş puts forward a double solution to the crisis. The first is the adoption of participatory

¹⁰² “Bu bölgede [Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta], sanayi tesisleri, verimli havuç ve patates yetiştirme talanları, narenciye bölgeleri, turistik tesisler, dünyanın ganimeti bulunuyordu. ¶Bu bölgedeki insanların okuma yazma oranı yüksek, yönetsel kültürleri temizdi. Yani rüşvet ve torpil yoktu. Bu bölgedeki insanlar, yaşamak kavgası veren bir aile gibi birbirine bağlı, sınıflaşmamış, dayanışma içinde ve bir ‘ulusal kurtuluş savaşı’ ortamında yetişmiş nesillerdi. Rüşvet, suistimal ve torpilin girmediği bir yönetsel yapı, sivil ve askeri kanatta sağlıklı, eşitliğe saygılı ve adaletli bir nitelik arz ediyordu.” (Denктаş, 1997: 168)

democracy, against the ‘façade democracy’ of patronage politics and oligarchic parties. The second is the adoption of a welfare state [sosyal devlet] based upon planned economic development (Denktaş, 1997: 208–232, 256, 293–294; 1986: 106–108).

Following Fatma Azgın, one of the leading figures of T/C politics and CTP, Hakkı (2006: 87) argues that the pre-2004 regime had four pillars: 1) Keeping Rauf Denktaş and UBP in power; 2) sharing of G/C property; 3) transferring people from Turkey and bestowing T/C citizenship; and, 4) getting support from the Turkish state. According to Hakkı (2006: 90–92, 94–95), the Denktaş–UBP rule firstly depended upon G/C movable property and spoils for votes. As movable spoils were exhausted, immovable property was distributed, with priority being given to migrants from Southern Cyprus. Shortly afterwards, people who were neither migrants nor had any ‘equivalent property were handed out G/C property. As public support to Denktaş and UBP fell, due to unjust distribution, the Constitution of KKTC was drafted in a way to allow the transfer of the ownership of G/C property from the state private persons. Subsequently, the principle of the priority of the migrants from Southern Cyprus was lifted, and free sales and purchases of G/C property were established. Furthermore, as of 2000, nearly 40 thousand people—with their dependents, almost a 100 thousand—were detached from a productive life, and rendered dependent, from the stomach, upon the mini-state [*devletçik*] of only 200 thousand people. The basic resource supporting those people comes from Turkey that makes up more than half of the KKTC budget. Pervasive corruption in the use of public

money shows, why KKTC must at once, through the EU, become part of the Western system of government where everything is done according to the law.

One of the most outspoken critics of the foregoing issues is Çetin Uğural, formerly President of the Public Services Commission [*Kamu Hizmeti Komisyonu*]. According to Uğural (1999: 52), the foreign tutelage [*dış himayecilik*], underlying the economic approach of the right political ideology, has also been shaping up the current strategies of development and welfare. Under the circumstance of a structure where they have been cut off from production, T/Cs have lost their self-confidence and self-esteem, at the risk of failing in their efforts to protect their very existence (Uğural 1999: 53). Despite its short run returns from the point of view of right-wing politics, the integrationist understanding of thankfulness is the greatest obstacle before the rationalisation of economic policies (Uğural, 1999: 55). As a rhetoric denying the own resources and own strength of the T/C society, it breeds the wrong perceptions of a lazy T/C society that lives off others (Uğural, 1999: 61). Besides, there are many politicians and journalists, in Turkey, who constantly propagate the view that the T/C society is idle, freeloader, and lacking decency (Uğural, 1999: 61). Furthermore, the understanding of thankfulness also corrupts the vertical class politics and the political and cultural–intellectual richness associated with class conflicts, at the expense of sterile, horizontal conflicts and jealousies of all sectors of the society to increase their shares from the public budget (Uğural, 1999: 78). The major causes of the inadequate

economic and social development of Northern Cyprus are two: (a) The unsolvableness of the Cyprus issue; and (b) local politicians and parties who see turned chauvinistic and separatist politics as the unique basis of their political existence, and the political and bureaucratic centers in Turkey who see Cyprus as just a political–military stronghold. (Uğural, 1999: 98, 100)

As a consequence of the majoritarian politics of G/C and Greek rulers, the sterile economic, political and cultural politics of the alliance of the T/C Right and Turkish politicians, T/Cs have been turned into a static, consumption society, that is being cut off from production (Uğural, 1999: 100).

Looking at the foreword, by the late Özker Özgür, of CTP’s ‘Green Book’ ‘*Artık Herşey Daha Güzel Olacak*’ [Everything’s Gonna Be Beautiful],¹⁰³, one can see the very same critique of the forced detachment of T/Cs from production, the weakening of their productive forces, intrinsic dynamics, the modification of their demographics, and the forced erosion of their authentic identity (CTP, 1993: 6). According to Özgür, the economy of the society had reached a dead end, the society did not produce but only consumed, public sector waste had become a serious threat to the future of the society, etc. With the castration and complete politicisation of public administration, where citizens are simply compelled to resort to such ways as *torpil*,¹⁰⁴ or

¹⁰³ The so-called Green Book epitomised CTP’s breakaway from its pro-Soviet politics of the 1970s, and its conversion into liberal–left politics which was more compatible with the times of globalisation, and from the red, to the green.

¹⁰⁴ The word *torpil*, which comes from the French *torpille* [torpedo] means a special favour by someone of power, by a patron, to a client, such as, most typically, placement at a secure, government job.

bribery, it is impossible for democracy to thrive (CTP, 1993: 21)

Despite the fact, amongst the T/Cs, the critiques of the key role of the distributive role of the state towards the reproduction of the existing relations of power are commonplace; the issue is largely non-problematised, and under-theorised. Furthermore, one of the common, undercurrent themes of the critiques, namely, that the existing order of things has significant psychogenic effects over the populace is also, largely non-problematised, and under-theorised. It is too often argued, that the clientalist and nepotist relations of patronage cause, affectively, not only loyalty and obedience, but also, loss of self-esteem, corruption of work ethics, apathy, cynicism, etc. patronage, clientalism, nepotism, etc.¹⁰⁵ Thus, according to Navaro-Yashin (2009: 3), the word ‘loot’ [*ganimet*], popularly used to refer to the G/C property appropriated, involves a “... self-critical moral commentary ...” implying that “... [e]veryone’s hand has been dirtied by plunder ...” Furthermore, “[n]umerous idioms and expressions about civil service circulate in Turkish-Cypriot society, illustrating the simultaneous desire for and ridicule of work in the state administration. Civil servants are not respected, and although they have social status, they are ridiculed for their idleness. Depending upon the state for jobs, provides the daily bread, but also, requires loyalty and obedience to the administration (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 283). Speaking of the pervasive feelings of apathy, indifference,

¹⁰⁵ There are few scholars and authors, who have tried to study such problems from a theoretical points of view, comprising, most importantly, Egemen (2006), Hatay (2008), Hatay and Bryant (2008), and Navaro-Yashin (2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009). See the following sub-section, for a detailed review.

depression, and moral breakdown prevalent amongst the civil servants, Navaro-Yashin (2006a: 285) poses the basic problematic as follows: “Desire and reverence for the state administration, on the one hand, coexist with resentment, irony, restraint, apathy and dissatisfaction, on the other. How could this be explained?” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 285)

Although many students of T/C politics consider the distributive role of politics (the state) to be the key *explanans*, this is one problem which remains largely under-theorised. This thesis aims to help towards closing this theoretical-methodological deficit.

2.3. RECENT THEORETICALLY-INFORMED STUDIES OF DOMESTIC DYNAMICS BY STUDENTS OF IDENTITY POLITICS

During the last decade or so, there has been a surge of scholarly studies on the domestic dynamics of the T/C society.¹⁰⁶ Most of such novel, theoretically-informed work focuses upon the questions of identity, from the

¹⁰⁶ The generalised crisis of the T/C society seems to have prompted some students of Cyprus to methodologically criticise the neglect of domestic dynamics by ‘realist’ readings of various sorts. Thus, Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 149) suggest “... that the shifts in Turkish Cypriot politics raise critical questions about the nature of the Cyprus conflict, and, by implication, about the nature of “ethnic conflict” more generally. The burgeoning field of conflict studies ... accept the essentialist representations of the will and interests of political communities of the contending parties, and their definitions of what the conflict is about ... [Therefore,] [a]ttention needs to be focused, instead, on the processes of identity formation and transformation, and the conflicting visions of political community within ethnic groups in order to understand inter-group conflict.” Similarly, Trimiklionatis and Bozkurt (2012: 48) argue that “... the weaknesses of [both] the *liberal conflict resolution model* and the global/regional geopolitics model in making sense of the Cyprus dispute are related to both approaches’ sharing the main assumption of the Realist theory in international relations, which conceptualizes states as unitary, and autonomous actors, each moving toward their own national interest.” Accordingly, they (2012: 63) argue that “... what is missing is a *holistic reading* that would try to critically string ... [the various] perspectives together in a manner that would properly grasp the vitality and actual agency of the local dynamics and potential for social-political action ...”, and, to that end, try to “... locate gaps in knowledge and ... [critique] the approaches to the theorization of the state formations in Cyprus.”

point of view of the theories of nationalism and cultural studies.

For instance, Niyazi Kızılyürek, one of the leading students of the Cyprus issue, places particular emphasis upon the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, enquiring them from the point of view of the theories of nationalism. On the other hand, in his early works, Kızılyürek adopts a simple, reductionist approach, treating nationalism as the epiphenomenon of contradictory class interests and the ensuing class conflict. Thus, writing in the early 1980s, and opposing the common habit of putting the whole onus for the woes of the Cypriots onto the external dynamics, Kızılyürek (1988: 36–38) argues that, ‘economic contradictions’ between the G/C and T/C ‘upper classes’ [*yukarı sınıflar*] was, effectively, the key domestic factor in the internalisation of the external factor—imperialism, and the creation of the Cyprus issue. Accordingly, Kızılyürek (1988: 40) sees the rise to the prominence, politically, of the Turkist ideology and *Çarşı* before 1960, to be the product of the quest of the T/C upper class to build a new support base, with the close of British colonialism looming ahead. Similarly, he claims that the dependence of the T/C bourgeoisie upon a separate economic organisation for its survival was one of the major causes of the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus—given that the latter allowed the free movement of capital and labour.¹⁰⁷ Economic life was entirely dominated by the G/C bourgeoisie, and the far weaker, uncompetitive T/C bourgeoisie

¹⁰⁷ “1960 Cumhuriyeti sermaye ve emek mobilitelerini sınırlamadığı için cılız Kıbrıs Türk burjuvazisinin ve sürdürdüğü kampanyanın ayakta kalmasına imkan yoktu. Kapitalizmin o acımasız çarkı ırkların ve renklerin ötesinde kâr için dönerken, Kıbrıs Türk burjuvazisi tamamen yok olmakla karşı karşıya kaldı. Bunun üzerine, Cumhuriyetin ortadan kalkması için üstüne düşeni yaptı.” (Kızılyürek, 1988: 45)

saw the Republic as a major threat to its own existence (Kızılyürek, 2001: 68–69). More generally, the ‘young’ Kızılyürek (1988: 50) argues that the process of embourgeoisement of the privileged few begins with the process of the division of Cyprus, whilst the speed of embourgeoisement and the process of separate state are coordinated. Writing in the early 1990s, Kızılyürek (1993: 30–31) now tends to substitute the term T/C ‘elite’ for the T/C upper class or bourgeoisie, whilst pointing to uneven (economic) development as the major cause of the reactive, ‘separatist’ T/C nationalism—in contradistinction with the ‘exclusionary’ G/C nationalism. Finally, in his late works, Kızılyürek converts to a multifactorial—political, economic, and cultural—view of nationalism as the product of modernity, placing particular emphasis upon the role of, now, the intelligentsia.¹⁰⁸ Thus, in pre-modern societies, the source of the legitimacy of state power derives, not from a homogeneous, common culture, and cohesion comes from the loyalty of the subjects to the monarch. In other words, in pre-modern societies, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between state—or power—and culture. Linking politics and culture together, and transforming and redefining local communities so as to give rise to a new nation, are the political, economic, and cultural dynamics unleashed by modernity (Kızılyürek, 2005: 17–18, 20). With the rise of modernity, now all roads lead to nations/nation-states, albeit via different paths (Kızılyürek, 2005: 2324). Generally speaking, in early comers, there was a transition from the (territorial) state to the nation. In late comers, on the other hand,

¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Evre (2004: 17) argues that, like others, the T/C nationalism is also product of modernity, where elites and the intelligentsia play the key role.

such as Germany, and Italy, there was a transition from the nation to the state, with nationalism laying the ground for the state, by promoting cultural unity.¹⁰⁹ According to Kızılyürek, what is peculiar to the case of Cyprus is that, both G/C and T/C nationalisms were oriented towards unification with the ‘motherlands’—‘unificationist’ nationalism, rather than state-building (Kızılyürek, 2005: 26–27). In his late work, Kızılyürek clearly shifts the focus from economy and class interests/conflict onto culture. The emergence of reactive T/C nationalism is now seen as the product of the ‘weak modernisation’ of the T/C community—to be more specific, of the fears and existential anxiety of the T/C community set off, particularly, by rapid G/C modernisation and the rise of G/C nationalism—rather than, narrowly, relative economic backwardness (Kızılyürek, 2004: 283). Furthermore, the most important factor underlying T/C politics and historical–political projects, now argues Kızılyürek (2004b: 287–288), is the dominance of a political culture based upon ethnicity, i.e., a basically essentialist understanding of identity. Accordingly, as far as the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus is concerned, the foremost cause that panics the T/C leadership into secessionist politics is now seen to be its concern that the new state could lead to the ‘Cypriotification’ [*Kıbrıslılaşıma*] of the T/Cs—rather than the threat of a common economic sphere dominated by G/C capital (Kızılyürek, 2004: 289).

So far as his analysis of the domestic dynamics of the T/Cs, Kızılyürek

¹⁰⁹ Obviously, there are exceptions. For instance, the emergence of the Turkish nationalism corresponds to the first category, despite its being a late comer (Kızılyürek, 2005: 26).

attributes a truly explanatory role to political economy, only apropos of the post-1974 order of things.¹¹⁰ According to Kızılyürek (2011: 71), the emergence of the ‘economic market’, and class differentiation essentially concurred with the post-1974 period. The trade bourgeoisie, whose accumulation of capital and rise firstly relied upon *ganimet*, further enriched itself through ‘imports with waiver’ [*bedelsiz ithalat*],¹¹¹ and public tenders. In the 1990s, traders moved to the finance sector, to usury through small family banks (Kızılyürek, 2011: 71) Looking at industry, one can see that, here too, *ganimet*—G/C factories—constituted the base of the major public holding, namely, *Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi Holding İşletmeleri, Ltd.* [Turkish Cypriot Industry Holding Enterprises, Ltd.], whose plants were eventually privatised or closed (Kızılyürek, 2011: 71–72). Overall, the history of the T/C economy indicates that there never was a capital accumulation which depended upon a liberal understanding. There is neither a liberal market, nor the invisible hand of the market that works freely. As a consequence, economy and politics are now completely entangled (Kızılyürek, 2011: 72).

¹¹⁰ Apparently, as far as the clientalistic order characterising the relationship of politics and economy is concerned, Kızılyürek takes as the starting point 1974. I disagree for both clientalistic politics and the process of state-building, precedes the post-1974 era. Elsewhere, I (Arslan: 2012) have tried to show that the proto-state and state formations of the 1960s and 1974 firstly emerged in the 1950s, as a part of the intra-elite struggles for leadership. On the other hand, I argue, in this very thesis, that to comprehend the clientalistic order of the post-1974 era, one must look at dynamics of the period of 1964–1974. Also, the work of Salih Egemen (2006) meticulously relates the long history of clientalism in Cyprus. It is important to note that the supposition that state-building started only after 1974 seems to be common: “After the geographical division of the island, the Turkish-Cypriot administration declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), and embarked on a state-building process, as statehood was deemed “necessary for the survival of the Turkish ethnic community and identity (Çolak 2004, 3).” (Sonan, 2007: 3)

¹¹¹ The so-called ‘*bedelsiz ithalat*’—which, by the way, is the imports with waiver item of the balance of payment statistics—are imports financed by earnings of the T/C nationals living abroad, with a duty waiver. (Therefore, there are not corresponding outflows of foreign currency to the rest of the world.) In the late 1970s and early 1980s, prior to the liberalisation of foreign trade, goods thus imported were exported to Turkey, through the shuttle trade [known as *valiz/bavul ticareti*—luggage trade] carried out by Turkish tourists.

So far as the structure of property ownership is concerned, the property used by the T/C society and the particular sectors of the bourgeoisie was the product of neither market laws, nor socialist policies. The property of the greater part of the T/C society comes from *ganimet*. Furthermore, the allocation of *ganimet* property entangled economy and politics and gave rise to the present structure of patronage relations. Not even the freest markets can regulate such a structure, and can, amongst other things, equalise the price differences between the different categories of Turkish property, equivalent and allotted property, and *ganimet* property (Kızılyürek, 2011: 72). Also, given a climate dominated by business circles that chase after easy money, shun investment, i.e. prefer the making of money to being true bourgeois, the concentration of the greater part of the populace in the public sector is rather comprehensible (Kızılyürek, 2011: 72). Finally, for the T/C society, privatisation can be but a transaction of transfer to the Turkish capital, overlooking public interest, since a climate of true competition has not been created. Since there is no competition, there can be no provision to citizens of better quality services at lower prices. In other words, the circumstances of privatisation envisaged by the EU are non-existent in Northern Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2011: 72). The basic problem is that, a society of civil servants [*memurlar toplumu*] was created out of the society of warriors [*mücahit toplum*], for the sustenance of the political structure in Northern Cyprus. The politics of creating a paradise of retirees [*emekliler cenneti*] aimed at making of the citizens ‘Northerners’, and of the North, the eternal country of the Turks [*ebedi Türk yurdu*]. Overall, the ‘market forces’

of the T/C society are conditioned by politics, which is exactly what the 1974 order is all about. This is the common making of Turkey, and the T/C elite, to avoid the resolution of the Cyprus issue. The nurturing of the North was a necessary part of the politics of non-resolution (Kızılyürek, 2011: 72).

I would argue that Kızılyürek's analysis involves at least two grave problems. Despite the fact that he claims a key role for political economy in the analysis of the post-1974 order of things, he clearly falls short of using the theoretical potentiality of political economy. As a matter of fact, from the point of view of the various theories of political economy, the foregoing analysis is a poor one. More critically, Kızılyürek's approach sadly and deeply contradicts one of the fundamental insights of classical and modern political economy, namely, the critique of the fetishistic ideas of the 'pure' bourgeois, 'pure' markets, 'pure' competition, 'pure' private property, 'pure' privatisation, etc. Discursively, one of the greatest achievements of capitalism was the idea of 'state (political) *versus* civil society', and politics (the political) *versus* the economy, drawing a strict line of demarcation between the two as perfectly distinct spheres. As a matter of fact, the re-connection of the two spheres, by demonstrating the behind-the-backs processes mediating between the two was the very core of Karl Marx' theoretical project. (And similarly, with Karl Polanyi's key idea of embedded (and, disembedded) markets; the institutionalist turn in political economy—most notably, the French *Régulation* school and the Social Structures of Accumulation approach; as well as the modern, non-reductionist Marxist theories of the state.) Kızılyürek's analysis is relativist,

for it opposes the concrete, empirical—the economy and politics of Northern Cyprus, to the normative—the abstract constructs of pure markets, pure competition, and suchlike, as truth. As such, from the ontological and epistemological point of view, Kızılyürek’s understanding of capitalist relationships closely corresponds to that of Neoclassical Economics, according to which any empirical deviations from its own theoretical conclusions are the doing of extra-economic factors. Competitive market structures are, normally, self-regulating and self-reproducing. Therefore, any divergence from the equilibrium is claimed to be caused, by the deviances of market structures and/or agencies from the norm(al)—the truth—caused, most notably, by political interference. As a consequence, Kızılyürek ends up seeing the case of Northern Cyprus, from a relativist point of view, as exceptionality and abnormality, which, in and of themselves, become the explanans.¹¹² Borrowing Robert Boyer’s words for Neoclassical Economics, Kızılyürek treats the crisis of the T/C society “... as a sort of absurdity [insofar as] a crisis represents the difference between theory and reality in the economy in question ...”¹¹³

¹¹² This is a critique that applies, *par excellence*, to the modernist theories of development, and the Neo-Classical theory of growth, according to which observed deviances from the theoretically suggested path of development or growth are abnormalities, caused by policy interferences. As a consequence, the explanans becomes a tautology, which causes tremendous difficulties for neo-classical empirical research.

¹¹³ “The RA [Regulation Approach] rejects the starting point of neo-classical economic theory, namely, that a clearly delimited, socially disembodied sphere of economic relations exists that tends toward general equilibrium. ... And, in Boyer’s words, it rejects the neoclassical treatment of crisis ‘as a sort of absurdity [insofar as] a crisis represents the difference between *theory* and *reality* in the economy in question, a result of the irrationality of consumers and workers (victims of monetary illusion for example, or the blockage of market mechanisms by monopolies, labor unions, or interest groups that introduce rigidities leading to inflation and unemployment’ ...” (Jessop and Ngai-Ling, 2006: 5). In the particular case of Northern Cyprus, Kızılyürek believes that the utmost blockage comes from Turkey.

Another student of the T/C nationalist movement who places emphasis upon the domestic dynamics is Rebecca Bryant.^{114, 115} Approaching the issue from the perspective of modernity, Bryant sees the rise and the decline of nationalist politics as the product of the systemic crises characterising the periods of transition, respectively, from the pre-modern to the modern, and, from the modern to the post-modern. Furthermore, such crises are caused by the contradiction between the older forms of politics, the forces of the new times they can no longer accommodate.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, the encounters with the new forms of politics by those forces under the old forms give to alternative reimaginings of the body politic—the key role of ideologies.¹¹⁷ Therefore, her analysis “... is premised on the belief that a future for Cyprus

¹¹⁴ “Speaking of the Island’s division and the ensuing stalemate, Bryant argues: “Hence, the stalemate in Cyprus since the island’s division in 1974 has not been only the result of international politics or of Cyprus’ position as a pawn in larger power games. And, in contrast to what many analysts have suggested, I argue here that the Cyprus conflict was not only, or even primarily, a result of a British colonial divide-and-rule strategy. Rather, I claim that the ideologies of freedom that emerged under British rule and that allowed Cypriots to imagine a better future for themselves and their children were necessarily imagined in nationalist terms. This was not, I contend, the simple result of irredentist propaganda on the part of the Greek and Turkish states but was, instead, a result of the demands for freedom, equality, and representative politics that emerged under the British rule.” (Bryant, 2004: 3)

¹¹⁵ Although the present survey is confined to the Turkish and T/C students of the Cyprus issue, I include Rebecca Bryant, for I consider her work as indispensable to the understanding of the domestic dynamics of the T/Cs. And likewise for, Yael Navaro-Yashin.

¹¹⁶ Introducing her readers to her excellent book, ‘Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus’, Bryant (2004: 1) notes that her “... narrative is necessarily bracketed between the pre-national and post-national—or some would say, the pre-modern and the post-modern.” Furthermore, “... [j]ust as the paternalistic politics of the Ottoman heritage no longer sufficed for Cypriots of the late nineteenth century, so the nationalist political games played by the older political players in the island no longer suffice for Cypriots at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In both instances, the result was a groundswell of protest that built the momentum of a quiet, but forceful, revolution.”

¹¹⁷ It is important to note that Bryant not only provides narratives of G/C and T/C nationalisms, but also, espouses a certain theory of nationalism. Thus, she (2004: 4) argues that, “... [n]ationalism is thoroughly entangled with modern politics ...” and, “... only by understanding such differing encounters with modernity will we be able to outline a theory of nationalism that places it squarely within modernity, but without reifying it as a “product” to be packaged, sold, or imitated (the West’s influence on the rest), and without resorting to the near-primordialism or protonationalism.”

should be founded on a fuller understanding of the ideologies that divided the island and sustained that division over decades.” (Bryant, 2004: 1–2)

Historically, the first crisis in Cyprus is caused by the contradiction of between the paternalistic politics of the Ottoman heritage and the old structures of authority, and the demands of G/Cs and T/Cs for representative politics, as they encountered with modernity, ultimately expressed as nationalist politics. And, the second crisis is caused by the contradiction between the traditional representative–nationalist politics, and the encounters of G/Cs and T/Cs with post-modernity, through particularly, the supra-national EU (Bryant, 2004: 1). It is important to note the intrinsic connections between politics, the state, ideology, and culture. Thus, “... in modern representative politics claiming rights entails defining oneself as a certain type of person—a citizen—with claims on a particular state. It is here that the theoretical articulation of experience—namely ideology—comes into play and divides.” (Bryant, 2004: 2)

Encounters with modernity— i.e. the transformation induced in the old social structures caused by modernity—also transformed the ontologies G/Cs and T/C used to explain their worlds, and the new ontologies, being made ideological, became the ground for politics upon which the limits of the respective communities were defined. As a matter of fact, “[c]ertain cultural logics appear to explain one’s situation in the world better than others, and so those logics take prominence, becoming hegemonic.” (Bryant, 2004: 4). The cultural logics of G/C and T/C nationalist politics , belonging to the age of Cyprus’ modernisation, no longer appear to provide adequate

representations of the world of globalisation, represented most potently by the post-national European Union (Bryant, 2004: 6–7).

Lately, going beyond the question of the traditional G/C and T/C nationalisms, studies of identity and nationalist politics have concentrated upon the dynamics of Cypriotness, and the so-called Cypriotturk nationalism [*Kıbrıstürk milliyetçiliği*]. Evre (2004: 30–31) defines Cypriotness, as the paradigmatic anti-thesis of nationalism, which (a) rejects Turkish and Greek nationalisms, and Turkey and Greece as authoritative motherlands, and (b) accepts Cyprus as the shared land/motherland of T/Cs and G/Cs, and defends peaceful coexistence. Vural (2003: 40) notes that, the rise of Cypriotness is historically associated with the fall of communist class politics of the interethnic solidarity of workers—clearly, the derivative of the discourse of the unity of all workers of the world. As a consequence of the war, waged by EOKA and TMT against the communists during 1955–1958, and 1958, respectively, the left rhetoric of workers’ solidarity subsided, to be replaced by the liberal rhetoric of intercommunal cooperation and *détente*. This particular discourse not only emblematised the birth of the T/C left, and also sealed its fate, as a historical heritage left from the late 1950s. According to Bryant (2004: 7), what has provided Cypriotness with a ‘horizon of possibility’, is economic development for G/Cs, and Turkish colonisation for T/Cs: “As Greek Cyprus has grown economically powerful, Greek Cypriots have begun the possibility of their own cultural independence ... [whilst] for Turkish Cypriots, the experience of Turkish colonization of the northern part of the island has meant a new

definition of the constitutive Other, who is now defined as the non-Cypriot Turk.”¹¹⁸ Therefore, as far as the T/Cs are concerned, Cypriotness and Cypriotturk nationalism are closely intertwined. Below, presented are the works of a number of T/C authors who have focused upon the dynamics of Cypriotness and Cypriotturk nationalism.

Alankuş-Kural (1995: 31), who approaches the issue of identities from the perspective of discourse theories,¹¹⁹ draws a distinction between the Turk [*Türk*] identity and Cypriot Turk [*Kıbrıslı Türk*] identity. Thus, the first was used to distinguish the identity of the T/Cs [*Kıbrıs Türkleri*], who, prior to 1974, were not allowed, as a community, to feel as a part of Cypriot geography for they were the unwanted of the Island, from that of the Greeks of the Island [*Adalı Rumlar*]. The second was used to distinguish the identity of the T/Cs, which they started to develop after encountering the Turks of Turkey [*Türkiyeliler*]¹²⁰—who had now replaced the G/Cs, and when they started to develop, spatially, a sense of belonging to Cypriot geography—as a part or a whole, from that of the migrants from Turkey. Alankuş-Kural (1995: 31) argues that, at the outset, being excluded by the G/C identity, and being treated as the foreigner/invader/other, along with the

¹¹⁸ See, for the understanding of nationalist history and politics, and of Cypriotness amongst the G/Cs, Kızılyürek (2007b).

¹¹⁹ Alankuş-Kural (1995: 34–35) adheres the view that different conceptions of identity are formed in accordance with the different positions of individuals apropos of discourses and spaces. Therefore, one of the key aspects of identity struggles is the struggle to control, hegemonically, discourses and spaces. Accordingly, political powers, in Northern and Southern Cyprus alike, spatially attribute meanings to the Island’s geography, by means of their ways of building, not only the verbal, but also the spatial language. For instance, whilst, in Northern Cyprus, guideposts have been renewed and disconnected from the Greek part of the Island, in Southern Cyprus, old guideposts have been kept, signifying, symbolically, the integrity of the Island.

British, the reciprocal other of the Turks naturally became the G/Cs. Amongst the T/Cs, the conception of Cypriotness could emerge only after 1974, when they possessed a space where they could feel themselves permanently settled, following a long period of enclave life. They also, finally could find, a new, constitutive other, the migrants from Turkey, by means of whom, they could recall their Cypriotness. The identity of Cypriotness was firstly voiced, from the mid-1980s onwards, by the cohorts of leftists who had studied in the universities of either Turkey, or—taking advantage of the scholarships poured into the Island after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus—the West, who were the counterparts of the generations of 1968, and 1978 in Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, even amongst the T/C political elite, was there a tendency to emphasise the Cypriot part of their identity against the others from Turkey, howbeit they did not quite make that public (Alankuş-Vural, 1995: 32). In the spatio-temporal course of their struggle to survive on the Island, T/Cs brought to the fore the Turkness component of their identity against the G/C identity, and its Cypriotness component against the migrants from Turkey. After 1974, as the problem of security was resolved, Cypriotness came to the fore, under the circumstances of economic and political uncertainty, and due to the distributive problem of sharing the wealth with the migrants. The wealth differential with the South of the Island, feelings of being stuck on a tiny piece of land, deprivation from the prospect of accession to the EU, the negativity of demographic change and the fear of assimilation were particularly effective in the coming to the fore of Cypriotness in effected

sectors of the populace (Kural-Alankuş, 1995: 33).

In T/C politics, the key advocate of Cypriotness has generally been CTP, founded on 27 December 1970, by Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu (b. 1925), Barrister-at-Law, from the same birth cohort of leaders as Rauf R. Denktaş, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Osman Örek, etc. “Maintaining that the solution to the Cypriot question should be ‘based on the partnership of two national communities’, ... CTP drew the attraction of leftist Cypriot students studying in Turkey and many students, led by Naci Talat, became members of CTP and soon drew the party to a leftist position.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 173) “Ideas expressed as ‘Cyprus belongs to the Cypriots’ and the ‘population of Cyprus above everything else was Cypriot’ became the ruling ideas among the left-wing Turkish-Cypriots ... [and hence] ... the second generation of the Turkish-Cypriot Left emerged as an ‘identity movement’ and highlighted the cultural codes that were specific to Cyprus, ... against the hegemony of Turkish nationalism.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 173) After 1974, the T/C started to stress their Cypriotness more explicitly, because they perceived the population transfer from Turkey as a threat to their identity (Kızılyürek, 2012: 174). Besides a ‘difference-blind’ attitude, which treated T/Cs as but Turks, Turkey often intervened in the domestic affairs of the T/Cs, which gave greater impulse to reactive Cypriotness (Kızılyürek, 2012: 175).

Similarly, Ali Bizden also points to the two alternate identities, situated at the opposite ends of the spectrum. On the one end, is the still ruling, local

variant of the Turkish nationalism, constructed by reference to the Greek other. On the opposite end, is the Cypriotness, which, despite its being violently suppressed during the early years of its construction prior to and after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, resurfaced after 1974, as the outcome of rise to the prominence of T/Cs condition of dependency upon Turkey. Whilst, in the resurfacing and constructing of Cypriotness, the migrants from Turkey served as the constituent other, the key role was played by the group of poets, known as the 1974 Cohort [*1974 Kuşağı*]¹²⁰ (Bizden, 1997: 80). In the 1980s, the transformation of the traditional *Çarşı*, and of the traditional inner city of the walled Nicosia was the key to the further rise of Cypriotness. Prior to the liberalisation of Turkey's foreign trade in the 1980s, *Çarşı* was full of T/C importers and retailers of imported goods, due to the so-called luggage trade carried out by Turkish tourists. Whilst some of those shuttle traders gradually came to own and run shops of their own, turning into retailers, the traditional Cypriot craftsmen and shopkeepers [*esnaf*], and peddlers started to slowly disappear. Also, in the early 1980s, T/C dwellers of Nicosia started to desert the streets of the old city to live in the monotype social houses built in the environs of Nicosia. On the other hand, as the construction sector expended, the deficit of construction workers was closed with migrant workers from, particularly, Eastern and Southeastern Turkey who started to live in the old houses of the old city, now converted into shabby lodgements. So whilst the old city was

¹²⁰ The group of poets, which published the literary journal *Karanfil* [Carnation, the flower], of which only one issue came out, comprised, amongst others, Mehmet Yaşın, Neşe Yaşın, and Hakkı Yücel.

being vacated, the urban fabric as a whole was getting modernised (Bizden, 1997: 81–82).

Heycan Erhürman (2007) explores the conflicts and struggles of identity, amongst the T/Cs, set off by the political and cultural conditions accompanying the Annan Plan, from the point of view of the theoretically key relationship between identity and memory. She (2007: 97) defends the view that identity-related memory can only be constituted, discursively, through the complex interaction of social narratives of family, nation, society, etc., and ontological narratives of who we are. On the other hand, narratives are being constantly re-articulated and restructured under historically, politically and culturally conditioned relationships of power. Finally, she argues (2007: 98–99) that, the Annan Plan, with its projection of a future to be shared with the G/C others, provided a fertile ground for new articulations and possibly, the restructuring of the memory through competing narratives of the past involving the others. As a matter of fact, this was a quasi-war, between two alternate discourses—Turkishness *versus* Cypriotness, waged to ‘capture’ the ‘hegemonic memory’.

According to Bülent Evre, the Cypriotness of T/Cs—as opposed to that of G/Cs— has two aspects. As it relates to Turkey, the proponents of Cypriotness defend, from the point of view of T/Cs, Cyprus-based, rather than Turkey-based politics, which treat Cyprus as Turkey’s outpost. Accordingly, they reject the sort of relationships, between T/Cs and Turkey, based upon the noted metaphor of motherland–infantland, and try to come

to terms with the Turkish nationalism. As it relates to the G/C community, the proponents of Cypriotness argue that Cyprus is the shared land of T/Cs and G/Cs, and suggest the establishment of a common federation. As such, the vision of the unified federal state closely corresponds to the paradigm of Cypriotness (Evre, 2004: 31). Sociologically, Cypriotness is firmly rooted amongst the post-1974 generations of T/Cs (Evre, 2004: 31). This is due to the fact that the security-based official discourse of Greek atrocity, of a past full of afflictions and struggle no longer affected the post-1974 generations, pointing to the old guard's loss of its customary control over the youth. The biggest concern of the well-educated youth was job security—rather than life safety, and certainty about the future (Evre, 2004: 32). On the other hand, T/Cs, due to their communal culture, negatively reacted to the perpetual transfer of rural populace from Turkey. Also, migrant citizens came to be seen the root cause of the various problems with public safety and order. T/Cs labelled the Kurds, Arabs, and the Turks from Eastern and Southeastern Turkey, singly as the Turks of Turkey [*Türkiyeliler*]. As a consequence, after 1974, the T/Cs started to place the emphasis upon the Cypriot identity. The tense encounters, at the newly established T/C universities, between T/C students and nationalist students from Turkey gave further impulse to the rise of Cypriotness. Amongst the young T/Cs, the perception of the Turks of Turkey as the other ranges from plain antipathy to ethnocentrism and cultural racism, transforming Cypriotness from a transnational outlook into nationalism (Evre, 2004: 32).

Pembe Behçetoğulları (2007) critically studies the question of Cypriot

identities, generally, and the Cypriotturk nationalism, more specifically, from the perspective of Gilles Deleuze's conception of shame. Behçetoğulları's (2007: 101) basic problematic is to come up with a way for the Cypriots, as the muted, the voiceless, the identity-less periphery of politics, to get politicised without making the Turks of Turkey [*Türkiyeliler*], also a periphery, pay for the price of that politicisation. Despite the fact that, politically, Turkness as a discourse belongs to the Right, and Cypriotness, to the Left, the repudiation of being part of Turkey [*Türkiyelilik*] is a characteristic of both. However, with the failure of the CTP Government, Cypriotness falls into a deep crisis, and starts to disintegrate, requiring a redefinition. Whilst espousing, in opposition, the identity of Cypriotness as a political weapon, once in government, CTP dissolves the implicit contract with its larger base (Behçetoğulları, 2007: 102). On the other hand, the unconscious of the T/Cs reads the rejection of the Annan Plan by G/Cs, as their exclusion, and along with that, the left loses one of the key referents of its discourse. As it loses its like other [*benzer öteki*] it would walk together to the future, the Left converts to the discourse of the Right (Behçetoğulları, 2007: 106). Yet, to transpose the political tensions with the Motherland onto the plane of culture is both problematic and perilous. The framing of Cypriotness with feelings fed by a hierarchical and exclusionary understanding of cultural differences necessarily leads to cultural and political conservatism. A negative attitude towards those who migrate out of poverty and despondency—the lowest of the low, the poor, the excluded—can only be reactionary (Behçetoğulları,

2007: 104). The construction of Cypriotness by means of negatively loaded cultural references, without any class analysis can at best be apolitical, demanding for the continuance of ‘our middle class privileges’. And once, under opportune circumstances, it turns into a political language, it is potentially racist and fascist (Behçetoğulları, 2007: 106). And, this is where Deleuze’s philosophical outlook of the feeling of shame apropos of historical tragedy—namely, Auschwitz, that ‘We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them’ could be of aid. We have the responsibility to think before the ‘catastrophe’, and we have to see the shame, not as some after-the-fact, involuntary feeling, but as active responsibility, and think over the deprivation and the poverty of the others (Pembeoğulları, 2007: 106). The proper solution is give up ‘identity’ politics, to save ourselves from middle class parochiality, share political power with others, and base ‘the political’ upon ‘the humane’ (Behçetoğulları, 2007: 106-7).

Vural and Rüstemli (2006) approach the issue of identity construction, from the point of view of ‘identity fluctuation’ which they define as the changes—and the causes thereof—in the internal hierarchy between the various components of identity.¹²¹ More specifically, they (2006: 332, 334) empirically explore and aim to understand “... how Turkish-Cypriots describe their identity preferences within a series of options ranging from

¹²¹ “Moreover, the notion of political representation in Cyprus has historically rested on religious, linguistic and ethnic community membership. This paper concentrates on intra-community processes and aims at enhancing our understanding of internal hierarchy of identity and the rationale of it. Components of collective identity are likely to range from the most important to the less important, enabling us to understand the hierarchy between the components of identity.” (Vural and Rüstemli, 2006: 334)

ethno-national identity (Turkishness) to territorial-civic identity (Cypriotness) ... [as well as the] demographic factors which can be associated with the ... fluctuations in the perceptions of collective identity.” (Vural and Rüstemli, 2006: 334)¹²² For the components of the T/C identity, Vural and Rüstemli (2006: 335) provide a fourfold classification, “namely the civic (Cypriotness), ethno-national (Turkishness), religious (Moslemness) and post-national (Europeanness) elements.” Furthermore, they (2006: 337) argue that differences in the patterns of identity hierarchies arise from differential responses to the economic and socio-political environment, and hypothesise that “... age- and education-related identity fluctuations within the Turkish-Cypriot community due to changes in educational and socio-political practices.” Empirical results doubly point to the historicity as well as the economico-cultural aspects of the deepest cleavages in KKTC. “As expected, ethno-national identity is the most frequent among the late adult and elderly generations, of whom most had experienced intercommunal conflicts and were trained as ‘mujaheddins’. The adults who had little direct experience of the inter-communal struggles exhibited a preference for ‘Cypriotness’ over ‘Turkishness’. The youngest generation showed a split between ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’.”

¹²² Vural and Rüstemli (2006: 335) suggest one of the most articulate distinctions between Turkness and Cypriotness: “According to a particular perspective, ‘Turkishness’ constitutes the ‘primary component’ of Turkish-Cypriot identity while ‘Cypriotness’ is the secondary element, only stressing a ‘geographical dimension’. The extreme version of this perspective denies any role of Cypriotness in Turkish-Cypriot identity and sees the Turkish-Cypriot community as a part of the Turkish nation. An opposite perspective regards ‘Turkish Cypriotness’ as a sub-identity of an overarching Cypriot identity. Some stress the ‘primacy of Cypriotness over Turkishness’. Those who stress the political importance of the concept give a political role to ‘all Cypriots’ in resolving the Cyprus dispute. According to another distinct perspective, Turkish-Cypriot identity is a combination of civic and ethnic dimensions.”

Also, “[w]hile ‘Cypriotness’ had priority among university graduates, ‘Turkishness’ was dominant among all other groups.” (Vural and Rüstemli, 2006: 343) Finally, in the settlers group, the most important identity components rank as ‘Turkishness’ (56.0 %), followed by ‘Moslemness’ (35.5 %), to a mere 4.7 % alone, is Cypriotness the most important identity (Vural and Rüstemli: 344).

Students of Cyprus who approach the issue of identity struggles from the perspective of the theories of nationalism and cultural studies have greatly contributed to the understanding of the domestic dynamics of the T/C society. Yet, as I have argued above, focus upon the process of identity construction must be complemented by focus upon the processes of state-building and capital accumulation. As a matter of fact, some authors have recently heeded the problems of state-building and capital accumulation—howbeit not from the perspective of the theories of the state, and political economy.

Yael Navaro-Yashin is one of the eminent students of Cyprus who problematises and methodologically tackles a variety of severely undertheorised issues apropos of T/C politics and economy. Firstly, one must note that, rather than dismissing it, she problematises and investigates the T/C statehood in its various aspects—bureaucracy, territory, its regimes of citizenship and property ownership, from the perspective of, particularly, the all-important question of affectivity. The problem with the T/C state is not that it constitutes an aberration—that which it does not, just because it is

illegal and dependent, but that its *sui generis* character compels a different type of affectivity.¹²³ From a Foucauldian point of view, KKTC has “... a state administration with procedures, laws and regulations much on a par with legally recognised states, ... and therefore has modes of ‘governmentality’, in the Foucauldian sense ...” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 290). The point is that the study of KKTC requires a two-tiered analysis, because she is a two-tiered entity “... whereby governmental and calculable functions are in constant and ongoing conflict with modes of sovereign power.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 291) Furthermore, ‘abnormal’ and ‘normal’ states have more in common than one would think, and, methodologically, the study of the ‘normal’ traits of the abnormal could uncloak the abnormal traits of the normal.¹²⁴ It is important to note that “[t]he state-centric international system operates through a normalizing discourse ...” (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 115), which certainly imposes itself upon the students of abnormal, i.e. ‘failing’ states. Thus, “[t]he study of zones of illegality should ... help us to become aware of ‘the abnormal’ that underlies what is presented as ‘normal’ in such discourses.” (Navaro-

¹²³ “I do not consider the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an anomaly or as an administrative modality which counters the valid procedures of modern and legal states in its entirety. Turkish-Cypriots modelled their state administrations by mimicking the bureaucratic practices of legal and recognised states: Britain, the Republic of Cyprus, and Turkey. In other words, the ‘TRNC’ is not a culturally ‘other’ state structure, but one that shares many features with other modern administrative systems. And yet, because it is illegal and dependent on the sovereignty of another country and its military, civil service under this ‘state’ compels a peculiar mix of affectivity.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 282)

¹²⁴ “If I picked what could be called an ‘abnormal’ context for ethnographic research, the territory of Northern Cyprus carved out of international recognition, I intend this ‘facing [of] the extreme’, in Tzvetan Todorov’s terms (1996), of an exaggerated context, to accentuate the ‘abnormal’ in contexts that are usually considered as politically ‘normal’.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 107) And, more generally, “... doesn’t the exception have something to tell us about the rule, totalitarianism about democracy, the camp about modernity, the illegal about the law, the abnormal about the ‘normal’?” (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 108)

Yashin, 2003: 115)¹²⁵

Central to Navaro-Yashin's theoretical approach is affectivity discharged by objects, underlying the relationships of people to the surrounding things and constructs, such as official documents, *ganimet*, bureaucracy, and space (borders, land, buildings, etc.) As a first point, from the perspective of the anthropologist, argues Navaro-Yashin (2003: 17), there is much that subjects are unable to put into rationalised language, by consciously articulated words. Therefore, methodologically speaking, "[w]hat the anthropologist has also to catch is not the formalized narrative of identity, the tamed memory, or encoded oral history. More revealing of the experience of the Janus faces of suffering are the passing comments, exclamations, statements made out of despair, sighs, interrupted sentences, ironic phrases, laughter, and the like."

Accordingly, Navaro-Yashin brings into the analysis the so-called Actor Network Theory and the psychoanalytic work on affect, to explore the social relationships, not only as man–man relationships, but also, as emotively charged, man–object relationships. In contradistinction with subject-centred theories, Actor Network Theory (of, specifically, Bruno Latour's), presents itself as a new, object-oriented turn in social–cultural

¹²⁵ Hence, so far as the normalising discourse of globalisation as opposed to the 'abnormal' effects of globalisation is concerned, "[t]he 'TRNC' phenomenon ... is no anomaly within a normal international 'order of things'. It only accentuates the process, call it global or transnational, that is transforming many parts of the world into such 'no man's lands.'" (Navaro-Yashin, 2003: 120)

theory, which puts the object to the core of the key problem of agency.¹²⁶ It is important to note that, objects and constructs of a divided geography, unrecognised statehood, as well as appropriated G/C property are critically placed at the core of T/C politics, economy, and lifeworld—thereby, ‘the thingliness of politics’.¹²⁷ On the other hand, whilst agreeing with the object-centred approach of Actor Network Theory, Navaro-Yashin (2009: 9) criticises Latour’s claim to a post-linguistic and post-hermeneutic shift in social theory, to attack the linguistic turn: “Objects are not involved in relations with human beings in a linguistically or symbolically neutral arena. Objects are, rather, qualified through language. They could be neither pre- nor post-linguistic.” Of the two pillars of Navaro-Yashin’s work, the other is ‘affectivity’. What has been referred as the ‘affective turn’, following the work of Gilles Deleuze, led by scholars from the fields of geography and cultural studies, is a “... movement which follows, critiques, and moves beyond the ‘linguistic turn’ in the human sciences.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006a: 8; 2009: 11) It is important to note that affects are not simply emotions as, particularly, in the psychoanalytic tradition which focuses upon the inner

¹²⁶ “Latour has written against the privileged ascription of agency to human beings, arguing that, as ‘actants’ of sorts, ‘non-human entities’ too may be interpreted as effecting ‘agency’ ... In a recent work on politics, Latour has written: ‘It’s not unfair to say that political philosophy has often been the victim of a strong object avoidance tendency’ ... ‘Back to Things!’ is the motto of Latour’s work (as well as of others working with Actor Network Theory) ... The point of this dictum is to effect a shift from a subject- to an ‘object-oriented’ philosophy ...” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 8).

¹²⁷ “Thinking through my material from Northern Cyprus, I agree with Latour that there is a need to attend to the centrality of objects in the making of politics. The ethnographic account at the start of this article illustrates, akin to Latour’s intentions, the embroilment of subjects with objects, in this case, seized from other subjects. Indeed, as I have argued above, a new body politic has been fashioned in Northern Cyprus out of appropriating, using, and exchanging objects captured by violation from other people. I am therefore interested in the thingliness of politics.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 8)

world, interiority, psyche, or the unconscious of the ‘human subject’.¹²⁸ As I see it, the critical point is that the concept of affectivity links subjectivity with objectivity—to be more exact, with objects and constructs. As Navaro-Yashin (2009: 12) points out, “Deleuze is referring to sensual intensities that may move through human bodies, but that do not necessarily emerge from them. The reference-point for affect (which used to be, singularly, subjectivity) has been radically altered and multiplied in this approach, making it possible to read many other things, such as space and the environment, as affective ...”¹²⁹

Now studying the affective relationships of subjectivity–objects/constructs in KKTC, Navaro-Yashin deploys a number middle-range concepts, for instance, ‘abjectivity’. Casually, the adjective ‘abject’ is defined as (1) “sunk to or existing in a low state or condition”; (2a) “cast down in spirit” and (2b) showing hopelessness (Merriam–Webster). As I see it, conceptually, abjectivity is about otherisation—the labelling, casting out, distancing (not necessarily metrically, but also visually), and the containment of the mostly intrinsically ‘dirty’, ‘filthy’ as aspects of the society, be they things, persons, or constructs of some sort—keep one’s

¹²⁸ “The point with which I very much agree is that most theoretical work on affectivity, before this particular ‘affective turn’, has focused on the inner world or interiority of the human subject, coined ‘subjectivity’. In the psychoanalytic tradition, for example, affect has been synonymous with subjectivity (in spite of the fact that subjectivity was studied as conflicted and split) ...” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 12)

¹²⁹ Underlying Navaro-Yashin’s work, is her rejection of the disciplinary demarcation between psychoanalysis/psyche, on the one hand, and anthropology–sociality, on the other. “Long before British psychoanalysts and anthropologists divided labour between one another, the one claiming the ground of ‘psychology’ and the latter that of ‘sociality’ ..., Malinowski (1927) was exploring possible areas of convergence between the psychological and the social ... Here, I follow Malinowski in centring affectivity in an exploration of sociality.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 4–5)

(and/or the collectivity's) sense of moral and psychical integrity. As Navaro-Yashin puts it "[t]he abject is that which is not me'. "Or, it is against 'that', that dirty, filthy thing, which I define and identify myself as having integrity. But in Kristeva's work the abject is a boundary which protects and challenges psychical integrity at one and the same time. She argues that as far as it is pushed away (or banished from) subjectivity, the abject keeps harrying the ego incessantly from where it has been cast out ... Therefore, she studies that constant tension or collision between ego and the abject." Furthermore, "[b]uilding strongly upon Douglas's arguments, we have the psychoanalytic work of Julia Kristeva, who studies 'the abject' not only as that which contradicts the social order, but also as the negative counterpart to the ego. For Kristeva, abjection is an othering process through which the individual attempts to maintain and protect her psychical integrity." (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 6)

Apparently, according to Yael-Navaro Yashin, the pathology, the malaise of the T/C society is basically due to the fact that, given the centrality of the appropriated G/C means of subsumption and production, the abject is so 'here and there', so 'with us', so 'part of us', in a manner of speaking, that society can not even externalise it. As a matter of fact, the abject is internalised, rather than being externalised, so the process of abjection simply does not work, in T/C society. Navaro-Yashin (2009: 6) points out that "[i]n the Cypriot context ..., the abject ... is not that against which the social order or political system was defined. Rather, the abject has become central to the social order or the political system itself. ... [T]he abject is

right there, in one's vicinity, environment, and domestic space, it is one's very dinner table, lounge, or bedroom, in one's midst. Abject material has been consumed, and this consumption has been generative of new subjectivities and a new political system. The abject has become not a negative counterpart ('the other') to the subjective realm or the social order, but intrinsically constitutive of it." She applies the idea middle-range concept of abject, to define the affect discharged by appropriated G/C objects—*ganimet* [the loot] onto the T/C subjects, and analyse its moral consequences apropos of the society, and the political regime. More specifically, she (2009: 4) explores "... affect that is generated in a community that has re-created its life and livelihood significantly on the basis of objects and properties belonging to another community which was officially coined as 'the enemy'." Accordingly, she identifies the kind of affect generated by abjectivity as 'melancholy'—longing for and grief at the lost thing—which is directly reflected onto the moral-discursive plane. Melancholy has three aspects: "On the one hand, Turkish-Cypriots inhabit the melancholy of the other community through their left-behind objects and spaces, because the environment effects this affect. There is the Turkish-Cypriot refugees' own melancholy, having lost their own personal belongings and homes in southern Cyprus, as well as members of their own community in shootings by Greek-Cypriots during the war. But there is also another order of melancholy, having to do with violence done to others by way of appropriating their objects. The melancholy experienced, via the everyday presence of objects belonging to others, in this case, is a loss of a

sense of moral integrity. This is articulated and consciously symbolized (put into discourse) by the Turkish-Cypriots, through decades of appropriation and right up to this day, as in my analysis of moral discourses around *ganimet*.” (Navaro-Yashin, 2009: 16–17)

Yael Navaro-Yashin has studied affectivity apropos of T/C subjects relationships to (a) the bisected space of Northern Cyprus, the ruins left of the interethnic war, and the disrupted temporality thereof; (b) the internationally unrecognised forms of official documents, and; (c) bureaucracy and the clientalistic politics associated with civil service jobs. As far as the bisected space and the ruins of Northern Cyprus is concerned, “[i]n this place which was transformed into ‘no man’s land’,” points out Navaro-Yashin (2003: 117), “time is caught, like the flip-second of a camera shot, in between. Somewhere in the middle, life is frozen, trapped, held on hold: 29 years (after 1974), 40 years (after 1963) fled by, half a lifetime—the cycle does not turn. One experiences death within life in ‘no man’s land’. This place is already off the records.” Once more, she criticises (2003: 121) the rationalising discourse of (political) anthropology: “‘The political’, here, ... never shows itself in the holistic form in which it is often depicted in political anthropologies. It rather appears, often in phantasmic form, between absence and presence ... Here, the meaning of existence, betwixt and between life and death (a subversion of the opposition), must be sensed to be grasped, in the subdued tentativeness of time, in the fleeting or cursory remarks, in the weird surroundings.” Elsewhere, Navaro-Yashin (2006a: 281–282) concentrates on the affect engendered by civil service

under the unrecognised state of KKTC, trying to comprehend why “... a community run by an unrecognised state have such ... [a strong] attachment to civil service ...”, and “... this mixture of desire for jobs in the state administration with feelings of apathy towards the state ...” In so doing, Navaro-Yashin (2006a: 282) not only explores aspects of the T/C clientalist politics, but also, provides a critique of the rationalising—once more, and legitimising theories of bureaucracy: “Recent scholarship on modern bureaucracies has tended to portray administration in a mode, which would be preferred by the institutions themselves: that of emotive neutrality. Bureaucracy has been studied as a rationalising apparatus, instigating discipline and organising audit procedures, with no room for affect.” Alternatively, she proposes that “... bureaucracy be studied as a practice which ... produces and incites specific modes of affectivity in its own right ...”, as an emotive domain. Finally, Navaro-Yashin (2007) studies the affects engendered by the various ‘official’ documents issued by the unrecognised state of KKTC—the ‘make-believe’ [*uyduruk*] papers, as publicly called. She (2007: 88) points out, that “... Turkish-Cypriots are ... aware of the contradictions in the documents they employ, especially of those which hide histories of looting or violence or which have no real security or permanence because the ‘TRNC’ is not recognized. They relate to the documents they use with a sense of despair, distrust, contempt and alienation.”

I would argue that it may not be too far-fetched to suggest that, the question of affectivity, as between subject and object, was problematised, *avant la*

lettre, by the young Marx, through the concept of ‘alienation’ introduced in the ‘Economico–Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844’. There, the young Marx criticises and connects the (Embodied) ‘Labour Theory of Value’ of political economy, to the problem of alienation of ‘man as species–being’. More specifically, the root cause of the problem of alienation is private property—or, historically, the ‘forced’ appropriation of the means of production, of subsumption, and of the commons, more generally, which he, in his later work, called ‘primitive accumulation’.¹³⁰ Furthermore, Marx posits alienation as the consequence of the objectification of (social) labour, brought about by the emergence of a certain ‘mode of production’—to use his later terminology: “...[T]he object which labour produces—the product of labor—confronts it as an *alien being*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labor is labor embodied and made material in a thing; it is the *objectification* of labor. The realization of labor is its objectification. Within political economy, this realization of labor appears the *loss of reality* of the worker, objectification appears as *the loss of the object* and *bondage to it*; appropriation appears as *alienation* [*Entfremdung*], as *externalization* [*Entäusserung*].” (Kamenka, 1983: 133). As noted above, Navaro-Yashin theorises the subject–objects/constructs relationships between T/Cs and forcibly appropriated G/C property—the ‘primitive accumulation’ of the T/C society, the ‘original violence’ underlying the T/C economy—by means of the concept of affect/affectivity. As I see it,

¹³⁰ See Capital, Volume I, Part Eight: So-Called Primitive Accumulation, and especially, ‘Chapter 26: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation’ (Marx, 1982: 873–876).

although Marx problematised alienation, he also left it undertheorised,¹³¹ given that he was historically confined by the limits of the theories of the times, notably, British political economy, and German speculative philosophy.¹³² I would argue that, affectivity could be, or replace the missing link, in Marx's theory, between objects as the socially constructed objectifications of the capitalist form of the relations of property ownership, on the one hand, and the subjects, on the other. Furthermore, object-generated affectivity can be one of the missing links between economic and political crisis as well,¹³³ which have traditionally been black boxed by the various brands of 'Automatic Marxism'.¹³⁴

¹³¹ That undertheorisation led, a century later, to the efforts of a number of Marxists, to develop a full-fledged theory of alienation. Prominent in the debates thereof, were the Yugoslavs, and the models of workers' self-control, self-management; and Israelites, and the kibbutz, as a socialistic way of national development. As I see it, most of the modern, orthodox Marxist work on alienation suffered from the faulty urge of black-boxing the missing link of affectivity. For a review of the various approaches and issues, see Schweitzer (1989), Marković (1989), and Rosner and Mittelberg (1989).

¹³² The 'old' Marx's concept for the object-subject relationships under the capitalist mode of production was, commodity fetishism, defined in the following words: "There it is a definite social relations between men that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mystified regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products itself to the products of labour, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities." I should like to point out two things: First, one must note that the 'Section 4: The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret' is the climax of the all too important 'Chapter 1: The Commodity' (of 'Part One: Commodities and Money'), where Marx expounds the foundations of his critique of the quantitatively-based labour theory of value of classical economists, elaborating the qualitative aspect, that value, as the organising principle of the capitalist division labour, i.e. as socially necessary, abstract labour is the ultimate 'social bond'. Secondly, just like the Actor Network Theory, Marx attributes almost a social power, agency to objects, in this particular case, to the commodities as things, as reified relations of production.

¹³³ It is important to note globalisation and the finance-led growth regime—to borrow the latter term from Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy—significantly compresses urban spaces and transforms urban and rural objects. The recent riots of Gezi Parkı appear to testify to the role of the accumulation of affects discharged by the compressed space and transformed objects in triggering sudden eruptions of protest cycles.

¹³⁴ Marxists of seemingly different persuasions have traditionally tended to believe that economic crisis will, 'somehow'—read it automatically, trigger a political crisis, and the

In a series of independent and joint articles, Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant, studying the politics of resistance of the first decade of the 2000s, establish interesting links between, (a) (nationalist, modernist–orientalist politics) identity politics; (b) questions of political empowerment–disempowerment, and (c) economic and statutory equality. In so doing, they bring together economy and politics, paying due attention to the intra– and inter–class relations of distribution. More particularly, they tend to see the recent rise of Cypriotness as a function of the neo-liberal economic policies of the 1990s.

Exploring the dynamics of the discriminatory attitudes and practices of the many T/Cs towards migrants from Turkey, as a form of ‘resistance’, Hatay (2008: 147–149) emphasises the key role played by a local form of Orientalism, that casts Anatolia as the ‘East’, and Islam as the old. At the core of this Orientalism, is the T/C modernisation, Westernisation, and secularisation, which followed the exemplar of the Kemalist ideas of the early Republic of Turkey. The first, large-scale encounters of the T/Cs with migrants from Turkey was after 1974, when extra labour force was required to work the lands and factories that belonged to fleeing G/Cs. Culturally, the migrants’ dress and appearance seemed to contradict the Kemalist ideals of the T/Cs. Nonetheless, Hatay (2008: 151) argues that “... the cultural

latter, ‘somehow’ a revolutionary crisis. In his seminal article ‘The Politics of the Crisis Theory: Toward the Critique of Automatic Marxism II’, Russell Jacoby (1975: 4) brilliantly singled out the fundamental dilemma of Automatic Marxism as follows: “But nothing seems to fit: a decisive political intervention seems dependent on the theory and fact of an (objective) collapse, if such intervention is not to be reduced to tinkering within the existing apparatus. Yet the objective theory of the collapse seems also to relegate the subject to a passive spectator. Subject and object seem incomplete apart, and incomprehensible together.

differences ... [were] emphasised and exaggerated by Turkish Cypriots in order to justify their exclusive claim to certain resources which seem to be both scarce and, ... unjustly distributed.” According to Hatay (2008: 154), orientalist commentaries accompanying the rise of Cypriotness rose to prominence at the start of the 1990, largely, as consequence of the effects of economic liberalisation. In the 1990s, the new wealth associated with the large-scale privatisation of public enterprises significantly modified the cultural landscape, as “[c]onsumption and the need for change became the defining concepts of this period.” (Hatay, 2008: 155) And, despite the brief pause of the banking sector crisis during 2000–2001, the post-Annan construction boom propelled the T/C wealth upwards (Hatay, 2008: 156). Apparently, accompanying the conjunctures of finance– and speculation–led growth was not only the segmentation of the labour markets, but that of the urban space as well. As a matter of fact, according to Hatay (2008: 156–157), the population of Northern Cyprus began to crystallise into three groups: 1) KKTC citizens and investors from Turkey and Cyprus, and; 2) migrant workers who worked for the KKTC citizens and the latter companies. It is important to note that those citizens of KKTC who failed to adapt to the new economy managed to take refuge in public sectors jobs, through the existing networks of clientalistic politics, soon constituting the bulk of the now expanded ‘middle class’. On the other hand, the walled city of the T/C part of Nicosia was transformed into a ghetto of migrant workers, whilst the so-called middle class moved outwards. Hatay (2008: 163–164) also argues that it was paradoxically the bias of the T/C middle class

towards public sector jobs that effectively required the filling of the gap for low-paid, low-skill jobs by the inflow of poor workers from Turkey. On the other hand, most of the public funds used to pay for the public sector came directly from Turkey, which demanded a say in certain areas, leading to accusations of colonisation, of T/Cs will being impeded. And, migrant workers, now occupying the inner city that historically was the centre of the T/C urban culture became the easy target of the accusations of colonisation. It is important to note that the 'class' factor is at the core of Mete Hatay's approach to the rise of Cypriotturk nationalist politics. Thus, "... in popular discourse class difference is often confused with cultural difference, just as immigrants are often confused with the Turkish state." Interestingly, "... [a] 'Cypriot' identity has taken shape in reaction to immigration, but it is by nature a class-based identity that disguises its own roots in class inequality." As a consequence, "... [u]nder the cover of 'colonisation,' it has also been possible for Turkish Cypriots to claim that they are 'resisting' the North's 'Anatolianisation', at the same time allowing the perpetration of hate speech, a lack of attention to social inequality, and blindness to other social needs, such as the ecological destruction that resulted and continues to result from the recent construction boom in the north." (Hatay, 2008: 166)

In a joint, insightful article, Hatay and Bryant (2008) explore more fully the significance of the walled city of Nicosia for the T/C community, and the key role it has played in the construction of the Cypriotturk nationalist politics, through the nostalgic symbol of the jasmine [*yasemin*] flower. Approaching the issue from the point of view of cultural politics, Hatay and

Bryant (2008: 423) point out that “[i]n the past decade in Cyprus, the jasmine flower has become the symbol of Nicosia, the island’s divided capital, and subsequently of a revolution within the Turkish-Cypriot community.” Accordingly, Hatay and Bryant (2008: 424–425) argue that for many T/Cs, and the proponents of the Jasmine Revolution, of course, the demand for return of our flowers [*‘Yaseminlerimi Geri Verin’*] as a nostalgia, was a “...for resistance to a perceived colonization of northern Cyprus by Turkey, which many saw as having destroyed the Cypriot character of the island.” Concentrating upon the use of nostalgia as a means of cultural resistance, Hatay and Bryant (2008: 425, 427–428) make two interesting points. Firstly, they relate the rise of nostalgia for the lost old Nicosia of the jasmine flowers, to the traumatic experiences of the destruction of the communalist dreams of the egalitarian life of bygone times. The ‘enclave’ period of 1964–1974, during which the T/Cs, concentrating into strongly fortified urban neighbourhoods and bigger villages, lived estranged from the rest was a time of hardship, but also, of equality and solidarity.¹³⁵ After 1974, inequalities emerged between “... those who benefited from the spoils of war and those who had not, or between Turkish-Cypriot villagers and the new immigrants ...”, which, beginning in the late 1980s, grew more important. Moreover, in the 1990s, “... a wave of [neoliberal, so to say,] nostalgia was churned up by neoliberal reforms that increased inequalities and appeared to destroy the communalist

¹³⁵ “But in all cases discussions of the decade between 1964 and 1974 would slip into wistfulness: even though conditions were hard, they were hard for everyone, people would say; there was equality, and everyone worked together. ... It was a time of hardship and hope, when everyone had the same duties and everyone pulled together.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 427–428)

dreams of early nationalisms.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 427–428)

Secondly, “[w]hat was deceptive about this form of nostalgia, ... is that although in some manifestations it bore the signs of other forms of cosmopolitan nostalgia, ... it was not for most people a nostalgia aimed at reunification, and *Kıbrıslılık* did not necessarily imply a common identity for the entire island.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 431) Therefore, the longing of T/Cs for a past when they, as ‘this country’s masters’, collectively resisted to survive against the G/C enemy, actually epitomises their desires to resist and survive the domination and perceived colonisation of Turkey. See Hatay and Bryant (2008: 431–432). Once more, Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant provide a class-based economic analysis of the recent resurgence of Cypriotness. By the early 1980s, the new T/C ‘middle class’, aspiring something more modern, move out of the walled city and to the outskirts of Nicosia, whilst many of old houses were turned into hostels serving the migrant labour force working at the booming construction sector (Hatay and Bryant: 2008: 434). It is important to note that the walled city was the centre of the struggle for existence, “... the site where a community recreated itself, declaring its independence from Greek-Cypriots at the same time that they declared their ties to the island.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 438) Furthermore, “[t]he enclaves, therefore, constituted not only a state within a state but also a world apart and self-contained, where Turkish-Cypriots maintained some form of control and therefore had a sense of determining their destiny. Nicosia became the site where this was most vividly realized, as a completely Turkish social and cultural life flourished

in a way that it never had before.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 440) “Hence, the “jasmine scent of Nicosia” carries with it not only a longing for a presumably better past, but specifically for a past characterized by an egalitarian struggle for an independent future.” (Hayat and Bryant, 2008: 441)

Connected with the neglect of the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, is some sort of a ‘relativist’ understanding,¹³⁶ which sees the T/C state, politics and economy as aberration, at best, and counterfeit, at worst, which are all, the epiphenomena of a child-like dependency. For instance, according to Ümit İnatçı, even the T/C nationalism—and just like its other the G/C nationalism— lacks authenticity, as ‘mimetic’ nationalism. Accordingly, the rival, ethnocentric nationalisms of Cyprus were both quests for, not for a genuinely Cypriot identity, but for a political entity driven by mimetic, ‘motherland-aspired’ nationalism. The rival nationalisms of Cyprus are but the platonic, reflective images, the mimeses of motherland nationalisms (İnatçı, 2003: 121). Underlying the mimetic nationalism of the T/Cs, is a society characterised by diffidence, and always needy of saviors—and all that being the doing of Rauf R. Denktaş. As a matter of fact, Denktaş constantly tried to define threats and fabricate fears, presenting himself as the omniscient, ultimate savior of the society he disempowered (İnatçı, 2003: 125, 127). Motherland Turkey, instead of tending the ‘decorative’

¹³⁶ I borrow the term ‘relativist/relativism’ from Galip Yalman (2009), who uses it to criticise the center–periphery models advanced by Şerif Mardin and others, to explicate the so-called Ottoman–Turkish ‘strong state’ tradition, which is treated as a deviance from the Western models of state–civil society relationships.

civil servants in the government offices of the so-called ‘state of KKTC’, must henceforth heed to being the mother—and—land of her own people. On the other hand, it is time for T/Cs to be weaned (İnatçı, 2003: 128). Further delay of necessity of growing up, lest the benefits of childhood be lost, is bound to give further impulse to the process of social, cultural, and economic erosion (İnatçı, 2003: 129).

It is likely that, the utmost example of the relativist approach to the politics and economy of the T/Cs belongs to the late Ulus Baker. To paraphrase, Baker (1995: 17) claims that today’s KKTC is just a ‘caricature album’ [*karikatür albümü*]: A non-existent state apparatus; a non-existent economy; a government apparatus devoid of the mechanisms of decision making; Evkaf¹³⁷, as the agency of unique control over the urban and rural rents; the so-called ‘army’, transformed from the former body of warriors [*mücahitlik kurumu*]; trade unions seeking after workers as would-be members; the official Bayrak [Flag] TV, which, for many years, only reflected the broadcasts of Turkey’s TRT;¹³⁸ etc. In short, it is all about a simulacrum of state, and a simulacrum of country. Everything points to the lack of a national economy, and the so-called *raison d’état* is just a bizarre motley of the relics of colonial institutions and a society administered by the TV causeries of Denktaş. As a matter of fact, by its daily habits, the T/C society cannot but be a stateless society—the T/C cannot make anything out of the state, bristles at the mere sight of the state, wrangles with the public

¹³⁷ The central administration and umbrella organisation of Ottoman pious foundations.

¹³⁸ *Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu*—Turkish Radio and Television Corporation.

servant—who is just a neighbour, gets around everything using personal connections, etc. Territorial and demographic insecurity was so pervasive a fact that someone like Asil Nadir even dared to think of buying a whole country. According to Ulus Baker, even the presence of a true police establishment as a basic organ of state power is dubious (1995: 17).¹³⁹ Apparently, Baker’s benchmark to compare and contrast the case of Cyprus is the nationalisms of Nineteenth, and early Twentieth century. Thus, the sheer pride of having established the ‘Seventeenth Turkish State’ itself is the clear evidence of the shallowness of the so-called T/C nationalism. For the Nineteenth and early Twentieth century nationalisms were, par excellence, about state-building—the construction of public institutions, governance structures, administrative mechanisms, and the establishment of the so-called ‘*raison d’état*’, etc. On the other, argues Baker (1995: 16), the distinctive point about the nationalisms of our times is their being bound to fail, eventually, given that the building of ‘nation-state’ apparatuses to successfully adapt to the caprices of the world market, its shifts and dislocations, and its vibrations [*titreşimler*] is getting increasingly more difficult.

I must admit—and this, despite the sad fact this beloved son of Cyprus is no longer able to reply to his critics—that I am deeply frustrated by the scholarly style of the late Ulus Baker. There are three objections I should like to raise. Firstly, Baker seems to suggest that the scale of the small

¹³⁹ “Kıbrıs Türk kesiminde gerçek anlamda—her devletin esas mekanizması olan polis kurumunun bile varolduğu kuşku götürür.” (Baker, 1995: 17)

island of Cyprus simply does not allow the establishment of a modern state, due to the face-to-face character of the lifeworld. I disagree: As a matter of fact, a hermeneutically careful reading of the T/C history is likely to point to the fact that the increasing concentration and centralisation of power, the emergent hierarchies of power in the 1950s, led to significant formalisation of the hitherto close personal relations. Secondly, as I have argued above, relativist approaches to the case of Cyprus, in this particular case, using the yardstick of a classical of Nineteenth and early Twentieth century nationalism, is theoretically problematic. And, last and but not least, I tend to believe that, the metaphoric language deployed by Ulus Baker tends to seriously obscure his analysis of the T/C politics and economy. Metaphoric analogies can be of great use, but substituting emotionally-charged metaphors for well-founded concepts is a sure recipe of creating epistemological barriers before true scientific enquiry.¹⁴⁰ Apparently, seeing the T/C statehood as abnormality, aberration, as ‘the irrational’ leads to the understanding that rational theories, or the theories of ‘the rational’ are not applicable. Thereby, it follows that the case of the T/C statehood is unproblematic. One must also note that the use of emotionally-charged metaphors about the statehood and other aspects of Cyprus is commonplace amongst the T/C intellectuals. I understand the feelings, but I reject the analyses.

Salih Egemen’s ‘*Kıbrıslı Türkler Arasında Siyasi Liderlik*’ [Political

¹⁴⁰ Marxists, on their part, have long suffered the ravages of trying to think on the basis of metaphors, such as, most notably, sub- *versus* superstructure, and substance *versus* surface (appearances).

Leadership amongst the Turkish Cypriots], is one of the works which I most value apropos of the domestic dynamics of the T/Cs. Egemen deploys a middle range theory of patronage, to study the clientalistic relationships between a basically Weberian elite, and their clients, making frequent references to class dynamics and politics, as well. Egemen (2006: 39) points out that the existing studies on the T/Cs almost entirely ignores the dynamics of domestic politics, and the struggles for power and leadership. In his book, which is a sequel to his doctoral thesis (1988), he (2006: 39–40) tackles the question of political leadership from the perspective of patron/brokers–clients relationships. In the patronage theories of leadership, the ‘patron’ is defined as the leader using the power, who gives out concrete resources in exchange of the clients’ support. The patron not only give out ‘prizes’, but if necessary, by being able to take them back, utilises penalties (fear) to manipulate the clients. Therefore, patron/brokers–clients type of relationships are actually relations of exchange, taking place under certain conditions (2006: 290) Salih Egemen reads the various epochs of T/C politics from the point of view of patronage relationships. He (2006: 102) argues that, under the traditional society of agriculture, because there were no big landowners, the ‘notables’ [*eşraf*] basically consisted of the trustees and stakeholders [*mütevelliler ve galleharlar*] of Evkaf property. In 1925, the notable Sir Münir (Mehmet Münir), a British-educated barrister-at-law, was appointed as the Muslim director of Evkaf, and in 1928, a royal decree turned the nominally autonomous Evkaf into a department of the British colonial administration (Egemen, 2006: 99–101). Sir Münir disposed of

two types of resources, namely, the renting out of *Evkaf* property to *eşraf*, and the posts of civil service (Egemen, 2006: 103). *Esnaf* [craftsmen and shopkeepers] were also dependent upon *Evkaf* for rental shops and short term credits (Egemen, 2006: 105–106). Finally, there were farmers who rented *Evkaf* lands, and peasants who worked at *Evkaf* farms as casual labour (Egemen, 2006: 106–108).

On the other hand, politically, the TMT leadership, liquidated *eşraf* and its extensions, and based itself upon the peasantry and in Nicosia, the new ‘national bourgeoisie’. The two resources employed by the TMT leadership were the cooperatives, in agriculture, and the so-called ‘*Türk’ten Türk’e*’ [From the Turk, to the Turk] policies of creating a T/C enclave market to create and support the rise of a new bourgeoisie (Egemen, 2006: 148–149).

The model of economic development applied after 1974 put to the fore the policy of supporting the rise of the national bourgeoisie, as a continuation of the old Denktaş policy of creating, via ‘*Türk’ten Türk’e*’, a T/C bourgeoisie, and making use of its entrepreneuring spirit for the sake of economic development (Egemen, 2006: 160). The state patronage was now founded upon a state apparatus which had all the necessary resource endowments to meet the needs, expectations and demands of the society. Firstly, there were houses, household goods, cattle, shops, etc. deserted by the fleeing G/Cs, which were allocated to the migrants from Northern Cyprus, and settlers from Turkey (Egemen, 2006: 165–166). More importantly, these resources

could also be taken back by the state, for the property thus allocated formally belonged to the state—although that gradually changed from 1974 to 1993. So, there were not only rewards, but penalties as well, which effectively made the greater part of the society part of the patronage relations (Egemen, 2006: 168). Secondly, after 1974, the T/C society acquired the means of capitalist development, namely, hundreds of modern, G/C plants in the sectors of agriculture, industry, and tourism, and companies marketing agricultural produce. The plants in question were run by the state, giving rise to a huge state capitalist sector, which, consisting of the so-called KİTs, came to dominate nearly 80 % of the sectors of industry and tourism (Egemen, 2006: 169–170). Consequently, with the post-1974 economic structure being essentially founded upon the state capitalist sector, state employment came to be another basis of patronage, namely, through the relationships of exchange—votes for jobs— between patrons and the job seekers (Egemen, 2006: 170). Because state employment is so critical a buttress of the patronage relationships, patrons have always thwarted all suggestions to curtail state jobs, as a standard part of the economic programs suggested, after 1999, by Turkey (Egemen, 2006: 170–171). One must not forget the fact that the incomes of public servants and the farmers of the plain of Mesaoria [*Mesarya vadisi*], as the two biggest ‘vote deposits’, are largely financed by Turkey. The fact remains that the T/C economy depends upon the T/C state, and the T/C state, upon Turkey. The true source of the relatively higher levels of T/C welfare lies, not with production, but consumption financed out of Turkish aids (Egemen, 2006: 208).

According to Salih Egemen, the relationships of patronage have critical repercussions, politically, culturally, and morally. The T/C electorate largely perceives politics as the inter-personal distribution of state resources, and a relationship of exchange between themselves and the patron, or the brokers acting on behalf of the patron. As a consequence, votes are cast for the patron and the brokers, to whom one owes a ‘debt for the favour’ [*iyilik borcu*] (Egemen, 2006: 210). Therefore, elections become a platform where those who have done some sort of a favour for one or one’s family are paid off, rather than the means of the choices made on the basis of class interests, and ideologies and creeds. And, each and every resource obtained, fairly or unfairly, from the state effectively becomes the subject of a political exchange where the favour is paid off by votes (Egemen, 2006: 210–211). It is important to note that, according to Egemen, decadence and corruption really begins with the rule of Derviş Eroğlu. As patron, Denktaş actually aimed at the creation and the reinforcement of the commercial bourgeoisie, by utilising state resources and state power—which essentially meant protectionism [*kollamacılık*]. Contrariwise, the brokers of Eroğlu’s rule, rather than acting as mediators pure and simple, were seeking to accumulate resources on their own accounts. During Eroğlu’s rule, corruption and misfeasance, and thereby, political decay became pervasive. Overall, state resources that were utilised for the class interests of the bourgeoisie under Denktaş, came to satisfy, mostly, the personal interests of patrons and brokers (Egemen, 2006: 246).

There are, furthermore, two recent contributions which have tried to

explicate the roots of the generalised crisis of the T/C, on the basis of the recent decomposition of the politico-economic relations of power. Thus, according to Sonan (2007: 5), crisis has two aspects, economic and political. On the side of the economy, there is the full collapse of the redistributive means which have hitherto sustained the so-called ‘constituency clientalism’, due to two successive economic crises. On the side of politics, there is the catalyst effect of the UN reunification plan, with its promise of a new, concrete alternative to replace the now defunct politico-economic system of constitutive clientalism (Sonan, 2007: 5) Initially, the politico-economic system was based upon the distribution of G/C movables and immovables. When these spoils were exhausted, the political distribution of Turkey’s fiscal aid replaced them.¹⁴¹ “Crucially, the entire economic system was built around the political aim of keeping the pro-taksim elite in power; economic rationality was completely pushed aside. As the future flow of Turkish aid was taken for granted, there was no urge to establish a sustainable economic structure.” (Sonan, 2007: 9–10) Furthermore, the nationalist elite praised what actually was a relationship of dependency, as the tightening up of the bonds between the ‘motherland’ and the ‘infantland’. Thus, a great part of Turkey’s fiscal aid disappeared into the black holes of public sector wages and salaries, social security, and export and agricultural subsidies. On the revenues side of the budget, the share of local revenues decreased from roughly 76 % in 1994, to some 55 % in 2000. “Clearly, more than a state, the TRNC looked like a teenager on allowance.”

¹⁴¹ On my part, I somewhat doubt that this ordering—spoils first, than Turkey’s aid—is correctly based upon solid empirical observations, and thereby precise.

(Sonan, 2007: 9–10)

On the other hand, one must give the work of Hannes Lacher and Erol Kaymak (2005) credit for its elaborate historical and theoretical perspective, particularly, for its attribution of the rise of the redistributive politics of patronage, to the establishment of the relations of power characterising the nationalist project of state-building. As a matter of fact, there are some resemblances between my analysis of the emergence and further development and consequences of the T/C nationalist project of state-building, and theirs. They basically explicate the emergence of the T/C nationalist movement through the intra-elite competition and mass mobilisation for power, status and wealth.¹⁴² Thus argue that nationalist ideologies basically serve to legitimise the competing claims to state power (and state-allocated status and wealth). On the other hand, the active reproduction of nationalist ideology and movement cannot be sustained only by the motivations of persistent inter-ethnic and inter-state conflict, but it also requires the fulfilment of its ‘promises of national independence and development’, implicit in the nation-state model. Thus, its inability to deliver on these promises may eventually lead to a severe ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 150). They also try to develop a ‘political

¹⁴² See Arslan (2012: 122–124) for my account of the T/C elite struggles for political power, as they took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s. “Intra-elite struggles are critical to the centralization of political power as the core process of the genesis of future proto-state and state structures. Centralization of political power essentially consists of the elimination by the winning fraction, of alternative contestants to political leadership, within and without, via a multifaceted struggle based on a discourse of communal/national unity.” (Arslan, 2012: 122–123)

approach' to the question of identity, and identity transformations.¹⁴³ The basic concern of Lacher and Kaymak is the conditions necessary for the 'reproduction' of nationalist relations of power. Thus, they argue that, after 1974, it was basically the distribution of the spoils which made possible the construction of a new alliance of old and new elites and ensured its control over the masses through patronage and clientalist relations. Thus, generous transfer payments financed by Turkey's fiscal aid enabled conservative-nationalist parties to provide higher incomes, compared to the 1960–1974 period, and a high degree of social security. However, these policies were not without their costs. Thus, like many other students of T/C politics, Kaymak and Lacher also tend to regard Turkey's heavy influence over T/C politics to be the consequence of her economic aid: "As the bill was picked up by Turkey, its influence increased in turn, which contributed to a latent sense of alienation of administrators and citizens from 'their' state." (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 157) According to Lacher and Kaymak, Turkish nationalism starts to decompose gradually, especially after the foundation of the TRNC, in 1983, due to three reasons. Firstly, the declaration of 'sovereignty' caused, amongst the T/Cs a reactive disenchantment with their state and a growing sense of the distinctiveness of their identity, eroding the cultural bases of the Turkish nationalist claims of Rauf R. Denktaş. Secondly, the 1983 declaration of independence turned a chimera, as the TRNC was denied recognition by the UN, and except by Turkey. Thirdly, the declaration had a detrimental effect on the economy, in terms of the

¹⁴³ See, particularly, the subsection 'Political Economy of Identity Transformation' (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 155–159).

economic sanctions it provoked and the economic isolation thereof (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 150, 156). Crucially, this state of affairs proved untenable, as a consequence of Turkey's recurrent economic crises and the ensuing difficulties of continuing her economic aid to the TRNC, and the strengthening of a new, emergent sense of identity, directly at odds with the official ideology. Thus, "[e]specially after 2000, a new willingness to redefine the nature of political community in the North can be witnessed. To an increasing part of the population of the TRNC, especially those under 30, the project of state formation in the North now appears as a failure." (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 157)

My basic critique of the theoretical work concentrating upon cultural/identity politics, from, amongst others, the various theories of nationalism is that, (a) it speaks of the state/politics, but without a theory of the (capitalist) state, and; (b) it speaks of the economy, but without political economy. However, as I see it, the T/C nationalists were modernists in three respects: Economic, political, and socio-cultural. Thus, cultural focus on identity politics needs to be complemented by focus on the economic and political aspects of nationalist modernity. Therefore, theoretical work on the processes of identity formation must be complemented by theoretical on the processes of state building *and* capital accumulation. It is unfortunate that, not only has the process of state-building hitherto been neglected, but the T/C proto-state and state formations have generally been reproached, because they have been unrecognised and/or dependent.

CHAPTER III

OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ECONOMY AND POLITICS

In accordance with the criticisms I have levelled against the existing Turkish literature on the T/Cs, this thesis attempts to approach the T/C nationalist project of modernisation in terms of its other two key sub-processes, from the point of view of two respective theories:

- (a) State-building, in the light of state theories, and;
- (b) Capital accumulation, in the light of political economy.

The above, with the various remarks I have made about the generalised crisis of the T/C society, implies that this thesis is to revolve around the basic question of the relationship between economy and politics/state. Thus,

- (a) firstly, there is the problem of bringing together, theoretically, the two co-processes of the T/C nationalist project of modernisation, namely, state-building and capital accumulation, and;
- (b) secondly, the claim that the key to understanding the nature and current crisis of T/C politics is the distribution of economic resources by the state actors towards the reproduction of existing relations of power equally brings to the fore the question of the relationship between economy and politics/state.

On the other hand, (a) and (b) together call for a theoretical framework that

problematizes and models the relationships of determination between economy and politics/state. Accordingly, this thesis involves a reconsideration of the Marxist debate on the relationship between economy and politics/state, through the specific case of T/C society. This theory chapter constitutes the first step of this task.

3.1. MARX’S DISCOVERY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMY AND POLITICS, AND THE MODERN MARXIST DEBATES THEREOF

In his excellent first chapter to the ‘The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx: 1843 to Capital’, Ernest Mandel traces the intellectual trajectories of the young Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as follows: “ ... [F]rom criticism of religion to criticism of philosophy; from criticism of philosophy to criticism of the state; from criticism of the state to criticism of society—that is, from criticism of politics to criticism of political economy, which led to criticism of private property.” (Mandel, 1971: 10–11) Marx’s engagement with the political economy was the consequence of his conceptualisation and problematisation of the capitalist society as a dichotomised whole, consisting of the institutionally distinct spheres of political society and civil society, that stood in a curiously inverted relationship. Marx’s conceptualisation of capitalist society as a dichotomised whole, and concentration over the critique of political economy had serious repercussions upon Marx’s own work, and the future Marxist thought. Marx left behind, a sophisticated critique of political economy, but not a theory of the state of matching power. His legacy also

bifurcated future Marxist studies, for it led to a theoretical division of labour, to separate studies and theories of the capitalist economy and the state. Furthermore, the distinguishment of state and civil society, not only caused the development of separate theories, but also required their synthesis. One scholarly consequence of the bifurcation was the rise, in the 1960s and 1970s, of the Marxist theories of the capitalist state, on the one hand, and of Marxist political economy/economics, on the other. The basic problematic of the former was the theorisation of the relationships of determination between the state and the capitalist economy. One of the basic problematics of the various Marxist theories of economic crisis was also the relationships of determination between the state and the capitalist economy.

3.1.1. State *versus* Civil Society: Marx Discovers Political Economy

Excited by Engels's article of February 1844 in the *Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher*, 'Outlines of Political Economy', Marx engaged the study of political economy firstly in March, and composed his 'Economico-Philosophical Manuscripts' during April–June 1844.¹⁴⁴ As Mandel (1971: 27) points out, "[i]t was during his exile in Paris that Marx applied himself eagerly to the study of political economy, study which he continued during his exile in Brussels, broke off when he returned to Germany, and

¹⁴⁴ In October 1843, Marx moved to Paris, where he began to collaborate with Arnold Ruge, in the production of the radical review *Deutsch-französische Jahrbücher*—of which, just a single issue came out, in February 1844 (Kamenka, 1983: lvii–lviii). It was probably late in 1843 that Engels submitted his article for publication (Oakley, 1984: 10). The incomplete Paris manuscripts, known as the 'Economico-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844' were first published in 1932 (Kamenka, 1983: civ).

completed at the British Museum during his exile in London.”¹⁴⁵ According to Rosdolsky (1976: 25), the Manuscripts of 1844 were part of a grand work, called the ‘Critique of Politics and Political Economy’ (1844–1846).¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, the sweep of the work was greater than what the title might suggest. As a matter of fact, the Preface to the Manuscripts, contained the first plan of his projected work, according to which he was to compose “... a series of distinct, independent pamphlets on the ‘the state, law, ethics, civil life, etc.’ and political economy and secondly, a critique focusing on the extant treatment of the material by speculative (Hegelian) philosophy.” (Oakley, 1984: 11–12) This plan was the first ever of a long series of revised plans, this was part of his long, methodological quest.¹⁴⁷ In 1851, Marx narrowed the scope of his projected work down to the critique of political economy, by abandoning the idea of comprising the critique of politics, law, morality, and especially philosophy (Rosdolsky, 1976: 2829).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ Being deported by the French Ministry of Interior, Marx left Paris on 3 February 1845, for Brussels. On 4 March 1848, he was deported from Belgium, and after a brief sojourn in Paris, he arrived in Cologne on 10–11 April 1848. On 3 June 1849, he returned to Paris, and on 24 August, left Paris for London, where he lived for the rest of his life (Kamenka, 1983: lix, lxvi, lxx).

¹⁴⁶ “... [E]arly in 1845, ... [Marx] arranged with the Darmstadt publisher Karl Leske a contract for the publication of ... a two-volume work to be entitled Critique of Politics and Political Economy.” (Oakley, 1984: 12) In February–March 1846, Leske cancelled the contract (Kamenka, 1983: lxi).

¹⁴⁷ “The question of the ‘scientific’ definitude of his critical theory troubled Marx very much. He agonised over the analytical scope required for his critique to be ‘complete’. In bibliographical terms, the problem contributed to Marx’s life-long indecision with respect to the appropriate ‘plan’ for his critical theory and his consequent failure to ‘finish’ *Capital*. It was the question of where to ‘start and where to ‘end’ his analysis which plagued the methodological and substantive development of his critique.” (Oakley, 1984: 2)

¹⁴⁸ Credit goes to Roman Rosdolsky, the great Austrian Marxist—as a theorist as well as practitioner, for being the first to have problematised how and why Marx had changed his plans. See his brilliant book “*La Genèse du ‘Capital’ chez Karl Marx*” (Rosdolsky, 1976).

Based upon the correspondence between Marx and Engels, Rosdolsky infers that Marx, by the end of 1851, had abandoned this first plan, namely, the inclusion of a ‘Critique of Politics’, for he had now decided to confine himself to a ‘settling of accounts’ with previous economic and socialist thinking (Rosdolsky, 1976: 28–29). Accordingly, Marx “... now referred to the work he intended to publish as simply the ‘Economics’ ...” (Oakley, 1984: 18). One of the most critical turning points—if not ‘the’ most, of these successive plans is the transformation of the 1857 plan—as presented in the *Grundrisse*¹⁴⁹—to the 1866 (or 1865) plan. Between the two was a period of deepening, continued research towards the form of exposition that would best suit the theoretical material, and progressive limitation of the former plan (Rosdolsky, 1976: 32, 35). The first plan consisted of six books: I) The Book on Capital; II) The Book on Landed Property; III) The Book on Wage–Labour; IV) The Book on the State;¹⁵⁰ V) The Book on Foreign

¹⁴⁹ ‘*Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*’ was composed during 1857–1858, and published for the first time, in its original German, in Moscow in 1939–1941. The discovery of the manuscripts, apparently unknown to Engels, had been announced in 1925 (Kamenka, 1983: cvii, 371). As of 1857, the evidence of an impending economic crisis—long awaited by both Marx and Engels, since 1850, had become overwhelming. So Marx resumed his economic, his objective being “... to provide a sound theoretical basis upon which the social revolution that would *necessarily* ensue as a consequence of a severe economic depression could proceed.” The result was the prodigious manuscript known as the *Grundrisse*. It is important to note that the *Grundrisse* “... represented Marx’s first large-scale attempt to set down his independent critical thought in political economy. The sophistication and novelty of the analyses reached well beyond that which he had achieved in any known earlier writing.” (Oakley, 1984: 20) In his “*La genèse du ‘Capital’ chez Karl Marx*”, Rosdolsky largely leaves out the ‘prehistory’ of *Grundrisse*, taking as his starting point the plan of 1857 (Rosdolsky, 1983: 32).

¹⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that the key topic covered under the heading of the state was the problem of unproductive labour, and the state absorption and redistribution of surplus value: “... (2) The categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois society in the form of the state. Viewed in relation to itself. The ‘unproductive’ classes. Taxes. State debt. Public credit. The population. The colonies. Emigration.” (Marx, 1973: 108). And, also,

Trade, and VII) The Book on the World Market and Crisis (Rosdolsky, 1976: 35, 38, 91).¹⁵¹ See also, Kamenka (1983: 370–371). On the other hand, the plan of 1866 covered: 1) Book I: Production Process of Capital; 2) Book II: Circulation Process of Capital; 3) Book III: Forms of the Process as a Whole (Rosdolsky, 1976: 91).¹⁵² This means that the six books of the plan of 1857 were eventually transformed into the three volumes of ‘Capital’. In 1864–1865, Marx gave up the writing of the last three books (Books IV, V and VI) of the 1857 plan, and during 1864–186, integrated the essential themes of the Books II and III, into Volumes I and III of Capital. As a consequence, the six books as originally planned were reduced to one, ‘The

“... Then the *state*. (State and bourgeois society. – Taxes, or the existence of unproductive classes. – The state debt. – Population. ...” (Marx, 1973: 264). The theory and empirics of government absorption of surplus value, and the effect of net taxes on the rate of surplus value were fully developed by Shaikh and Tonak (1996: 137–141, 344–345). In my subsequent analysis of the relationships between T/C politics and economy, the treatment of the nationalist state-building process from the point of view of state absorption plays a key role.

¹⁵¹ To be more exact, “[i]n the [Grundrisse] manuscripts, Marx wrote down several plans for his future work on the critique of political economy and these were amplified in his letters and later manuscripts.” The first of these, written down during September 1857, included five topic headings, summarised by Allen Oakley as “... (1) simple, ahistorical categories which are common to the understanding of any economic system presented in the abstract; (2) bourgeois categories of political economy; (3) the bourgeois state; (4) international political economy; (5) the world market and crises.” It is important to note that this plan closely followed the spirit of the method of political economy suggested by Marx in the ‘Introduction’ part of the *Grundrisse*, namely, “... ‘ascending’ in abstract analysis from the simplest, ahistorical categories of political economy through to those appropriate to the more complex and compound analysis of bourgeois reality, both in the national and international setting” (Oakley, 1984: 20–21). As a matter of fact, this plan is the very last paragraph of section ‘(3) The Method of Political Economy’ of the Introduction. See, Marx (1973: 108). However, “[w]hen Marx began writing the ‘Chapter of money’, and indeed throughout the *Grundrisse* and after, he found it appropriate to consider only the categories of capitalism ... [and] deleted the first of the above topic headings from the second of his plans.” (Oakley, 1984: 21) On the other hand, ‘(2) bourgeois categories of political economy’ above was extended into three books. Thence, the definitive plan of 1957 [*le plan primitif*], mentioned by Roman Rosdolsky. For a very useful, graphic contrast of the two plans, see Rosdolsky (1976: 91).

¹⁵² Some notably add a ‘Book IV: The History of Theory’. See, e.g. Kamenka (1983: 372). Called the Volume IV of Capital, this is supposed to correspond to the three volumes of the ‘Theories of Surplus Value’.

Book on Capital’, whilst that one book was expanded into ‘Volumes I, II and III of Capital’ (Rosdolsky, 1976: 37)

From the point of view of state/politics and economy relationships, the foregoing implies two things: 1) After 1844, the theoretical work of Marx focused upon the critique of political economy, and thereby; 2) after 1844, the theoretical work of Marx left out a systematic treatment of politics, and what is today called, political philosophy. As a matter of fact, one can speak of a theoretical bifurcation in the work of Marx—the critique of political economy and all the rest, which had critical repercussions upon future Marxist thinking. Therefore, one must look at more closely to the causes of this bifurcation, as well as its consequences.

Underlying the bifurcation in Marx’s work, in favour of the study of political economy as opposed to that of politics/political philosophy, was his understanding of the dualities of state/politics *versus* economy, or the political *versus* the economic, as distinct fields of the society. The young Marx basically adopted Hegel’s conception of the modern society, in his ‘The Philosophy of Right’, “... as a division between ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’, or between society and the state ...”, where “... ‘civil society’, dominated as it is by competitive individualism, represents a kind of *bellum omnium contra omnes*.” (Colletti, 1992: 31) In his youthly ‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State (1843),¹⁵³ Marx criticised Hegel,

¹⁵³ This is the unfinished Kreuznach manuscript, ‘*Kritik des Hegelschen Staatrechts*’ composed, most likely, during March–August 1843, also translated as ‘Critique of Hegelian Constitutional Law’, or ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. See Kamenka

for having considered the state as the subject, and society as predicate, whilst the reverse is actually true.¹⁵⁴ Thus, "... [a]s Marx notes at the beginning of the *Critique*, ... while in reality 'the family and civil society are the preconditions of the state; they are the true agents ... in speculative philosophy it is the reverse. When the idea is subjectivised by the real subjects – civil society, the family, "circumstances, caprice, etc. – are all transformed into unreal, objective moments of the Idea referring to different things." (Colletti, 1992: 32) Marx's discussion of Hegel's inversion of the subject–predicate relationship has two key implications, the first, from the point of view of emancipatory and egalitarian politics, the second, from the point of view of methodology and theory. As Colletti (1992: 33) points out, according to Marx, the inversion did not quite originate in Hegel's philosophy itself, but, in the reality itself. In other words, the point was not that Hegel's concept of the state was a hypostatized abstraction, but, that the modern state was itself hypostatized.¹⁵⁵ The modern state, as opposed to previous ones, was 'abstracted', i.e. detached and estranged from the society, implying the separation of politics from economics, of the 'public'

(1983: ciii), and Colletti (1992: 18). Not to be confused with '*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung*' ('Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction'), published in the first and only issue of the *Deutsche-französische Jahrbücher* (February 1844), published by Arnold Ruge, in Paris.

¹⁵⁴ According to Colletti (1992), the core of Marx's critique of Hegel's theory of the state was his objection, from a philosophical point of, of the Hegel's inversion of the subject–predicate relationship. Thus, in the words of Colletti (1992: 19–20), Marx argued that "Hegel inverts the relationship between *subject* and *predicate*. The 'universal' or concept, which ought to express the predicate of some real object and so be a category or function of that object, is turned instead into an entity existing in its own right. By contrast, the real subject, the *subjectum* of the judgment (the empirical, existing world) become for him a manifestation or embodiment of the Idea – in other words, a predicate of the predicate, a mere means by which the Idea vests itself with reality."

¹⁵⁵ Collins Dictionary defines the verb hypostatise as 'the attribution of real identity to a concept' (Merriam–Webster), or '1) to regard or treat as real' and '2) to embody or personify.

sphere' from the 'private sphere', etc. (Colletti: 1992: 33). Curiously, the modern state actually had a separate subjectivity of its own. But, that only came from the nature of civil society. In the words of Colletti (1992: 34), "In 'civil society' – which for Hegel as for Adam Smith and David Ricardo was a 'market society' of producers – individuals are divided from and independent of each other. Under such conditions, just as each person is independent of all others, so does the real nexus of dependence (the bond of *social unity*) become in turn independent of all individuals. This common interest, or 'universal' interest, renders itself independent of all the interested parties and assumes a separate existence; and such social unity established in separation from its members is, precisely, the hypostatized modern state." Furthermore, one of the most intriguing aspects of the division between political society and civil society is the contrast between the formal (constitutional) equality of the former, and the real inequality of the latter—a theme Marx was to elaborate upon, in 'On the Jewish Question' (1844) (Colletti, 1992: 35).¹⁵⁶ The perfected state of the equal unity of all corresponds to the (true) species-life of man, whilst his material life, to its exact opposite. As a matter of fact, "[w]here the political state has attained its full degree of development man leads a double life, a life in heaven and a life on earth, not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in *reality*. He lives in a political *community*, where he regards himself as a *communal being*, and in *civil society*, where he is active as a *private individual*, regards other men as means, debases himself to a means and

¹⁵⁶ 'Zur Judenfrage' ('On the Jewish Question') was published in the *Deutsche-französische Jahrbücher*, in February 1844.

becomes a plaything of alien powers.” (Marx, 1992: 220) As I see it, from the theoretical point of view, one must seriously problematize and enquire, how and why, economically unequal men come to see themselves to be politically equal. Or, conversely, “[i]t is a curious thing ...”, as Marx (1992: 230–231) puts it, speaking of the Article 8 of the French Constitution of 1795, “... that a people which is just beginning to free itself, to tear down all the barriers between the different sections of the people and to found a political community, that such a people should solemnly proclaim the rights of egoistic man, separated from his fellow men and from the community (Declaration of 1791) ...” The lesson of all this from the point of view of emancipatory politics is that, only when real, individual man becomes species-being in his empirical life, “... and only when man has recognized and organized his *forces propres* as *social forces* so that social force is no longer separated from him in the form of political force, only then will human emancipation be completed.”¹⁵⁷ Moreover, one can infer, as a general principle, that all emancipation, and the achievement of equality—economic, political, cultural, or women’s—would require the correction of the inverted relationship (of dependency) between subject and predicate.

¹⁵⁷ See also “Critical Notes on the Article ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’”—published in *Vorwärts*, the German radical periodical published in Paris, on 7 August 1844. This was Marx’s reply of Arnold Ruge’s ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’, published in the 27 July issue of the same periodical. It is a brilliantly written piece of work that is most inspiring from the perspective of today’s debates on social policy. Starting from the duality of state *versus* civil society, or the public sphere *versus* private sphere, Marx argues that “[t]he [state] administration ... has to confine itself to formal and negative action, for where civil life and its work begin there the power of the administration ends. Impotence *vis-à-vis* the consequences which spring from the unsocial nature of civil life, from private ownership, trade, industry and the mutual plundering engaged in by the various bourgeois circles is the natural law governing the administration. This fragmentation, this oppression, this slavery to civil society, is the natural foundation on which the modern state rests ...” (Marx, 1992: 153)

On the other hand, from the point of view of methodology and theory, one must note the various continuities between the young and the older Marx. As I see it, the continuity between the youthful works and *Capital* is quite remarkable. Obviously, young Marx's approach to the duality of state and civil society implies a distinction between state as the universal, abstract category, on the one hand, and the capitalist state (the bourgeois state) as its historically specific form, on the other. Likewise, in his 'Introduction' to *Grundrisse*, and criticising the eternalisation of production, capital, and property by 'economists', Marx makes the well-known distinction between (universal) determinations that belong to all epochs, and (historically specific) determinations that belong to only a few.^{158, 159} Furthermore, one must note that, the founding Chapter 1 of *Capital* is, methodologically, based upon the three, logically connected elements of the youthful critiques, namely, 1) form analysis; 2) subject–predicate relationship, and; 3) formal equality of one sphere as opposed to the real inequality of the other. Notably, the starting point of Marx's analysis is the 'commodity form', as the constituting unit of capitalist wealth, and, by tracing through the 'phenomenal form' of exchange value, he arrives at the 'value form', which

¹⁵⁸ "Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this common element, sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to all epochs, others only to a few. ... the elements which are not general and common, must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that in their unity ... their essential difference is not forgotten. The whole profundity of those modern economists who demonstrate the eternity and harmoniousness of the existing relations lies in this forgetting." (Marx, 1973: 85)

¹⁵⁹ Accordingly, the first two parts of the very first plan introduced in the Introduction, did involve, as noted above, study of: (1) simple, ahistorical categories which are common to the understanding of any economic system presented in the abstract; (2) bourgeois categories of political economy, separately.

is but ‘human labour in the abstract’. But form analysis is the very gist of Marx’s critique of political economy: “Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it has never asked the question why this content has assumed that particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product.” (Marx, 1982: 173–174) Furthermore, the form is mystified, because the subject–predicate relationship is inverted: “These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, instead of the opposite, appear to the ‘political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.” (Marx, 1982: 174–175) Finally, the opposition between political society as the realm of formal (constitutional) equality, and civil society is the realm of real inequality is now carried onto new terrain. Thus, the sphere of circulation or commodity exchange is the realm of legal and contractual equality between capitalist and workers.¹⁶⁰ Contrariwise, the sphere of production is the restricted, private sphere of unequal relations of power.^{161, 162}

¹⁶⁰ “The sphere of circulation or commodity exchange, within whose boundries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the law.” (Marx, 1982: 280)

¹⁶¹ “Let us therefore, in company with the owner of money and the owner of labour-power, leave this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in full view of everyone, and follow them into the hidden abode of production, on whose threshold there hangs the notice ‘No admittance except on business’.” “When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, ... a certain change takes place, or so it

Colletti (1992: 23) points out that, "... in the 1839–43 period ... [Feuerbach] touched a peak of personal achievement (soon followed by decline) which gives him a significant place in the critique and dissolution of Hegelianism in Germany, and so in the formation of Marx's thought." As Oakley (1984: 5) puts it, in his critique of Hegel and of religion, Feuerbach had inverted the latter's view of the determination of historical progress. (In other words, re-inverted the inverted causality between subject and predicate Hegel had posited.) As it turned out, "[t]his inversion represented a profound shift in the approach to the interpretation of the situation of man in the world. The determinants of his being were now immediately human, including his material needs and satisfaction. This satisfaction proceeded by means of a real interaction with nature in the vital ontological process of labour. ... [F]or Marx it was the form and situation of man's labour that were the primary factors affecting the nature of man's existence. In the material dimensions of life were to be found the keys to the comprehension of its totality." (Oakley, 1984: 5–6) The point where Marx differed from Feuerbach was the ontological primacy of 'man–man' over 'nature–man' relations, or, to be more exact and correct, the mediation of man's

appears, in the physiognomy of our *dramatis personæ*. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but – a tanning." (Marx, 1982: 279–280)

¹⁶² Having derived, from the commodity—and through the investigation of exchange value—value, and thence the money, Marx then looks at the transformation of money into capital, and at its expansion through surplus value. As it turns out, surplus value, the increment in value cannot result from the sphere of production, i.e. from the traders' selling of commodities at prices over the values, as that would simply lead to a zero-sum game. Thereby, he concludes, the source of the surplus value, i.e. of the expansion of capital, i.e. the capitalist for of wealth lies not within the formally equal sphere of exchange, but the really unequal sphere of production. Formal equality of the former conceals the real inequality of the latter.

relationship to nature by the society, as species-activity^{163, 164} Furthermore, in the process of working out his critique of Hegel's political philosophy, "Marx also would have noted that political economy had a crucial role in interpretation the nature of civil society, for Hegel referred to it in this context in the *Philosophy of Right*. Very soon, political economy was to come very much to the fore in Marx's social critique and remain there for the rest of his life." (Oakley, 1984: 6) As Marx recalled, in 1859, in the very noted 'Preface' to 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy', "[m]y investigation led to the result that legal relations such as forms of state are to grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material conditions of life, the sum total of which Hegel, following the example of the Englishmen and Frenchmen of the eighteenth century, combines under the name of 'civil society', that however the anatomy of civil society sought in political economy." (Marx, 1983: 159) It is important to note that it was the concept of labour, and the labour theory value that enabled Marx to

¹⁶³ "As Marx noted in a letter to Arnold Ruge dated 13 March 1843, 'Feuerbach's aphorisms seem to me incorrect only in one respect, that he refers too much to nature and too little to politics. That, however is the only alliance [i.e. with politics] by which present day philosophy can become truth.' Feuerbach had failed to give due emphasis to the social and political dimensions of man's being. The man-nature interaction was, for Marx, necessarily mediated by society." (Oakley, 1984: 6)

¹⁶⁴ Shifting the focus to society, Marx now equated 'exchange'—and its basis, labour—with the species-life, species-activity and species-spirit of man. Quoting a passage from the 'Comments on James Mill', dated 1844, where Marx equates exchange, defined as "... both of human activity within production itself [i.e. the division of labour] and of *human* products against one another ..." to species-activity, Oakley (1984: 40) notes: "This is a profound passage in which man's existence as a *species-being* (*Gattungswesen*), that is, his *human identity*, is linked directly to his *individual* involvement in the economic process of exchange. His individual being is facilitated by the *social community* (*Gemeinwesen*) and by exercising his nature, that is, his essential life activity, he helps to create the set of social relations that comprise the social community." Furthermore, "... in this ontology, it is very much *labour* that is the essence of man's being, as Marx recognised later in the Comments."

synthesise German speculative philosophy and political economy—and further, socialist and working class politics. Thus, Mandel (1971: 27) points out that: “Marx found it all the easier to reduce society and social man to labour because Hegel had already described labor the ultimate source of value. The synthesis occurred in a flash, the two ideas were combined ...”

Thus, after 1844, the Marx’s systematic work became the study of political economy, and the composition of his ‘economic’ *magnus opum*, at the expense of philosophy and politics.¹⁶⁵ Kamenka (1983: xix) points out that whilst “he spent most of 1850s and 1860 gathering material for his great economic and historical analysis of capitalism, *Das Kapital* ... his other writings ... were mostly essays in political pamphleteering.” As a matter of fact, his economic work now also being the greatest concern of the family and the close circle of friends,¹⁶⁶ the work was only interrupted by political polemics and events of key importance, necessities of earning a living, and ill health. Marx engaged his first intensive study of political economy during early 1844–early 1848, in exile, first in Paris, then in Brussels (including a short study–visit to Manchester), which basically broke off, upon his return to Germany (April 1848) (Mandel, 1971: 27, 44–45, 52; Kamenka, 1983: lviii–lxi; Oakley, 1984: 27). In August 1849, Marx moved to London, and there resumed his economic studies, but soon was compelled

¹⁶⁵ “During the drafting of the Paris Manuscripts, begun in the spring of 1844, Marx became convinced that primacy had to be given to the political economy of capitalism in formulation of a complete critique.” (Oakley, 1984: 47)

¹⁶⁶ Following the defeat of the revolutions of 1848, “... Engels moves to Manchester to work in the family textile mill; his main motive is to be able to support Marx materially while Marx continues his economic studies.” (Kamenka, 1983: lxxii)

to do journalistic work, and, together with other problems, stopped working on his economic work altogether, from August 1852 to the end of 1856 (Mandel, 1971: 79–80). In 1857, economic crisis finally broke out, and Marx renewed his efforts to complete his economic work. “Such was the degree of pressure that Marx felt himself to be under that in less than a year, from August 1857 to about June 1858, he wrote a prodigious manuscript of some 800 printed pages”, namely the *Grundrisse* (Oakley, 1984: 19–20). In 1859, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ was published; by September 1865, rough drafts of all three volumes of *Capital* were completed, and the completed draft of Volume I of *Capital* was turned in to the publisher, in April 1867 (Kamenka, 1983: cviii, lxxxvii–lxxxviii).

What made the study of political economy a further priority was the links that Marx and Engels saw between economic crises and revolutionary politics. Cyclicity and exogenous crises were well-established features of the capitalist economy, ever since the 1820s. Of the two friends, Engels, in his ‘Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy’ (written in late 1843), had already discussed the so-called overproduction crisis as one of the fundamental expressions of the contradictions of capitalism—namely competition (Mandel, 1971: 20). See also, Oakley (1984: 36). And, in his ‘Economico–Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844’, Marx discussed the impact of cyclical ups and down upon the wages of workers, largely drawing upon Adam Smith’s theory of natural price/wage.¹⁶⁷ As of the end

¹⁶⁷ See, particularly, the first pages of the ‘Wages of Labour’ in the First Manuscript (Marx, 1992: 282–288).

of 1846, and early 1848, the basic elements of a theory of crisis were there: The first hints of the essence of Marx's future theory of value; the first sketch of the so-called 'law of the increase in the organic composition of capital'—from which followed the noted 'law of the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall', and; the presentation of the links between the anarchy of production, capitalist competition and the ensuing economic crises (of overproduction), on the one hand, and the intensification of workers' class struggle to protect wages and its transformation into a political struggle for a new society (Mandel, 1971: 52, 54, 60–62). As a matter of fact, as David Riazanov points out, the revolutions of 1848 were actually preceded by the economic crisis of 1847, which had held all of Europe in its grip. Now in London, and having studied the current economic conjuncture, Marx came to the conclusion that the circumstances were not favourable to revolutionary eruption, that revolution was receding, and no renewal of the revolutionary struggle was possible until another economic crisis broke out (Riazanov, 1973: 100–101).¹⁶⁸ The articles that Marx wrote, during the 1850s, for the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Politisch-ökonomische Revue* "... comprised critical reviews of current events in England and Europe and included the prediction that an economic and consequent political crisis would follow from the 'boom' conditions of the late 1840s." (Oakley, 1984: 16) On many occasions, he tried to forecast the onset of the crisis, but failed, apparently, on the basis of the evidence of five to seven

¹⁶⁸ Part of the disputes that led to the split between Marx–Engels and Willich–Schapper and eventually, the dissolution of the Communist League, in 1852, was the disagreement over the objective–subjective preconditions of revolutionary struggles (Riazanov, 101–102).

years fluctuations revealed in past economic data (Oakley, 1984: 20).¹⁶⁹ See also, Mandel (1971: 67, 70). Finally, the boom period that started in 1849 ended, and a panic broke out in 1857. And, “[a]s he had foreseen, the new economic crisis brought to life a number of revolutionary movements all over the world. In 1858 there already began a general rise of the opposition and revolutionary movements in all western European countries. The old unresolved problems were again brought to the fore.” (Riazanov: 1973: 109–110)

3.1.2. Critique of Political Economy, Bifurcations in Marx’s Work, and Marxist Thought

Overall, the concentration of the theoretical work of Marx over political economy, at the expense of philosophy, political philosophy, and politics, had serious repercussions upon future Marxist thought:

- i) The first point is that, Marx’s distinguishment of state and civil society, and his concentration over political economy to comprehend the anatomy of the latter, necessarily bifurcated the Marxist thought, requiring the development of, separately, a theory of the capitalist state, and a theory of the capitalist economy. Certainly, Marx left behind a far too sophisticated theory of the capitalist economy—of capital accumulation, competition, economic crisis, capitalist labour

¹⁶⁹ But, despite his successive failures to foresee the dating of the economic crisis, “... these eight years of study of conjunctural problems had given Marx the conceptual tools with which, in *Capital*, he was to offer if not a complete theory of the capitalist cycle—he did not have the time to write that—at least the main materials with which to build such a theory.” (Mandel, 1971: 77)

process, finance, etc. However, “[i]t is a commonplace” argues Jessop (1982: 1), “that Marx did not produce an account of the state to match the analytical power of his critique of the capitalist mode of production in *Das Kapital*. ... Instead his legacy in this respect comprises an uneven and unsystematic collection of philosophical reflections, journalism, contemporary history, political forecasts, and incidental remarks.

- ii) Secondly, the distinguishment of state and civil society, required, not only the separate studies and theories of the two, but also, the synthesis of the separate theories, from the point of view of both the theorists of the capitalist state, and the theorists of the capitalist economy. As I see it, prior to the 1970s, Marxist thought suffered from the twin problems of 1) the failure to build ‘good’ theories of the capitalist state, and fill the gap left by Marx; 2) the failure of ‘Marxist economics’¹⁷⁰ to build ‘good’ theories that successfully link the capitalist economy to the state, and thereby, complete the work of Marx.

Accordingly, and as far as the relationship of state and economy is concerned, the renaissance of critical Marxist thought from the late 1960s onwards has followed two distinct trajectories: a) the rejuvenation of the ‘capitalist state debate’, and the rise of the new theories of the capitalist state; b) the rejuvenation of ‘political economy’—particularly, of the

¹⁷⁰ Below, I contend that Marxist economics, or Marxist political economy do exist, and do have the right to exist.

‘economic crisis debate’, and rise of the various theories of economic crisis. This is not the place to engage a full review of either of the two, so I only confine myself a number of issues that are relevant for the purposes of this thesis.

I should like to start with the definition of ‘political economy’.¹⁷¹ Here, the key issue concerns the appellation itself, since the theoretical propriety of using ‘political economy’ to designate a certain field of enquiry has been contested by many, following Marx’s emphasis on the word ‘critique’, as with the subtitle of *Capital*—‘The Critique of Political Economy’.¹⁷² On this issue, there appears to be three alternate positions amongst the modern Marxists: 1) There is no Marxist economics/political economy, but only the Marxist critique of political economy; 2) there is a (Marxist) political economy, as a ‘holistic’ theory, or the theory of the ‘whole’, and 3) there is a Marxist (or radical) economics/political economy/political economics on a par with orthodox (or other heterodox) economic theories. As it seems, Marx’s use of the term ‘economic’—in contradistinction with his consistent attachment of the term (and the sub-title) ‘critique’ to political economy, is ambiguous, at best. Firstly and clearly, he used the adjective ‘economic’ in

¹⁷¹ Originally, political economy simply meant “... the economy of the state—though of course not only the *polis*, the city-state of Greece—or, what is almost the same thing, ... public policies of an economic nature.” In the nineteenth century, and before Alfred Marshall, with his ‘Principles of Economics’ (1890) established the term ‘economics’ from its publication in 1890 onwards, the term commonly used was political economy (Schumpeter, 1994: 21).

¹⁷² ‘*Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*’, I.Bd., Buch I, Hamburg and New York, 1867 (Kamenka, 1983: cvix). Sadly, the subtitle has been ignored—modified or lost—in the various editions/translations, as pointed out by the late Nail Satlıgan. See, “*Nail Satlıgan ile Kapital Üzerine...*” (<http://www.sendika.org/2011/06/nail-satliganla-kapital-uzerine/>, 19.07.2013).

its standard meaning, to qualify and define a certain field of social activity, or social dynamics, or the theoretical study thereof, in his youthly, as well as the mature work.¹⁷³ As noted above, he referred to his projected critique of political economy, as his ‘economic work’. More interestingly, he seemed to put to the core of his *Capital*, quite explicitly, ‘the economic’:¹⁷⁴ Thus, in his ‘Preface to the First Edition’ of *Capital* (Volume I), he notably argued that “... it is the ultimate aim of this work to reveal the *economic* laws of motion of modern society ...” (Marx, 1982: 92) [My italics—H.A.]

In his ‘Economico–Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844’, Marx, despite his strong critique of political economy,¹⁷⁵ seemed to make a distinction between ‘political economy’, and the thinking of the ‘economists’. In his ‘Postface to the Second Edition’ of *Capital* (Volume I), Marx points out that political economy is bourgeois, “... [i]n so far as it views the capitalist order

¹⁷³ For instance, consider the following words in the ‘Economico–Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844’: “We proceed from an economic, *contemporary* fact. ¶The more wealth the worker produces, the more his production increases in power and scope, the poorer he becomes.” (Marx, 1983: 133)

¹⁷⁴ The more customary translation goes: “... [i]t is the ultimate aim of this work, to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society ...” The importance of this is that most Marxists who reject the use of ‘political economy’, from, particularly the perspective of form analysis, do so by arguing that the duality of the economic and the political is somewhat deceptive, despite its being a ‘real’ separation caused by the inversion of the subject–predicate relationship. But, in the foregoing quotation, Marx seems to use the term, rather straightforwardly, in its customary sense.

¹⁷⁵ Engels and Marx were particularly emphatic upon the contradiction between the centrality of the Labour Theory of Value in political economy, and its utter lack of concern over the condition of the working class: “Political economy itself emphasised the role of labour in understanding the operations of capitalism, and yet its status is reduced to that of a functional component without concern for its human form.” As Marx put it, ‘Political economy starts from labour as the real soul of production; yet to labour it gives nothing, and to private property everything.’ (Oakley, 1984: 47) Also, “[p]olitical economy can ... advance the proposition that the proletarian, the same as any horse, must get as much as will enable him to work. It does not consider him when he is not working, as a human being; but leaves such consideration to criminal law, to doctors, to religion, to the statistical tables, to politics and to the poor-house overseer.” (Oakley, 1984: 50) “In Marx’s words, capitalism and thus political economy, ‘knows the worker only as a working animal – as a beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs.’” (Oakley, 1984: 53)

as the absolute and ultimate form of social production, instead of as a historically transient stage of development ...”. Yet, he notably makes a distinction, between ‘scientific political economy’ or ‘scientific bourgeois economics’, on the one hand, and ‘vulgar economics’, on the other, as the two opposite ends of ‘bourgeois political economy/economics’. The scientificity of classical (British) political economy lies in its putting to the centre of the ‘antagonistic’ dynamics of the class relations, despite the fact that it takes them as a social law of nature.^{176, 177} Yet, “In so far as political economy is bourgeois, ... it can only remain a science while the class struggle remains latent or manifests itself only in isolated and sporadic phenomena.” (Marx, *Capital*, 1982: 96) After the revolutions of 1830, as the bourgeoisie conquered political power in France and England, “... the class struggle took on more and more explicit and threatening forms, both in practice and in theory ... [which sounded the knell of scientific bourgeois economics. It was thenceforth no longer a question whether this or that theorem was true, but whether it was useful to capital or harmful, expedient or inexpedient, in accordance with police regulations or contrary to them.” (Marx, 1982: 97) Thus, the rise of ‘vulgar economics’, and its apologetic,

¹⁷⁶ Marx tends to emphasise that aspect of Classical political economy that concentrates upon the class contradictions in the sphere of production, involving, profits, wages and rents. “Let us take England. Its classical political economy belongs to a period in which the class struggle was as yet to develop. Its last great representative, Ricardo, ultimately (and consciously) made the antagonism of class interests, of wages and profits, of profits and rent, the starting point of his investigations, naïvely taking this antagonism for a social law of nature. But with this contribution the bourgeois science of economics had reached the limits beyond which it could not pass.” Marx (1982: 96), in his ‘Postface to the Second Edition’ of *Capital* (Volume I).

¹⁷⁷ According to Allen Oakley, “[f]or Marx, political economy represented the formal intellectual manifestation of the socially and politically dominant vision of early nineteenth century capitalism.” (Oakley, 1984: 1) Furthermore, “[t]hese analyses, political economy, were to Marx’s mind, the valid intellectual reflections of the dominant view of the nature of nineteenth century capitalism.” (Oakley, 1984: 16)

eulogise economists. Finally, as far as the use of ‘political economy’ is concerned, despite his constant use of the subtitle ‘critique’ for his work, he occasionally seems to suggest that ‘political economy’ as a scientific field of enquiry—and not, narrowly, in the sense above of ‘classical’ political economy—is possible after all.¹⁷⁸

Amongst the Marxists, those who espouse the view that there is no Marxist economics/political economy, but only the Marxist critique of political economy, belong to different schools of thought.¹⁷⁹ Looking, for instance, at the ‘Open Marxist’ school, one can see that its arguments against the use of Marxist economics are based upon the critical ideas of the inversion of the subject–predicate relationship, commodity fetishism, and emancipatory politics.¹⁸⁰ Werner Bonefeld, in his essay ‘*Kapital* and its Subtitle: A Note on the Meaning of Critique’, which is largely representative of the Open Marxist school, criticises Mandel’s view that ‘Marxist economics’ is not a contradiction in terms, and Simon Mohun’s conception of Marxist economics. Bonefeld (2001: 53) argues that “[e]conomics is what Marx called the relationship of the *things* between themselves ...” [my italics—

¹⁷⁸ “In the domain of political economy, free scientific inquiry does not merely meet the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with summons into the fray on the opposing side the most violent, sordid and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest.” (Marx, 1982: 92)

¹⁷⁹ In Turkey, the late Nail Satlıgan argued against the use of political economy: “*Kapital* ve Marks’ın bütün yapısı bir ekonomi politik değildir. Ya da öbür ekonomi politıklere, burjuva ekonomi politiğine, Adam Smith ve David Ricardo geleneğine alternatif bir ekonomi politik değildir. Ekonomi politiğin eleştirilmesi ve Marksist ve Hegelci anlamda aşılmasıdır.” See, “Nail Satlıgan ile *Kapital* Üzerine...” (<http://www.sendika.org/2011/06/nail-satliganla-kapital-uzerine/>, 19.07.2013).

¹⁸⁰ Generally speaking, the group of scholars, who have gathered under the roof of the ‘Conference of Socialist Economists’ (founded, 1970), and the ‘Capital & Class’ journal (founded, 1977).

H.A.], and claims that the same goes for Marxist economics as well. According to Bonefeld (2001: 54), Simon Mohun understands critique as the alternative, Marxist ‘economic theory’ that, by establishing the causal connections between prices and (embodied labour) values, synthesises to neoclassical concern with the form and the classicals’ concern with the content, and thereby, transcends both neoclassical and classical economics.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, for Mohun, commodity fetishism is the very basis of a Marxist theory of ideology, which implies that, “... there is a Marxist economic science, a Marxist theory of ideology, and in addition one might add, a Marxist theory of the state, a Marxist theory of society, a Marxist theory of history etc...” (Bonefeld, 2001: 55). But the proliferation of such a variety of Marxist theories actually presupposes the existence of distinct ‘social structures’, related to one another only externally (Bonefeld, 2001: 55) The problem is that “... the economic interpretation of Marx’s critique of political economy reduces human relations to economic categories, frustrating Marx’s programme of reducing ... economic categories to human social relations ...” And, more specifically, “Marxist economics does not ask why the content, human social existence, assumes the form of capital.” (Bonefeld, 2001: 57) On the other hand, Marx’s own critique of capital, value (commodity fetishism), and of political economy, more generally, tries to show the human content that, however debased, “... subsists, suffuses and contradicts the perverted economic forms, ... through

¹⁸¹ “According to Mohun ..., Marxist economics has to answer three questions: 1) ‘Why is value labour-time, and what sort of labour-time is it’, 2) ‘what is money, and why is it the form of value?’; 3) ‘How do amounts of labour-time become represented as sums of money, and what is the meaning of this representation?’” (Bonefeld, 2001: 54)

which social relations subsist contradictorily as relations between things ...”
(Bonefeld, 2001: 58, 60).¹⁸²

Whilst Bonefeld argues against the use Marxist economics—and, by implication, that of Marxist political economy, on the grounds that it breaks unity of the Marxist theory, the so-called ‘world-system’ theorists see political economy to be a holistic theory, or a theory of the whole. Thus, in the opening pages of his ‘Europe and the People without History’ [1982], Eric R. Wolf points out that, in the middle of the nineteenth century, “... inquiry into the nature and varieties of humankind split into separate ... specialties and disciplines”, epitomised, as it is, by the emergence of sociology. But, before sociology, there was political economy, “... concerned with ‘the wealth of nations’, the production and distribution of wealth within and between political entities and the classes composing them (Wolf, 2010: 7–8)”. In the eighteenth century, the challenge of the newly rising social forces, against the state, asserting the validity of the new social, economic, political and ideological ties—now conceptualised as the ‘society’, led to disorder, rebellion, and revolution. Accordingly, the new science of sociology hope to answer the ‘social question’, namely, how social disintegration could be prevented, and social order restored and

¹⁸² Open Marxists take the youthful work of Marx seriously, and see continuity, rather than ‘*coupure épistémologique*’ between the youthful and mature works of Marx. I fully agree with this particular interpretation. They also put great emphasis on commodity fetishism, and that, too, is just fine. However, their reading of Capital seems to stop short there, at the expense of, particularly, Volumes II and III. One of the usual suspects is the so-called ‘transformation problem’, which some tend to treat as a purely technical question of little relevance. But without the transformation of values into the prices of production, it would be impossible to explicate how value operates as the social bond, which is the very basis of commodity fetishism.

sustained. And, in so doing, it severed its ties with political economy (Wolf, 2010: 8). Furthermore, the “... severance of social relations from the economic, political, and ideological contexts in which they are embedded and which they activate was accompanied by the assignment of the economic and political aspects human life to separate disciplines (Wolf, 2010: 9). Thence, the rise of economics as the theory of market exchanges, and political science as the theory of the aggregation of demands and the making of the decisions at the level of the government (Wolf, 2010: 9–10). Finally, “[a]nthropology, ambitiously entitled *The Science of Man*, did lay special claims to the study of non-Western and ‘primitive’ peoples (Wolf, 2010: 13). It is important to note that the simple addition of all the disciplines—becoming multi-disciplinary, that is—would not suffice to overcome the limits of disciplinary specialisations (Wolf, 2010: 19). The relevance of Marx is that “[h]e was one of the last major figures to aim at a holistic human science, capable of integrating the varied specialisations ...”, and his concept of production was “... not merely economic in the strict sense but also ecological, social, political, and social-psychological.” (Wolf, 2010: 21) On the other hand, credit goes to Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein for having provided holistic theories of the capitalist world system and the arrangements of its parts, with a focus upon how the core subjugated the periphery (Wolf, 2010: 21–23).¹⁸³

¹⁸³ Wolf (2010: xix) defines political economy, as the study of “... societies, states, and markets as historically evolving phenomena and hence questions whether conceptions of these arrangements particular to the capitalist experience can be generalized to cover all times and places.” Given that Karl Marx subtitled his *Kapital* “A Critique of Political Economy”, Wolf uses ‘political economy’ “... to designate inquiries into the economic foundations of different polities and societies in their changing trajectories.”

Finally, there are those who argue that there is a Marxist economics/political economy, which is on a par with or excels orthodox economic theory. This is due to its *differentiae*, in terms of methodology, and also substantively, in terms of its problematics, concepts, and issues. Thus, according to Resnick and Wolff (2006: 287), the *differentiae* of radical economic theories are their ‘entry points’ and ‘logics’. Pointing out that they too, have their own interpretation of Marx and their related radical theory, they put the distinctiveness of Marxism as its combination of two commitments: “[T]he entry point of class and the logic of overdetermination.”¹⁸⁴ So far as the definition of ‘the economic’ is concerned, Albritton (2007: 10) argues that “... it is consistent with Marx’s theory of capital’s deep structures to state that most fundamentally economics is about how we spend our time and energy providing for ourselves and how the organizational forms and power relations resulting from this provisioning advance or retard human flourishing considered as deeply embedded in the natural environment.” According to Albritton (2007: 11), Marx’s single greatest contribution to economic theory is, conceptually, the commodity form. Methodologically, economic theory can utilise mathematics only when the commodification of economic variables is complete, for otherwise relatively autonomous economic and noneconomic structures will alter quantitative outcomes is

¹⁸⁴ Resnick and Wolff (2006: 288) expound the antiessentialist logic of (Althusserian, apparently) overdetermination as follows: “The class relationships within capitalist societies are Marx’s primary focus, analytically and politically, but class is conceived neither as the essential determinant of social events nor as a phenomenon of some other singular cause. Instead, any particular form of class relations exists only as the combined effect of all the other non-class aspects of society which provide its necessary conditions of existence. All are jointly necessary because all aspects of society are mutually constitutive; none can be treated as conceptually independent of the others or as “the” cause of some event, action, or relationship.”

such a way that no mathematical precision is possible. But since, historically, full commodification can never be achieved, economics is always bound to be a multidisciplinary task. So far as the problematics and issues of Marxist economics are concerned, Hollander (2008: 6) argues that “... the standard topics of Marx’s ‘positive’ economics ... [are] value and distribution, growth theory with emphasis on the ‘Reproduction Schemes’, the falling real-wage trend, the falling profit rate and the cyclical dimension.”

On my part, I hold the view that ‘(Marxist) political economy’ does exist. In so doing, I follow Russell Jacoby (1975: 44), who points to the odd contradiction that “... the Marxist *critique* of political economy is also a political economy. This contradiction is, once more, due to, the theoretically too-far-important inversion of the subject–predicate relationship: “The laws of political economy are abstractions that possess a certain validity. To the point these laws present social and historical relations as non-historical relations, they serve as alibis for the status quo: but to the point the laws accurately portray a society in which things do control people, they form part of the critique. ... The critique of political economy is as much a task and hope as a fact; it presents the dead laws of the economy so as to clear the way for their active subversion. The *telos* of the critique of political economy is the abolition of political economy; the misery of the critique of political economy is that it is also a political economy.”¹⁸⁵ To sum up, I hold

¹⁸⁵ If true, this would solve the so claimed contradiction between the ‘Hegelian’ philosopher Marx of Volume I, and the ‘Ricardian’ political economist Marx of Volume

the view that Marxist political economy exists, for the critique of political economy is also political economy.

The aforementioned bifurcation in Marx's work had multiple consequences for the theory of Marx as well as for the Marxist thought:

- i) He left behind a sophisticated 'critique of political economy', a study of 'capital', which itself was largely a 'political economy';
- ii) he left behind no sophisticated theory of the state, matching the theoretical vigour of his critique of political economy;
- iii) therefore, he left behind no articulate theory of the relationship of causality between the capitalist economy and the state—which, in the first instance, was the *leitmotiv* of his original interest in (the critique of) political economy;
- iv) there emerged, within Marxist thought, a division of labour (specialisations) between the theory of the capitalist economy, on the one hand, and the theory of the capitalist state, on the other, or more broadly—between structural/base issues, and superstructural issues;

III. Thus, according to Milios, et al. (2002: ix), "... Marx's economic writings comprise two different discourses: ¶a) The theoretical system of the Critique of Political Economy, which is mainly developed (albeit in a "philosophical" way of presentation, which makes its understanding not easy) in the first part of Volume I of Capital, in the 1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in the Grundrisse and is repeated in his other works; and, ¶b) a sophisticated version of the Ricardian Political Economy of value as "labour expended", which is to be found mainly in sections of Volume III of Capital, such as the "Transformation of Commodity Values into Prices of Production" or the theory of "Absolute Ground-Rent" and at other parts of his 1861-65 writings. This second discourse seems to have influenced most contemporary approaches to Marxist value theory." In terms of Jacoby, Volume III could be where the critique of political economy of Volume I became or succumbed to political economy.

- v) given this legacy of theoretical bifurcation, the renaissance of the Marxist thought in the late 1960s and 1970s, path-dependently, proceeded on two fronts, Marxist political economy/economics, on the one hand, and the Marxist theories of the state—and philosophy, and the theories of all the other neglected, non-economic, ‘superstructural’ issues, e.g. ideology, culture, etc.;
- vi) one of the most basic problems and tasks of modern Marxist enquiries was the theoretical elaboration and defence of the claims of causal determinations and primacies originating in the distinction of capitalist economy and the state;

Below, I take up, briefly, the legacy of Marx and Engels with respect to the theory of the state; the rise of the Marxist political economy/economics in the late 1960s, and particularly, its treatment of the economy–politics problematic as a part of the various theories of economic crisis, and; the rise of the Marxist theories of the state in the late 1960s and 1970s. It is important to note that the state theory of Bob Jessop and the theory of determinations of Erik Olin Wright—the two theories to be tested in this thesis, as well as the theory of productive and unproductive labour of Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak—used to supplement the first two, are all the fruits of this renaissance period of Marxist thought.

3.1.3. Marx and Engels's Theory of the State, and the Renaissance of Marxist Theories in the 1960s

As noted above, the first plans of Marx's work included a comprehensive treatment of the state, which, in due process, Marx was apparently forced to forsake. Thus, Marx's own legacy largely consists of a dispersed collection of philosophical reflections, journal articles, commentaries on contemporary history, political forecasts, and incidental remarks. Neither Engels, despite his noted account of the class origins and the class nature of the state, 'Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State' (written March–May, 1884, published October 1884), was able to develop a complete and coherent theory of the capitalist state (Jessop, 1982: 1). According to Bob Jessop, the first phase of Marx's critique of the state consists of the ideas proposed in his earliest works, comprising the "Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law'" (1843), the 'Introduction' to a proposed revision of that critique (written in 1843–1844), and 'On the Jewish Question' (1844).¹⁸⁶ In these, Marx follows Hegel distinction of the society into the two spheres of the state and civil society, and argues that neither institutional independence of the state, and nor the proposed alternatives of the agency of the bureaucracy, return to organic feudal order, or the further development of bourgeois democratic republic could overcome and transcend the egoism of civil society and realise universal interest. See,

¹⁸⁶ English titles of the early works and manuscripts vary due to, amongst other things, translations. The first work above is the unfinished Kreuznach manuscript '*Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts*' of 1843, also translated as 'Critique of Hegelian Constitutional Law' and 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right'. The second is '*Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Einleitung*' published in the first and only issue of the '*Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*' (1844), and translated as 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction'.

Jessop (1982: 2–6). Overall, “[i]t should be apparent that these studies do not amount to a near-definitive theory of the state apparatus or state power ...” whilst “... the entire theoretical discussion is cast in a philosophical framework and that many of the key economic and political concepts are heavily imbued with philosophical overtones.” (Jessop, 1982: 6–7) amongst the major themes of the early critique are the irrationality of the state, its denial of the social character of man, man’s alienation from a genuinely public life, and the preconditions of true human emancipation (Jessop, 1982: 7–8). The second phase of the critique of the state is the product of the collaboration between Marx and Engels, and begins with *The German Ideology*. In the later works of Marx and/or Engels, one comes across a number of critical themes which have inspired future Marxist views and theories of the state. They can be cited as: (a) The distinction between economic base and political superstructure; (b) the state as an instrument of class rule; (c) the state as a factor of cohesion, and; (d) the state as an institutional ensemble. See Jessop (1982: 7–24), for the full review.¹⁸⁷ Thus, one of the prominent arguments is that the state is the ‘superstructural’ reflection of the ‘economic structure’ or ‘base’ of the society, and that the doings of the state are the reflections of the needs of the economy and/or the class balances of the society.¹⁸⁸ It is important to recall that the base–

¹⁸⁷ Elsewhere, speaking of the ‘classic texts’ of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky and Gramsci, Jessop (1990: 25–29) points out that there are at least six different approaches: (i) State as a parasitic institution; (ii) state power as epiphenomena; (iii) state as the factor of cohesion; (iv) state as the instrument of class struggle; (v) state as a set of institutions; (vi) state as a system of political domination with specific effects on the class struggle.

¹⁸⁸ “This interpretation of politics in terms of a ‘base-superstructure’ model is most clearly stated in *The German Ideology*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, the *Preface to a Contribution to*

superstructure type of analysis relates to not only the capitalist economy and state, but all socio-economic formations generally, and lays the ground for the debates thereof. The second theme is the conception of the state as the instrument of class rule, which has paved the ground for two future Marxist approaches. The first assimilates it to the reductionist approach via the assumption that the economic base determines the balance of forces in the struggle for the control of the state power; the second is the voluntarist approach which focuses upon the independent role of politics and class struggles in the transformation of the economic base. One of the key themes is the cohesive role of the state in the sustenance of the social formation, closely identified now with the anti-instrumentalist views of Poulantzas.¹⁸⁹ And, finally, Marx and Engels define the state as a set of institutions—‘institutional ensemble’ whose core is the concentrated and centralised power in the modern military–bureaucratic state apparatus. According to Engels, the defining attributes of the state are, its organisation on a territorial basis, specialised coercive apparatus, taxation, administrative staff, and political rights granted on the basis of property. According to Jessop, “... rather than attempt to distil a single ‘essential’ Marxist theory of the state” one must “... emphasise the discontinuities and disjunctions in their work and try to show how it’s very incompleteness and indeterminacy account for the wide range of so-called Marxist theories of the state

the Critique of Political Economy, the third volume of *Das Kapital*, the second part of *Anti-Dühring*, and Engels’s letters on historical materialism.” (Jessop, 1982: 9)

¹⁸⁹ “... Marx and Engels suggest that the conquest of state power presupposes the successful representation of a class interest as the general interest and thereby anticipate much subsequent Marxist analysis of ‘hegemony’ in the sense of ‘political, intellectual, and moral leadership’ aimed at winning the ‘active consent’ of the dominated sectors to the rule of capital ...” (Jessop, 1982: 17)

developed during the last hundred years.” (Jessop, 1982: 2)¹⁹⁰ This certainly applies to the state theories of the Marxist renaissance of the late 1960s and 1970s.

The rise of Marxist political economy/economics came in the late 1960s. Its emergence and development can be traced, historically, to the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and intellectually, to the rise of the Western Marxist current which was equally critical of both the US—and the Soviet—type polities and economies. Its members—mostly the neoclassically trained graduate students of the 1960s, quested after a new, alternative vision of economics that would guide the struggles against the various malaises of the old society, and towards a new type of society. Overall, as Pietrykowski puts it, “The intellectual history of radical political economics is inextricably tied to both the New Left political and social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, and the rejection of neoclassical method and analysis.” (Pietrykowski, 2003: 481) As one of the key roof organisations Marxist political economy, and more broadly heterodox economics, the ‘Union for Radical Political Economics (URPE)’ in the United States held its first national conference, in December 1968, in Philadelphia, in opposition to the American Economics Association (AEA) meeting in Chicago (Pietrykowski, 2003: 481). The Conference focused upon alternative, socially and politically motivated issues, including “... poverty, urban crisis

¹⁹⁰ “...[W]e find [in Marx and Engles] a variety of themes and approaches which are capable of independent (and in part contradictory) theoretical development but which are typically combined in various ways ... in their empirical studies of particular societies and political conjunctures. These themes and/or approaches occasionally receive an exclusive and one-sided treatment but they are generally articulated in a way that ensures their mutual qualification in a state of theoretical tension.” (Jessop, 1982: 3)

and race relations, corporate/government power and the erosion of democratic rights, economic imperialism, and the political role of economists in society.” Participants were strongly critical of the Neo-Classical theory, substantively and methodologically. Amongst other things, marginalist analysis was argued to be intrinsically reactionary for it was against large-scale social change, and the Neo-Classical claims to ‘value-free’ scientific objectivity were brought under attack (Pietrykowski, 2003: 481). It is important to note—and also, in the context of this thesis, that the question of objectivity and neutrality of Neo-Classical economics, not substantively, but in its formal and empirical techniques, proved to be one of the major bones of contention amongst Marxist economists/political economists, which has led to future splits.^{191, 192} The mirror image of the view that the problem of Neo-classical economics is not its techniques but its substantive analysis is the view that the selfsame techniques can be applied to develop the substantive analyses of all heterodox theory, or the still tenable elements of the Marx’s economic theory, for that matter.¹⁹³ As a matter of fact, one of the extreme applications of the view that Marx’s

¹⁹¹ Thus, already in 1969, John Weeks, in his lead article to the first issue of URPE’s ‘Review of Radical Political Economics’, argued that “... political ideology and not marginalist method is to blame for the reactionary nature of mainstream economics. This tension between political interests and scientific method repeatedly resurfaces in debates surrounding the development of the radical research program.” (Pietrykowski, 2003: 481)

¹⁹² “By entering the productivity debate, radicals adopted the methods of mainstream economics: empirical measurement, model specification, and explanatory power of regression results. Echoing Weeks’ 1969 position, Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf claim, “the mainstream economists’ inability to solve the productivity puzzle reflects a failure of vision, not of technique” ...” (Pietrykowski, 2003: 485)

¹⁹³ Incidentally, a very influential early instance of this approach was Oscar Lange’s ‘market socialist’ model of economy, based upon the claim that General Equilibrium Economics better applied to a socialist economy, for it had the critical agency that the competitive price required but capitalist economy actually lacked—the auctioneer, in the body of the central planning board.

economics need to be revised more apropos of its methodology, than its substantive claims is the Analytical Marxist economics who have tried to demonstrate the correctness of most of Marx's views on the basis of rational choice theory.¹⁹⁴ Thus, Samuel Bowles, the late David Gordon, and Thomas Weisskopf, for instance, applied macro-econometric models to non-orthodox problems, to analyse, amongst other things, segmented labour markets and economic cycles. For more orthodox Marxists, the sole concern was not only the use of quantitative techniques, but the 'quantities' themselves. Thus, from the mid-1970s onwards, Anwar Shaikh, criticising the use of orthodox concepts and empirical data in purportedly Marxist analyses, as proxies for Marxist value and price categories, set out to develop a proper theoretical-empirical basis for Marxist economic theory. This work, based as it was, upon the noted problem of productive and unproductive labour in the works of Marx and the classical economists' eventually turned into the 1994 book 'Measuring the Wealth of Nations', with the co-authorship of E. Ahmet Tonak. It is important to note that, this a part of a general drive amongst Marxists from different areas to found Marxist analysis upon solid theoretical-empirical grounds in confronting and challenging the mainstream approaches that dominated their respective disciplines. Thus, Erik Olin Wright, focused upon the elaboration of solid conceptual and empirical foundations that would allow Marx's class theory to successfully confront and challenge the approach of orthodox sociology to the question of social stratification.

¹⁹⁴ See, Howard and King (1992: 335).

The basic problematic of the newly emergent Marxist theories of the capitalist state was the relationship of causality between state and economy. On the other hand, the forms and functions of the state were a minor concern for Marxist economists/political economists, who mostly focused upon the theory of value/price, economic growth and cycles, distribution, etc. Crisis theory was the major area where the question of the relationship between economy and politics most clearly came out. As Russell Jacoby beautifully and aptly put it, in his seminal article on the critique of ‘Automatic Marxism’, “[t]he crisis theory is especially interesting because it presents the problem of Marxist political economy in its most provocative form; the crisis theory is at once an economic theory and a political one. It draws together the objective and economic moment in Marxism with the subjective and political moment.” (Jacoby, 1975: 3) Crisis debates prior to the 1970s generally related different crisis theories to different political and/or revolutionary strategies: Russian populists/Narodniks (under-consumption) *versus* legal Marxists (disproportionality), and Lenin (anarchy of production); German reformists–revisionists (refutation of break-down theories, organised capitalism) *versus* Luxemburg (under-consumptionist world economic, imperialist crises); Luxemburg *versus* Lenin and Bukharin (Bolsheviks); Bukharin *versus* Henryk Grossman and the left communist Pannekoek and Mattick (production–based falling rate of profit and capitalist breakdown). See, particularly, Jacoby (1975: 4–43). However, these older debates, in terms of the establishment of the linkages between economic and political/revolutionary crises were utter failures: “But nothing

seems to fit; a decisive political intervention seems dependent on the theory and fact of an (objective) collapse, if such intervention is not reduced within the existing apparatus. Yet the objective theory of the collapse seems to relegate the subject to a passive spectator.” (Jacoby, 1973: 4) Accordingly, the overall lesson of the debates as drawn by the Frankfurt School critical theorists Max Horkheimer, Franz Leopold Neumann, and Herbert Marcuse was that, even if break-down theories were true; so, even if a ‘final’ economic crisis were a true necessity, “... this would not mean that a political change would have to follow on the economic collapse”, and that “... between the ‘automatic’ collapse and the reconstruction of a new society there is only nonautomatic subjectivity, conscious will.” (Jacoby, 1973: 31)

After a prolonged pause during the post-War economic boom, and given the pernicious effects of Stalinist politics upon creative independent Marxist thinking, the Marxist debate on economic crises has picked up following the outbreak of the world economic crisis of 1973. In the late 1970’s, the new generations of Marxist economists/political have reviewed—sometimes even resuscitated, as in the rediscovery of Grossman by David Yaffee— and exegeted old ideas, debates and theories, and reworked, formally and/or mathematically and empirically, their alternative theories of crisis. Thus, James N. Devine classifies the three major post-1973 Marxist theories of economic crisis as:

- The ‘rising organic composition of capital’ school (David Laibman,

Anwar Shaikh, etc.);

- the ‘social conflict’ school (David Gordon, Tom Weisskopf, and Samuel Bowles, etc.), and;
- the ‘monopoly/underconsumption’ school (John Bellamy Foster, etc.).¹⁹⁵

On the other hand, in his seminal 1978 article ‘An Introduction to the History of Crisis Theories’, Anwar Shaikh points out that there are, in the history of economic thought, three distinct lines of thought apropos of capitalist reproduction:

- The first, and the most popular, suggests that capitalism is capable of automatic self-reproduction, if left to itself (Neo-Classical theory), or aptly managed (Keynes). Therefore, there are ‘no necessary limits’ to the capitalist economy;
- The second argues that, by itself, the capitalist economy is incapable of self-expansion. In order to survive, it needs to open up, and thrive upon some external source of demand, like the non-capitalist rest of the world (e.g. Narodniks, and Luxemburg). Under-consumption theories belong to this line of thought, according to which, the limits of capitalism are external to it;
- Lastly, there is the line of thought, that “though capitalism is capable of self-expansion, the accumulation process deepens the internal contradictions of which it is based, until they erupt in a crisis: the limits

¹⁹⁵ See Devine (1987: 23–26).

to capitalism are *internal* to it. This line is almost exclusively Marxist, and includes both ‘falling rate of profit’ and ‘profit squeeze’ explanations of crisis.” (Shaikh, 1978: 219–220)¹⁹⁶

It is important to note that Anwar Shaikh basically attempts to formally substantiate the orthodox Marxist view that capitalist economic crises are ‘necessary’, by elaborating Marx’s ‘law of the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall’ in Volume III of *Capital*—which is a ‘necessity theory’ of crisis as opposed to the ‘possibility crises’ and possibility theories of crisis. Thus, the political implication of Shaikh’s crisis theory is, following Lenin, Luxemburg, Grosmann, and others, that the subjective revolutionary agency has a definitely objective basis. Finally, his approach to the problem of the relationship between economy/economic crisis and politics/political crisis is rather close to that of critical theorists: “A crisis is not only a period of great distress but also one of great possibility. One way or another, the capitalist system will be changed. ... It is clear in many parts of the world that the current world crisis is an objectively revolutionary situation. We need to bring the message home. Either we fight to make socialism possible, or we submit to corporate rule. This is, in the end, an issue of class struggle.” (Shaikh, 1987: 124)

As far as the relationship between economy/economic crisis and

¹⁹⁶ Thus, it is not surprising that Shaikh’s major engagement in the crisis debates of the late 1970s and early 1980s is with the ‘wage squeeze of profits’ views of the contemporary economic crisis. See, for a critique of the profit squeeze approach and others, Shaikh (1978; 1987). Marxist empirical evidence of this critique has been provided in Shaikh (1987), and Shaikh and Tonak (1994: 221–224).

politics/political crisis is concerned, two more points are noteworthy. Firstly, one of the most interesting lines of enquiry in this respect, has been the study of the so-called ‘long cycles’ (Kondratieff Cycles), or ‘long waves’, or ‘long swings’, or simply ‘stages’, which have focused upon the long-term (usually 50–60 years) upswings, peaks, downswings and troughs (crises) of the capitalist economies, and which combined economic and political factors and dynamics in interesting ways. As a matter of fact, most of the recent crisis theories—Anwar Shaikh’s, David Gordon’s, etc. are long cycle theories, as well. Secondly, and as I see it, those Marxist and/or radical political economists who have been most successful at linking economy and politics are the ones who have adopted the so-called ‘institutional turn’, most notably, the French regulationists, and the students of the American ‘Social Structure of Accumulation’ (SSA) school.¹⁹⁷

Prior to its renaissance in the late 1960’s and 1970s, Marxist views of the state were dominated by the so-called ‘Marxist–Leninist’ tradition, which treated the state as the repressive instrument in the hands of the economically powerful class to exercise its dictatorship over subordinate classes (Jessop, 1990: 49). More specifically, the Soviet theories of ‘state

¹⁹⁷ As one its founders and leading theorist Robert Boyer put it, the starting point of the (Parisian) Regulation school is that, “... economic activity is embedded within a collection of social, political and legal relations and value systems, [and thereby] there would be no point in wielding the scalpel in the hope of finding the form of pure economics.” (Boyer, 2002: 18) The key ‘institutional forms’ (as a key concept of and) studied by the Regulation School are: Monetary regime; wage–labour nexus; form of competition; nature of the state; insertion in the international regime (Boyer and Saillard, 202: 44). Similarly, the Social Structure of Accumulation, as the external environment of profitability as the regulator of the pace of accumulation and economic growth, consists of a number of key institutions. For the post-war US economy, these were: 1) Capital–labour accord; 2) Pax Americana; 3) Capital–Citizen Accord, and 3) Moderated inter–capitalist rivalry. See, Gordon, et al. (1987: 47–51).

monopoly capitalism' (stamocap)—largely inspired by a Leninist approach to Marxist theory—argued that, the current stage of capitalism was characterised “... by the fusion of monopoly force with the bourgeois state to form a single mechanism of economic exploitation and political domination.” (Jessop, 1982: 32; 1990: 49) On the other hand, writing in 1977, Bob Jessop pointed out that “... even though Marxists have long claimed special knowledge of the state in class struggle, it is only in the past ten years ... that they have rediscovered the state as a problem in political economy.” (Jessop, 1990: 24) As a matter of fact, in the late 1960s, the exegeses of Marxist–Leninist orthodoxy came increasingly under attack as part of the Western Left’s break away from Stalinist politics and the influence of the Soviet bloc, and in the state debates of the 1970s, it was the Marxists who made the running, as they related the form and the functions of the state to capital and/or class struggle.¹⁹⁸ Overall, there emerged three significant trends in the state debates. These were: (i) The ‘capital logic’ school in West Germany; (ii) Althusserian structuralism in France—later to be spread to Britain, and; (iii) the re-appropriation of Gramsci in Italy and elsewhere (Jessop, 1990: 2, 50). It is important to note that Poulantzas theoretically progressed from Althusserian to Gramscian concerns. Therefore, I briefly summarise below the three trends above, and comprise the work of Poulantzas as a part of the second and the third trends.

¹⁹⁸ And, in the 1980s, when the Marxist state debate had largely exhausted itself, the field came to be dominated by the non-Marxist ‘Statist’ (or State-centred) school, which was more interested to analyse the state in its own terms (Jessop, 1990: 2). The basic idea is that “... the state has its own special interests by virtue of its insertion into an international order as well as its unique responsibilities for maintaining domestic order.” (Jessop, 1990: 92) See, particularly, Jessop (1990: 278–288) for a critical review of the statist school (or, ‘state autonomy theory’), led by Theda Skocpol, and Michael Mann.

(i) Capital logic (state derivation) school [*Staatableitung*]:

“The analysis of the state was rediscovered as a major theoretical problem in West Germany and West Berlin in the 1960s ... and, indeed came to dominate discussion among German Marxists in this period.” (Jessop, 1982: 78–79) Thus, the capital logic school originating in West Berlin makes part of the broader ‘German Debate’ on the state aiming at a critique of the German social democracy, and initially led by Jürgen Habermas and Claus Offe. At the core of the views of Habermas and Offe, there was a theoretical–ontological duality of state and the wider social system, where the former was characterised as a Weberian, rational–bureaucratic form of domination, and the latter, as a Marxist class society (Clarke, 1991a: 6). The basic functions of the political and administrative organs of the state were integrative, as they functioned to channel, filter, and reformulate the economic, social and political demands to reconcile the conflicting pressures it was subject to. Therefore, a political was, *par excellence*, a ‘crisis of crisis management’, where the state could no longer reconcile the conflicting pressures from the wider class society. Therefore, unlike the Marxist theories of economic–political crisis, economic crisis was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the outbreak of political crisis (Clarke, 1991a: 6). According to Simon Clarke, the basic problem with the Habermas–Offe theory of the state is its duality, and its Weberian conceptualisation of the state, its functions, and its crisis. Thus, they

basically “... treated the relationship between capital and the state as purely external ...” for there was nothing specifically capitalist about the state, as it was defined a Weberian rational–bureaucratic form of domination/admisitration. Accordingly, “[t]he limits of the state were equally not defined in relation to the limits of the capitalist mode of production, but were defined in the post-Weberian terms of the ‘limits of rationality’, the rationality of the state as a form of administration being compromised by political and bureaucratic conflicts which may or may not have a relation to fundamental class divisions.” (Clarke, 1991a: 8) Hence, the critique of the ‘functionalist’ approach and the ontological duality of the Habermas–Offe theory of the state (and of the stamocap theory) was the original *leitmotiv* of the so-called state derivation debate (Clarke, 1991a: 9). The major concern of the state derivation school was to problematise, explicate and derive the particular ‘form’ of the capitalist state, more specifically, “... the institutional separation of the sphere of political domination from that of economic production and its implications for the specific forms and functions of the capitalist state.” (Jessop, 1990: 50) State derivation theorists tried to explicate “[t]he constitution of the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ as distinct spheres of social existence ... [which defined] the capitalist form of the state ... on the basis of the social form of capitalist production.” (Clarke, 1991a: 9) Methodologically, they claimed that Marx’s theory of value was the starting point of not only the Marxist

theory of the ‘economic forms’ of existence, but of the Marxist theory of the ‘political forms’ alike (Clarke, 1991a: 10). In so doing, they sought to derive the form of the state, logically and historically, from the categories developed in *Capital*— notwithstanding that they somewhat differed in terms of the starting points (Jessop, 1990: 49; Clarke, 1991a: 9)¹⁹⁹ One of the basic arguments was that the economic and political relationships as distinct spheres were but the fetishised forms of the underlying social relations of production, i.e. of one and the same social formation.²⁰⁰

(ii) Althusserian Structuralism:

Jessop (1992: 50) points out that Althusser’s structuralist theory developed in opposition to (a) the formal Marxist–Leninist thought, and (b) the ‘humanist’ reaction to the Soviet theory and practice. Thus, Althusser rejected both the voluntaristic idea of a class subject endowed with consciousness and free will, and the economic deterministic approach which posited the economic forces as the motor of history. He replaced these approaches with the idea of a

¹⁹⁹ Alternative starting point were, “... the circulation of commodities, the sphere of exchange relations among competing sources of revenues, the dual nature of the commodity as use-value and exchange-value, ‘capital in general’ v. ‘particular capitals’, and the relationship between capital and wage labour.” (Jessop, 1990: 50)

²⁰⁰ “At the most general level of abstraction ... [state derivationists/capital logic theorists] argue that the separation of state and civil society characteristic of bourgeois social formations stems from the nature of generalized commodity production. For, not only is such a separation possible under capitalist production (because surplus labour is appropriated in the form of surplus-value realized through formally free exchange on the market rather than through extra-economic compulsion), but is also necessary, because an institution that is not immediately subordinate to market forces is required to provide those general preconditions of capital accumulation as a whole that are inappropriate or impossible for any particular competing capital to secure.” (Jessop, 1992: 35)

mode of production, and by extension, society, which, as a ‘structured whole’ determines its parts, namely, the political, ideological, and juridico–political ‘regions’. Despite their being relatively autonomous, the three regions nonetheless condition one another, whilst the whole is characterised by the dominance of one region (political, ideological, or juridico–political). And, the whole “... is subject to economic determination in the last instance in so far as the mode of reproduction of the relations of production assigns the dominant role to one or another of these regions.” (Jessop, 1990: 50) On the other hand, Althusser’s model was rather perfunctory in its conceptualisation of the economic determination in the last instance, with the emphasis being put upon the autonomy of the three regions (Jessop, 1990: 51).²⁰¹

In his early work, Nicos Poulantzas followed Althusser’s structuralist model of society as composed of three levels, and problematised the autonomy of the juridico–political level. He thereby tried to develop the hitherto missing theory of the political region, so as to complement Marx’s *Capital*, which provided the theory of the economic region alone (Jessop, 1990: 51; Clarke, 1991a: 16–17).

²⁰¹ To be more precise, the Althusserian model combined the idea of ‘structural constraints’ upon class struggle—thus the lack of active agency, due to a process of strictly structural determination—with the ‘autonomy’ of the economic, political and ideological levels: Thus, according to its formulation by Poulantzas, as paraphrased by Clarke (1991a: 20) “... class practices are constrained by, and confined within an objective structure composed of autonomous levels which are functionally related to one another within a complex whole. The function of each level is defined not, as in orthodox Marxism, in relation to the economic level, but in relation to the structure as a whole.”

(iii) Re-Appropriation of Gramsci:

In contradistinction with the reductionist/essentialist or the instrumentalist approach identifying the state apparatus as the locus of state power, Antonio Gramsci focused instead “... on the modalities of class domination within the social formation as a whole.” (Jessop, 1982: 147) Looking at the issue from the point of view of the ‘exercise’ of state power, rather than the ‘boundaries’ of the state apparatus itself, Gramsci defined the ‘integral state’ [*lo stato integrale*] as State = political society + civil society. On the other hand, the inclusion of civil society into the (extended) definition of the state logically led to the identification of two modes of class domination, namely, ‘force’ and ‘hegemony’ (Jessop, 1982: 147–148). Whilst “[f]orce involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the mass of people into conformity and compliance with the requirements of a specific mode of production ... *hegemony* involves the successful mobilisation and reproduction of the ‘active consent’ of dominated groups by the ruling class through their exercise of intellectual, moral and political leadership.” (Jessop, 1982: 148) Finally, it is important to note that, whilst the moment of force is institutionalised in the coercive apparatus of, particularly, the narrowly defined state, consent is exercised in and through a complex system of ideological apparatuses, located throughout the entire social formation (Jessop, 1982: 149).

Jessop (1982: 153) points out it was up to Nicos Poulantzas, rather than the Italians, to develop a comprehensive political theory based upon a distinctive reading of Gramsci's work. He (2007a: 32) also points to Poulantzas's theoretical progression "... from a structuralist framing of the question of the relative autonomy of the state and political region within capitalism (which, in Poulantzasian terminology, can be called a 'regional theory') to an analysis of the position of the state and the role of state power within the expanded reproduction of class relations (which, following Poulantzas's own claim to distinctiveness, ... [can be] termed his 'relational' theory')"²⁰² The neo-Gramscian analysis of Poulantzas located the key question of securing the necessary conditions for capital accumulation at the level of class practices. This problem concerned, first and foremost, the organisation of the dominant class, and the disorganisation of the dominated classes. Here, the key to this question was the intellectual and moral leadership of the popular

²⁰² Elsewhere, Jessop (1982: 154) argues that despite his reputation as a structuralist, and the tendency of most of his critics to locate his work within the structuralist-instrumentalist problematic, and if one ignores the Sartrean overtones in his earliest studies of law and jurisdiction, and his flirtation with Althusserian structuralism in his first major work on the capitalist state [Political Power and Social Classes (1968)], his most influential inspiration was Gramsci. For the emergence and the nature of the tension that Poulantzas has introduced into his theory in his efforts to juxtapose, combine and synthesise Althusser and Gramsci, see, particularly, Jessop (1982: 155–156). This shift in Poulantzas's view of the capitalist state and its wider theoretical and political implications has been noted by others as well: "However, for all his reference to the 'determination in the last instance by the economic', Poulantzas was primarily interested in the ideological and political dimensions of the class struggle. Moreover the relaxation of his structural determinism in his later work gave even greater play to ideological and political factors in determining the development of the class struggle in the 'conjuncture', pushing the 'economic' still further into the background, providing plenty of scope for the 'voluntarism' and political opportunism which his theory had supposedly dispelled." (Clarke, 1991a: 21) As a matter of fact, as a disciple of Poulantzas's, much of Jessop's own efforts to elaborate and build upon the former's thought has been oriented towards the correction of this voluntarism/politicism.

classes by the so-called power bloc (Jessop, 1990: 42). The popular classes—whose support was to be secured for hegemony to hold—consisted of: (a) The dominated classes—the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and sectors of the working class; (b) of social categories (the military, officials and intellectuals), and; (c) of the significant social forces (ethnic minorities, religious movements, and similar groups capable of controlling the class struggle between capital and labour). On the other hand, the power bloc was defined as “... a fairly stable alliance of dominant classes or class fractions, whose unity depends on a modicum of mutual self-sacrifice of immediate interests and on their commitment to a common world outlook.” (Jessop, 1990: 42) It is important to note that that the success of the power bloc to build and keep its hegemony depended upon the successful incorporation and articulation of ‘popular-democratic’ struggles into “... an ideology that sustains the power of the dominant classes and fractions, rather than working to reinforce the revolutionary movement.” (Jessop, 1990: 42)

One interesting point in the hegemony conceptualisation of the neo-Gramscian Poulantzas is his analysis of the conditions for the stability and the instability of the political regime. In principle, bourgeois political domination is reinforced by the institutional setting of free competitive elections and strong parliamentary representation. “For it seems that electoral competition encourages the power bloc to take into account of the interests of the dominated

classes when formulating its policies for capital accumulation.” (Jessop, 1990: 43) On the other hand, although the so-called ‘exceptional’ forms of capitalist state (such as military dictatorship and fascism) may appear to be very strong, due to their immense concentration and centralisation of all power, they are potentially unstable, from the point of view of keeping the social cohesion and securing the conditions for continued capital accumulation. Here, the basic cause of the potential instability of such regimes is their inflexibility: “For their apparent strength hides a brittleness of institutional structure which means that they are unable to respond effectively to the changing crisis, conflicts and contradictions inherent in [capitalist] societies.” (Jessop, 1990: 43)²⁰³

Finally, it is important to note that one of the key ideas in the work of Poulantzas was the idea that “[t]he structure defines a particular ‘conjuncture’, which is essentially a field of objectively possible outcomes of class struggle (Clarke, 1991a: 17). This idea of the structure as conjuncture was later to be adopted by Bob Jessop, and elaborated, extended and assimilated into his own ‘strategic–relational’ analysis.

²⁰³ One of the key questions to be enquired in this thesis shall be the nature, the contradictions, and the crisis thereof, of the ‘exceptional’ T/C proto-state of the first phase (1964–1967) of the enclave period (1964–1974). In this context, there are two questions involved: (1) Does the T/C ‘exceptional’ proto-state fit the definition of Poulantzas? Or is it rather a ‘*sui generis*’ exceptional state?; and if so, (2) did the *sui generis* T/C exceptional state share any of the basic characteristics of the Poulantzian exceptional state which might explicate its eventual crisis and reform after 1967? More on this, in Chapter 4.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the state debate has been carried over to Great Britain, through two alternative channels, namely, the Marxist circles of the ‘New Left Review’, and the ‘Conference of Socialist Economists’ (CSE). The greatest appeal of Poulantzas’s view was not in France, where he lived and worked, but in Great Britain, where the basic issues of the relationship between the economic and political, the structure and the struggle (agency) had hardly been addressed hitherto (Clarke, 1991a: 18, 21). The siege of the first critical encounters was the New Left Review, where, Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas, most notably, had their well-known exchange over the determinants of the class character of the state.²⁰⁴ Thus, to demonstrate the class character of the state, Miliband documented the facts about the social backgrounds, personal ties and shared values of the state elite, and about the impact of government policies in terms of the inter-class distribution of income and wealth. The underlying idea was that its monopolisation of economic power gave the bourgeoisie the means of its direct–personal control over the state apparatus, and the means of legitimisation of its rule (Jessop, 1990: 29; Clarke, 1991a: 19). In response, Poulantzas criticised Miliband, from the point of view of the structuralist approach, “... for analysing the state in terms of the individual human subjects who control it, rather than in relation to its structurally determined role in capitalist society.” (Jessop, 1990: 30) On the other hand, from its first conference of January 1970 onwards, the siege of the second round of

²⁰⁴ It is important to note that Miliband and Poulantzas had different concerns. Thus, Miliband was rather interested in confronting the liberal theory of democracy, and Poulantzas in confronting the instrumentalist approach of the traditional Communist orthodoxy of state monopoly capitalism (Jessop, 1990: 29–30).

the state debate was the ‘CSE’ (founded 1969), from which two major Marxist theories of the state have emerged, namely the ‘Open Marxist’ school, and the theory Bob Jessop. In the context of the growing disquiet with the theoretical alternatives implied by the Miliband–Poulantzas debate, particularly, the CSE, and above all John Holloway and Sol Picciotto have adopted and popularised the German derivation approach, and thereby paved the way for the Open Marxist thought. See, Jessop (1982: 83–84) In this respect, the 1977 Conference of the CSE on ‘Class Struggle, State and the Restructuring of Capital’ proved to be a decisive turning point. “The theoretical starting point of the approach which developed over the next few years was the critical examination of the theories of the state proposed by Poulantzas and emerging from the German ‘state derivation debate.’” (Clarke, 1991a: 35) As I see it, Open Marxists have three basic claims:

1) Form Analysis, as opposed to Base–Superstructure Analysis:

According to the Open Marxists, Marx’s critique of capital, and his *Capital*, is basically not an account of the relationships between base and superstructure, as distinct and externally related social spheres, but a critique of the economic, political and ideological forms, as the different forms of same social whole—the social relations of production, and of class domination. It is important to note that form is the subject–object relationship, inverted. Thus, commodity, as the form of our product,

stands outside us, stands against us, denies us, negates us—commodity rules, and we are negated.²⁰⁵

2) *Class Struggle as the Core of Capital Accumulation:*

Clarke's early contribution claimed, against the structuralist view of the autonomous levels (1978: 42), that the concept of class relations was analytically prior to the political, economic and ideological forms taken by those relations, and thereby, made it possible for a Marxist analysis to conceptualise the complex relationships between the economic and the political, as complementary forms of the fundamental class relation (Burnham, 2001: 104). On the other hand, Holloway and Picciotto's early critique of Marxist 'economics' argued that the latter had become divorced of the study of both class struggle and the state, "... leading to a view of the relationship between the two as an external relationship between 'economics' and 'politics', rather than as a relationship between different, but related, forms of class domination." (Clarke, 2001: 39). According to the Open Marxists, class struggle lies at the heart of Marx's account of accumulation, for "... capital must not only extract surplus from labour daily in the production process but must also ensure the successful reproduction of the total social circuit of capital through its three principal forms." (Burnham, 2001: 104)²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ See, Holloway (2001: 66).

²⁰⁶ Thus, the primacy of capital-labour struggle, and the oversight of the struggle of capital against capital, i.e. competition amongst many capitals, and, consequently of Volume III of Capital.

3) *Openness of Open Marxist Theory:*

Open Marxists argue that, by definition, class struggle, as the core dynamic of capital accumulation, is uncertain and leaves outcomes open. In essence, this version of the Marxist thought, based as it is, upon an understanding of the complexities of the rotation of capital, focuses on resistance to the imposition of work, and thereby points to the fragility of capitalism as a system of class domination. It is in this sense of the indeterminacy of the consequences of class struggle, and thence, of capital accumulation, that the Open Marxist theory is ‘open’.

To summarise, Open Marxists conceptualise the movement of abstract value—i.e. the capital accumulation, as ‘labour in capital’. Therefore, that very movement encompasses, intrinsically, the class struggle. On the other hand, the state and the economy do not exist as externally related entities, which determine one another externally, but as the different and distinct forms of existence of one and the same relation that constitutes them. Hence, the separation of the political as a distinct form is the consequence of its displacement away from production and towards the state, which, therefore, concomitantly leads to the emergence of the opposite form of the economic.²⁰⁷

Finally, it is important to note that emphasis of Open Marxists upon class struggle has critical implications for their specific theory of crisis. This basically implied that the laws of motion of capitalism are neither natural

²⁰⁷ See Bonefeld (1992: 100–102).

nor inevitable, but depend upon the balance of forces of in the class struggle between capital and labour. Therefore, crises result from the failure of capital to keep its dominance over labour, rather than the inexorable dynamics of capital accumulation (Jessop, 1990: 39).

3.2. BOB JESSOP: SOCIETALISATION, STATE AS A STRATEGIC SITE, AUTOPOIETICIST STRUCTURES, DISCOURSE, AND REGULATION

The second offshoot of the CSE debates of the 1970s has been the state theory of Bob Jessop. A ‘one man’ school in the field of the Marxist theories of the capitalist state, Jessop defends the existence of separate, structurally coupled, but operationally self-referential, self-reproducing, and self-regulating subsystems (such as the economy, law, politics, and science), or axes of societalisation. It is one of the aims of this thesis to test, on the basis of a detailed reading of the T/C historical–empirical material, Jessop’s model of the causality between politics and economy.

On a number of occasions, Jessop has provided detailed accounts of the evolution of his theory. Speaking of the major building blocks of his work, he points out that its primary referent is Marx’s critique of political economy. On the other hand, the first impulse of his focus on state theory, appears to be the need to transcend reductionist, orthodox Marxist-Leninist and the structuralist, Althusserian interpretations of the state–civil society relationships (Jessop, 2007a: 22). In his own words, from the 1970s onwards, he takes “... the ‘high road’ of anti-reductionism rather than the ‘low road’ of economic determinism ...”, by also denying “... that any sub-

ensemble of social relations could ever be determinant in the last instance.” (Jessop, 1990: 4). In so doing, and beyond the critique of political economy, his ‘strategic–relational’ approach to state theory—as well as to political economy, social theory, and ‘cultural political economy’—has drawn upon a number of other, secondary sources—debates, traditions and theories. “These can be described,” he says “in the spirit of Lenin’s remark, and only half-jokingly, as post-war German politics, post-war French economics, and post-war Chilean biology ...”, i.e. the German ‘Derivation’ debate, French ‘Regulation’ School [*L’école de la régulation*], and the ‘Autopoieticist’ theory (Jessop, 2007a: 22–23). In a prior work, he gives a more detailed list of the ideas, theories and theorists that have inspired himself. These are, apart from Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas 1) The German concept of societalisation (Joachim Hirsch); 2) state as the site of strategic dilemmas as well as structural contradictions; 3) autopoieticist theory (Niklas Luhmann); 4) Discourse analysis (Ernesto Laclau), and 5) Regulation theory (Robert Boyer) (Jessop, 1990: x–xi).

Let me start with the three major influences, namely, (I) German politics, (II) French economics, and (III) Chilean biology.²⁰⁸

- (I) German politics refers to the post-war German state debate and theory, which, in the mid-1970s, was carried over to the United Kingdom, through the Conference of Socialist Economists. Concentrating upon the changing forms and functions of the

²⁰⁸ Apparently, Niklas Luhmann, the prominent German systems theorist, borrowed the term ‘autopoiesis’ from the Chilean cognitive biologists.

capitalist state, Jessop was particularly inspired by the German debate, but the influence of the ideas of the German state theory coexisted with that of Gramsci's concept of the 'integral state' [*lo stato integrale*], and of Poulantzas's concept of 'hegemony' (Jessop, 2007a: 23).

- (II) On the other hand, the Gramscian influence further continued through his interest in the French Regulation School. Gramsci had defined “‘the state in its inclusive sense’ as ‘political society + civil society’ and saw state power in Western societies as based on ‘hegemony armoured by coercion’.” Inspired by his encounter with the Parisian Regulation school, and by way of analogy, Jessop extended the idea into what he termed the ‘integral economy’ [*l’economia integrale*], defined as “‘an accumulation regime + social mode of economic regulation’ and ... [by analysing] accumulation as ‘the self-valorization of capital in and through regulation’ ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 24). The basic problematic and task of the Regulation School is to provide “... specific institutional answers to the old Marxist question of how, despite its structural contradictions and class conflicts, capitalism can continue to expand for relatively long periods.”²⁰⁹ In so doing, “[i]t stresses that economic expansion

²⁰⁹ Obviously, its problematisation of the continuity of capitalism, in the first instance, together with its empirical agenda of the transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism, as opposed to its crisis, has rendered the Regulation school the target of criticisms for being a deterministic theory of capitalism. It is a glass half empty, half full: To use the old terminology of the subjective-objective, by arguing that capitalism is ‘subjectively’ sustainable, Regulation school actually implies that it is not, objectively, unsuperable. See, particularly, the exchange between the critical Werner Bonefeld, John Holloway, Simon

depends on specific modes of economic regulation that complement the role of market forces in guiding capitalist development.” Obviously, all this closely relates to the key role played by the state in the mode of the regulation, especially, in “... securing the extra-economic as well as economic conditions for capital accumulation and in institutionalizing class compromises that facilitate accumulation.” (Jessop, 2007a: 24) Whilst working on regulation, Jessop continues to reflect upon the key question of the reconciliation of the relative autonomy of the state—the problem of ‘politicism’, on the one hand, and the seemingly autonomous logic of profit-oriented market forces. At stake, was the noted issue of the relationship of economic and political orders to one another. Jessop came to the conclusion that, despite their institutionally separate entities, and their organisations according to different types of social logic, the two order could be ‘structurally coupled’, to produce a relatively unified historical bloc. “At the same time I became interested in the conditions, if any, under which economic and

Clarke and the defensive Bob Jessop: Bonefeld (1991); Jessop (1991b); Holloway (1991b); Clarke (1991b); Jessop (1991c) and; Bonefeld (1993). See, for a very creative extension of the basic Open Marxist ideas to the strategies of class struggle, Holloway (1991a). Incidentally, underlying the Open Marxist school is a sociological approach to Marx’s Capital—more specifically, to the value form—which gives the priority to the class struggle, at the expense of inter-capitalist competition. Inadvertently, this implies attributing more importance to Volume I, than Volume III, where the dynamic of competition is put to the core of the transformation of values into prices of production, and the tendency of the profit rate to fall. Thus, against Holloway’s (and others’) claim that ‘capital is class struggle’, Jessop (1991c: 149) points out that Marx, “... rather than beginning with the class struggle, ... showed how the logic of abstract labour was imposed on workers *and* capitalists alike.” [sic—H.A.] As a matter of fact, “[t]o argue otherwise would be to reduce Marx’s critique to political economy to a sociology of class struggle from the viewpoint of the working class. It is this sort of critique ... which runs the risk that it ‘stop short at a sociological critique of economics and fails to develop the Marxist critique of political economy’ ...” (Jessop, 1991c: 155).

political structures and operations can be coordinated strategically by a power bloc (comprising dominant class fractions and political elites) to guide economic and political development.” (Jessop, 2007a: 25)

- (III) “Finally, in his attempts to combine relevant concepts from the German state theory and the French Regulation, Jessop comes across Chilean biology, through the work of German social theorists, and especially, Niklas Luhmann. Thus, as far as the relationships between, especially, the sub-ensembles of politics/state and economy is concerned, the concept of ‘autopoiesis’ or ‘self-reproduction’ becomes one of the core concepts of Jessop’s ontology. “Transposed ... from cell biology to sociology, autopoietic theory suggests that major societal subsystems (such as the economy, law, politics, and science) can be studied as self-referential, self-reproducing, and self-regulating.” (Jessop, 2007a: 26) Although the subsystems basically “... function according to their own operational codes and programmes rather than obeying an external logic or being readily steered from outside, ... they are materially interdependent.” As Jessop puts it, “[o]ne consequence of this, which is especially important for a materialist–discursive strategic–relational approach, ... is the scope it creates for the logic of one system to dominate the overall development of what could be described as the self-

organizing ecology of self-organizing systems.” (Jessop, 2007a: 26)²¹⁰

As noted above, one of the original motives underlying Jessop’s work was his dissatisfaction with the Althusserian idea that the ‘economic’ sub-ensemble of social relations was determinant in the last instance. Jessop reinterpreted the Poulantzasian concept of ‘historical bloc’ now in the light of the autopoieticist ontology. Thus, “... the ‘historical blocs’ formed through the reciprocal consolidation of economic, legal, political, and certain cultural institutions could be understood in autopoieticist terms.” Overall, historical blocs would be the consequence of the interactions amongst “... (a) the path-dependent ‘structural coupling’ of several *operationally autonomous* but *substantively interdependent* sub-systems, (b) the path-shaping efforts of economic, political and other social systems, (b) the path-shaping efforts of economic, political, and other social forces to influence (or govern) the nature and direction of this co-evolution, and (c) the ‘ecological dominance’ of the market-mediated, self-valorizing capitalist economy.” (Jessop, 2007a: 26) On the basis of these arguments, Jessop proposed to replace the economistic idea of the ‘determination in the last instance’, by the so-called ‘ecological dominance’, which referred “... to the

²¹⁰ Jessop’s espousal of the autopoietic theory has not been without its problems: “... [M]y autopoietic theories have ‘irritated’ me ... it, into a radical rethinking of some key concepts for a critique of political economy. This has required the disembedding of the source ideas from their autopoietics systems context and an effort to break with their autopoieticist mode of expression so that they can be more adequately integrated in the strategic-relational approach.” (Jessop, 2007a: 27) See, Chapter 11 ‘Political Economy or Radical Autonomy? Regulation, Societalization and Autopoiesis’ of ‘State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place’ (1990), for Jessop’s elaboration of ‘structural coupling’ and ‘autopoiesis’, and particularly pp. 331–335, for the challenges that the latter poses against Marxist state theory.

capacity of one system in a self-organizing ecology of self-organizing systems to cause more problems for other systems that they can cause for it.” (Jessop, 2007a: 26)

Now, as noted above, Bob Jessop qualifies his state theory as ‘relational–strategic’. The first epithet of his theory—relational, implies ‘relations amongst relations’, “[f]or the complex synthesis of multiple determinations which produces actual events cannot be reduced to a single principle of explanation and must be interpreted instead as the resultant of the interaction of various causal chains.” (Jessop, 1982: 252)²¹¹ Jessop elaborated the relational approach, as one of the earliest elements of his state theory, at the end of his 1982 book, ‘The Capitalist State’.²¹² As far as the determinations which produce actual events as the resultant of the interaction of various causal chains is concerned, Jessop deploys three more categories/concepts: (i) structural constraints as opposed to conjunctural opportunities; (ii) power, and (iii) interest.

- (i) It is important to note that ‘constraint’ and ‘opportunity’ are dynamically related and relativistically defined terms, coupled with

²¹¹ “The core of this approach was its focus on ‘the relations among relations’, that is, ‘an analysis of the relations among different relations comprising the social formation’ ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 13).

²¹² In his 1980 book, Jessop came to the conclusion that there could exist no general theory of the capitalist state, let alone the state in general. “Instead, it offered some methodological and substantive guidelines for the analysis of the state as a concrete-complex object of inquiry.” (Jessop, 2007a: 12–13) From the methodological point of view, this required the introduction of new middle range concepts to facilitate “... transition from abstract-simple to more concrete-complex analyses of the state apparatus and state power.” (Jessop, 2007a: 14) Obviously, concrete-complex analyses cannot lead to a general theory. Underlying the impossibility of a general theory is that the ontology of ‘relations amongst relations’ necessarily implies ‘contingent necessity’—a term to be shortly presented .

one of the most debated dualities in social analysis, namely, ‘structure’ and ‘conjuncture’, or the ‘structural’ and the ‘conjunctural’. According to Jessop (1982: 253), “[t]he ‘structural’ moment can be defined as those elements in a social formation that cannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period ...” Conversely, “[t]he conjunctural moment can be defined as those elements in a social formation that can be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) during a given time period.” Therefore, it is possible for one and the same element to constitute a constraint for one agent (or set of agents), and yet be open to transformation by another (set of agents). Accordingly, one must compare the potential transformative powers of the various agents. Interestingly, the foregoing also implies that, “... the same element can act as a ‘structural constraint’ for one agent (or set of agents) and provide a ‘conjunctural opportunity’ for the same agent(s) in association with another agent (or set thereof). (Jessop, 1982: 253)

- (ii) Jessop (1982: 253) defines power as “... the production of effects within the limits set by the ‘structural constraints’ confronting different agents.” “[T]he analysis of power is closely connected with the analysis of the organization, modes of calculation, resources, strategies, tactics, and so forth, of different agents ... and the relations among these agents (including the differential composition of the ‘structural constraints’ and ‘conjunctural opportunities’ that they confront) which determines the overall balance of forces.”

(Jessop, 2007a: 29) It is important to note that power as such constitutes an explanandum, rather than explanans, and thereby, cannot be the independent variable, so to speak, of any causal analysis. For “... unless one regards ... [the] actions [of the agents involved in a power relation] as random within the ‘structural constraints’ confronting these agents or else considers them as the result of and otherwise unconstrained free will, it is also necessary to investigate how the attributes, capacities and, and modes of calculation of these agents further limit the possibilities of action and thereby help to determine the resulting power relation.” (Jessop, 1982: 254–255) As far as the determination of the balance of forces is concerned, due attention must be paid to the net costs (or net benefits) of the different courses of action (Jessop, 1982: 256). In a later work, and speaking of the noted structure–agency issue, Bob Jessop beautifully points out that, “[i]f power involves an agent’s production of effects that would not otherwise occur, it is essential both to identify the structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities confronting these agents and the actions that they performed which, by realizing certain opportunities rather than others, ‘made a difference’.” (Jessop, 2007a: 43)

- (iii) Jessop (1982: 256) defines interest as ‘comparative’ advantage’, rather than some intrinsically defined, absolute drive that is independent of the concrete circumstances—particularly, the given set of structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities obtaining

over a given period. Furthermore, interest relates to one's conditions of existence, and interest calculation, by implication, to the ascertainment and/or the protection of one's conditions of existence. Accordingly, "[a] situation, action, or event can be said to be in an agent's interest if it secures a greater net increase (or smaller net decrease) in the realization of that agent's conditions of existence than do any feasible alternatives in a given conjuncture." (Jessop, 2007a: 30) On the other hand, the multiplicity of the distinct sub-systems of social relations to which the agent in question belongs implies that "... there may be conflicts among the conditions of existence relevant to these systems and/or subjectivities with the result that the agent has no unitary and non-contradictory set of interests capable of realisation." (Jessop, 1982: 257) Finally, together with the changes in the configurations of structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities, subjectivities and interests are also defined, redefined and combined, discursively, in and through ideological struggles (Jessop, 1982: 257).

It is important to place the analysis of structural constraints–conjunctural opportunities, power and interest, into a 'relational' analysis, i.e. the analysis of the 'relations among social relations'. What matters is the identification of the entire matrix of social forces, and the overall articulation of its elements. "This matrix involves a complex hierarchy of potential powers determined by the range and determinacy of opportunities for influencing elements that constitute constraints for other agents. This

potential for power depends ... on the relations among different positions in the social formation ... [and] on the organization, modes of calculation, and resources of social forces.” (Jessop, 2007a: 44)

The second epithet of Jessop’s theory—‘strategic’—was elaborated in his 1990 book, ‘State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place’. That the state could be analysed “... as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies ...” was implied by the argument that the state is a social relation (Jessop, 2007a: 15).²¹³ Given the need to bridge the gap between the capital-theoretical (or capital-logic) approach and the class-theoretical approach, the consequence of the relational orientation has been its extension into the strategic-relational analysis. For the ‘capital-theoretical’ or ‘capital logic’ theorists, the capitalist state is the political support of the imperatives of capital accumulation.” (Jessop, 2007a: 32) Accordingly, the forms and the functions of the state correspond, respectively, to the given level of the development of the relations of production, and the needs of the bourgeois class rule (Jessop, 2007a: 32–33) On the other hand, for the ‘class-theoretical’ theorists, the forms and the functions of the state reflect the given balance of the class struggle (Jessop, 2007a: 33) Whilst the former group of theorists emphasise the abstract logic of capital accumulation, with

²¹³ Jessop’s extension of the relational orientation of his 1982 book to the relational-strategic approach of his 1990 book was mediated by his critical study of the work of Nicos Poulantzas, “... who, on the basis of his own theoretical, historical, and contemporary analyses of the capitalist type of state, had first explicitly proposed that the state is a social relation.” (Jessop, 2007a: 32) See, also Jessop (1990: 10) More particularly, Jessop was focused upon Poulantzas’s transition from what could be called a regional theory—“... a structuralist framing of the question of the relative autonomy of the state and political region within capitalism”, to what could be called a relational theory—“... an analysis of the position of the state and the role of state power within the expanded reproduction of class relations.” (Jessop, 2007a: 32)

its iron laws of motion—i.e. structurally-inscribed tendencies and counter-tendencies, the latter concentrate upon the concrete modalities of class struggle. Jessop believes that the notion of strategy seems particularly suitable to fill the gap in question (Jessop, 2007a: 33) More specifically, the concepts of the ‘strategic–theoretical’ approach can be deployed to render the abstract laws of motion more concrete, and to render the concrete modalities of class struggle more abstract. (Jessop, 2007a: 33) Therefore, the concepts of the relational–strategic approach are the ‘middle–range’ concepts needed to fill the gap capital–logic and class theoretical approaches. Accordingly, competing logics of capital must be viewed in terms of the competing ‘accumulation strategies’, and the field of class struggles, in terms of the competing ‘hegemonic projects’.²¹⁴ This will bring together the perspective of structural determination and the perspective of class positions (Jessop, 2007a: 34). From the point of view of methodology, “... the key to resolving the impasse was to emphasize not just that structure and agency were dialectically related but also that each moment in this dialectical relation contained elements from its ‘other’.” (Jessop, 2007a: 35) And finally, critical to the transcendence of the duality of capital–logic and class–theoretical approaches to state theory was the conceptualisation of the state as political strategy, i.e. as the site, the generator, and the product of strategies ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 35)

Jessop introduced three key arguments around the strategic–ness of the state:

²¹⁴ See, also Jessop (1991a).

- (i) The state is the site of strategy, which can be analysed as a ‘system of strategic selectivity’, “...whose structure and *modus operandi* are more open to some types of political strategy than others. ... Thus a given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power; and it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic and political strategy than others because of the modes of intervention and resources which characterize that system ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 36)²¹⁵ The term ‘strategic selectivity’ brings the ‘relational’ character of selectivity more clearly to the fore than its older alternative ‘structural selectivity’. The point is that, “... the differential impact of the state system on the ‘capacity’ of different class(–relevant) forces to pursue their interests in different strategies over a given time horizon is not inscribed in the state system as such but in the relation between state structures and the strategies which different forces adopt towards it.” (Jessop, 2007a: 36)
- (ii) “ ... [T]he state is also a site where strategies are elaborated.” (Jessop, 2007a: 36) One can only understand the unity of the state system and the activities of the state only by referring to ‘political’

²¹⁵ Or, alternatively, “[p]articular forms of state privilege some strategies over others, privilege the access of some forces over others, some interests over others, some time horizons over others, some coalition possibilities over others. A given type of state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power. And it will be more suited to the pursuit of some types of economic or political strategy than others because of the modes of intervention and resources which characterize that system.” (Jessop, 1990: 10)

strategies. Marxist arguments for the institutional and/or class unity of the capitalist state are not convincing, for the ‘formal’ unity of the state, represented by its sovereignty and its centralised bureaucracy, do not suffice to ensure its ‘operational’ unity. For the state is not only the site of class(–relevant) struggles and contradictions, but also that of the struggles and rivalries of its own branches (Jessop, 2007a: 36–37) The key question here is how the state ever comes to act in unity, as a political force. One must understand the key role played by ‘state managers’ (politicians and career officials), their different strategies and tactics in the imposition of a relative unity upon the various activities of the state (Jessop, 2007a: 37).

- (iii) “The structure and modus operandi of the state system can be understood in terms of their production in and through past political strategies and struggles.” (Jessop, 2007: a) They could have been developed within or without that system, and with a view to preserve or to transform it. Therefore, the current strategic selectivity results from the combined effect of the patterns of its past strategic selectivity and the current strategies and struggles which aim at its transformation. Also, the calculating subjects who operate on the strategic terrain of the state are partly constituted by its strategic selectivity (Jessop, 2007a: 37)

Progressively, Jessop extended the arguments of the strategic–relational analysis from the state theory to (a) ‘critical’ political economy, as he calls

it, and; b) the structure–agency problem, generally. In so doing, he tried to develop a ‘middle–range’ neo-Gramscian analysis of the economy in its inclusive sense, and engaged the regulation approach towards a strategic–relational analysis of the capital relation itself (Jessop, 2007a: 38). He aimed to reinterpret Marx’s critique of capital, that capital is social relation, i.e. “.... a relationship between people mediated by the instrumentally of things ...”, in the light of his strategic–relational analysis (Jessop, 2007a: 38). And, his starting point is the contradiction in the commodity form between use-value and exchange-value, for that was wherefrom Marx started to unfold the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production, the necessity of periodic crisis, and the role that the latter plays in the reintegration of the capital circuit, towards renewed expansion. He suggested that all forms of the capital relation are based upon the dependent but interconnected versions of the basic contradiction between use- and exchange value, and “...that they impact differentially on (different fractions of) capital and (different strata of) labour at different time and places ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 38)

On the other hand, Bob Jessop’s attempt to generalise the strategic–relational approach to the issue of ‘structure and agency’ involved the ‘relativisation’ of both categories (Jessop, 2007a: 38, 40). The so-called structure–agency dilemma basically consists of a “... dichotomy that divides the social world into mind (free will) and matter (social facts) ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 38) It is all about a ‘false’ duality, which counterpoises ‘action’ (as concrete conduct) and ‘structure’ (as rules and resources), where the two are recursively reproductive of one another (Jessop, 2007a: 41). ‘Genuine’

duality can be realised by the ‘dialectical relativisation’ of the two analytical categories, rather than their mechanical connection. “In this context, social structure can be studied in ‘strategic-relational’ terms as involving structurally inscribed strategic selectivity; and action can likewise be analysed in terms of its performance by agents with strategically calculating structural orientation. The former term signifies that structural constraints always operate selectively; they are not absolute and unconditional but are always temporally, spatially, agency- and strategy-specific. The latter term implies that agents are reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation about the current situation.” (Jessop, 2007a: 41)²¹⁶ This is exactly where, in his discussion of the the structure–agency question, that Jessop makes the distinction between the structural and conjunctural moments, mentioned above. To recall, the former relate “... those elements in a given temporal-spatial context that cannot be altered by a given agent (or set of agents) pursuing a given strategy during a given time period ...” whilst the latter comprise those elements in a given temporal-spatial strategic context that can be modified.” (Jessop, 2007a: 42) Furthermore, the strategic–relational approach rejects the conventional approach that defines the structure as a ‘unified’ and ‘absolute’ condition, for “... the self-same element(s) can operate as a structural constraint for one agent (or set of agents) and as a conjunctural opportunity liable to

²¹⁶ For the purposes of this thesis, ‘strategic selectivity’ is both one of the core elements of Jessop’s understanding of causality between state and civil society, and one of its basic points of distinction with Eric Olin Wright’s ‘structural selection’, between state (structure) and class struggle (agency/action) rooted, as it is, in the Althusserian structuralist ontology.

transformation by another agent (or set of agents).” (Jessop, 2007a: 42) One of the most important aspects of Jessop’s analysis of the structure–agency issue in terms of the constraint and opportunity couplet, for the purposes of this thesis, is the notion of the temporal and spatial horizon. Thus, specific agents always deploy their powers to realise a specific range of effects, in specific action contexts and in specific temporal and spatial horizons (Jessop, 2007a: 43).

On the basis of the foregoing remarks, Bob Jessop’s definitions of the ‘society’, of the ‘economy’, the ‘state’, and the ‘capitalist state’ can now be fully explicated.

Bob Jessop defines society as a limit–process, the end product of ‘society effects’, or the limit of the process of ‘societalisation’. Accordingly, there are two alternative ways of looking at the society/societalisation:

- (a) “Society refers to social processes in and through which society effects are produced”, and;
- (b) Societalisation consists of the “... complex social processes in and through which specific institutional orders and their broader social preconditions are secured.” (Jessop, 1990: 4–5)

It is important to note that, ontologically, society is the limit product, the end resultant of ‘different types of societalisation’, of ‘society effects’. As a matter of fact, society involves multiple sub-ensembles and systems of social relations. As noted above, Marx had Hegel’s dissection of the

capitalist society into political society—the state, and civil society, as the realm of material interests, pursuits and relationships, i.e. the capitalist economy and the market. This, to the young Marx, was both the *differentia specifica* of capitalism, historically, as a socio-economic formation, and the starting point of his critique of political economy. On the other hand, Bob Jessop revises and extends Hegel’s and Marx’s distinction, by firstly reinterpreting civil society as the public sphere, distinct from the economy and the market, and secondly, by introducing the concept of the ‘lifeworld’.²¹⁷ Thus, capitalist society can generally be dissected into (and analysed in terms of) the economy, politics and the state, the life world, and civil society (Jessop, 2005: 11–12). Jessop’s first broad classification is the distinction between the systemic ‘ecology’ of ‘instituted’ orders, sub-ensembles or social relations, on the one hand, and the non-systemic lifeworld, on the other. Therefore, whilst Marx has devoted most of his energy to the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist economy, modern society comprises several autopoietic (self-organising) systems, namely, the legal system, the political system, science, the educational system, religion, and art. And each of these sub-ensembles of social relations has their own, distinctive “... operational codes, organisational principles, institutional dynamics, instrumental rationalities

²¹⁷ In their ‘German Ideology’, Marx and Engels defined civil society as follows: “Civil society embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of this stage and, in so far, transcends the state and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must reassert itself towards foreign peoples as nationality, and inwardly must organize itself as state. The word civil ‘civil society’ emerged in the eighteenth century, when property relationships had already extricated themselves from the ancient and medieval communal society. Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic super-structure, has, however, always been designated by the same name.” (Kamenka, 1983: 180)

and logics of appropriateness.” (Jessop, 2005: 8) Most importantly, “[t]ogether they form a self-organising ecology of the instituted systems that develops through the interaction between their respective operational autonomies and material [and substantive—H.A.] interdependencies.” (Jessop, 2005: 8) Alongside the system domain, there exists a complex lifeworld (often confused with civil society), which is irreducible to the logic of the instituted orders. More specifically, the lifeworld, as one’s emotive, inter-subjective experience—percept, perhaps— of the everyday life, one’s life conditions, is the “... realm of identities, values, modes of calculation and social relations not anchored in specific systems or their logics.” (Jessop, 2005: 35)²¹⁸ The lifeworld comprises multiple sites of resistance against the encroaching and invasive logics of the instituted systems, and the bedrock in its own right of conflicts, confrontations and struggles, as well as mutual recognition and solidarities (Jessop, 2005: 9). On the other hand, according to a classic tri-classification, capitalist society is institutionally separated into a market economy, a sovereign state, and a civil society, the latter being defined as the public sphere located beyond market and state. Civil society alike can become a major stake in the various conflicts, in the struggles for its colonisation and integration into the service

²¹⁸ Here, Jessop basically follows and somewhat reinterprets Jurgen Habermas’s definition of the lifeworld, and distinction between lifeworld and system—to which issues the Volume II of ‘The Theory of Communicative Action’ (1981) was devoted. It is important to note that Habermas too, was inspired by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. In a footnote, Jessop (2005: 277) notes: “I extend systems well beyond his initial economy and juridico-political couplet to include any self-organizing (or autopoietic) system with its own instrumental rationality, institutional matrix and social agents who consciously orient their actions to that system’s code. I also interpret the lifeworld more widely than Habermas initially did. Thus it is used to refer to all those identities, interests, values and conventions that are not directly anchored in the logic of any particular system and that provide the substratum and background to social interaction in everyday life, including enmity and antagonism as well as intimacy and solidarity.”

of one specific instituted order or the other (Jessop, 2005: 32).

As far as the relations of causality between the various sub-ensembles of social relations, and types of societalisation are concerned, Jessop suggests to replace the orthodox idea of economic determination (in the last instance), with ecological dominance, and its economic variant, economic domination. As noted above, according to Jessop, economy does not have any ontological priority over the other sub-ensembles of social relations in terms of the imposition of bourgeois societalisation, i.e. the subordination of an entire social order to the logic and reproduction requirements of capital accumulation oriented towards the logic and the needs of capital accumulation. It is important to note that the self-valorisation of capital requires: (a) the transformation of the key inputs into the process of capitalist production into real or fictitious commodities;²¹⁹ effective control over labour power and the labour process; stable environment to enable capitals to orient their activities to profit opportunities; proper conditions for the realisation and investment of profits. However, “there is wide variation in how far capitalist market forces (and the associated logic of profit-seeking) come to dominate the overall organization and dynamics of social formations.” (Jessop, 2005: 22) On the other hand, at any given conjuncture, there are (i) a variety of societal projects that prioritise radically different organisational principals, and (ii) conflicts over the rival projects based

²¹⁹ Fictitious commodities are inputs into the production process that have the form of a commodity—i.e. they can be sold and bought, but are not created in a profit-oriented labour process. There are four key categories of fictitious commodity: Land, money, knowledge and labour-power (Jessop, 2005: 13).

upon the same principle of societalisation. “Thus social formations may be relatively unified under the dominance of religion (theocracies), military–police considerations (national security states), nation–building (new nations), socially constructed ‘racial’ demarcations (apartheid), capital accumulation (bourgeois societies), etc.” (Jessop, 2005: 22) Accordingly, bourgeois societalisation involves, beyond narrowly continuing capital accumulation, the relative subordination of the entire social order—relations amongst the relations—to the logic and the requirements of capital accumulation. As a matter of fact, using the terms of Gramsci, “[t]his could be described as the development of an ‘historic bloc’ between the economic base, juridico–political structure and forms of consciousness ...” (Jessop, 2005: 23)

As far as the relationships of causality between the different axes of societalisation are concerned, Bob Jessop rejects the traditional Marxist/structuralist idea of ‘determination in the last instance’ and redefines it as ‘economic determination’. Thus, many Marxists have try to defend the idea of the determination in the last instance of the extra-economic by the economic. Jessop finds little merit in this idea, which he argues is clearly untenable. For the social relations of production to be able to play this causal role, two conditions must be satisfied: 1) they must be entirely self-contained and self-reproducing, so they can be a cause without a cause—or determine without being determined; 2) there must be some sort of a necessary correspondence between the economy, the other instituted sub-ensembles of relations, and the lifeworld. But, “... the economic lacks

the self-closure necessary to determine the extra-economic without being reciprocally determined by the latter in turn.”²²⁰ (Jessop, 2005: 23) Therefore, Jessop replaces the idea of ‘determination in the last instance’ with the idea of ‘ecological dominance’. On the other hand, he reserves the term ‘economic determination’ to imply the primacy of the moment of production within the overall circuit of capital, which actually is one of the basic claims of Marxist economists/political economists *vis-à-vis* the other heterodox schools, for instance, the Sraffians who privilege the sphere of exchange.²²¹ Thus, economic determination basically means that “... wealth must first be produced before it can be distributed or, in Marxist terms, that value must first be produced before it can be realized.” (Jessop, 2005: 24)

Ecological dominance, a term adapted from biology, originally refers to the fact that, in a given ecological community, one species amongst others exerts upon the rest an overriding influence.²²² (Jessop, 2005: 24) Applied to the social systems, it “... refers to the structural and/or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organizing ecology of systems to imprint its developmental logic on the other systems’ operations far more than these

²²⁰ The same goes for the claim the technological—as opposed the economic—determinist argument that the forces of production determine the relations of production (Jessop, 2005: 23).

²²¹ The ‘primacy of production’ thesis follows directly from Marx’s analysis of surplus value and value–price relationship. Thus, (1) surplus value is created in production, and not exchange, which implies that the other moments of the circuit of capital are functionally dependent upon the moment of production; 2) the magnitude of surplus value determines (limitates) the magnitude of profits, and 3) values determine prices of production, around which market prices gravitate. Of the above, Jessop seems to emphasise all three.

²²² Obviously, its extension to social sciences requires its reinterpretation, given that social systems are communicatively and discursively mediated, involving reflective and self-reflective forces with a capacity to affect the conditions of their own evolution (Jessop, 2005: 25).

systems are able to impose their respective logics on that system. This capacity is always mediated in and through the operational logic of other systems and the communicative rationalities of the lifeworld.” (Jessop, 2005: 25) It is important to note that ecological dominance implies a relationship where one sub-system amongst others becomes dominant in a complex situation of ‘co-evolution’, and not one of unilateral ‘domination’, where it one-sidedly dictates its logic. Furthermore, “... there is no ‘last instance’ in relations of ecological dominance—they are always contingent.” (Jessop, 2005: 26) Accordingly, any one system can become ecologically dominant, and one must study the historically specific conditions under which capital accumulation gets to be the ecologically dominant process. On the other hand, the idea of ecological dominance is closely related to the idea of structural coupling of the different sub-systems. From the point of view of capitalism, this implies that, outside the imaginary world of a pure capitalist economy, it has to be structurally coupled with the other systems and the lifeworld. This is because, “... capitalism cannot be reproduced solely through the value form. It depends on other systems and the lifeworld to help close the circuit of capital and to compensate for market failures.” (Jessop, 2005: 26) A number of conditions are required for any sub-system to become ecologically dominant, of which I should like to cite “... its capacity to get actors in other system and the lifeworld to identify its own operations as central to the reproduction of the wider system of which it is always and necessarily merely a part – and thus to get them to orient their operations more or less willingly to their

understanding of its particular reproduction requirements.” (Jessop, 2005: 27) As far as capital is concerned, it can subvert the logic of other sub-systems by means of their colonisation through the inroads of the commodity form, or by mere personal corruption. On the other hand, other sub-systems and their actors will try to resist and limitate commodification, or steer economic activities by imposing their own systemic priorities and their modes of calculation. “By way of illustration, consider the impact of territorial state committed to an alternative principle of societalization and willing to accept the political costs pf de-coupling from the world market.” (Jessop, 2005: 27) Finally, the mode of resistance against the ecological dominance of capitalist economy is the “... struggles to privilege the operations the operational logic of some other system or systems”, and the typical actors mobilised for and against are the “... [a]dvocates of other logics (e.g., legality, military security, health, religion)” (Jessop, 2005: 33).

Jessop’s critique of the ‘reductionist’ Marxist theories of the base–superstructure relationships can now be better placed into its context. As noted above, Jessop argues that the capitalist economy is intrinsically incapable of self-closure, i.e. unable to reproduce itself through pure market forces alone. Therefore, the core process of capital accumulation cannot exercise any sort of economic determination in the last instance over the other sub-ensembles of relations. But Marxist analysis is primarily concerned with ‘capitalist’ societalisation, in other words, the complex social processes in and through which the economic order—capitalist economy—and its broader preconditions are secured. Accordingly, Marxist

analysis involves two potential weaknesses associated with reductionism: “[F]irst, it tends to ignore other axes of societalization or treat them as secondary, and, secondly, it tends to deny the authenticity of projects which give primacy to other forms of societalisation.” (Jessop: 1990: 7)

In his definition of the state, Bob Jessop generally draws upon and brings together Gramsci and Poulantzas. Thus, from the relational point of view, and as a sub-ensemble and system of relations amongst others, “... one can define the state as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and activities organized around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community.” (2005: 6)

6) It is important to note that Jessop denies any totalistic idea of the state, which attributes it any ‘subjectivity’: The state is no unified subject, and ‘acts’ not. From the double point of view of the relations of power and capital accumulation, the state is primarily a system of ‘political domination’, whose systemic logic and forms “... may be more or less adequate to securing the various requirements of capital accumulation in different situations.” (Jessop, 1990: 34) And, from a discursive point of view, “[t]he state system ... [can be] treated as an imagined political entity with its own specific boundaries, conditions of existence, political subjects, developmental tendencies, sources of legitimacy and state projects.” (Jessop, 2005: 7) As a matter of fact, at any conjuncture, there may a multiplicity of competing state projects.” But, the co-existence of multiple competing state projects basically implies that “... effectively functioning

states are emergent, tendential phenomena and that there could well be continuing struggles to impose contradictory ‘apparatus unities’ on (potential) state organs.” (Jessop, 1990: 9) It is important to note that the tendency of the various actors to formulate different state projects originates in its distinctive character and role as a sub-ensemble of relations. Its relationship to the other sub-systems involves not only separateness, but also embeddedness. On the one hand, there are significant lines of demarcation, both materially and discursively, between the state qua institutional ensemble and other institutional orders and/or the life world. On the other hand, the apparatuses and practices of the state are also materially interdependent with other institutional orders and social practices. Therefore, states do not, isolatedly, oversee the rest of their respective societies, but are embedded in a wider political system, and articulated with other institutional orders. In other words, they are just but one institutional ensemble amongst others (Jessop, 2007a: 6). However, the state is also “... peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the social of which it is merely a part. Its paradoxical position as both part and whole of society means that it is continually called upon by diverse social forces to resolve society’s problems and is equally doomed to generate ‘state failure’ since so many of society’s problems lie well beyond its control and may even be aggravated by attempted intervention.” (Jessop, 2007a: 7) As a matter of fact, it is precisely this peculiar character of the state—its responsibility for the overall cohesion of the society at large, as well as its functions in its reproduction—that the makes it the siege of the

various struggles between the supporters of the different principles of societalisation, the different state projects, and the site, the generator, and the product of the different strategies. Furthermore, it is equally the cause of a different dynamic of political crisis than that suggested by Marxist economists/political economists. As noted before, the various accounts of capitalist crisis, as expounded by Marxist economists/political economists, generally tend to treat political crisis to be the consequence of endogenously generated economic crisis. Since Jessop rejects the kind of unilateral causality which privileges the economy—or any other sub-ensemble of relations, for that matter, political crisis can be the consequence of the problems encountered in any sub-ensemble or set of sub-ensembles, and the consequence of a multiplicity of complex determinations, causes and dynamics. Accordingly, political crisis can also arise due to the problems of the reconciliation of the needs of the capitalist economy with the other sub-ensembles by ensuring their political unity at the level of the state. As a matter of fact, one of the key types of political crises is that which relates to the absence of a successful ‘hegemonic project’. The starting point is the distinction between the question of securing the substantive institutional unity of the capitalist state, and the question of the infusion of this institutional unity with a definite class unity. Only the successful combination of institutional and class unities with a ‘national–popular project’ would make the state and state managers the political *Traeger* (support) of capitalist interests.²²³ In the absence of such a successful

²²³ “In broad terms hegemony involves the interpellation and organisation of different ‘class-relevant’ (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the ‘political, intellectual,

hegemonic project, state managers could have to resort to constitutionalised violence to secure compliance, or worse still, the unity of the state might collapse all together (Jessop, 1990: 8–9).

It is important to (re-)emphasise that it is directly Bob Jessop's ontology which leads to the very possibility of plural types of states and state failures (political crises). Potentially, “‘societies’ (or, better, imagined human communities) can be dominated by different principles of societal organization (*Vergesellschaftung*) associated with different projects and priorities (e.g., economic, military, religious, political, social ranking, cultural).” (Jessop, 2007a: 8) Accordingly, the state acts as the key site where social power relations amongst the different sub-ensembles are crystallised—thus the idea of the ‘relational’ character of the state as ‘relations amongst the relations’. Therefore, the state is also where struggles between the different types of societal organisations, principles of societalisation, and state projects, etc. are conducted, because of the part–whole paradox in which the state is so strongly implicated.” (Jessop, 2007a:

and moral leadership’ of a particular class (or class fraction) or, more precisely, its political, intellectual, and moral spokesmen. The key to the exercise of such leadership is the development of a specific ‘*hegemonic project*’ which can resolve the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interests and the general interest. This involves the mobilisation of support behind a concrete, national-popular programme of action which asserts a general interest in the pursuit of objectives that explicitly or implicitly advance the long-term interests of the hegemonic class (fraction) and which also privileges particular ‘economic–corporate interests compatible with this program. Conversely those particular interests which are inconsistent with the project are deemed immoral and/or irrational and, insofar as they are still pursued by groups outside the consensus, they are also liable to sanction. ” (Jessop, 1991a: 171) The term ‘class-relevance’ which concretely characterises popular or elite movements, is a term Jessop has borrowed from Ernesto Laclau, as the alternative of its orthodox counterpart, class-consciousness: “... [P]opular or elite movements organized around extra-economic institutional orders, with their own modes of domination and exclusion and their own politics of identity and difference, have no necessary class belonging ... But they still have a conjuncturally determined – thus hard to calculate and provisional – class relevance.” (Jessop, 2005: 32)

8) Since there are a multiplicity of rival principles of societalization linked to different functional sub-systems, identities and values anchored in civil society or the lifeworld, any of these, in principle, could become dominant, at least temporarily. Accordingly, there is no guarantee that the ‘modern state’ will always (or ever) be ‘capitalist’, and it is perfectly possible for it to principally operate as “...a military power, a theocratic regime, a representative democratic regime answerable to civil society, an apartheid state, or an ethnico–political state.” (Jessop, 2007a: 8)²²⁴ Furthermore, even where capital accumulation is the dominant principle of societalisation by virtue of structural biases and/or successful political strategies and struggles, this would not imply that state managers would disregard the principles of societalisation, due to the operational autonomies and the substantive interdependencies of the sub-systems. Therefore, they “... typically have regard to the codes, programmes, and activities of other functional systems and the dynamic of the lifeworld in their efforts to maintain a modicum of institutional integration and social cohesion within the state’s territorial boundaries and to reduce external threats.” (Jessop, 2007a: 8)

As the name implies, Bob Jessop’s 2002 book ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’ concentrates, specifically, upon the nature, functions and forms of the ‘capitalist’ type of state, and its future given the worldwide trend towards the ecological dominance of the capitalist economy. One of the key questions here is what is it that distinguishes the institutional forms of the

²²⁴ Perfectly, and not ‘equally’ possible, because “... exploration of state forms may indicate certain strategically selective biases ...” in regard of the capitalist state (Jessop, 2007a: 8).

capitalist state, form the other types of states, based upon the organising principles of other sub-systems of relations.

As far as the ‘modern’—or the capitalist, for that matter—type of state is concerned, Jessop points out Marx and Engels have themselves left only few remarks of the sort. Nonetheless, the ostensive definitions they have offered have singled out as the basic features of the state, the concentration and centralisation of power, the territory, bureaucracy, army and police (the coercive apparatus), clergy, taxation, political and property rights, and taxation.²²⁵ On the other hand, there have been few further attempts to develop, by later Marxists, a theory of the state based on an ‘institutional’ definition, similar to that of the orthodox political science.²²⁶ Jessop (2007a: 9) himself argues that, tentatively, “...the *core of the state apparatus* can be defined as a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’. This broad definition identifies the state in terms of its generic features as a specific form of macro-political organization with a

²²⁵ Thus, in the ‘German Ideology’ (1845–1846), they refer to the state’s control over the means of coercion and often give ostensive definitions with the list of the institutions that comprise the state. In his celebrated ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (1852), Marx refers to the French state as executive power, supported by bureaucratic and military organisation. In ‘The Civil War in France’ (1870), he describes the French state, as the centralised state power, supported by the organs of army, policy, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature. And, in ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ (1875), he identifies the Prussian state as a military despotism and a police state, supported by a bureaucracy, and embellished with parliamentary forms. Finally, in his ‘The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State’ (1884), Engels cites, as the defining features of the state, its territorial organisation, specialised coercive force, taxation, administrative staff, and, the political rights graded on the basis of property. See, Jessop (1982: 21).

²²⁶ A rare instance is Ralph Miliband, who, in the opening chapters of his ‘The State in Capitalist Society’ (1969), argues that the state is not unitary, but composed of a number of institutions which, together make up the ‘state system’ (Jessop, 1982: 22)

specific type of political orientation ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 9) For the theoretical–empirical purposes of this thesis, Jessop’s emphasis upon the institutional definition of the state, generally, and the forms of the different types of states, more particularly, offers two advantages:

- Firstly, it provides a proper theoretical–empirical framework to enquire of the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building, generally, in terms of the emergence and the further evolution of its key institutions, and;
- Secondly, it enables the identification of the different societal principles and state projects which have come to dominate the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building, proto-state and state formations, on the basis of the composition and internal hierarchy of its various institutions.²²⁷
- Thirdly, the actual and imaginary, material and discursive properties and claims of the capitalist state provide a yardstick against which to measure the historical–conjunctural deviations of the T/C proto-state and state formations, that have been cause for past conflicts, struggles, potential and actual crises and transformative reforms.

As far as the capitalist state is concerned, the institutional properties and elements that are noteworthy, from the perspective of the articulation of economy and politics under capitalism, and for the purposes of this thesis, are as follows:

²²⁷ “This approach can also serve as a basis for describing specific states and political regimes and exploring the conditions in which states emerge, evolve, enter into crisis, and are transformed. A particular benefit of this initial cluster definition is its compatibility with diverse approaches to the analysis of the state and with recognition of what Mann (1986) terms the polymorphous crystallization of state power associated with alternative principles of societalization.” (Jessop, 2007a: 9)

Table 3.1. Jessop's Stylised Model of the Capitalist State

ARTICULATION OF ECONOMY AND STATE IN CAPITALISM		
Institutional separation between market economy, sovereign state and a public sphere (civil society) located beyond market and state	Constitutionalized claim to a monopoly of organized coercion within the territory mapped by the state. Role of legality in legitimation of the state and its activities	State is a tax state. Income derives largely from taxes on economic property, actors and activities and from loans raised from market actors. Tax capacity depends on legal authority + coercion. Ideal bourgeois tax form is a continuing and general contribution to government revenue that can be applied freely by state to legitimate tasks – not ad hoc, specifically levied for specific tasks.
IMPLICATION FOR THE ECONOMY AND CLASS RELATIONS		
Economy is organized under dominance of capitalist law of value as mediated through competition between capitals and economic class struggle	Coercion is excluded from immediate organization of labour process. Thus value form and market forces, not direct coercion, shape capital accumulation. Nonetheless coercion has a key role in securing the external conditions of existence of the operation of the capitalist economy	Taxes deducted from private revenues may be used to produce 'public goods'.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATE AND POLITICS		
<i>Raison d'état</i> (autonomous political rationality) distinct from profit-and-loss logic of market and from religious, moral, or ethical principles	Specialized military–police organs are subject to constitutional control. Force has ideological as well as repressive functions. Subject to law, state may intervene to compensate for market failure in 'national' or 'public' interest	Subjects of the state in its territory have a general duty to pay taxes, regardless of whether or not they approve of specific state activities. Taxation capacity acts as security for sovereign debt. Taxation capacity acts as security for sovereign debt
Specialised administrative staff with its own channels of recruitment, training, and <i>esprit de corps</i> . This staff is subject to the authority of the political executive.	Economic subjects are formally free and equal owners of commodities, including labour-power. Private law develops on the basis of property rights and contract law.	Formally sovereign state with distinct and exclusive territorial domain in which it is free to act without direct, authoritative interference from other states or actors. Substantively, states are constrained in exercise of

It forms a social category (not a class) that is internally divided by market and status position		sovereignty by balance of international forces as well as by domestic balance
	Public law organized around the individual–state, public–private, and the national–international distinctions	Conflict between economy as abstract and apolitical ‘space of flows’ in the world market and as the sum of localized activities, with an inevitably politically overdetermined character. Particular capitals may try to escape state control or seek support in world competition from their respective states
		Ideally, states are recognized by other states as sovereign in their own territories but they may need to defend this territorial integrity by force. Political and military rivalry depends in part on strength of national economy. Need to balance pursuit of geo-economic and geo-political goals and social cohesion

Source: Slightly abridged form of ‘Table 1.4 Some key features of the capitalist type of state’, Jessop, (2005: 38–39)

There are three more elements of Bob Jessop’s theory that I should like to cover before I bring this chapter to a close by a few critical remarks. These are, respectively, (a) the issues of the spatial–temporal fix and structured coherence—the ‘geographical turn’ in his theory of strategic selectivity; (b) the ‘cultural turn’ in his critical political economy, and (c) his method of inquiry.

(a) Spatial-temporal fix and structured coherence:

One of Bob Jessop's recent areas of interest is global/international political economy, and more specifically, the changing spatial-temporal scales of the relationship of capital(s) and state(s), more specifically, the complex relationships between the scales of governance of nation-states and capital (accumulation), in the age of 'globalisation'. In this respect, Jessop critically assimilates two basic concepts of David Harvey's work on the geography of capital accumulation, namely, the spatial-temporal fix, and structured coherence, by recasting some of the key elements of his theory in these terms. Harvey's starting point is the critical remark that Marx's *Capital* basically treats capital accumulation in its temporal dimension, at the expense of its spatial (and/or geographical) dimension. Generally speaking, his conceptualisation and discussion of value, surplus value, and the rate of surplus value in Volume I, of the circulation of capital in Volume II, and of the circuit of capital in Volume III seem to neglect the spaces/geography of capital and to put to the core its temporality. Think, for instance, of his discussion of the measurement of value, of the rates of absolute and relative labour value, of the inter-temporal conditions of inter-departmental balances, the turn-over times of the various phases of the capital circuit, etc. According to Harvey, worldwide capitalist crises of over-accumulation are the basic trigger of the efforts to restructure the process of capital accumulation, not only temporally, but spatially, as well. In its temporal dimension, capitalist accumulation is about commanding surplus labour

time and converting it into profit within the socially-necessary turnover time. But space, there, is an obstacle: Hence, the perpetual striving of capital to overcome spatial obstacles, ‘to annihilate space with time’. The contradiction here is that, time needs space to annihilate space: Spatial organisation (transport, communication, urbanisation) is necessary to overcome space. The upshot is a tendency towards a ‘structured coherence’ which embraces production, consumption, patterns of supply and demand (for commodities and labour power), production and realisation, class struggle and accumulation, culture and lifestyle, the forms and technologies of production, the technologies, quantities and qualities of consumption, patterns of labour demand and supply, and patterns of physical and social infrastructures. Corresponding, geographically, to structured coherences, are regional spaces (Harvey, 2001: 327–329). Capitalism strives, in a perpetual manner, to create a social and physical landscape in its own image and requisite to its own needs at a particular point in time, only just as certainly to undermine, disrupt and even destroy that landscape at a later point in time (Harvey, 2001: 332–333). On the other hand, Jessop extends the ideas of spatio-temporal fix and structured coherence to his analysis of strategic selectivity, and historical blocs. Thus, “[a]ll structures privilege the adoption, as a condition for success, of certain spatial and temporal horizons of action by those seeking to control, resist, reproduce or transform them ... [whilst] ... strategies and tactics are often concerned with the most appropriate spatio-temporal horizons,

forms of spatio-temporal governance ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 46) On the hand, one of the conclusions of the strategic-relational approach is that the interactions between structurally inscribed selectivity and structurally oriented strategic calculation could lead ... to the constitution of a configuration characterised by ‘structured coherence’.” (Jessop, 2007a: 46) As a matter of fact, the so-called ‘historical bloc’ as “... the mutually implicated, structurally coupled, and historically co-evolving ensemble of economic, political, and socio-cultural relations, the construction of which depends on the activities of organic intellectuals and collective projects as well as on the gradual and emergent co-adaptation of institutions and conduct.” is but one of the forms that the structured coherence could assume (Jessop, 2007a: 46–47) Furthermore, this conclusion could be extended to involve the spatio-temporal fixes, “... that is, [the] social arrangements that facilitate the deferral and displacement of contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and conflicts and thereby help to produce zones of relative stability at the expense of future problems, other spaces, zones.” (Jessop, 2007a: 47)

(b) Cultural Political Economy (CPE):

On the other hand, Bob Jessop has lately reinforced his prior ‘cultural turn’, by adopting the term ‘cultural political economy’ as a step forward in the development of his strategic–relational approach (Jessop, 2007: 51).²²⁸ Jessop and Sum (2001: 89–90) reject the fetishisation of

²²⁸ This, especially after his collaboration with Ngai-Ling Sum, who has first suggested the term CPE.

disciplinary boundaries. They distinguish three phases in the development of political economy, namely, the pre-disciplinary, disciplinary, and post-disciplinary. Whilst the origins of classical political economy was pre-disciplinary—its students were plymaths, it was thence separated into distinct disciplines, sociology, economics, etc, and it is now becoming post-disciplinary. From the point of view of the post-disciplinary project, the significance of Marxism is its ambition to provide a comprehensive perspective on social relations as a whole, in term of the historically specific conditions of existence (Jessop and Sum, 2001: 91). To develop a post-disciplinary approach to the capitalist social formations, Jessop (2004: 159–160), Jessop applies the so-called cultural turn to ‘critical political economy’, by way of synthesising it with ‘critical semiotic analysis’. It is important to note that, cultural political economy is, *par excellence*, the critique of traditional political economy, thus, in a way, the completion of Marx’s critique of political economy. The point of cultural political economy is that, semiosis contributes to the constitution, co-constitution, and co-evolution of social objects and social subjects. Epistemologically, cultural political economy opposes to traditional political economy, in its emphasis on contextuality and historicity of knowledge, together with the materiality of social relations, and its efforts to highlight, in the spirit of Marx’s work, the ‘behind-the-backs’ processes. Basically, Jessop uses the ideas of critical semiotic analysis, to extend his concept of strategic selectivity into ‘discursive selectivity’. In so doing, he draws upon Colin Hay, who

argues that in periods of moral panic and social crisis, struggles to interpret the given conjuncture potentially shape subsequent developments, so that, the ability to win such struggles depend “.... not only on structural factors (strategic selectivity), but also on discursive factors (discursive selectivity).” (Jessop, 2007a: 48) It is important to note that Jessop places his semiotic approach on materialist foundations. The point is that access to the context is discursively mediated. Thus, “[h]ow actors behave—the strategies they consider in the first place, the strategies they deploy in the final instance and the policies they formulate—reflects their understanding of the context in which they find themselves.” On the other hand, “... for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide certain templates through which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors’ direct and mediated experiences. In this sense the discursive or ideational is only ever relatively autonomous of the material.” (Jessop, 2007a: 49) Thus, context is doubly selective: (i) Strategically, in the sense that it selects, but never determines, certain strategies over others, and; (ii) discursively, in the sense that it selects, but never determines, the discourses through which it might be appropriated. ...” (Jessop, 2007a: 49) Discursive selectivity has critical consequences upon the dynamics of social integration, cohesion, tensions, break-ups and crises, and transformations, through, especially, the competing narratives of the origins of the crisis, its significance, and the way forward.²²⁹

²²⁹ “In order to explain why some discourses rather than others became hegemonic, it is necessary to explore how specific material and discursive mechanisms combined in

(c) Methodology—Critical Realism, and the Method of Articulation:

Bob Jessop adopts critical realism, which he defines as “... a philosophy of science (natural and social) that distinguishes between real structures (mechanisms, capacities, vulnerabilities), actual processes or events (the actualization of certain potentials), and empirical evidence (traces of these events).” (Jessop, 2007a: 45) In his ‘The Capitalist State’ (1982), he critically studied the substantive arguments associated with the three basic methodological approaches to Marxist state theorisation, namely, subsumption, derivation, and articulation,²³⁰ each with its own ontology and epistemology, claims, and its own substantive research agenda (Jessop, 2007a: 28). Methodological approaches comprise ontological claims apropos of the relationships of causality, and epistemological claims apropos of theory construction. Out of the three methodological approaches above, Jessop espouses the method of articulation. Ontologically, Jessop’s key concept is the so-called ‘contingent necessity’, defined as “... the non-necessary interaction of different causal chains to produce a definite outcome whose own necessity originates only in and through the contingent coming together of these causal chains in a definite context.” (Jessop, 1990: 11)²³¹

different ways with different weights at different times to select some discourses (imaginaries) from others (especially during periods of crisis when there was a massive proliferation of competing narratives offering interpretations of the origins of the crisis, its significance, and the way forward) and in a next round retained (embrained, embodied, and institutionalized) some of the previously selected discourses.” (Jessop, 2007a: 50–51)

²³⁰ Different methodological approaches are associated with different theoretical traditions. Thus, the so-called ‘stamocap’ (state monopoly capitalism) approach which “... involves the repetition of basic Marxist–Leninist principles and the subsumption of specific cases under these principles ...” is based upon the method of subsumption (Jessop, 1982: 72) On the other hand, the German derivation debate which “... has stressed the need for a systematic derivation of the form and functions of the bourgeois state from the most abstract principles of political economy.” (Jessop, 1982: 78)

Epistemologically, this implies a double strategy of theory construction that reinterprets Marx's discussion of the method of political economy in the Introduction to *Grundrisse*. Thus, "... the appropriate methodology for theory construction is one based on a dual movement: first, from abstract to concrete along one plane of analysis; and, secondly, from simple to complex through the differential articulation of different planes of the real world." (Jessop, 1990: 11). Substantively, the contingent necessity of social phenomena implies a trans-theoretical, trans-disciplinary research agenda. This is because, "[t]he concept of 'contingent necessity' with its apparent '*contradictio in adjecto*' highlights the fact that, while the combination or interaction of different causal chains produces a determinate outcome (necessity), there is no single theory that can predict or determine the manner in which such causal chains converge and/or interact (contingency)." (Jessop, 1982: 212) From the point of view of the relationships of causality, the basic implication is the refutation that "... the economic system (ro the dominant mode of production) has the properties necessary to enable it to play a unilateral causal role in determining the form, functions or impact of other systems of social relations." (Jessop, 1990:12). On the other hand, Jessop's refutation of 'economic determinism' implies that "Marxist analyses (i.e. studies which focus on modes of production, their dynamics, their conditions of existence and their effects on other phenomena) could exhaust all aspects of social structures and or social

²³¹ Clearly, contingent necessity as a mode of causality follows from the prior claim of ontologically distinct subensembles of social relations.

relations. Therefore, "... Marxist analyses must be articulated with concepts, principles of explanation and assumptions drawn from non-Marxist theories." (Jessop, 1990: 12–13) More specifically, and in terms of the state theory, Jessop refutes all attempts to reduce the state to just one of its many determinations. On the other hand, in his enquiries of specific questions and cases, Jessop tries to avoid one of the most frequent problems, that of trying to analyse concrete–complex issues of conjuncturally specific practical action, through abstract epistemological or methodological fiat: "[T]he 'strategic-relational approach' leaves these issues underdetermined on an abstract-simple level and permits their resolution through appropriately detailed conjunctural analysis." (Jessop, 2007a: 44)

Notwithstanding that, in the historical–empirical testing of their respective theories of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright, I shall try to keep equal distance to both thinkers for the sake of fairness, my theoretical sympathies lie with the former. Whilst I adopt his understanding of the society, state, causality, strategic selectivity, discursivity, etc., there is one particular point I tend to disagree. As noted above, Jessop's society consists of several autopoietic (self-organising) systems, such as the economic system, the legal system, the political system, science, the educational system, religion, and art. They all have their own distinctive operational codes, organisational principles, institutional dynamics, modes of calculation, logics of appropriateness, etc. Most importantly, together they form a self-organising ecology of instituted systems where, the systems are *operationally*

autonomous, and *materially–substantively interdependent*. Now, my objections are two: (1) They may not quite be operationally autonomous, and; (2) by implication, one may not be able to neatly distinguish between operational autonomy and material–substantive interdependence.

Thus, I generally think that one must more closely pay heed to two levels of analysis, namely, the level of organisations, and the level of individuals. More specifically, due attention must be given to the necessary conditions of existence of (i) organisations, and (ii) individuals:

- (i) Organisations: The instituted sub-ensembles or systems of social relations above, can alternatively be considered as, firstly distinct types fields of activities, and secondly organised activities. Thus, economy, legal affairs, politics, science, education, religion, and art, are distinct types and fields of human activity. Furthermore, they are organised activities, i.e. fields of activity consisting of a multiplicity of different organisations—they are, organisational fields. All human activity consists of using up certain inputs towards specific ends. It is important to note that, the inputs in question are the products of human labour. Therefore, all types of activities presuppose and depend upon for the fulfilment of their functions, the production activity, i.e. the social division of labour, and the products of human labour. But they only access to the inputs they need, by means of linking to the economy, in one way or another. It is true that, once they start their operations, they are autonomous in their operational

codes, organisational principles, institutional dynamics, modes of calculation, logics of appropriateness, etc. However, they must first access the inputs, in order to be able to start and restart their operations. Therefore, they are not, operationally autonomous. In this sense, biological ecologies and the operations of biological systems are not a good point of reference to understand the society. Furthermore, once it is admitted that the instituted sub-systems are operationally not autonomous, the distinction between operational autonomy and material–substantive interdependence is totally blurred. Overall, there is a critical causal asymmetry between the economy, and all the other sub-systems that depend on its operation for their own operations. The only sub-system that is operationally autonomous in the above sense is production, for it depends for its present operation on its own, past operation.

- (ii) Individuals: All individuals are constantly facing the basic problem of survival, i.e. the question of the provision of the conditions of their physical–emotive existence. Once more, this implies that they depend for their survival upon the products of human labour, in other words, that their survivals presuppose a certain division of labour, and the outcomes of production activity. But, they can only access to the material inputs of their individual existence, by means of integrating themselves into, not necessarily economic activity, but to one or another field of activity of sub-ensembles of relations. Therefore, even if they may not be part of production or economic

activity, or even if they may feel secure and independent, they actually depend upon the outcomes of production, the products of human labour. Therefore, the basic human condition of existence compels each and every individual to devise a personal strategy to access to the products of human labour. It is important to note that the possibility of not being able to access to the products of human labour means for every individual a concrete and immediate threat to his or her own existence and a potential limitation of his/her own freedom due to the necessity of integrating himself/herself through the membership of one sub-ensemble of relations or another, to the wider society. It is important to note that, the foregoing argument does not assume full or even partial commodification, despite the fact that the problem probably becomes most acute under the circumstances of a fully commodified society.²³²

3.3. YOUTHLY AND MATURE WORKS OF ERIC OLIN-WRIGHT: MODES AND MODELS OF DETERMINATION *VERSUS* MARXIST MICRO-FOUNDATIONS AND CAUSAL SYMMETRY

“For over a quarter of a century Bob Jessop has been creatively grappling with the problem of how to understand the capitalist state, its dilemmas and contradictions. The Future of the Capitalist State is a thoughtful, complex, provocative culmination of this work. It unequivocally demonstrates that

²³² “Whatever the ethics of the situation, workers who own no means of production, and thus no access to the resources of nature in a ‘civilised’ society, are placed in a position of subservient dependence upon those who do own such means.” “The appearance is, though, that the sale of labour is freely entered into by the worker as an exchange process and that the necessary equity of such exchange processes applies. For Marx this represented a distortion in that it gave no recognition to the fact that the worker’s situation is one of continuous dependence motivated by sheer survival. He cannot rationally choose to opt out and he enters the ‘exchange’ at a distinct disadvantage relative to the capitalist.” (Oakley, 1984: 52)

Marxist tradition remains a vibrant source of ideas about capitalism and the state.”

*Erik Olin Wright, University of Wisconsin**

The *doyen* of the Marxist theory of class, uncontestably, Erik Olin Wright’s work is characterised by continuity and break. His interest in the subject matters of class and equality, on the one hand, and his early fastidiousness about methodology—conceptual and empirical models of causality, on the other, do continue. Yet, from the Althusserian structuralist that he once was, he has converted into the Analytical Marxist he now is. Furthermore, he has retreated from a number of key concepts approaches of his youthly work, namely, value and surplus value—and thereby, the Labour Theory of Value, *à la* Marx, and dialectics.²³³ For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be placed upon his youthly work, more specifically, the model of causality elaborated in his 1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’, which will be tested on the basis of a detailed reading of the T/C historical–empirical material.

As a graduate student of sociology, during the revival of Marxist studies in the late 1960s, Wright encountered “... the hegemony of an empiricist, positivist hegemony in the social sciences.” (Wright, 1979: 9) One response was to equate the use of quantitative techniques—testable hypotheses, linear

* Eric Olin Wright on Bob Jessop’s ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’, the back cover of Polity Press edition of 2005.

²³³ Nonetheless, in his definition of exploitation, he seems to resort to some sort of a ‘surplus product’ and ‘surplus labour.’ Obviously, the question is how labour would be reduced to ‘standard labour’, using the terms of Ricardo. As is well known, before he arrives at the concept of value, Marx discusses at length, the problem of the reduction of concrete, heterogenous labour, to abstract, homogenous, socially necessary labour.

regressions, etc. to bourgeois ideology and positivist methodology, as opposed to historical and dialectical thinking. Another was to engage alternative empirical work, which served to legitimise the use of some Marxist categories, but where “... much of the dialectical character of Marxist theory was [also] lost in the process.” (Wright, 1979: 9–10) But, there was a third course to pursue to engage orthodox social theory and to counter its claims to scientificity—to develop, as Marxists, more precise concepts and more precise causal connections amongst those concepts, in a way to produce empirically testable propositions.²³⁴ Clearly, the young Erik Olin Wright had a strong distaste for both the ‘speculative’ and the crass ‘empiricist’ type of dogmatic works that plagued Marxist theory.²³⁵ As he saw it, one of the epistemological premises of Marxist theory was the distinction between the level of appearances—the everyday experiences of people, and the underlying structures and dynamics of social relations that were not immediately observable (Wright, 1979: 11). Accordingly, Marxists had generally stressed the importance of decoding and elaborating a theory of the underlying structures of social relations, of their intrinsic contradictions, and the way in which they generated the appearances people

²³⁴ “Naturally, there is a third alternative: the attempt to develop empirical research agendas firmly rooted within not only the categories, but the logic, of Marxist theory. Such an approach would reject the positivist premise that theory construction is simply a process of empirical generalization of law-like regularities, but would also insist that Marxist theory should generate propositions about the real World which can be empirically studied.” (Wright, 1979: 10)

²³⁵ According to Wright (1979: 12–13), there are two problems with Marxist research: “On the one hand, Marxist theory often tends to become very ideological and immutable to transformation from empirical study. The frequent impression in Marxist research that all of the answers are pre-given, are ‘known’ prior to investigation, is at least partially the result of the methodological distance between the general theory and the ‘facts’ of history. On the other hand, Marxist research often becomes purely descriptive contributing only marginally to the development of Marxist theory.”

encountered in their everyday experiences (Wright, 1979: 11–12). Yet, it was one thing to claim that scientific explication required the decoding of deep structures and hidden contradictions, and another, to develop a ‘strategy’ to study the social world that would allow to link the level of structural processes to that of empirically observable phenomena. “General maxims about moving from the concrete to the abstract and back to the concrete are not very helpful. The problem is *how* to move from the concrete to the abstract, and how to move back.” (Wright, 1979: 12)

In his later works, Erik Olin Wright espouses Analytical Marxism. Emerged in the 1970s, this current of thought has combined analytical philosophy—with its emphasis upon clarity and formal arguments, empirical social science, and neoclassical economic analysis with traditional Marxist theoretical and political concerns. As a project of the reconstruction of Marxism, Analytical Marxism aims at the clarification of its core concepts and assumptions, and its foundation upon rigorous logical and/or formal arguments. “In particular, analytical Marxists are impatient with vague programmatic schemes of an all-encompassing sort and with views that elude precise formulation.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 3) Not surprisingly, its affiliations with conventional methodological and philosophical approaches and its dialogue with Neoclassical Economics have made Analytical Marxism the target of severe criticisms by the more orthodox Marxists. One of the basic arguments of Analytical Marxism is its “... rejection of the thesis that Marxism as a social theory deploys a distinctive methodology that differentiates it radically from “bourgeois social science.” (Wright, et

al., 1992: 5–6) To reconstruct Marxism upon solid grounds, it is necessary to confront the kind of obscurantist arguments that have made claims to its methodological distinctiveness. Take, for instance, the claims that Marxist theory, in contradistinction with its rivals, is ‘dialectical’. According to Erik Olin Wright, the meaning of this oft-repeated claim is notoriously ambiguous. This does not imply that all of the specific elements subsumed, heretofore, under the expression of Marxist method should be dismissed at once. “The point is that in order to be useful, such elements have to be translated into a language of causes, mechanisms and effects, rather than left as elusive philosophical principles.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 6)

In retrospect, it is clear that the quest for a conceptually and causally clear, empirically-oriented theory was the basic drive of Erik Olin Wright’s theoretical evolution.²³⁶ In the opening pages of his 1978 book, Wright sets out the basics of a new strategy. Thus, the first task is to overcome the opacity which generally characterised Marxist theoretical work, and (re)formulate Marxist theory in a comprehensible way. “In particular, it is critical to distinguish within Marxism between assumptions or premises which are not subject to transformation by historical investigation, and propositions which are; and it is important to distinguish between definitions of concepts and propositions about those concepts.” (Wright, 1979: 13) As noted above, the two level—that of the deep structural relations and the ‘observed’ level of appearances largely characterises

²³⁶ Thus, his abandoning of parts of Marx’s thought, which he took to be too speculative to become conceptually and causally comprehensible and to lend themselves to empirical work, and his espousing of Analytical Marxism.

Wright's understanding of the Marxist ontology and epistemology. Therefore, a conceptually and causally clear and empirically-oriented theory would necessitate the clarification and the full elaboration of the relationships (of causality) between the deeper structures and the 'causes' thereof, on the one hand, and the surface phenomena and the manifest effects thereupon.²³⁷ Althusser's idea of 'structural causality', and 'over-determination',²³⁸ particularly, was the right steps towards the of elaboration of a Marxist theory that would yield itself to empirical study, but it was too general and aggregate to be readily applied. This required two tasks:

- i) To break down structural causality into the different types of causality, to be more precise, "... a series of distinct relationships of determination among the structural categories of Marxist theory and between those categories and the appearances of empirical investigation ...", called the 'modes of determination';

²³⁷ "... [H]istorical investigation gathers data at the level of appearances (by definition): events, personal ties, manifest economic variables, institutional arrangements, demographic distributions, and so on. In some sense these phenomena constitute 'effects' of structural relations. The problem is to define more systematically what 'effects' means. If empirical investigation is to be directly linked to the logic of the theory itself, then much greater rigour in understanding the logic of causality implicit in the theory is necessary." (Wright, 1997: 14)

²³⁸ The core concept of Althusser's understanding of (structural) causality is over-determination, which is based on the ontology of the 'complex structured whole'. "Thus the Althusserians [including, amongst others, Poulantzas] argue that a mode of production (and, by extension, a social formation) is a complex structured whole, comprises several relatively autonomous regions which nonetheless condition each other, is characterised by the dominance of one region (economic, juridico-political, or ideological) over the other regions, and is subject to economic determination in the last instance in so far as the mode of production assigns the dominant role to one or other of these regions ..." (Jessop, 1982: 130) It is important to note that the basis of 'economic determination' is the mode of production as the whole, and not its economic' part (region). Althusserians have thus distanced themselves from a narrowly conceived economic 'determinism'.

- ii) to develop ‘structure–agency’ models of causality—namely, ‘models of determination’, i.e. “... schematic representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process ...” comprising the various structures and agencies, on the one hand, and the various modes of determination amongst them, on the other (Wright, 1979: 14–15).²³⁹

Accordingly, the scheme of causality Wright introduces in his 1979 book is, basically, a provisional attempt to elaborate a more differentiated version of the Althusserian ‘structured whole’. Wright also argues that his symbolic maps are aimed at the elaboration of a ‘dialectical view of history’, seeing history as a ‘dynamic’, ‘non-random’ process, caused by ‘structural constraints and contradictions’.²⁴⁰

Wright (1979: 15) defines six basic modes of determination which make up part of the global concept of structural causality: i) Structural limitation; ii) selection; iii) reproduction/nonreproduction; iv) limits of functional compatibility; v) transformation, and; vi) mediation:

²³⁹ Apart from one or two brief remarks, Erik Olin Wright reveals very little about the genesis of his theory of causality: “The idea of trying to formulate a systematic language for capturing the causal imagery of Marxist theory was initially stimulated by the work of Arthur Stinchcombe, especially in his book *Constructing Social Theories*, New York, 1968. In particular, his discussion of the logic of functional causation and historicist causation was important in suggesting the utility of distinguishing between types of causal relations. The specific typology of determination presented here has been most influenced by the work of Poulantzas and other ‘structuralist’ Marxists and the work of Claus Offe.” (Wright, 1997: 14)

²⁴⁰ “The diagrams themselves may appear to be highly mechanistic and rigid, not allowing for the dynamic movements which lie at the heart of a dialectical view of history. The intention, however, is to develop a way of representing the structural constraints and contradictions present in a given society which make that dynamic movement a non-random process.” (Wright, 1979: 15)

- (i) *Structural Limitation*: This is basically a reinterpretation (or assimilation) of the ‘asymmetrical’ relation of causality and the correspondence, between structure/base and superstructure, postulated by Marx, in his noted ‘Preface’ to ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ (1859). This is a ‘limit’—as its name implies, and in this sense, Althusserian ‘in the last instance’ type of causality. Structural limitation “constitutes a pattern of determination in which some social structure establishes limits within which some other structure or process can vary, and establishes probabilities for the specific structures or process that are possible within those limits.” (Wright, 1979: 15–16) In other words, some structure puts limits upon, or determine the forms of some other structure, and it is in this sense that the latter is determined, in its form. This kind of form determination is the key to understanding the sense in which economic structures ‘ultimately’ determine political and ideological structures: “... economic structures set limits on the possible forms of political and ideological structures, and make some of those possible forms more likely than others, but they do not rigidly determine in a mechanistic manner any given form of political and ideological relations.” (Wright, 1979: 16) A good example of the structural determination is the relationship between the economic structure and the corresponding forms of the state.²⁴¹ For instance, under a feudal economic structure, a representative democracy based upon universal

²⁴¹ As noted above, modes of determination were about the relationships of determination amongst the structural categories, as well as between those categories and the appearances

suffrage is structurally impossible, or, alternatively speaking, falls outside the structural limits of that economy, such as the control of the means of production by the peasantry, the appropriation of the surplus product by coercion, the restricted amount of surplus available, etc.²⁴² On the other hand, the selfsame limits allow a fairly wide range of state forms, from the decentralised manorial type of political rule, to the relatively centralised Absolutist state. Accordingly, “[w]hile the given structure of feudal economic relations may have shaped the likelihood of different specific forms of the feudal state, it did not determine uniquely which form occurred.” (Wright, 1979: 16)²⁴³

- (ii) *Selection*: This is about ‘second-order’ limits, i.e. the setting of limits within the first order limits above. More specifically, selection concerns “... those social mechanisms that concretely determine

of empirical investigation. It is not clear, if the ‘form’ (of a structure) is treated as appearance of structure. As far as this particular example is concerned, it is not clear whether it is about a causality between two structures, or between a structure and an appearance—or the ‘form’ a structure, or yet to forms. Recall that in his Introduction to Grundrisse, Marx clearly distinguished between production as abstraction, and the form of production. In the introductory first paragraph of Volume I of Capital, Marx singles out the immense accumulation of commodities—whose unit is a single commodity, as the ‘appearance’ [*erscheint*] of ‘wealth’ under the capitalist ‘mode’ of production, in other words, problematises the capitalist ‘form’ of wealth. On the other hand, in the opening pages of Volume I of Capital, Marx often speaks of the ‘phenomenal’ forms. Thus, in Marx, forms do not always seem to relate to surface phenomena, e.g. as in the case of the ‘value form’—as opposed to the commodity form, or exchange value, or yet, as in the case of the ‘mode’ of production. Be that as it may, in Wright’s presentation of his theory of causality, the distinction between deeper (structural) causes and appearance, on the one hand, and the superstructure and appearance, on the other, does seem to remain ambivalent.

²⁴² I find this kind of counter-historical, counter-factual examples involving past economic structures and future forms hardly useful. However, the idea of structural limits could well be useful, if applied to historical–factual situations, which involve present forms and past structures. Thus, as far as the Cypriot economy of the early 1960s is concerned, I claim that its small-peasantry and petty-trade basis posed a structural limit against the sustenance of the modern form of the state.

²⁴³ It is important to note that not “... every structurally possible form of the state (or other structure determined by a relation of structural limitation) is necessarily functional for the reproduction of the determining structure.” (Wright, 1979: 16)

ranges of outcomes, or in the extreme case specific outcomes, within a structurally limited range of possibilities.” Analyses of specific ‘historical conjunctures’ generally concern the enquiries of the concrete patterns of selection that occur within the structural limits. Wright defines two types of selections, termed as ‘negative’ and ‘positive’. Whilst negative selection concerns those mechanisms which exclude certain possibilities, positive selection concerns those which determine the specific outcomes from amongst those that are possible. More specifically, the so-called ‘decision-making processes’ are processes of positive selection. Negative and positive selections together determine the concrete structural outcomes within the first-order structural limits. A good illustration would be the relationships between the economic structure (forces and relations of production), the state structure and class struggle. Thus, “... the economic structure establishes limits of variation on both class struggle and the structure of the state: the state in turn acts as a selection mechanism on forms of class struggle, shaping those struggles within limits established by the underlying economic structure.” (Wright, 1979: 17)²⁴⁴ It is important to note that Bob Jessop rejects and replaces the concept of structural selection with the concept of ‘strategic selectivity’.

²⁴⁴ “For example, the possibility of revolutionary socialist struggles organized through political parties is beyond the limits of variation imposed by feudal economic relations. Within the broad range of possible class struggles that could occur, the structure of the state was an important selection mechanism which determined whether struggles would take the form of land invasions, grain riots, millenarian movements, peasant flight from landlords, etc.” (Wright, 1979: 18)

(iii) *Reproduction versus Non-Reproduction*: “To say that one structure functions to reproduce another implies that the reproducing structure prevents the reproduced structure from changing in certain fundamental ways.” In the case of the relationship of capitalist economy—the structure, and the state—the superstructure, this is to say two things: (a) The capitalist state reproduces the capitalist economic relations (the structure), i.e. prevents them from changing into non-economic relations, and; (b) in the absence of such a reproduction (prevention) process, capitalist economic relations would, potentially but not inevitably, change into non-capitalist economic relations (Wright, 1979: 18). Therefore, reproduction is also a ‘limit’ type of causality, but of another sort—so that it keeps the determined structure within certain limits of variation. On the other hand, “[t]he essential difference from structural limitation is that in the latter case there is no presumption that the determined structure would necessarily change in the absence of the specific structural limitation process, whereas in the case of reproduction such changes would normally occur.” (Wright, 1979: 18–19) Finally, to say that the capitalist is necessary for the reproduction of the capitalist economic structure does not imply that the state always functions optimally towards the reproduction of those economic relations. It may function very unoptimally, and under some circumstances, it may even become in non-reproductive. Thus, “[R]eproduction/nonreproduction must

therefore be understood as a variable relation of determination, not an absolute one.” (Wright, 1976: 19)

- (iv) *Limits of Functional Compatibility*: Apparently, Wright has in mind here, the Marxist debate on the socio-economic formations, and more specifically, the question of the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production. Thus, if the state can fall short of functioning optimally, for the reproduction of the capitalist economy, and even become non-reproductive, then one needs to identify the processes which determine the forms of the state that are functionally reproductive, and non-reproductive. “This is what is meant by ‘limits of functional compatibility’: the mode of determination which determines which forms of the state will be reproductive and which non-reproductive. Stated in somewhat different terms, limits of functional compatibility determine what the effects of a given structure of the state will be on economic structures.” (Wright, 1979: 19) Apparently, despite its being a causality whose direction is from the state to the economy, this mode of determination is a ‘subordinate’ one, which is conditioned, in the first instance, by the ‘limits’ imposed upon itself by the economic structure—thus the ‘limits’ of functional compatibility: “As expressed in this model of determination, the economic structure both sets limits of variation on the structure of the state, and determines the extent to which it will itself be reproduced by the actual structure of the state which emerges.” On the other hand, the problem here is that the ‘limits of functional compatibility’ are not

intrinsically coordinated with the ‘structural limits’, or the ‘limits of structural variation’, or, alternatively speaking, the two modes of determination do not necessarily coincide. Accordingly, under certain circumstances, it is possible for a form of the state to emerge which is non-reproductive, and therefore, a structural contradiction to exist between the economic and the state structures. When this happens, there will either be a rapid transformation in the economic structures, or the state will be altered in a way that makes it once more reproductive. And, by and large, the outcome will be determined by the outcome of class struggles (Wright, 1979: 20). To illustrate this mode of determination, Wright refers to the classic case of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Thus, during the early stages of the rise of capitalism, the Absolutist state in Western Europe could be considered reproductive of a limited development of the new mode of production, in the context of a still largely feudal social structure. According to Perry Anderson, whilst the Absolutist state apparatus fundamentally protected the property and privileges of the aristocracy , the means whereby this protection was promoted could simultaneously ensure the development of the nascent mercantile and manufacturing capital. Yet, as capitalism developed, the Absolutist state started to become non-reproductive, as its basically feudal structure frustrated its promises for capital, even though it still fell within the structural limits of variation of the overall economic structure. The outcome was the resolution of the functional

incompatibility by means of the bourgeois revolutions and the violent transformation of the Absolutist state. As a matter of fact, Wright's understanding of the concept of 'contradiction' hinges upon the multiple ways in which the non-correspondance between structural and functional limits is generated (Wright, 1979: 16, 20–21).

- (v) *Transformation*: This is the mode of determination by which class struggle affects the processes of structural limitation, selection and reproduction/non-reproduction. It is important to note that transformation is the key to the 'dialectical' character of the relations of causality. Thus, whilst class struggle is structurally limited and selected by the various social structures, simultaneously, it reshapes those structures. It is important to stress the simultaneous quality of these modes of determination: "Class struggle is intrinsically a process of transformation of structures, and thus the very process which sets limits on class struggle is at the same time transformed by the struggles so limited." (Wright, 1979: 21)

Erik Olin Wright attributes a very key role to class struggle in the process of crisis and change. Thus, class struggle is not passively the consequence of the some 'objectively' produced crisis, but actively the cause of the crisis itself. Accordingly, the relationship between the concept of 'contradiction' and 'transformation' is the key to understanding the dynamics of crisis, agency and change. As noted above, contradictions between structures were made possible by the

non-correspondance between structural limits and the limits of functional compatibility, as modes of determination. “For that possibility to become actualized, however, class struggle must affect social structures through relations of transformation. Class struggles are, above all, struggles over social structures.” (Wright, 1979: 21–22) This implies that even if the structure of the state falls within the limits of functional compatibility, there is no reason to believe that compatibility will automatically last into the future. Class struggles transform economic relations, and thereby change the reproductions requirements themselves. Class struggles also transform the state, and thereby make it potentially less reproductive over time. “There is thus a systematic tendency for the contradictions between classes (class struggle) to generate contradictions between social structures (non-reproductive relations of determination).” (Wright, 1979: 22)

- (vi) *Mediation*: “It defines a mode of determination in which a given social process shapes the consequences of other social processes.” It is important to note that a mediating process of mediation must be distinguished from the so-called ‘intervening’ process of variable. The latter implies transitivity: A variable *Y* is situated between a variable *X* upon which it depends, and a variable *Z* which depends on itself. In other words, *X* causes *Y*, and *Y* causes *Z*. On the other hand, a mediating variable *Y* is one which affects (causes) the way in which *X* affects *Z*. Thus, “[i]n a sense a mediating process can be viewed as a ‘contextual variable’: processes of mediation determine the terrain on

which other modes of determination operate.” (Wright, 1979: 23)

Class struggle, typically, is a mediation type of mode of determination which affects (a) selection, (b) reproduction/non-reproduction, and (c) structural types of modes of determination:

(a) Thus, whilst the bureaucratic structure of the capitalist state act as one of the key selection mechanisms in the determination of actual state activity—policies, interventions, etc., class struggle mediates this selection relation. Therefore, identical state structures can have very different consequences in terms of state activity, depending upon the effects of class struggle upon the state. When class struggles take place completely outside the state institutions, bureaucratic structures are little affected, and effectively select state policies which conform to the interests of capital. But when class struggles take place inside the very state institutions, where “... civil service workers and teachers become unionized, state employees go on strike, welfare workers support their clients, etc. ...”, the same structure of the state can select very different state policies and interventions.” (Wright, 1979: 24)

(b) Class struggles also mediate reproduction type of mode of determination. The kinds of class struggles that take place in a society affect the capacity of a given state structure to reproduce the economic structure. “Where class struggle is very intense and

very politicized, bourgeois democratic structures may prove quite unproductive; where class struggle is very economic and apolitical, the identical structures may function very productively.” (Wright, 1979: 24–25)

- (c) Finally, class struggle also mediates the operation of structural limits. As noted above, structural limitation defines both those forms of determined structures which are impossible, and those forms which are of relatively higher likelihood. Class struggle mediates this relationship, and alter the patterns of the probability of alternative forms. Mediation type of mode of determination acquires salience during the revolutionary times of the transformation of existing structures. “For example, after a socialist revolution, a variety of new state forms are structurally possible. To the extent that the working class has a history of active participation in bourgeois democratic struggles, the likelihood that a genuinely democratic form of the socialist state will emerge is increased.” (Wright, 1979: 25)

Wright causally links together (i) the economic structure, (ii) the state structure, (iii) the class struggle, and (iv) state policies/interventions, by means of the six modes of determination above. It is important to note that (i) and (ii) are structures, and (iii) and (iv) relate to agency. On the other hand, this basic model of the politics/state and economy relationships can be further extended by the inclusion of other elements, such as ideology. “Or,

more complex interconnections among the elements could be posed.” (Wright, 1979: 25) The six modes of determination are also used to link (i) class structure (defined by social relations between classes), (ii) class formation (structural capacities and organisational class capacities), and (iii) class struggle, towards the construction of a class model of determination. See Figure 2.3 (Wright, 1979: 104). Finally, the class model of determination can involve class structure, class struggle and state policies as well. Thus, “... when one analyzes state policies in terms of the ways in which class structure shapes the feasible options of the state, class struggles affect the kinds of policies that occur within the set of feasible options, and class power shapes the likely outcomes of class struggles.”²⁴⁵ (Reflections on Marxism, Class and Politics, p. 5)

In two successive articles, Wright (1981a; 1981b) engaged the Sraffian critics of Marx’s ‘Labour Theory of Value’, by means of his theory of causality—the modes and models of determination. In the Value Controversy of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issue at stake, between the Sraffians led by Ian Steedman, and the Marxists, was the heart of Marx’s Labour Theory of Value, ‘Theory of Surplus Value’, and the so-called ‘Transformation Problem’. On the basis of Piero Sraffa’s famed ‘Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities’ (1960) Steedman (1981: 12–13) argued that the “... theoretical analysis of wages, profits, and prices, within ... [the classical economists’] surplus approach, was entirely

²⁴⁵ “Reflections on Marxism, Class and Politics”, Erik Olin Wright responses to interview questions posed by Chronis Polychroniou, February 2001, p. 5 (<http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Polyc-int.PDF>, 22 April 2013).

independent of any ‘labour theory of value’ and, indeed any labour theory is necessarily a barrier to the development of a surplus-based theory.” As a matter of fact, in the spirit of the ‘surplus approach’, it was possible to determine, from the ‘physical’ quantities of output and inputs, simultaneously, both the rate of profit and the prices of production. “Furthermore, no quantities of embodied labour play any necessary role in the determination of either the rate of profit or prices of production: embodied labour quantities are entirely redundant ...” (Steedman, 1981: 13)

The point was that, in ‘Chapter 9: Formation of a General Rate of Profit (Average Rate of Profit), and the Transformation of Commodity Values into Prices of Production’ of Volume III of Capital, Marx tried to determine, from the values, and consecutively, the rate of profit and the prices of production. On the other hand, Marxist Transformation technically requires, first the computation of values from the data of physical quantities, and then, the computation of prices of production, from the values. Therefore, since prices of production (and, simultaneously, the rate of profit) could well be computed directly from the physical quantities, Steedman argued that: (i) The Marxist Transformation was a rather unnecessary detour; (ii) prices of production were determined, not by embodied labour values, but, physical quantities, and; (iii) the rate of profit was determined not by the rate of surplus value, but the real wages and the direct and indirect conditions of production of the wage goods. And, this basically implied that surplus value was not the source of profits (Steedman, 1981: 13, 17). In his defence of Marx’s Labour Theory of Value and Theory of Surplus Value,

Wright (1981a: 44) argued that "... it is possible to recast slightly the model of determination in the traditional Marxist theory so as to preserve the central point of the traditional Marxist theory so as to preserve the central point of the theory and yet accomodate ... [the Sraffian] objections." In so doing, it was necessary to introduce more complex relationships of causality, involving, particularly, two modes of determination, namely, structural limitation and selection (Wright, 1981a: 44–45). As noted above, structural limitation was the mode of determination in which one structure set limits of possible variation on another, where there was a wide variety of possible outcomes and the limits themselves were determinate. Thus, according to the model of determination suggested by Erik Olin Wright, the quantity of surplus value determined the upper and lower limits (of variation) for the possible and impossible of profits. Furthermore, within the limits of variation set by surplus value, the socio-technical conditions of production and the real wage had a selection effect on profits (Wright, 1981a: 45–48).

Erik Olin Wright uses the idea of the modes and the models of determination to also expound the capitalist laws of motion, an historical materialist theory of class struggle, capital accumulation and crisis, and more generally of the 'stages' of capitalism. It is important to note that classes are never simply passive positions in a social structure, but social forces which actively transform the social structure (Wright, 1979: 28). However, the transformation of class structure by class struggle, in and by itself is completely directionless. To save the dialectical logic of class

relations from indeterminacy, and to establish the capitalist laws of motion, one must decipher the logic of capital accumulation, and reveal, specifically, the nature of its contradictions and the crises thereof (Wright, 1979: 111). The basic idea is that the process of accumulation faces the dominance of the different types of ‘constraints’ or ‘impediments’, at different stages of its development. Furthermore, these impediments are not exogenous to the process of accumulation, but generated by that very process. On the other hand, the systemic solutions to the dominants impediments at a given stage become the impediments to accumulation of the subsequent stage. “It is in this sense that the impediments to accumulation can be considered *contradictions* in accumulation rather than merely obstacles to accumulation. They are *contradictions* because the ‘solutions’ to a particular impediment become themselves impediments to accumulation.” (Wright, 1979: 112) Accordingly, the world-wide capitalist economic crisis (of the 1970s) “... can be (tentatively) understood as part of a transition from one pattern of constraints on accumulation, characterized by Keynesian solutions, to a new set of emergent constraints which were in part caused by those very Keynesian strategies in earlier crises and which are no longer amenable to Keynesian solutions.” (Wright, 1979: 112)

As a part of his conversion from Structural Marxism—or from Marxist structural determination—to ‘Analytical Marxism’, Erik Olin Wright drops several key elements of his earlier theoretical arguments. Early in his theoretical work, Wright comes under the influence of Poulantzas. On the other hand, from the outset, he was critical of some aspects of Poulantzas’s

methodology, and of the Althusserian School more broadly: The vagueness of their philosophical formulations, the opacity of such ‘grandiose’ principles as overdetermination, continued reliance upon the texts of Marx, Lenin, and other ‘authorities’. (Reflections on Marxism, Class and Politics” ..., p. 4) One of the most important elements of Wright’s earlier theory which he later forsakes is the Labour Theory of Value. In the 1970s and early 1980s,²⁴⁶ Wright argued that “... using price as the metric for comparing quantities of products raises the question: what is it that the money attached to a commodity is measuring?” If the answer is not to be circular, the ‘quantitative’ aspect of the social product had to have a theoretical content. (Wright, 1979: 115) One of the heterodox alternatives to the embodied labour value was Ricardo’s standard commodity. Yet, from the point of view of the qualitative relations of the forces and classes underlying social production, a measure of value based upon hours of human labour embodied in commodities was the most useful (Wright, 1979: 115, 117). Thus, whilst he defends the Labour Theory of Value in his early work by trying to develop a ‘sociological’ rationale for its continued relevance, subsequent debates convinces him that this theory has no defensible foundations, so he no longer uses it in his work (Reflections ..., p. 4).

Analytical (and Rational Choice) Marxist thought emerged as a distinct school in the 1970s, and grew rapidly in the 1980s. According to Howard

²⁴⁶ Recall that the collectively edited book ‘The Value Controversy’ [Steedman, Ian, et al. (eds.), 1981] was published in 1981. Wright’s first article in this book (Wright, 1981a) was the reprint of a previous 1979 *New Left Review* (116) article.

and King (1992: 335–336), Analytical Marxist thought has got three basic claims:

- Strict emphasis upon ‘analytical’ rigor and clarity, i.e. concern with the exact meanings of definitions, the process of deduction by which conclusions are logically derived, and how far traditional Marxist propositions can be thus sustained;
- the use of non-Marxian theories and tools, especially, Analytical Philosophy, mathematical models, modern psychology, and Neo-Classical Economics;
- a pronounced tendency to derive Marxist propositions about socio-economic systems from the rational behaviour of the agents. This feature makes Analytical Marxists also Rational Choice Marxists. As such, they can be seen as the reactive critics of Althusser’s structuralist thought, which has dominated the Marxist intelligentsia in the late 1960s, as well as the Sraffian political economy, which has tried to reconstruct the economic theory of Marx, in accordance with a classical surplus approach, founded upon structuralist principles.

On the other hand, Erik Olin Wright himself defends his espousal of Analytical Marxism, and its theoretical bases, ‘Rational Choice Models’ and ‘Game Theory’, on the grounds that (A) it offers a scientific method of general validity, which also applies to specifically Marxist questions and

concepts, and (B) it provides Marx's analysis with micro-foundations.²⁴⁷,
“We share the general view of analytical Marxists that what are most valuable and distinctive in the Marxist tradition are its substantive theses about the World. Marxian claims to methodological distinctiveness, generally, are misleading at best and harmful at worst. But so are assertions by methodological individualists concerning the proper way of understanding explanation in social science. Social science ought to be methodologically anti-reductionist if the properties and relations it investigates are multiply realized.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 127)

(A) Wright points out that, as the name implies, ‘Analytical Marxism’ combines two component parts together, the scientific method which is ‘analytical’, and the questions and concepts which are ‘Marxist’. Of the two, the first component refers to four basic principles:

- “A commitment to conventional scientific norms in the elaboration of theory and the conduct of research.” Thus, Analytical Marxism rejects the claims that Marxism should be based upon a different, esoteric methodology or metatheory, and should not be subject to

²⁴⁷ Thus, according to Wright, to the extent that one believes that, under some circumstances, human agents make conscious choices, or at least sometimes try to assess the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action, Rational Choice Models could prove useful. As a matter of fact, he argues that, on many occasions, Marx and Marxists have deployed Rational Choice Models, without using their formal techniques. Furthermore, some of the most noted Marxist problems can be viewed as and cast into ‘Game Theory’ problems. Thus, the theory of the falling rate of profit, is a standard case of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’; the transformation of the working class from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself is a case where individual prisoners’ dilemmas in the process of collective action is transformed into an assurance game (Reflections on Marxism ..., p. 6).

the same standards and criteria of other ‘paradigms’ of social science.

- An emphasis upon systematic conceptualisation, i.e. careful elaboration of the definitions of concepts and the logical coherence of repertoires of interconnected concepts.
- “A concern with a relatively fine-grained specification of the steps in the theoretical arguments linking concepts.” Thus, the use of explicit, systematic models of the processes is a hallmark of Analytical Marxism. These can vary from formal mathematical models to less formal causal models.
- “The importance accorded to the intentional action of individuals within both explanatory and normative theories.” This does not imply that Analytical Marxism reduces social action to rational action, but it does imply that intentionality is attributed special status.

It is important to note that these ‘methodic’ principles are not themselves what makes Analytical Marxist theory especially Marxist in character. What makes the theory Marxist, then, are the problematics, the concepts and the substantive theoretical arguments. Thus, Analytical Marxism problematises exploitation, capitalist dynamics, ideology and class relations, and class struggle and the state. “These are distinctively Marxist questions formulated in terms of Marxist concepts.” (Reflections ..., p. 7)

As noted above, Wright is the theoretician of class, *par excellence*, so he clearly takes class as a distinctively Marxist question. On the other hand, “[w]hat makes class analysis distinctively Marxist is the account of specific mechanisms embedded in class relations. Here the pivotal concept is exploitation.” (Reflections ..., p. 9) It is important to note that the theoretical basis of the concept of exploitation in Capital is the Labour Theory of Value.²⁴⁸ Since Wright, in his later work, has forsaken the Labour Theory Value, he defines exploitation without recourse to that theory, as a particular form of interdependence of the material interests of people, which satisfies three criteria: (i) The inverse interdependent ‘welfare principle’, according to which the material welfare of exploiters depends upon the material deprivations of the exploited; (ii) the exclusion principle, according to which the inverse interdependence welfare principle depends upon the exclusion of the exploited from access to certain productive resources, and; (iii) the appropriation principle according to which “[e]xclusion generates material advantage to exploiters because it enables them to appropriate the labor effort of the exploited.” (Reflections ..., p. 9) Thus, underlying the exploitation is the ‘appropriation’ of the ‘surplus’ generated by the ‘labour effort’ of the exploited.²⁴⁹ Overall, Wright

²⁴⁸ Recall the sequence in which Marx reveals the origin of capital in Volume I of Capital: Commodity → exchange value → value (abstract labour) → money → capital → surplus value (increment of capital) → new value created in production less value of labour power → absolute and relative surplus value, etc. Under the assumption that all labour is productive—actually, a contradictio in *adjecto*, since the capital circuit necessarily involves unproductive activities—exploitation would be equivalent to (the appropriation of) surplus value. However, unproductive workers are also exploited due to the appropriation of their surplus labour time, so the overall rate of surplus value and the overall rate of exploitation are typically divergent. See, particularly, Shaikh and Tonak (1996: 86–88).

rejects the Marxist price theory that relative market prices are regulated by relative prices of production, and the latter, by relative labour times embodied. Therefore, labour times can at best be useful for the evaluation and measurement of the surplus product, etc., i.e. for a sociological, rather than economic, purposes.²⁵⁰

- (B) Secondly, Erik Olin Wright claims that one must build Marxism upon solid micro-foundations, and Analytical Marxism does just that. As noted above, he basically holds that the *differentia specifica* of Marxian theory is substantive, and not methodological. Furthermore, “... the methodology adopted by Marxists ought to be just good scientific methodology.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 108) It is important to note that Analytical Marxist quest for micro-foundations proceeds

²⁴⁹ “... [T]he inequalities occur, in part at least, through the ways in which exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over resources, are able to *appropriate surplus generated by the effort of the exploited*. ... exploiters depend upon the effort of the exploited for their own welfare. ... Exploitation depends upon the *appropriation of labor effort*.” (Reflections ..., p. 10) [My italics—H.A.]

²⁵⁰ Given the time limits of this thesis, I have not fully been able to identify the precise theoretical underpinnings of the late Wright’s conception of exploitation. As of 2001, he seems to explicate exploitation as the resultant of unequally distributed property rights, and the ‘surplus labour’ extracted thereof. Howard and King (1992: 339) point to the influence of John Roemer’s conception of exploitation upon his work on the complexities of class positions in modern capitalist societies, and the identification of how the middle classes are located. Thus, “[t]he new theory – often referred to as the property-rights approach to exploitation – is cast explicitly in game theoretic concepts, and can be summarised as follows. Imagine a society – it can be of any type – comprising N people, with a well-defined distribution of ownership rights over property. Roemer would define a subset of agents S exploited when there is a hypothetically feasible alternative distribution of property rights which is egalitarian with regard to all other forms of property, and which would make S better off if it withdrew from existing society under the new distribution. If the rest of society ($N - S$) would be made worse off by such a withdrawal they would be classes as exploiters, for their welfare depends in part on enforcing a less egalitarian distribution of property which imposes losses upon S relative to the more egalitarian distribution.” Furthermore, Roemer demonstrates “... that the examples [he has] given earlier, which used a labour value definition of exploitation in specific circumstances, are *special cases* of the property-rights conception of exploitation.” (Howard and King, 1992: 339) [My italics—H.A.] Clearly, exploitation here is defined the lack of ‘Pareto optimality’ in terms of the endowments according to Walrasian Welfare Economics.

from a double critique of, namely, (i) methodological individualists' reduction of social phenomena to strictly individual properties, and (ii) structural Marxists' reduction of social phenomena to the aggregate properties of structures. On the other hand, whilst Wright thinks that 'methodological individualism' is not good scientific methodology, he suggests that some of its motives are sound, particularly its implication that macro-level theory requires the elaboration of its micro-foundations (Wright, et al. 1992: 108).²⁵¹ Wright accepts John Elster's argument—in his book 'Making Sense of Marx' (1985)—that methodological individualism is not good scientific methodology, because its 'reductionist' ambitions cannot be fulfilled. The starting point of Wright is his critique of the 'atomistic' methodological individualist, and 'holistic' Western Marxist approaches. Thus, Elster "... defines methodological individualism as 'the doctrine that all social phenomena—their structure and their change—are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals—their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions. ...'"²⁵² However, Elster is no reductionist, for "[h]e concedes that 'many properties of individuals, such as "powerful", are inherently relations, so that an accurate description of one individual may involve reference to

²⁵¹ Wright warns that the Analytical Marxist interest in individual-level explications, does not, by itself, justify the accusations of its being just another case of methodological individualism: "But it is neither necessary nor helpful to frame the call for micro-foundations as a call for methodological individualism." (Wright, et al., 1992: 127)

²⁵² "Methodological individualists insist that in principle it is desirable not simply to add an account of micro-causes to macro-explanations, but to replace macro-explanations with micro-explanations. Were we able, methodological individualists would have us ban aggregate social concepts or else tolerate them strictly as expository conveniences." (Wright, et al., 1992: 116)

others.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 111) On the other hand, the claim that aggregate social categories are ever irreducibly explanatory basically implies that, they can be reduced to the ‘relational’ properties of particular individuals—thus, the micro-foundations of macro categories and properties (Wright, et al., 1992: 113). On the other hand, holistic approaches are reductionist in the opposite sense, for they tend to attribute agency to aggregate social forces alone, now at the expense of the individual level explications. Overall, “[h]olistic teleologies figure in accounts of history that see the trajectory of social change as objectively directed towards and ultimate goal that exists independently of the subjective goals of human actors. Individuals, then, are only the agents of goal-achieving impersonal social forces; and what they do or choose is explained by—but does not explain—social phenomena.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 113) It is not surprising that Wright identifies the thoughts of Louis Althusser and his followers—given their view of the complex structured whole and of the individual as a mere ‘*Traeger*’ or ‘*porteur*’,²⁵³ as one of the most important recent tendencies towards radical holistic explications within Western Marxism.²⁵⁴

²⁵³ Althusserian Marxism proposed “... the concept of a complex structured whole with causal priority over its economic, political and ideological parts, and also asserted that individuals functioned merely as the passive *Traeger*, *porteurs* or ‘supports’ of social relations which were essentially self-reproducing.” (Jessop, 1990: 50)

²⁵⁴ “Despite their express opposition to vestiges of Hegelian teleological thinking, Althusserians effectively reproduced some of its more dubious features. Thus Althusser proposed the obscure notion of ‘structural causality’, according to which structures cause structures and individuals are only ‘supports’ of social relations. While such claims may simply reflect Althusser’s rhetorical style, some Althusserian explanations appear to dispense with individual level mechanisms in principle.” (Wright, et al., 1992:114)

Overall, Wright claims that social phenomena can only explicate social phenomena to the extent that there causal linkages, or mechanisms working through the micro level of individuals. There is a two way causality between the macro level of structures, and the micro level of individuals: Social structures explicate social structures “...via the ways they determine the properties and actions of individuals which in turn determine social structural outcomes.” Thus, “[t]he investigation of such micro-pathways through which macro-structures have their effects is the study of micro-foundations.” (Wright, et al. 1992: 121)²⁵⁵ Finally, it is important to note that the call for micro-foundations is not tantamount to a call for rational strategic actor models. A number of alternate approaches, such as the theories of socialisation, psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, or the Marxist theories of ideology, can be deployed to build the micro-foundations of social phenomena (Wright, et al., 1992: 126).

As noted above, in his 1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’, Erik Olin Wright argued that ‘structural limitation’ type of determination “... is especially important for understanding the sense in which economic structures ‘ultimately’ determine political and ideological structures: economic structures set limits on the possible forms of political and ideological structures ...” (Wright, 1979: 16) Clearly, this is a

²⁵⁵ For instance, Elster proposes to look at class solidarity as a transformation of the preference orderings characteristic of a freerider problem to an assurance game. In a prisoner’s dilemma, players prefer to sponge off one another’s sacrifices, whereas, in an assurance game they prefer to cooperate, so long as they all feel assured that others will cooperate as well (Wright, et al., 1992: 123).

reappropriation of Marx's scheme of determination in the Preface of his 1859 book, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy',²⁵⁶ and of the Althusserian 'determination in the last instance. And, so far as the structural limitation type of mode of determination is concerned, in Wright's models of determination, causality always flows onwards, from some basic structure to the other elements. Thus, in Wright's model of determination between 'economy and the state', causality flows from the economic structure, to the state structure, class struggle and state policies/interventions. On the other hand, in his 'class' model of determination, causality flows from the class structure, to the class formation and class struggle. Therefore, one can argue that, in the early work of Wright, there was a clear idea of 'determination in the last instance', where some basic structures and structural limitation clearly took 'causal primacy' over the other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination. In his late works, Erik Olin Wright calls into question this idea of the causal primacy of certain structures and modes of determination over the others, that was present in his early works. This is the problem of so-called 'causal asymmetries', which Wright, et al. discuss in their 1992 book, 'Restructuring Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History'.

²⁵⁶ "The sum total of ... [the] relations of production constitutes the *economic structure* of society—the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political *superstructure* and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The more of production of *material life* determines the social, political and intellectual life process in general. ... With the change of the *economic foundation* the entire immense *superstructure* is more or less rapidly transformed." Marx, in Kamenka (1983: 159–160).

According to Wright, et al. (1992: 129) many disagreements in the social sciences revolve around issues of causal primacy and other asymmetries: “Often, proponents of contending positions agree that certain causes are relevant for explaining some phenomenon, but differ in their assessments of the relative importance of these causes (*quantitative asymmetry*) or in their understanding of the qualitatively different ways in which they enter into particular causal processes (*qualitative asymmetry*). Thus, Wright’s interest in the formulation of the different modes and models of determination in his early work, now continues in his discussion of causal asymmetries. It is important to note that debates amongst Marxists, and between Marxists and their opponents have generally concerned the causal primacy of the economic structure and class, over the forms of the state, ideology, and gender (Wright, et al. (1992: 29). Be that as it may, the question of causal primacy and asymmetries has scarcely received any attention from the philosophers of science. Thus, “... while there is a vast literature on the metaphysics of causation and the status of causes within scientific explanations, there has been hardly any discussion of what it means to assign differential importance to causes in multicausal systems or of the qualitatively different ways in which causes enter into causal processes.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 131) Finally, it is important to note that Wright and co espouse a ‘realist’ ontology and epistemology. Thus, they are concerned with the discovery of the ‘real’ causes, mechanisms, underlying particular phenomena. Accordingly, they try “... to sort out the senses in which, in particular explanatory contexts, some (real) causes are more important than

others, and the different ways in which these causes enter into causal processes.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 131–132)

Now, so far as the quantitative type of causal asymmetry is concerned, there are two kinds, each tantamount to a specific sense of causal primacy. The first is the ‘distribution-dependent causal primacy’, which implies that some causes are ‘more important’ than others in the ‘explication’ of particular phenomena, and; the second, ‘causal potency’, which implies that some causes are ‘more powerful’ than others, in the ‘generation’ of particular. Furthermore, the first requires adequate information about the ‘frequency distribution’ of the causes, and the second, the specification of the functional forms of the causalities (Wright, et al., 1992: 136–145). However, it is often impossible to satisfy these requirements for many of the issues debated by radical social scientists, i.e. to define the frequency distributions of causes or to define the functional forms of causalities—particularly, so far as large-scale phenomena such as revolutions, the contradictions of state policies, etc. are concerned (Wright, et al., 1992: 145).

Accordingly, another alternative is to shift the attention from the quantitative to the qualitative type of causality. Although qualitative asymmetries are often thought of as providing the basis for causal primacy chains, Wright, et al. (1992: 45) argue that the differences in the way in which causes enter into multi-causal processes must not be confused with their relative causal importance, or the distinctions in causal importance.

Qualitative asymmetries vary along two dimensions: (a) whether they are ‘systemic’ or ‘contingent’, and; (b) whether they are ‘synchronic’—in the sense of the simultaneous operation of several causes or ‘diachronic’—in the sense of the temporal ordering of causes. These two dimensions together give four general categories: (i) Contextual asymmetry; (ii) functional asymmetry; (iii) temporal asymmetry, and (iv) dynamic asymmetry (Wright, et al., 1992: 146).

(i) *Contextual Causes:*

This type of causes determine the conditions under which other causes generate their effects. A noted case of the contextual causes is the so-called ‘structural limitation’—as opposed to the ‘selection’, which has played a significant role in the past Marxist debates on causality. “The idea is that in some explanatory problems it is possible to partition causes into two general categories: those that explain the *range of possible outcomes*, and those that explain *what actually occurs* within that range of possibilities. The first set of causes is said to impose ‘limits’ on the outcome, whereas the second ‘selects’ an outcome from within those limits.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 147) For instance, in Rational Choice Theory, it is common to distinguish between the set of choices available to the individual, and the choice(s) he or she makes from within that set. Whilst the set of feasible choices is determined by such ‘structural’ factors as the distribution of resources, the institutional rules of the game, and the relative power of the actors, the choice(s) actually made depends

upon such subjective factors as ‘individual preferences’. The point is that, “[t]he causes implicated in setting the limits are often said to be ‘more fundamental’ than those that select outcomes from within those limits in so far as the former establish the conditions of possibility under which the latter operate.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 147) As a matter of fact, this was exactly Wright’s claim some ten years ago, when he said that, to paraphrase, structural determination was especially important for understanding the sense in which the economic ultimately determine political and ideological structures.²⁵⁷ In the on-going debates about politics, this type of causality is used, counter-factually, to explicate the non-occurrence of certain events—the ‘non-events’ (Wright, et al., 1992: 147). For instance, according to the Marxists, the limits on state activity originate in capitalist property relations, and the requirements of capital accumulation: “The range of allowable policies may be more or less extensive, but the feasible set is limited, in the final analysis, by the functional requirement of reproducing capitalism.” On the other hand, actual choices will depend upon causes that are distinct from those that reproduce capitalist property relations *per se*, for instance the rules of electoral politics (Wright, et al., 1992: 148) It is important to note that, Erik Olin Wright now opposes the Marxist

²⁵⁷ Wright and co refer to the same Claus Offe article Wright had referred to in his 1978 book: “Claus Offe has presented a particularly pointed discussion of these issues as they apply to the problem of the capitalist state in this influential essay ‘Structural Problems of the Capitalist State: Class Rule and the Political System. On the Selectiveness of Political Institutions’ in Kalus von Beyme, ed., German Political Studies, vol. 1 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1974).” (Wright, et al., 1992: 147, f. 26) See, for the original reference, Wright (1979: 14, f. 6).

view that the structural causes which generate limits to the feasible outcomes are *ipso facto* ‘more important’ or ‘more fundamental’ than those which select specific outcomes out of the feasible ones. For instance, this is the basis of the Marxist argument that class structural factors impose limits on feasible state policies, and thereby, they are most important causes of state activity. However, Wright and co believe that this conclusion is not quite warranted (Wright, 1992: 148). This is because the claim that the process of limitation is a more important cause can only be defended by demonstrating its superiority to the process of selection, in terms of either ‘relative causal potency’, or ‘relative distribution-dependent causal importance’, mentioned above. And unless ‘units’ can be assigned, to measure and compare the ‘effects’ of limits and selections, determinate answers are unlikely (Wright, et al., 1992: 149).

Overall, whilst Erik Olin Wright still thinks that the Marxist distinction of structural limits and contingent selections has a great explanatory power, he rejects the view that the former is, in a scientific sense, more important or more fundamental than the latter.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁸ Take for instance, the causal relationship between capitalist development and the emergence of social security: “Very generally, the Marxist analysis of capitalist development explains why all developed capitalist countries had some form of social security by 1950. The structure of capitalist property relations and the conditions for the reproduction of capital accumulation explain the basic limits of possibility on such redistributive state policies. Within those limits, however, a wide variety of historically contingent factors—contingent with respect to theories of capitalist development—explain

Finally, Wright and co consider the so-called ‘interactive causality’, which is often taken to be a type of contextual asymmetry. Basically, this is the same mode of determination which Wright had called ‘mediation’ in his 1978 book. See Wright (1979: 23–25). Thus, when cause *X* affects the relationship between cause *Y* and effect *Z*, this is called interactive causality. This type of causality is especially the key to the analysis of particular historical conjunctures of change, in terms of the distinction between fundamental causes and the precipitating events. In this case, *X* would represent the fundamental causes underlying some event (cause and effect) *Y–Z*, whilst *Y* could be seen as the precipitating cause, “... in the sense that it would not have the consequences that it in fact has, but for the presence of the fundamental causes with which it interacts.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 151)²⁵⁹ Take, for instance the noted ‘Brenner Debate’²⁶⁰, where Robert Brenner argues that “... it is the structure of class relations, of class power, which will determine the manner and degree to which particular demographic and commercial changes will affect long-

specific types of variation, such as the timing of the initial introduction of social insurance programs.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 150)

²⁵⁹ Wright, et al. (1992: 151–152) give the quintessential case of the outbreak of the First World War, upon the assassination in Sarajevo, of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent of the Habsburg Monarchy, on 28 June 1914. in Sarajevo, by a Bosnian Serb nationalist.

²⁶⁰ In a seminal 1976 article, Robert Brenner, US Marxist historian, set forth the so-called ‘Brenner Thesis’—that the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe must be looked at in the light of the prevailing class structures in agriculture, rather than the rise of international trade. He thus attacked Paul Sweezy and Immanuel Wallerstein as ‘neo-Smithian Marxists’. See, Brenner, Robert (1976), “Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe”, *Past and Present* 70. The ‘Brenner Debate’ that followed, more particularly, concerned the identification of the causes which determined the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, the two alternatives being the Malthusian type of demographic and economic cycles, and class structure type of explanations.

terms trends in the distribution of income and economic growth—and not vice versa.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 153) In other words, the manner in which demography affects growth is determined by class. Thus, in Brenner’s statement of this issue—the transition, “... *X* ... represents the ‘structure of class relations’, *Y* stands for ‘demographic and commercial changes’, and *Z* represents ‘long-term trends in the distribution of income and economic growth’. Brenner’s claim is that *X* determines the effects of *Y* on *Z* while *Y* does not determine the effects of *X* on *Z*.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 153–154) On the other hand, the interpretation of interactive causality as a qualitative asymmetry between the causes—that structural causes are more important, or more fundamental than the precipitating causes, would not be legitimate. Because, “... one could as well say that the precipitating cause explains why the underlying conditions produced the effects they did when they did, as vice versa. Without that precipitating cause, the underlying conditions would not have had the consequences they did (Wright, et al., 1992: 153). This said, one must nonetheless admit that both the mainstream historian’s account of the outbreak of the First World War, and Brenner’s analysis of the transition to capitalism seem to involve real asymmetries amongst causes. However, argue wrigth, et al. (1992: 154), in each case, the asymmetry is not quantitative, but qualitative. Thus, “... to describe a cause as a precipitating event is to say that the probability of the outcome it helped to produce was already very

high before the precipitating cause occurred.” As a matter of fact, this is a special case of what Wright and co call ‘temporal asymmetry’. (Wright, et al., 1992: 154)

(ii) *Functional Asymmetry:*

This type of asymmetries applies whenever causes are systematically linked as parts of a functionally integrated system (Wright, et al., 1992: 155). Thus, “... functional asymmetries exist whenever the persistence of some social practice is explained by its beneficial effects on something else, and these causes are joined by an appropriate feedback loop.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 157) The question of functional asymmetries and ‘functional primacy’ as a type of causal primacy has been a key part of the recent debates on the historical succession of socio-economic formations. Consider, for instance, Cohen’s reconstruction of Marx’ conception of historical change. According to Cohen, “... Marx explains the nature of the relations of production in a given society by the functions they fulfil for the development of the forces of production.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 158) In any society, the effects between the relations of production and the forces of production are reciprocal. For instance, some given technology can reinforce or destroy the existing set of production relations. On the other hand, given relations of production can reinforce or retard (fetter) the development of the existing forces of production. Therefore, the critical question is, given the presence of reciprocal effects, how can one speak of any

causal asymmetry? “Cohen argues that in classical historical materialism, this claim is based on a functional asymmetry within this pattern of reciprocal causation: the social relations of production are the way they are because of their beneficial effects on the development of the forces of production and not vice versa.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 158) This basically implies that there is ‘qualitative’ asymmetry between the (reciprocal) effects of the forces and the relations of production. Cohen proposes the same argument for the causal asymmetry between the economic structure and the superstructure. Thus, the superstructure is the way it is, because of its beneficial effects on the reproduction of the economic structure—the ‘base’. (Wright, et al., 1992: 158) Once more, this implies the presence of a qualitative asymmetry between the economic structure and the superstructure.

Wright, et al. (1992: 158) argue that, although, this sort of functional interactions involve a type of qualitative asymmetry, they do not, by themselves, provide any grounds for attributing differential explanatory importance to any of the elements of the functional relationship. As a matter of fact, they tend to see the functional asymmetry, not as relative importance, but causal potency. To re-take Cohen’s reconstruction of Marx’s scheme of historical change, “... it cannot be concluded, *simply by virtue of their functional interconnection*, that the forces of production are a more important cause of the relations of production than the relations of production

are of the forces of production.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 158) Recall that, the forces of production have a tendency to develop, and as they reach a threshold after which the relations of production fetter their further development, they start to destabilise the relations of production. Also recall that, the superstructural forms tend to reproduce the current relations of production. Therefore there are two forces which affect the relations of production in opposite ways: Whilst the forces destabilise the relations, the superstructures stabilise the relations. “The critical thesis that allows for an epochal trajectory of social forms is that the first of these causal forces is more potent than the second.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 159) Therefore, the Marxist ‘Primacy Thesis’ does not argue for the explanatory power of the forces of production over the relations of production, from the point of view of their ‘functional’ relationship. And, neither does it claim greater explanatory importance for the forces of production relative to relations of production. “It is strictly a causal potency claim: in general, the forces of production are more powerful than the superstructure *with respect to their effects on the relations of production.*” (Wright, et al., 1992: 159) Therefore the real issue is not whether, in a systemic relationship of reciprocal effects, *X* explains *Y* to a greater extent than *Y* explains *X*. “Rather, what we have is a structure in which relative causal potency claims are being made either about two causes of the development of the forces of production (human nature and the relations of production)

or about two causes of the relations of production (the forces of production and superstructures).” (Wright, et al., 1992: 159–160)

(iii) *Temporal Asymmetry:*

Suppose there is an event which is explicated as the culmination, the end-point of a chain of other events. And, suppose that there is a temporally ordered sequence of causes, used to explicate the end-point. Temporal asymmetries are characteristic of such historical and causal chains and sequences (Wright, et al., 1992: 160). Thus, “... the most frequently encountered argument that moves from temporal ordering to a claim about causal primacy occurs in analyses that assign explanatory importance to the ‘origins’ of particular processes.” Accordingly, speaking of a chain of events $\{X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4\}$, where the subscripts denote temporal order, one can argue that the first cause is intrinsically more important than the rest, simply by the virtue of its being the first (Wright, et al., 1992: 161). In seeing the first cause as the most important one arises from the failure to consider the eventuality of counter-historical scenarios. Now suppose that the chain of events $\{X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4\}$ actually did occur. Also suppose that, once X_2 takes place, the probability of X_4 to occur is very close to unity. On the other hand, suppose that after X_1 and before X_2 took place, the probability of an alternative future, other than the chain of $\{X_2 \rightarrow X_3 \rightarrow X_4\}$ was also close to unity. Under the circumstances, it is clear that, from the perspective of the realised end-point of events, i.e. X_4 , X_1 is not the

most important cause, simply by the virtue of its being the first cause in the sequence. But “... [b]ecause many historians refuse to consider counterfactual trajectories of events, they therefore treat the ‘origins’ of *de facto* sequences as most important by default.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 161–162)

However, there may be cases, where the causes identified as the ‘origins’ of some future trajectory of development matter, from the point of view of causal primacy. For example, the particular events and processes—conditions and conflicts, etc.—which have accompanied the establishment of a state are sometimes thought to be more important than subsequent events and processes, to understand the origins and the nature of the institutional characteristics of that state. “Foundational struggles [typically] generate constitutions and other institutional norms and practices that regulate basic political structures and procedures for long as the state exists.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 162) As a matter of fact, it is possible for what that goes on during the genesis of states to produce a set of restrictive ‘structural limits’ within which the causal process of later times would operate as ‘selections’. As noted above, Wright and co argue that there is no way to single out structural limits to be more important than selections. “Nevertheless, when the explanatory objective is to account for the exclusion of specific kinds of historical alternatives, it may well be possible to identify initial

processes of institutionalization as ‘decisive moments’ within which important exclusions are created.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 162)²⁶¹

(iv) Dynamic Asymmetry:

Above, systemic causes were already distinguished from contingent causes. “Dynamic asymmetries are systemic in the sense that they operate within particular systems, pushing these systems along a trajectory of social change.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 165) Therefore, systemic causes must be distinguished from those other endogenous causes which do not impart the systems they are part of, any trajectory or tendency of development, and of all exogenous causes. The precondition for the existence of dynamic asymmetries is the presence of some underlying mechanism which generates a trajectory of tendency of development (Wright, et al., 1992: 165) Notably, historical materialism tries to theorise the entire trajectory of social history through the dynamic relationship between the forces of production, and the relations of production, which, together make up ‘the mode of production’. Accordingly, the trajectory of social change is not conceived of as the cumulative outcome of sets of contingently connected causes. “It is determined by underlying, dynamic processes.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 166)

²⁶¹ Some explanations could involve extreme cases of ‘path-dependency’, the view that the path to some result is singular. “In such explanations, there is a well-defined meaning to the notion of an ‘origin’: it is that point at which the historical trajectory is set in motion. ... However, temporal asymmetry arguments, even when they refer to singular causal chains, do not imply that the origins of trajectories are more important than the causes that follow them.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 162–163)

Historical materialist arguments comprise a number of claims that combine dynamic and contingent causes. Take, for instance, Marx's account of the contradictions that are supposed to ensure the demise of the capitalist mode of production. According to Marx, the process of capital accumulation contains a fundamental and fatal contradiction: Each capitalist, trying to maximise profits, makes innovations that substitutes labour for capital, which raises the 'organic composition of capital', i.e. the ratio of physical capital to living labour. Since only living labour produces new value, and since profits originate in surplus value, the rise in the organic composition of capital lowers the average rate of profit in the process. This will lead to bankruptcies and eventually, to a general economic crisis. Due to the devaluation of bankrupt capitals, the conditions of profitability will be restored, and a new upswing will follow. Yet, because the rise in the organic composition of capital is always there, the peak of the average rate of profit in the new cycle will be below those in previous cycles. Thus, in the long term, recoveries will be less robust and booms shorter and busts deeper and longer (Wright, et al., 1992: 166–167). If this scenario were correct, the capitalist mode of production would be unable to reproduce itself, for the rate of profit would be so low, that it would simply collapse. On the other hand, Marx thought that the fall in the rate of profit and the ensuing deterioration of economic prospects would drive the masses to oppose and topple the capitalist mode of production long before it

collapsed out of purely economic reasons. Due to a variety of ‘contingent’ political, cultural, and historical factors, the necessary conditions for the overthrow of the capitalist mode of production could be easier or harder to achieve, but, in all likelihood, its contradictions are so deep that the workers will eventually be able to transform it. “It might therefore seem that this mechanism most fundamentally explains capitalism’s inevitable decline and fall, even if the explanation for the demise of actual capitalisms depends more on contingent political and cultural factors.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 166–167)

Obviously, the causal primacy claims of historical materialism as outlined above revolve around the distinction of systemic/contingent, which is always relative to descriptions of system-properties (Wright, et al., 1992: 168). On the other hand, “[t]heories show what comprises a system and what does not. To say that *A* and *B* are parts of a system, and that *C* is not, is to say that *A* and *B* are causally interconnected in a systematic and reproducible manner, and that *C* is not connected with *A* and *B* in this way.” Therefore, in the present context, one must be able to posit some sort of ‘systematicity’ for the interconnections between the various causal mechanisms, because it will not otherwise be possible to distinguish between the dynamic endogenous causes and the exogenous ones (Wright, et al., 1992: 168–169). Even if a dynamic account of the general trajectory of human history of this kind may not be possible, one can still propose

dynamic arguments of a more limited nature, with respect to specific historical episodes or the histories of specific institutions. As a matter of fact, many Marxists now argue that, although historical materialism as a general theory of history may not be tenable, the Marxist account of capitalist development is basically sound (Wright, et al., 1992: 169). Thus, on the basis of his theory of causality, Wright tends to concede that it is not quite possible to defend historical materialism on scientific grounds. Yet, it is largely possible to defend Marxism, on scientific grounds, as a theory of capitalist development.

In his late works, Erik Olin Wright also re-tackles the issue of the causality relationship between economy and politics/the state. Thus, he and his associates try to establish the theoretical conditions for the causal primacy of the economic structure, on the basis of the distinction between ‘dynamic-systemic causes’ and ‘non-dynamic-systemic causes’. Thus, looking at the capitalist society from a ‘static’ point of view, and explore the structural relationship between its economic and political institutions, it is difficult to justify the Marxist idea of the base–superstructure type of causal asymmetry, in a structural, contextual, or even functional sense. On the one hand, it is true that the capitalist structure of the economy imposes limits upon the state, particularly due to the latter’s dependency upon the former, for its revenues. On the other hand, it is equally true that the state, institutionally and policy-wise, superintends the capitalist

economy, by, amongst other things, putting limits on what the capitalist firms can do. Therefore, the economy and the state mutually impose limits upon one another. One might try to argue that the limits imposed by the economic structure are more powerful than those imposed by the state, but this is unlikely to substantiate the economy's causal primacy claims on solid grounds (Wright, 1992: 169).

However, there could be a case for causal asymmetry and primacy, if one could combine dynamic and synchronic dynamics together. Suppose that, from a synchronic point of view, economy and state mutually impose limits upon one and another. On the other hand, from a dynamic point of view, suppose that the "... economies contain an engine of social change, rooted in capitalist exploitation, competition and accumulation that explains the central tendencies of capitalist development from merchant capitalism to multinational global capitalism." Finally, suppose that the state institutions are deprived of a like, intrinsic and systematic engine of change, and that its development is driven by external causes. If this characterisation of the synchronic and, particularly, dynamic causes is correct, then, despite the simultaneous co-determination of economy and the state, the historical development of the overall system of society would be driven by the endogenous dynamics of the economy (Wright, 1992: 170). Obviously, this analysis would no longer be valid, were there dynamic mechanisms that govern the forms of the state. The

dependency of the state to the economy for its historical development would change. As a matter of fact, “[m]uch has been made, in recent years, of the fact that states are embedded in competitive geopolitical state systems. Competition in these systems could function like capitalist market competition as a mechanism driving states to accumulate resources and power.” Therefore, Wright, et al. (1992: 171) concede that “[i]f arguments of this kind turn out to be sound, there might not be any dynamic asymmetry between class and the state after all.”

Finally, Wright, et al., (1992: 172) warn that the temptation to take the asymmetry itself as the basis of causal primacy is not justified. As a matter of fact, there are no grounds to claim that dynamic endogenous processes are ‘more important’ than the contingent or the synchronic systemic causes simply by virtue of their dynamic and endogenous character. The point is that, the endogenous dynamic of the capitalist economy could be the major determinant of the overall trajectory of development or of the eventual demise of the capitalist society, in its broad contours, despite its failure to explicate the finer-grained aspects of capitalist development, or the actual demise of a concrete capitalist society (Wright, et al., 1992: 173).²⁶²

²⁶² The same holds true of gender analysis: “Even if class is very important in the explanation of many phenomena having to do with gender relations, it does not follow that it is important in the explanation of all explananda somehow connected with gender.” (Wright, et al., 1992: 173)

Eric Olin Wright and his associates summarise the results of their 1992 book 'Reconstructing Marxism', and the epistemological implications thereof, as follows:

- 1) Since all kinds of qualitative asymmetry are basically reducible to quantitative asymmetry, "... causal primacy claims, if correct, should be recast as quantitative *asymmetry* claims." (Wright, et al., 1992: 173) This requires ultimate care in the sustenance of causal primacy claims with precision. Thus, in order to defend any claims to causal primacy, one either must show the relative importance of the different causes through their empirical distribution, or devise a strategy to formally specify and compare the potencies of the different causes. The latter task would prove particularly difficult, since the calibration of the causes in commensurable units could prove to be impossible (Wright, et al., 1992: 173)
- 2) It is not legitimate to automatically infer that qualitative asymmetry implies differential explanatory importance. Thus, "... limits are not inherently more important than selections; functional asymmetries do not imply causal primacy; there is no general reason to regard earlier links in causal chains as more important than later ones; and endogenous dynamic causes are not in themselves more important than contingent or non-dynamic systemic causes." (Wright, et al., 1992: 173) In each case, claims to relative importance can only have one rationale, that 'any' one cause is quantitatively more important

than the other, in total disregard of the qualitative relationship involved (Wright, et al., 1992: 173).

Thus, so far as the most interesting problems of social sciences are concerned, broadly speaking, for instance, so far as the relationship between the state and class is concerned, the likelihood of coming up with fine-grained evaluations of the relative importance of the different causes is very low. In particular instances, such fine-grained assessments amongst important causes may be possible. Yet, so soon as the precise characterisation of the explananda is changed, the assessments of relative importance will also have to change. In other words, assessments of relative importance are vulnerable to the specification of the problem, which basically implies the theoretical impossibility of grand theories (Wright, et al., 1992: 174).

The foregoing analysis of causal asymmetries and causal primacy has a number of critical implications for the critique of Marxist ‘orthodoxy’, and for the reconstruction and the future of alternative Marxist thought, generally, and for the class theory and theoretical–empirical work of Erik Olin Wright’s. Thus, Wright, et al. (1992: 174) point out that the claims of traditional Marxism, particularly of its Hegelian versions, for the causal primacy of class were embedded in a conception of society as a tightly integrated ‘totality’. If society were a tightly integrated whole, organised by a singular ‘essence’ in the sense that one key part or set of relations amongst others determines all the rest, and if that one part or set of relations were the

class (relations), then there would be sound grounds for the causal primacy of class (relations), in general. This kind of class primacy claims actually amount to a class–reductionist Marxist theory. However, Wright, et al., (1992: 174) argue that, “[s]ocieties are understood to contain *a variety of irreducibly distinct causal mechanisms*. While there are asymmetries among causes, including asymmetries that justify causal primacy claims, there is no principle that warrants the conclusion that class considerations *always* comprise the primary determinants of social phenomena.” Once one drops the presumption that class by itself is the singular determinant of the social whole, and the existence of a variety of other, distinct and efficacious mechanisms is accepted, the kind of sweeping claims to the causal primacy of the economic structure, that has long characterised the orthodox Marxist become entirely unsustainable. Accordingly, “... it is very likely that class considerations are of great explanatory importance for many well-defined explananda. But we also believe that it is unlikely that this condition—or anything like it—could possibly hold for ‘society’ in general.” (Wright, 1992: 174) Furthermore, social research must be shifted away from the agenda of causal primacy, to that of causal importance, and be focused upon the multiple causes which are causally important. Concomitantly, Marxist class analysis must sustain a case for the causal ‘pervasiveness of class’, and not, for its causal primacy, and must ground its claim of pervasiveness in a specific explanatory agenda (Wright, 1992: 175).

Clearly, all this implies a substantial revision of the earlier model of determination between economy and the state, that Erik Olin Wright had

suggested in his earlier works, especially, his 1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’. This is because, there are no grounds to believe that the formal model of determination there was built with a dynamic point of view.²⁶³ Moreover, the foregoing analysis of causality signifies a great detour in his work, in at least four important respects:

- (i) One of the basic ideas of his early thought, the asymmetrical relationship of causality between the economic structure and the state—and other structures, for that matter—in terms of the structural limitation–selection modes of determination has now been dropped as a ‘simultaneous’ form of causality;
- (ii) the conceptualisation of the overall society, as a structured, overdetermined whole, i.e. which is ‘determined in the last instance’ by the mode of production—the substance of his defence of the thesis of ‘Causal Primacy’ in his early works, has now been dropped, partly because structural limitation is no longer regarded to be more important than selection;
- (iii) the possibility that other structures, or sets of relations can also be ‘absolutely’—as opposed to relatively—‘autonomous’, i.e. that they too, can have dynamic and endogenous mechanisms which govern

²⁶³ To be more precise, there appears to be a contradiction between the formal analysis of the static model of determination presented in Chapter 1 (Methodological Introduction), on the one hand, and the historical analysis of capitalist development in Chapter 3 (Historical Transformations of Capitalist Crisis Tendencies). See, particularly, p. 27 for the formal model, and pp. 168–169 for the historical analysis (Wright, 1979).

their own evolution has now been conceded, for at least the state, as the actor of the inter-state system of relations;

- (iv) there are no ‘grand’ theories of general validity to explicate society and its history; there can only be generally valid methodic principles of enquiry, and particular theories for particular, concrete cases.

3.4. ANWAR SHAIKH AND E. AHMET TONAK: PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR, STATE ACTIVITY AND ABSORPTION

This thesis aims to test, on the basis of a detailed reading of the T/C historical–empirical material, Bob Jessop’s and Erik Olin Wright’s models of the causality between economy and politics/the state. To that end, I have reviewed above, the state theory of Jessop, and the theory of determinations of Wright. A supplementary theory that I shall be using in testing the two theories is the ‘productive–unproductive labour’ theory of Anwar Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak. More specifically, I am interested in one key idea of this theory, that state activity is an ‘unproductive’ activity, ‘absorbing’ portions of the surplus value that is produced elsewhere in the economy. This issue basically concerns the measurement of the wealth, or the production of the capitalist nations. The basic measures employed by orthodox as well as most heterodox economists are the gross domestic product (GDP) and the gross national product (GNP),²⁶⁴ as the organising

²⁶⁴ GDP and GNP are slightly different measures of the yearly net product of a country. GDP is a territory-based measure which takes into account the net product produced inside the national borders, by both the residents of the country *and* by the foreigners. On the other hand, GNP (or, more properly GNI—gross national income) is the net product produced by the nationals of the country, whether inside the national borders, *or* outside.

terms of the so-called systems of national accounts.²⁶⁵ As is well known, there are three ways of measuring the GDP, namely, by output, by income, by expenditure. Let us consider the first method: Let there be N production sectors in the economy, and let VA_i denote the value added (net product) produced by the i th production sector, where $i = 1, 2, \dots, N$. The aggregate net product (GDP) produced in the economy would be the total sum of the value addeds produced by all the production sectors: $GDP = VA = \sum_1^N VA_i$. The question is this: What if the activity of any one of these supposedly ‘production’ sectors is not actually production, but some sort of a consumption, instead? Firstly, then the GDP would be ‘over-measuring’ the real wealth of the nation. Secondly, since the sector in question does not add to the net product of the country, and since its activity earns it incomes anyhow, it would be able to make a claim upon the net products of the other sectors. Thirdly, suppose that the sector in question expands, in other words increases its incomes faster than the average. In this case it would be able to claim a relatively greater part of the net product produced by the other sectors, part of which it would then use up to conduct its ‘non-production’ activity. Obviously, this would lower the overall rate of growth of the economy.²⁶⁶ More concretely, the critical question is this: Are such sectors

²⁶⁵ The system of national accounts most widely used throughout the world is the ‘United Nations System of National Accounts’ (UN SNA). The United States has recently converted from the GNP-based ‘National Income and Product Accounts’ to the GDP-based UN SNA. Turkey now uses ‘the European System of National Accounts’, which is a slightly modified version of the UN SNA.

²⁶⁶ Technically speaking, “... an increase in the share of social consumption in net output is a decrease in the social savings rate, and this tends to reduce the rate of growth of the system ...” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 18).

as finance, parts of trade, etc. which count as production in the orthodox systems of national accounts, really production sectors?

In his book *Capital*, Marx was interested in laying bare the economic laws of motion of modern society. As Marx saw it, the core process of the capitalist economy was capital accumulation, and the single most important social force of the modern society was capital. On the other hand, the source of capital was (accumulated) surplus value. Therefore, Marx, just like the Physiocrats, and the various classical economists before himself, was concerned with distinguishing between those activities which were ‘productive of surplus value/capital’, and those which were not. According to classical economists (and Marx), “... some activities were actually forms of social consumption, not production ...” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 18) The key distinction here is between ‘outcomes’ and ‘outputs’. All activities have outcomes, but only some outcomes are outputs, directly adding to social wealth. “But others preserve or circulate this wealth, or help to maintain and administer the social structure in which it is embedded.” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 2) On the other hand, “[t]he outcomes of nonproduction activities may be socially necessary results, but they are not outputs.” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 18) Productive activities are (i) production, and (ii) production for profit. Thus, one must begin with the distinction between production and nonproduction activities. According to Shaikh and Tonak (1996: 21–22) there are four types of ‘basic activities of social reproduction: (i) production; (ii) distribution; (iii) social maintenance and reproduction, and; (iv) personal consumption. Here, social maintenance

and reproduction is defined as the activities “... in which use values are used up in the private and public administration, maintenance, and reproduction of the social order by the government, the legal system, the military, corporate security personnel, etc.” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 21–22)²⁶⁷ The first distinction to be made is that between production labour and nonproduction labour. Personal consumption does not count as labour activity. On the other hand, although distribution and social maintenance are labour activities, they are not production, and thereby, the labour they involve is nonproduction labour, in other words, they are not production activities. But this basically implies that distribution and social maintenance are actually forms of ‘social consumption’. Therefore, total consumption consists of social consumption (distribution plus social maintenance) plus personal consumption (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 29). Finally, production activities are of three types, defined by their ends: (i) For profit; (ii) for income, and; (iii) for direct use. “The identification of that labour which produces surplus value – in other words, that labour which is productive of capital – immediately allows us to specify its two salient properties: ¶(a) it is wage labour which is first exchanged against capital (i.e., it is capitalistically employed); ¶(b) it is labour which creates or transforms use values (i.e., it is production labor).” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 30) As far as

²⁶⁷ “Finally, we have all those activities that revolve around the maintenance and reproduction of the social order. Police, fire departments, courts, and prisons involve the protection of persons, property, and the social relations that surround them. National defense and international affairs do much the same, only on a world scale. General government activities (such as those involving administration, public assistance, pensions, social security, etc.) fall into the same category. ... On the other hand, government-owned electric power plants are part of production, while government agencies that buy and sell grain are engaging in distribution activities.” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 27)

the government is concerned, it is important to note that it generally absorbs critical portions of the surplus value. Thus, “government purchases of commodities directly absorb a portion of the surplus product, and government administrative employment indirectly absorbs another portion through the consumption expenditures of the government workers.” (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 137)

In this thesis, I hypothesise that: (i) the T/C nationalist project of state-building necessarily involved a fundamental contradiction, since the peasant-based economy of the T/Cs did not generate the surplus product that was necessary for the maintenance of a relatively large, modern state apparatus, and: (ii) the nationalist politics of *Taksim*, necessarily implied the large-scale militarisation of the critical portions of the social labour power, thereby, further intensifying the aforementioned contradiction. I would not like to foretell a result before I derive or demonstrate it, but, I see in the low capacity of the T/C economy to produce surplus product, a structural limitation type of determination, which is the key to understanding many conflicts and crises of the T/C society.

3.5. A NOTE ON THE T/C SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION, AND THE HISTORICAL CONDITIONS OF STATE-BUILDING, AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

On the basis of the foregoing, some brief remarks on the nature of T/C socio-economic formation would be in order. Below, I allow myself to quote a few long passages from a previous work (Arslan, 2012).

“A basic understanding of the *social division of labor between T/Cs and G/Cs in the British era* is key to comprehending the dynamics of the T/C nationalist drive toward state-building. This is true, to the extent that the emergent nationalist discourse and strategy involved the problematization of the T/Cs’ relative position within the given division of labor, its transformation, and the elimination of its various aspects. A review of the T/C newspaper clips and articles of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as compiled by An (1996, pp. 1–40) reveals the way in which the T/C elite perceived the problems associated with the social division labor between T/Cs and G/Cs. Thus, as the T/C elite saw it, *commerce, industry and high-level public office was under G/C monopoly. G/Cs had specialized in modern, urban professions and skilled arts, whereas T/Cs were largely confined to traditional, unskilled occupations. In terms of such vital needs as law and health, T/Cs were fully dependent on G/Cs. T/C town dwellers were dependent on G/C traders for the provision of consumption goods, while T/C peasants were dependent on G/C merchant-usurer capital for both the realization of their produce and the provision of subsistence goods.* Thus, one frequent source of complaint was clearly *the extraction of the surplus generated by the T/C peasants by the G/C town-based commercial capital.* As such, the establishment of a circuit and circulation of capital and circuit of income between the T/C rural, and the T/C urban has become one of the basic objectives of T/C nationalists. Apparently, and ideally, this required captive buyers’ and sellers’ markets, i.e. ideally, a unified, national market, as well as secure and stable communication and transportation routes between T/C locales, i.e. a unified, national territory. The causes of T/C backwardness were seen from a secularist, ethical point of view, which put

the blame on laziness, selfishness, indifference, ignorance, weak feelings of communal and national bonds, and, last but not least, the influence of religious conservatives and reactionaries.” (Arslan, 2012: 120–121)

Overall, from the point of view of the historically given conditions of the T/C society during the 1950s and 1960s, two remarks are noteworthy:

- i) T/Cs and G/Cs cohabited, from a demographic–geographical point of view, as they were also connected regarding aspects of the basic social activity of circulation, and;^{268, 269}
- ii) the T/C society was not capable of generating the economic surplus necessary to sustain a modern state apparatus, given the weight of peasant production in its economy.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ The point is that, despite the institution of a modern bureaucracy, The British basically continued the Ottoman ‘*millet*’ [literally translated ‘nation’, but implying religious community] system. According to Joseph (2009: 378–379), “[t]he Ottoman millet administrative system distinguished the two communities on the basis of religion and ethnicity.” “When the British took control of Cyprus, the millet system was not completely abolished. A modern bureaucratic administration was established, but the two ethnic groups retained control in matters of religion, education, culture, personal status, and communal institutions.”

²⁶⁹ The degree of the separateness of the two communities has been one of the major bones of contention between nationalists and supporters of Cypriotness of both sides (*Kıbrıslılık*). Obviously, from the methodological point of view, it is wrong to try to reduce the complex division of labor between the two communities, to the unidimension implied by the term separatedness. Theoretically, it seems proper to speak, in the plural, of the modalities and degrees of separateness which were determined by the division of labor as embodied in the Ottoman *Millet* system, and its transformations during the British rule. Thus, Taeuber (1955: 13) argues that “[s]eparateness in occupational functioning, community activities, and school attendance serve, along with residential segregation, to perpetuate the ancient dichotomy of the religious groups.” Furthermore, high degrees of separatedness in many forms do not necessarily exclude the possibility of one community being highly dependent in one or another critical form. Thus, Melamid (1956: 356–7) argues that “[t]he two major communities, Greek and Turk, are economically largely self-sufficient in their activities, and their agricultural, industrial, and commercial functions rarely complement one another.” Yet, the lack of functional complementarity does not mean the lack of dependency. Oğuz (1975: 75) points out that, T/Cs preferred, throughout the history, agriculture to commerce. Thus, T/Cs were highly dependent, as consumers and producers, on G/C importers and wholesalers, for consumption goods and production inputs. Also, as Plümer (2008, 2) notes, T/C peasants were dependent for exports of their produce on G/C exporters.

²⁷⁰ According to Melamid (1956: 364) “[t]he Turkish conquest eliminated ... aspects of feudalism and led to the evolution of peasant ownership ... [so that, as of 1956] ... 84 per cent of the agricultural land [was] cultivated by its owners ...” Oğuz (1975: 160–1) notes

3.6. AN HISTORICALLY AND EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK *À LA* MARX

The basic objective of this thesis is to rethink, from the point of view of the relationships of causality between politics and economy, the (relative, when possible) explanatory powers of Bob Jessop's theory of the (capitalist) state, and Erik Olin Wright's theory of causal determinations and primacy, through the empirical-historical material about the T/C politics and economy, during, particularly, the 1960s. This is not so easy a task, for the works of two authors is not fully congruent, and readily comparable, for the following reasons:

- (1) To Jessop, Marx's thought is, inseparably, about methodology *and* theory, whereas, for (the younger, but even more so for the mature) Wright, one must make a distinction between strictly substantive *and* strictly methodological/methodic issues. Thus, from a substantive point of view, Marx's theory is about specific questions (problematics) and concepts. Thus, the claims of those Marxists who claim the distinctiveness of Marx's methodology/method are not warranted, for there is no emphatically Marxist methodology in Marx that could stand the test of the generally accepted standards of science. Contrariwise, for Jessop, Marxist concepts are not only substantive, but methodological as well, for it is not theoretically

that, as of 1960, of all agricultural enterprises in Cyprus, 73.3 % were under 5 decares, and, that by 1970, agriculture still constituted the backbone of the T/C economy, with an estimated 60 % of the T/C populace depending on agriculture for livelihood.

possible to separate substantive issues from methodological ones, and *vice versa*;

(2) Thus, there is a very basic incongruence between Jessop and Wright—Jessop is the theorist of concepts–cum–methodology, whilst Wright is the theorist of methodology, *par excellence*, except perhaps his class theory. As a matter of fact, Wright’s ‘concepts’ are, strictly speaking, ‘definitions’ rather than concepts, following the formalistic habits of theoretical–applied social sciences—economics, and sociology. Therefore, this thesis will inescapably be testing the concepts and relationships of Jessop’s theory, and the *definitions* and relationships of Wright’s between;

(3) The foregoing distinction between the concerns and interests of the two authors seems to have had in terms of the course of their respective works. Jessop’s lifetime work is one of progressive development of its starting points based upon the elaboration and introduction of ever new concepts, whereas Wright’s, one of breaks and turns, where several of the early claims to the causal primacy of a number of concepts (e.g. value), and relationships (structural determination, economic determination in the first instance) have later been abandoned.

Accordingly, as the reference point of this thesis, I take the early work of Erik Olin Wright, as expounded in his noted 1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’.

Appendix 2 comprises a full summary of the causality theories of Bob Jessop, and Erik Olin Wright, in terms of their respective (1) theoretical trajectories, (2) the *leitmotivs* of their theoretical work, (3) their theoretical inspirations and sources, (4) their key theoretical concepts, (5) their ontologies and concepts/definitions, (6) the relationships of causality involved in their theories, (7) their approaches to the key Marxist question of crisis; (8) their respective methodologies and methods of enquiry. The theoretical claims that are to be deployed and/or reconsidered here make parts of (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) above, as summarised below. Appendix 2 gives their theoretical claims in their full scale.

Table 3.2. *Bob Jessop v. Erik Olin Wright: Theories of Causality and Elements to be Reconsidered*

This table presents, comparatively, those elements of the causality theories of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright that are to be rethought by using the historical and empirical material relating to the case of the T/Cs.
• THEORETICAL <i>LEITMOTIVS</i> AND TRAJECTORY Jessop’s work is characterised by relative ‘continuity’, ‘progressive build-up’, i.e. the elaboration of its original problematic and conceptual structure, by drawing upon new ideas and working out and adapting new concepts from different theories and theorists. On the other hand, Wright’s theory is characterised by ‘discontinuity’, i.e. by ‘ruptures and new turns’, in terms of concepts, theories that he draws upon, and central claims. Thus, there is an ‘early Wright’, and a ‘late Wright’. Thus, this thesis focuses upon the ‘early Wright’. The major work that represents the early Wright is his 1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’, whose causality theory this thesis undertakes to test. The major work that characterises the late

Wright is his 1992 book ‘Restructuring Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History’, where he disavows his early theory of causality.

The most important distinction between the Bob Jessop and the early Wright is their approach to the Althusserian idea of the ‘economic determination in the last instance’. It is important to note that Althusser’s idea of causality between the various elements of the so-called ‘socio-economic formation’—between state and economy, particularly—dominated the debates, through Althusser’s own work, in the 1960s, and through Poulantzas’s reappropriation of Althusser’s work, in the 1970s.

The key distinction underlying the basic approaches and future trajectories of the two theorists is that,

- Jessop totally rejects the idea of the ‘economic determination in the last instance’, as a part of his dissatisfaction of reductionist–instrumentalist approaches to the relationship of causality between state and economy. Consequently, he endeavours to develop a non-reductionist theory of causality amongst the various elements of society,
- whilst, Wright, basically accepts, breaks down and thus expands the idea of the ‘economic determination in the last instance’—or, more generally, Althusser’s ‘structuralist’ theory, i.e. society as a ‘structured whole’, characterised by ‘overdetermination’. However, he finds the idea too broad and somewhat open to speculative use, so he sets out to build a formal ‘model’ of the structured whole, by breaking down causality into its different types, which he calls the ‘modes of determination’.

• KEY ONTOLOGICAL & THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

ONTOLOGY

1. CONCEPT OF SOCIETY

- According to Jessop, **society is the sum of** a variety of distinct ‘**SYSTEMS**’, or systemic **sets**, or **sub-ensembles of relations**, plus the non-systemic lifeworld.
- The systems of relations that constitute society are **AUTOPOIETIC** (i.e. **self-organising**)—e.g. the legal system, the political system, science, the educational system, religion, and art.
- Jessop makes a distinction between ‘instituted’ and ‘non-instituted’ sets, or sub-ensembles of relations (or, systems). Thus, on the one part, there is the ‘**ECOLOGY**’ of ‘**INSTITUTED**’ orders, sub-

ONTOLOGY

1. CONCEPT OF SOCIETY

- Notably, in the Preface to his 1859 book, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’, Marx suggested a conceptualisation of **society as socio-economic formation**, consisting of two different levels of **STRUCTURES**, namely, **STRUCTURE** and **SUPERSTRUCTURE**. Structure is the **ECONOMIC BASE**, whilst superstructure comprises the **legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms**.

ensembles of social relations, and on the other, the NON-SYSTEMIC lifeworld. The young Marx had, following Hegel, defined society as political society (state) + civil society. Jessop modifies this and defines society as market economy + sovereign state + civil society (public sphere) + lifeworld.	
2. RELATIONS OF CAUSALITY - According to Bob Jessop, relationships of CAUSALITY must be seen as the causal relations between different systems of social relations, types of autopoietic systems. AUTOPOIESIS implies that each system of social relations is operationally autonomous, but materially–substantively interdependent on others. Thus, society as a whole is a self-organising ecology of the instituted systems that develops through the interaction between their respective operational autonomy and material–substantive interdependencies. - In terms of the relations of causality, one of Jessop’s key concepts is the so-called ‘CONTINGENT NECESSITY’, defined as the non-necessary interaction of different causal chains to produce a definite outcome whose own necessity originates only in and through the contingent coming together of these causal chains in a definite context. - Jessop refutes all forms of economic determinism, including its sophisticated versions, such as ‘determination in the last instance’. Thus, he refutes that the ECONOMIC SYSTEM (or the	2. RELATIONS OF CAUSALITY Wright breaks down the Althusserian structural causality into different types of causality, which he calls the MODES OF DETERMINATION. - He then uses these modes of determination to build MODELS OF DETERMINATION, which actually are the differentiated forms of the Althusserian STRUCTURED, OVERDETERMINED WHOLE. Models of determination are also ‘STRUCTURE–AGENCY’ type of causality models. As such, they are ‘schematic representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process’ and comprise the various structures and agencies, on the one hand, and the various modes of determination amongst them, on the other. - Using his break-down of structural causality into the different modes of determination, Wright reinterprets the idea of the DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE, which now means that some basic structures and ‘structural limitation’ take ‘CAUSAL PRIMACY’ over the

dominant MODE OF PRODUCTION) has the properties to enable it to play a unilateral causal role in determining the form, functions or impact of other systems of social relations. • Thus, economy has no ontological priority, or causal primacy in the determination of other sets of relations. There is no economic determination in the last instance. • The idea of ‘economic determination in the last instance’ is now replaced by the idea of ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE, which refers to the structural and/or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organising ecology of systems to imprint its developmental logic on the other systems. It is important to note that, any system, and not only the economy, can potentially be ecologically dominant. • When the economy is ecologically dominant, this is called ECONOMIC DOMINATION. • Accordingly, agents associated with different sets of relationships can advance different PRINCIPALS OF SOCIETALISATION, different societal projects, and DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATE. Thus social formations may be relatively unified under the dominance of religion (theocracies), military–police considerations (national security states), nation–building (new nations), socially constructed ‘racial’ demarcations (apartheid), capital accumulation (bourgeois societies) • Therefore, ‘CAPITALIST’ STATE is not a necessity—there is	other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination. • Wright breaks down the Althusserian into its 6 basic modes of determination, which are defined as a series of distinct RELATIONSHIPS OF DETERMINATION among the structural categories of Marxist theory and between those categories and the appearances of empirical investigation. (1) STRUCTURAL LIMITATION; (2) SELECTION; (3) REPRODUCTION V. NONREPRODUCTION ; (4) LIMITS OF FUNCTIONAL COMPATIBILITY (5) TRANSFORMATION; (6) MEDIATION. • Wright uses the modes of determination above to build the MODELS OF DETERMINATION, which basically are the his reformulation of the Althusserian structured whole, consisting of structures and agencies. At the most general level, his model of determination (MODEL I) links together (1) THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE; (2) THE STATE STRUCTURE; (3) THE CLASS STRUGGLE; (4) STATE POLICIES & INTERVENTIONS, by means of the six modes of determination above. • Furthermore, (i) and (ii) are

no guarantee that the ‘modern state’ will always (or ever) be ‘capitalist’, and it is perfectly possible for it to principally operate as a military power, a theocratic regime, a representative democratic regime answerable to civil society, an apartheid state, or an ethnico–political state • BOURGEOIS SOCIETALISATION involves the relative subordination of the entire social order to capital accumulation. In the terms of Gramsci, this could be described as the development of an ‘HISTORIC BLOC’ between the economic base, juridico–political structure and forms of consciousness.	structures, and (iii) and (iv) relate to agency, so the above is actually a specific type of the structure–agency models. On the other hand, this basic model of the politics/state and economy relationships can be further extended by the inclusion of other elements, such as IDEOLOGY. Or, more complex interconnections among the elements could be posed. • It is important to note that STRUCTURAL LIMITATION V. SELECTION are the two modes of determination of key importance in the Marxist debates and the extension of Althusser’s Structural Causality. • DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY—so far as the structural limitation type of mode of determination is concerned, in Wright’s models of determination, causality always flows onwards, from some base/structure towards the other elements. • In the model of determination between ECONOMY & THE STATE, causality flows from the economic structure, to the state structure, class struggle, and state policies & interventions. • In Wright’s models of determination, ‘DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE’, means that some BASIC STRUCTURES and STRUCTURAL LIMITATION take ‘CAUSAL PRIMACY’ over the other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination. • Wright gives different definitions of the idea of DIALECTICS. According to one of these definitions, dialectics is defined as

	the contradictions of an historical process where the ‘SOLUTIONS’ to a particular impediment at a particular stage of capitalist development become themselves IMPEDIMENTS to accumulation.
3. CRISIS DYNAMICS • As opposed to the classic accounts of Marxist theories of economic crisis, where causality generally flows from the economy to politics and the state, according to Jessop, POLITICAL CRISIS can be the consequence of the problems in any system/subensemble of relationships, or set of systems. Thus, crisis can be the consequence of a multiplicity of complex determinations, causes and dynamics, since Jessop rejects the kind of unilateral kind of causality which privileges the economy—or any other sub-ensemble of relations, for that matter. Thus, there is a plurality of the types of crisis. • Accordingly, political crisis can also arise from the problems of the reconciliation of the needs of the capitalist economy with the other systems/sub-ensembles by ensuring their political unity at the level of the state. As a matter of fact, one of the key types of political crises is that which relates to the absence of a successful ‘HEGEMONIC PROJECT’. In the absence of such a successful hegemonic project, state managers could have to resort to constitutionalised VIOLENCE to secure compliance, or worse still, the UNITY OF THE STATE might collapse altogether. There is a plurality of the types of states, and a plurality of the types of state failures (political crises). Crises can and do arise due to conflicts	3. CRISIS DYNAMICS • The early Wright suggests a ‘STAGES’ THEORY OF CAPITALIST CRISES. He claims that, the systemic solutions to the dominant impediments of a prior stage become the impediments to accumulation of the next stage. • Wright also argues that, it is in the sense above that the impediments to accumulation can be considered as CONTRADICTIONS IN ACCUMULATION, rather than merely obstacles to accumulation. They are contradictions because the ‘solutions’ to a particular impediment become themselves impediments to accumulation. Accordingly, the world-wide capitalist economic crisis of the 1970s can be understood as part of a transition from one pattern of constraints on accumulation, characterised by Keynesian solutions, to a new set of emergent constraints which were in part caused by those very Keynesian strategies in earlier crises and which are no longer amenable to Keynesian solutions.

over rival projects that privilege radically different organisational principles as well as conflicts over rival projects based upon the same principle of socialisation. • EXCEPTIONAL FORMS OF CAPITALIST STATE may appear to be very strong, due to their immense concentration and centralisation of all power, yet they are potentially unstable. Here, the basic cause of the potential instability of such regimes is their inflexibility, for they are unable to respond effectively to the changing crisis, conflicts and contradictions.	
SELECTED ELEMENTS OF JESSOP’S STATE THEORY	
Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright both advance theories of causality about the relationship of the state to the economy. It is important to note that, they had the same starting point, namely, the Althusserian ideas of the structured, overdetermined whole, and (structural) determination in the last instance, which the former totally rejected, and the latter found too general and speculative. However, despite this common point, their theoretical interests and trajectories were widely different. Jessop’s basic project was to develop an alternate theory of the state, whilst Wright’s basic project was to develop a theory of class, and a theory of causal determinations. Accordingly, Jessop’s theory of causality was embedded into his theory of the state, whilst Wright advanced a separate theory of causality <i>per se</i>. Methodologically, for Jessop, the elaboration of the relations of causality has relatively been part of the elaboration of the concepts of state theory. For Wright, the elaboration of the theory of causality and the theory of class were relatively distinct tasks—and became increasingly more so. Overall, for the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that Jessop had a theory of the state, whilst Wright did not. Thus, as far as the state theory is concerned, this thesis undertakes to test the following aspects of Jessop’s theory of the state alone. • Bob Jessop calls his approach to state theory ‘RELATIONAL–STRATEGIC’. The first epithet, i.e. ‘RELATIONAL’ is defined as relations amongst relations, implying the relationships amongst the different sets/subensembles, or systems of social relations. • As far as the determinations which produce actual events as the resultant of the interaction of various causal chains is concerned, Jessop deploys three more categories/concepts, elaborating his alternate approach to the classic structure–agency issue: (i) STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS as opposed to CONJUNCTURAL OPPORTUNITIES; (ii) POWER, and (iii) INTEREST. • One of the most important aspects of Jessop’s analysis of the structure–agency issue in terms of the constraint and opportunity couplet, for the purposes of this thesis, is the idea that agents, striving to realise the ends they pursue, have their own varying TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL HORIZONS.	

- The second epithet, **STRATEGIC**, implies that the state is the **SITE OF STRATEGY**. One of the most important ideas associated with the strategic-ness of the state is **STRATEGIC SELECTIVITY**, which Jessop substitutes for ‘structural’ selectivity. This basically means that the state can be regarded as a ‘system of strategic selectivity’, ‘whose structure and modus operandi are more open to some types of political strategy than others.’
- The next idea associated with the strategic-ness of the state can be defined as **the site where strategies are elaborated**.
- Finally, Jessop argues that **the selection of successful strategies is the combined effect of PATH-DEPENDENT and CURRENT-TRANSFORMATIVE STRATEGIES and STRUGGLES**

In what follows, methodologically, I will be pursuing a double strategy. Firstly, I will be suggesting an historically and empirically grounded conceptual framework, to capture the dynamics of the T/C politics and economy. On the other hand, I will try take a ‘pre-theoretical’ route, by way of restricting myself to simply identifying the empirical relationships without any recourse to the concepts of either political economy or the theories of the state. Then, I will reconsider the empirical relationships in the light of the theoretical relationships suggested by the theories of Jessop and Wright, and see, where they can be accepted, and where refuted. One of the end products of this exercise will obviously be a theoretical model unifying—or, in alternative words, theoretical narrative of—the T/C politics and economy.²⁷¹

²⁷¹ I believe this way of proceeding accords closely with Marx’s approach to the method of political economy in the Introduction to Grundrisse. According to Marx, political economy begins with the observed ‘concrete’ and the chaotic conception of the whole. Then it works up observation and conception into concepts, by way of moving analytically through ever thinner abstractions and finally arriving at the simplest determinations and simple concepts, i.e. the ‘abstract’. And finally, by the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete, thought now appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the ‘concrete in mind’. See Marx (1973: 100–101). For a view of Marx’s method of Concrete–Abstract–Concrete as a model of using the modern terminology empirical–theoretical model of research, see Mandel

Looking vertically, the framework in question involves, using the International Relations terminology, multiple levels of analysis, more specifically, the inter-state (USA, GB, Turkey, Greece), and the global (International Political Economy) levels. Thus, I argue that, on a first level, the given conjuncture of world politics, political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, and international political economy conjuncture (dominant development strategies, policies and policy tools) together determine the externally-given constraints and possibilities faced by T/C nationalist leadership. On a second level, externally-given constraints and possibilities, and the domestically-given constraints together determine the range of the options for strategic choices as regards to state-building and capital accumulation. However, in terms of the specific relations of causality between economy and politics, this part of the model is, theoretically, ‘empty’, in two specific senses:

- (1) Despite the fact that it broadly suggests that the various inter-state and domestic political, and economic factors together determine the range of options for strategic choices regarding state-building and capital accumulation, it does not make any specific claim about causality, i.e. the causal relationships amongst the factors in question, leaving that issue open for the test;
- (2) Furthermore, this model, precisely because it is empty, could fit well with a theory of the state–economy relationship.

(1975: 16–17). As I see it, the way of proceeding suggested above basically offers an empirically testable model of qualitative research *à la* Marx.

The rest of the model involves a personal claim to link the successive stages of the T/C history. Overall, strategic choices reflect strategic constraints, possibilities, options, and policy (or, political) priorities. Each strategic choice gives way to a different set of relations, and modes of determination between politics and economy, and thus, each strategic choice brings about a new set of contradictions, underlying the politics of the sub-period under study. Such conflicts, together with the changes in the conjuncture of world politics and political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, eventually lead to change.

Finally, let me define some of the (pre-theoretical) terms used in the historically–empirically testable model illustrated below:

- i) A ‘constraint’ can be defined as “something that limits one’s freedom of action or choice” (Merriam–Webster). One must also note that a constraint can, *inter alia*, be a ‘limit’ (upper and lower bounds); a ‘restriction’ (rule or law); ‘control’; a ‘restraint’ (decision, rule, idea) or; a ‘limitation’ (act, or process) (Oxford).
- ii) On the other hand, a ‘possibility’ can be defined as “the state or fact of likelihood” (Oxford). Generally, constraint connotes negativity, whereas possibility, generally but not necessarily, connotes positivity.²⁷²

²⁷² For instance, the so-called ‘production possibility boundary’ in macroeconomics connotes both negativity (looking from above the boundary, upper limits to what can be produced), positivity (looking from below the boundary, potential production yet to be realised), or both (the boundary itself representing the trade-offs, called the opportunity costs).

- iii) Option can be defined as “the power, right, or opportunity to choose”.
Priority can be defined as “the fact or condition [of a thing] of being regarded or treated as more important than others”.
- iv) Finally, one must that although priority and choice are semantically distinct, they are not, analytically and empirically, non-exclusive. Thus, a new choice may or may not reflect a priority, whereas a priority can be the outcome of a past choice. Also, there is the empirical difficulty that, priorities can be consciously kept covert, being thereby not readily observable. Obviously, priorities can change over time, signifying radical, strategic changes in the behaviours of the agents.
- v) Finally, constraints and possibilities are relatively defined, from the point of view of the subjective priorities of the agents. Therefore, the logical starting-point must be priorities.

Table 3.3. An Historically–Empirically Grounded Conceptual Framework

FOCUS: DOMESTIC DYNAMICS		State-building
		Capital Accumulation
THEORY		
ECONOMY AND POLITICS/STATE	JESSOP	Theory of Capitalist State
		Theory of Capitalist Economy
		Relations between Economy and State
	WRIGHT	Modes and Models of Determination
STATE AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION	SHAIKH & TONAK	Productive/Unproductive Labor
	HARVEY	Geography (of Capital Accumulation)
EMPIRICS/THEORY		
Conjuncture of World Politics (USA, GB, Turkey, Greece)		HISTORICAL & EMPIRICAL MATERIAL
Political and Economic Conjuncture in Turkey		
International Political Economy Conjuncture (Development Strategies)		
(together determine)		
Externally-given constraints and possibilities faced by T/C leadership		
Externally and Domestically given constraints		
(together determine)		
Range of Options for Strategic Choices Regarding State-building and Capital Accumulation		
and, finally		
Strategic Choices (reflect, strategic constraints, possibilities, options, and policy (or, political) priorities		
➤ FURTHERMORE, IT IS THE CLAIM OF THIS THESIS THAT		
Each strategic choice give way to a different set of relations, and modes of determination between politics and economy		
Each strategic choice brought a new set of contradictions underlying the politics of the sub-period under study		
Such conflicts, together with change in the conjuncture of world politics and political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, eventually led to change		
Results & Reconsideration of Theory		

CHAPTER IV

PRELUDE: T/C POLITICS AND ECONOMY, AND THE CYPRUS ISSUE PRIOR TO ZURICH–LONDON

This chapter serves as a prelude to the study of the period of 1960–1967, by providing an account of the dual nationalist strategy of state-building and capital accumulation of the pre-1960 period, of the genesis of the Cyprus issue, and a summary account of the conjuncture of world politics prior to Zurich and London Agreements. In so doing, I will firstly recapitulate the basic elements of the dual T/C nationalist strategy of state-building and capital accumulation in the pre-1960 period, which I have expounded in my prior work.²⁷³ However, the greater part of the chapter is novel work, which brings up a number of neglected features of the period.

4.1. THE DUAL T/C NATIONALIST STRATEGY OF STATE-BUILDING AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION OF THE PRE-1960 PERIOD

So far as exterior relations were concerned, throughout the 1950s, T/C nationalist leaders sought to become one of the active players of the question of Cyprus. The principal vehicle for this was the use of the ‘motherland’ leverage which firstly required the construction of Cyprus as Turkey’s prime ‘national cause’.²⁷⁴ Domestically, they pursued a strategy of

²⁷³ Thus, the first sub-section below draws largely upon Arslan (2012).

²⁷⁴ See, amongst others, Kızılyürek (2005: 225–227). It is well-known that, prior to 1955, the status of Cyprus was officially a non-problem for Turkish foreign policy (see Gürel, 1985: 71–77). Efforts towards the construction of Cyprus as Turkey’s national cause were led by a network of the local notables in Cyprus (Fazıl Küçük, Ahmet Faiz Kaymak, etc.), T/C university students studying in Turkey (Osman Örek, Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, etc.), bureaucrat members of the T/C diaspora (Derviş Manizade,

state-building, coupled with one of capital accumulation. Note that state is a social relation and an institutional ensemble, and each state project defines in its own way the boundaries between the state and its environment. By implication, state-building can be seen as the building up of specific relations, institutions, and a specific space. As such, it entails the construction of new power relations via the formation, if necessary, the centralisation, concentration, and institutionalisation of power resources.²⁷⁵ This concerns, as sub-processes, the constitution of monopoly on violence, concentration of political power, centralisation of administration, quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to accelerate capital accumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation, and institutionalisation of centralised budgetary practice.

In the specific case of the T/Cs, the concentration of political power was achieved through the building of a party-front type of organisation consisting of *Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birliği Partisi* [KMTBP—National Turkish Unity Party of Cyprus], and *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* [Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions, briefly *Federasyon*]. The major milestone in the constitution of monopoly on violence was the founding of

Mehmet Ali Pamir, etc.), plus a number of Turkish nationalists (Hasene Ilgaz, Sedat Simavi, etc.). It was Hasan Nevzat Karagil (b.1920), a T/C student with Turkish citizenship, first at the Linguistics–History–Geography Faculty of Ankara University, then at the Law Faculty of İstanbul University, who actually played the key role in shaping up this network, in the late 1940s. See, particularly, Yaşın (1997).

²⁷⁵ I borrow the term power resources from the field of the Organisation Studies. Colin Hales, starting from a relational and relative conception of power (as power over), classifies the types of power resources into physical, economic, knowledge (administrative-technical), and normative power. The classic typology belongs to J.P.R. French and B. Raven, who distinguish power into its coercive, reward, referent, expert, legitimate, and informational elements (Hales, 1993: 20–3).

the TMT. Demands for partition (*Taksim*) were expressive of the quest for territory, while the separation of municipalities, etc. was concrete steps towards it. The nationalist leadership's economic strategy had three basic elements: The first was to ensure and put to use Turkey's fiscal transfers.²⁷⁶ The second was the emergence of fiscal instruments and policies, particularly, in the form of taxation and public spending by the *Evkaf*. The third was a capital strategy, based on the actuation of a process of rapid capital accumulation, around the *Çarşı*, via the institution of a closed, all-Turkish circulation of capital, under "From the Turk, to the Turk" (*Türk'ten Türk'e*) campaign. Note that the two pillars of the leadership's strategy of capital accumulation were *Evkaf*, and "From the Turk, to the Turk" campaign. This was a public-led strategy, with *Evkaf* playing the role of the key public entrepreneur, and funder of and creditor to the cooperatives and private investors.

Pointed out in Subsection 2.3 above, was the latent contradiction between the strategies of state-building and capital accumulation. In the late 1950s, and prior to the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, this latent contradiction did not surface, for two basic reasons: 1) There was not, yet, a large and autonomous T/C bureaucracy and a military to absorb the surplus product generated by the T/Cs; 2) there were not massive demographic

²⁷⁶ Turkey's fiscal transfers, as a basic resource enabling the distributive function of politics is therefore key to understanding the relationship between T/C politics and economy. Systematic transfers began with the budget of 1953, following the lobbying efforts of the T/C diaspora. Budgetary allowances were passed on to Cyprus via *Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği*, and used by *Federasyon* to finance school expenditures and build school buildings, (Ergin, 2001b: 281; KKTC Dışişleri ve Savunma Bakanlığı, 2000: Manizade, 1975: 320). To Fazıl Küçük, the monetisation of the Turkish interest in Cyprus was the single most important success of the year 1952 (Evre, 2004: 118-9).

dislocations to disrupt the conditions of stable capital accumulation. State absorption of the surplus only became a major problem after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, in 1960. And, massive demographic dislocations disrupting the conditions of stable capital accumulation only occurred after the collapse of the common state, in 1964.

Besides agriculture, the major occupation amongst the T/Cs was public service, as a legacy of the Ottoman past, when the Turks were the more urban ruling class.²⁷⁷ Under the circumstances, the revenues of T/C state functionaries were a) payables by the British colonial administration, and; b) injections into the T/C and G/C economies. According to Sadrazam (1993: 41), the Turkish bureaucracy acquired the conditions of its “autonomous existence” in 1955, when the British relinquished control of Evkaf property. Be that as it may, before the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the problem of state absorption of the surplus product was the concern of the British, not that of the T/Cs or G/Cs. For the T/C leadership, state absorption of the surplus only became a major problem and cause for concern after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus. As a matter of fact, the constitution of central and local organs of the representative politics, bureaucracies, the armed forces, and the police, as envisaged by the Constitution, required the extraction of the surplus product through taxation

²⁷⁷ As Taeuber (1955: 12) puts it, “[f]or the three centuries between 1571 and 1878 the Turks lived in Cyprus as a ruling class. It is to be expected, therefore, that they should have been a more urban group than the subject Greeks, and that they should have occupied paramount positions throughout Cyprus ... [while] [t]he position of the Turks as an ancient urban group is further evident in their concentration in Nicosia, and within Nicosia in the old walled city.” Note that the T/C quarter of the old walled city and its extensions and outskirts were to become the biggest T/C enclave in 1964, and the commanding center of T/C resistance thence.

and other means, and its absorption through public expenditure on, particularly, salaries.

As far as demographics are concerned, the emergence of the nascent forms of borders and territories dates back to the late 1950s. Nonetheless, "... the physical separation of the two communities was local and discontinuous, [as] they were still living adjacent to one another all over the Island and no basis existed for dividing the territory as a whole between them." (Reddaway, 1986: 95)²⁷⁸ Note that the dislocational effects of the later stages of the 1955–1959 civil war were confined to the full evacuation of only 13 mixed villages and one T/C village, and the partial evacuation of 13 mixed villages. The weight of the exodus was borne by the Famagusta district, with 749 of all 1,335 refugees (56.1 %).²⁷⁹ Effects on the economy of the interethnic clashes of particularly June–July 1958 were severe, but relatively short-lived. Crashaw (1959: 141) reports that commercial life was drastically curtailed, due to disruptions in transportation, disruptions in

²⁷⁸ Nascent borders and territories assumed a variety of concrete forms, such as, the Mason–Dixon line in Nicosia, barbed wire, barrels, pits, roads, streets, road blocks, walls, the outside walls of houses, whole villages, as well as separate municipalities. At stake with the establishment of separate T/C municipalities, as proclaimed on 29 April 1958, and stipulated by Article 173 of the 1960 Constitution, was the question of territory, i.e. the delineation of municipal borders. See, amongst others, the secret TMT plan for the temporary phase (*geçici merhale planı*) (An, 2002: 102).

²⁷⁹ Compare this, to the total number of 103 villages evacuated from December 1963 through August 1964, and the 18,667 refugees therefrom. Computations are based on the information given in Appendix I to Oberling (1982). One should note that the intercommunal strife of summer 1958 witnessed the first-ever organised migration of the T/Cs, from Akoursos (*Akarsu*) in the Paphos district, to Sykyllura (*Yılmazköy*) in Nicosia (Crashaw, 1959: 140; An, 2002: 136). See also, the website of PRIO Cyprus project "Dialogue for Trust-Building and Reconciliation: Cypriots Seeking New Approaches to the Property Issue", namely, "Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife" (<http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net>, 26 June 2012). Writing in May 1963, Kutlu Adalı names 15 villages, left in 1958, whose emigrants never return, comprising practically all of the fully evacuated Famagusta villages cited by Oberling (Adalı, 1997b: 86).

production in the building and contracting industry, and at Greek factories employing T/C workers. Furthermore, “[t]he Turkish community, which was far from self-sufficient and depended on the Greeks for much of its trade, was confronted with food shortages and black-market prices.”

To sum up, prior to the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, the T/C leadership did not face any serious drags on and disruptions in the process capital accumulation, caused by the absorption of the surplus product by bureaucracy and the military, or by massive demographic dislocations. As a matter of fact, several other aspects of the T/C strategy of state-building (*Taksim*) served to actuate rapid capital accumulation. After all, concentration of political power (*Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birliği Partisi*, and *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu*), together with the constitution of monopoly on violence (TMT) enabled and enforced the nationalist leadership’s economic strategy. The basic instruments and policies were Turkey’s fiscal transfers, centralisation of the budgetary practice via the *Evkaf* and *Federasyon*, the enforcement of taxation, public spending, subsidies and credits to cooperatives and businessmen, and the construction of a captive market (‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ campaign) with substantial trading margins. They were effectively used for building a relatively closed, T/C circulation of capital, which was compatible with and part of the nationalist goal of catching up with the G/C wealthy.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ In his defence of “From the Turk, to the Turk”, Rauf R. Denктаş (2000: 153) blames the critics for ignoring the fact that the campaign in question gave rise to well-established trade corporations which are still standing.

Aforementioned above, in Subsection 2.3, were the two historically-given constraints on the T/C nationalist leadership's strategies of state-building and capital accumulation. Firstly, the T/C society was not capable of generating the surplus product necessary to sustain a modern state apparatus. Secondly, T/Cs and G/Cs geographically cohabited, while they were also connected regarding aspects of the basic social activity of circulation. To these, one must now add a number of further, externally-given constraints of the conjunctural type, faced by the T/C nationalist leadership under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus. The first class of such constraints derive from the conjuncture of world politics, and Turco-Greek relations, conditioning the specific character and structure of the common state. The second class derives from Turkey's domestic politics, more specifically, from the overthrow and replacement of the Menderes government by the military, on 27 May 1960, weeks before the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus.

The consideration of the strategies of state-building and capital accumulation under historically and externally given constraints, together with the development paradigm of the era should help to putting into place the options available to and choices made by the T/C nationalist leadership.

4.2. THE CYPRUS ISSUE, AND SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE CONJUNCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS PRIOR TO ZURICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS

To be able to properly put the train of events leading first to the foundation, then the collapse of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus into their place, one must bear in mind the complex whole of the contemporaneous scenery, three elements of which I would like to single out. The first is the post-war conjuncture of decolonisation, and the Cold War at large. The second is the geo-politics of the Middle East, including the rise of Arab nationalism, as the leading agency of decolonisation. The third is the intellectually predominant climate of modernisation, and, more specifically, aspirations for, *inter alia*, modern state-building and economic development, and, of course, socio-cultural transformation.

Although, by 1914, Britain had already conceded autonomy to the so-called Dominions²⁸¹ and Ireland ('Home Rule'), the First World War was the first set of events which severely shook the structure of colonialism. Following the revolt of 1919–1922, the British were compelled to transform Egypt from a protectorate to a semi-independent kingdom, while following the revolt of 1918–1922, India, as the core of the British Empire, became intermittently ungovernable (Hobsbawm, 1997: 210–211). The next critical set of events was the Great Slump: Dramatic collapse in the prices of primary products and the deterioration in the terms of trade of the colonies led to political radicalisation as “the outlines of the mass politics of the

²⁸¹ Namely, the white settlement colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

future began to emerge” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 213–214). Yet, as of 1939, the universal end of colonialism did not seem quite imminent. “What transformed the situation was the Second World War.” “Until 1943, the great colonial empires were on the losing side”, while the whole course of the War was “... the proof that white men and their states could be defeated, ... that the old colonial powers were too weak, even after a victorious war, to restore their old positions.” (Hobsbawm, 1997: 216) To this, one must obviously add that the global economy of the British Empire had long been bereft of the means to generate the surplus product (or value) required to back such grandiose schemes as to keep the colonies.²⁸² The old colonial systems first broke in Asia, with the British colonies of Syria getting independent in 1945, and India and Pakistan in 1947. By 1950, Asian decolonisation had already come to a close, except in Indochina. (Hobsbawm, 1997: 217, 220) In 1952, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser led the revolution of the Free Officers in Egypt. British attempt to reassert herself as a global imperial power in the Suez crisis of 1956 utterly failed, concluding irrevocably what has been called ‘Britain’s Moment in the Middle East’, the epoch of British hegemony in that region since 1918. In 1958, the Western client regimes in Iraq and Syria were overthrown (Hobsbawm, 1997: 220–221). Generally, “by the late 1950s, it had become

²⁸² Madden (2000: 43) argues that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (in office, January 1955–October 1963) “... did not want to preside over the liquidation of the empire, but he knew Britain was ‘still trying to do more’ than her resources provided. Having lost her pre-eminence in material strength, she must live by her wits as in earlier periods and exert influence in other ways, if no longer by authority” The hegemonic decline of Britain dates back to the end of the nineteenth century: “During the long wave upswing of the mid-nineteenth century, Britain was still too strong to be challenged. By the time of the next upswing (after 1893), however, British hegemony had weakened, Germany had emerged as a leading industrial economy and tensions between the great powers had increased.” (Goldstein, 1998: 336)

clear to the surviving old empires that formal colonialism had to be liquidated, and by 1970, the imperial era was largely, if not entirely, at an end (Hobsbawm, 1997: 221–222).

The brunt of the post-war decolonisation was naturally born by the British Empire, as the largest colonialist, and the former hegemonic power.²⁸³ On the part of the British administrators, the dismantling of the Empire necessarily called, as a strategic response, for the reformation and the further expansion of the Commonwealth, and, by implication, complete revision of the status of the colonies. A first idea that came up was a two tiers ‘Commonwealth of British and Associated Nations’: A close circle of ‘independent British states’ owing a common allegiance to the Crown (the older Dominions), plus the ‘associated states’, not accepting that allegiance, but seeking a position of ‘independence within the Commonwealth’ (the bigger colonies).²⁸⁴ Contrariwise, the so-called ‘small territories’ were told to be bereft of the capacity for or the prospect of independent, sovereign statehood.²⁸⁵ Thus, Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies cited three grounds to deny Dominion status to 21 small colonies (cities and

²⁸³ So, Frederick Madden, Oxford historian of the Empire and the Commonwealth laments that, “... the combined hostility and jealousy of the great powers ...”, “[t]he UN's articulate doctrinaire hostility to colonies, the end of French and Belgian empires in Africa, and fears of violence in East and Central Africa, left British governments with little alternative but to grant independence—to 2 more in the 1950s, to 22 in the 60s, to 14 in the 70s and to 11 since.” (Madden: 2000: xiv, 2)

²⁸⁴ Cabinet Secretary (1947–1967) Sir Norman Brook, reporting to the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Relations (3 April 1948) (Madden, 2000: 6–7).

²⁸⁵ In his invitation to the members of the Committee of Enquiry into the Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies (4 October 1946–28 February 1950) stated that: “[w]hile in the course of time some of the larger colonies would achieve independence, that would be ‘a very long period even for the few’ and the majority, too small and poor, would never ‘be able to maintain true independence’.” (Madden, 2000: 22)

islands): 1) Strategic importance to the rest of the Commonwealth; 2) too slender resources to support self-government; 3) too great weakness for self-defence.²⁸⁶ Finally, Jones was also emphatic that the strategic argument, which concerned ‘our own interests’ was crucial in Cyprus, Hong Kong, and Gibraltar (Madden, 2000: 11)

Thus, in the minds of the British administrators, the problem of small territories was not purely one of geopolitics, but one of geographic, demographic, and economic ‘scales’ as well.²⁸⁷ Economic productivity, or, to be more exact, the capacity to generate sufficient surplus product was the basis of the modern, independent, and sovereign state.²⁸⁸ So whilst the

²⁸⁶ As Creech Jones put it to the Cabinet, overall, three types of colonies existed: “[T]hose potentially capable of independence; those which might combine with others for independence; and those outside either category.” (Madden, 2000: 10). The 21 small colonies were: Malta, Gibraltar, Cyprus; St. Helena-Ascension-Tristan de Cunha, the Falklands, Bahamas, Bermuda; Gambia, S.L., Zanzibar, British Somaliland; Aden colony and protectorate, Mauritius, Seychelles; H.K., Fiji, and the W. Pacific H.C. Territories (Solomons, Gilbert and Ellice, N. Hebrides condominium, Pitcairn and Tonga) (Madden, 2000: 22). All but four were islands. The fate of the 21 colonies lied at the heart of the so-called ‘problem of small territories’ “... which ... consumed so much time in the departments and in the Cabinet Office during two decades.” As of 1957–1958, Labour and Conservatives still concurred that “... full sovereignty was not possible for the great majority of British dependencies.” (Madden, 2000: 2)

²⁸⁷ Speaking to the Conference on the British Caribbean Federation (23 February 1956), Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Tindal Lennox-Boyd drew attention to the implications of the status of (full) self-government within the Commonwealth: “Self-government meant something more than the formal relinquishment by Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom of constitutional powers of control. It meant that *a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and financially*, that it could *finance its own administration* and that it was able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international relations to the extent that either was involved by its geographical or international standing.” (Madden, 2000: 80) [my italics—H.A.]

²⁸⁸ “It is now a truism to say that political independence is unreal unless it is based on financial stability which, in turn on a solid foundation of economic productivity—i.e., on an adequate ‘national income’.” (Standing Closer of Association Committee’s report on the prospects of the federal structure in the British West Indies, dated 21 October 1949) (Madde, 2000: 70). Incidentally, note that the orthodox measures of productivity are always based on the ‘final product’. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP)—or using the more recent terminology, Gross National Income (GNI)—are the two basic measures of final product in orthodox accounts. As for the so-called Classical economists, as well as Marx, the key to their economic thinking is the concept of ‘surplus’

smaller dependencies would be granted the new status of ‘Island and City States’, their economic and other resources would not admit their becoming fully independent and sovereign. Accordingly, the declared policy of Her Majesty’s Government (H.M.’s G) to develop territories to the point of ‘responsible self-government’ would therefore be confined to local affairs alone (Madden, 2000: 6, 24–27). It is important to note that the promise of local, representative democracy was not the only offer for solace to pacify nationalist oppositions to the falling short of full independence and sovereignty. Equally significant was, the promise of (social, cultural and) economic development.^{289, 290} As a matter of fact, the British administrators

product (and/or value). In fulfilling its various functions, the state directly and indirectly absorbs portions of the surplus product (Shaikh and Tonak, 1996: 131, 137).

²⁸⁹ Thus, Margery Perham of the Committee of Enquiry into Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial Territories (and, Reader in Colonial Administration at Oxford) argued that, to earn or preserve “the loyalty of the peoples in the difficult constitutional compromise”: “a) In all constitutions we should frankly and explicitly reserve defence and foreign affairs. b) In every other sphere we should make on paper and in fact the fullest delegation of power to the people (c) To compensate for the denial of complete self-government we should offer fully and actively the greatest possible degree of economic, social and educational service and contact with this country.” The basic task of the Committee was to devise “... a new status, short of full independence, but one which would satisfy the legitimate pride and aspirations of the inhabitants of those territories.” To this end, the 1951 report of the Committee came up with seven guiding principles: “1. H.M.’s G. as the ‘center of the Commonwealth’ would retain total control of external defence and foreign affairs: colonies would limit their aspiration for complete independence just as the U.K. might surrender a degree of sovereignty in the interests of the U.N. and the free world. (2) Increasingly the people of these territories must be granted the fullest delegation of power and as much internal responsibility as possible. (3) *Government must be as simple and inexpensive as was compatible with efficiency.* (4) *H.M.’s G. must provide the greatest amount of economic, social and educational aid to local resources.* (5) A sense of belonging to a larger entity as partners in the Commonwealth must be created. (6) Especially in plural societies a sense of local patriotism must be fostered. (7) The distinction between dependent and independent must be lessened.” Commenting on the Committee’s recommendations, officials of the Colonial Office and governors argued that “[t]he need was economic stability rather than constitutional progress. ‘The real problem of the smaller colonial territories [was] one of resources and to neglect this in favour of experiment with political forms [was] to build on sand.’ (Madden, 2000: 26) (Madden, 2000: 10–11, 22–23, 26). [my italics—H.A.]

²⁹⁰ Thus, G/C and T/C political critics alike of the proposed constitutional reforms in Cyprus were either indifferent, purposely, or simply oblivious to the economic aspect of the British proposals of 1948, and 1954. Amongst the Turkish and T/C students of Cypriot studies as well, there seems to exist a tendency to focus on politics at the expense of

not only promised economic development along with political reform, but they also saw the former to be the alternative of the latter. Where nationalist or communist oppositions effectively blocked the road to earning local acquiescence in return for political reform, the preferred policy of British administrators was bureaucratic autocracy, cushioned by economic development via planning.²⁹¹

Under the CD&W Act of 1945²⁹², the Colonial Office required the colonies to prepare and submit ten-year plans for the period of 1946–1956, and five-year plans thenceforth. As of the late 1950s, all British colonies were formulating plans, allocating the funds becoming available to them to

political economy, and international political economy. See, for a rare exception, Gürel (1985: 79, 82).

²⁹¹ Consider, for instance, the case of British Guiana. With the pro-communist People's Progressive Party sweeping the elections of 27 April 1953, and large-scale work stoppages on the sugar estates, the British called a halt to the process of political reform, by suspending the newly introduced constitution, declaring a state of emergency, and militarily occupying the country on 9 October 1953. In order to counteract the communist influence, the Interim Government embarked on a policy of 'efficient progressive administration' together with the 'vigorous carrying out of the development plan'. The five-year plan of 66 million dollars was funded locally, by a loan, and the so-called Colonial Development and Welfare grants (Madden, 2000: 233, 251, 257).

²⁹² Apparently, the origins of the British policies of development planning after the Second World War can be traced to the pre-war civil disturbances and other problems precipitated in the West Indies by the drastic price collapse of crucial cash crops. Following the recommendations of a royal commission of investigation, the British Government passed the 'Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) Act' of 1940, superseding the 'Colonial Development Act' of 1929. In 1945, another CD&W Act was passed, more than doubling the funds available for development projects in the colonies (Waterston, 1969: 30, 34). Apparently, one of the goals of the CD&W Act was to export the British welfare state to the colonies. Dosser (1959: 255, 263) argues that the post-war British plans were not a signal success, which fact he attributes to the failure to formulate sectorally integrated plans taking into consideration the existing input–output linkages. Havinden and Meredith (1996: 253, 255) also argue, in the same vein, that "... the planning process remained superficial—plans consisted of 'shopping lists' of desirable projects which often not integrated with each other or the total economy. Colonial governments lacked the statistical information for national accounting which was essential for development planning and the setting of targets at a more sophisticated level. Most importantly, the plans ... lacked strategy."

different projects (Dosser, 1959: 255; Waterston, 1969: 34).²⁹³ In putting into its place the British riposte to the crumbling of the Empire by means of economic planning, one must allow for the following two factors: 1) the *Zeitgeist* of the post-war period, i.e. westernization and modernization, and; 2) the ‘economic’ Cold War. To begin with, as Hobsbawm (1997: 200) argues,

“... the dynamics of the greater part of the world’s history in the Short Twentieth Century ... consist essentially in the attempts by the elites of non-bourgeois societies to imitate the model pioneered in the West, which was essentially seen as that of societies generating progress, the form of wealth power and culture, by economic and techno-scientific ‘development’ in a capitalist to socialist variant. There was no operational model other than ‘westernisation’ or ‘modernisation’ or whatever one chose to call it.”

As Engerman (2004: 32) points out, during the Second World War (and after), “... as demands for (and the likelihood of) independence increased, economic plans proliferated.” Leaders of the so-called Third World equated political self-determination with economic self-determination; political independence and sovereignty with economic growth; economic development with industrialisation, and the latter with planning (Engerman, 2004: 31, 36–37). Furthermore, planning itself became “the intellectual

²⁹³ In the case of the British colonies, funding for the development plans came from four basic sources: Overseas aid (CD&W grants), loan funds (including those from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), public savings, and private savings (Dosser, 1959: 256–257). However, the ailing British economy was not up to the task of supporting the development of the colonies by direct aid. Thus, “... after the financial crisis of 1947 in the United Kingdom, increased output and income from which each territory could finance most of its development became a main British objective of colonial development.” (Waterston, 1969: 34)

matrix of the entire modernization ideology.”²⁹⁴, ²⁹⁵ Note that the term ‘Third World’ grew out of the rhetoric of the Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s, to signify the project of a group of countries getting together to become a ‘third force’ in pursuance of a ‘third way’, in inter-state politics and the economy (Tomlinson, 2003: 309). The Bandung Conference of 1955 of the 29 Asian and African independent countries, principally led by radical colonial ex-revolutionaries was the very first attempt to create such a force, namely, the ‘Non-Aligned’ Movement (Tomlinson, 2003: 309; Hobsbawm, 2007: 356). The pronouncements of the Bandung Conference stressed the former colonies’ unanimity over the precedence of economic development, while leaving the question of the specific form of economic organisation to the discretion of each country (Engerman, 2004: 35). As a matter of fact, under the Cold War circumstances, “[i]t was over broad issues of economic development that the fiercest battles for the concept of the Third World were fought.” (Tomlinson, 2003: 310) Historiographically, it is important to see the Cold War as more than just super-power politics of episodic crises, of military conflicts and diplomatic standoffs. It also, and critically, encompasses at its epicentre a political contest over economics:

- (a) Consensus over the goal of ‘increasing the net output’ (i.e. economic growth), but, differences over
- (b) the forms of ‘coordination’ of social production that would best increase the net output (planning *versus* the market), as well as

²⁹⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, quoted by Engerman (2004: 31).

²⁹⁵ “Today, the national plan appears to have joined the national anthem and the national flag as a symbol of sovereignty and modernity.” (Waterston, 1969: 28)

(c) the ‘allocation’ of the net output amongst alternate uses (present consumption *versus* future consumption, i.e. investment; investment on consumption goods *versus* the means of production; emphasis on agriculture *versus* industry, light *versus* heavy industry, etc.).²⁹⁶

On the basis of the foregoing, one can see that the British response to the menace of decolonisation in the specific case of Cyprus basically took the same path as elsewhere of constitutional reform *and* economic development. As a matter of fact, one of the major schools of thought amongst those concerned with the Cyprus issue within the British political establishment was that economic development would remove political discontent.²⁹⁷ On the Island, while the Atlantic Charter had fostered the hopes for *Enosis*, by 1943, A.K.E.L.²⁹⁸ had indisputably assumed the leading role in Cypriot politics, linking the cause of Communism with *Enosis*, and posing the greatest threat to the colonial regime. Thus, “[a]s the war approached its

²⁹⁶ The trenchant critique above of the existing Cold War historiography and the reading of the Cold War as contestation over the coordination of social production and the allocation of the net output has been expounded by David Engerman in a brilliant 2004 article. I have somewhat changed the terminology: Engerman actually speaks of three economic trends, which are “consensus over the need for performance and conflicts over both organization and priorities”. See, particularly, Engerman (2004: 23–25).

²⁹⁷ See Reddaway (1986: 13–16) for the different, though sometimes overlapping British approaches to the Cyprus issue. Closely allied with the pro-development approach were the advocates of liberal constitutional reform proposing a self-governing Cyprus within the Commonwealth. Reddaway (1986: 14) correctly argues that, while the pro-development approach had a point, it was of limited use, politically: “... [T]he people on the Island passionately believed themselves to be Greeks and Turks and to them the issue of overriding importance was that of the sovereignty and the final status of the Island.” Ideologically, underlying the differences was the old feud between the philhellenic Gladstonian liberalism and the Disraelite Tory conservatism. On this, and the conflicting positions of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office on the issue of self-determination (cession) *versus* strategic security (retention) in the Middle East and Cyprus, see particularly Louis (1998: 205–225). It is important to note that these positions did not strictly overlap with the Labour *versus* Conservatives distinction.

²⁹⁸ Acronym for *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú*, the Progressive Party of Working People.

end, ... the need to convince Cypriots of the advantages of British rule became even more imperative.” (Yiangou, 2012: 146–147) The basic strategy of the Colonial Office was, in the short term, to dismiss any possibility of the abrogation of British sovereignty by a steadfast resolution that would ward off the threat of Enosis by steadying the nerves on the Island, and pave the way for economic development.²⁹⁹ Over the longer term, planned spending on social and economic infrastructure and services, together with a more liberal approach to constitutional affairs supported by selective repression would serve to counter communist threat, stifle *Enosis* agitation, and encourage cooperation by the Church and conservative politicians (Yiangou, 2012: 149–150).³⁰⁰ In so doing, “[t]he long-range weapon to be used in a potentially violent situation would be the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945.” (Louis, 1998: 213–214) In the autumn of 1945, the Colonial Office drew up, with a sense of urgency, the ‘Ten-Year Programme of Development of Cyprus’ for the period of 1946–1955, backed by £ 1,750,000 from the CD&W Fund, and covering ‘every

²⁹⁹ Amongst others, Sir Arthur Dawe, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office believed that “[t]he fires of Greek nationalism ... could be permanently extinguished by the quelling of economic discontent ... [arguing] vigorously for full employment and closer economic ties between the British and Cypriot merchants as well as projects for irrigation that would ... bring about agricultural prosperity.” (Louis, 1998: 205–206)

³⁰⁰ In the Colonial Office, Dawe, and on the Island, Charles Campbell Woolley, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus (3 October 1941–24 October 1946), and the next Governor Lord Winster (Reginald Thomas Herberst Fletcher, 1st Baron Winster, 24 October 1946–4 August 1949) all seem to have entertained the idea that a new power bloc of ecclesiastical and political conservatives giving assent to a ‘British’ Cyprus could actually thrive on the projected political and economic development, consisting of the clergy, merchants, lawyers, journalists, teachers, the educated, and the peasantry. Underlying this idea was the wide current of British post-war thought on Cyprus that Enosis was a non-authentic movement, refuted by the majority of the G/Cs. See, particularly, Louis (1998: 218–220).

aspect of the Island's life and economy' (Louis, 1998: 214).³⁰¹ On 4 October 1946, Arthur Creech Jones was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies. On 23 October 1946, Creech Jones reported to the House of Commons, that he proposed to invite the Governor, Sir Charles Wooley, "to call together a Consultative Assembly, drawn from representative elements in the Island, to consider the framing of proposals for constitutional reform", and that the Ten Year Plan was being published today.³⁰² On 24 October 1946, Lord Winster was appointed Governor of Cyprus, to be Labour's pick for orchestrating the process of constitutional and economic development.³⁰³

³⁰¹ Creech Jones, addressing the House of Commons on 6 November, and 18 December 1946, offered the broad outlines of the Plan. The total cost of the Plan was £ 6,000,000 (not inclusive of the extra £ 3,350,000 to be spent on Island-wide electrification). Priorities had been drawn up beginning with projects costing £ 4,000,000. Principal priority projects comprised work on irrigation and forestry development, agricultural improvement schemes, anti-malarial and rural health measures and improvement of hospitals, educational development, with emphasis on teachers' training, village improvement schemes, and tourist development. Thus, the focus of the Plan was Under the CD&W Act of 1945, £ 1,750,000 was allocated, part of which to be spent on priority projects. Also, the Government considered the possibility of contributions from local revenues and expected to raise £ 1,900,000 in loan-monies (as of September 30, 1946, £ 11,300,000 were on deposit in the banks of the Colony.) See *HC Deb 18 December 1946 vol 431 c1943*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/1946/dec/18/cyprus-development-plan>, 10.27.2012), and *HC Deb 06 November 1946 vol 428 cc272-3W*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written-answers/1946/nov/06/cyprus-development>, 10.27.2012). Reddaway (1986: 37) argues that the introduction of income tax and estate duty in 1941, remedying the excessive reliance on indirect taxation, made possible, along with the CD&W aid, the wide range of projects undertaken during the last two decades of British rule. Meyer (1959: 253–255, 259–260), more specifically, points to the significance of the tax-royalties on copper sales for the financing of the overall \$ 30,000,000 spending through the ten years of the Plan: "Cyprus first needed an adequate set of public utilities, and installation of these occupied the island's administrators and took most of its excess revenues from 1946 to 1956. Post-war Britain was financially incapable, had it wanted to, of launching an American-type aid program (as in Puerto Rico) for Cyprus. Following Commonwealth policy, each unit in the empire was expected to "pay its own way." Cyprus did this, and its copper revenues were spent on the island ..." Incidentally, the primary producer and exporter of copper was the notorious American 'Cyprus Mines Corporation', known for having contaminated the Lefke (*Lefka*) area with depositions of carcinogen heavy metals.

³⁰² *HC Deb 23 October 1946 vol 427 cc396-7W*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written-answers/1946/oct/23/cyprus-government-policy>, 10.27.2012).

³⁰³ Morgan (2010: 201) notes that "Winster ..., like many British administrators before and after him, ... totally failed to comprehend the appeal of *enosis*. His enthusiasm for the newly

The so-called ‘Winster Constitution’ envisaged a Legislative Council consisting of elected representatives, plus 4 *ex officio* members. Finance, defence, external affairs, minority rights, the Constitution itself were ‘reserved’ subjects, and the status of Cyprus too, could not be discussed.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, Governor could override the Council’s legislative powers. Finally, there would be a purely advisory Executive Council, presided by the Governor as its head, and consisting of appointed *ex officio* and Legislative Council members. The Ethnarchy denied cooperation, A.K.E.L. demanded ‘full’ self-government, and the draft constitution was rejected by the G/Cs. Lord Winster then dissolved the Consultative Assembly, and resigned.³⁰⁵ Under the governorship of Sir Andrew Barkworth Wright (4

announced 10-year development plan was, in part, due to a belief that material and economic improvements could be an adequate counterweight to the attractions of union with Greece. Subsequent governors attempted in vain to explain to their subjects how much better life was under British rather than Greek rule and, like Winster, remained baffled by the apparent irrationality of the desire to unite with an economically destitute, war-ravaged country that was still locked in a bitter civil conflict. (Morgan, p. 201)

³⁰⁴ “... [T]he Governor ... would have power to declare a Bill or motion as if it had been duly passed if he considered it expedient in the interests of public order, good faith or good Government even if it had been rejected by the Legislature. The Governor would have the usual power of reserving a Bill passed by the Legislature for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure.” (Tornaritis, 1977: 28)

³⁰⁵ Lord Winster arrived on the Island on 27 March 1947. The Consultative Assembly first convened on 1 October 1947, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Jackson, the Chief Judge. Scorning to debate anything that fell short of self-determination, Ethnarchy and the G/C Right simply boycotted the Assembly. On the other hand, the basic bone of contention was between the British authorities and A.K.E.L.’s Assembly members was the nature of the ambit of the Assembly, which the latter defined as the drafting of a constitution of ‘full’ self-government. In response, in a despatch of 7 May 1948 to the Governor of Cyprus, the Secretary of State for the Colonies outlined the preliminary terms of reference of a British constitution. On 10 May 1948, Sir Jackson publicly despatched the so-called Winster Constitution to the Assembly members, and on 20 May, the Assembly convened to debate and vote on the proposals. With seven G/C members, criticising the proposals for falling short of comprehensive full self-government, voting against and pulling out, Sir Jackson adjourned the Assembly indefinitely. On 12 August 1948, Lord Winster dissolved the Assembly, resigning, the next October, a bitter man. See, for the Winster Constitution, Tornaritis (1977: 28–29), Reddaway (1986: 43), and particularly, Gürel (1985: 60–65), Gazioglu (1996: 375–388; 467–480), (Stefanidis, 1999: 4–7), and Fırat (2006a: 596–597) for detailed accounts of the Winster Constitution and/or the repercussions of accompanying events on G/C, Greek, T/C and Turkish politics. See, for the A.K.E.L.–Ethnarchy contest for political leadership underlying the various G/C reactions to the Winster Constitution,

August 1949–1954), the Island relapsed into a period of mild autocracy with renewed emphasis on economic development (Reddaway, 1986: 43). Technically, the Winster Constitution stayed open for consideration until 1954. Meanwhile, the economic part of the reform process, the Ten-Year Plan, was being put into effect with some positive results (Stefanidis, 1999: 5).³⁰⁶

On 15 January 1950, the Ethnarchy organised an island wide plebiscite for *Enosis*, as a display of the popular will behind. With reportedly 95.7 % of the orthodox G/Cs coming out for, the plebiscite was used to reinforce the demand for *Enosis*, and to compel the Greek government to the recognition of *Enosis* as the prime national cause of Greece.³⁰⁷ British response to the spurring of *Enosis* by the plebiscite, now under the effective leadership of

Kızılyürek (2005: 91–95). On the part of the T/Cs, one of the major upshots of the Winster Constitution was the foundation, on 11 June 1948, of the so-called ‘Committee for Turkish Affairs’ (*Türk İşleri Komisyonu*), presided by the noted Judge Mehmet Zekâ. The ‘Interim Report’ report produced by the Commission (and published and submitted to the Governor on 20 January 1949) was by far the most systematic study to date, under the British rule, of the various problems of the T/C community, paving the way for the secular laws introduced in the first part of the 1950s. The Turkish version of the Interim Report of 1949 of the Commission has been reproduced by Harid Fedai (2002: 173–237). For a detailed account of the foundation and the subsequent activities of the Committee, see Gazioglu (1996: 389–408), and Denktaş (2000: 91–94). Rauf R. Denktaş was, as a young, promising barrister, the secretary of the T/C delegation to the Consultative Council, and the secretary member of the Committee for Turkish Affairs, marking the beginnings of his long public career. See, Batur (2007: 119–120).

³⁰⁶ Thus, “[e]vidence of Winster’s ‘substantial material improvement’ and the benefits of the 10-year plan were not hard to find. Extensive development was already in progress. Mains water and electricity were brought to remote villages, new roads were built, while ‘in the towns hundreds of fine new stone houses and blocks of flats are arising.’ (Morgan, 2010: 202)

³⁰⁷ The idea of a plebiscite to invest self-determination–cum–*Enosis* with popular legitimacy originally belonged to A.K.E.L., to promote the cause before the United Nations. While rejecting A.K.E.L.’s ouvertures for a common ‘front’, the Ethnarchy endorsed the plebiscite, as a means of constructing *Enosis* as the national cause of Greece, rather than internationalising the issue through the United Nations. See Stefanidis (1999: 6–7, 9–11), and Kızılyürek (2005: 90–99). According to Kızılyürek, the contentious relationships between A.K.E.L., the Ethnarchy and Greece governments are to be seen as the ‘periphery’s steering of the centre’. Also note that, as the aged Archbishop Makarios II died on 28 June 1950, Makarios III was elected Archbishop of Cyprus, on 18 October.

the new Archbishop Makarios III, was to repress ‘seditionary’ activities with severe punitive measures, to reiterate that the constitutional offers of 1948 were still open for consideration, and to introduce the so-called ‘Village Improvement Boards’ to step up the pace of rural development.³⁰⁸

For Cyprus, 1954–1956 were crossroads years, on account of at least four sets of events: 1) The onset and outbreak of the Suez Crisis; 2) the internationalisation of Cyprus issue by Greece through the United Nations; 3) the start of EOKA³⁰⁹ attacks on the British; 4) the onset of the T/C and Turkish counterthrust. On 19 October 1954, Nasser and Sir Anthony

³⁰⁸ “In 1950, certain villages were declared ‘improvement areas’ by the Act 12/1950, and later governed by the Villages (Administration and Improvement) Act, Cap. 243” (Coucounis, 2012: 92). Villages were to apply, singly or conjointly, to be declared as improvement area to access government subsidies. The so-called Village Improvement Boards were conceived as organs of local self-government, consisting of *ex officio* as well as elected members. Makarios opposed the Bill itself and called for a boycott of the Village Boards elections, with only 47 villages applying for the programme by the end of 1954. See Gürel (1985: 78–79). Apparently, the basic concern underlying the British emphasis over rural development was the prevention of Enosis, as a modern, urban movement, from building a power base in the villages. British administrators of the late 1940s and early 1950s typically thought of *Enosis* as a non-authentic movement, and were confused over how deep-seated *Enosis* really was in the villages. Thus, Lord Winster, for instance, “... was utterly baffled by the tenacity with which Greek Cypriots clung to what appeared to him to be an irrational, sentimental attachment. This in turn contributed to a failure to believe that the movement could be an authentic one with an organic basis amongst the rural community.” See Morgan (2010: 201–202). Apparently, cooperatives were of the major beneficiaries of the schemes of rural development. Note that the British administrators set up and promoted the cooperative societies with a view to counter the political influence of the nationalist G/C usurer-merchants over small peasantry through patronage relations. See Kızılyürek (2005: 255–256). The Lefkoniko Savings Bank, founded 22 November 1909, was the first precursor of Cyprus’ cooperative societies. Legislative Council’s approving of ‘Law 13 for Co-operative Credit Societies’ of 1914 furnished cooperative societies in agriculture with legal status. The ‘Co-operative Societies Law (Non-Credit)’ of 1923 extended them to other sectors of the economy. For a brief history of the Cyprus’ cooperative movement under the British, see Co-operative Societies’ Supervision and Development Authority (2004: 16, 29–30, 37). Interestingly, from the late 1950s onwards, cooperative societies were to become the standard remedy of the T/C nationalists for the lack of money capital and entrepreneurship skills. As a legacy of the British cooperative movement, cooperativist ideology came to characterise all shades of the T/C political spectrum, from the ‘communalist’ (or communitarian) Right and Left through the socialists. More on this, later.

³⁰⁹ (Acronym for *Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakou Agónos*—National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle).

Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1954–1956), signed the Suez Treaty, under which British troops would withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone, by June 1956. As British presence at Suez was drawing to a close, leaving Cyprus as her last strategic bastion in the Middle East, Greek Premier Alexandros Papagos, on 16 August 1956, raised the Cyprus issue before the General Assembly of the United Nations.^{310, 311} On 28 July 1954,

³¹⁰ Madden (2000: 422) notes that: “[t]he chiefs of staff defence review [had] resulted in June 1954 with *The strategic importance of retaining full sovereignty in Cyprus*”. “At this juncture the withdrawal from Egypt and [later, in March 1955] the dismissal of Glubb Pasha in Jordan emphasised the strategic importance of Cyprus, while British forces and British rule had soon to withstand and overcome the E.O.K.A. campaign against them. Greece was taking the Cyprus problem to the U.N. and the U.S. was refusing to back the U.K.” (Madden, 2000: 424, 433). Cyprus’ strategic value for Britain was by no means a constant; See Gürel (1985: 30–52) for a periodisation. Accordingly, on 1 December 1954, the British Government moved the headquarters of her Middle East Command to Nicosia, Cyprus. Also see, Gürel (1985: 91). According to Morgan (2010: 207), the conviction “... widely held by imperial defence staff in London ... [was] that a military base in Cyprus could only be secured by retaining sovereignty over the entire island.”

³¹¹ The ‘internationalisation’ of the nationalist cause appears to be a basic strategy common to all nationalist movements. This applies to Greek–G/C, and Turkish–T/C nationalisms, as well. Obviously, the construction of the nationalist cause as an international problem entails the choice of the international platform which best suits the interests of the nationalism in question. This is accomplished either by opting for an existing platform, or building a whole new one. Using the prestige and the influence of the anti-colonialist current and the legitimacy of the right to self-determination, G/C nationalists and Greece opted as the appropriate platform the United Nations—just as many other leaders of the Third World did. Note that the very idea of internationalisation through the United Nations actually belongs to A.K.E.L., which asked, in late 1949, a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, to ascertain G/C people’s will. Faustmann (2001: 4) also points out that “[t]he idea of a plebiscite on the question of *enosis* had originally developed on the Left but was quickly adopted by the political Right as well, which was eager to become the sole leader in the national question.” As aforementioned, “[t]he Ethnarchy ... endorsed the plebiscite idea in a somewhat modified form—instead of seeking UN involvement and supervision, it decided to keep the process within the domestic domain.” (Stefanidis, 1999: 6) During the 1950s, post-war and post-civil war circumstances and problems kept successive Greek governments far from making a move at the United Nations, favouring, in its place, bilateral negotiations with the British. See Faustmann (2001: 6). On the other hand, before the General Assembly, the Cyprus issue was firstly raised by Greek Premier Alexandros Papagos, on August 16, 1954, and repeatedly thereafter, through 1958. See Firat (2006a: 598–600), and Hasgüler (2007: 220–2) for details. See, particularly, for a comprehensive narrative of all five Greek recourses to the United Nations from 1954 through 1958, Faustmann (2001). The relationship between the G/C nationalist and anti-colonialist movement/Makarios, and the emergent Non-Aligned Movement has been brought to the fore and thoroughly studied by Mehmet Hasgüler. See Hasgüler (2007: 97–110), for a brief account. Turkey’s accession to NATO came at a time when some NATO members faced the process of decolonisation, and when internationalisation, via, particularly the United Nations (on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations) was a major strategy pursued by the independence movements. Turkey’s stand was to look at the international problems

Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State for the Colonies (1952–1955), speaking before the House of Commons, expounded the British response to the new circumstances. Once more, this was the customary dyad of:

- a) Constitutional reform as a first step towards responsible government where the Executive Council involved a majority of *ex officio* members as opposed to the elected majority of the Winster Consitution (Madden, 2000: 422), and;
- b) economic development, with a view to revive the Village Improvement Boards,³¹²

accompanied by a sharp rebuff of demands for the abrogation of her sovereignty over the Island.³¹³

from the point of view of NATO, and support NATO members in any problems they faced, unconditionally, including those of decolonisation (Gönlübol and Ülman, 1987: 313–314).

³¹² “A vigorous policy of economic and social development would be continued—a sound budgetary policy with loans on favourable terms, and U.K. assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts ...” (Madden, 2000: 422) See also, Gürel (1985: 82). Note that 1955 was the end year of the Ten-Year Programme of Development of Cyprus, whereas 1995–1956 the beginning of five-year plans and programmes in Cyprus as in most of the colonies. See Dosser (1959: 257, Table I), and Waterston (1969: 587–685, Appendix III).

³¹³ “... [T]here are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can *never* expect to be fully independent. [Hon. Members: ‘Oh’].” (Madden, 2000: 423) [my italics—H.A.]. One must particularly note Hopkinson’s diplomatic slip of the fatal word ‘never’. According to Madden (2000: 423–424), “... [T]his remark of Hopkinson’s provoked Cypriot and international reaction which demanded the need for some acceptable new status for fortress colonies—maybe a formula of full internal autonomy but with the U.K. retaining control of defence and foreign affairs.” See Fırat (2006a: 597), for a description of the conjuncture underlying Hopkinson’s statement. Hopkinson’s diplomatic gaffe was a sequel to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (26 October 1951–7 April 1955) Anthony Eden’s curt response to Papagos, earlier, on 22 September 1953, to the effect that “there was no Cyprus question, nor would there ever be one” (Faustmann, 2001: 7). Eden’s and Hopkinson’s curtness and steadfastness, together with the ‘never’ slip, enraged Greek and G/C nationalists. Apparently, they also conduced Papagos to change his stand, who, “[p]ressured by Makarios, the Greek Orthodox Church, public opinion, and the political Left, ... saw no reason to oppose the advocates of enosis for the sake of Greek–British relations any longer.” Thus, on 15 April 1954, “Papagos informed his Foreign Minister, the Greek delegate at the UN, and other leading politicians, of his decision to appeal to the UN regarding Cyprus if bilateral negotiations did not start

On 17 December 1954, the General Assembly of the United Nations, upon the report of the First Committee, voted to table the Greek motion for Cypriot self-determination, by resolving that "... for the time being, it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus".³¹⁴ Greek–G/C setback at the United Nations prompted Greek government to consent to the launching of the EOKA campaign, on 1 April 1955, with synchronised bombings of British targets.³¹⁵ British response to the double Greek and G/C drive of destabilisation within through the EOKA campaign, and internationalization without through the United Nations equally comprised a double strategy: 1) Constitutional reform and economic development, accompanied by counter-insurgency within, and 2) containment without, by creating the alternative platform of Britain–Greece–Turkey.³¹⁶ Accordingly, one of the British motives to organise the Tripartite London Conference of August 29–September 7, 1955 was to

by August." (Faustmann, 2001: 7–8) See also, Gürel (1985: 90–92), Kızılyürek, 2005: 102), and Fırat (2006a: 597).

³¹⁴ *Resolution 814 (IX), 17 December 1954,*

(<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/095/49/IMG/NR009549.pdf?OpenElement>, 11.12.2012). See Gürel (1985: 98–100), and Fırat (2006a: 598–599), for the British, Greek and Turkish views expressed at the United Nations on the issue. See Faustmann (2001: 9–17), for a full account of the United Nations process.

³¹⁵ "As the synchronised bombs went off, leaflets were scattered about the major towns, attributing the explosions to the work of 'Dighenis', a mythical Byzantine warrior, applauded in mediaeval folk songs, who according to legend, leapt from Asia Minor to Cyprus where he grasped the Pentadactylos Mountain in the Kyrenia range, leaving on it the imprint of his hand." (Morgan, 2010, 212) Dighenis was Colonel Georgios Grivas's *nom de guerre*. Makarios had been contemplating the strategy of 'armed struggle' since October 1950, when he was elected Archbishop. Makarios and Grivas began to lay the groundwork for the future EOKA on 6 June 1951. See, particularly, Gürel (1985: 102–104), and Kızılyürek (2005: 99–102).

³¹⁶ Gürel (1985: 105) argues that, the most urgent question Eden faced as the new Prime Minister (7 April 1955–10 January 1957) being that of Cyprus, he adopted a triple policy: 1) Organising a tripartite conference; 2) drafting a new constitution, and; 3) drafting a new development programme of economic take-off.

internationalise Cyprus as a Turco-Greek, international problem, as opposed to a colonial one.³¹⁷ The other motive was to introduce the British proposals for constitutional reform and economic development, breaking the expected deadlock between Greece and Turkey, and thereby, assuming the ostensibly constructive role of mediatorship between the two.³¹⁸ The London Conference had already reached a deadlock, when the tragic İstanbul pogrom of 6–7 September spelled its end. One critical consequence of the pogrom was the big blow dealt to the Turco–Greek relations (Firat, 2006a: 602).³¹⁹ The bilateral process of *détente*, beginning firstly in the late 1920s–early 1930s, had continued into the early 1950s, as the further warming up

³¹⁷ Under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, Turkey, recognised the formal British annexation of 1914, for fear that bringing up the issue of Cyprus would make the British more intransigent over the abolition of capitulations (Hale, 2000: 130). Thus, with the London Conference of 1955, Turkey did anew become a direct party in Cyprus, for the first time after she forewent her claims over the Island (Hasgüler, 2007: 221–2). Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux (2005: 31) argue that with the London Conference the issue of Cyprus was effectively internalized as a NATO problem. See, also, Esenbel (1993: 41–42, 45, 47). Faustmann (2001: 17) argues that “Faced with the new situation, London opted for an escalation strategy in disguise: the internationalization of the Cyprus question through a tripartite conference on Cyprus which in effect would ensure the preservation of its colonial status. For this purpose Greece and Turkey should be given some authority in the island with a neutralizing effect. In a classic example of divide and rule policy, the Foreign Office hoped that once Turkey was established as a political partner, Greece would prefer the continuation of British colonial rule with a vague hope for enosis to Turkish interference ‘which would render *enosis* for ever impossible’.” (Faustmann, 2001: 17) For comparable ‘divide-and-rule’ interpretations of the Conference, see, amongst others, Mavroyannis (1990: 130), and Gürel (1985: 106–107, 111).

³¹⁸ Accordingly, the basic outlines of a draft constitution and a draft development plan were ready well ahead of the Conference. For a sketch of the British constitutional offers see the “Draft ‘Possible Plan’ for Tripartite Conference, dated 17 August 1955, in Madden (2000: 430–431). The draft development plan of £ 39,000,000 involved spending on education as well, with a view to minimise G/Cs cultural ties with Athens. The draft development plan would have been presented, along with the draft constitution, had the Conference been a success (Gürel, 1985: 105–107). Secondary schools were the hotbeds of the youth’s *Enosis* agitation. See the Departmental Memorandum of the Foreign Office, dated 8 February 1955, in Madden (2000: 427). “The involvement of schoolchildren in riots and demonstrations and, more seriously, in the movement of arms and the targeting of victims became a hallmark of the next three years. The recruitment of youngsters to the cause of the EOKA rebellion was a tactical masterstroke on the part of Colonel Grivas.” (Morgan, 2010: 213).

³¹⁹ Domestically, the İstanbul pogrom triggered the resignation of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on 29 November 1955. The fourth Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*—DP) government won a vote of confidence on 13 December 1955 (Eroğul, 1992: 126–127).

of relations, now within the trilateral framework of Greece, Turkey and the USA (Kalaitzaki, 2005: 107–110). Henceforth, the Turco-Greek rapprochement gave way to significant tension within the Southern wing of NATO, with both sides fiercely promoting their respective nationalist projects, namely, *Enosis* and *Taksim*.^{320, 321}

Weeks after the collapse of the London Conference, Sir John Harding was appointed Governor of Cyprus (25 September 1955–3 December 1957).³²²

Harding's strategy was a combination of: 1) Cracking down hard on the EOKA insurrection, using military measures to restore law and order; 2) pursuing constitutional reform through direct negotiations with Makarios, and; 3) convincing G/Cs of the merits of British rule, through rapid economic development (Morgan, 2010: 218; Gürel, 1985: 112).^{323, 324} Thus,

³²⁰ Firat (1997: 56–57) suggests that, once the Cyprus issue was successfully internationalised by Greece, and upon realizing that her colonial rule over Cyprus was doomed, Britain sought to rouse ethnic sentiments, and thereby, involve Turkey as a party to the problem, to the point of tangling her with Greece, as a way of legitimizing her own presence on the Island. Kızılyürek (21: 2006) argues that the point of British efforts to involve Turkey was to thwart Greek demands for self-determination, and keep the issue from the problem of colonialism, by holding that Turkey had a stake, too. The memoirs of Faiz Kaymak, president of the *Federasyon* before Rauf Denktaş, indicate that the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs Henry Hopkinson actually encourages or tells the T/C delegation he meets on September 17, 1954 to go to the United Nations. Thus, two T/C delegations go to New York, the first in late September, and the second in December, the latter apparently to attend the General Assembly meeting of 17 December on Cyprus (Kaymak, 1968: 32–38).

³²¹ Although Greece internationalised the Cyprus issue in 1954, Turkey's initial response was on the mild side, to only harden and end the rapprochement in mid-1955. One major casualty of the Turco-Greek tension was the Balkan Pact of 1953—then the Balkan Alliance of 1954, between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, which died out following the pogrom of September 6–7, 1955. See Firat (2006a: 588–592) for details.

³²² Field Marshall, and Chief of the Imperial Staff, Harding was the first serving soldier to rule the Island since 1879. Furthermore, he had experience suppressing insurgencies in Malaya and Kenya (Morgan, 2010: 218).

³²³ Harding outlines his strategy in a top-secret memorandum to the Colonial Office (The Constitutional Problem in Cyprus, dated 18 January 1956) as follows: “To defeat *Enosis* Greek Cypriot mentality must be changed. To do so, Greek irredentist propaganda must be effectively countered: the political power of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus must be

on 4 October 1955, the day after his arrival on the Island, Harding began face-to-face negotiations with Makarios, as a prelude to the constitutional reform (Morgan, 2010: 218).³²⁵ On the other hand, he announced, on 16 November 1955, the Development Programme of 1956–1961, and declared, on 26 November 1955, a state of emergency, marking the beginning of the ‘Cyprus Emergency’ of 1955–1959 (Gürel, 1985: 112).³²⁶ At the close of February 1956, Harding–Makarios talks collapsed, with the Archbishop being deported and flown to the Seychelles, on 9 March 1956. Nonetheless, on 12 July 1956, Prime Minister Eden told the House of Commons that the Government had asked Lord Cyril John Radcliffe to start work forthwith as Constitutional Commissioner, apparently, as a sign of its good faith and continuing will to proceed with political reform.³²⁷ Lord Radcliffe submitted

neutralised by the development of independent and moderate secular political leadership; E.O.K.A. must be utterly destroyed; the Communists must be kept powerless; the Greek Cypriot majority must be convinced that the material advantages of the British connection substantially outweigh anything Greece could offer. To do this a reliable, non-political public service must be created; non-political information, publishing and propaganda services retained; secondary, technical and university education reformed and provided, and an extensive development plan devised for soil, agricultural, geological research, water and housing. The island economy must be put on a sound and viable long term basis, and a comprehensive modern system of local representative government must be developed.” (Madden, 2000: 433–434)

³²⁴ Subsequent attacks by EOKA aimed at economic targets as well. Speaking of the effects on the Cypriot economy of EOKA attacks, Reddaway (1986: 31) argues that “... the EOKA conflict engulfed the Island just when its economy was beginning to “take off”; it did not in fact halt the process of development (investment in development projects was actually stepped up during the Emergency); but it did create conditions in which it was difficult to pursue important elements in the development programme.”

³²⁵ See, for a succinct account of the proposals put forward by the British during the talks, and the objections of Makarios, Tornaritis (1977: 31–33). See also, Reddaway (1986: 44–48).

³²⁶ “The government could now impose collective punishments on entire villages, deport senior clerics found guilty of sedition and even horse-whip offenders under 18, while convictions for carrying firearms, shooting and throwing bombs carried the death penalty, even if no loss of life ensued.” (Morgan, 2010: 222)

³²⁷ *HC Deb 12 July 1956 vol 556 cc595-602*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/jul/12/cyprus-new-constitution-1>, 11.14.2012). Eminent jurist, Lord Radcliffe was best known for his arbitration of the drawing of the Indo-Pakistani border. Eden also noted that “[t]he new Constitution will not,

his proposals to the Government in November 1956 (Reddaway, 1986: 49). The British Government then brought them to the attention of the Greek and Turkish Governments, with the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Alan Tindal) Lennox-Boyd (28 July 1954–14 October 1959) going to Athens, thence to İstanbul to discuss the proposals.³²⁸ In İstanbul, Britain consented to (and even suggested) ‘double self-determination’, thereby the prospect of *Taksim*, in return for British enclaves (sovereign bases), whilst Turkey officially shifted from reclamation to *Taksim*.^{329, 330} On 19 December 1956,

however, be put into effect until terrorism has been overcome ...” See Esenbel (1993: 47, 55–59), for Eden’s assurances of Menderes, on the self-same point.

³²⁸ See, *HC Deb 19 December 1956 vol 562 cc1267-79*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals>, 11.14.1012).

³²⁹ As a matter of fact, prior to Lennox-Boyd’s visit to İstanbul, the hallmark of Turkey’s Cyprus policy was reclamation. Note that, whilst *Enosis-cum-Taksim* came to be called double-*Enosis*, the exact equivalent of *Enosis* was not so much *Taksim*, as the reclamation of Cyprus from Britain. Gürel (1985: 109) also sees reclamation as the exact symmetric of *Enosis*. On the other hand, *Taksim* signified, doubly, geographical partition between T/Cs and G/Cs, and, political partition between Turkey and Greece. The shift from reclamation to *Taksim* was epitomized by the change of slogans, from “Cyprus is Turkish, Turkish will She Stay” to “*Taksim* or Death” (*Ya Taksim Ya Ölüm*), which the youth accepted somewhat reluctantly (Kızılyürek, 2006: 24–25). According to the version of the story of the T/C visit to London in September 1954 recounted by Faiz Kaymak to Arif Hasan Tahsin, the British tell the T/C delegates that colonialism is now a relic of the past, that they must demand not the continuation of the status-quo, but the reclamation of Cyprus to Turkey,: “*Bu çağda sömürgeciliği savunmak ayıptır. Kıbrıs eski sahibine iade edilmelidir demelisiniz.*” Kaymak also claims that the British actually sends the T/C delegation to New York for the promotion of that very idea (Tahsin, 1995: 41). Obviously, narratives always involve multiple testimonies and multiple interpretations. Thus, it is rather difficult to come up with a ‘faithful’ account of what that actually happened. Nonetheless, it so appears that one can safely assume active British manipulation of T/C and Turkish official thinking, concerning both reclamation, and *Taksim*. On the other hand, this does not necessarily imply passive reception by the latter. Addressing a crowd of 60 thousand in Bursa on 3 May 1957, Prime Minister Menderes declared that *Taksim* was the last sacrifice Turkey would make, lest the communists internationally abuse the issue and split the allies up. “*Bursa’da 60 Bin Kişiyeye Hitabeden Başvekil Kararımızı Bildirdi: Kıbrıs’ın Taksimi Son Fedakârlığımızdır*” (Milliyet, 4 May 1957). Apparently, the words of Menderes were simply the reiteration of the US position on the Turco-Greek dispute, “... that the Cyprus problem, as well as bilateral problems between the countries, were relatively unimportant and had to be subordinated to the real danger, which continued to be the communist infiltration and exploitation of the weakness in the southeastern European region.” (Kalaitzaki, 2005: 112)

³³⁰ The British proposal of double self-determination and partition, and Turkey’s settling for it caught, amongst others, the T/C nationalists too, by surprise (see Kaymak 1968: 50–52). However, the idea of reclamation seems to have endured in some quarters, most importantly, amongst the army officers. Thus, according to the testimony of İsmail Tansu,

the ‘Radcliffe Proposals’ were presented to the House of Commons, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Alan Tindal) Lennox-Boyd (28 July 1954–14 October 1959). Given the terms of reference envisaging a liberal constitution for a self-governing Cyprus under British sovereignty, Radcliffe’s proposed solution for a proper state structure was a unitary ‘diarchy’.^{331, 332} Speaking to House of Commons, Lennox-Boyd appended to Radcliffe’s original proposals the notorious statement that any

an officer of the covert Research Board of Mobilization (*Seferberlik Tetkik Kurulu*) of the General Staff, later renamed as the Special Warfare Department (*Özel Harp Dairesi*), the plan for the organization of TMT on the Island was baptized as “Retaking Cyprus” Kıbrıs’ı İstirdat Projesi” (KİP). Kemal Vuruşkan, the first Turkish commander of the TMT, recounts a meeting with Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, days before his arrival to the Island on 1 August 1958, where Zorlu speaks to the effect that the ultimate goal is to seize control of the whole Island, when necessary and if conditions permit (An, 2002: 147–148). In his letter to Denктаş, dated 4 October 1960, Vuruşkan speaks of the Presidency of KİP as a subsection of, possibly, the Special Warfare Department (Denктаş, 2000: 163–165).

³³¹ The terms of reference communicated to Lord Radcliffe by the Secretary of State on 12 September 1956 directed that the constitution be “based on the principles of liberal democracy”, and confer “a wide measure of responsible self-government”, provided that, during the period of the constitution, Cyprus remains under British sovereignty, and “all matters relating to external affairs, defence, and internal security are retained in the hands of H.M.G or the Governor”, and the special interests of the various communities (i.e. the T/Cs) are protected by such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may be necessary (Nedjatigil, 1977: 37).

³³² Lord Radcliffe proposed a unitary, rather than a federal state structure, for there was no pattern of territorial separation between the communities, while under the alternative form of functional federation, effective government was not practicable (Reddaway, 1986: 51). On the other hand, Lord Radcliffe preferred “[a] form of constitution ... which recognises explicitly the existence of the diarchy implicit in the terms of reference.” (Nedjatigil, 1977: 37) Diarchy was a familiar idea, historically, and was being contemplated by British administrators, as a solution to the problem of small colonies, such as Jamaica. India had had a diarchy, Malta and Gold Coast had, respectively, ‘open’ and ‘concealed’ diarchies (Madden, 2000: 35, 149, 152). Tanim, “reserved subjects” in the hands of the governor. See, Madden (2000: 24) debate on diarchy in Malta. The report of the Working Party of Departmental Heads on the Diarchy System, dated 21 January 1955 defined diarchy as “... a system in which the functions of Government are explicitly divided between ‘reserved’ and ‘transferred’ sides; the former is dealt with by persons appointed by the Crown; the latter by an elected legislature and an elected executive.” (Madden, 2000: 152) Lord Radcliffe basically recommended two legislative and executive systems “... existing side by side but separated according to the difference of subject with which they deal”, namely, the ‘reserve’ and the ‘self-governing’ sides. External affairs, defence and internal security were the Governor’s reserved fields. Development, Interior and Local Government, Finance, Communications and Works, Social Services and Natural Resources were the matters of the self-governing side (consisting, basically, of the Legislative Assembly, the Cabinet, and the Ministries.) See Madden (2000: 439–447), for the Radcliffe Proposals; see Nedjatigil (1977: 37–50), for an unofficial summary.

prospective exercise of self-determination would include partition amongst the eventual options.³³³

Yet, it was too little, too late for the Radcliffe Constitution to succeed, because, besides the nationalist intransigence which had proved too strong to overcome, the breakout of Suez Crisis on 29 October 1956 permanently changed the parameters of the geo-politics underlying the terms of reference of the proposals. After Gamal Abdel Nasser decided, on 26 July 1956, to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, Britain and France together conspired with Israel to concoct a scheme that would enable them to retake control of the Canal. The scheme was exposed, Britain and France were disgraced and their forces repulsed, facing the military threat of the Soviet Union, financial pressure from the United States, and worldwide condemnation as aggressors.³³⁴ The Suez Crisis served to demonstrate the fact that Britain could no longer insist on pursuing great power politics, independent of the United States, and outside of NATO. From a broader perspective, it was the close of the secular trend of hegemonic power transition from the British Empire to the United States, and the prelude to the wave of Middle East

³³³ “When the time comes ... it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options.” *HC Deb 19 December 1956 vol 562 cc1267-79*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/19/cyprus-lord-radcliffes-proposals>, 11.14.1012).

³³⁴ See, for a brief account of the Suez Crisis, Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu (2006: 627–629). Speaking of the consequences of Suez Crisis, “[t]he British suffered most; it cost them much goodwill, particularly within the Commonwealth, and squandered confidence in the sincerity of their retreat from empire. It shook their faith in American goodwill and inflicted a financial and economic crisis on them.” (Roberts, 1999: 546).

crises of 1956–1960.³³⁵ The effects of the Crisis on Cyprus politics were twofold: 1) “Britain's defeat at Suez ... prompted the Conservative government to slowly start reassessing whether the retention of full sovereignty over the island best met its changing military needs.” (Morgan, p. 233); 2) under the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, declared on 5 January 1957, the United States would thenceforth substitute the British as the leading Western power in the East Middle, and, by implication, assume the a greater role concerning the Cyprus issue.³³⁶ On the other hand, Gürel (1985: 121–122) argues that, the first effect of the Suez fiasco on the British politics of Cyprus, was the recognition of the possibility of self-determination, now including the prospect of partition.³³⁷

After Maurice Harold Macmillan replaced Eden as Prime Minister (10 January 1957–19 October 1963), the change in the British politics of Cyprus—from sovereignty over the whole Island to orderly withdrawal

³³⁵ See, for the successive wave of crises of Syria (1957), Iraq (1958), Lebanon (1958), and Jordan (1958), Firat and Kürkçüoğlu (2006: 627–635). One must also note that the coup d'état of 14 July 1958 led by Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim gave way to the collapse of the Baghdad Pact, which was one of the pillars of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War.

³³⁶ The Eisenhower Doctrine was the strategic response of the United States to the consequences of Suez Crisis, so as to fill the power vacuum left by the British Empire, and counter the surge of Soviet prestige. For the details of the Doctrine, see Erhan (2006: 564–568). See Gürel (1985: 121, 127), for its repercussions for Cyprus.

³³⁷ Thus, the covert understanding reached between Lennox-Boyd and Menderes, on 16 December 1956; Lennox-Boyd's addendum, on 19 December 1956, to the Radcliffe Proposals of the possibility of double-determination, and; finally, Menderes's reversion, publicly, to Taksim, on 28 December 1956. See, Gürel, (1985: 123–124), and Esenbel (1993: 47, 55–59). One of the effects of the Suez setback on the British politics of Cyprus was that, “[i]n a remarkable shift of policy, Britain now regarded the Turkish Cypriots as far as self-determination was concerned as an equal community instead of a mere minority.” (Faustmann, 2001: 21) One should note that the shift in question stands in sharp contrast to the terms of reference given to Lord Radcliffe, and, by implication, to the Lord's arguments against political equality for the T/Cs—full, in this case, on the grounds that a federation of communities would eventually lead to political stagnation and frustration (Reddaway, 1986: 51). The ‘constitutional battles’ of the common Republic of Cyprus subsequently, appear to have proved the Lord right. More on this, later.

enabling the possession of large sovereign bases—became even more patent (Gürel, 1985: 128, 131).³³⁸ According to Melih Esenbel, Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first substantive statement of the United States over the Cyprus issue came on 25 March 1957, urging for direct negotiations between concerned parties, prior to the XII. General Assembly of the United Nations set for December 1957. Furthermore, on 23 April 1957, the United States Ambassador told Menderes that Turkey's Taksim thesis could not possibly succeed (Esenbel, 1993: 78–79, 82). As a matter of fact, the United States "... favoured the continuation of quiet diplomacy by those directly concerned outside the UN." (Faustmann, 2001: 28). As of December 1957, the United States was advising Turkey against Taksim, and for quiet diplomacy, pointing thereby to either tridomium, or independence (Esenbel, 1993: 93, 95).

On 22 October 1957, Sir Harding resigned, and was replaced by Sir Hugh Foot, the last British Governor of Cyprus (3 December 1957).³³⁹ As it appears, in the beginning, Foot thought that the avenue of self-government was not yet fully closed off, provided that it be supported by a policy of

³³⁸ "Given that after the Suez defeat Cyprus no longer needed to home a strategic reserve, the possession of large bases with airfields on the island was now regarded as sufficient. Consequently, the new Prime Minister had two targets: first to secure the bases and secondly to get out of the Cyprus predicament as soon and as smoothly as possible." (Faustmann, 2001: 25) On the other hand, Mavroyannis (1990: 131) argues that, British abrogation of her sovereignty over the Island paved the way for the coming to the fore of the aspect of Turco–Greek conflict, with the G/C–T/C clashes of 1958 completing the transformation of the Cyprus issue from one of decolonisation, to one of Turco–Greek conflict. More on the clashes of 1958, below.

³³⁹ Upon his return from the Island, Sir Harding met Lennox-Boyd, on 5 December 1957, presenting the latter a memorandum where he put forth the following two views: 1) "An international solution is indispensable to a lasting settlement and must precede the introduction of a constitution." 2) "If we cannot get the Radcliffe solution, which is the ideal, we should continue to go for tridominium." (Madden, 2000: 451)

leniency—all of which, he hoped, would pay off in the medium term, by building confidence. Thus, the so-called Foot Plan proposed five or seven years of self-government under the aegis of the British Government, together with self-determination on equal terms for both G/Cs and T/Cs.³⁴⁰ On 25 January 1958, the Plan was brusquely rejected by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs (25 November 1955–27 May 1960), and on 27–28 January, on the Island, pro-Taksim demonstrations protesting the Plan ended up with the deaths of T/Cs during street clashes with British soldiers.^{341, 342} With the process of negotiations once more leading to stalemate, civil war in Cyprus expanded to full scale, to become one of all against all, save the T/C communists and pacifists, who were none but the

³⁴⁰ See, *FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. X, Part 1: 14 - Cyprus*, (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/14cyprus1.html>, 11.18.2012). On the other hand, the prospect of self-determination would be subject to the condition that the problem of the Turkish minority be satisfactorily settled. Furthermore, Reddaway (1986: 104) argues that, whilst it appears to honour the British commitment to double self-determination, the Plan actually cancels *Enosis* and *Taksim*, by giving each community a veto over the other's choice. See, Reddaway (1986: 105–107), on other aspects of the Foot Plan.

³⁴¹ Governor Foot, and John Selwyn Brooke Lloyd, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs together, met Zorlu on 25 January 1958. Lloyd also met Prime Minister Menderes, on 26 January, and on 28–30 January. See, *FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. X, Part 1: 14 - Cyprus*, (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/14cyprus1.html>, 11.18.2012). The text of the Plan still not being available, it is not easy to fully assess the causes of its rejection by the Turkish Government. See, See, for the various aspects of the Foot Plan, as well as the causes of its rejection, (Gürel, 1985: 138–139), Reddaway (1986: 104–107), Faustmann (2001: 30), and Morgan (2010: 240–242). On the other hand, according to Niyazi Kızılyürek, Zorlu counterposed the following conditions, namely: 1) Introduction of a federal model of self-government; 2) recognition of T/Cs right to self-determination by means of a separate agreement; 3) provision of veto rights for the T/Cs over constitutional matters, and; 4) establishment of a Turkish military base on the Island. See, Kızılyürek, “27/28 Ocak Olayları: Taksim için Tam Gaz”, Gaile, 02.07.2011.

³⁴² The T/C riots of 27–28 January were a critical turning-point, as the prelude to a series of provocations, mass mobilisations, mob riots, etc. which, *inter alia*, aimed at shaping the policy decisions of not only the British, but on occasion, the Turkish Government as well, by creating a severe crisis of governance. Accordingly, “[t]he British authorities had hitherto been able to count on the restraint of the Turkish community and its vital co-operation in the struggle against Eoka, but from now on were faced with the possibility of armed opposition on two fronts.” (Crawshaw, 1959: 137) After one witness, Denктаş said of the deaths: “We need the dead. We will make the world hear our voice with the dead.” (An, 1996: 78).

victims.³⁴³ On 19 June 1956, British Prime Minister Macmillan, speaking to the House of Commons, announced the so-called ‘Partnership Plan’, proposing, what could be viewed as a ‘federal tridominium’.³⁴⁴ Firstly, there would be a Council, presided by the Governor, with matters relating to sovereignty would be specifically reserved to the Governor “... acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments.” Secondly, there would be “... a separate House of Representatives, for each of the two communities, and these Houses [would] have final legislative authority in communal affairs”, ensuring thereby communal autonomy.³⁴⁵ As such, the Plan was truly one of partnership, with

³⁴³ Thus, with the TMT’s entrance in early 1958 into the conflict, the civil war in Cyprus now involved all three parties, namely, the G/Cs, T/Cs, and the British. In January, the EOKA attacked and executed the members of the Left-wing PEO (the Pancyprrian Federation of Labor), with violent clashes taking place between the Right and the Left. On 27-28 January, following the pro-Taksim demonstrations in Nicosia and Famagusta, seven Turks got killed in clashes with British soldiers. In April, the EOKA resumed armed action against the British, breaking what was a year-long truce (Reddaway, 1986: 108). Then, following the jointly celebrated May Day of 1968, there came a series of TMT executions, targeting pro-AKEL journalists and PEO unionists who were the pacifist proponents of a unified Cyprus. This was followed by the events of 7 June, when thirteen Cypriots were killed, setting off a wave of horrific killings from both sides, including the hacking to death of eight G/Cs at *Gönyeli* (Geunyeli), on 12 June. See, for the details of the *Gönyeli* incident, Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux (2005: 34-35). “This incident, perhaps more than any other, reinforced Greek Cypriot suspicions that the British were collaborating with Turkish Cypriots in order to oppress them and is still remembered with bitterness today.” (Morgan, 2010: 244) Thus, G/C and T/C confrontations, rare until then, became more serious in June and July 1958 (Copeaux and Mauss-Copeaux, 2005: 34).

³⁴⁴ As of the summer of 1958, “Cyprus was on the brink of civil war which could not be limited to the Island itself” (Radcliffe, 1986: 108). Therefore, Britain could now effectively assume the role of arbitration between Greece and Turkey, G/Cs and T/Cs. Accordingly, Macmillan told the House of Commons that, “[i]n view of the disagreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments and between the two communities in Cyprus, and of the disastrous consequences for all concerned if violence and conflict continue, an obligation rests with the United Kingdom Government, as the sovereign Power responsible for the administration of the island and the well-being of its inhabitants, to give a firm and clear lead out of the present deadlock. They accordingly declare a new policy which represents an adventure in partnership—partnership between the communities in the island and also between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey.” See, *HC Deb 19 June 1958 vol 589 cc1315-20*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1958/jun/19/cyprus>, 11.19.2012).

³⁴⁵ “The essential provisions of the new constitution will be: (a) There will be a separate House of Representatives for each of the two communities, and these Houses will have

sovereignty being shared, albeit not fully proportionately, between Britain, Greece and Turkey, and political equality being observed, albeit not fully proportionately, between G/Cs and T/Cs.³⁴⁶ On 21 June, the Greek Government publicly rejected the Plan, and on 15 August, appealed, once more, to the United Nations.³⁴⁷ British Prime Minister Macmillan also presented, the same day, to the House of Commons a revised version of the 19 June Plan, and stated his Government's decision to give effect to the proposals with these revisions (Crawshaw, 1959: 144; Reddaway, 1986: 111–112).³⁴⁸ On August 25, the Turkish Government announced its

final legislative authority in communal affairs; (b) authority for internal administration, other than communal affairs and internal security, will be undertaken by a Council presided over by the Governor and including the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments and six elected Ministers drawn from the Houses of Representatives, four being Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots; (c) the Governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments, will have reserve powers to ensure that the interests of both communities are protected; (d) external affairs, defence and internal security will be matters specifically reserved to the Governor acting after consultation with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments; (e) the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments will have the right to require any legislation which they consider to be discriminatory to be reserved for consideration by an impartial tribunal." See, *HC Deb 19 June 1958 vol 589 cc1315-20*, (<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1958/jun/19/cyprus>, 11.19.2012). See, also Crawshaw (1959: 143).

³⁴⁶ Gürel (1985: 140–141) argues that the Partnership Plan actually amounted to *Taksim*, by effectively partitioning the Island between Britain, Greece, and Turkey, save territorial porportioning. Note that the state structure proposed by the Plan was a functional—as opposed to territorial—federation, preparing the ground for the state structure stipulated by the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959. More on this, later.

³⁴⁷ Archbishop Makarios condemned the Plan for precluding the fundamental right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination as well as for potentially destroying its unity. Greek and G/C leaders were disturbed with the idea that the Plan would give Turkey a stake which could not be revoked, and which implied, historically, the return of Turkey to Cyprus (Crawshaw, 1959: 143–144; Reddaway, 1986: 111). See, for the details of the Greek appeal to the United Nations, Faustmann (2001: 30–31).

³⁴⁸ Macmillan's statement of 19 June 1958 to the House of Commons also pointed out that an Order-in-Council had already been approved authorising the preparation of electoral rolls in the Island, and that the Governor would authorise the establishment of separate G/C and T/C municipalities (Crawshaw, 1959: 144; Reddaway, 1986: 112). Accordingly, T/Cs started preparations for municipal elections (Gürel, 1985: 144). T/C members of municipal councils of the towns had already resigned from their posts on 3 June 1957. The T/C nationalist leadership decided to establish separate municipalities on 4 May 1958, and the T/C Municipality of Nicosia was established on 16 June 1958 (Akkurt, 2000: 82, 84–88). The establishment of separate municipalities was a critical part of the T/C nationalist drive

agreement to the revised British proposals.³⁴⁹ Reddaway (1986: 115) argues that “... [Greek] non-cooperation [meant] that Britain would go ahead with the plan with the cooperation of Turkey (and the Turkish Cypriots) alone. The Turkish presence would then become established in the Island and, ... become ever more pronounced and more difficult to remove as time went by.” Makarios’s response to preempt the British scheme was to switch, rather surprisingly, from self-determination to independence (Gürel, 1985: 144–145).³⁵⁰ Accordingly, the Greek appeal was now for independence under G/C majority rule and under United Nations auspices (Crawshaw, 1959: 145–146; Faustmann, 2001: 31). On 1 October 1958, the British Government put the Plan into effect, with Turkey’s cooperation, putting further pressure on Greece (Esenbel, 1993: 114). At this point, the burdens of intransigence over the Cyprus issue were getting entirely unendurable for all parties concerned, and all the more so for Greece and Turkey.³⁵¹ For Turkey, 1958 and 1959 were years of multiple crises in the realms of

towards state-building, and cause for great concern, on the part of the G/C nationalists. See, for the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building during the 1950s, Arslan (2012). One must also note that the practice of separate municipalities, carried into the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, would be one of the major or bones of contention between the two sides, during the common state of 1960–1963. More on this, later.

³⁴⁹ *FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. X, Part 1: 16 - Cyprus*, (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/16cyprus3.html>, 11.19.2012).

³⁵⁰ “On 22 September Archbishop Makarios told Mrs Barbara Castle in Athens that the Cypriots would accept an interim period of self-government leading to independent status which would not be changed without the sanction of the United Nations. Later Makarios formally submitted this proposal to the British Government through its Embassy in Athens.” (Crawshaw, 1959: 145)

³⁵¹ According to Faustmann (2001: 25), “Greece started to regard the Cyprus issue as a burden for its national interests. Athens felt increasingly isolated within NATO and in danger of a war with Turkey for the sake of Cyprus.” Mavroyannis (1990: 132) argues that the Greek Government was the one party amongst all which most desired a solution, for fear of being overthrown, due to the growing public anger over Cyprus. As such, the Greek Government gave the priority to NATO, rather than *Enosis*, with its potentially destabilising effects on domestic politics.

foreign policy, domestic politics, and the economy.³⁵² Thus, towards the end of November 1958,³⁵³ Menderes told Esenbel, that the costs of the Cyprus to

³⁵² In her relationships with the United States, specifically, Turkey had, on the credits side, critically strategic value for NATO's southeastern flank. On the other hand, on the debits side of the balance, Turkey was, as of mid-1958, rather vulnerable to, particularly, economic pressures by the United States. Throughout the 1950s, underlying Turkey's relationship to the United States was the delicate balance caused by the basic fact that "... the Turkish economy was faced with severe balance of payments difficulties at a time when the US containment strategy was increasingly becoming dependent upon countries like Turkey which were at the front line of the Cold War." (Yalman, 2009: 181) Firstly, "during the 1950s, Turkey was ... engaged in two unsuccessful projects to extend Western defence structures to the Balkans and the Middle East." (Hale, 2002: 123–124) As a matter of fact, Turkey was one of the major participants of the Cold War politics of containment (Tellal, 2006: 514). However, by mid-1958, both the Balkan Pact, and the Baghdad Pact, as the two pillars of Turkey's aspirations for regional leadership, had collapsed—the latter coinciding with the G/C—T/C interethnic clashes on the Island, the process of Macmillan Plan, and of Zurich–London Agreements. [In Iraq, the coup d'état led by General Qasim took place on 14 July 1958. On 15 July 1958, the United States sent troops to Lebanon, and on 17–18 July, Britain followed suit, by sending troops to Jordan. See, Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu (2006: 632–634)]. Secondly, on the plane of domestic politics, the Menderes Government and the DP were apparently shifting towards authoritarian rule. According to Feroz Ahmad, the turning point was the parliamentary elections of 2 May 1954, when the DP swept 57 % of the votes: "Adnan Menderes was transformed by the result. The transition period of 1950–4 was over; he now expected all opposition to bend to the 'national will' [millî irade] or he threatened to break it." (Ahmad, 2008: 236) Likewise, Cem Eroğul also dates the DP's shift away from political liberalism to its triumph at the 1954 elections. Accordingly, after a brief interlude of political thaw following the vote of confidence of 13 December 1955, systemic repression begins as of April 1956, against the press, university professors, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP), and the opposition, at large. See, Eroğul (1992: 125–132), for details. At the parliamentary elections of 27 October 1957, the number of votes earned by the DP was less than the total of the number of votes received by opposition parties. As of 1958, DP's tendency towards authoritarian rule had become even more patent, aiming, as it was, the army, the bureaucracy, and university students, as well. See, Tunçay (1995: 184–187). General Qasim's coup appears to have caused growing apprehensiveness amongst DP leaders about the prospect of a military coup, leading them to further repressive measures: "The July 1958 military coup and the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq had a detrimental effect on political life in Turkey. As a result the Democrats become more truculent and began calling for measures against the opposition, accusing it of engaging in 'subversive activities'. ... On 12 October 1958 [they] called for the creation for a 'Fatherland Front' [*Vatan Cephesi*] in order to counter what they described as the RPP's 'front of malice and hostility'." (Ahmad, 2008: 237–238) Thirdly, according to the periodisation of Korkut Boratav, the sub-period 1954–1961 is one of economic bottleneck and adjustment. During the preceeding subperiod of 1946–1953, Turkey had been able to finance her cumulative trade deficit of \$ 500,000,000 via United States aid and foreign credits. Imports, sailing on the average around \$ 550,000,000 through the years 1952 and 1953, began to regress after 1954, due to the shortage of foreign resources, falling down to \$ 315,000,000 as of the year 1958. After 1954, visiting foreign economic missions constantly advised Turkey to engage stabilisation policies of the standard IMF type. However, rather than adopting deflationary and devaluationary measures, supported by trade liberalisation, the DP Party, pursued populist policies based on inflationary and expansionary methods, supported by direct price controls and import substitution. However, the continuing deterioration of balance of payments reaching a state of full crisis by mid-1958, the DP Government was compelled to introduce the stabilisation measures of 4 August 1958, under the guidance of the IMF. Stabilisation measures

the Government had increased, so that it would be appropriate to find a halfway solution, provided, of course, that Turkey's basic goals were not compromised, ensuring, 1) political equality for T/Cs, and; 2) that Cyprus would not ever fall into enemy hands—implying Turkey's military presence on the Island (Esenbel, 1993: 114). Therefore, Turkey had actually dropped her demands for *Taksim*, before the series of United Nations meetings of late October, and early December 1958. As for Greece, she suffered successive defeats, firstly in the First Committee, on 4 December, and secondly and finally, in the General Assembly, on 5 December.³⁵⁴ As Faustmann (2001: 34) points out, “Greece had considered the XIII session of the General Assembly its last chance to stop the British and the Turks. The prospect of settling the dispute through the UN had vanished.”³⁵⁵ It is important to note that, United States efforts (and pressure) for a Greek–

comprised, customarily, the lifting of direct price controls, foreign trade controls, devaluation of the TL, price rises for the goods produced by public enterprises, and the cutting down of budget deficits. As the flow of foreign financing was resumed, imports recovered its former levels. See, Boratav (1995: 316, 321–322) Thus, the late 1950s witnessed severe shortages of consumer goods, queuing, etc. constant quests for foreign financing became the standard part of DP leaders' foreign relations agenda, particularly, with the United States, and the Federal Republic of Germany. See, also, Eroğul (1992: 130), and Tunçay (1995: 183, 185–186). Of the \$ 359,000,000, envisaged by the stabilisation loan program of August 4, announced by the United States Government, the IMF, and the OEEC, \$ 234,000,000 was provided by the United States. *FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. X, Part 1: 16 - Cyprus*, (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/16cyprus3.html>, 11.19.2012).

³⁵³ Esenbel fails to give the precise date of his conversation with Menderes, but is, most probably, some days before the First Committee, which dealt with the Cyprus issue, first met on 15 November.

³⁵⁴ "The General Assembly, ... expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." *Resolution 1287 (XIII), 5 December 1958*, (<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/747/31/IMG/NR074731.pdf?OpenElement>, 20.12.2012). 1287 (XIII). For the arguments of all three parties and others, in the First Committee, and the General Assembly, see, Gürel (1985: 149–150), and Faustmann (2001: 33–34).

³⁵⁵ According to Ahmet Gazioğlu, the essence of Resolution 1287(XIII) was that finding a solution of permanence to the Cyprus issue through United Nations resolutions was not possible (Satan and Şentürk: 2012: 37).

Turkey compromise also got intensified, particularly, in December 1959 (Gürel, 1985: 153–154).³⁵⁶ On 6 December, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers agreed on the “basic idea of a permanent and guaranteed independence of Cyprus as a compromise, giving rise, eventually, to the Zurich and London Conferences of February 1959, and the consequent establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (Faustmann, 2001: 35). Thus began, the Turco-Greek rapprochement of the early 1960s, too (Gürel, 1985: 150).

³⁵⁶ From the mid-1950s onwards, whilst successfully rousing Turkey’s interest in Cyprus, Britain also feared losing control over the course of events, for the hardening of Turkey’s stand and the prospect of war between two members of NATO could prompt intervention by the United States (Kızılyürek, 2006: 21–2). The United States, on her part, generally considered Cyprus to be part of Britain’s sphere of influence, thereby opposing Greece’s internationalisation of the issue via the United Nations (Kalaitzaki, 2005: 112). From the mid-1950s up to the Zurich and London Conferences of February 1958, the United States seems to have considered Cyprus as an intra-NATO, or inter-allies issue, preferring NATO, or the triangle of Britain-Greece-Turkey as the proper platform for its resolution, and intervening only privately, via NATO and/or other allies. This, together with her reluctance to alienate either Greece or Turkey by direct interference, apparently, urged the United States to pursue the path of ‘quiet diplomacy’ over the Cyprus issue. As Fairfield (1959: 247) argues, “[i]t is interesting to note that the Cyprus agreement resulted from the traditional pattern of “quiet diplomacy” despite Greece’s effort to try the case before the World court of public opinion.” More particularly, Greece and Makarios were not either able to press the United States Government, domestically, because, “[c]ontrary to Greek hopes, the bid for independence made little impact in the United States.” (Crawshaw, 1959, 146) The pressure the United States applied upon Greece and Turkey, as a part of her ‘quite diplomacy’, was either direct, or through NATO. See Fırat (1997: 57), and Kızılyürek (2009: 15). As a matter of fact, in 1957 and in 1959, there were two initiatives taken by General Secretary Paul-Henri Spaak (1957–1961) aiming at a settlement within NATO, which bore no fruits (Crawshaw, 1959: 145; Joseph, 2009: 380–381). Apparently, Turkey took most of the brunt of the United States pressure. Americans advised the Turkish Government not to heed any of the luring British appeals. Also, they probably hinted that, in case of non-cooperation, the forthcoming Federal German aid of D-Mark 150,000,000 might be called off (Gürel, 1985: 153–154).

CHAPTER V

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THE COMMON STATE (1960–1963)

The Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey³⁵⁷ met at Zurich, and on 11 February 1959, agreed upon the outline of a constitution, namely, ‘The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus’, composed of 27 articles (the ‘Basic Articles’).³⁵⁸ On 19 February, the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Greece, and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük signed and initialled the so-called London Agreements, embodying The Basic Structure

³⁵⁷ Respectively, Konstantínos G. Karamanlís and Adnan Menderes; and Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu.

³⁵⁸ Article 27 of the so-called ‘The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus’ stipulated: “All the above points shall be considered to be the basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.” See, for the official English translations of the original French text, Nedjatigil (1977: 53–57) or Ertegün (1977: 36–40). It is important to note that, the basic articles, by definition, could by no means be amended. Accordingly, Article 182. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus also stipulated that “[t]he Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal.” Since, particularly, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were part of the basic articles, G/C jurists argued that Article 182. 1 of the Constitution was the outright denying of the right of self-determination: “The right of self-determination is denied to the people of Cyprus by the constitutional provisions whereby the constitutional structure created by the Zurich Agreement shall remain unalterable by any means and that the so called Basic Articles of the Constitution cannot be amended by way of variation, addition or repeal (Article 182. 1), no matter how unworkable and how obstructive and injurious to the normal functioning of the state were proved to be. Such provisions are contrary not only to the accepted principles of public law and to current constitutional practice but offend against the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and peremptory rules of international law.” (Tornaritis, 1977: 55–56) And, “[t]he fact that both agreements were eventually incorporated into the constitution, and their provisions became the bases of the document, constitutes a major novelty of the fundamental law of Cyprus, which thus emerges as an essentially international compromise imposed upon the people of the island without even giving them a chance to vote on it.” (Papastathopoulos, 1965: 121) Note that “[o]nly after 11 February were the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders informed and brought into the picture. Makarios at a meeting with the Greek government accepted, if reluctantly, the Zurich agreement since it was evident that rejection of Zurich and the continuation of the armed conflict would mean partition.” (Madden, 2000: 460)

of the Republic of Cyprus, agreed upon at Zurich, and the three associated treaties called, ‘The Treaty of Establishment’, ‘The Treaty of Guarantee’, and ‘The Treaty of Alliance’. Following the Zurich and London Agreements of, respectively, February 11 and February 19 1959, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was drafted and signed on August 16, 1960, giving rise to the new, common state of the G/Cs and T/Cs. One must note that the Zurich and London Agreements represented, *par excellence*, the current conjuncture of world politics, in terms of the balance of powers amongst the NATO allies, and between the two blocs, in the Eastern Mediterranean. As it turned out, however, the federal state structure as envisioned at Zurich came to naught, with the wave of interethnic violence which broke out on December 21, 1963. Upon the T/Cs’ concentration, *en masse*, and estrangement inside the narrow confines of fortified urban neighbourhoods and villages—the so-called ‘enclaves’, the common state effectively became the state of the G/Cs. In this chapter, I will firstly give a summary account of the conjuncture of world politics of the early 1960s, as represented by the Zurich and London Agreements. This, I will complement by a summary account of the political and economic conjuncture in Turkey. Then I will explore the strategic constraints, possibilities, options faced by, and the strategic priorities and choices of the T/C nationalist leaders as to the questions of state-building and capital accumulation under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus. Finally, I shall bring out and assess the strategic priorities and choices of the T/C leadership, against the background of the

historically and conjuncturally given constraints, possibilities, and options, and try to explicate the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus.

5.1. SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE CONJUNCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS AS OF THE ZURICH AND LONDON AGREEMENTS OF 1959

According to the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus:

1. The Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance would have constitutional force (Article 21, and also, Article 181 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, dated 16 August 1960);³⁵⁹
2. The State of Cyprus would be a presidential *régime*, with a G/C President, and a T/C Vice-President, in whom the executive power was vested. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, would be composed of seven G/C and three T/C ministers (Articles 1 and 5);
3. The House of Representatives, in which the legislative power was vested, in all matters other than reserved to the Communal Chambers, would be composed of 70 % G/C, and 30 % T/C members, elected on separate rolls (Article 6);
4. The President and the Vice-President would have the right of final veto and the right to return over the decisions of the Council of Ministers, and the right to return the laws and the decisions of the House of Representatives (Articles 5 and 9);
5. The adoption by the House of representatives of any law relating to the municipalities, and the imposition of duties or taxes would

³⁵⁹ Article numbers refer to the articles of The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus, unless otherwise stated.

require a simple majority of the G/C and T/C members taking part in the vote and considered separately (Article 7);

6. There would be two Communal Chambers, with the right to impose taxes and levies on the members of their community, which would exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status; exercise authority over and supervise producers' cooperatives and credit establishments; and exercise authority over and supervise the municipalities which would be composed of one community only (Article 10);
7. The Civil Service would be composed as to 70 % G/C and 30 % T/C (Article 11); the army of 2,000 men would be composed as to 60 % G/C and 40 % T/C, and the security forces (gendarmerie and police) of 2,000 (which could be reduced or increased by the President and the Vice-President conjointly) would be composed as to 70 % G/C and 30 % T/C (Article 14);
8. Separate municipalities would be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the T/C inhabitants thereof (Article 20).
9. The total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State (implied, *Enosis*), or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two independent States—implied, *Taksim*) would be excluded (Article 21);³⁶⁰

³⁶⁰ Therefore, the 'independence' of the Republic of Cyprus meant, not only independence from the British, but from Greece and Turkey, as well.

10. The Greek and Turkish Governments would have the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities (Article 24).

According to the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus pledged to ensure the maintenance of its independence, and territorial integrity, and prohibit all activity tending to promote either union, or partition of the Island. Similarly, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, pledged to ensure the maintenance of the independence, and territorial integrity of the Island, and prohibit all activity tending to promote either union, or partition of the Island. See Nedjatigil (1977: 58) or Ertegün (1977: 41). According to the Treaty of Alliance, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey pledged to cooperate for their common defence, and to resist any attack or aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. In the spirit of this alliance, a tripartite Headquarters would be established in Cyprus, involving a Greek contingent of 950, and a Turkish contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. Also, by an additional article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece, Turkey, and the Republic of Cyprus pledged to respect the integrity of the British sovereign bases.

On the basis of the foregoing, the following points must be made:

1. In so far as the Treaties of Guarantee, and of Alliance were part of the Basic Articles which, by the way, could by no means be

amended, the Republic of Cyprus was at best a quasi-independent, quasi-sovereign state, reflecting the compromise between the Macmillan's offer of tridominium, and Makarios's demand for independence;

2. to the extent that the Treaties of Guarantee, and of Alliance represented the particular strategic interests of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, these interests were given constitutional force, and thereby protected by the Constitution of the Republic;³⁶¹
3. through the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, the Republic of Cyprus was effectively made an extension of NATO;³⁶²
4. the Republic of Cyprus was a 'functional'—as opposed to territorial—federation, with a dual state structure, in terms of the duality of the executive and legislative powers, and in terms of the duality of the central and communal states;
5. the duality of the state concerned the fields of communal affairs, including communal budgets and taxation, and the cooperative societies, but otherwise excluded the field of economy, and

³⁶¹ "The Treaty of Establishment was aimed at safeguarding British military interests in Cyprus. ... The Treaty of Alliance was a defence pact between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. ... The Treaty of Guarantee was primarily aimed at mutual abandonment of the conflicting ethnopolitical goals of *enosis* and partition." (Joseph, 2009: 381) "During the tripartite conference that followed immediately in London, general understanding was reached to the effect that: a) the strategic needs of the British government should be clearly met in a manner which could not later be challenged; b) there should be a reconciliation of the two communities; (c) there should be a revival of friendship between Greece and Turkey; d) the Cypriotes should be given an opportunity to develop their own institutions." (Papastathopoulos, 1965: 120-1)

³⁶² Also, "The Gentlemen's Agreements", dated 11 February 1959, secretly reached between Karamanlis and Menderes at Zurich, formally stipulated, *inter alia*, that "Greece and Turkey will support the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The establishment of N.A.T.O. bases in the Island and their composition require the agreement of the two Governments" (Madden, 2000: 461)

economic policies, thereby, giving rise to a single economic sphere (of circulation and capital accumulation).

Now, one can construct ‘balance sheets’ for the different actors of the Cyprus issue, in terms of their credits and debits, in the light of the secular, historical forces and trends they were part of or subject to, as well as their original, subsequent, and final stands/positions:^{363, 364}

The historical trends Britain was subject to, were, firstly, her decline and United States’ rise as a hegemonic power (i.e. the hegemonic power transition from Britain to the United States), and secondly, post-war decolonisation and the close of the Empire. The British stand over the Cyprus issue was, originally British sovereignty, subsequently British–Greek–Turkish tridominium, and finally, independence with sovereign military bases. Overall, what Britain lost was what she could not keep, i.e.

³⁶³ The t-tables below are cast in terms of the original, intermediate and final positions, selectively.

³⁶⁴ There seems to be a general consensus amongst the students of the Zurich and London Agreements, that there trade-offs for each of the actors, and that Greece came off worse, compared with, particularly, Turkey. Thus, according to Crawshaw (1959: 147), “[t]he final settlement was far removed from the original claims of the main contestants. All three countries had made major concessions. The hardest sacrifice of all was probably the Greek surrender of the long-cherished hope of *Enosis*.” Similarly, Papastathopoulos (1965: 121) argues that: “[e]ach had to forego something in favour of something else; the Greeks exchanged *Enosis* in favour of independence; the Turks, partition for special safeguards, a rather disproportionate share of political power; Britain, sovereignty over the whole island for sovereignty over British bases.” According to Mavroyannis (1990: 132–133), Turkey was came better off, since mostly, the toll for the compromise befell Greece. Not only did Turkey prevent *Enosis*, but she also got a stake in the Island and better rights for the T/Cs. It is important to note that the consequences of the Zurich and London Agreements from the point of view of the key actors are critical to understanding the strategic constraints, possibilities, options faced by, and the strategic priorities and choices of the T/C nationalist leaders, under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, and thereafter. Therefore, I need to engage a more elaborate analysis of the trade-offs.

her full sovereignty, while she saved herself of the tremendous economic and military costs of keeping Cyprus.

CYPRUS POLITICS: BRITAIN'S BALANCE SHEET

Credits	Debits
• <i>Sovereign Military Bases</i> • <i>Savings on Economic and Military Costs</i>	• <i>Full Sovereignty</i>

The historical trend Greece was subject to, was the emergence and the rise of nationalism, and the foundation and territorial enlargement of the Greek nation-state.³⁶⁵ The Greek stand over the Cyprus issue was, originally, non-intervention, subsequently *Enosis*, then self-determination, but this, as a stepping stone towards *Enosis*, and finally, independence. By forsaking her demand for *Enosis*, Greece saved herself of the costs of alienating the United States and NATO, the costs of military encounter with Turkey, and the destabilising effects of the Cyprus issue on domestic politics. The foundation of the independent Republic of Cyprus gave Greece greater influence over Cyprus.

CYPRUS POLITICS: GREECE'S BALANCE SHEET

Credits	Debits
• <i>Savings on the Costs of Alienating the United States and NATO</i> • <i>Savings on the Costs of Potential Military Encounter with Turkey</i> • <i>Influence over Cyprus through the Majority G/Cs</i>	• <i>Enosis</i>

³⁶⁵ Cyprus was one of the territories claimed as a part of the *Megáli Idéa* [Big Idea], the Greek irredentist goal of reviving the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire.

The historical trend Turkey was part of and subject to, were the repercussions of the 19th century ‘Eastern Question’, the breakup of the Ottoman Empire as a world empire of the old type facing the rising forces of nationalism and Western imperialism, continued loss of territory—most particularly the loss of Crete and the Dodecanese, to Greece. The Turkish stand over the Cyprus issue was, originally, non-intervention, subsequently reclamation [*iade*—return, or *istirdat*], then *Taksim*, and finally, independence conditional upon Turkish military presence and influence over the affairs of the Island. One must note that the presence of a Turkish military contingent, however small, was of great symbolic value, given the socially vivid recollections of the Ottoman soldier’s parting from the Island.³⁶⁶ What Turkey lost by the Zurich and London Agreements, was what Turkey could not get anyways, i.e. *Taksim*.³⁶⁷ By forsaking her demand for *Taksim*, Turkey saved herself of the costs of alienating the

³⁶⁶ Rauf R. Denktaş’s grandfather, ‘*Şeherli*’ Mehmet, who was an Ottoman *zaptiah* [*zaptıye*—policeman], had personally gone through the agonising experience of witnessing the last of the Ottoman soldiers parting from the Island. He often told the child Denktaş of the saddening scenes he still reminisced, of the lowering of the Turkish flag, and the raising of the British one (Cihangir, 2000: 8–9; Denktaş, 2000: 56, 58–59; Batur, 2007: 32, 36–37). See Gazioğlu (1996: 25–29) for a brief account of the arrival of the British on the Island and the flag ceremony in Nicosia. According to Gazioğlu (2000b: 146–147), his grandfather’s reminiscences of the flag ceremony were key to the importance Denktaş attributed to the Turkish soldier’s presence on the Island. The Turkish Army Contingent, commanded by Colonel Turgut Sunalp, arrived on the Island on 16 August 1960. Şeherli Mehmet’s surviving friends were invited to the welcoming ceremony by Denktaş (Batur, 2007: 33).

³⁶⁷ This, technically and politically, became a real possibility only in the 1970s. For one thing, in the 1960s, Turkey lacked landing crafts. A top-secret Cyprus Government Paper (A Study of Partition, 22 May 1957) prepared by officials in Cyprus following discussions in Ankara and Lennox-Boyd’s statement to the House of Commons argued that “[p]artition would be seen as a deliberate decision to favour Turkey and incur the enmity of Greece. Therefore on grounds of expediency the partition line in X and Y ought to favour Turkish interests. But there would be no guarantee that Turkish support would be forthcoming for any line conceivably sponsored as fair and reasonable by H.M.’s G. Partition could not be regarded as a quick solution and would involve heavy direct charges by both governments [i.e. Britain and Turkey] and a large military commitment by H.M.’s G.” (Madden, 2000: 450)

United States and NATO, and the destabilising effects of the Cyprus issue on domestic politics and economy. The foundation of the independent Republic of Cyprus gave Turkey greater influence over Cyprus.

CYPRUS POLITICS: TURKEY'S BALANCE SHEET

Credits	Debits
• <i>Savings on the Political and Economic Costs of Alienating the United States</i> • <i>Influence over Cyprus through the Minority of T/Cs, and as a Guarantor State</i> • <i>Turkey's Military Presence on the Island (Symbolic Value)</i>	• <i>Taksim</i>

The historical trend G/C and Greek nationalists were part of, was the *Panhellenic* Enosis movement, with its dramatic defeat in Asia Minor, and successive victories in the 'islands', i.e. Crete, the Ionian Islands, and the Dodecanese. G/C and Greek nationalist stand over the Cyprus issue was, originally, and independence, finally, as the interim phase of the ultimate goal of Enosis. Their attitude towards the T/Cs was, one of non-recognition, or at best, recognition as a minority.

CYPRUS POLITICS: G/C–GREEK NATIONALISTS

Credits	Debits
• <i>Nominal Independence and Sovereignty as the Intermim Phase of Enosis</i> • <i>Advantages of Being the Ethnically Dominant, Majority Element</i>	• <i>Enosis</i> • <i>Pseudo-Independence, and Pseudo-Sovereignty</i> • <i>Political Equality for T/Cs</i> • <i>Turkey's Influence over Cyprus through the Minority of T/Cs, and as a Guarantor State</i> • <i>Turkey's Military Presence on the Island (Symbolic Value)</i>³⁶⁸

Finally, the historical trend T/Cs were part of, was the continuing loss of the former Ottoman territories, and the condition of having being fallen outside (or not being counted as part of) the borders circumscribed by the National Oath [*Misak-ı Milli*—National Oath], being part of the so-called problem of Outside Turks [*Dış Türkler*].³⁶⁹ Facing the rise of the *Enosis* movement, the T/C nationalists, at first, sided up with the British, demanding wider communal, minority rights. Subsequently, they demanded the reclamation of Cyprus by Turkey, and finally, called for *Taksim*. Zurich and London Agreements accorded T/Cs political equality and autonomy, albeit disproportionately, and Turkey's assistance and guarantorship.

³⁶⁸ “At the end of August [1959] Archbishop Makarios stated in Athens that the Cypriots were determined to ‘combat and oppose by all means at their disposal ... any attempted return of Turkey to Cyprus in whatever form’.” (Crawshaw, 1959: 144)

³⁶⁹ *Misak-ı Milli* was a pact of six articles, voted by the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies [*Meclis-i Mebusan*], on 28 January 1920, in defiance of the dictates of the Entente forces. *Misak-ı Milli*, which effectively became the statement of the Turkish nationalist aims, declared that “[t]he whole of those parts [of the Ottoman Empire] whether within or outside the said armistice [of Mudros] lines which are inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim [in effect, Turkish and Kurdish] majority, united in religion, in race and in aim ... form a whole which does not admit of division for any reason.” “In effect, the nationalist resistance had decided not to re-build Turkish power in the Middle East.” (Hale, 2001: 47) *Misak-ı Milli* served as the basis of the Turkish claims at the Conference of Lausanne (November 1922–July 1923), becoming the guiding foreign policy principle of the Republic of Turkey.

CYPRUS POLITICS: T/C NATIONALISTS

Credits	Debits
• <i>Political Equality</i> • <i>Autonomy, from the G/Cs</i> • <i>Turkey's Assistance and Guarantorship</i> • <i>Turkey's Military Presence on the Island (Symbolic Value)</i>	• <i>Taksim</i>

Looking at the consolidated balance sheet of all actors considered together, one can see that of all the actors, two were definitely running deficits. These were the G/C–Greek and T/C nationalisms, whose aspirations of, respectively, *Enosis* and *Taksim* were left unfulfilled. The question of unfulfilled nationalisms would prove to be the major factor of destabilisation for the politics of the Republic of Cyprus.³⁷⁰ On the other hand, all three guarantor states, prior to the collapse of the common state after the events of 21 December 1963, at least, generally regarded the Republic of Cyprus as the permanent solution to the Cyprus issue, and generally honoured the Zurich and London Agreements.

³⁷⁰ The Greek nationalism was left largely unfulfilled, due to the fact the Cyprus issue was at the core of factious Greek politics. Thus, Stefanidis (2001: 27–28) points out that “[t]he Cyprus campaign [of 1950–1960] was ultimately a failure. It ended with a compromise which set up an independent republic under tripartite tutelage and explicitly excluded *Enosis* in perpetuity. This outcome did not permit its domestic champions to reap any fruits of victory. Rather, nine years of irredentist agitation had encouraged opinion leaders among the press, interest groups and opposition parties to outbid each other in intransigent, maximalist rhetoric.” T/C and Turkish nationalist reactions to the sudden departure of the Menderes Government’s from Taksim were rather muted. For the criticism the directed at the Grand National Assembly at the Government, see Fırat (1997: 68–73). For the criticisms of the Turkish weekly *Akis* [Echo], and the protest of the Menderes Lycée students in Cyprus, see Hasgüler (2005: 123–132, 134). Writing in the aftermath of the Zurich and London Agreements, Fairfield (1959: 243) noted that “... despite the relatively favourable political settlement on their behalf, no doubt many in the Turkish minority feel that their future is insecure. They hailed the agreement with a strike. Turkish teacher resigned, and 2000 children demonstrated quietly. Some of the latter carried placards reading, ‘We will not accept a murderer for our president’—which leads us to the probable choice of Makarios as first president.”

To that, one must also add the United States that, in Cyprus affairs, gradually but decidedly replaced the British as the new hegemonic player, through the late 1950s and early 1960s. Under the conditions of Cold War, the United States clearly desired the continuance of the Republic. In Turkey, the leaders of the 27 May 1960 coup, and the successive İsmet İnönü governments were supportive of the Republic. In Greece, except for brief intermissions, from 6 October 1955 until 17 June 1963 there were Konstantinos G. Karamanlis governments, that were for the continuance of the Republic of Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 103).³⁷¹

5.2. SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONJUNCTURE IN TURKEY

Four sets of events are critical, apropos of the Turkish politics and economy, to identifying the constraints, possibilities and options conjuncturally faced by the T/C nationalist leadership, during the common state of the Republic of Cyprus:

³⁷¹ Consider, for instance, the Karamanlis letter to Makarios, dated 20 December 1963—just a day before the outbreak of interethnic violence on Cyprus. In his letter Karamanlis pointed out that, “[t]he Royal Government desires to make clear to its Cypriot brethren and their Government that it is resolved to do everything possible to promote the smooth functioning of the Cypriot state and genuine co-operation between the Greek population and the Turkish minority, in such a way that the future, the progress and the well-being of independent Cyprus will be assured.” Karamanlis accepted that the Zurich and London Agreements had proved unworkable, but their improvement required a step by step approach, through negotiations, and not through the use of force, that could only lead to catastrophe. Karamanlis was also critical of the pro-*Enosis* radicals: “We are indeed informed that recent actions of the Royal Government, which were everywhere judged to be prudent and thanks to which an irremediable disaster to the detriment of Cyprus and its people was averted, were misconstrued by some circles in question who, it seems, see the solution of the Cyprus problem only in deadly conflict between Greeks and Turks.” (Reddaway, 1986: 221)

- 1) The toppling of the DP Government on 27 May 1960, the provisory *régime*, constitutional reforms, and the restoration of party politics;
- 2) the transformation of the Turkish General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces [*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı*] into a key actor of Turkish politics;
- 3) the introduction of comprehensive economic planning, and;
- 4) continuing attempts at economic stabilisation.

On 29 April 1959, İsmet İnönü, President of CHP, launched the ‘Great Offensive’ [*Büyük Taarruz*] campaign, conceived of with a view to driving the DP Government out of power.³⁷² Soon the Country slid into the state of a quasi-civil war. On 27 May 1961, the DP Government was deposed and replaced by the so-called National Unity Committee [*Millî Birlik Komitesi*—MBK or NUC], headed by General Cemal Gürsel, former Commander of the Land Forces, and composed of 36 officers of mostly lower ranks—radical colonels, majors, and captains (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 32; Zürcher, 2007: 241). Although the putschists’ first proclamation stressed the non-partisan character of the coup, the balance of the relations of power was greatly reversed through a series of purges conducted by the NUC. Whilst DP leaders were forthwith arrested, and on 14 October 1960 the *so-called* Yassıada trials started, the DP was suspended on 31 August, and on 29

³⁷² The Great Offensive was the name of the fatal Turkish campaign, launched on August 26 1922, which drove the Greek army back to the Aegean Sea. General İnönü was one the leading commanders of the Turkish ‘War of Independence’ (*İstiklâl Savaşı*). One must also note that the cities of the Aegean region were the DP’s strongholds. Whilst Government authorities resorted to prohibitive measures, to obstruct the campaign. On 1 May 1959, daily newspapers were censored. İnönü and his entourage were harassed on a number of occasions. On 4 May 1958, İsmet İnönü narrowly escaped a lynch, thanks to a troop of mounted gendarmerie passing by.

September dissolved (Zürcher, 2007: 241–242).³⁷³ Furthermore, there was a close correspondence between the demise of the Democrats, and the rise of İsmet İnönü, as the major actor of mediation and element of balance in Turkish politics.³⁷⁴ After the fall of the DP, the role of İnönü, as a mediator between the world of the civilians and the officers, greatly increased, and in the early 1960s, the so-called ‘Pasha factor’ [*Paşa faktörü*] became prominent in domestic affairs, foreign affairs and the Cyprus issue

The NUC also purged, from the Turkish Armed Forces, 235 generals and some 5,000 colonels and majors; and from the universities, 147 professors and lecturers (respectively, by Law No. 42, dated 2 August 1960, and Law No. 114, dated 27 October 1960).³⁷⁵ Ahmad (2003: 125) notes that, during

³⁷³ Amongst the arrested were President Celâl Bayar, President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*—TBMM) Refik Koraltan, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, as well as the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces Rüştü Erdelhun, who was also cashiered. A decree of 12 June 1960, established two extraordinary bodies, namely, the Supreme Committee of Investigation (*Yüksek Soruşturma Kurulu*) to enquire the misdeeds of, and the Supreme Council of Justice (*Yüksek Adalet Divanı*) to try arrested DP leaders (Eroğul, 1992: 134). The ‘*Yassıada* trials’—thus called, after the Sea of Marmara island as the venue for the trials—commenced on 14 October 1960, and concluded on 15 September 1961, with 123 people being acquitted, 31 sentenced to life imprisonment, 418 to lesser terms, and 15 to death. Whilst 12 of the death sentences were commuted, including that of the President Celal Bayar, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were hanged on 16 September 1961, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the next day.” For the *Yassıada* Trials, see Eroğul (1992: 135, 138–139), Özdemir (1995: 198–199), and Zürcher (2007: 247–248).

³⁷⁴ “İnönü was a constant reminder of the past and became a factor – the ‘Pasha factor’ – in Turkey’s political life throughout the 1950s.” (Ahmad, 2008: 236) Thus, one of the critical consequences of 27 May was the further reinforcement of the ‘Pasha Factor’ in the Turkish policy making on various issues, including that of Cyprus.

³⁷⁵ Overall, 235 generals out of a total of 260 were subject to compulsory retirement, the underlying motive being doubt about the reliability of those concerned. Retired officers got organised under the Association of Retired Revolution Officers (*Emekli İnkılâp Subayları Derneği*—EMİNSU). Amongst the retired, was General Ragıp Gümüşpala, the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, who became the founding President of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*—AP), the heir of the DP. On the other side of the coin, were the promotions of pro-coup officers, e.g. the succession of General Cevdet Sunay, one of the key actors of the military coup of 12 March 1971, to the post of the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces. See, for the case of EMİNSU, Özdemir, (1995: 199–200). Compulsory retirements were accompanied by promotions, The purge of the scholars caused significant public

the DP–CHP struggles of the late 1950s, “[t]he officers came to see the problems of Turkey in the way they were articulated by the Republican opposition and the press”, so accordingly, “[t]he solutions that were acceptable to them after they seized power were also borrowed from the intelligentsia.” As a matter of fact, the enthusiastic cooperation of the intelligentsia was the key to both the legitimisation, and, more critically, the transformation of officers’ movement, from a coup to a comprehensive restructuring of the state.³⁷⁶ As most of the reforms transforming the forms of power relations were prescribed in the new constitution, it seems imperative to review the basic changes introduced therein.

On 13 December 1960, the NUC adopted Law No. 157, establishing a bicameral Constituent Assembly (*Kurucu Meclis*), of which one chamber was itself, and the other, the House of Representatives (*Temsilciler Meclisi*), consisting of the representatives of the political parties, excepting the now

outcry, leading to the resignation of the rectors of all universities. Thus, Law No. 114 was reversed two years later, by Law No. 43. The case of the so-called 147s (*147’ler*) caused a big breach of trust and estrangement between the NUC and its supporters. See, Özdemir (1995: 200–201), Zürcher (2007: 243), and Baltacı and Akın (2007: 91).

³⁷⁶ Scholars from the Law Faculty of İstanbul University and the Law Faculty and the Faculty of Political Sciences [*Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi*—SBF] of Ankara University—all acclaimed as the classic training grounds of future state cadres—were particularly active. The day after the coup, the NUC formed a commission of scholars (from the İstanbul University) to draft a new constitution. The very first task of the ‘Onar Commission’—thus called after its chairman, Prof. Sıddık Sami Onar, Rector of İstanbul University, one of the ardent opponents of the DP Government—was to delegitimise the DP Government, and legitimise the putschists. Thus, its preliminary report, dated 28 March 1960, stated that “... political power under the Democrats had been totally corrupted by personal and class ambition ... [and that the] DP may have come to power legally, but the legality of a government lay not in its origins but in its respect for the constitution and for such institutions as the press, the army, and the university.” (Ahmad, 2003: 127) Furthermore, “... [T]he junta’s decision to involve intellectuals transformed a military coup into an institutional revolution, a ‘revolution of the intellectuals’. ... The [Onar] commission recommended creating a totally new state and social institutions before restoring political authority and legal government to civilians.” (Ahmad, 2008: 240) Other members of the Onar Commission from the İstanbul University were, Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Naci Şensoy, Ragıp Sarıca, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Hüseyin Nail Kubalı ve İsmet Giritli.

defunct DP, and of the various corporate bodies (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 14).³⁷⁷ Due to its mode of (s)election, the lower house was dominated by the CHP (Özdemir, 1995: 203; Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 15). On 6 January 1961, the Constituent Assembly convened, and on 27 May 1961, approved the Constitution Bill, which was largely based on the CHP's Manifesto of First Goals [*İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*] of 1959.^{378, 379} In its spirit, the Bill was based on the idea that absolute power bred its corruption, reflecting its authors' critique of DP Government's autocracy.³⁸⁰ If

³⁷⁷ According to Hikmet Özdemir (1995: 202), the science commission that prepared the bill for the Constituent Assembly aimed at bringing together the 'dynamic forces' (*zinde kuvvetler*), the term in question being used to depict, the vanguard sectors of society, i.e. army officers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, university students, broadly, or the Turkish Armed Forces, narrowly.

³⁷⁸ There were two draft bills available to the Constituent Assembly, the one prepared by İstanbul group of scholars of the Onar Commission, the other by the scholars of Ankara's SBF (Eroğul, 1991: 137). The Constitutional Commission of the Constituent Assembly consisted of some members of the Onar Commission (Hıfzı Veldet Velidedeoğlu, Ragıp Sarıca, and Tarık Zafer Tunaya), plus, scholars from Ankara's SBF, the Middle East Technical University [Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi—ODTÜ/METU], and the Public Administration Institute of Turkey and the Middle East [*Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü*—TODAİE], including, Enver Ziya Karal (Ankara University) Turhan Feyzioğlu (ODTÜ), Yavuz Abadan (Ankara University, TODAİE), Muammer Aksoy (Ankara University), Turan Güneş (İstanbul University), Ali Coşkun Kırca (Ankara University), Doğan Avcıoğlu (TODAİE), Münci Kapanı (Ankara University), Bahri Savcı (Ankara University), Mümtaz Soysal (Ankara University).

³⁷⁹ The Manifesto of First Goals was a programmatic statement, declared at the 14th CHP Convention of January 1959, of a number of democratic and administrative reforms, to which the Party committed itself. Precedent to the First Goals was the joint *communiqué* issued by the opposition parties CHP, Freedom Party [*Hürriyet Partisi*], and the Republican Nation Party [*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*], prior to the parliamentary elections of 1957, promising "... to amend the constitution and establish a bicameral legislature; to set up a constitutional court to test the legality of laws; to provide for proportional representation so as to prevent the tyranny of the majority; and to give the right to strike to unionised workers. The RPP went further and promised state employees the right to unionise, to repeal anti-democratic laws, and to put an end to partisan administration." (Ahmad, 2003: 125–126) The First Goals comprised, *inter alia*, the freedom of thought, speech, the Press, and of science; the right to strike; impartiality of state broadcasting; impartiality of the Presidency; effective legislative monitoring of the executive; judiciary independence; honest, equal, and free elections based on the principle of proportionality; impartiality of the Assembly Presidency; parliamentary freedom of speech, immunity, and full rights of interpellation and motion of censure for the opposition; right to evidence, and; the declaration of property. "*CHP Kurultayı Taahhüde Girdi: İktidara Gelince Yapılacak İşler Beyanname ile Açıklandı*" (Milliyet, 15 January 1959).

³⁸⁰ One of the prevailing ideas amongst the critics of the DP rule seems to be that, "[t]he institution of the state was transformed into an appendage of the party organisation."

excessive centralisation of power—in this particular case, in the hands of a majoritarian government—was the problem, its confinement, decentralisation and diffusion would be the solution,³⁸¹ through:

- a) The recognition of civil liberties and social rights,
- b) creation of a system of checks and balances, through the provision of counterbalancing state, public institutions and the opposition organs, and
- c) the introduction of a proportional elective system.³⁸²

Firstly, The Constitution of 1961 brought explicit guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association and publication, freedom of work and enterprise (Ahmad, 2003: 129; 2008: 241). Secondly, political power was decentralised and diffused through various state and public institutions so as to counterbalance the elected executive.³⁸³ Thus, within the bicameral Grand National Assembly, the second chamber, the Senate of the Republic [*Cumhuriyet Senatosu*], consisting of elected, as of right, and ex officio members, shared the executive powers of the first chamber, the National

(Ahmad, 2003: 125) (As is known, anterior CHP Governments were also criticised by DP cadres on similar grounds.)

³⁸¹ Generally speaking, "... the Constitution ... reflected a distrust of politicians and elective assemblies by creating an effective system of checks and balances to limit the power of those elected organs." (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 16)

³⁸² "... [T]he main philosophy behind the constitution was to prevent elected governments from abusing the national will by instituting an authoritarian rule. To this end the new constitution provided a detailed definition of the principles of basic rights and the rule of law and introduced a system of checks and balances. For the same end, the new election law introduced the proportional system to replace the majoritarian system." (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 33)

³⁸³ "The main aim of the authors of the new constitution was to prevent a power monopoly such as the DP (and the RPP before it) had held, by counterbalancing the national assembly with other institutions." (Zürcher, 2007: 245) In other words, the Grand National Assembly would henceforth be just one of the many state organs to exercise the right of sovereignty (Özdemir, 1995: 205).

Assembly [*Millet Meclisi*], consisting of elected members. Two higher courts, the Constitutional Court [*Anayasa Mahkemesi*], and the Council of State [*Danıştay*] were founded.³⁸⁴ Universities, the judiciary, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation [*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*—TRT],³⁸⁵ and the Press were guaranteed autonomy. See, Ahmad (2003: 129-130), Altunışık and Özlem (2005: 33), Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 16). On the other hand, Article 111 created the National Security [*Millî Güvenlik Kurulu*—MGK], affording the Turkish General Staff extensive powers over practically any aspect of politics (Zürcher, 2007: 245).³⁸⁶

As Ahmad (2008: 242) puts it, the Revolution [*İnkılâp*] of 27 May changed Turkey's political architecture in significant ways. Workers were given to right to strike, students allowed to organise their own associations, and Leftists, their own parties, such as the Workers' Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*—TİP]. As a matter of fact, the political climate created by the Constitution of 27 May prepared the ground for the rise of the students' and workers' movement in the late 1960s. It is important to note that, in the aftermath of 27 May, and under the new Constitution of 9 July 1961, Turkey had entered into a period of a sort of political liberalisation, towards a relatively more decentralised party politics, parliamentary and state

³⁸⁴ Note that "[t]he demand for the establishment of a constitutional court was expressed in the 1957 election platform of the [CHP] and its Declaration of First Objectives issued on 14 January 1959." (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 15)

³⁸⁵ To be more precise, the TRT was founded on 1 May 1964, by Law No. 359, in accordance with the Constitution of 1961.

³⁸⁶ "[The] function [of the MGK] was to assist the cabinet 'in the making of decisions related to national security and co-ordination'. The term 'national security' was so broad and all-embracing that the generals had a say in virtually every problem that came before the cabinet." (Ahmad, 2008: 241)

organisation. As a matter of fact, the new constitutional order would redistribute power away from the government (party), and towards the opposition parties, sectors of the state apparatus, and the intelligentsia. Surely, this was bound to have critical repercussions upon the actors and dynamics of T/C politics, under the newly founded Republic.

One must also note that the power struggles of the early 1960s amongst the different sectors of Turkish Armed Forces had critical repercussions on the T/C politics. On a first level, there were power struggles inside the NUC, between, broadly speaking, junior and senior officers. Junior officers were the radicals, led by Colonel Alpaslan Türkeş, supporting a long-term military régime, and top-down reforms, whilst the seniors, in alliance with İsmet İnönü, supported a swift restoration of parliamentary politics, following the drafting of a new constitution (Eroğul, 1992: 135–136). On 13 November 1960, the senior sect of officers purged 14 of the radical officers, including Türkeş, from the NUC (Zürcher, 2007: 243). On a second level, there were struggles, during 1960–1961, between the NUC, as a body which defied the command chain of the Turkish Armed Forces, and the generals at the top of the hierarchy.³⁸⁷ To reduce the NUC's power, and restore command hierarchy, the top brass of generals founded the Armed Forces Union [*Silâhlı Kuvvetler Birliği*].³⁸⁸ The momentous confrontation took

³⁸⁷ Members of the NUC were equals, regardless of their ranks. So, for instance, a captain could have the say over a general's fate (Eroğul, 1992: 135).

³⁸⁸ "Increasingly, during 1960–61 the army's highest-ranking officers became worried about the interference of the NUC in purely military matters and about the way it undermined the army hierarchy. To prevent any future independent action by junior officers, the army top brass itself founded the Armed Forces Union ..., which interfered in politics repeatedly during 1961 and 1962 with memoranda warning the civilian politicians

place in June 1961, when Cemal Gürsel's attempt to purge Commander of the Turkish Air Forces Lieutenant General İrfan Tansel was thwarted by the top brass, marking the transition of power from the NUC to the AFU (Özdemir, 1995: 206; Ahmad, 2003: 128–129). On 22 February 1962 and 20/21 May 1963, junior officers and cadets, led by Colonel Talât Aydemir, executed two abortive coups, with a view to carry the betrayed Revolution of 27 May through. Following the suppression of the coup attempts, the proponents of the 27 May were purged, and the command hierarchy of the Turkish Armed Forces was reinforced (Özdemir, 1995: 214; Ahmad, 2008: 241).^{389, 390}

On 13 January 1961, the ban upon political party activities was lifted, and the date was 15 October 1961, for the general elections. Furthermore, new parties now being allowed to register, the Justice Party [*Adalet Partisi*—AP], and the New Turkey Party [*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*—YTP] were founded on the right, to claim the legacy and channel the votes of the defunct DP (Altunışık and Tür, 2005: 33; Zürcher, 2007: 245). Founded on 11 February 1961, the Justice Party had the blessing of the military, for its leader, retired

not to return to the politics of before 27 May. They did this in order to keep the initiative and forestall independent action by radical officers who opposed any return to civilian politics.” (Zürcher, 2007: 244)

³⁸⁹ The top brass' restoration of its power implied that any future military interventions would be executed within the command hierarchy. See, on this point, and the case of Talât Aydemir, Eroğul (1992: 142). Note that the military intervention of 12 March 1971 followed the aborted coup of 9 March 1971, and largely completed the consolidation of the command hierarchy.

³⁹⁰ The culminating point of the purges was the liquidation of the Left-oriented sect of officers, whose coup attempt on 9 March 1971 was thwarted by the Right-oriented top brass, known as the 'Extended Council of Command' [*Genişletilmiş Komuta Konseyi*]. Özdemir (1995: 214) argues that the military intervention of 12 March 1971 was as much against the opposition within as the Government. On the other hand, the junta leaders of the military intervention of 12 September 1980 were, from the very outset, very emphatic on keeping to the principle of command hierarchy.

General Ragıp Gümüşpala, former Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces was the coup leaders' insurance against a possible comeback and revanche of the DP forces, and the ex-Democrats' insurance against military pressure (Ahmad, 2008: 243)³⁹¹ On the left, the Worker's Party of Turkey [*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*—TİP] which was clearly out of the Kemalist mould and whose driving force was the publicist, lawyer and former university teacher Mehmet Ali Aybar, was founded on 13 February 1961 by 12 trade unionists (Zürcher, 2007: 246) Of the above, the Justice Party, which eventually came to government in 1965, was ambivalent towards the new constitution, critiquing the 'excessive' powers given to the administrative and judiciary bureaucracy. Thus, they basically argued that the constitution would create serious problems of political governability, and demanded a stronger executive. Apparently, they were also disturbed by the extensive social rights it granted to the workers and the populace, as well as by its other left-leaning aspects (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 17).

The new constitution was put on referendum, on 9 July 1961, only to be declined by roughly 38 % of those casting votes, whilst another 17 % abstained from voting—a clear setback for the military. This probably indicated that people were still suspicious to the military and feared the coming back of the mono-party order, and the outright rejection of the

³⁹¹ At the time of the military coup, Gümüşpala was the Commander of the Third Army. He threatened the MBK leaders that he would march to Ankara with his Army, unless a superior of his stepped in to assume the command of the Turkish Armed Forces. The coup leaders pointed to Cemal Gürsel, and shortly thereafter, Gümüşpala took the post of the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, now vacated from Gürsel, but then was retired on 2 August 1960, as a part of the purging of some 5 thousand officers. Gümüşpala's presidency of the Justice Party gave comfort to the coup leaders, just like Celal Bayar's leadership of the emergent DP movement, in the late 1950s. See, Eroğul (1992: 138).

constitution in the eleven, strongly pro-DP Western coastal cities demonstrated that Menderes still held significant influence (Ahmad, 2003: 129; Zürcher, 2007: 246). On 17 September 1961, just another eight weeks to go to the general elections, Menderes was executed, under the pressure of the Armed Forces Union, with a view to scare ex-DP cadres and voters, and arguably, to dispel the popular belief in his immortality following the plane accident of 17 February 1959, on his way to the London Conference (Eroğul, 1992: 138-139). In the general elections of 15 October 1961, the two heirs of the DP, Justice Party and the New Turkey Party, won 48.5 % of the total votes (34.8 % and 13.7 %, respectively)—and even higher, if one counts the 13.4 % of the conservative *Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* — CKMP [Republican Party of Peasants and the Nation] compared to the 36.7 % of İnönü's CHP. Election results were taken to be a tribute to Menderes, even a referendum against 27 May, as were they cause for great dismay on the part of the military as well as CHP. As there could be no question of letting a neo-DP coalition come to power, President Cemal Gürsel asked İnönü to found the government, which led to the coalition of CHP and its reluctant partner, AP (10 November 1961–30 May 1962) was a partnership between the RPP and a reluctant JP (Özdemir, 1995: 207; Zürcher, 2007: 246; Ahmad, 2008: 242).³⁹² Under the constant threats and prodding from the Armed Forces Union, this first coalition could only last about six months, and collapsed because of the delicate issue of an amnesty for the former DP cadres, and the works towards a planned economy, eagerly

³⁹² According to Eroğul (1992: 141), the military leaders' actual purpose was thus to force the two sides of a near civil war to cooperation and conciliation.

supported by CHP, intelligentsia, and the soldiers, but bitterly opposed by AP (Özdemir, 1995: 208, 210; Zürcher, 2007: 249; Ahmad, 2008: 242). Thus, in May 1962, AP rejected a proposed law it deemed insufficient to reduce the sentences of the imprisoned DP cadres, and the feud was refuelled, whereupon, İnönü formed a new government, now with the smaller two parties, YTP and CKMP plus the independents—and that, after considerable bullying by the military (Zürcher, 2007: 249). However, as its partners very badly stumbled in the local elections of 17 November 1963, putting AP well ahead of CHP (45.9 %, and 36.2 %, respectively), İnönü was forced to resignation, as CHP was now entirely isolated, given that the results had clearly demonstrated that collaboration with İnönü was, for the junior right, the surest way to hell. Furthermore, after the local elections, AP became the most popular party in the country, now patiently counting down for its own, single rule.³⁹³ See, Ahmad (2008: 242). Now, President Gürsel asked Gümüşpala to found the government, a significant move indeed, which indicated that the military now regarded AP as no threat, and Gümüşpala needed not the tutelage of İnönü. Yet, as Gümüşpala failed to strike a deal, İnönü was once more charged with forming a government. Accordingly, on 25 December 1963, the third İnönü coalition, now a minority one, in the accompaniment of the independents, took Office. On the other hand, YTP gave its support from without and its vote of confidence on 3 January 1964, arguing that the prevention of a likely government crisis was its national duty, given the outbreak of violence in

³⁹³ “There were many frictions and the worst was the proposal, sponsored by İnönü as part of the reforms demanded by the constitution, for a land tax.” (Zürcher, 1997: 249)

Cyprus, and the threat of war with Cyprus (Eroğul, 1992: 143; Özdemir, 1995: 210; Zürcher, 1997: 249). Despite its patent weakness, the third İnönü government was let to survive through 1964, due to the serious international conflict that developed over Cyprus in that year. Yet, despite the preoccupation of the Government with the Cyprus crisis, the opposition gave it no quarter, and in early 1965, when the crisis had largely passed, AP moved to bring CHP down. So, on 13 February 1965, İnönü was finally forced to resign, when he failed to get his budget past. As a matter of fact, Süleyman Demirel, who had now replaced Gümüşpala on 29 November 1964, upon the latter's passing away on 6 June 1964, had simply waited for the most opportune moment to secure his position both inside AP, and with the military (Eroğul, 1992: 144; Zürcher, 1997: 249; Ahmad, 2008: 242–243). A caretaker government under AP's control, and headed by Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, former diplomat and independent deputy, managed the affairs until the upcoming parliamentary elections of 10 October 1965, which AP swept, by getting a majority of the votes cast (52.9 %), and CHP going down to 28.7 % (Eroğul, 1992: 144–145; Zürcher, 1997: 249–250).

Looking at Turkey's economic policies after 27 May 1960, one can identify two key elements, namely, the introduction of comprehensive economic planning, and the continuing attempts at economic stabilisation. Also, it is important to note that the late 1950's and early 1960s were the heyday of massive United States involvement in Third World development, and of modernisation theory.

- 1) the introduction of comprehensive economic planning, and;
- 2) continuing attempts at economic stabilisation.

In the second half of the 1950s, DP came under attack by opposition and critics who condemned it for planless and wasteful economic policies and development, drawing upon foreign resources. As a matter of fact, the views of opposition and critics closely resonated with the policy advices of foreign missions as well as the contemporaneous US politics of development.

According to Korkut Boratav, the years 1946–1953 are a (sub-)period of attempt at a different type of articulation with the world economy. Accompanying the big post-war devaluation of 7 September 1947, were liberalisation measures oriented towards integration into the world economy, and quest for foreign aid. At its 1947 party congress, CHP quitted its protectionist–statist understanding of industrialisation, by reinterpreting the statist principle as, essentially assistance to the private sector (Boratav, 1995: 314). As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the financing of development by means of foreign savings, i.e. foreign borrowing was a key idea. US thinking then tended to regard planning as a policy that intrinsically characterised ‘collectivist’ economies (Sönmez, 2010: 496). In the late 1950s, sympathy for economic development, elimination of irrational state intervention into economic activities, and development based upon US foreign aid were the *leitmotifs* of DP, as a dynamic new opposition party (Sönmez, 2010: 496). As a matter of fact, foreign trade deficits reached a cumulative \$ 500,000,000 US during the

period of 1946–1953, which were closed by US aid and foreign credits (Boratav, 1995: 316). On the other hand, Boratav sees the sub-period of 1954–1961 as one of increasing bottlenecks, and re-adjustment, when the post-war conjuncture of economic expansion and the use of liberal foreign trade policies had largely exhausted themselves, economy was subject to fluctuations in relative stagnancy, foreign demand for exports fell, and imports were restricted due to the constraints on foreign resources. Sönmez (2010: 496–497) lists the post-1954 bottlenecks as, problems in exports, in further increasing arable lands, excessive public spending, trade deficit, overvaluation of the TL, and inflation. As a matter of fact, after 1954, standard IMF type of stabilisation measure recipes were constantly advised, particularly, through the IMF channel, and by the visiting economic missions. By 1959, shortages had become particularly acute, giving rise to queuing and emergent black markets. See, Tunçay (1995: 183, 185–186). However, instead of the standard, deflationary–devaluationary measures of stabilisation, and trade liberalisation, DP tried to pursue price and market controls, and inflationary–expansionary populist policies backed by import substitutionist investment oriented towards the peasantry. Overall, this implied a double policy of (i) a controlled foreign trade regime, and; (ii) import substitution, largely led by public investments, and oriented towards the removing of the constraints faced in the imports of consumer goods (Boratav, 1995: 319, 321). As of early 1958, Turkey’s foreign debts were over 10 % of the GNP, and overdue debts over 2 % of the GNP, nearly equal to her total exports. By the summer of 1958, foreign exchange

reserves had dried up, causing all imports to come to a stall. And foreign economic aid nearly stopped, since all credit sources were tied to IMF approval. In May, the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) decided to stop all aid, unless Turkey accepted the IMF programme, which compelled the Menderes Government to finally take the IMF–World Bank factor more seriously (Schick and Tonak, 1992: 365). Thus, on 3 August 1958, a government decree declared that the foreign trade regime would be revised, and on 4 August 1958, the US Government, the IMF, and the OEEC commonly announced a \$ 359 million US stabilisation loan program for Turkey, of which the United States provided 234 million,³⁹⁴ and \$ 422 million US–worth of foreign debt was rescheduled (Schick and Tonak, 1992: 365). As part of the deal, the Menderes Government devaluated the exchange rate (TL/\$) from 2.80 to 9, partly loosened the strict controls on foreign trade, raised the prices of the goods produced by the public economic enterprises [*Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri*—KİT], and committed itself to reduce the budget deficit (Boratav, 1995: 322). Until the summer of 1959, the DP Government rather strictly pursued the 1958 programme, but then returned to its customary inflationary policies, with the rate of growth of money supply higher than the target rate (Schick and Tonak, 1992: 366; Sönmez, 2010: 500). Most of the budget and KİT deficits were being met by Central Bank resources. Hence, in January 1960, the Government proposed a budget that would significantly rise public spending. As of mid-1960, there were 4965 medium- and large-scale

³⁹⁴ See, FRUS, 1958–60, Vol. X, Part 1: 16 - Cyprus, (<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus58-60x1/16cyprus3.html>, 11.19.2012).

projects, but no domestic or foreign financing for the most. Thus, after 27 May 1960, the ‘Revolution Government’ [*Devrim Hükümeti*] found itself with very little room for manoeuvre (Sönmez, 2000: 500).

At a first glance, the economic policy choices of Menderes looked like a classic case of statist development, given the weight of the public sector, though it becomes apparent, upon closer inspection, that they represented a curious instance of the ‘mixed economy’, considering the considerable state assistance to the private sector (Boratav, 1995: 320). However, this never went so far as the acceptance of economic planning: Government never conceded the presence of inflation, and never felt the need of planning (Boratav, 1995: 320). As a matter of fact, the introductory text of the 1959 Budget openly stated that the adoption of new measures never meant that the Government had been practising economic ‘planning’ (Sönmez, 2002: 497). But this was a little anachronistic now, given that the United States and other international circles had stopped seeing planning as a sort of pervertedness. As a matter of fact, from the end of the Second World War until about 1958, the US had restrained herself from sanctioning special deals and creating special agencies for the economic problems of the Third World. However, “... [t]he rising incidence of revolutionary activity in Latin America reinforce the Marshall Plan thesis that communism fed on poverty and that massive infusions of capital could affect the proper cure.” Accordingly, by 1958, the US “... policies toward the third world began to show striking similarities to our earlier policy toward Europe.” (Benjamin, 1973: 247) Therefore, as of the late 1950s, and early 1960s, the United

States had taken a strong stand in advocating development planning in Third World countries. It is important to note that economic development in the Third World had been stimulated by using the leverage of loans and grants. They, Western countries, whether or not they accepted the planning principle for their own economies, they advocated it in recipient countries, and often tied the promise of economic aid to the conditionality of the formulation of plans. (Waterston, 1969: 36) “In his State of the Union Address to the Congress of January 30, 1961, the late President Kennedy proposed that all United States foreign aid be extended on the basis of ‘orderly planning for national and regional development instead of a piecemeal approach.’” (Waterston, 1969: 36)³⁹⁵ Furthermore, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, modernisation theory in the field of development studies had reached its apogee, as epitomised by the publication of Walt Whitman Rostow’s ‘The Stages of Economic Growth’ (1960).³⁹⁶

Therefore, US pressures upon the Menderes Government for planning were part of a broader policy change, despite the distinct possibility that Menderes had failed to assess that accordingly.³⁹⁷ As a matter of fact, until

³⁹⁵ The “... Latin American policy [of the US] during the 1960s—based on the Alliance for Progress, with its emphasis on economic development, political reform, and social engineering—represents a significant departure from a policy which, in general, has always been a minimalist one.” (Benjamin, 1973: 244) “The Charter of Alliance for Progress, the Program set up in 1961 by 20 nations in the Western Hemisphere as a co-operative effort to improve education, housing, health and economic growth in Latin America, requested Latin American countries to create or strengthen their long-term development planning machinery and facilitate the preparation and execution of long-term plans.” (Waterston, 1969: 36)

³⁹⁶ See, for post-war modernisation theories of economic development, Payne and Phillips (2010: 62–71).

³⁹⁷ As resources were largely exhausted as of 1957, Süleyman Demirel, then Director of State Hydraulic Works, echoes the critics, by advising Menderes that they should make a plan. Menderes retorts the critiques and the advices by arguing that the government budget

1956, international organisations, namely, OEEC, U.S.F.A.O (US Foreign Operations Administration), World Bank missions, confined their advices to rational investment policies, and generally, did not generally advise medium term budgets and investment programmes, which they thought were neither feasible nor desirable (Sönmez, 2010: 497) On the other hand, as of 1958, the year of negotiations and devaluationary measures, this attitude had also changed. Thus, the OECD report on Turkey advised the establishment of a Ministry of Coordination, which would coordinate investments in accordance with a development programme. As a result, two new government agencies were established, namely, the Ministerial Coordination Board, and the Investment Programme Committee [*Envestisman Program Komitesi*]. Here, the underlying idea was the choice of the projects, on the criteria of project-based evaluations, in a way to maximise their contribution to the balance of payments.

Overall, there was, upon the Menderes Government, heavy pressures to force it to adopt economic planning, both internationally and domestically, from the academics, and opposition groups (educated middle classes, public servants, army officers, teachers, as well as CHP) (Sönmez, 2010: 498). On the part of the foreign supporters of economic planning, the uses of planning basically boiled down to the necessity of ensuring the proper use of foreign aid, and coordinating investment projects so as to avoid the risk of serious

is his plan: “‘Sayın Başbakanım, Plan yapmaya mecburuz.’ Bir durdu, şöyle: ‘Yahu, ben ... bütçe dedim, duymadın mı?’ ¶‘Bakın, bu sene bütçe yapıyoruz ve ondan sonraki sene, her sene, kaynaklar giderek azalıyor. Her sene yeni kaynaklar bulmak lazım. Bunu 5-10 seneyi göreceğiz biçimde yapmamız gerek.’” See, Türkcan (2010: 107).

fiscal imbalances. CHP's conception of planning was also a restricted one, essentially limited to the idea of a stable and well-ordered economy (Sönmez, 498–499). The 'Revolution of 1960' [*1960 İhtilâli*] changed all that: The MBK officers were generally very open to the progressive views of academics, the press, bureaucracy and political parties. Thus, radical views of economic planning, seeing it as the comprehensive transformation (modernisation) of economy and society, were represented in the Constituent Assembly, and the various working commissions established by MBK (Sönmez, 2010: 498–499). Only four months after 27 May, on 30 September 1960, the State Planning Organisation [*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*—DPT] was established by Law No. 91.³⁹⁸ The constitutional law of DPT pointed towards a 'comprehensive' mode of planning. In the new constitution, DPT was included under Article 129, and acted as an advisory board with the as its chairman. The five year economic plan was to be prepared by the High Planning Council [*Yüksek Planlama Kurulu*—YPK] with due regard to political and technical problems (Ahmad, 2003: 132). On the other hand, now the dirigiste principle was also a constitutional proviso: "The state was also empowered to force private enterprises to act 'in accordance with the requirements of national economy and with social objectives' (Article 40)." (Özbudun and Gençkaya, 2009: 17). After 1960, economic planning became the bone of contention of ideological struggles, and the measure of whether a given government was progressive or not

³⁹⁸ Incidentally, Ziya Müezzinoğlu, who 'designed' the post-1974 T/C economy and introduced into the T/C socio-economic formation, the Turkish type of planning organisation and KİT's, was the third undersecretary of DPT (30 September 1962–14 July 1964).

(Sönmez, 2010: 500). Efforts to put the economy on a track of expansion by means of planned economic policies started to bear its first fruits in 1962.

On the other hand, the years 1960 and 1961 fully bore the stamp of the stabilisation programme introduced in 1958 (Boratav, 1995: 321). In the successive three years that followed 1958, both the DP Government, and the governments established after 27 May, continued to implement, in its broad outlines, the 1958 stabilisation programme which could be characterised as more inflationary than pro-free trade (Boratav, 1995: 322). After 27 May 1960, the new government's priority was the fiscal issues. The budget was revised, spending was cut down by TL 500 Million, some of the KİT investments were called off, and some cancelled altogether, with a total of TL 1000 Million worth of savings in KİT expenditures (Sönmez, 2010: 501). The Plan was not only comprehensive, but also, mandatory for the public sector, and indicative for the private sector. The MBK Government memo of 29 June 1961 to DPT, called 'Plan Targets and Strategy' [*Plan Hedefleri ve Stratejisi*] asked for a yearly average investment rate of 18 % for the next 18 years (up from 12 %), and rate of growth of 7 %. Financing would come from rising private and public savings, and deficit financing would be banned (Sönmez, 2010, 502–504). Policy tools were the land reform [*Toprak Reformu*], the administrative autonomy of the KİT's, and Kaldorian progressive income tax.³⁹⁹ However, the coalition government

³⁹⁹ Nicholas Kaldor, noted Cambridge economist, served as a consultant for DPT. He wrote the so-called Kaldor Report [*Türk Vergi Sistemi Hakkında Rapor*], known as *Kaldor Raporu*, which was submitted to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, on 20 April 1962. See, Türkcan (2010: 310–312).

did not make the suggested tools a part of the First Five Year Plan of 1963–1967, severing the ties between plan targets and plan tools, completely (Sönmez, 2010: 503–505).

5.3. STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS, POSSIBILITIES, OPTIONS FACED BY, AND THE STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND CHOICES OF THE T/C NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP

The purpose of this section is to classify the facts and the events of the period under study in terms of the strategic constraints, possibilities, options faced by, and the strategic priorities and choices of the T/C nationalist leaders as to the questions of state-building and capital accumulation.

Since the period under study comes to a close with the collapse of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, I start my analysis by identifying the character of the crisis which led to the collapse. On the very surface, the problem was one of constitutional crisis. As a matter of fact, one of the final events which spelt the end of the common state was the thirteen-point memorandum of proposed constitutional amendments Makarios transmitted, on 20 November 1963, to Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the British High Commissioner, and Greek and Turkish Ambassadors. See, Kızılyürek (2009: 20). Proposals to revise the Constitution were flatly rejected by the Turkish Government, on 6 December 1963, on the grounds that they concerned the revision of the Constitution, and thereby, the Zurich and London Agreements, as the basic documents guaranteeing the rights and the

interests of the T/Cs.⁴⁰⁰ Overall, the memorandum proposed the following amendments:

1. The President and the Vice-President's right of final veto would be revoked (Z–Articles 5 and 9; C–Article 50);⁴⁰¹
2. The practice of separate majorities in the House of Representatives for the elections of the G/C President and the T/C Vice President, as well as the enactment of certain laws (concerning, *inter alia*, taxation) would be abolished (Z–Articles 1 and 7; C–Articles 1 and 78);
3. Communal Chambers would be abolished (Z–Article 10; C–Articles 86, 87, 88 and 108);
4. Municipalities (Z–Article 20; C–Article 173.1) and the administration of justice (Z–Article 17; C–Articles 159 and 160) would be unified;
5. Division of Security Forces into Police (commanded by a G/C) and Gendarmerie (commanded by a T/C) would be abolished (Z–Article 13; C–Article 130);

⁴⁰⁰ See, for the Turkish Government *communiqué* of 6 December 1963, Bilge (1987: 376). Apparently, Dr. Küçük did not reply Makarios officially (Copeaux and Copeaux-Mauss, 2005: 41). However, he found the proposed amendments 'of a sweeping nature' going far beyond ensuring the claimed aim of the smooth functioning of the Constitution, that they attacked the very foundations of the common Republic, with the ulterior motive of reducing the T/Cs from political equals to a minority (Reddaway, 1986: 137). The Turkish Ambassador officially transmitted Turkey's response on 16 December, but Makarios rejected to even consider it and transmitted the note back. "*Makarios, Türk Notasını Garip Tarzda İade Etti*" (Milliyet, 18 December 1963).

⁴⁰¹ Above, majuscule C refers to the articles of the Zurich document of 'Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus', and majuscule Z, to those of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Article numbers for the Constitution come, with a few exceptions, from the careful editorial review of the proposals by the Turkish daily *Milliyet*: "*Durum: Makarios Fırsattan Yararlanmak İstiyor*" (Milliyet, 9 December 1963).

6. Numerical strengths of the Security Forces and the Defence Forces would no longer be determined by the Constitution, but, by the Government, by a Law (Z–Article 14; C–Articles 129 and 130.1)
7. Proportions of the employment of G/Cs and T/Cs in public services (70 % and 30 %, respectively) would be modified in accordance with the ratio of the population of the two communities (82 % and 18 %, respectively) (Z–Article 11; C–Article 123);

It is important to note that, the amendments proposed by Makarios concerned, generally, the basic functions of statehood, and sought, specifically, doing away with the dual structure of the state, and thereby, the underlying principle of communal autonomy. And, since the basic functions of statehood were prescribed by the Constitution, the crisis leading to the demise of the common state manifested itself as a constitutional one. As a matter of fact, the short life of the common state was riven all through by controversies over the basic functions of statehood. Oberling (1982: 71–80) sums up the critical controversies as follows:⁴⁰²

1. *The Security Forces Controversy*: The discharge of the T/Cs hired as police auxiliaries during the Emergency, the placement of EOKA cadres with the Police and the Gendarmerie, and generally, the non-observation of the 70/30 ratio;
2. *The Armed Forces Controversy*: The formation of separate G/C

⁴⁰² Pierre Oberling appears to strongly sympathise with the T/C nationalists. Oberling's list of the key controversies is quite accurate. However, the contents of the controversies as he sums up generally reflect the views of the T/C nationalists.

and T/C units, at least at the platoon and company levels, as defended by Dr. Küçük, as opposed a monolithic force, as defended by Makarios, and vetoed by Küçük, as well as the placement of EOKA cadres as officers;

3. *The Public Service Controversy*: The deadlock at the G/C-dominated Public Services Commission, the nonobservation of the 70/30 ratio, on the grounds that there were not enough qualified T/C candidates to fill the 30 % quota;
4. *The Municipalities Controversy*: The rejection by Makarios of the promulgation of the laws concerning separate municipalities, on the grounds that they were states within the state, conducive to *Taksim*; the Turkish Cypriot Chamber's approval, on 29 December 1962, to preserve separate T/C municipalities; the Council of Ministers' decision to abolish all municipalities, on 2 January 1963, declared by the Supreme Constitutional Court as void *ab initio*, on 25 April 1963, with Makarios defying the Court;
5. *The Tax Controversy*: Deadlock over and T/C veto of the tax laws; the T/C claims that part of the Government's tax revenues were unfairly spent to recruit G/C civil servants in excess of the 70 % ratio, and allotted to G/Cs as development aid at the expense of T/Cs; Makarios's claim that T/C veto obstructed the regular functioning of the state; payment of taxes to the

Communal Chambers, instead of the Government, by both communities.⁴⁰³

It is important to note that the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building of the pre-Republic 1950's had encompassed, as subprocesses, the functions above (and others), namely, "... the monopolization of the means of violence, concentration of political power, centralization of administration, quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to ensure capital accumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation, and the institutionalization of centralized budgetary practice." (Arslan, 2012: 132) On the other hand, as Joseph S. Joseph aptly puts it, the very first task before the new polity was also state-building.⁴⁰⁴ Therefore, from the three points above, namely, that:

- (i) The constitutional crisis concerned, generally, the basic elements of statehood, and, specifically, the 'dual' structure of the 'common' state;
- (ii) the T/C nationalist project for state-building also concerned the basic elements of statehood;
- (iii) the very first task of the new polity—the Republic of Cyprus, that is, was state-building,

⁴⁰³ According to John Reddaway, the British Administrative Secretary at Cyprus (1957–1960), basic disagreements over the application of the Constitution concerned the Army, the Police and the Gendarmerie, the public service quotas, and, the municipalities—as the single most important issue. See, Reddaway (1986: 145–147).

⁴⁰⁴ "One of the primary tasks of the first government of the republic was to build the state institutions provided for by the constitution. ... A series of incidents revolving around "basic articles" of the constitution undermined the entire process of state building." (Joseph, 2009: 384)

one can infer the precise character of the crisis which led to the collapse of the common state. In retrospect, the crisis appears to be the consequence of the conflict between the two opposing, G/C and T/C nationalist projects for state-building, which in the process of building a single state, together, collided apropos of the basic functions of statehood. Understanding how the potentiality of conflict gave way to the actuality of collision requires a thorough analysis of the strategic constraints, possibilities, options faced by, and the strategic priorities and choices of the nationalist leaders as to the questions of state-building and capital accumulation. In what follows, I will try doing this for the T/C nationalist leaders.

5.3.1. Priorities of the T/C Leaders post–Zurich

Under the common Republic of Cyprus, and as far as the sub-processes of state-building and capital accumulation (economic development) were concerned, one could discern the presence of two sorts of alternate priorities. Ideally, the first alternative, which I call the ‘priority of politics over economics’, was to follow through the nationalist politics of state-building, under the common state. From the point of view of G/C nationalism, this entailed exclusionary politics, i.e. the marginalisation, politically and economically, and at the very worst, the all-out ethnic cleansing of the T/Cs. From the point of T/C nationalism, the priority of politics entailed the follow-through of separatist politics. Generally, students of Cypriot politics argue that, throughout the short life of the common state, *Taksim* for the T/C leadership, and *Enosis* and/or Grecification for the G/C

leadership continued to be the ulterior motives, or top priorities.⁴⁰⁵ The implication is that, basically, the common Republic of Cyprus was treated by both sides as the interim phase [*geçici merhale*] that would usher into the ultimate goal.⁴⁰⁶ As for the second alternative, which I call the ‘priority of economics over politics’, this entailed the cooperation of the two communities under the common roof of the Republic, in the pursuance of economic growth and prosperity together. Basically, this view was associated with the liberal and pro-Left republicans of the two communities. Whilst the distinction between the two alternate priorities ideally corresponded to the basic political cleavage between nationalists, on the one hand, and liberal and pro-Left pacifists on the other, this did not imply that changes of priority were impossible in the case of specific actors.⁴⁰⁷

The liberal perspective of the priority of the economy was formalised by Stahis S. Panagides, a brilliant UC Berkeley economist, using a Neo-

⁴⁰⁵ Amongst others, Joseph (2009: 388) argues that “[i]n effect, the creation of an independent state was viewed by the two sides as an interim phase for materialization of enosis or partition.”

⁴⁰⁶ As a matter of fact, the nationalists of both sides also blame one another for pursuing ulterior motives, i.e. sticking to the ultimate goal, and causing the collapse of the partnership state based on the principle of goodwill.

⁴⁰⁷ According to Hatzivassiliou (2005: 524), “... the new Republic, the Greek Cypriot community and Archbishop Makarios could follow one of two courses: the ‘long-term’ option of implementing the 1959 agreements as they stood, including the restrictions imposed on the Cypriot state; or the ‘short-term’ option of trying to overthrow these restrictions.” In terms of the terminology I suggest above, the former appears to have given the priority to politics, the latter, to the economy. According to Hatzivassiliou (2005: 528–529), supporters of the short-term option argued that the Zurich–London Agreements were unworkable, because T/Cs were granted excessive rights, and restrictions upon Cypriot independence were insulting, and imposed upon the G/Cs. On the other hand, Greek Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis, as the leading advocate of the long-term option, argued that the Agreements, for all their defects, created a relatively independent state, whose smooth development, with the passing of sufficient time, might enable Greece and G/Cs to convince Turkey about Enosis. In this case, the whole course would rest upon the assumption that Zurich was the definite resolution of the dispute. Furthermore, Karamanlis placed a great deal of emphasis upon the positive effects of economic development. Hatzivassiliou (2005: 531) also argues that, there is strong evidence indicating that, as of early 1959, Makarios was quite agreed with the long-term option.

Classical general equilibrium and welfare economics (and, the economics of discrimination) framework. Panagides's starting point was that integration and unity in Cyprus could only be achieved through the combination of cultural diversity, and loyalty to the common Republic. Thus, deliberate public policy would have to be pursued towards increased economic interaction and interdependence—to be more precise, the dependence of one community upon the other for its own continued existence. As a matter of fact, economic interdependence—in the sense of the 'liberal' policies of the free flow of resources between the two communities—was not only desirable, but also conducive to social stability, for "... a deliberate policy to foster economic integration may render a type of externalities in terms of social benefits pertinent to stability and peaceful coexistence." (Panagides, 1968: 136–137) As a matter of fact, theoretically, it was possible to demonstrate that "... when a minority's share of the total resources of the society becomes proportional to that minority's share in the total population, a situation more conducive to social stability is realized, than if resources are not so distributed ..." (Panagides, 1968: 133).⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, the economic consequences of partition would be disastrous for the minority, and would certainly prove relatively costly to the minority, unless massive economic aid from without is given (Panagides, 1968: 137). Appropriate public policy tools would be a good model, fiscal tools, and public investments.⁴⁰⁹ Under the circumstances of partition, the majority group would be more advantageous, because it would have a more balanced ratio of the factors of production, and would be able to take advantage of scale economies. As a matter of fact, market size and scale economies together

⁴⁰⁸ This holds, assuming (a) similar productivity in the two groups; (b) that there is a positive, linear relationship between resource ownership and income. Public policy would aim, through the use of appropriate policy tools, to minimise the welfare function $W_c = \frac{Y(G)}{Y(T)} - \frac{P(G)}{P(T)}$, where: $Y(G)$ = Greek community income; $Y(T)$ = Turkish community income; $P(G)$ = Greek population; $P(T)$ = Turkish population (Panagides, 1968: 133–134).

⁴⁰⁹ "The incorporation of communal functions into a model will then allow minimization of the inequality coefficient via the use of relevant policy instruments, notably taxation, government expenditure, and investment." (Panagides, 1968: 139)

play a great part in Panagides's case for the re-unification of the Island.⁴¹⁰ It is important to note that, under the circumstances of partition, capital accumulation would be no remedy to the ills of the T/Cs, because they would suffer from the presence of excess capital, due to a combination of small market size and plant indivisibilities.⁴¹¹ Thus, ethnic considerations would "... result in misallocations and non-optimal factor relations which thus force the society to operate below its production possibility frontier. Thus the objective of economic integration is very consistent with economic efficiency and development, to say nothing of the market enlargement aspect and dynamic efficiency considerations." (Panagides, 1968: 141) Furthermore, "... the process of secularization associated with development will in itself contribute to a more pragmatic view of the world more conducive to a stable social equilibrium." (Panagides, 1968: 142)

There are two secret, and oft-cited documents, used to support, by G/C nationalists and the T/C opponents of the T/C nationalist leadership, the claim that the T/C leadership never actually backed off from *Taksim*.⁴¹² The first is the so-called '*Geçici Merhale Planı*' [the Interim Phase Plan], dating

⁴¹⁰ Panagides uses a single Cobb-Douglas type of manufacturing production function with constant returns to scale—i.e., with the same parameters, which reflects the assumption of same potential productivity, for both. Using the actual figures for the endowments of capital and labour of the two communities, Panagides shows that the production of the T/Cs, and the total aggregate production of the two communities would be higher, if there were free movement of labour, due to a more balanced capital/labour ratio for the T/C community, as a consequence of the equalisation of the of the capital/labour ratios of the two communities. In other words, greater allocative efficiency through communal integration in the labour market would increase would reduce the inequality coefficient. (Note that, under the absence of labour mobility, the aggregate capital/ratio of the T/C community is higher than that of the G/C community, indicating the presence of excess capital, due to, possibly, plant indivisibilities. While the problem of plant indivisibility is a serious problem, Panagides's use of manufacturing establishments as units of capital seems rather questionable.) (Panagides, 1968: 139–141)

⁴¹¹ Panagides does seem to have a point here: As a matter of fact, after 1974, the small size of the all-T/C domestic market was pointed at, by many T/C bureaucrats, as the basic cause of the excess capacity problems and the ineffective management of the relatively capital intensive G/C manufacturing factories.

⁴¹² Apparently, G/C security forces, raiding Dr. Küçük's abandoned Office on Christmas Eve, found the two documents at his safe, following the outbreak of armed clashes on 23 December 1963.

from 1962.⁴¹³ According to the document, the T/C nationalist leadership only conditionally consented to the Zurich and London Agreements, on the common understanding, with the Menderes Government, that the Republic was just an interim phase on the way to the ultimate goal [*nihai gaye*] of full independence [*tam istiklâl*], i.e. *Taksim*. Thus, if the T/C leadership were told—apparently, by Turkey—that the Agreements were the final resolution [*nihai bir hâl çaresi*], rather than a temporary phase of the Cyprus issue, they would never consent, and carry on the fight between the two communities until the United Nations was finally compelled to accept *Taksim*.⁴¹⁴ Accordingly, the T/C leadership had agreed, with the Menderes Government, that the temporary phase of the Republic would be used to better prepare for the final goal, to exploit the faults and the gaffes of G/Cs, and, when the right time comes, accuse them of breaching the terms of the Agreements and declare full independence. To this end, the T/Cs would be given, by Turkey, maximum economic and other aid to prepare for, and continue to raise the national cause of ‘Separate Community’ [*ayrı cemaat*] towards the ultimate goal. Furthermore, during the very first contacts with General Cemal Gürsel, consensus had been reached on the self-same principles, with the precept that the Agreements were but a temporary phase being expressly reiterated (An, 2002: 100, 102). Overall, the document of *Geçici Merhale Planı* seems to indicate that, as of 1962, the T/C nationalist

⁴¹³ See Kızılyürek (2009: 17). According to An (2002: 99), this was a TMT report, written, possibly, by Denктаş.

⁴¹⁴ “Zürih ve Londra anlaşmalarını ‘geçici bir merhale’ olarak kabul ettik ve bunun için imzaladık. ‘Geçici bir merhale’ değil de ‘nihai bir hal çaresidir’ denseydi kabul etmez, Cemaatler arası kavgayı bir müddet daha uzatır ve Birleşmiş Milletler’i, ‘olmaz, kabili tatbik değildir’ dedikleri taksim ile karşı karşıya bırakabilirdik.” Quoted by An (2002: 100).

leadership considered *Taksim* as its top priority. Economic development was emphasised as a ‘derived’ priority at best, as the basic instrument to support the separatist politics aiming at the fulfilment of the ultimate goal of *Taksim*. The second document, signed by Dr. Küçük and Denктаş, dates to shortly before the collapse of the common Republic, 14 September 1963. It considered possible economic strategies, under two different scenarios of the unfolding of constitutional crisis, the first being the abrogation, *de jure*, and the second, the *de facto* non-observance of the Constitution by the G/C leadership. In the first case—which was the way things actually turned out, the sole choice available to the T/Cs was to establish a separate republic outside the Zurich Agreements, i.e. *Taksim* (An, 2002: 106–111).

However, the retrospective identification of *Taksim* as the top priority throughout by a document of 1962 may not accurately reflect the true views of the leadership in toto, during, especially, the early days of Zurich and the Republic. Circumstantial evidence suggests the possibility of the leadership having accepted the Zurich Agreement as ‘the’ permanent resolution, and thereby, economic development as a priority in itself. On 11 May 1959, Dr. Küçük, upon arriving on the Island—from Ankara whereto he was called on the occasion of Karamanlis–Averoff visit—spoke to the effect that Zurich and London Agreements represented the final resolution of the Cyprus issue, the economy thus now being the top priority of the T/Cs.⁴¹⁵ As *Nacak*,

⁴¹⁵ “İki devlet ... Kıbrıs meselesi üzerinde tamamen anlaşmış durumdadır. Bizi ilgilendiren, en önemli meseleyi de beraberce görüşmüşler ve cemaatlerin iktisaden kalkınması için müştereken ... harekete geçilmesi için karara varmışlar ve bunu ortak bir bildiriyle bizlere duyurmuşlardır. ... Üç-beş gün sonra açıklayacağımız programla, yine Zürih anlaşmasına

the newspaper of the Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions, noted on 10 July 1959, the cause of Cyprus had been resolved in favour of the T/Cs thanks to the to the arduous work of ‘our leaders and our Turkey’, with the new cause of the T/C community now being economic development.⁴¹⁶ On 18 September 1959, *Nacak* warned against feckless self-seekers who tried to wreck the present situation which was to the benefit of the T/Cs, at a time when the two communities in Cyprus strived to build a common life.⁴¹⁷ Similarly, from the overall tone of the ‘Activities Report of the Turkish Communal Chamber for the Year 1960–1961’ of 15 September 1961, one can infer that the T/C nationalist leadership still considered the Republic as the final solution, and economic development as the top priority.⁴¹⁸ Overall, one can safely assume that the public position of the T/C leaders over the

sadık kalarak, Kıbrıs Türkü için ne gibi refah yolları açılacağını sizlere müjdeleyeceğim.” (Gazioğlu, 2000: 177)

⁴¹⁶ “Kıbrıs davası, liderlerimizin ve Türkiye’imizin azimli çalışmaları sayesinde çok şükür lehimize halledildi. Dava kazanıldı, haklarımız teslim edildi. Halen cemaat olarak bir kalkınma davamız var. Bu güzel adada şerefli bir Türk varlığı halinde gelişmek kararındayız. Bunun için en kısa zamanda kalkınmak lâzım.” Quoted by Keser (2012b: 312).

⁴¹⁷ “Bafta son günlerde bir gizli teşkilat adına faaliyette bulunulduğu, üye kaydedildiği, bu maksat için fotoğraf istenip vesikalar imza ettirildiği ve bu arada da üyelerden para sızdırıldığı haber alınmıştır. Üzerlerinde hiçbir mesuliyet hissi olmayan bu menfaatperestlerin Kıbrıs Türklerinin lehine olan şimdiki durumu baltalamak için giriştikleri bu gayreti takbih ederiz. Kıbrıs’taki cemaatlerin müşterek bir hayat kurmak için uğraştıkları bu zamanda böyle menfi hareketlerle istikbalimizi kirletmeğe çalışanlara karşı uyanık davranılacağına eminiz.” Quoted by Keser (2012b: 309). According to Hikmet Afif Mapolar, noted journalist and a man of belles-lettres, Denктаş wanted to found a fanatic, fascist newspaper. The choice of the word ‘*nacak*’ (short axe) was itself telling. Several of the most horrendous killings by both sides were committed by chopping the victims to death by axes. The motto of the newspaper was ‘One *Nacak* to Each House’ (*Her Eve Bir Nacak*), apparently, with the double implication of a call for both readers and arms (Mapolar, 2002b: 194–195). On the façade, the owner of *Nacak* was Denктаş, whereas it actually belonged to TMT, from which policy instructions came. See the interview with Fuat Veziroğlu by Satan and Şentürk (2012: 107–108). So, it is interesting for such a newspaper to so praisefully speak of the common life of the two communities. Note that the warning of *Nacak* comes shortly after the expulsion from the Island of the Turkish nationalist Celâl Hordan (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 74). More below, on the case of Hordan.

⁴¹⁸ See for ‘*Türk Cemaat Meclisinin 1960–1961 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*’ read by Denктаş at the first session of the second parliamentary year of the Turkish Communal Chamber Akkurt (1998: 275–315). More on this important document, later.

priorities of the nationalist movement through the early times of the Republic was, at best, one of ambivalence. One must also bear in mind that emphasis on economic development was well in accord with Turkey's resolve to honour the Zurich and London Agreements.

5.3.2. Strategic Constraints and Possibilities Faced by the T/C Leadership

Apropos of the questions of state-building and capital accumulation, following the Agreements of Zurich and London of February 1959, the T/C leadership faced combinations of the elements of a set of internally and externally, historico-geographically and conjuncturally given political and economic constraints. Note that, the polity of the common Republic as the immediate setting for the policies of the T/C leadership was based on the conditions and the state structure set by the 'The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus' signed at Zurich, and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, I begin by looking at the constraints signified by the very Republic of Cyprus.

5.3.2.1. The Polity of the Republic of Cyprus as a Set of Externally, Conjuncturally Given Political and Economic Constraints and Possibilities

As noted before, in Section 3.1 above, state-building comprises, as sub-processes, the constitution of monopoly on violence, concentration of political power, centralisation of administration, quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to accelerate capital accumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation, and

institutionalisation of centralised budgetary practice. Accordingly, it is important to see how the polity conceived at Zurich distributed power resources required for state-building and capital accumulation. Note that the Zurich and London Agreements, and thereby the Constitution itself, represented, *par excellence*, the balance of power amongst Greece, Turkey, Britain, and the United States, at a given conjuncture.⁴¹⁹ As such, they defined some of the basic, externally and conjuncturally given political and economic constraints upon the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building and capital accumulation.

A. Constraint on the Monopolisation of Violence:

The major milestone, amongst the T/Cs, towards the constitution of the monopoly on violence was the founding of TMT. In many ways, violence seems to be the *sine qua non* of the process of state-building as well as capital accumulation: It was used to liquidate political contestants and concentrate power; in the quest for territory, by means of forced, demographic and geographical separation; for

⁴¹⁹ Speaking of the future status and the constitutional history of Cyprus, Arthur Creech Jones, subsequent Secretary of State for the Colonies, noted, in 1945, the intrinsic conflict between the fundamental rights of the Cypriots and the strategic interests of the Empire, and the consequent necessity of reconciling the two: “... *L’histoire constitutionnelle de Malte, de Gibraltar et de Chypre est un exemple des difficultés que l’on rencontre lorsqu’il s’agit de décider quelles limites imposer aux peuples mûrs pour l’autodétermination, quand les necessities stratégiques de l’Empire commandent notre conduit. ... [I]l faut sans aucun doute faire un sérieux effort pour réconcilier ces facteurs...*” Quoted by Crawshaw (1964b: 217–218). Besides, the situation was further complicated by the fact that there were two communities, rather than one people (Crawshaw, 1964b: 218). The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus tried to reconcile not only the strategic interests of the Empire, but, in varying degrees, those of Greece, Turkey, and the United States as well. Firat (1997: 64) also argues the Constitution itself was the product of the compromise between Britain, Greece and Turkey, externally imposed upon ‘the people of Cyprus’. As such, the Agreements aimed to protect the balance in Eastern Mediterranean, and involved a variety of intrinsic contradictions arising therefrom.

the construction of a captive market and relatively closed circuit of capital—through “From the Turk, to the Turk” campaign, and enforcement of taxation, and; last but not least, to influence the foreign policy decisions of great powers, and of Turkey. Under the Republic, monopoly over the legitimate use of violence was shared by G/Cs and T/Cs (the Forces of the Republic, i.e. the Army, the Police, the Gendarmerie), and, by Greece and Turkey (Greek and Turkish contingents), due to the guarantorship rights. Furthermore, all activity—by implication, violence—tending to promote either union, or partition of the Island was expressly prohibited by the Agreements of Zurich and London.

B. **Constraint on the Concentration of Power:**

The concentration of political power amongst the T/Cs was achieved through the building of a party-front type of organisation consisting of *Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birliği Partisi* (founded 6 November 1949), led by Dr. Küçük, and *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* (founded 3 September 1949) led by Faiz Kaymak, and from October 1947 onwards, by Denктаş.⁴²⁰ This dual structure became well established as of the mid-1950s, and further concentrated political power by being complemented, in the late 1950s, first by the assumption of Turkish-Cypriot control on *Evkaf*, as the organisation of economic

⁴²⁰ See (Manizade, 1975: 240, 243), for the foundation of *Federasyon*, and (Akkurt, 2000: 26), for the foundation of KMTBP. At the *Federasyon* congress of 27 October 1957, Faiz Kaymak, Küçük’s right-hand man once, was replaced by Rauf Raif Denктаş (Akkurt, 2000: 33).

command, and second, by the foundation of TMT, as the organisation of monopolised violence. The T/C elite had developed some proficiency at competitive, representative politics, through the central and local administrative institutions of the British rule.⁴²¹ In the post-war period, the British tried to counter the rise of monolithic, nationalist politics, by means of introducing through constitutional development, a plural, competitive system of representative politics, as the fertile source of a new class of moderate political actors. However, prior to the foundation of the Republic, and particularly, after the foundation of TMT, the structure of T/C politics had become fully monolithic, and intra-elite politics, largely selective, with the leading cadres for the various posts being selected by a narrow circle of leaders, and, in the last instance, by the Special Warfare Department of the Turkish General Staff.⁴²² On the other hand, the politics of the Republic of Cyprus, as

⁴²¹ Thus, Necati (Mısırlıazade) Özkan, a major contestant in the leadership struggle against Fazıl Küçük in the 1940s and early 1950s, won a seat on the Municipal Council of Nicosia, in the municipal elections of 1926, then a seat on the Legislative Council (*Kavanin Meclisi*), in the elections of 1930, when he led the *Millî Cephe* group against the pro-British Sir Mehmet Münir and his *Evkaf* group (Birinci, 2001: 116-120, 139). Obviously, such administrative bodies as the Legislative Council, or the Consultative Council (Meşveret Meclisi)—a non-competitive body, founded after the G/C revolt of 1931, consisting of *ex officio* members—were not, *per se*, organs of ‘responsible’ government. The law on the restitution of *Evkaf* to the Turkish community, dated 22 July 1955, stipulated a two-stage electoral process of firstly, mosque commissions, then from amongst the commission members, the Supreme Council of *Evkaf*, as well as the executive committee. *Federasyon* and KMTP drew up a joint list of candidates for the mosque commissions, which swept the elections of 20 and 22 January 1956, against independent candidates (Akkurt, 2000: 30–32; Gazioğlu, 2000: 153).

⁴²² Thus, General Kemal Yamak, in his memoirs, notes the strong influence the Special Warfare Department had been exerting upon the choice of leadership between Dr. Küçük and Denктаş, ever since the late 1950s. Apparently, after the Zurich and London Agreements, there were doubts, in Ankara, as to whether Dr. Küçük or Denктаş was the proper choice for the post of the vice president. According to the account of Yamak (2006: 156), the views of Colonel Turgut Sunalp’s, his superior at the Private Warfare

envisaged by the Zurich and London Agreements, were based on a representative, parliamentary regime with free elections amongst plural candidates and parties. As it appears, competitive elite politics *à la* Schumpeter of the Republic aimed at counterbalancing the former, autocratic politics of the nationalist leaderships, by the creation of more moderate, party politics. Overall, that the old ways of concentrating power were, in principle, categorically ruled out by the new conditions of competitive politics was now a patent fact known to all parties.⁴²³ To this, one must add that the centralisation, concentration, and institutionalisation of power resources fully in the hands of the T/C nationalist leadership was impossible, also because such resources were now shared with the G/C elite, due to the dual structure of the central state functions, particularly, the sharing of the ministries.⁴²⁴

Department—to the effect that Dr. Küçük as the elder one was the proper choice to act as the official representative, and Denктаş, as the more active one under the shadow, who, when necessary, would come out and speak on behalf of the community, fight and be prepared as the future leader—were effective.

⁴²³ In his defence of Dr. Küçük against his critics in Cyprus and in Turkey, Rıza Burçak argued that, even if the former's alleged disposition towards dictatorship were true, circumstances were less than propitious for this, because, the simple fact that, due to the peculiar structure of the Cypriot state, the institution of free elections could not be infringed by any means was equally known to Küçük as anyone else. "*Bağımsızlık Arifesinde: Bir Kıbrıslı Türk'ün Görüşleri—Dr. Fâzıl Küçük'ün Durumu (2)*", Rıza Burçak, (Milliyet, 12 July 1969). Rıza Burçak was the *nom de plume* of Semih Sait Umar, T/C journalist, and a literary figure.

⁴²⁴ Thus, for instance, Article 46 of the Constitution stipulated that, the Council of Ministers, exercising the executive power was composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers, with "[o]ne of the following Ministries, that is to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance, [being] ... entrusted to a Turkish Minister". According to the Article 2 (b) of the 'Agreed Measures to Prepare for the New Arrangements in Cyprus', a 'Transitional Committee in Cyprus' would be founded "... with responsibility of drawing up plans for adapting and reorganising the Governmental Machinery in Cyprus in preparation for the transfer of authority to the independent Republic of Cyprus." The Committee would consist of the Governor of Cyprus, plus the G/C and T/C leading representatives, and other G/C and T/Cs nominated

C. *Constraint on the Quest for Territory:*

As noted above, in Section 3.1, demands for *Taksim* were expressive of the quest for territory. Forced rupture of everyday relations between G/Cs and T/Cs, demographic and geographical displacements, the establishment of separate institutions, and particularly, Turkish municipalities were concrete steps towards it.⁴²⁵

Such practices towards the quest of territory were now strictly constrained by the Agreements of Zurich and London. As noted above, in Section 3.1, Article 21 of the Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus—the outline constitution agreed upon at Zurich, stipulated that the total or partial union of Cyprus would be excluded (Article 21). Accordingly, Article 185 of the Constitution of Cyprus stipulated that “[t]he territory of the Republic is one and indivisible, and “[t]he integral or partial union of Cyprus with any State or the separatist independence is excluded.” Furthermore, by the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance, which both had constitutional force, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, pledged to ensure the maintenance of the independence, and the territorial integrity of the Republic, and prohibit all activity tending to promote

by the Governor, after consultation with the two leading representatives, in compliance with the 7/3 ratio of Article 5 of the ‘Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus (Ertekün, 1981: 140). Basically, the Transitional Committee which was founded on 5 April 1959, and which started its work on 21 April 1959 was but a transient government. The T/C members of the Transitional Committee were Dr. Fazıl Küçük (the leading representative), Dr. Niyazi Manyera (Minister of Health), Osman Örek (Minister of Defence), and Fazıl Plümer (Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources) (Akkurt, 2000: 93) T/C ministers Manyera, Örek and Plümer kept their posts after the establishment of the Republic. Provisions of power-sharing also applied to the legislative, and the judiciary.

⁴²⁵ According to the Turkish weekly *Akis*, the T/C boycott of common municipalities was the first critical step towards *Taksim*. See, Hasgüler (2005: 96).

either union, or partition of the Island, and; pledged to resist any attack or aggression against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic.

D. ***Constraint on the Construction of a Captive Market and a Closed Circuit of Capital:***

The T/C leadership had, by late 1958, decided “to establish a separate *Çarşı* [market-place], implying, a separate circuit of commercial and productive capital, supported by a captive market for the means of consumption and production, based upon a separate set of exchange relations between importer-wholesalers, retailers, producers, and consumers.” (Arslan, 2012) Such schemes were now tacitly, overtly, and implicitly constrained under the Zurich and London Agreements. As noted above, in paragraph C, and earlier, in Section 3.1, the Republic of Cyprus, hence the T/C leadership and Turkey, amongst others, had pledged to prohibit ‘all’ activity tending to promote the partition of the Island, including, by implication, activities towards economic separation. Furthermore, Article 23 of the Constitution on property explicitly stipulated that ‘all’ citizens had full freedom in terms of property ownership, and thereby, in terms of the relations of exchange—rights of which no deprivation, restriction or limitation could be made.⁴²⁶ Also, by Article 25 on profession and work, and Article 26 on contracts, citizens were

⁴²⁶ “Article 23 [Property]: 1. Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such right. ... 2. No deprivation or restriction or limitation of any such right shall be made except as provided in this Article ...”

given, individually and collectively, freedom of contract, concerning the exchange of labour power, and decisions as to the process of capital accumulation—rights which could only be restricted in public, as opposed to national or communal, interest.⁴²⁷ Thus, in terms of the relations of exchange, circulation of capital, and capital circuit, the Constitution defined a single, trans-communal economic sphere, which could not, by any means, be delineated on ethnic grounds, putting, amongst others, a strict constraint upon such practices as ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’.⁴²⁸ As a matter of fact, one of the basic criticisms levelled by CHP, during the debates of the special session on Zurich and London Agreements of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey [Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi—TBMM] on 4 March 1959, was that the Agreements did not involve any exclusive article about Turkey’s direct economic aid to the T/Cs. As a matter of fact, the kind of aids that Turkey and Greece could provide their respective communities comprised education, culture, sports, and charity, but not economic assistance. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu’s response to this was that Turkey could provide the T/Cs with any

⁴²⁷ “Article 25 [Profession, Work]: 1. Every person has the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business ...” “Article 26 [Contracts]: 1. Every person has the right to enter freely into any contract subject to such conditions, limitations or restrictions as are laid down by the general principles of the law of contract. A law shall provide for the prevention of exploitation by persons who are commanding economic power ...”

⁴²⁸ Speaking of the petering out of ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ campaign, under the common Republic, Kızılyürek (1998: 39) notes that, from the point of view of the T/C ‘upper class’, capital and labour mobility—the so-called ‘three freedoms’ of property ownership, residency, and travel— constitutes, to this day, the single most important issue of the G/C–T/C negotiations.

kind of assistance, that no restrictions were involved (Firat, 1997: 69, 71–72).

E. *‘State within the State’ as a Possibility:*

İsmail Bozkurt, the TMT veteran, commander at the Kophinou [Gr. *Kophinou*; Tr. *Köfünye–Geçitkale*] clashes of 1967, politician and a great man of *lettres*, argues that the state-building process of the T/Cs starts with the Zurich and London Agreements and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, from the point of view of the institutions of state-building, he singles out (a) the Republic itself, and (b) the Turkish Communal Chamber, within the Republic.⁴²⁹ Thus, he points to the fact that, the T/Cs, as the equal founding members of the common state, had reached the stage of statehood, through the organs of the Republic, and the Communal Chamber under the roof the Republic.⁴³⁰ As noted by Fırat (1997: 64), the defining foundations of the Republic involved a number of contradictions: Despite all the emphasis that was put upon her independence, sovereignty, and unity, the fact remained that she was neither, independent, nor sovereign, nor unitary. It was this last point, the non-unitary character of the state structure that the T/C leaders were most emphatic about. Hence, in a T/C report to the

⁴²⁹ It was G/Cs, who questioned the statehood of the Republic of Cyprus, rather than the T/Cs, who were generally happy about the principle of ‘political equality’ it rested upon. Thus, argued that, unless the Constitution was radically amended, the Republic was bound to a lesser state at best, due to its lack of independence, and sovereignty—most emphatically, due to its lack of the right to change its constitution

⁴³⁰ “... Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti ve bu Cumhuriyet’in çatısı altında kurulan Türk Cemaat Meclisi ile, Kıbrıs Türkleri devletleşme aşamasına ulaşmış oldu.” (Bozkurt, 2012: 35).

Turkish government, dated 23 January 1961, they pointed out that the T/C Communal Chamber was the ‘T/C state’ organ of the ‘federal’ Republic of Cyprus, and, that it readily qualified as a state, with its Chamber, its Executive Committee, and its judiciary.⁴³¹

As noted above, the Agreements of Zurich and London no longer permitted the centralisation, concentration, and institutionalisation of power resources fully in the hands of the T/C nationalist leadership, because such resources were now shared with the G/C elite, due to the dual structure of the central state functions, particularly, the sharing of the ministries. However, from the point of view of T/C nationalist drive towards state-building, the duality of the state of the state—in terms of the sharing of the central state powers and of the ministries, as well as that between the local state, and the communal and local (municipal) state, implied, *not only* a constraint, but *also* a possibility. In fact, duality was so strongly inscribed into the state functioning and apparatus that, as Melek Fırat puts it, the preconditions for the development of confidence and a consciousness of Cypriotness were fully frustrated. To be more exact, whilst the functioning of the constitutional system presupposed full confidence, the same very system was so emphatic on the distinctions that it simply left no grounds upon which

⁴³¹ “*Türk Cemaati, Türk Cemaat Meclisini, Federal Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinin Kıbrıs Türk Devlet organı halinde görmektedir. Türk Cemaat Meclisi İdaresi, Meclisi, İcra heyeti ve mahkemeleri ile şeklen devlet vasfını hazır bir idaredir.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 181). More on this important report, later.

confidence—its own presupposition, that is, could thrive (Firat, 1997: 65) Structural distinctions were most patent in the case of separate ministries, the right to veto, separate votes, communal chambers, public services, municipalities, and relationships with the motherlands.

Overall the dual structure had three levels: (i) The central state, where there was G/C–T/C division of labour in terms of the control of ministries; (ii) the communal state—seen by the T/C leadership, as their own ‘central’ state, and; (iii) the local state (municipalities). It is important to note that the last one also involved ‘geographical’ separation, in terms of municipal ‘borders’, which was correctly perceived by both sides as a question of territoriality, *par excellence*. From the point of view, the third level of the local state was a particularly sensitive issue because it implied the territoriality of the T/C society. Going back to the late 1950s, recall that the British had given their consent—and probably their support to the T/C nationalist demand for separate municipalities, despite all the objections of G/Cs. The principle of separate municipalities had then been carried over to, and made part of the Zurich–London Agreements, and of the Constitution. Later in 1959, and under the Transitional Committee, bi-communal commissions (Mixed Municipal Commissions) had been established to work on the

delienation of municipal borders.⁴³² After two and a half years, no agreement had been achieved on the final borders (Crawshaw, 1964a: 339). According to Hatzivassiliou (2005: 524–525), the single most important cause of the disagreement was that “... the Greek Cypriots supported *functional* separation, and the Turkish Cypriots *geographical* separation.”

Overall, as noted above, it is quite clear that the common state had imposed a constraint upon the customary T/C leadership politics of the concentration and centralisation of power exclusively in its hands. On the other hand, the dual structure of the state, in terms of (a) the sharing of the ministries at the level of the central state; (b) separate chambers at the communal level, and (c) separate municipalities at the local level, giving rise to situation of ‘state within the state’ provided the T/C nationalist leadership with an opportunity.

5.3.2.2. Economic Planning (Planned Development) as an Externally, Conjuncturally Given Economic Possibility

The early 1960s, which were the first years of the new Republic of Cyprus, had also witnessed the heyday of development economics and planned development. Historically, the practice of development planning in Cyprus goes back the post-war years of the late 1950s, when the British, in response

⁴³² The T/C side was represented by was Ümit Süleyman Onan, from the House of Representatives, and Şemsi Kâzım, from the Communal Chamber. The G/C side was represented by the mayor of each district. See Fizi Besim’s interview with Ümit Süleyman Onan (Besim, 2011: 49).

to their decolonisation crisis, devised the dual policy of ‘constitutional and economic development’. ‘Constitutional’ development basically meant ‘self-government’ in strictly domestic affairs, as a way of appeasement of the demands for independence, which, in retrospect, has clearly failed in its aim to arrest the decolonisation drive of the Third World revolutionaries and nationalists. As noted above, Cyprus was amongst the so-called small territories (city states, and mostly islands) which, being (a) too strategic to the rest of the Empire, (b) too poor to sustain independent statehood, and (c) too weak for self-defence, would never be allowed to gain their independence. (See above, Section 3.2 ‘Summary Account of the Conjunction of World Politics’.) So, the most they could get was responsible self-government, supported by the benefits of planned economic development, under the guidance of the Colonial Office. Thus, under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945, colonies were required to implement, firstly ten-year, then 5-year economic plans, using partly British aid funds, and partly their own savings. Thus, in Cyprus, in the autumn of 1945, the Colonial Office started the ‘Ten-Year Programme of Development of Cyprus’ for the period of 1946–1955, in the face of the communist threat, and the Enosis agitation. Priority projects had comprised work on irrigation and forestry development, agricultural improvement schemes, anti-malarial and rural health measures and improvement of hospitals, educational development, with emphasis on teachers' training, village improvement schemes, and tourist development.⁴³³ As noted above, in Section 3.2,

⁴³³ Few of the students of Cyprus nationalist politics seem to be fully aware of the key role the British attached to planned economic development as a way of quelling the Enosis

British proposals in Cyprus in the late 1940s and 1950s for constitutional reform were always accompanied by promises of economic development—i.e. promises of the British variant of welfare society as a privileged member of the Commonwealth, in return for political restraint from independence.

As I have argued before, in Section 3.2, in order to be able to put the British riposte to the crumbling of the Empire by means of economic planning, one must look at two contemporaneous dynamics. The first is the *Zeitgeist* of the post-war period, i.e. westernisation and modernisation, and the second, the economic component of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early years of the post-war period, economic planning had come to be identified with westernisation and modernisation. On the other hand, the hegemonic rivalry between the two super powers comprised, as a key element, the rivalry between the alternative models of economic development they advocated. Thus, the British model of economic planning through the Colonial Office must be seen, from a broader perspective, as part of the ex-hegemonic power's (i) response to the *Zeitgeist* of the post-war years; (ii) efforts to remain as a great power—if not a super power, in all its aspects, including the economy, and; (iii) attempts to reform and keep what has been left from her empire.

drive. Paul Nicholas Strong argues is correct when he argues that the newly founded Republic of Cyprus had inherited a legacy of development planning from the British. However, he (1999: 71) also claims that "... development planning, in terms of civilian priorities, only really got underway after independence". To the best of knowledge, this claim is not true, for the simple reason that the British priority projects put the focus upon rural development. This was because they thought that *Enosis* was essentially an urban movement, and that they would be able to keep the peasants away from its influence, by winning them by means of rural development projects.

Overall, it is obvious that the first source of the post-1960 Cypriot economic planning was the British legacy of planned economic development in her colonies. The second, was the US model of development advocated to the newly independent ex-colonies. It is important to note that the British type of development plans were actually programmes—and so were they often called—lists of projects, rather than comprehensive plans based upon formal-mathematical models considering the economy in its macro-economic and inter-industrial dynamics. By the late 1950s, the US reconsidered her old dogmatic attitude towards the use of economic planning in the Third World. As a part of this, the process of economic planning was restructured and reoriented, from project evaluations on a single basis, to comprehensive model-building, and the selection of the projects, not on a single basis, but on the basis of its relationship to model projections. Thus, model-building came to be seen as the key to ensuring the consistency of projects, and the optimality of resource use. After 1958, economic planning became the conditionality of economic aid, and the disciplinary device of state allocation of resources. The basic agents of US-type economic were the various UN organisations, and international financial institutions.

Accordingly, after the founding of the Republic of Cyprus, two actors came together to assist the economic development of the Island. The British, as the former ruler of the Island, extended start-up funds, and the UN assumed the guidance of economic planning. Gradually, the United States stepped in, and took over the responsibility of economic aid from the ex-hegemonic

power. Thus, when the five signers of the London Agreement came together on 16–18 January 1960, the total area of the sovereign British bases was determined to be 120 square miles, and the fiscal aid the British would provide to the Republic, £ 12 million for the subsequent five years (Firat, 1997: 67). A part of this of this British aid to the Republic of Cyprus would directly go to the T/Cs. On the other hand, in 1960, the Cypriot Government followed UN advice by establishing a planning bureau to replace the British colonial bureaucracy, and to plan and co-ordinate economic development (Strong, 1999: 71). The newly founded Republic also invited in foreign experts to assist in the development of a planning strategy that would address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the economy—most notably, its dependence upon a very few exportable products, and the invisibles coming from the foreign troops that were stationed on the Island (Strong, 1999: 72).⁴³⁴ As a matter of fact, the planning process had two broad objectives: (i) To increase productivity, and; (ii) to diversify the economy in a way to reduce its dependence upon a few, insecure external sources (Strong, 1999: 76). On the other hand, the size of the Island was too small to pursue the model of import substituting industrialisation that was adopted elsewhere, by greater ex-colonies. Thus, “... Cyprus, perhaps inadvertently, almost certainly of necessity, defied many fellow ‘non-aligned’ states by following a path of export led growth.” (Strong, 1999: 72) In 1962, the

⁴³⁴ Accordingly, in the autumn of 1960, the ‘U.N. Economic Survey Team’, led by Dr. Willard L. Thorp visited the Island to make a survey of her economy, the outcome of which was the famous ‘Thorp Report’, provided to President Makarios in December 1960, and published on 5 April 1961. Amongst other things, the Report suggested the establishment of a state investment bank to provide long-term and low-interest loans for development projects. Thorp, Willard Long (1961), *Cyprus: Suggestions for a Development Programme*, United Nations, New York.

United States stepped in to assist the economic development of Cyprus, in order to show the governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, that she was backing the Zurich–London Agreements, and the peace between the two communities. Thus, in December 1961, Spyros Achilleos Kyprianou, the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, asked the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for US economic assistance for the external financing of the five-year plan. Cyprus would be able finance £ 30 million by her, but needed another £ 32 million in external assistance, to complete all the projects as planned. The goal was to make the Cypriot economy completely self-sustaining in seven to ten years. The priorities of the Cypriot Government, as expressed by Kyprianou, were water projects—to which much of the development funds would go, plus a new port, the improvement of tourist accomodations, and the modernisation of agriculture.⁴³⁵ As of 1961, the British, as the ex-rulers of Cyprus and the United States shared the view that the major risks on the Island were potential inter-ethnic strife between G/Cs and T/Cs, the communist threat, and economic problems. As they saw the situation, these problems were inter-related (Sonyel, 2003: 28).

Thus, one of the potential opportunities faced by the T/C leadership, under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, was the projects carried out as a part of the planned economic development, aided by the British, the US, and under the technical guidance of the UN. However, the extent to which

⁴³⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Document 253*, (<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v16/d253>, 13 August 2013).

this potential opportunity could be seized by the T/C leadership, and be realised, depended upon other conditions, and constraints.

5.3.2.3. The 27 May Regime as a Conjuncturally Given Set of Political and Economic Constraints and Possibilities

Shortly prior to the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus, the DP Government of Adnan Menderes was toppled by a military coup, on 27 May 1960. From the point of view of the T/C nationalist leaders, the 27 May brought along a number of new developments which posed challenges for their hold on power. In the 1950s, the T/C politics had witnessed the centralisation and concentration of power through the elimination by the winning elite fraction, of alternative contestants to political leadership from within and without, due to the imposition of a monolithic, non-competitive party-front organisation, under the rhetoric of national unity.⁴³⁶ This monolithic, non-competitive political structure was complemented, as an integral constituent of the emergent proto-state and state structures, the monopolisation of the means of violence, under TMT, and its use to institute taxation and support capital accumulation. The same process also witnessed the emergence of the basic elements of T/C economic policies, including, public investments of urban constructions—possibly inspired by and

⁴³⁶ “Overall, these years witnessed the emergence for the first time of the dual organizational structure with the Federation as the culturally- and economically-oriented front, umbrella organization, headed by Faiz Kaymak, then Küçük’s right-hand man, and *Kıbrıs Millî Türk Partisi* as the more properly political vanguard, headed by Küçük himself (KKTC Dışişleri ve Savunma Bakanlığı, 2000, p. 81). This dual structure became well-established as of mid-1950s ... This whole process, corresponded, to the completion of a certain elite coalition between Küçük, university students/graduates, the T/C diaspora in Turkey, its collaboration by Turkish nationalists, and the recognition by the Turkish state of its capacity to represent as well as its political leadership of the T/Cs.” (Arslan, 2012: 124)

modelled upon by the ‘urban transformation’ of İstanbul by Menderes, financed by embryonic forms of taxation, as well as Turkey’s fiscal transfers (Arslan, 2012: 132). On the other hand, the toppling of the DP Government by a military coup brought about number new developments with critical consequences for T/C politics and economy. These were:

(1) The Purge of DP Cadres, The Introduction of a Liberal New Constitution, and the Restoration of Party Politics, as a Constraint (from the Point of View of the T/C Nationalist Leadership) on the Concentration of Power

As noted above, the 27 May movement tried to purge the DP cadres, and DP supporters, from politics as well as state institutions. Although the putschists first proclaimed the non-partisan character of the court, DP leaders and cadres were arrested and tried, there were great purges in the Turkish Armed Forces, and the universities. Furthermore, previous relations of power were largely reversed, as anti-DP, dissident intelligentsia—especially university professors, in the role of mentors and advisors, and CHP cadres rose to prominence. The Constituent Assembly was dominated by CHP cadres, and the ‘Pasha Factor’, the weight of İnönü, that is, was the key to the various balances between the military and politics, as well as inside the military. On the other hand, the constitutional reforms of 27 May led to three developments in the field of politics, that there the key to the balances of the T/C politics, as well. As noted above, CHP’s Manifesto of First Goals was the basis of the new Constitution of 1961, whilst the basic idea underlying the

Manifesto itself was that absolute power bred its corruption, reflecting its authors' critique of DP Government's autocracy. Accordingly, the Constitution of 1961, tried to confine, decentralise and diffuse power, with a view to prevent its excessive concentration in the hands of a 'majoritarian party'. As a consequence,

- a) The recognition of civil liberties and social rights—freedom of thought, expression, association and publication, freedom of work and enterprise—unleashed previously excluded social forces of radical opposition;
- b) the creation of a system of checks and balances, through the provision of counterbalancing state, public institutions and opposition organs—in concrete terms, the introduction of a diarchic parliamentary structure, the autonomisation of universities, of the judiciary, of the public media— theoretically prevented a monolithic structure of politics, reigned by a majoritarian party and 'elected' executive;

Obviously, the change in the balances of power and the reform of the representative democratic institutions of Turkey were bound to impose serious constraints upon the T/C nationalist leaders' politics of power concentration and centralisation supported by non-competitive 'elections' and hierarchic, top-down selections, as well as the threat and actual use of coercive force.

(2) The Transformation of the Turkish General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces into a [Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı] into a Key Actor of Turkish Politics as a Possibility from the Point of View of T/C Leaders

One must also note that the power struggles of the early 1960s amongst the different sectors of Turkish Armed Forces had critical repercussions on the T/C politics. On a first level, there were power struggles inside the NUC, between, very broadly speaking, junior ‘radical’ and senior ‘moderate’ officers. The 27 May movement had greatly disturbed the customary hierarchy of power relationships within the army, formally based upon the regular command chains. On 13 November 1960, the junior radicals were purged from the NUC. Furthermore, the NUC’s power—as the organ of supervision of junior officers with a say over the political, economic *and* military affairs of Turkey—was reduced by the so-called Armed Forces Union, founded by the top brass of generals. The key moments of the shift of power towards the older brass of conservative generals were the two abortive coups of 22 February 1962, and 20/21 May 1963, staged and led by junior officers, to save and put back on track the betrayed Revolution of 27 May through. Following the suppression of the coup attempts, the proponents of the 27 May were purged, and the command hierarchy of the Turkish Armed Forces was reinforced (Özdemir, 1995: 214; Ahmad, 2008: 241). The final episode in the consolidation of the powers of conservative generals was the pre-empted ‘pro-Left’ coup of 9 March 1971. It is important to note that the balance of power within the Turkish Armed Forces during the first few

years of 27 May constituted a serious ‘constraint’, from the point of view of the T/C nationalist leaders. As a matter of fact, the ‘Special Warfare Department’, as the key actor of the relationship between the Turkish state and the T/C nationalist leaders, had been marginalised, dismantled, and largely made dysfunctional. However, as of 1962, and particularly 1963, the two years of crisis and, eventually outbreak of violence in Cyprus, conservative senior officers had retaken charge of the command chains.

(3) The Introduction of Comprehensive Economic Planning as the Organising Principle of Public Investments and Private Capital Accumulation, to be Financed by Increasing Public and Private Savings, as a Constraint/Possibility

Opposition criticisms of the DP Government before 27 May were generally concentrated upon two issues: The lack of respect for democracy and a distinct tendency towards autocracy, and; ‘populist’ economic management, planless investments, so wasteful use of scarce resources, foreign aid, and the ensuing indebtedness. As noted above, on the overall, the DP Government had preferred inflationary–expansionary economic policies to ensure relatively rapid growth that would keep its popular bases, essentially the peasantry, satisfied. On the other hand, Prime Minister Menderes and his economic entourage seem to have missed the turn in the US politics in the late 1950s, towards the conditionality of economic planning as the conditionality of her assistance to the Third World. It is important to note that, ‘discursively’, the criticisms of, particularly, wastefulness above, were deployed to

legitimise and rationalise the 27 May coup, and to legitimise, rationalise and substantiate the post-1960 policies of planned development and economic stabilisation. Furthermore, the principle of planned economy had a hegemonic, ‘interpellating’ character, defining the identities ‘for’ and ‘against’, i.e. separating the ‘progressive’ from the ‘reactionary’. Although several of the radical, socially transformative interpretations of economic planning were soon abandoned, the ideology of economy planning had nonetheless gained ground economic as the only road to modernisation. Therefore, under the circumstances, it seemed no longer possible for the T/C leadership to so freely channel the Turkish monies to ‘planless’ investments of public and private buildings, and factories. From this point of view, economic planning was a clear constraint, at least, upon the old ways of the T/C leaders. On the other hand, it was now the basic policy tool economic development, and, if backed by real resources for investment, a possibility for the T/C economy. On the other hand, it is important to note that Turkey’s post-27 May economic planning openly rejected and even planned to ban deficit financing, giving the priority to increasing public and private savings.

(4) The Introduction and Application of Economic Policies of Stabilisation Aimed to Close Public Deficits, as a Constraint

After 27 May 1960, one of the new government’s basic priorities was the resolution of fiscal crisis. The budget was revised, public spending was cut, and KİT investments were called off or cancelled altogether. On the other hand, deficit financing would be banned and domestic

savings increased. Particularly, 1960 and 1961 were the years of strict austerity. As a matter of fact, as of the first years of the establishment of the common Republic of Cyprus, Turkey had essentially run out of the fiscal means to generously assist the T/C leadership and society. Furthermore, as Strong (1999: 64) points out, there were estimates “... that [in 1960] per capita income in Cyprus was nearly 20 % of US per capita income in the same year, *slightly more than Turkey*.” [my italics—H.A.] That, was a clear constraint, from the point of view of the T/C leadership.

5.3.2.4. Coexistence, Scale, and (T/C) Socio-Economic Formation as Internally and Historico-Geographically Given Constraints

Beyond the conjuncturally determined constraints and possibilities, the T/C leadership’s politics of *Taksim*, the total separation—indeed, total de-linking of the T/C community from its G/C other in terms of all sorts of social bonds, has also faced a number of historically determined constraints, as well. These are, (I) the historical co-existence of the two communities; (II) the problem of small economic scale, as a particularity of small islands—as the British administrators knew only too well, and (III) the issue of the relative, and in this particular case ‘absolute’ economic backwardness of the T/C community. Although the three conditions above were historically (and geographically) determined, they gained some new significance under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus.

(I) *Communal Co-existence as a Constraint*

There exists on both sides of the divide, a strong G/ and T/C rhetoric of a common past, a common identity, and a nostalgia for the peaceful coexistence of old times, associated with the pro-unification liberals, leftists, and the defenders of Cypriotness. The rhetoric in question is clearly reactive, to both the irredentist arguments of the nationalists of both sides, as well as to the loss of the past, peaceful life. On the other hand, it is important to lay bare and put into perspective the true nature of the past relationships between T/Cs and G/Cs. I would argue that, the best way to proceed would be (a) first to identify the different types of societalisation, and; (b) to describe the relationship in question as ‘difference in unity’, apropos of, particularly, the economy. Thus, looking at the different sub-ensembles of social relations, and the different axes of societalisation, in the terms of Bob Jessop, it is possible to classify where ‘separatenesses’ and ‘togethernesses’ were most marked. Thus, Paul Nicholas Strong contends that, “Turkish and Greek–Cypriots did not live together in Cyprus before, 1974, 19963, or even 1955.” Thus, he argues, their mode relationship could be defined as one of ‘co-existence’, at best, rather than ‘integration’: “... [I]n traditional society, they lived separately in mixed communities, geographically and culturally close together and without ‘ethnic’ hostility.” (Strong, 1999: 128) It is important to note that the ‘functional’ division of labour followed a religious and cultural pattern: G/Cs were stone masons, T/Cs

carpenters; G/Cs aspired to commerce, T/Cs to administrative posts; the wealthiest few were G/C merchants, whilst most T/Cs were poor peasants. Furthermore, separation was most marked amongst the more affluent, the best educated, and those of the highest social status (Strong, 2012: 128–130). The important point for the purposes of this thesis is that the two communities contributed to the sustenance of the same economy (Strong, 1999: 130). This view is supported by Stahis Panagides as well: “The nature of the Cyprus society is such ... that between the two communities the major area of possible interaction is the economic sphere of life. While religion, language, ethnic origins, and all that is understood by the word ‘culture’ are heterogeneous for the two groups ..., the market place remains a major place of interaction between the two peoples.” (Panagides, 1968: 137)

On the basis of the above, one can argue that for one to be able to identify separateness–togetherness in terms of the different personal or communal traits of people, or the different spheres of social life, one must be able to first define, theoretically, those different traits, or spheres of social life.⁴³⁷ Thus recall, for instance, that Bob Jessop sees the ‘society’ to be composed of the different instituted orders—autopoietic sub-ensembles/systems of social relations (namely, the market, the political system—comprising but not restricted to the state, the legal system, science, the educational system, religion, and

⁴³⁷ As a matter of fact this would fetch another, interesting question: Why is it that, people are separated in terms of these traits, rather than those, or in terms of these spheres, rather than those?

art.⁴³⁸ Thus, looking at the political system, one can see that there was a significant level of co-working in the colonial bureaucracy. On the other hand, there were distinct patronage networks—on the T/C side of the divide, the notable Sir Münir, his brokers and clients. Therefore, as far as the political system is concerned, it is clear that the key to identifying the points of separateness and togetherness, is the analysis of power relationships. The educational sub-system was very divided, with only few common schools. There were separate religious institutions, and a separated jurisdiction as well. As I see it, the more interesting case was the economy, which was characterised with a high degree of ethnically-based division of labour, in terms of the specific types of economic activities, and the functions fulfilled. On the other hand, one must judge the degree of the integratedness of the economy from the point of view of the circulation and the circuit of capital (productive, commercial, and financial), and, more generally, the circulation of commodities and incomes. Thus, from the point of view of circulation, the Cypriot economy was characterised by ‘difference in unity’, i.e. ethnically based differences in terms of the types of activities and the functions fulfilled, which were yet part of the same circulation of commodities and incomes. Most importantly, “[I]n terms of such vital needs as law and health, T/Cs were fully dependent on G/Cs. T/C town dwellers were dependent on G/C traders

⁴³⁸ Obviously, one might as well adopt a different concept of society and its constituent parts. The point is that one has to adopt one, so that one can identify, theoretically, the points of separateness and togetherness.

for the provision of consumption goods, while T/C peasants were dependent on G/C merchant-usurer capital for both the realization of their produce and the provision of subsistence goods.” (Arslan, 2012: 120–121) Accordingly, the establishment of a circuit and circulation of capital and circuit of income between the T/C peasantry, and the T/C merchants had become one of the basic objectives of T/C nationalists. Overall, the existing, G/C dominated division of labour was, from the point of view of the T/C nationalist leaders, a major constraint which they aimed to change, by “... a capital strategy based on the actuation of a process of rapid capital accumulation, around *Çarşı*, via the institution of a closed, all-Turkish circuit of capital.” (Arslan, 2012: 132–133)

(II) *Scale as a Constraint*

Stahis S. Panagides, the UC Berkeley economist, and one of the most brilliant students of the Cypriot economy, points out that “... boundaries among nations are drawn without regard to economic common sense, but like islands, are the result of historical or geological accident.” (Panagides, 1967: 400) As a matter of fact, the history of the T/C nationalist drive towards state-building has often been replete with the problems of the historico-geographical accident of having had to draw boundaries demarcating less than half the area and the populace of Cyprus. Panagides was a liberal who defended economic integration, on the grounds that in a small island economy the size of Cyprus, divisions based upon non-economic considerations

were detrimental to economic efficiency and growth. Furthermore, economically unjustifiable duplication of production plants caused by economic separation actually harmed the T/Cs the most, for the G/C majority could take advantage of the more balanced availability of resources, and of whatever economies of scale were available (Panagides, 1968: 139–140). However, there is a twist to this analysis, somehow overlooked by Panagides, in terms of the implications of the relationship between scale economies and the ethnically monopolistic market structures.

According to Panagides (1967: 391–392), despite the fact that rising incomes normally enlarge effective demand, the small size of the domestic populace—150 thousand households as of 1967—is bound to be a permanent constraint to the further development of manufacture. Drawing upon other studies for the United States, and “[a]ssuming low income elasticities for some products, and the same potential technology in similar industries ...” Panagides estimates that “... the Cyprus market can sustain efficient plants whenever for the same good an efficient plant in the U.S. is of a size covering .004 – .006 of the U.S. market.” (Panagides, 1967: 393) As far as flour mills are concerned, this analysis implied that an efficient plant could be sustained for every 150 thousand people. Accordingly, given the total population of Cyprus—600 thousand, three to four flour plants could be sustained at optimum scale efficiency. As for as the production of cement is concerned, only one plant could be sustained, and that, only

at 15 % higher cost than the lowest attainable in the United States (Panagides, 1967: 393). Thus, the small size of the market which prevented scale economies in a number of key industries posed a serious constraint upon the industrial development of Cyprus.⁴³⁹ In other industries, such as “... shoes, canned fruits and vegetables, fresh meat packing and metal containers, fresh baked goods, etc.” plant sizes could be efficient at lower levels (Panagides, 1967: 394). Furthermore, in the light of the dependence upon foreign raw materials of the Cypriot economy—characteristic of small island economies, the future direction of manufacturing industry appeared to be in the area of agricultural processing. Food industries are not also hindered by small scale inefficiencies (Panagides, 1967: 399).

Therefore, Panagides generally seems to advise, like many others, a model of ‘light agro-industrialisation’ for Cyprus. On the other hand, where small scale inefficiencies are not a serious hindrance, relatively large numbers of small plants seem to be feasible. However, in others, where the optimum plant size is close or roughly equal to the potential market size, and where dependency upon foreign raw materials could

⁴³⁹ As it turned out, that Panagides had a point was demonstrated by the post-1974 experience of the T/C economy. According to Mustafa İnan, Consultant to the TRNC Ministry of Trade and Industry [*KKTC Ticaret ve Sanayi Bakanlığı Müşaviri*], one of the most serious problems faced by the Turkey and the T/C authorities in the management of the economy was the problem of scale inefficiencies and thus the under-utilisation of plant capacities. İnal argued that the root of the problem was the ‘decrease in demand caused by reduced population’, in other words, the disproportionalities between the scales of the plants left by the fleeing G/Cs, and the small size of the all-T/C population. Thus, in the case of the plants producing plastic goods, domestic demand was less than the efficient scale of production, and there being no other outlet than exports to Turkey, there was a serious problem of idle capacity (İnal, 1989: 63, 71).

somehow be overcome, there would be oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures. Panagides complained: “In recent years when Greek-Turkish antagonism was at a peak, the Turkish community pursued a policy of economic separation from the Greek majority. Such a policy necessitated undue production facilities. For Cyprus Coca-Cola duplication of example, the company was in Greek hands. Therefore the Turks developed their own cola substitute, causing duplication economically unjustifiable, especially for a small country. Similarly for a number of other activities, notably transportation, duplication also took place.” (Panagides, 1968: 140) As I see it, the T/C nationalist leadership took the establishment of large-scale T/C private or public plants in oligopolistic, and particularly, monopolistic markets seriously, since they were critical to capital accumulation and a source of public revenues. Thus, with the establishment of the so-called Transitional Committee in Cyprus, the T/C investments were now subject to the permits granted by G/C dominated state agencies, instead of the British colonial administration. The fact that the Ministry of Trade and Industry was now dominated by the G/C side could pose problems for planned T/Cs investments. Thus, the Ministry was apparently reluctant to issue a permit for the imports of machinery needed for the flour mill that was to be established by the noted T/C merchant Ahmet Raşit Mustafa and Co., which was a 40 thousand liras worth of investment, on the grounds that there was no room for another flour mill as the existing one could satisfy all

domestic demand (Gazıoğlu, 2000a: 73). But this basically meant ‘G/C monopoly’ in the market for flour, and a number of other markets alike. As a matter of fact, it is very likely that the nationalist leaders of both sides aimed to capitalise on the oligopolistic and monopolistic profits (and derived public revenues), caused by the small size of the Island’s economy. As a matter of fact, it would not be farfetched to call the inter-nationalist civil war in Cyprus a monopolistic war.

Overall, dependence upon the various permits issued by the G/C dominated agencies for T/C investments was a very serious constraint, from the point of view of the T/C nationalist leadership.

(III) *Socio-Economic Formation as a Constraint*

A variant of the scale problem was the relatively large scale of the modern state apparatus to be established as a part of the common Republic of Cyprus, in view of the T/C economy’s capacity to produce the necessary surplus to meet its share of the costs. It is important to note three points: (a) The greater part of the T/C economy was based upon ‘pre-capitalist’ small peasant production;⁴⁴⁰ (b) the overall size and the scale of capitalist activity was negligible, and (c) part of the capitalist activity was trade, which was ‘unproductive of surplus value’, dependent upon G/C wholesale trade,

⁴⁴⁰ In using the term ‘pre-capitalist’, I ignore, for the sake of practicality, the Wallerstein type of ‘world-system’ criticism of the notion of the articulation of old and new modes of production.

and thereby, potentially unable to accumulate the capital necessary to convert into productive activity. Furthermore, the ratio of the T/C population to overall population was 18 %, whilst its share in central state employment was 30 %. This basically meant that, the T/C leadership faced a ‘relatively’ bigger problem of the state absorption of surplus product.

Furthermore, not only the T/C economy, but the Cypriot economy as a whole was characterised by serious problems which actually put its capacity to sustain a modern state apparatus in doubt. As of 1960, Cyprus’s per capita income was estimated to be nearly 20 % of US per capita income, albeit slightly more than Turkey. Like other newly independent countries, the Cypriot economy contained serious structural imbalances manifest, amongst other things, in pervasive unemployment, particularly in agriculture. The trouble was doubly that, not only did agriculture—where unemployment was pervasive—have a great weight in the overall economy, but the leading sectors generally comprised ‘unproductive’ activities.⁴⁴¹ To that, one had to add the employment of the urban, relatively more educated youth. Furthermore, “Manufacturing in 1960 did not look much like a modern sector able to productively absorb surplus labour from agriculture. Being essentially dominated by agricultural processing and small scale craft based industries, manufacturing exhibited signs

⁴⁴¹ “Out of the three main sectors of economic activity, primary, secondary and tertiary, only the tertiary sector looked very productive in Cyprus in 1960.” (Strong, 1999: 64) One must note, however, that *not all* tertiary sectors are unproductive.

of low productivity, over 13 % of labour employed in the sector produced 12 % of GDP. ... Only in small, mining, transport, financial and property services industries, was under-employment entirely absent.” (Strong, 1999: 65)

Table 5.1. *The Economy of Cyprus, 1960*

	Composition of Employment by Main Sector (%)	Composition of GDP by Main Sector (%)
Agriculture	44.4	16
Mining and Quarrying	2.5	5
Manufacturing	13.1	12
Construction	9.5	5
Tourism	3.5	2
Trade	7.6	10
Financial, Property and Financial Services	1.1	21
Transport, Storage and Communications	4.5	8
Government Utilities, Community, Social & Personal services	13.8	21

Source: Strong (1999: 65–66).

There were, nonetheless, some external sources of revenue that partly made up for the low productivity— in Marxist terms— of the Cypriot economy. Thus, the “... construction and operation of UK military bases in Cyprus made a contribution equivalent to approximately 90 % of all export earnings in 1960.” (Strong, 1999: 68, n. 14)⁴⁴² Therefore, as of 1960, the Cypriot economy as a whole did not look like it could support a modern state apparatus. Furthermore, the T/C community was substantially worse off, as “[t]he economic position of Turkish-Cypriots in the income distribution of the Republic of Cyprus

⁴⁴² However, one must note, not only the domestic deficit of the economy, caused its lack of the capacity to produce the surplus product necessary to support state absorption, but also the foreign deficit, caused by its dependency upon imports, as a small island economy. Thus, by 1960 “[...] exports represented over 20 % of GNP, whilst imports were twice that value.” (Strong, 1999: 68)

prior to 1963, was generally concentrated in the 30 % lower group, though economic differences were only really obvious in urban areas.” (Strong, 1999: 129–130) Accordingly, one can see, from the data estimated by Panagides, that the T/C community’s share in GDP was, except in the case of transportation, lower than its proportion in the total population (roughly 18 %).

Table 5.2. *Percentage Communal Contributions to GDP: Estimates by Panagides for 1963*

Sector	G/C Contribution (%)	T/C Contribution (%)	Others (%)
Value Added, Agriculture	83.9	12.1	4.0
Value Added, Construction and Dwellings	91.8	6.1	2.1
Value Added, Public Administration and Defence	24.1	1.2	74.7
Value Added, Manufacturing Including Electricity and Gas	81.0	15.0	4.0
Value Added, Mining	84.5	11.5	4.0
Value Added, Services Including Banking, Insurance and Real Estate	81.0	15.0	4.0
Value Added, Transportation, Storage, and Communications	68.3	27.2	4.5

Source: *Panagides (1968: 138)*

Looking at the manufacturing industry, more specifically, that of the establishments employing five persons and over, only a tiny 4.2 % were T/C. Clearly, most of what was classified as T/C manufacturing industry consisted of the traditional workshops that belonged to ‘master artisan–capitalists’, and its capacity to generate the surplus product/value necessary to meet the T/C obligations to the sustenance of their share of the modern state apparatus.

Table 5.3. Manufacturing Industries, 1962, by Ethnic Group

	Establishments Engaging 5 Persons and over (%)	Establishments Engaging 1–4 Persons (%)
<i>Establishments</i>		
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
Greek	88.9	89.0
Turkish	10.8	10.1
Other	0.3	—
<i>Persons Engaged in</i>		
TOTAL Establishments	100.0	100.0
Greek Establishments	91.4	88.7
Turkish Establishments	6.3	11.3
Other Establishments	2.3	—
<i>Gross Output of</i>		
TOTAL Establishments	100.0	100.0
Greek Establishments	92.9	88.7
Turkish Establishments	4.2	11.3
Other Establishments	2.9	—

Source: Panagides (1968: 140) (Original Source: Census of Industrial Production for 1962)

To be able to put the entire picture into perspective, one must consider the various figures in Table 3.4, together. Thus, (1) it is important to note that the T/Cs constituted a relatively more urbanised sector of the overall populace—the legacy of their concentration in the towns as the dominant ethnic group, under the Ottoman administration. However, as noted above, (2) their share in the productive modern–urban industry sector was substantially lower than that of the G/Cs. Similarly, (3) their relative agricultural productivity ($12.4/87.4 = 0.14$) was substantially lower than their relative share in arable land ownership ($20.4/78.3 = 0.26$). Accordingly, (4) their contribution to the state budget in terms of personal and corporate income taxes and direct personal taxes was substantially lower than that of the G/Cs: Thus T/Cs paid only ‘six tenth of one hundredth’ ($1.8/29.7 = 0.06$) of the personal and corporate income taxes paid by G/Cs; and ‘eight tenth of one

hundredth' ($7.6/92.4 = 0.08$) of the direct taxes paid by G/Cs—less than 1 %, in each case. Finally, in terms of their share in state employment, their record was a mixed one, 20.4 % in the case of government officers, and 36.2 % in terms of their share in the security forces—greater, and lower than, respectively, the 30/70 ratio stipulated by the Zurich and London Agreements. It is important to note that the lower ratio was due to the T/C community's lack of sufficient numbers of university graduates to fill the posts; and the greater ratio, due to scores of T/C 'police auxiliaries', hired after 1955, by the British colonial administration to fight EOKA.

Table 5.4. Statistical Data by Ethnic Group: Greeks and Turks on Cyprus

	Absolute Values	(%)		Absolute Values	(%)
<i>Population Distribution</i>					
Urban, 1960 Census			Rural, 1960 Census		
Greeks	141,566	33.6	Greeks:	280,572	66.4
Turks	41,970	40.2	Turks:	62,350	59.8
Others	22,447	82.9	Others:	4,661	17.1
<i>Public Service (Number of Employees)</i>					
Government Officers (Including Ministers and Members of House of Representatives) as of December 31, 1963			Security Forces (Police, Gendarmeries, and Army)		
Greeks	4,041	75.2	Greeks	1,499	63.8
Turks	1,331	24.8	Turks	851	36.2
<i>Agriculture</i>					
Land Holdings (Donums—3.025 donums = 1 acre)			Gross Value Added, Main Agricultural Crops (1963)		
Greeks:	2,502,441	78.3	Greeks:	16,229,991	87.4
Turks:	652,486	20.4	Turks:	2,333,215	12.4
<i>Taxation</i>					
Income Tax, 1958 (Under British)			Total Direct Taxes, Greeks and Turks Only, 1958 (Under British)		
Greeks & Greek Companies	£ 1,320,167	29.7	Greeks	92.4	
Turks & Turkish Companies	£ 82,257	1.8	Turks	7.6	
Armenians & Armenian Companies	£ 46,532	1.0			
Other Communities & Companies	£ 3,002,852	67.5			

Source: *Panagides (1968: 142–144)*

Overall, it is important to note that, the new, ‘independent’ Republic of Cyprus critically involved a process of state-building, i.e. the establishment of the modern state institutions, politics, and the public sphere. According to Mavroyannis (1990: 134), despite serious inter-ethnic problems, during the first three years of the Republic of Cyprus, the foundations of modern statehood and public life had been laid, and a good, internally consistent development plan prepared. On the part of the T/C leadership, this implied the emergence of a large scale bureaucracy, and the problem of the sustenance of its part of the

state and political institutions. Thus, on January 1964, only days after the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence on 23 December 1963, Denктаş reported to the Turkish authorities gave the following figures on the numbers of the T/Cs, employed by the central and the communal state: 1813 public servants, 937 teachers, 748 police officers, 148 Cyprus Army personnel, and 824 workers (Denктаş, 1999: 214).

Thus, one of the biggest problems caused by the establishment of a modern state apparatus was the T/C economy's lack of the capacity to generate the surplus necessary to support the T/C share of the state absorption. There is circumstantial evidence that this problem caused great concern on the part of the T/C leaders. This can be seen from a report that Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denктаş had submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during their Ankara visit in the early days of June 1960. The report pointed out that although the share of the T/Cs in total population was one fourth, their economic share was only one twentieth. Unless they got the economic assistance of Turkey, they would have to beg the G/Cs and be ridiculous. As soon as the Agreements were put in practice, there would be a big budget deficit in education and other communal affairs, which had to be met by the Government.⁴⁴³ Another report, dated 23 January 1961, pointed

⁴⁴³ “Bugünkü günde Rumların bizi hiçe sayması, bizi iktisaden çürütüp eritebileceklerine inanmalarındandır. Nüfus nisbetimiz dörtte bir olmasına rağmen, iktisaden yirmide bir durumunda bulunuyoruz. Her şey için Rumlara el açmak zarureti ile karşı karşıyayız. ... İktisaden yardım görmezsek gülünç ve acınacak duruma düşeceğiz. ... Anlaşmalar tatbik edilmeğe başlar başlamaz Kıbrıs Maarif bütçesinde ve diğer cemaat işlerimizde görülecek

out that the T/C community saw the T/C Communal Chamber (headed by Rauf R. Denктаş) as the ‘T/C state’ organ of the ‘Federal’ Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁴⁴ As a matter of fact, the T/C Communal Chamber readily qualified as a state, with its Chamber, its own Executive Committee, and judiciary.⁴⁴⁵ However, in order to be able to perform like a complete state in the face of any possible political crises, claimed the report, the Chamber needed a substantial amount of fiscal support, for its deficit of operating expenses, as well as investments.⁴⁴⁶

In conclusion, the low capacity of the T/C socio-economic formation to generate the surplus product necessary to sustain its share of the modern state apparatus was a major constraint faced by the T/C

bütçe açığının Türkiye Hükümeti tarafından karşılanması ayrı bir zarurettir.” (An, 2002: 15–16)

⁴⁴⁴ The report in question, namely the ‘Memorandum of the Turkish–Cypriot Community Delegation’ [*Kıbrıs Türk Cemaati Heyetinin Muhtırası*] was submitted by the Delegation of T/C Representatives [*Kıbrıs Türk Parlamento Heyeti*] led by Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu. Apparently, its aim was to bypass the Turkish Ambassador Emin Dırvana and report directly to and impress and change the negative attitude of the pro-27 Mayıs Turkish authorities to, particularly, Rauf R. Denктаş and other TMT cadres, warn about the Turkish authorities directly, representatives of Report submitted n 23 January 1961, the ‘Delegation of Turkish–Cypriot Representatives’, headed by Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu, went to Turkey to submit a report to the Turkish Government, evaluating the current situation in Cyprus.

⁴⁴⁵ It is important to note that, actually, Communal Chamber themselves were directly defined as ‘the executive’—and not only the legislative, by Article 89 1(a)(ii), and 1(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.

⁴⁴⁶ “*Türk Cemaati, Türk Cemaat Meclisini Federal Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinin Kıbrıs Türk Devleti organı olarak görmektedir. Türk Cemaat Meclisi İdaresi, Meclisi, İcra Heyeti ve mahkemeleri ile şeklen devlet vasfını hazır bir idaredir. Ancak müessir bir rol oynayabilmesi, yetkisi dahilindeki konularda görevini başarabilmesi ve muhtemel siyasi bir kriz karşısında Türk Cemaati bakımından tam teşekküllü bir devlet halinde çalışabilmesi için esaslı bir maddi desteğe çok muhtaçtır. Bu hususta da Anavatan Hükümetinin hiçbir fedakarlıktan çekinmeyeceğinden Türk Cemaati emin bulunmaktadır. ... Böyle maddi bir desteğin, Türk Kooperatif Merkez Bankasına ve Türk Cemaat Meclisinin İngiltere Hükümetinden aldığı yardımın bir kısmı ile tesis etmeyi tasarladığı İnkişaf Sandığına esaslı bir para yardımı ve Türk Cemaat Meclisi Bütçesindeki yıllık zaruri açıkların kapatılması halinde olması muvaffık olur.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 181)

nationalist leadership, under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus.

5.4. A PRE-THEORETICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF THE 1960–1963 PERIOD

This sub-section is about a pre-theoretical narrative of the events of the 1960–1963 period, in chronological order. I call it ‘pre-theoretical’, because I basically try to relate the events—not without interpreting them, but without ‘theoretically’ interpreting them.⁴⁴⁷

- *First Reactions to the Zurich and London Agreements of the T/C Leadership — Menderes Government Attempts to Align the T/C Leadership with the New Air of Amity between Greece and Turkey — on the Island, Turkey Calls off the Youth Organisation and Ends the ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ Campaign*

The drastic shift of the DP Government from Taksim to independence was, on the part of the general public, a complete *fait accompli*. As a matter of fact, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey had resolved, on 16 June 1958, that the only acceptable way for Turkey was *Taksim*—the partition of the Island between Turkey and Greece, on the grounds that the T/C and G/C communities were no longer able to live together, and that was the last of the sacrifices Turkey would ever make (Firat, 1997: 69).

⁴⁴⁷ Ever since Edward Hallett Carr wrote his ‘What is History?’ in 1968, amateur historians like myself know only too well that ‘facts’ are selected, ‘interpretatively’. Thus, I would not certainly claim that the events I relate in what follows are objective facts, since they are constructed on the basis of the interpretations of their authors. What I mean is that, I will try not to read and relate them through the lenses of the theory, in the first instance, and I will try to keep them as ‘raw’ as possible, before I subject them to the test of the alternate theories of causality.

It is important to note that the T/C nationalist leadership was excluded from the negotiations from the high level negotiations between Turkey and Greece. Thus, according to the 3 January 1959 issue of *Akis*,⁴⁴⁸ the Menderes Government now blocked the *Taksim* meetings it had so actively supported the last summer, controlled the *pro-Taksim* activities of student associations, and Dr. Küçük and Denктаş would not say a word about *Taksim* (Hasgüler, 2005: 116). The 1 September 1959 issue of *Akis* reported Denктаş's unexpected visit to Turkey, upon the sudden invitation by the Government, to make him 'correct' his excessive [*müfrit*] views. According to *Akis*, he had been asked not to speak to journalists (Hasgüler, 2005: 148–149). Furthermore, in Cyprus, the T/Cs had been prevented from holding their customarily jubilant celebrations of 30 August, on the strict orders of Ambassador Vecdi Türel, who acting like the 'Governor' of Cyprus surtly warns the T/Cs to make that day the start of amity between Turkey and Greece. *Akis* also reports that, after Denктаş, Dr. Fazıl Küçük also gets invited to Turkey to get 'aligned' (Hasgüler, 2005: 159). According to the 8 September 1959 issue of *Akis*, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis, Greek Prime Minister complaints to Menderes of some T/C circles on the Island that are not keeping to this 'new air of amity'. Apparently, the first part of the complaint concerned the activities of Celâl Hordan, the nationalist student leader who, sent to the Island to build a youth organisation to be used against the G/Cs, had gone too far. Turkey calls back Hordan. The second

⁴⁴⁸ Published from mid-1954 through the end of 1967, *Akis* had a generally pro-CHP stand. Its chief editor was Metin Toker. In April 1960, it was closed by the DP Government, and its directors were arrested. *Akis* was also supportive of the 27 May movement.

part of the complaint concerned the T/C boycott of the G/C goods, backed by public beatings of the disobedients (Hasgüler, 2005: 151). Upon this, Nihat Erim, getting his orders from Ankara sets out to break the boycott, goes to the Ledra Street, and shops from the G/C stores. According to *Akis*, this causes a great uproar on the Island (Hasgüler, 2005: 151–152). According to the 15 September 1959 issue of *Akis*, there were widespread rumours on the Island that Dr. Küçük and Denктаş were told that, whether T/Cs like it or not, the Constitution would be enacted (Hasgüler, 2005: 153). Thus, the order they had received from Menderes that they would now be friends with the G/Cs had left the T/C leaders on the horns of a dilemma: Either they would obey Ankara and fall into contradiction with the public opinion on the Island, or they would heed to the wishes of the T/C people and fall out of Ankara's favor. According to *Akis*, it could be possible to call the T/C leaders to Ankara and put them into line with the ways of Menderes Government, but this would not put away the dilemmas created by past policies (Hasgüler, 2005: 154). On the other hand, the 3 February 1960 issue of *Akis* reported how Dr. Küçük had avoided journalists' questions about the Second London Conference, upon the instructions of Menderes Government authorities that he should not comment on the disagreements between the G/Cs–Greeks and the British, that he should even support the G/C side, and the theses of Makarios (Hasgüler, 2005: 161, 164–5). Finally, according to the 6 March 1959 issue of *Akis*, addressing to the delegates of a certain congress, Dr. Küçük told some 650 delegates that they simply obeyed the wishes of the Motherland, thus putting the burden squarely upon the

shoulders of Turkey's leaders (Hasgüler, 2005: 132). In a letter of farewell, dated 4 October 1960, to Rıza Vuruşkan, the first and founding commander of TMT, now relieved of his duty by the 27 May cadres, Denктаş agreed with Vuruşkan that, despite the foundation of the Republic, the dangers facing the T/C community had not been lessened, but aggravated. See Denктаş (2000: 163–5), and particularly pp. 163–164 for Vuruşkan's views of the situation.

Overall, students and historians of Cyprus agree with the account of the events as given by the pro-CHP *Akis*. Thus, historian Ahmet C. Gazioğlu points out that the Turkey's expectations having been fully met by the Agreements, that T/C leaders were constantly warned of Turkey's determination to honour her commitments; that they should not heed to G/C excesses; that Turkey would be there, as Guarantor Country, to protect the T/Cs; that G/Cs could not violate the Constitution, and destroy this Republic. See the interview with Ahmet C. Gazioğlu by Satan and Şentürk (2012: 43). On the other hand, Kızılyürek (1988: 22) argues that the 1960 state was based upon the 'suppression' and the 'freezing', and not the 'elimination' and 'transcendence' of the contradictions between the upper classes of the two sides. The G/C and T/C upper classes were silenced through intensive pressures, and in the late 1950s, it was the external factor which had determined the final outcome. Yet, although the external was temporarily able to suppress the internal factor, the latter had only been silenced, and not, exterminated. Thus, it was only in 1964, that the internal factor came to fore, and given that the external pressures were relatively

eased, and relatively, the internal contradictions started to work autonomously. As a consequence, the interest and power conflicts of G/C and T/C upper classes broke out into open clashes (Kızılyürek, 1988: 37).

Looking now at the side of the G/C leadership, Kızılyürek argues that the Zurich and London Agreements created a new paradox. Before 1960, the G/Cs did not regard the T/Cs as a major threat or as their ‘national enemy’. However, the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus changed all that. Now, the G/Cs came to regard the T/Cs as that community that had obstructed *Enosis*, deprived the majority of its right to self-determination, and risen from being a minority to the equal status of partnership in the state. And, this is exactly when, true feelings of enmity towards the T/Cs really arose (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 114).

In his interview with Kızılyürek, Glafkos Clerides makes some critical remarks about the reactions to the Agreements of the G/C leadership. Thus, the failure of the EOKA struggle of 1955–1959 had caused serious disappointment amongst the G/Cs. As a matter of fact, G/C people were quite unprepared for the proposal of independence, for the struggle was for *Enosis*, i.e. union with the Motherland, and not independence—which, in those days, was equated to traitorship. To that, the political equality proposed by the Constitution between the two communities added feelings of injustice, because their right to self-determination had been obstructed, and the T/C minority had been given excessive rights. Furthermore, Makarios himself disbelieved the Agreements, and upon his return to the

Island from London, delivered his famous speech ‘*Nenikikamen*’ [we have won],⁴⁴⁹ in which he claimed that the Agreements were just an outpost towards the completion of ‘our’ national destiny. Thus, this showed that he intended to gradually modify and change the Agreements. Be that as it may, Clerides nonetheless believes that all such problems could have been overcome, had the leaders of the two communities cooperated more closely. Not enough had been done, to do away with the feelings of disappointment, and replace them with others. Although Clerides holds the leaders of both sides responsible for the final outcome, he tends to place the greater part of the blame upon the shoulders of G/C leaders. This is because the G/C community was the bigger one, and had to tell the smaller community, “Let’s get together and cooperate.” (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 88–89, 115) On the other hand, the relationship between the G/C leadership and the Greek governments was pretty comparable to that between the T/C leadership and the Menderes and the subsequent 27 May governments. Thus, As Kızılyürek reminds to Clerides, before 1964, the coming of Georgios Papandreou to the power, no Greek government had expressed any desire for the amendment of the Constitution of 1960—so soon after its introduction (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 119) On the other hand, the G/C kept telling its followers, that the plans of G/C side were always being thwarted by Greece, and that Makarios was under constant pressure to give his consent to things he absolutely regarded as unacceptable. And, this state of affairs basically continued until the junta’s seizure of power in 1967 (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 119–120). Clerides

⁴⁴⁹ *Nenikikamen* or *nenikakamen* (We are victorious) was the cry of Pheidippides, the messenger, as he reached Athens, running all the way from Marathon.

agrees by adding that, never during his hold of the Office (4 November 1961–17 June 1963), had Konstantinos G. Karamanlis indicated any desire to amend the Constitution; thus, only after Karamanlis resigned, due to the widening of his differences with the King, that Papandreou found enough room for manoeuvring (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 122).

Finally, one must note that, there were apparently some differences amongst the T/C leaders and political cadres towards the Zurich–London Agreements. Dr. Fazıl Küçük has generally been portrayed as the moderate one, and Denктаş, the pro–Taksim radical, or extremist. Thus, in his report to the Foreign Office, dated 19 November 1960, Sir Arthur Williams Clark, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, noted “... that the position of Dr. Küçük was not so safe, criticised by his opponents for not being able to safeguard the rights of the T/C community, and for not being able to secure tangible benefits.” (Sonyel, 2003: 19–20) The issue here, was about the realisation of those provisions of the Constitution that favoured the T/Cs. Furthermore, Clark claimed that Denктаş, Burhan Nalbantoğlu, and Orhan Müderrisoğlu, as the ambitious rivals of Dr. Küçük, were more than ready, if only they got a chance. Reportedly, TMT was also against the leadership of Dr. Küçük (Sonyel, 2003: 22). Apparently, as far as the British authorities were concerned, the hopes for the continuation of the order of things that were agreed upon at Zurich basically depended upon the presence of Makarios and Dr. Küçük (Sonyel, 2003: 21). “According to the British FO, Dr. Küçük exercised a moderating influence.” (Sonyel, 2003: 29).

Finally, Clark, in his report to the Commonwealth Relations Office, dated 27 January 1961, remarked that the T/Cs, suffering from serious feelings of minority anxiety, were beginning to assert their separateness as a community more strongly than before, by taking advantage of the separatist provisions of the Constitution (Sonyel, 2003: 19–20).

Overall, one can argue that, under the post–Zurich–London conditions of Greece–Turkey rapprochement, the T/C leadership had started to experience a number of new constraints, before its former politics of the strict separation of the two communities, the use of violence, and particularly, in their ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ policy of the stimulation of the T/C economy and Çarşı. On the other hand, the post–Zurich–London concerns of the T/C leadership were not only confined to politics, but also comprised doubts and demands over the T/C economy. To these issues, I now return below.

- ***‘The Economic Consequences of the Peace’, on the Part of the T/Cs — The Question of Turkish Economic Aid — Opposition Claims and Government Promises — T/C Leaders’ Quest for Economic Aid — The Uses and Misuses of Economic Aid (İmar ve İstimlâk)***

The 20 February 1959 issue of *Kim* gave a valuable overview of the basic opposition objections in Turkey, against the Zurich and London Agreements.⁴⁵⁰ One the objections specifically concerned the economic aspect, warning about the potential consequences of leaving the critical

⁴⁵⁰ *Kim* was a pro-CHP magazine, published from May 1958 through 1968. As its editor, Şahap Balcıoğlu, was sentenced to 16 months before 27 May, and the magazine itself closed for a month, the subsequent four issues of *Kim* were published as ‘*Mim*’.

issue of Turkey's aid to the T/Cs—investment assistance, loans, etc., to the discretion of G/C dominated government agencies (Hasgüler, 2005: 131–2). Similarly, the 28 February 1959 issue of *Akis* comprised a critical note about the economic aspect of the Zurich–London Agreements, arguing that the ‘veto’ right, by itself, would not suffice to protect the interests of the T/C community. According to *Kim*, that no measures had been taken for the prevention of the economic pressure of G/C was an incredible oversight.⁴⁵¹ Dr. Küçük's demand to have the Ministries of Defence, Agriculture, and Trade and Industry was turned down by Makarios, who argued against giving two economic ministries to the T/Cs (Hasgüler, 2005: 138). According to the 23 June 1959 issue of *Akis*, Denktaş regarded Cyprus's membership to the Commonwealth as a necessity, particularly, from the point of view of the economy. Unless the threat of unemployment was prevented, and each and every one made a livelihood, the Island would fall into the hands of Greek communist organisations. Therefore, Rauf Denktaş was convinced that such realistic attitudes would prove a lot more effective than either independence or *Taksim* (Hasgüler, 2005: 141). The 28 July 1959 issue of *Akis* provided some valuable information about the T/C leadership's economic policies, at this conjuncture. The overall impression of *Akis*, was that the T/C leaders had now replaced the old slogan ‘Taksim, or Death’ [*Ya Taksim, Ya Ölüm*], with a new one, ‘development’ [*kalkınma*]. But changing slogans did not guarantee, by itself, that the T/Cs would be on

⁴⁵¹ “Yunanlıların iktisadi baskısını önlemek maksadıyla—menzili maksuda erişmek için Rumların en çok güvendiği silah budur—hiçbir tedbirin alınmaması akla durgunluk verecek bir ihmâl olarak gözüktü.” (Hasgüler, 2005: 129)

solid grounds, from the point of view of economy, despite the fact that the leaders themselves appeared quite optimistic. For instance, Rauf D. Denктаş claimed that bygone were the days when the T/Cs were oppressed, and abused by the G/Cs, now that they now were at the doorsteps of a whole new era of economic development.⁴⁵² According to *Akis*, the optimistic views of Denктаş were based on dubious grounds. The fact that the provision of monies and credits were themselves not sufficient to ensure economic development had been demonstrated in other cases. Whilst the T/C leaders looked quite possessed by slogans of ‘unforeseen development’, the way for the poor minority of a poor island to achieve economic miracle could not possibly be some lavish projects devoid of any sense of efficiency (Hasgüler, 2005: 144).⁴⁵³ According to *Akis*, the T/C leaders were now at the stage of the raising aid, for the T/C community’s cause of economic development, of which Turkey was effectively the sole source. It was to that end that the *Federasyon* President Denктаş had spent five days in Turkey, and met the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of Public Works, and of Education. Denктаş’s expectations were monies, people, technical know-how, customs exemptions, etc.—everything, indeed. On the other hand, the T/C leadership had not quite made clear how all these resources would be

⁴⁵² “*Acaba liderlerin ağzında ‘Ya Taksim, Ya Ölüm’ sözünün yerini alan ‘Kalkınma’ sloganı Ada Türklerinin iktisaden sağlam bir duruma geçmesini temin edecek midir? Liderler bu hususta çok iyimserdir. Mesela, Rauf Denктаş ‘Rumların Türkleri ezmesi, istismar etmesi devrinin, artık tamamen tarihe karıştığını, Türk cemaatinin yepyeni bir iktisadi kalkınmanın eşiğinde bulunduğunu’ söylemektedir. ‘Artık ezilecek başımız değil, ezecek pazumuz vardır.’ diyen Rauf Denктаş’ın iyimserlik sebebi meçhuldür.*” (Hasgüler, 2005: 144)

⁴⁵³ “*Ne çare ki, Kıbrıslı liderler ‘görülmemiş kalkınma’ sloganlarına kapılıp ‘düşünülmemiş bir kalkınma’nın peşinde oldukları intibasını vermekteler. ¶Fakir bir Adada, fakir bir azınlığın iktisadi bir mucize göstermesi beklenirken, rantabiliteyi unutup gösterişli projelere heveslenmesi ümit kırıcıdır.*” (Hasgüler, 2005: 44)

utilised (Hasgüler, 2005: 145). Thus, some sort of an economic plan was urgently needed, in order to avoid the possible waste of the limited means of aid, and domestic and foreign experts were to set out, at once, to prepare it (Hasgüler, 2005: 145–146).

As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of Zurich and London Agreements, the provision of economic aid had become ‘the’ key question, and not only for the T/Cs, but the G/Cs as well. Apparently, there was some sort of an understanding about the urgency of assuring foreign economic aid. On the other hand, *Akis* and *Kim*, were particularly vocal as to the possible misuses of economic aid. Thus, drawing upon a news in Dr. Küçük’s newspaper, the 20 March 1959 issue of *Kim*, reported that precious economic aid would be spent to pay for the confiscations, demolition of old neighbourhoods, and the construction of immense buildings. According to *Kim*, this was Dr. Küçük’s way of expressing his admiration for DP and Menderes, by giving the weight to ‘confiscations and construction works’ [*imar ve istimlâkler*]. It was obvious that the T/C community had more urgent needs than construction works. Yet, the splendour and the pride of construction far surpassed all (Hasgüler, 2005: 169).

In retrospect, the claims of *Akis* and *Kim*, about the misuses of economic aid, and of the public revenues, generally, appear to be well-founded. According to Ümit Süleyman Onan, in the process of the drafting of the Constitution, the T/C leadership asked the British to pay a compensation for the years during which *Evkaf* was put out of the T/C community’s control.

This compensation, of the magnitude of £ 1 million, was later used for the construction of the prestigious *Saray Otel*, the Communal Chamber, schools, and for other communal works (Besim, 2011: 52)

As it appears, there is a period after the conclusion of Zurich and London Agreements, when the T/C leaders gave the priority to economic development, rather than to separatist claims and work, trying to ensure the necessary funds and technical assistance from, particularly Turkey. It is very likely that the public funds—the greater part of which being Turkey's aid, were gravely misused. As it appears, the T/C leaders, possibly under the influence of the DP model of economic development and modernisation through construction works, came to be possessed by the grandeur of urban construction works, justifying the post-1960 criticisms of their T/C opponents for planless and wasteful economic development.

- ***Towards a Planned Development — Greece and Turkey Agree to Coordinate Economic Aid — Priority of Economic Development — Development as National Right and Self-Government — Rauf R. Denктаş and Development — MBK and Planned Development — Scale and the T/C Flour Mill — New Factories and Quest for Domestic Savings***

As a consequence of the Turco–Greek rapprochement of post–Zurich days, the problem of development came to be approached as a transcommunal, Cypriot problem, which also required a common solution. As a matter of fact, Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük had decided to cooperate on the issue of development aid (Hasgüler, 2005: 164). However, it seems that cooperation was more against the British, than between the two communities. More

particularly, Greek newspapers were strongly against Turkey's direct economic aid to the T/C community. They suggested that, in the spirit of Zurich–London, the proper addressee of all economic aid was the central government, and all aid was to be shared between the two communities. In his cryptogram of 6 April 1959, the British Ambassador in Athens reported that Turkey's economic aid to the T/Cs was being criticised by the Greek media, on the grounds that the both communities should benefit from such aid. In the weeks following the Zurich–London Agreements, the Greek newspapers of Athens had claimed that Turkey would give the T/Cs £ 2 million, to form her own, separate economic institutions, towards the goal of the economic division [*Taksim*] of the Island (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 175–176). Furthermore, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff, sending a message to his Turkish colleague, expressed his regrets and unhappiness about the Turkish Government declaration of plans for unilateral development aid to the T/Cs. In his reply to Averoff, Zorlu assured that the amount of the assistance to the T/Cs had greatly been exaggerated, that it actually consisted of some small amounts of fiscal aid (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 176).

On the other hand, upon his return to the Island from Ankara,⁴⁵⁴ on 11 May 1959, Dr. Küçük announced that he was accompanied by a Turkish

⁴⁵⁴ Dr. Küçük had been summoned to Ankara on the occasion of the visits of Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis and Minister of Foreign Affairs Averoff during the first days of May 1959. He held some talks about the current stalemates in the preparation of the Constitution, and briefed the authorities about the economic development programme of the T/C community. It is very likely that some sort of understanding had emerged between the governments of Greece and Turkey, about the conditions of economic aid to the T/Cs and the Island as a whole. Probably there would be some direct aid from Turkey to the T/Cs,

economic mission, led by Semih Günver, and composed of other select bureaucrats that would study the measures to be taken for the sake of the cause of Cyprus and the economic development of the T/Cs. In Ankara, he had talked with the Menderes Government on the economic problems of the T/Cs, and asked for the economic aid of the Motherland. As a consequence, the Government of Turkey had promised, as a first aid, TL 12.5 million—which, according to Gazioğlu equalled £ 125 thousand in terms of that day's exchange rates) (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 177). Dr. Küçük and the Turkish Economic Mission head Günver spoke to the crowd, from the Küçük's balcony. Küçük criticised the pro-CHP magazine *Kim* in very strong terms, and told the crowd that unity was all that mattered, that T/C people would not heed this kind of intrigues. As far as the economy was concerned, Dr. Küçük said that, the two states (Turkey and Greece) were now fully agreed on the Cyprus issue, including the problem of economic development. As a matter of fact, they had discussed the problem together and decided to cooperate for the common economic development of the two communities, and declared this in their joint *communiqué*. The Turkish Economic Mission would make a survey of the T/C economy, determine the necessary measures, and put them into practice very soon. In a couple of days, Küçük would announce a programme, in the spirit of the Zurich Agreements, and the way to the opulence for T/Cs. Küçük also made it clear that development was a national right; that it did not contradict the Zurich spirit;

but there would be some limits to that, and the general principle would be the cooperation and coordination of Turkey and Greece, in the provision of economic aid to the two communities together.

and that Turkey would aid the T/Cs directly as well as separately (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 177). According to Küçük, they had to make progress in all the areas. Thus, the T/C could not be prevented from using their natural right to development, in the areas of trade, economy, and arts. Development offensive [*kalkınma hamlesi*] was a right from which no nation or society could be excluded, and would not, by itself, mean that they were against the others. Any society was entitled to manage its own affairs and enrich itself by its own toil—which meant no hostility to anyone.⁴⁵⁵ On the other hand, Semih Günver told the crowd that the Mission would enquire the needs of the Turkish society in the area of the economy, and prepare and submit a report to the concerned authorities. Turkish statesmen were very concerned about the economic future of the T/Cs, and they would provide all the aid they could, *directly and in cooperation with the Greek Government*.⁴⁵⁶

Clearly, there had now emerged a certain understanding between Turkey and Greece, on the conditions of the economic aid to the T/Cs and G/Cs. It is very likely that Turkey would be allowed to provide some aid directly, but there would be some limits to that, and the general principle would be cooperation and coordination between Turkey and Greece in the provision of economic assistance to the T/Cs, but principally, economic aid would go to the future government of the Republic of Cyprus.

⁴⁵⁵ “Biz bu yolu tutarken kimseye cephe almış değiliz. her milletin, her toplumun açık bir hakkı olan kalkınma hamlesinde bize engel olunmasına izin vermeyeceğiz. ... Bir toplum, kendi alın teri ile zengin olup kendi işlerini kendisinin idare etmesi gerekir. Toplum buna azmetmiştir; bunu yapmak ve başarmak kararındadır. Bunu yaparken de kimseye bir düşmanlığımız yoktur.” (Gazioğlu, 2000: 178)

⁴⁵⁶ “Türk Hükümeti, Türk devlet adamları, ekonomik geleceğinizle çok yakından ilgilenmektedirler. Bu maksatla ellerinden gelen yardımı gerek doğrudan, gerekse Yunan Hükümeti ile işbirliği halinde yapacaklardır.” (Gazioğlu, 2000: 178).

Apparently, between Zurich–London (February 1959) and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (16 August 1960), the T/C leadership had mobilised all its forces to strengthen and prepare the T/C economy for the new conditions, and to speed up economic development—the focus being *Çarşı*. It is very likely that these efforts were essentially led by Rauf R. Denktaş, though, the newly founded *Federasyon* [and indirectly, TMT] newspaper *Nacak*, which seemed to be Denktaş’s alternative to Dr. Küçük’s *Halkın Sesi*. Therefore, (1) the understanding between Turkey and Greece upon the conditions of economic aid, reached in the first days of May; (2) the dispatch of the Economic Mission of top bureaucrats and its accompaniment of Dr. Küçük upon the latter’s return to the Island, and; (3) the banning of Celâl Hordan’s activities in late August, by Menderes himself, were possibly moves to control and discipline the economic (and political) activities of radical cadres whose basic instrument was the open use of violence.

Thus, the monthly *Federasyon* bulletin published just before the first issue of *Nacak* came out contained a key policy article by Denktaş⁴⁵⁷, pointing to the import of economic development. According to Denktaş, having obtained its right to political equality, the T/C community must now rise to prominence in the field of the economy as well, transform itself from a society of purchasers and consumers, to one of producers and sellers. And the way to this is to develop its commercial life, to carry it beyond the retail

⁴⁵⁷ ‘*Tutunmak ve Yükselmek Azmindeyiz*’ [We are Determined to Hold out and Rise] (Keser, 2012b: 304–305).

trade, and the ‘protection of the Turk by the Turk’ [*Türk’ün Türk’ü koruması*] (Keser, 2012b: 304–305).

To make full justice, one must note that the Denktaş campaigns through Nacak had moved far beyond the field economic development, and aimed at a full-scale communal transformation, including the cultural modernisation of ‘traditional’ society as well.⁴⁵⁸ Thus, Nacak, the issue of which was dated 18 March 1960, aimed to raise the national consciousness of the T/Cs, comprised articles on sports, culture, geography, agriculture, and T/C villages, with a view to highlight the various dynamics that keep the T/C community up and going. More particularly, *Nacak* kept the general public informed of the political, cultural and economic activities of *Federasyon*, educated the people about the economy, and aimed at the economic development of the T/C community, and the enrichment of its commercial life (Keser, 2012b: 305). It also aimed to cultivate new skills, in the areas of agriculture, husbandry, dairy production, honey production, and fishing. Furthermore, it encouraged the development of cooperatives, as a major means of the preservation of T/C presence on the Island via cooperation. And all these activities were carried out by *Federasyon*.⁴⁵⁹ (Keser, 2012b:

⁴⁵⁸ “İlk etapta toplumun bütün katmanlarını kucaklayarak Kıbrıs Türk halkını sadece ekonomik olarak değil, siyasî ve kültürel açıdan da geliştirecek ve Rumlara bağlı kısıtlayıcı unsurları ortadan kaldıracak tedbirleri anavatan Türkiye’nin de desteğiyle bunları gerçekleştirmek söz konusudur. Bütün bu faaliyetler Federasyon çatısı altında toplanan kurum ve kuruluşların desteği, yol göstericiliği ve rehberliğiyle gerçekleştirilmektedir.” (Keser, 2012b: 306–307)

⁴⁵⁹ Obviously, *Federasyon* was the ‘government’ and ‘bureaucratic’ apparatus of the T/C community, before the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus. After 1960, *Federasyon* ceased its activities, to be replaced by the Communal Chamber. Accordingly, Denktaş, became a member and the President of the Communal Chamber, preferring it to the more prestigious, but far less influential House of Representatives membership—for which there

305–306). *Nacak* was also the key to the carrying out of three major, and equally controversial campaigns, namely, (i) ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ [*Türk’ten Türk’e*]; (ii) ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish’ [*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş*], and; (iii) Use Domestic Products [*Yerli Malı Kullan*] (Keser, 2012b: 306).⁴⁶⁰

Apparently, towards the end of summer 1959, and after the close of Hordan affair, the political messages of *Nacak* were somehow fine-tuned to the Cyprus policy of the Menderes Government. Thus, on 10 July 1959, *Nacak* pointed out that the Cyprus cause had been concluded to the advantage of the T/Cs, thanks to the dedicated efforts of ‘our leaders’ and of ‘our Turkey’. The cause had been won, and ‘our rights’ had been yielded up. Now, the next cause of the community was the cause of development. And, the way enroot the proud existence of the Turks on this beautiful island was rapid economic development.⁴⁶¹ *Nacak* regards the economy as top priority. Thus, in order to be able the live as a free community on the Island, the achievement of utmost economic independence is a must. Furthermore, the most important economic guaranty is the keep ‘our *Çarşı*’ alive (Keser, 2012b: 308-309). Finally, one must take note of the editorial commentary in the 18 September 1959 issue of *Nacak*, which is most interesting, as a sign of the existing balance of forces between moderate and extremist

was a big scramble, and a possible minister’s post. But the House was the real siege of political power, as eventually, his choice proved to be the correct one.

⁴⁶⁰ Apparently, this was a period of the ‘Turkification of Turkish Cypriots’. One way of doing this was by transferring and transfusing the Mainland Turkish folklore.

⁴⁶¹ “Kıbrıs davası, liderlerimizin ve Türkiye’mizin azimli çalışmaları sayesinde çok şükür lehimize halledildi. Dava kazanıldı, haklarımız teslim edildi. Halen cemaat olarak bir kalkınma davamız var. Bu güzel adada şerefli bir Türk varlığı halinde gelişmek kararındayız. Bunun için en kısa zamanda kalkınmak lâzım.” (Keser, 2012b: 312)

nationalists on the Island. This is a rather stern warning against the continued use of the old methods, based on violence, accusing some self-interested irresponsible for trying to damage the current state of affairs, which is clearly to the advantage of the T/Cs. The commentary then asks for utmost care against those trying to betray our future, through the times when the two communities in Cyprus have been striving to build a common life.⁴⁶²

The editorial of the 13 July 1960 of Dr. Küçük's *Halkın Sesi* pointed out that, the T/C leadership had been pursuing a 'planned' policy to ensure the progress of the T/C society in the field of the economy. Clearly, this was a significant policy change, given that only a year ago, the 28 July 1959 issue of *Akis* had criticised the T/C leadership for its planless and wasteful economic policies, and pointed to the need for planned development. One must recall that, between the two was the 27 May coup in Turkey. The editorial proudly argued that, the struggle to overcome the material deprivations of the T/C society was on the way to producing some positive results. The aid obtained to assist the T/C cooperatives and peasantry would further increase, whilst the embracement of these institutions by the T/C people was the key to their development. The British Government had just donated £ 500 thousand for the cooperatives, and was ready to provide

⁴⁶² “Bafta son günlerde bir gizli teşkilat adına faaliyette bulunulduğu, üye kaydedildiği, bu maksat için fotoğraf istenip vesikalar imza ettirildiği ve bu arada da üyelere para sızdırıldığı haber alınmıştır. Üzerlerinde hiçbir mesuliyet hissi olmayan bu menfaatperestlerin Kıbrıs Türklerinin lehine olan şimdiki durumu baltalamak için giriştikleri bu gayreti takbih ederiz. Kıbrıs “taki cemaatlerin müşterek bir hayat kurmak için uğraştıkları bu zamanda böyle menfi hareketlerle istikbalimizi kirletmeğe çalışanlara karşı uyanık davranılacağına eminiz.” (Keser: 2012: 309)

another £ 1 million in loans. On the other hand, the British Government would also pay a £ 1 million compensation for the various injustices and losses that *Evkaf* had suffered under the British rule. There would be other aid to be provided by Turkey. As a matter of fact, General Cemal Gürsel, the head of ‘our Revolutionary Government’ had pointed out that T/Cs would be helped to the extent that the means of Turkey allowed. Furthermore, the programme of MBK had also resolved to provide fiscal aid to the T/Cs.

Thus, the aid to be provided by the British Government equalled £ 1.5 million, of which 0.5 million would go to the cooperatives, and 1 million to Evkaf. As far as Turkey aid is concerned, there was the £ 125 thousand promised by Prime Minister Menderes, in mid-1959, supposedly as the first stage of a long-term economic aid. However, it is important to recall that from the point of view of the Turkish economy, the question of fiscal aid to the T/Cs did not only depend on its savings capacity—which was in bad shape, anyway, but to be most important, its capacity to aid in hard currency—which was nil, given its unsustainable current account deficits, which had stopped all imports, in 1958.

On the other hand, the T/C leadership tried to promote economic development through its own limited means as well. Thus, on 25 January 1960, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, President of the Cyprus is Turk Party, and *Federasyon* executives held a meeting with the representatives of the newly founded Chamber of Commerce member, where they took some key

decisions concerning the economic development of the T/C community. The most important decision was about the establishment of a flour mill. For this, a new company would be established, with a founding capital of 100 thousand Cypriot Pounds (Liras), and investment procedures would be started. Apparently, the T/C community consumed more than 1 ton of flour each month, so the monthly profit of the company was estimated at £ 5–6 thousand, monthly. To find the necessary capital, two options were considered at first: (i) A public limited company—led by small investors, and (ii); a cooperative. As it turned out, these two methods proved insufficient to put together the amount of money required for this kind of investment. Therefore, the only way out was to allow and encourage some wealthy businessman to build it—plans now included a biscuits factory, besides the flour mill. Finally, the notable Ahmet Raşit Mustafa and Co. stepped in to invest 40 thousand Cypriot Pounds. However, the Ministry of Trade and Industry was controlled by G/Cs, and the Ministry declined to issue the imports permit required to buy the necessary machinery and equipment, on the grounds that no other mills were needed on the Island (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 174).

It is important to note that the T/C leadership did not solely depend on external aid, but also tried to promote new investments, using its own policy tools, despite the fact that they were also very limited. The key issue here was obviously the low domestic savings, and lack of capital. Under the circumstances, the T/C leadership came up with three alternative, institutional forms of capital accumulation: (1) The cooperative form to

gather small savings of the peasantry and urban workers, through the cooperative banks, which, as savings and loans institutions, would then give out loans to public and private entrepreneurs; (2) public limited companies, which would gather small savings by selling out shares, and (3) promotion of wealthy people's private investments, using the promise oligopolistic or monopolistic profits as incentive. As far as oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures were concerned, the first two choices seem to have been given priority, i.e. the cooperative, as a form of public ownership, and the public limited company, which would be sharing oligopolistic/monopolistic profits amongst a group of relatively small businessmen. However, it was quite clear that domestic savings were too low to add up to any significant amount, so (1) and (2) were of limited use. On the other hand, there were few wealthy people who could afford relatively big investments, despite the considerable oligopolistic/monopolistic profits which they potentially fetched. Finally, there is circumstantial evidence that T/C investments in oligopolistic/monopolistic markets dominated by G/C capital were bureaucratically obstructed, on the grounds of possible scale inefficiencies.

- ***Attempts of the T/C Leaders to Carry their Old Ways over to the Republic of Cyprus (I) — 'Free' Elections with Single Candidates/Lists***

Apparently, after the Zurich and London Agreements, for a certain period, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf R. Denktaş tried to continue their repressive politics through the old means. Thus, the 8 August 1959 issue of *Kim* noted that behind the rhetoric of the security of T/C community, there was the

bare truth that the leaders were determined to daunt anyone who was critical of their policies, whose success was now being openly questioned. To overstate their power, they claimed that all they did were on the orders of the leaders of the Motherland. Any act or policy disliked by the T/C people was the doing of not their own, but the Motherland. They argued that the situation was too delicate and too extraordinary to allow for any disobedience. Even the smallest measure of noncompliance was labeled as treason and severely penalised. As a matter of fact, Dr. Küçük and Denktaş had a private militia that the community was made to pay for (Hasgüler, 2005: 177). As a matter of fact, in the aftermath of the Zurich and London Agreements, the key political question on the part of the T/C leaders was the model of politics implied by the new Constitution and the Republic, its possible effects upon the old model of politics, and its adaptive transformation in accordance with the new conditions. According to Ahmet C. Gazioğlu, firstly, there were those hardliners—led by Burhan Nalbantoğlu, who argued that, there was a need for a young, dynamic organisation, to ensure that the T/C community, in the transitional period, would continue to hold to its national goals, preserve its unity, and strengthen the conditions of its existence. Nalbantoğlu was not only one of the founders of TMT, but was also the second man of *Federasyon*, after Denktaş. In the second half of the 1960s, he maintained that all activities and organisations around the national cause had to be strictly controlled, and if necessary, by means of violence (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 63). Furthermore, Nalbantoğlu wanted to have the last say over the selection of people to the

top posts. Accordingly, he organised some actions against Dr. Küçük, criticised the Agreements, and tried to control the general course of politics. As a part of this, he called Celal Hordan, the former Vice President of the National Federation of Students [*Millî Talebe Federasyonu*], to Cyprus, to contribute to the efforts towards the organisation of the peasantry and the youth. Hordan was known for his 1957 organisations of ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish’ [*Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş*] campaigns in Turkey. During his three months and ten days’ sojourn in Cyprus—from 20 May 1959 to the end of August, Governor Foot had Hordan kept under close surveillance. Arguing that the latter’s activities was in clear violation of the spirit of good faith of Zurich–London, and connected to some political assassinations, Governor Foot took the initiative for his expulsion. At the end of August, he warned Denktaş about the use of violence, told the latter of his intention to expulse Hordan. Finally, the news of Hordan’s activities, his attempts to get arms and organise the youth gets to Prime Minister Menderes, who asks Namık Gedik, the Minister of Interior Affairs, to send a ministerial inspector to look into the matter. When he finally reads the inspector’s report, Menderes gets upset, and summons Hordan back to Turkey. Furthermore, Menderes makes it clear to the British, that Hordan’s activities were out of line with the needs of the day; that Turkey, in the spirit of Zurich and London Agreements, would do her best to speed up the preparation of the Constitution, and to build candid and cordial relations between T/Cs and G/Cs, and would definitely not allow seditious activities of any kind (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 73–74).

It is very likely that, the Hordan case signified a turning point from the point of view of the T/C nationalists. It became clear that, the smuggling of the old way of politics into the common state, and particularly, the continued use of violence—political or economic terror, and provocations—would not be one of the feasible options. And, this was the consequence of Turkey's choice to determine all her priorities upon the basis of the favourable inter-state balances underlying the Zurich–London Agreements.

Nonetheless, it was a period of transition, and the T/C leadership was able to smuggle the old way of politics—mono-candidate/list elections, into the first ‘free’ elections of the new Republic. On the way towards the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960, three successive elections were held, to choose: (a) the G/C President, and the T/C Vice-President (13 December 1959); (b) the members of the House of Representatives (31 July 1960), and; (c) the members of the Communal Chambers (7 August 1960).⁴⁶³ Soon after the Zurich–London Agreements, work towards the elections started to pick up. The 4 March 1959 issue of *Akis* reported that the homes of possible candidates were busted, they were beaten up, and threatened by TMT (Hasgüler, 2005: 134). According to the 4 April 1959 issue of *Akis*, TMT threats that outside candidates would be first beaten, and should that not work, killed, had now ceased after Denktaş's visit to Ankara (Hasgüler, 2005: 139). Clearly, the leaders, and

⁴⁶³ Note, however, that the elections dates were several times re-scheduled.

TMT had been warned to change their ways. Competition intensified in early 1960: Thus, the 27 January 1960 issue of *Akis* reported that, Dr. Küçük was quite disturbed by the attitudes of Denktaş, and of his former aid, Faiz Kaymak. His ‘Cyprus is Turk’ [*Kıbrıs Türk’tür Partisi*] and *Federasyon* wanted a single list. And, coming out against the single list, or coming up with an alternative list, or even being an independent candidate was being equated with traitorship, against the T/C interests, as much as Turkey’s. The list had already been announced, and all members of Küçük’s party were named. The most important aspect of the list is the Federation President Denktaş’s candidacy to the House of Representatives, as it should have been. On the other hand, Denktaş’s predecessor Faiz Kaymak—the first President of *Federasyon* was on the list for the Communal Chamber. But, the problem was that Kaymak actually wanted to be on the list for the House of Representatives. As a matter of fact, no one had ever consulted with him, and the Famagusta people supported his candidacy for the House. Under the circumstances, Kaymak had decided to go for the House independently, and there was no way of accusing a man like Kaymak of traitorship. Furthermore, his move could encourage people everywhere to become independent candidates, despite all the air of terror.⁴⁶⁴ Thus, elections were postponed since it was to the advantage of Makarios as well to buy some time against his own opponents (Hasgüler, 2005: 164).

According to the 27 July 1960 issue of *Kim*, election campaigns for the

⁴⁶⁴ Apparently, the biggest rival of the T/C nationalists was the pacifist, pro-Republican Kemalist-liberal Dr. İhsan Ali in Paphos (Hasgüler, 2005: 184).

House of Representatives, and Communal Chambers were hotly contested, due to the presence of independent candidates in Famagusta. Thus, on the one side, there was the single list of the so-called National Front [*Millî Cephe*]*—i.e. Federasyon, the National Unity Party [Millî Birlik Partisi] of Dr. Küçük, and the youth organisation,*⁴⁶⁵ and on the other side, seven independent candidates, including Faiz Kaymak who had been left out due to some talks and speeches he had made in Turkey and in Cyprus. Dr. Küçük warned against divisive acts, and assured that, elected National Front candidates would serve everybody, their opponents toes well (Hasgüler, 2005: 186-7). According to the 3 August 1960 issue of *Kim*, no independent candidates had come up in Nicosia, Larnaca, and Kyrenia. Thus, in these three towns, candidates for the House were elected without any actual elections. On the other hand, in Famagusta, Limassol, and Paphos, there were independent candidates for the House. In Famagusta, there were charges of irregularity claimed by the opposition, particularly, from the supporters of Kaymak, which were rejected by Burhan Nalbantoğlu and Orhan Müderrisoğlu. Mithat Berberoğlu was elected Representative to the House, outside the National Front list (Hasgüler, 2005: 187–189).

A future exchange in 1964, in the newspaper *Milliyet*, between Denktaş and Emin Dırvana, the first Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, could be referred to, in order to put into perspective the relationship between the old monolithic politics of the T/C leadership, and the new competitive politics under the

⁴⁶⁵ This is the youth organisation that was founded, several months ago, by Celâl Hordan. It has played a very active role during the election campaigns of the National Front (Gazioğlu, 2000: 78).

Republic of Cyprus. In his criticisms of Dırvana's mistakes as ambassador, Denктаş claimed that one of the basic problems was the latter's rejection of his demand to establish a coordination committee of the various organs with a view to steer all tasks single-handedly towards the same goal. In his brilliant response, Dırvana argued that this suggestion was but the expression of Denктаş's illness of keeping everything under his control, and steering everything towards the goals that he alone would decide.⁴⁶⁶ Clearly, Denктаş had in mind, to smuggle the institutions of centralised power relations of the second half of the 1950s, into the post-1960 setting, in order to neutralise the 'decentralising' effects of the institutions of competitive representative politics. As a matter of fact, what he suggested as his blueprint of ideal politics, at a later conjuncture, in 1973, was possibly the solution he had in mind in the early 1960. It is important to note that the period of 1967–1974 was a period of relative thaw in the domestic politics of the T/Cs. After 1967, there emerged a new wave of unionisation, which was led, particularly, by left-oriented, pro-unification teachers. In 1970, Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu founded the pro-Republican CTP. In 1973, Denктаş displaced Dr. Fazıl Küçük as the new communal leader, and the latter declared that he would go back to his old party politics. At a 'Special Committee' meeting, Denктаş expressed Ambassador Asaf İnhan and the

⁴⁶⁶ "Yazısında 'İşleri hep bir elden aynı hedefe gütmek için muhtelif organlar arasında bir koordinasyon komitesi kurulmasını istedik' dediğinden kastı da herhalde bütün işlerin Denктаş'ın elinde ve Denктаş'ın çizeceği hedefe güdülmesi hastalığı olsa gerek. Elbetteki böyle bir yetki ne Denктаş'a ne de herhangi bir diğer Kıbrıs'lı Türk lidere veya heyete verilemezdi. Elbetteki bu kadar şümüllü yetki, gerek Kıbrıs Türkleri'nin selâmeti, gerekse bütün Türk Milletinin güvenlik ve menfaatleri bakımından ancak Ankara'nın elinde sımsıkı tutulması gerekirdi. Her hal ü kârda ben o şekilde hareket ettim ve bundan ancak iftihar duyarım. Ben ayrıldıktan sonra bu tutum gevşetilmişse çok büyük hata edilmiştir." "Düşünenlerin Düşünceleri, Emin Dırvana'nın Cevabı: 'Denктаş Hakikati Tahrif Ediyor'", Emin Dırvana (Sâbık Lefkoşa Büyükelçisi), (Milliyet, 14 August 2013)

TMT Commander (the ‘Coordinator’), his views about the ways of the emergent forces and dynamics of multi-party politics. Thus, Denktaş believed that the threat of partisan politics [particilik] was likely to become a very grave danger especially after a possible resolution of the Cyprus issue. The fate of a whole nation would then be in the hands of 15 representatives. Should 10 of these unite with the G/Cs, they could even amend the constitution. Against this danger, the TMT leader must be in a position to keep all the individuals and political parties here in Cyprus within the confines of the ‘National Framework’ [Millî Çerçeve], and those institutions must be founded which would sustain this National Framework. In the same context, the Youth Organisation [Gençlik Teşkilatı] and the like must be kept under the control of the nationalists, by means of strict statutes.⁴⁶⁷

Thus, it is obvious that, with the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, as a competitive representative democratic polity, and the abandonment of the use of violence by the Government of Turkey as a means of control over T/C politics, there emerged a conflict between the old politics of the T/C leadership, and the new conditions. As a matter of fact, the centralisation and concentration of power in the hands of the T/C leadership, through non-competitive, monolithic politics seemed, in the aftermath of Zurich and

⁴⁶⁷ “Toplumun kaderine 15 Milletvekili hakim olacaktır. Bunların 10 tanesi Rumlarla birleşse Anayasayı da değiştirebilecektir. Rum’un ‘Muhalliflere vereceği ve tanıyacağı imkanlarla toplumun ensesinde çelik çomak oynayacaklar zuhur edebilecektir. Çare? Türkiye’nin Partiler üstü bir Kıbrıs Politikası olması ve buraya gönderilecek TMT liderinin buradaki şahısları ve siyasi kuruluşları ‘Millî Çerçeve’ içinde tutacak bir durumda olması; bu ‘Millî Çerçeveyi’ idame ettirecek Kuruluşların meydana getirilmesi: Gençlik Teşkilatı v.s gibi ve bu kuruluşları da sıkı bir yönetmelikle Milliyetçilerin hakim olmalarının sağlanması.” (Denktaş, 1999: 124) [sic].

London Agreements, and the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus, a remote possibility.

- ***Attempts of the T/C Leaders to Carry their Old Ways over to the Republic of Cyprus (II) — ‘Cherries on the Dinner Table’ and the Fate of ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’***

Kızılyürek (1988: 45) argues that, since the 1960 Republic did not restrict the free movement of capital and labour, there was no way the weak T/C bourgeoisie and its campaign could hold out. On the other hand, the T/C leadership originally intended to carry over its ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ campaign into the Republican period (Evre, 2004: 145). As a matter of fact, upon their return from London, Dr. Küçük and Denктаş called for a joint Party–*Federasyon* conference, where they briefed the delegates about the nature of Zurich and London Agreements. The conference also discussed the future fate of ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ campaign. As the delegates argued that ending it now would ruin the many that, relying on this campaign had put all they had into trade, and Denктаş claimed that it did not contradict the Agreements, the conference unanimously decided to go along (Kızılyürek, 1988: 45). Accordingly, the 4 March 1959 issue of *Akis* reported Denктаş making it clear they would not lose control of *Çarşı* (Hasgüler, 2005: 134). Yet, according to the 13 March 1959 issue of *Kim*, Zurich and London Agreements had adversely effected the boycott, and Dr. Küçük had come to realise that it would be exceedingly difficult to keep the economic bans going. Thus, *Akis* claimed, although ‘Küçük’s men’ would probably use more violence, even that would not suffice to protect the bans

(Hasgüler, 2005: 169). The 12 June 1959 issue of *Kim* wrote that the price of tomatoes in the T/C market (4 shillings) was double the price in the G/C market (2 shillings), because this was the only way to find the money that was necessary to complete the construction of ‘the Hotel’ (*Saray* Hotel). On the other hand, *Kim* also noted that the T/Cs economic boycott was getting extensive coverage by G/C newspapers, which argued that policies based upon the condemnation of the T/Cs to deprivation were bound to end in failure (Hasgüler, 2005: 175). According to the 10 July 1959 issue of *Kim*, although Makarios and Dr. Küçük together had told the G/C and T/C journalists that there were no longer grounds for animosity between the two communities, bullies had still been keeping the T/Cs away from the G/C market. Apparently, to be able to eat cherries and peaches, one had to go to the leader’s house (Hasgüler, 2005: 176). Apparently, during the summer of 1959, T/Cs had not been able to consume fruits, particularly, cherries. Thus, according to the 8 August 1959 issue of *Kim*, the economic boycott had turned the entire T/C sector into a zone of deprivations. People were being told not to eat and use [*yeme, kullanma*] any means of consumption that were not available in the T/C market. Furthermore, seeing the plenty and the cheapness in the G/C market, people had started to question their own deprivations. *Kim* also claimed that Dr. Küçük and Denктаş had a secret army whose costs the community they made to pay through the tributes it had to pay as overcharged prices. All the goods sold in the T/C market worst the worst quality and thrice as expensive. There were some big traders who had thrived in less than a year’s time, thanks to their overcharged prices, and

were in favour with the leaders, thanks to their donations to *Federasyon*. T/Cs were being obliged to buy whatever goods they brought, at whatever prices they charged. Small shopkeepers and traders of *Çarşı* were not either happy, since they were not allowed to contact G/C wholesalers directly, and pushed towards the expensive low quality goods of big T/C traders (Hasgüler, 2005: 178).⁴⁶⁸ Meanwhile, according to the 8 September 1959 issue of *Akis*, Konstantinos G. Karamanlis, Greek Prime Minister complained to Menderes of some activities on the Island that were not in line with the ‘new air of amity’, namely, the activities of Celâl Hordan, and the T/C boycott of the G/C goods, backed by public beatings. Upon this, Nihat Erim, getting his orders from Ankara sets out to break the boycott, goes to the Ledra Street, and shops from the G/C stores, which apparently caused a great uproar amongst the T/C nationalists (Hasgüler, 2005: 151–152). As far as one can follow from *Nacak*, the official organ of *Federasyon*, the support of the T/C leadership—that of Denктаş, at least—to the boycott continued well into late 1959, and early 1960. Thus, the 16 October 1959 issue of *Nacak* was openly supportive of the campaign (Evre, 2004: 145). In his editorial article in the 29 January 1960 issue of *Nacak*, Rauf R. Denктаş warned T/C shopkeepers against the misuse of the campaign. After praising Limassol’s shopkeepers organisation under the ‘Limassol Federation of Associations of Turkish Shopkeepers and Artisans’

⁴⁶⁸ This 8 August issue of *Kim* seems to have infuriated the T/C leaders; thus, Rauf R. Denктаş files a lawsuit against *Kim* and gets a ban on its circulation. In its 22 August 1959, 14 November 1959, and 21 November 1959 issues, *Kim* criticises the trial of a Turkish magazine at a British court, Turkish authorities intervene, and Denктаş pulls the suit back (Hasgüler, 2005: 180–4). This was precisely the times of severe of Menderes repression over the press in Turkey, and during İnönü’s trip to the Western provinces, several newspapers had been censored and published in blank columns.

[*Leymosun Türk Esnaf ve Sanatkârlar Dernekleri Birliği*], he argues that, although the T/C people supports the T/C shopkeepers, the latter must also fulfil their duties to their customers. If customers get badly treated and cheated, chances are that the support campaign will falter and not work (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 185–186). Overall, the Zurich and London agreements seem to have led to a political thaw between the two communities, and the amelioration of commercial relations, which meant new impediments to the development of small T/C manufacturers, and to getting the Cyprus agencies of foreign companies. As some T/Cs began to prefer G/C shops for goods that could be found in T/C shops, the Youth Organisation [*Gençlik Teşkilâtı*] and the Federation of Turkish Workers [*Türk İşçi Federasyonu*] made a press statement to warn the people, which was published in the 17 March 1960 issue of Bozkurt newspaper (Gazioğlu, 2000a: 190).

Apparently, having gradually faltered, the campaign ceased altogether around August–September 1960, as Denктаş recalls, shortly after the Turkish Ambassador Emin Dırvana assumed his post. At Dr. Küçük’s dinner in honour of Dırvana a few days after his arrival, Denктаş sees on the table cherries that are normally not found in the T/C market, and asks, jokingly or unguardedly, where they came from. Dr. Küçük argues that the campaign is being exploited to his own disadvantage, and it is no longer needed. On the other hand, Dırvana argues that if the T/Cs produce the best products, they will not need this kind of protection. Denктаş points out that ‘From the Turk, to the Turk campaign could not be run in disregard of Dr.

Küçük and Dırvana (Denktaş, 2000: 127).⁴⁶⁹ According to Denktaş, the establishment of the Republic ended the hopes for a more opulent *T/C Çarşı*, and G/C merchants dealt a big blow to *Çarşı*, by now capturing all foreign company agencies (Kızılyürek, 1993: 31).

Nearly two years later, in the 6 October 1961 issue of *Nacak*, there came up a rather interesting article, “Türk’ten Türk’e”, which was basically a ‘neo-mercantilist’ defence of the campaign. Despite its being somewhat confused in terms of accounting and economic theory, the basic argument was that imports were a leakage from the (flow of) national income, which would reduce the national income, and under the assumption of equal (and thereby constant) distribution of income, equally hurt all individuals and classes. Since the major consequence of imports—i.e. purchases of G/C goods—was T/C unemployment, this implied that “Türk’ten Türk’e” was, in the first instance, about unemployment combat (Kızılyürek, 1988: 41).

Thus, the T/C boycott of the G/C marked stood in stark contrast with the single economic sphere that the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 had envisaged.

⁴⁶⁹ “Ancak 1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin kurulmasıyla beraber Türk’ten Türk’e kampanyası da yavaş yavaş etkisini kaybetmeye başlar ve kendiliğinden ortadan kalkar; (Denktaş, 13 Temmuz 2003) “... (Türk’ten Türk’e kampanyasını) Ne zaman bozduk? Dırvana geldi ve ikinci, üçüncü gece Dr. Küçük bir yemek verdi. Dr. Küçük de bu şikâyetleri işittikçe bunalıyordu. O gece Dr. Küçük’ten kiraz gördük ilk defa olarak. Kiraz Rum tarafından gelir. Ben şaka olsun diye ‘Neredendir bunlar?’ diyince iş meydana çıktı. Dırvana çullandı bize “Bu iş olmaz, yürümez.” diye ve orada bu iş durdu. Belki de daha fazla devam etmesi de doğru olmayabilirdi. Ben onu da bilmiyorum. Artık barış, görüş olmuş, Cumhuriyet ordusu falan. Kendiliğinden söndü gitti o da.” See, Keser (2012b: 317)

- *27 May 1960 Regime Honours the Zurich–London Agreements — Faiz Kaymak and Dr. İhsan Ali Visit Turkey — Cumhuriyet Newspaper, and 27 May v. DP Feud amongst T/Cs*

The 27 May coup drastically reversed the existing relations of power, by purging the DP cadres, and increasing the weight of anti-DP, and partly pro-CHP cadres. Indubitably, this created a series of problems for the nationalist leaders who had ardently identified themselves with DP and its policies. As a matter of fact, radical changes in government in Turkey have generally had far-reaching consequences upon leadership struggles amongst the T/Cs.⁴⁷⁰ For instance, in 1950, the shift from CHP to DP had put the pro-İnönü, pro-CHP leader Necati Özkan at a distinct disadvantage against Dr. Küçük and his entourage. In the eyes of the military rulers and their supporters, the T/C leaders were likely to be big suspects due to their close ties with DP. For one thing, the Special Warfare Department of the Turkish General Staff, as the secret organisation behind the TMT, had been marginalised—in fact, almost disbanded, and its officer on the Island, TMT commander Rıza Vuruşkan had been called back. Furthermore, upon its coming to power, MBK openly declared that it would fully honour all the commitments of Turkey, including, the Zurich and London Agreements. During his stay on the Island, Turkish Ambassador Emin Dırvana strictly observed the spirit of the Agreements, tried to protect the opposition and keep the T/C leaders under his tight control.

⁴⁷⁰ Thus, dissident T/Cs in Cyprus and Turkey quickly seized the window of opportunity opened by the 27 May coup. For instance, one can take note of the letters sent by the lawyer Nevzat Karagil to MBK, about the T/C leaders and the Organisation [*Teşkilât*, i.e. TMT] (An, 2002: 163).

As far as the relationships with the US were concerned, Melek Firat argues that the leaders of MBK had two great concerns, namely, (i) that the United States could intervene, on the basis of the Agreement of Security Cooperation, dated 5 March 1959;⁴⁷¹ (ii) ensuring, in the face of serious economic problems, the continuity of economic aid. Accordingly, in the radio announcement on the morning of 27 May 1960, the coup leaders emphatically declared that they would honour all ‘our alliances and commitments’, and their belief in and allegiance to NATO and CENTO (Firat, 1997: 30; Oran, 2006b: 667).⁴⁷² The second cause of repeated assurances was the prevalence of economic questions, and thus the urgency of economic aid. As a matter of fact, Firat (1997: 44–45) points out that the United States ended the restrictions she had introduced in the last years of DP, and provided 75 % of the total aid Turkey received in 1960 (Firat, 1997: 44–45). On 28 May 1960, MBK also declared that the new administration would abide by the Zurich and London Agreements. According to Firat (1997: 73, 75), the rulers of 27 May thought there was a relationship of reciprocity, between the Turco–Greek amity, on the one hand, and the T/C–G/C amity, on the other.⁴⁷³ Glafkos Clerides also testifies

⁴⁷¹ ‘Agreement of Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Turkey’, date-signed and date-in-force, 5 March 1959. (<http://photos.state.gov/libraries/turkey/461177/pdf/10t320.pdf>, 22 August 2013). In its dibace, the Agreement stipulated that the United States’ armed intervention applied to the case of not only direct, but also of ‘indirect’ aggressions against Turkey. At the Foreign Affairs Commission [*Dış İşleri Komisyonu*] of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorities revealed that the term indirect aggression also comprised secret subversive activities. Apparently, CHP feared that DP could include in this category the anti-government popular mass movements, and call upon the United States to intervene. See, for details, Erhan (2006: 569–570).

⁴⁷² As a sign of continuity, the coup leaders pick, as new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Selim Sarper, career diplomat, and a close friend of Menderes (Firat, 1997: 31).

to the fact that, as far as Cyprus was concerned, the military government in Turkey was under US influence. Indubitably, the United States wanted peace in Cyprus, and the military government supported the continuance of the independent Republic of Cyprus (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 103)

After 27 May 1960, the criticisms of the anti-DP press in Turkey put on target especially Dr. Fazıl Küçük. Furthermore, between the lines, one is able to read the signs of the emergent rivalry between Dr. Küçük and Denktaş. Dr. Küçük, who had close ties to Menderes, was accused of being equally disposed to personal dictatorship, of adopting DR's conciliatory policy towards the West, whereas Rauf Denktaş, who pressurised and persuaded Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu into making Turkey Guarantor State and getting her soldiers onto the Island, was ready to protect Turkish interests at any cost (Firat, 1997: 73). After the 27 May coup, there were also a few protests against Dr. Küçük. Thus, on 23 June 1960, some young T/Cs in İstanbul marched from Harbiye to Taksim, to protest Dr. Küçük's attitude towards the 'National Revolution' [*Millî İnkılâb*] of 27 May.⁴⁷⁴ As a response, Dr. Küçük declared that, as T/Cs, they were devoted followers of *Millî İnkılâb* and on Turkey's side, under all circumstances.⁴⁷⁵ Apparently, the power struggles in Turkey which had paved the way to the 27 May coup had been followed very closely by the

⁴⁷³ The programme of the first 27 May government, dated 11 July 1960, pointed out that the resolution of the Cyprus issue would now lead to the further development of Turco-Greek relations (Firat, 1997: 74).

⁴⁷⁴ To the best of my knowledge, there are no written sources as to the precise content of such protests. This appears to be yet another key episode of T/C politics that has been left in the dark.

⁴⁷⁵ "Fâzıl Küçük, *Millî İnkılâba Bağlıyız ve İnaniyoruz, Dedi*", (Milliyet, 24 June 1960).

T/Cs. Accordingly, the emergence of the post-27 May opposition to the T/C nationalist leaders must be comprehended against the background of, not only the Zurich–London Agreements and the establishment of the Republic, but also, the 27 May coup and the events leading thereto. The centre of the emergent opposition was, from one point of view, the older leaders who, in one way or another, had been sidelined or neutralised. In Turkey, H. Nevzat Karagil who, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had played the key role in shaping up the new political alliances of T/C politics, addressed some letters to MBK about the policies and activities of the T/C leaders, as well as the ‘Organisation’ [*Teşkilât*, i.e. TMT] (An, 2002: 163). According to Osman Örek, Minister of Defence of the Republic, Faiz Kaymak, ex-President of *Federasyon* who, in 1957, had been replaced by Rauf R. Denktaş, regarded himself as the alternative leader, hoping that Dr. Küçük, as the known favourite of Menderes and Zorlu would now be purged by the rulers of 27 May (KKTC Dışişleri ve Savunma Bakanlığı, 2000: 93).⁴⁷⁶ Apparently, T/C dissidents expected and publicly asked for the removal of Dr. Küçük who, in their regard, was the equivalent of Menderes, due to his policies of the repression of opponents, enrichment of the few, and shortages caused by ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’. According to the 15 June 1960 issue of *Kim*, the news of the ‘27 May Revolution’ [*27 Mayıs İnkılabı*] has come as a bombshell to the T/Cs, and the devoutly pro-Menderes Dr. Küçük was now like a fish out of water. Only a few weeks ago, upon the news of 28 April

⁴⁷⁶ As a matter of fact, prior to the House of Representatives elections of 31 July 1960, Faiz Kaymak paid a visit to Ankara, to test the waters if he could get the support of the new rulers.

student riots in İstanbul, Dr. Küçük had sent a message of loyalty and support to Menderes, noting that 20 thousand T/Cs were at his beck and call.⁴⁷⁷ Having decorated all Cyprus with the names of Bayar and Menderes during the latter's era of bliss, Dr. Küçük now, under pressure from the youth, took down the nameplates of Celâl Bayar and Adnan Menderes high schools and the Menderes Village, but kept the 'Menderes' and 'Fatin Rüştü Zorlu' street names. *Kim* further claimed that some enlightened Cypriots who, when they praised the demonstrations of 28 April at the clubhouse of *Kardeş Ocağı* [Brotherhood Society], had been threatened by Dr. Küçük and his men, now came out against the latter. The future of Küçük–Denktaş partnership now seemed to hang in the balance, and the feigned allegiance they expressed to the new leaders in Turkey further alienated people in Cyprus from the once ardent supporters of Menderes (Hasgüler, 2005: 185). The 29 June 1960 issue of *Kim* further argued that, under the leadership of Dr. Küçük, this Green Island [*Yeşilada*] of middlemen [*orta hâlliler*] had been segmented into two, for a very small minority had enriched itself at the expense of the great majority who were impoverished (Hasgüler, 2005: 185). On the other hand, the 20 July 1960 issue of *Kim* claimed that the 'buddies' [*ahbap çavuşlar*] had not given up the dreams of ruling by force and repression, and continued their order through people like Kara Cemil in Paphos, and Ramazan Cemil and Ziya Rızkî in Limassol. Now that the T/Cs who had been educated abroad were most needed on the Island, Dr. Küçük

⁴⁷⁷ On 28 April 1960, known as the 'Black Thursday', during the incidents at İstanbul University, Forestry Faculty student Turan Emeksiz got killed by the Police, and about 40 others wounded. The Menderes Government then declared state of emergency in the cities of İstanbul and Ankara.

and his like simply continued their old policies of scaring their opponents away, showing that they had not drawn the necessary lessons from the latest events. All the efforts of the T/C leaders were oriented towards the delay of the establishment of the Republic. Now that the question of the drafting of the Constitution had been resolved, the T/C leaders had suddenly brought up the issue of the ‘30 percent’ ratio, at a time when the numbers of qualified people fell far short of the quota allocated to the T/Cs. According to *Kim*, Dr. Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were concerned in getting good salaried jobs for their obedient followers, rather than well-running state affairs in the hands of competent civil servants (Hasgüler, 2005: 186).

Most certainly, the greatest challenge to the T/C nationalist leadership came from the pro-Republican, liberal left-oriented Dr. İhsan Ali of Paphos⁴⁷⁸, and Ayhan M. Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan, known as the ‘Barristers’ [*Avukatlar*] or ‘Journalists’ [*Gazeteciler*], founders and editors of the weekly newspaper ‘*Cumhuriyet*’ [Republic], and founders of the ‘Turkish–Cypriot People’s Party’ [*Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi*]. According to

⁴⁷⁸ In the 1940, and 1950s, Dr. İhsan Ali (Coşar) (1904–1978) was the communal leader of the T/Cs of Paphos, and belonged to the same age cohort of leaders as Necati Özkan, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Ahmet Faiz Kaymak, and the Judge Mehmet Zekâ. Dr. İhsan Ali was a staunch critic of Taksim, and defender of the common, and independent Republic. After the outbreak of interethnic violence on 21 December 1963, Dr. İhsan Ali refused to pass to the T/C sector of Paphos, so he stayed out of enclave life. Being the archenemy of Rauf R. Denktaş and his followers, İhsan Ali was labelled by the latter as the ‘quisling’ of G/Cs. In 1998, Aydın Akkurt published his book ‘The Spies of Georghadjis’ [*Yorgacis’in Casusları*], where he accused Dr. İhsan Ali and the two murdered editors of the weekly *Cumhuriyet* [Republic], Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan, of being spies for the G/C Minister of Interior Affairs Polycarpus Georghadjis. See In 1970, İhsan Ali became Makarios’s advisor. He died in Southern Cyprus, in 1978. Commenting on the Akkurt book, Kenan Çoygun, the ‘legendary’ TMT commander of the enclave period, told T/C journalist Halil Paşa that Dr. İhsan Ali was a ‘true patriot’ [*“O gerçek bir yurtseverdi”*], and it was a shame to call him a spy. See, “*Bu Adadan İhsan Ali Geçti (2)*”, (Yeniçağ, 18 March 2011).

Ulus Irkad, the conflict between İhsan Ali and the Barristers, and Denktaş and his followers was actually one between the pro-CHP left Kemalists, and the pro-Menderes, reactionary, counter-insurgency forces. It was also the reflection of the splits and controversies in Turkey, between the old CHP bureaucracy, and the new DP bureaucracy.⁴⁷⁹ Apparently, Dr. İhsan Ali and Ayhan M. Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan tried to take advantage of the new conjuncture, namely, (a) the balance of forces amongst the major players of the Cyprus issue underlying the foundation of the Republic, and (b) the anti-DP swing in Turkey's domestic politics, to challenge the political power of the radical T/C nationalists. And, they tried doing that, on the one hand, by courageously expanding the realm of plural, competitive politics, through the establishment of a new opposition party and newspaper, and on the other, by using the leverage of the Turkish Ambassador's power and influence. Thus, the first issue of *Cumhuriyet* was suggestively published on 16 August 1960, the very day of the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus. In their introductory note, 'Our Course and

⁴⁷⁹ See, "1950'li Yılların Sonlarına Doğru Kıbrıs'ta Keskinleşen Politik Tartışmalar, Ulus Irkad, (Yeniçağ, 26 April 2012); "1950'lerden 1963'leri Anlamak ve İnönü'den Dr. İhsan Ali'ye Gelen Mektup, Ulus Irkad (Yeniçağ, 06 September 2012). Irkad's emphasis on the reflections to Cyprus of the struggles in Turkey between CHP and DP, and pro-CHP bureaucracy and pro-Menderes bureaucracy, etc. is important, since this was perhaps the most important of the key elements of the background to the struggles in Cyprus. On the other hand, the CHP-DP is too narrow a framework to comprehend some of the continuities, and all the differences. As a matter of fact, the tensions between the goals of Turkey's foreign policy and the goals of pro-Taksim T/C nationalists was not a product of the CHP-DP differences and of the 27 May coup, but was always there, and can be dated back, even to 1878, when the Ottoman Empire de facto, and certainly to Lausanne, when the Republic of Turkey de jure relinquished their rights over the Island. Also recall that, in the early 1950s, DP refused to even recognise the presence of the Cyprus issue, and after the Zurich-London Agreements, tried to restrict those activities of the T/C nationalists which aimed at *Taksim*. Similarly, during the period of 1965-1967, Rauf R. Denktaş, then in exile in Ankara, was politically isolated the pro-DP Süleyman Demirel Government. On the other hand, the conservative upper brass of generals of the Turkish Armed Forces, organised under the so-called Armed Forces Union, that resuscitated TMT in 1963 were also strongly anti-DP.

Ideals' [*Yolumuz ve İdeallerimiz*], Hikmet and Gürkan expounded the guiding principles of their editorial policy. *Cumhuriyet* was published to fill the gap of an independent newspaper in the T/C community. Its basic motto would be the great Atatürk's 'Peace at Home, Peace in the World' [*Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh*], and it would strive to make Cyprus the finest example of that motto. According to the editors, sovereignty belonged to the nation [*Hakimiyet Milletindir*], and the nation/community had the final say [*Söz Milletindir*].⁴⁸⁰ The realisation of these principles required the institution of a democratic life, free from all sorts of oppression, and asking the community its view in all matters that concerned it, as well as being accountable to the community. Furthermore, *Cumhuriyet* would defend the idea of the community's (economic) development in democracy and freedom. As a matter of fact, the elimination of all sorts of fear would by itself guarantee the rise of the T/C community. *Cumhuriyet* also promised to defend the rights of the T/C peasants and workers.⁴⁸¹ Finally, it would serve as a forum for the free expression of all sorts of independent ideas (An, 1996: 103–104). On the other hand, *Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi* was founded on 27 September 1960, in Limassol, and held a series of meetings in

⁴⁸⁰ Note the resemblance with 'Yeter, Söz Milletindir' [Enough, Let the Nation Have the Say], the famous campaign slogan of DP prior to the elections of 1950.

⁴⁸¹ According to Ahmet An, the parts of the newspaper about workers' problems were written by the AKEL member, T/C trade unionist Derviş Ali Kavazoğlu. On April 11 1965, he and Kostas Misiaoulis were ambushed and shot to death by TMT, on the Nicosia–Larnaka road. Former TMT members have openly avowed TMT's responsibility in the murders. See, "TMT'yle İlgili Bilinmeyenler...", Ahmet Tolgay, (*Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 16 January 2013).

Nicosia, Paphos, and Larnaca.⁴⁸² The first public proclamation of the Party defended the liberal ideas that constructive and well-organised opposition was the key to the development of freedom and democracy, without which no society could economically, socially, morally, and scientifically progress to achieve plenty and happiness (An, 1996: 116–117). According to Ayhan M. Hikmet, economic development was the biggest problem facing the T/C community. The most immediate task to overcome it was the preparation by a commission of experts of an economic programme based upon scientific principles, and detailed surveys of the conditions of farmers, shopkeepers, and all other economic strata. The economy was to be based upon the principles of social justice, and productive *étatisme*. On the other hand, any proposed attempts at economic development at the cost of the curtailment of basic freedoms and democratic rights were to be rejected outright—apparently a critique of the nationalist leadership’s economic policies, and most likely, ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ (An, 1996: 105).

The emergence of new opposition in Cyprus was well received by the anti-DP press in Turkey. Thus, in its 21 September 1960 issue, *Kim* gave coverage to the T/C newspaper *Cumhuriyet*. According to *Kim*, Dr. Küçük had accused the two barristers, Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan of being communists. Yet, despite all the efforts made by the leaders, the ranks of the opposition increased, and people had the courage to stand against the duo of Küçük–Denktaş, and speak out. The revolution in Turkey

⁴⁸² Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan was General Secretary, and Hikmet, Organising Secretary. Dr. İhsan Ali was amongst the founders, and elected to the Executive Board of Paphos district (An, 1996: 119).

had partly refrained those who had banked on the support of Menderes and associates. They were concerned that they could be called to account, for all the incoming aid and donations had been squandered—which was exactly what bounded the two together. On the other hand, there was a serious quarrel going on between Dr. Küçük and Denktaş over the placements to the government posts, apparently because the former had appointed people who, just a couple of years ago, were declared traitors. Apparently, the problem was that most of those appointed were not Denktaş's men, whereas Denktaş was accustomed to place his own informers (Hasgüler, 2005: 201).

It is important to note that Dr. İhsan Ali, and Ayhan M. Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan through *Cumhuriyet* dared to directly confront the T/C leadership, and were vilely targeted at by the Denktaş clique of nationalists, through the *Federasyon*–TMT newspaper, *Nacak*. In fact, they confronted all the core institutions and organs that were the loci of the Denktaş clique's power, namely, *Federasyon*, its newspaper *Nacak*, and the Communal Chamber. Under the new state structure of the Republic, Denktaş pursued the policy of the conversion and extension of *Federasyon* into the Communal Chamber, by means of tightly controlled electoral processes—single-candidate, single-list 'elections' under the rhetoric of the protection of national unity. Therefore, *Federasyon* became dysfunctional, and precisely three years after he became its president, on 27 October 1957, Rauf R. Denktaş resigned from his post, which he announced in a farewell note published in the 26 October 1960 issue of *Nacak*. In response, the 31 October 1960 issue of *Cumhuriyet* published a trenchant editorial critique of

Denktaş and *Federasyon*. In this, editors argued that Denktaş's claim that *Federasyon* was a supra-party, non-political organisation was senseless, for *Federasyon* was one of the pillars of the so-called National Front, in the elections for the representative organs of the Republic. Furthermore, *Federasyon*'s newspaper, *Nacak* had heretofore been preoccupied by nothing but politics. Denktaş's hurry to leave *Federasyon* and assume the Presidency of the Communal Chamber, and called upon all non-elected member of the Chamber, including Denktaş himself, to resign and let the people choose its representatives through multi-candidate, multi-party elections, in line with the winds of democracy now blowing over the country. Editors also raised doubts about the personal accounts of Denktaş, concerning the term of his presidency. *Cumhuriyet* also claimed that, although Denktaş had promised electors that Communal Chamber members would not be paid, some members were now demanding £ 100 monthly, or £ 5 for each session, adding up to £ 36,000 per year, which the community could ill afford to pay. On 26 December 1960, Dr. İhsan Ali, treating the same question of the cost to T/Cs of the Communal Chamber, accused the nationalist leaders of mimicking the wasteful corrupt policies of Menderes. Whilst G/Cs, as the larger community, had 23 representatives in the Communal Chamber, the Turkish Communal Chamber had 30 members, just to please relatives and friends. But, this was precisely a Menderes-like course: Act irrationally and painlessly, earn and hand out enormous salaries, then ask the already strained Turkish Government money for 'development', or squeeze poor people for taxes, and attack those who

criticise these improper acts.⁴⁸³ *Federasyon* newspaper *Nacak* often launched fierce attacks upon *Cumhuriyet*, by accusing its editors, Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan by traitorship. On the other hand, *Cumhuriyet* criticised *Nacak* for failing to support the Cyprus Mine Corporation (CMC) strike on the grounds that it was ‘ideological’, promoting violence (intra-community killings), endeavouring for the collapse of Zurich–London Agreements, fomenting inter-ethnic animosity, for its intolerance of *Cumhuriyet*’s criticisms of the extravagances of the nationalist elite, etc.⁴⁸⁴ The conflict between the two newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and *Nacak* continued to the last day, culminating and ending with the bombings of the *Bayraktar* and *Ömeriye* mosques in Nicosia, the night of 24–25 March 1962, and the brutal murders of Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan, the night of 23–24 April, 1962.

On the other hand, in his critiques, Dr. İhsan Ali claimed that the T/C nationalist leaders had so exalted Celâl Bayar, and particularly, Adnan Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, that they had practically substituted the former for Atatürk. Apparently, İhsan Ali resigned from the presidency of

⁴⁸³ “Biz daha işe başlarken Menderes rejiminde olduğu gibi Yağma Hasanın böreği kabilinden bir israfla başladık. Rumlar Cemaat Meclisinde 23 aza bulundururken, biz eşî dostu memnun etmek için 30 aza bulunduruyoruz. Sonra bu israfi ve akla, hayale gelmeyen muazzam miktarlardaki maaşları karşılamak için Türkiye hükümetinden – sıkışık durumunu bildiğimiz Türkiye hükümetinden para isteyeceksin. Yağma yok. Sen Menderesvâri bir gidişat takib edeceksin. Akıllı, izanlı ve plânlı hareket etmeyeceksin. Aksine olarak biraz yukarıda belirttiğimiz gibi muazzam maaşlar alacaksın ve dağıtacaksın. Sonra da Türkiye hükümetinden kalkınmak (?) için para istiyeceksin. Veyahut da biçare halkı vergiden ezeceksin. Ve bu uygunsuz hareketleri tenkid edenler yine Menderesvari hücumla uğrayacaklar...” Quoted by An (1996: 115), [sic].

⁴⁸⁴ See, “*Cumhuriyet Gerçeği* (Yenidüzen gazetesi yazı dizisi, 22 Nisan–15 Mayıs 1998)”, Salih Öztoprak, (<http://www.stwing.upenn.edu/~durduran/hamambocu/authors/dsy/cumhuriyet/>, 28 January 2010).

the Turkish Club in Paphos when the pictures of Menderes and Zorlu were put on the wall by the pro-*Taksim* nationalists—whom had to be put down a year or so later, as 27 May took place. According to Dr. İhsan Ali, the DP Government was blameful for having built a chauvinistic, nationalist momentum from which later governments were not able to free and to which they were compelled to adapt (Ali, 2002: 41–42). Clearly, Dr. İhsan Ali and the Barristers often tried to make use of the 27 May leverage against the die-hard nationalists. Thus, a couple of days after the 27 May coup, Dr. İhsan Ali flew to Ankara, to personally report the activities of the T/C leaders, to İsmet İnönü, and Bülent Ecevit. Although an appointment was arranged with İnönü, this was obstructed, for after he met Ecevit, the day before, he was taken by soldiers to the airport and sent back to Cyprus, apparently on the orders of Alpaslan Türkeş, and upon the notice of the T/C leaders. On the other hand, the 28 November 1960 issue of *Cumhuriyet* argued that, whilst there were most certainly a number of unresolved problems between the two communities, the course to be followed were peaceful negotiations through the Council of Ministers, House of Representatives, Supreme Constitutional Court, the President, Vice-President, and the mediation of, Greece and Turkey, in the final instance. *Cumhuriyet* also asked the T/Cs, to beware of agitators and the instigators of inter-communal clashes, not to pay heed to provocative newspaper articles, and to channel their efforts to the resolution of the economic problems of the Island, following the advices of Turkish Ambassador Emin Dirvana, and under the quiet of Zurich–London Agreements (An, 1996: 120–121).

According to the 7 August 1961 issue of *Cumhuriyet*, the newspapers *Halkın Sesi*, *Bozkurt*, and *Nacak* put at risk the future of the T/Cs, by bringing up *Taksim* under the cover of answering the *Enosisist* clamour. Furthermore, this clearly contradicted the policy of the Motherland, as demonstrated by the latest public statement of President Cemal Gürsel in which the latter argued that liability to the Agreements and the continuance of the Republic served the best interests of the T/Cs.

Under the conditions of the political setting after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, and the 27 May coup and its continuing support to the Zurich–London Agreements, the monolithic politics of the T/C nationalist leadership now encountered the problem of emergent opposition forces, in party politics, and the press—particularly, the liberal–left opposition of Dr. İhsan Ali and the Barristers.

In retrospect, it is clear that one of the most interesting points of conflict between the liberal–left pro-Republicans and the die-hard nationalists, particularly, the Denktaş clique, was in the realm of development strategies. The former supported in interesting mixture of politically and culturally liberal, and economically state–led, planned model of development, based upon social justice for peasants and workers, in a politically and economically united and integrated Cyprus. The latter supported a politically and culturally monolithic, and economically state–led model of development, oriented towards the promotion of a separate, Turkified economy and the constitution of clientalistic–corporatist relations of control

over the peasantry and workers. Clearly, underlying the conflict between Cumhuriyet and the nationalists was, amongst other things, the different visions concerning the mode of the incorporation of labouring classes into the new polity of the Republic of Cyprus.

- ***Emin Dırvana, 27 May Regime's Ambassador, Arrives on the Island***

On 16 August 1960, the Turkish Ambassador Emin Dırvana arrived on the Island, where he stayed a little longer than two years, until 26 September 1962. Apparently, it does not take too long for Dırvana and Rauf R. Denktaş to fall out. On 17 August, a group of communal leaders visit Dırvana. According to his own account, Denktaş argues that G/Cs are most likely to obliterate the Agreements ahead of the 1965 elections, so when that day comes, he wishes, Ambassador Dırvana would leave the Island as Governor of Turkey. Dırvana gets furious, bangs on the table, and tells his visitors that these Agreements bear Turkey's signature, so no one could dare to obliterate them, that they would live on (Denktaş, 2000: 166). Denktaş points out that, Dırvana did actually follow the instructions of the 'Revolution Government' [*İhtilâl Hükümeti*], that Turkey wanted no problems in Cyprus, that Denktaş and his companions were pro-*Taksimists* to be watched over. Thus, according to Denktaş, the first Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus had more confidence in Makarios than in themselves, would tell Dr. Küçük that political affairs were his turf, and not Denktaş's, trying to set the closest two friends at odds (Denktaş, 2000: 162–167).

According to the 3 October 1960 issue of *Akis*, the coming of Emin Dırvana eased off the pressure exercised by Dr. Fazıl Küçük. Thus, in the elections held for the two seats vacated by the two T/C representatives entering the Council of Ministers, one seat went to the Kemal Deniz, merchant as well as the former Secretary of the Turkish Union of Farmers [*Türk Çiftçiler Birliği*], who had been known for his opposition to Dr. Küçük. Furthermore, now that the new conditions were relatively free of oppression, some Turks had held a meeting in Limassol, to establish a new party, namely, *Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi*. Kim defended a multi-party order, where Turkey would keep impartial, and which would be conducted within civilised norms, and in unity and solidarity *vis-à-vis* the G/Cs (Hasgüler, 2005: 192–193).⁴⁸⁵

To be able to fully appreciate what that was at stake between Ambassador Emin Dırvana, on the one hand, and Rauf R. Denктаş and his associates, on the other, one can look at the brief polemic that took place between the two sides in 1964, after the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁸⁵ Ambassador Emin Dırvana lifted opponent leaders' bans to enter Turkey, including Dr İhsan Ali, and Necati Özkan, the unchallenged leader of the T/C community in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the early 1950s, Özkan lost the leadership contest to Dr. Fazıl Küçük. In late 1952 or early 1953, Özkan was denied a visa by Ambassador Burhan Işın, who apparently conspired with Faiz Kaymak to prepare a letter of denunciation, which claimed that he was actually an Arab, had connections to AKEL, and tried to ruin fellow T/C merchants. The ban was lifted on the initiative of Emin Dırvana, in August 1961 (Birinci, 2001a: 101; 2001b: 299–300, 303, 305–6).

⁴⁸⁶ Thus, from 22 March to 4 April 1964, the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* published a 14-part serial, written by Ömer Sami Coşar, in which the latter, especially in parts two and three, blamed Dırvana for the state the T/Cs had now fallen into. This was followed by a riposte by the Ministry of Affairs, in defence of Dırvana, then a sequel to Coşar's serial, by Rauf R. Denктаş, and finally, a riposte to Denктаş, now by Dırvana himself, all in the pages of *Milliyet*. Ömer Sami Coşar was a nationalist Turkish journalist who had been appointed by Denктаş as the head of the Department of Social Affairs and Municipalities of the Communal Chamber, as a direct link to Turkey, to bypass Ambassador Dırvana, and the TMT commander 'Kaya Bey', substitute for the now deposed Rıza Vuruşkan. See, Denктаş (2000: 165). Ahmet An (1996: 163) notes that Ömer Sami Coşar was known for his close ties to the National Intelligence Organisation [*Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı*].

Thus, Ömer Sami Coşar—Turkish journalist closely associated with Denктаş, accused Dırvana of barring the purchase of shotguns for the defence of remote villages, of leniency towards Makarios, of setting the stage for the ‘Comedy of Democracy’ [*Demokrasi Komedyası*] that had produced a state of total wretchedness [*perişanlık*] on the part of the T/C politics.⁴⁸⁷ According to Coşar, Dırvana’s Comedy of Democracy had entirely disrupted the unity of the T/Cs, by the falling out of the following four groups: (i) The Turkish Embassy and *Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi* which pretended to be siding up with it; (ii) Vice-President Dr. Küçük, his three ministers, and *Millî Birlik Partisi* [National Unity Party]; (iii) President of the Communal Chamber Denктаş and Chamber members, and; (iv) T/C representatives at the joint House of Representatives. As a matter of fact, rather than helping to found a solid coordination amongst the representatives of a small community of 100 thousand, the Embassy had precipitated the breakup. Furthermore, this wretched state of affairs was all normal from the point of view of Dırvana, who espoused the ‘democratic mentality’ that the 27 May had brought about.⁴⁸⁸ Coşar accused not only Dırvana, but other employees of the Embassy, and even the Ministry of Foreign of Affairs, of failing to foresee what the future course of events would bring. Thus, only a year and a half before the outbreak of bloody incidents, in June 1962, the Representatives of the T/C Community—i.e. the Denктаş-dominated Communal Chamber, had applied to the Turkish

⁴⁸⁷ “İfşa Ediyorum (2), Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nin Ölü Doğduğu Biliniyordu, Bir Kaç Sene Sonra Rum’ların, Tekrar Silâhlı Tecavüzlerle Türkleri Tasfiyeye Gideceğini Gösteren Deliller Pek Çoktu”, Ömer Sami Coşar, (*Milliyet*, 23 March 1964).

⁴⁸⁸ “27 Mayıs’ın getirdiği demokratik zihniyet bu.”

Embassy, for assistance in the institution of a separate tax administration, to levy and collect personal and succession [*veraset*] taxes, on the grounds that Makarios had continuously been violating the Constitution, and the coexistence of the two communities would gradually become impossible. According to Coşar, in those days, the Embassy had a consultant—Fiscal Consultant [*Maliye Müşaviri*] Neziroğlu—who was unable to account for the possible course of the ‘Cyprus cause’, and, looking at the expenses of Turkey only in terms of narrowly-defined fiscal costs and benefits, failed to appreciate that there could also be fiscal expenses useful in terms of their political returns to the cause. Apparently, in his response, Neziroğlu argued that the levies and collection through the central government as before would, (i) enable the just distribution of state expenditures between the two communities, and (ii) keep the tax policy at the disposal of the central state as a key macroeconomic and social policy tool. Otherwise, he argued, Communal Chambers would face serious problems in the collection of taxes, cooperation between the two communities would weaken, and the standing of the state would be dealt a big blow. Furthermore, Dırvana supported Neziroğlu, by arguing that the separation of tax administration would unnecessarily escalate the level of conflict between the two communities.⁴⁸⁹ It was clear that the claims of Coşar closely echoed the views of Rauf R. Denktaş, whose sequel was published on 16 March 1964, possibly, to support the former against the riposte of the Ministry of

⁴⁸⁹ “İfşa Ediyorum (3), İleri Görüşü Kıt Kişilerin Cezasını Kimler Çekiyor?.., Kıbrıs Cumhuriyetinin İtibarını Kurtarmak Bahanesiyle Türklerin, Bundan Bir Buçuk Yıl Evvel Federatif Sistemin İlk Adımlarını Atmasına İzin Verilmemişti”, Ömer Sami Coşar, (*Milliyet*, 23 March 1964).

Affairs.⁴⁹⁰ According to Denктаş, there were all the indications that G/Cs abrogate the Agreements at the first opportunity they got, and would destroy the Republic by all sorts of *faits accomplis*. Therefore, the T/C community should have responded by counter-measures in self-protection. ‘We’ had turned our backs on the warriors [*mücahitler*] of 1958, and there were traitors, such as Dr. İhsan Ali and his comrades Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan and Ayhan Hikmet, who constantly vilified the warriors, and worked to destroy the unity of the T/C community. Furthermore, the Embassy had established close ties to these people, whilst ignoring those of ‘us’ shouldering the administration of the community. Dırvana even lifted the bans of İhsan Ali and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan to enter Turkey, supposedly because this was what ‘democracy’ all about. Denктаş also pointed out that the Youth Organisation [*Gençlik Teşkilâtı*], and ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ campaign had been abolished during the two years of Dırvana’s ambassadorship. Denктаş also argued that ‘our’ demands to found a coordination committee to ensure cooperation amongst the various administrative organs had also been rejected by Dırvana.⁴⁹¹ In his riposte to Denктаş, Emin Dırvana points out that his basic duties involved the continuance of the Republic of Cyprus, whose founding agreements Turkey had undersigned and guaranteed, together with her allies. Accordingly, he and the Turkish Government knew only too well, who were up to disrupting this order, whether they be G/C, or others. Dırvana claimed that, during his

⁴⁹⁰ “‘İfşa Ediyorum’ Yazı Serisiyle İlgili Bir Açıklama”, (Milliyet, 11.04.1964).

⁴⁹¹ “Kıbrıs’ta İşlenen Hâtâlar”, Rauf Denктаş, *Kıbrıs Türk Cemaat Meclis Başkanı*, (Milliyet, 16 April 1964).

stay, everyone from himself got the treatment their behaviour deserved, and tried to orient minds and emotions towards constructive, rather than destructive ends, citing examples of how he had achieved success in earning the respect of even ex-EOKA people, and improving relations between the two communities. According to Dırvana, his other key task in Cyprus was to assist the economic, social and cultural development of the T/C community—which also was the primary responsibility of Denктаş as the President of the Communal Chamber. For all the mechanisms of this development, i.e. schools, sportive, social and cultural associations, the comprehensive system of cooperatives, *Evkaf* property, the £ one and a half million of *Evkaf* monies, received from the British as compensation, Turkey’s fiscal and in-kind aids on a yearly basis—all these were completely under the control of the Communal Chamber, which was fully free of any G/C interference, and of which Denктаş was the ‘invariable’ [*değişmez*] leader. Dırvana claimed that they—he and all those fiscal, cultural, trade and agricultural credit experts he had tried so hard to provide from Turkey—had made all the efforts to focus the attentions of Denктаş and his associates upon the issue of development, all to no avail, for the latter were too consumed with their petty quarrels with their G/C counterparts. On the other hand, Dırvana argued that the so-called demands to found a coordination committee to ensure cooperation amongst the various administrative organs were likely to be the expression of Denктаş’s desire of holding the reins.⁴⁹²

⁴⁹² “*Denктаş Hakikati Tahriif Ediyor*”, Emin Dırvana, Sâbık Lefkoşa Büyükelçisi, (Milliyet, 15 May 1964).

Rauf R. Denktaş, was not either happy with Ambassador Mazhar Özkol, who had replaced Mazhar Özkol, and who was not a career diplomat, but an economist. According to Denktaş, Özkol also thought that the Cyprus issue had been resolved with the foundation of the Republic, and the basic issues were now the improvement of the T/C economy.⁴⁹³

In retrospect, one can see that Turkey's Cyprus policy under the 27 May/İnönü Governments and Emin Dirvana's ambassadorship created three specific problems on the part of the diehard T/C nationalists. Firstly, the new conditions allowed the radical opponents of the T/C nationalist, to organise alternative parties, to speak out relatively freely, under the tacit support of Dirvana, making it more difficult the monolithic organisation of politics under the rhetoric of the necessity of ensuring 'national/communal unity'. Secondly, Turkey and Dirvana supported the improvement of the relationships between the two communities, which clearly put a break upon the 'escalatory' politics of diehard T/C nationalists. And, thirdly, Dirvana and the Embassy clearly supported the giving of the priority to the economic development of the T/C community.

- ***27 May and the Temporary Dismantling of TMT, and its Recuperation***

The rulers of the 27 May regime temporarily dismantled TMT, as the extension in Cyprus of the Special Warfare Department, suspected of being

⁴⁹³ “Ankara, Kıbrıs meselesine Cumhuriyetin kuruluşu ile “halledildi” gözü ile bakıyordu. Sorun, Türk toplumunun ekonomisi düzeltmekti!. Halbuki Makarios hergün yaptığı beyanatlara ve aldığı tedbirlerle 1960 Anlaşmaları ile oluşan düzendeki siyasi mücadele için de durmadan hazırlanıyordu.” (Denktaş, 2000: 167-8)

the private, secret army of the ousted Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. However, Menderes as well was apparently concerned about the activities of the Special Warfare Department. Thus, 26 February 1959, i.e. only days after the conclusion of Zurich and London Agreements, Menderes was briefed by the Department President Major General Daniş Karabelen, Lieutenant Colonel İsmail Tansu and TMT leader Rıza Vuruşkan. According to the account of Tansu, Menderes expressed his concerns over the repercussions of the Department potential activities under the new circumstances. Thus, he informed the Department members of the latest developments in foreign policy, emphasised the importance of Turco–Greek amity, and the centrality of peaceful solutions (Kılıç, 2010: 93–94). According to İsmail Tansu, there were differences between Menderes and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, as to the use of armed force. Zorlu supported TMT, and put the Special Warfare Department to the centre of his Cyprus policy. On the other hand, Menderes was generally for the resolutions of problems by peace, trying to avoid direct confrontations, but, in the final analysis, he was persuaded (Kılıç, 106–107). The leaders of the 27 May coup dealt a big blow to the Department, which they regarded as the special organisation of Menderes. Apparently, the Department found out about the coup only two hours before it took place. Zorlu, as the most enthusiastic sponsor of TMT, was now confined to the Island of *Yassıada*, and amongst the 235 generals and admirals the new rulers retired, was Daniş Karabelen, the founding commander of the Special Warfare Department, whose brother was the DP representative Danyal Akbal. About ten other members of the Department,

who had relatives amongst the DP leaders and representatives, were also retired. Allocations to the Department were cut, and the new rulers even considered closing the Department altogether. Apparently, İsmail Tansu, who was left in charge of the Department after the removal of Karabelen, went to see Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, Undersecretary to the Prime Minister, who believed that the Department had strayed from its original purpose—fighting communism, to become the private organisation of Adnan Menderes. But when Tansu reveals Türkeş the activities of TMT, the latter promises to keep the Department open and releases its allotment (Kılıç, 2010: 97–99).⁴⁹⁴ Until the purge of the 14 radical officers, including Türkeş, from the NUC, on 13 November 1960, everything went smoothly for the Special Warfare Department. However, after the purge, the activities of the Department came back onto the agenda of MBK, the purge of Department officers continued, and 10 more officers were retired, or had to retire. Apparently, the dominant view was that the Cyprus issue had been resolved for good, so as far as the activities of TMT was concerned, supplies and trainings were reduced, fiscal allotments from the budget of the Ministry of Defence were stopped, and officers were commissioned as if the TMT duties were ordinary tasks.⁴⁹⁵ As the coup officers realised that, given

⁴⁹⁴ Apparently, the belief that the Special Warfare Department recruited, and armed and trained some sort of a pro-Government militia to be mobilised in the case of attempted the military take-over, was widely shared amongst the military rulers of 27 May, due to the rumours caused by the secret shipment of arms from the armoury in Etlik, Ankara, to a secret destination, which was Cyprus. Thus, the nature of the real activities of the Department was known by very few officers, probably, by Generals Rüştü Erdelhun and Cevdet Sunay (Satan and Şentürk, 2012: 110; 515).

⁴⁹⁵ According to Kızılyürek (2007a: 102), all arms shipments to TMT were basically stopped after the case of '*Deniz*', when on 18–19 October 1959, the arms shipment through the *Deniz* boat was intercepted by the British. Except a small delivery in 1962, all

the United States' continuing support to the Special Warfare Department, it was impossible to close it, they decided to control it, by way of appointing to its commandership pro-27 officers. See, Satan and Şentürk (2012: 516–7), and Kılıç (2010: 101–103).⁴⁹⁶

The attitude of the MBK leaders against the Special Warfare Department naturally had serious repercussions on TMT in Cyprus. For one thing, Rıza Vuruşkan, the Department officer who, since 1 August 1958, had been serving as the covert commander of TMT was called back, sent a farewell letter to Rauf R. Denктаş, dated 4 October 1960, and transferring the task to Şefik Karakurt⁴⁹⁷, left the Island, for good. See, Denктаş (2000: 163). According to Aydın Samioğlu, the noted Nicosia Commander [*Serdar*] of TMT, after the 27 May coup, inside MBK, there were two views about the possible fate of TMT, one for and one against. Generally, the MBK members were very emotional about everybody who had taken offices under the Menderes Government, and purged the upper echelons of TMT entirely. Those who were against TMT argued that since Turkish Army Contingent was now there on the Island to protect the T/Cs, the continuance of TMT was unnecessary, asking for its demobilisation. In the early days of 27 May, Samioğlu is the Ankara Coordinator of TMT. He, Burhan Nalbantoğlu—one of the three founders of TMT, and the now relieved Rıza Vuruşkan met a few times some of the MBK members, in which they made it clear that

shipments to Cyprus were stopped and were only resumed in 1963. According to Fuat Veziroğlu, shipments ceased in the fall of 1961 (Satan and Şentürk, 2012: 109)

⁴⁹⁶ İsmail Tansu also decides to retire, before facing a possible exile (Kılıç, 2010: 108–9).

⁴⁹⁷ His public alias was 'Mustafa Kaya', and code name inside TMT, 'Dağlı'.

TMT was founded and worked to fight the enemy, not to suppress dissidents.⁴⁹⁸ Apparently, those against prevailed, and there followed a period of slowdown for TMT in Cyprus, for about two years. During this period, Rauf R. Denktaş seems to have made considerable efforts to resuscitate TMT, sending twice reports to Ankara with Samioğlu as his courier, to be delivered to the authorities via Mehmet Ertuğruloğlu, President of *Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği* [Turkish–Cypriot Association of Culture]. Finally, TMT gets reactivated, for which the coming of the Bayraktar Kenan Çoygun, known by his alias Kemal Coşkun (An, 2002: 161–162).⁴⁹⁹

Kenan Çoygun, as the second *Bayraktar* after Rıza Vuruşkan, assumed his post on 3 October 1962 (Keser, 2012a: 162). According to Samioğlu, the period of slowdown was also one of disorder and disarray amongst the ranks of TMT, with arbitrary acts [*keyfî davranışlar*] due to the lack of discipline (An, 2002: 161). Between the first and the second *Bayraktars*, i.e. Vuruşkan and Samioğlu, there was a period when Mustafa Kaya sat in as the head of TMT. Apparently, Mustafa Kaya tried his best to counteract and liquidate Rauf R. Denktaş, and Burhan Nalbantoğlu, two of the three original founders of TMT—as a matter of fact, he was one to the three adversaries Denktaş seems to have hated the most, along with Ambassador Emin Dırvana, and Dr. İhsan Ali. Furthermore, according to the more or less

⁴⁹⁸ Samioğlu's term of office ended on August 19 August 1960, after which he returned to Cyprus. We were then appointed as Coordinator of Bayraktarlık [TMT Command Headquarters], which continued up the outbreak of conflicts in December 1963 (An, 2002: 162).

⁴⁹⁹ See also, Besim (2011: 78–79).

direct testimonies of a number of people, there was, at one point, a roll of seven people to be shot, including Denктаş, Nalbantoğlu, Orhan Müderrisoğlu, and Aydın Samioğlu. When Mehmet Ertuğruloğlu was informed of the news, he talked to Memduh Tağmaç, Second Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, and the authors of the roll were ordered to stop.⁵⁰⁰ Nonetheless, Burhan Nalbantoğlu was beaten up by certain TMT commanders—now being won to his side by Mustafa Kaya, to warn him to keep from, apparently, provoking incidents between T/Cs and G/Cs. The beating of Nalbantoğlu seems to have raised a great concern amongst the cadres of TMT (An, 2002: 159–160). The background of the incident is too dark to allow safe speculation, but one must nevertheless take note of the conflict between Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Burhan Nalbantoğlu—the noted hardliner of those times, unlike the late Nalbantoğlu, who supported peace and told TMT was just a ‘joke’—about the use of violence. According to the testimony of Alpay Durduran, Dr. Küçük totally disliked Nalbantoğlu. Thus, during the period of the common Republic of 1960–1963, Dr. Küçük came against the use of armed action, on the grounds that its political consequences would be too grave, whereas Nalbantoğlu, in agreement with the lower echelons, continued to run the Organisation [*Teşkilât*, TMT],

⁵⁰⁰ Alpay Durduran, the former President of TKP, gives a different account of probably the same case, as told to himself by the late Nalbantoğlu. It is the Commander of Turkish Armed Forces, Cevdet Sunay who, upon seeing his name on the roll issued by ‘*Teşkilât*’ [Organisation, i.e. TMT], who calls Nalbantoğlu to Ankara, talks to him, and sends him back to Cyprus, saving his life: “*O zamanlar TMT’nin disiplini içinde vurulacakların ismini Genelkurmay Başkanlığı onaylarmış. Bir gün Burhan’a Ankara’dan, ‘Çok çabuk gel de [sic, H.A.] önemli bir şey var,’ diye bir haber gelmiş. O zamanın Genelkurmay Başkanı Cevdet Sunay, Burhan Nalbantoğlu’nu TMT’den eğitim için gittiği günlerden tanıyor. Vur emrini görünce, ‘Ben bu ismi Teşkilatın kuruluş günlerinden tanırım. Vurulacak biri olamaz,’ diyerek Burhan’ı Ankara’ya çağırılmış, konuyu ona hiç açmadan farklı şeyler konuşarak geri Kıbrıs’a göndermiş. Ve böylece bir hatadan dönülmüş.*” (An, 2002: 159)

outside the knowledge of even İsmet İnönü.⁵⁰¹

The relationship between the changes in the balances amongst the various cadres, ranks etc. inside the Turkish Armed Forces and the resuscitation of the Special Warfare Department and TMT remains obscure. Recall that, the years 1960–1961 were characterised by struggles between the junior ranks of the NUC and the top brass generals, who founded the so-called Armed Forces Union (AFU), and whose honorary leader was General Cevdet Sunay, Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces (4 August 1960–15 March 1966). It is important to note that Cemal Gürsel’s failure to purge, in June 1961, the Commander of the Turkish Air Forces General İrfan Tansel in the face of resistance by the top brass, marked the transition of power from MBK to the AFU. Following the two abortive coups by junior officers on 22 February 1962 and 20/21 May 1963, the proponents of the 27 May were altogether purged. Ecevit Kılıç notes that the Special Warfare Department’s reprise to prominence was pursuant to the proliferation of socialist ideas in the midst of the free environment ensured by 27 May, the rise of workers’ and students’ movements, and thereby, the identification of communism as enemy number one, the way it was in the 1950s. He also argues that the Department’s golden age came under Sunay’s commandship of the Turkish Armed Forces, and after Süleyman Demirel’s premiership, when

⁵⁰¹ In retrospect, Nalbantoğlu thought ‘the Doctor’ was right in the matter. In the words of Durduran, “*Doktor hiç sevmezdi Nalbantoğlu’nu. Siz bunu bilmezsiniz. 1960–63 arasında (Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti’nde) silahlı eylemlere Doktor karşı çıktı. Bunlarsa giderek alt kademe ile anlaşarak (Türkiye’de) İnönü’den bile habersiz teşkilatı sürdürdüler. Ben Doktor ile nedir bu kavga diye sorduğumda Burhan, ‘Doktor o meselede haklıydı,’ dedi. ‘Biz silahlar vasıtasıyla, silahlı olarak amacımıza ulaşmak istiyorduk. Doktor ise bunun faturasının çok ağır olacağı kaygısıyla engel olmaya çalıştı. Sonuçta haklı çıktı.’*” (An, 2002: 160)

Brigadier General Recai Ergin—Sunay’s favourite, was appointed to its head, its allotment increased, new training camps were opened, and new personnel was hired (Kılıç, 2010: 111–112).

The early years after the coup of 27 May were difficult times for the Special Warfare Department, and TMT. The Department’s recovery of its power was probably concomitant to the top brass generals’ taking control of the Turkish Armed Forces. On the other hand, TMT was resuscitated after the arrival on the Island of the second Bayraktar, Kenan Çoygun, in late 1962. Furthermore, there appeared to be key differences amongst the T/C nationalist leaders as to the use of armed actions.

- ***The Tax Controversy — T/C Community Finances — According to Clerides, the Only Conflict/Controversy of any Substance, between G/Cs and T/Cs***

As noted before, on the way towards the demise of the common Republic of Cyprus, there took place a number of key controversies, involving (i) the security forces, (ii) the armed forces, (iii) the public service, (iv) municipalities, and (v) taxes. Of the above, (i) through (iv) more directly concerned politics, whereas (v), more directly, the economy. On the other hand, the tax controversy is a case where the relationship between economy and (nationalist) politics comes to the fore, most distinctly. In his long interview to Niyazi Kızılyürek, Glafkos Clerides has recounted the gist of the controversy as follows: The funds allocated from the budget of the central government did not suffice to enable the communal chamber to fulfil

their responsibilities in the fields of education, religious affairs, etc.—their prerogatives under the Constitution. The G/C side had also been having difficulties in paying for education and religious services, but the T/C side's problems were bigger. Accordingly, the two sides discussed and generally agreed upon increasing the amounts of fiscal transfer set by the Constitution. Yet, they disagreed about the specific ratios to be applied to the two communities, as G/Cs insisted upon 18 %, in proportion to the T/Cs share in overall population, and T/Cs upon 30 %, the ratio applied to the distribution of political-administrative posts public services by the Constitution. According to Clerides, the G/C side acted very short-sightedly, because, (a) the needs of the T/Cs were bigger than those of G/Cs, and (b) if they were could get subsidised from the resources of the central government, they would have to ask Turkey for more aid, getting even more dependent upon Turkey (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 109).

At this point, Clerides claims—very critically, from the point of view of this thesis—that the only conflict and controversy of any substance between G/Cs and T/Cs was the tax issue. Thus, from the point of view of systemic functionality, the most basic issue was taxes. The 'state' could survive, had it been able to overcome the difficulties in the field of taxes. According to Clerides, electoral regulations, municipalities were all lesser problems. As a matter of fact, Makarios entrusted Clerides the task of negotiating with Denktaş, for the resolution of the disagreement, and the two even worked out a good way out of the impasse, i.e. the financing of the education expenses of both communities by the central state. In so doing, the basic

question at stake was whether or not it was necessary to amend the Constitution, which the T/C side was strongly against. Finally, the two sides decided to prepare a protocol to be signed by President Makarios, Vice-President Dr. Küçük, President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides, President of the Greek Community Chamber Constantinos Spiridakis, and President of the Turkish Community Chamber Denктаş. The gist of the protocol was that monies would be allocated in (central) state budget for the education expenses of the two communities in exchange for the cancellation of the requirement of separate majorities for the Tax Law. However, when the protocol was passed to the Council of Ministers, G/C ministers came out against, arguing that the Constitution had to be amended first (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 110). Thus, Minister of Labour Tassos Papadopoulos, Minister of the Interior Polycarpos Georghadjis, and others, as well as Makarios were for the amendment of the Constitution, so the protocol could never be concluded (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 111). Furthermore, Clerides argues that the rejection of T/Cs to ratify the Tax Bill since 1960 was the only rift of any substance between G/Cs and T/Cs, for without collecting taxes, they were completely tied up by the lack of necessary resources. For instance, they wanted to build a dam to solve the problem of water, and yet could not do it, because they were not able to collect taxes. The key point is that, according to Clerides, the Tax controversy did not originate from the (ethnic) conflict of the G/Cs and T/Cs, but actually, from a very real problem (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 111). The T/C side was not able to carry the burden of education services via the contributions from the central

state budget, as set by the Constitution, and Turkey's economic assistance did not either suffice to close the gap. Therefore, had the T/C side ratified the Tax Bill, the Turkish Communal Chamber would have been able to raise the tax revenue necessary to finance education expenses (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 111–112). It is important to note that the Turkish Community Chamber received a yearly contribution of £ 400,000 from the budget of the central government, and a yearly aid of £ 100,000 from the Government of Turkey, allotted to the payment of the salaries of teachers and other civil servants (Besim, 2011: 86). Therefore, the T/Cs were not coming against the Tax Bill on tactical grounds, but there was a real problem that could not have been solved by its extension over a period time, one that had to be addressed through negotiations. Clerides thinks this was just what they did, and the way out was the financing of education expenses of both communities by the central state, which would also clear the way for the ratification by T/Cs of the Tax Bill. The underlying motive behind the rejection by G/C leaders of the protocol prepared by Clerides and Denktaş was the insistence that the Constitution had to be amended on the grounds that it was unjust to the G/Cs.⁵⁰² In his interview to Kızılyürek, Clerides also argues that the basic purpose here was to render the state more efficient, for the principle and practice of separate majorities and taxations did, in fact, impede the functioning of state. Although the Constitution stipulated that the tax laws

⁵⁰² “Evet, gerçek bir sorun vardı. Bu konuyu zamana yayarak çözüm bulmak imkânsızdı. Bu yüzden çözüm bulmak için müzakereler yapmıştık. Çözüm, hükümetin iki toplumun eğitim giderlerini karşılaması, eğitimin ekonomik yükünü üstlenmeseydi. Böylece sorun çözülmüş olacak ve vergi tasarısı da onaylanacaktı. ... Ne yazık ki, bu öneri kabul edilmedi. Bu anayasanın Kıbrıslı Rumlara karşı haksızlık yaptığı ve mutlaka değişmesi gerektiği yönünde bir ısrar vardı.” (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 112)

inherited from the British colonial administration were to be replaced in six to twelve months' time, more than two years had passed, and no agreement could have been reached. Therefore, the purpose of asking for the cancellation of the separate majority's principle was to make the state function more efficiently. According to Clerides, it was impossible to execute planned activities using the British tax laws. Yet, they could not come to a compromise with the T/Cs, because the latter were being taxed by their own Communal Chamber. Had the central state collected the taxes, the Communal Chamber would not have been able to collect taxes for its own activities. The T/C community could not possibly bear the burden of a double taxation.⁵⁰³

Although the provision of education services requires the constitution of one of the most extensive state organs, the problem of financing the enlargement of the professional-political elite and the bureaucracy accompanying the new state of the Republic of Cyprus was by no means restricted to the payment of teachers' salaries.⁵⁰⁴ There were also the representatives of the House of Representatives, members of the Community Chamber, the

⁵⁰³ “Bu konuda Kıbrıslı Türklerle uzlaşma sağlayamadık. Bunun nedeni de Kıbrıslı Türklerin kendi Cemaat Meclisleri tarafından vergilendirilmesi idi. Eğer vergileri devlet toplamış olsaydı, Cemaat Meclisi ayrıca vergi toplayamayacaktı. Çifte vergilendirmeyi kimse kaldıramazdı.” (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 113)

⁵⁰⁴ Clearly, the constitution of an extensive system of education aimed at, not only the reproduction of the labour power required for the sustenance of the social division of labour, but the reproduction of the nationalist culture and identity, as well. Recall that the institution of solid links between the urban elite and the peasantry were the key to the success of nationalist politics, in the case of both G/Cs and T/Cs. As a matter of fact, the most important cadres of TMT were teachers, and particularly, village teachers, who generally were the local leaders and commanders of TMT. One of the most noted teacher-commanders of TMT was the late Arif Hasan Tahsin, known as ‘Arif Hoca’, who had successfully defended one of the key TMT outposts—a strategic passage over the Pentadaktylos [*Beşparmak*] mountains.

personnels of the other ministries, and particularly, members of the security and armed forces, and state workers. Also, prior to 1960, the three educated and/or professional groups were teachers, doctors and lawyers, and, as of the mid-1950s or so, T/C politics was dominated, particularly, by doctors and lawyers. The constitution of new state organs under the Republic of Cyprus, and the ensuing expansion of state bureaucracy led, in the early 1960s, to the rise of other groups of professionals related to state administration and other functions—most typically, of public administrators, and engineers, architects, etc.⁵⁰⁵ On the other hand, circumstantial evidence indicates that placements to the new public posts of the new common state were the key to the genesis and further institutionalisation of the relationships of patronage, amongst the T/Cs.⁵⁰⁶

One of the key controversies between G/Cs and T/Cs which led to the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus was the so-called tax controversy. Clearly, transfers from the budget of the central state, and the

⁵⁰⁵ This also meant that the new cohorts of or future nationalist leaders were not now necessarily doctors or lawyers. Thus, İsmet Kotak studied public administration at the prestigious Faculty of Political Science [*Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi*—SBF] of Ankara University. So did İsmail Bozkurt, who, following the advice of Kotak, decided to go SBF, rather than the Law Faculty of Ankara University. Under the circumstances of 27 May, he decided to focus upon constitutional law, to become, after 1974, one of the important authors of the new constitution, and the electoral law. Öte yandan, Bozkurt'un hak ettiği yere lise mezunu atanıyor. anayasa hukuku üzerinde yoğunlaşıyor. 1962'de döndüğünde, Evkaf'ta müdür yardımcılığı için başvuruyor, adayların SBF mezunu olması isteniyormuş. Ancak, o değil, bir lise mezununa iş veriliyor (Besim, 2011: 153-4).

⁵⁰⁶ From the point of view of the process state-building, it is important to note that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus led to the institution of new political-administrative bodies, and thereby, the enlargement of the professional-political elite and the bureaucracy. This period must also be seen as one of the key stages of the formation of clientalist, favouritist and nepotist relationships in the distributions of resources at the disposal of politics. Therefore, I would argue that the genesis and further development of patronage relationships around the political 'elite' can be best comprehended by reference to the process of state-building, and the reproduction of state power, beyond the level of the relationships between vote-seeking politicians and voting citizens.

Turkey's fiscal aid together were not sufficient to meet the expenditures of the Turkish Communal Chamber, the largest item being education, i.e. the salaries of teachers and the costs of the schools. Thus, the Turkish Communal Chamber was forced to collect taxes of its own, in order to be able to close the deficit. However, the economy of the T/C community could not support a double taxation, i.e. paying taxes to the Communal Chamber, as well as the central state. Accordingly, Clerides claims that the resistance of T/C nationalists to passing the Tax Bill was not the product of tactical considerations, but had real causes. On the contrary, the rejection by G/C nationalist leaders of the compromise formulated by Clerides and Denktaş was based upon tactical considerations. On the other hand, Clerides also argues that the tax issue was the only rift of any substantive import, between G/Cs and T/Cs.

- ***Early Signs of Substantive Disagreements between G/C and T/C Nationalists***

According to British journalist Nancy Crawshaw, reporter for the Manchester Guardian, the first major crisis between G/Cs and T/Cs erupted in December 1961, as the T/C members of the House of Representatives refused to vote for the budget (Crawshaw, 1964a: 339). However, one can retrospectively detect some earlier signs of the impending crisis. According to Glafkos Clerides, the majority of the G/Cs were deeply upset by the proposal of independence, since their entire struggle had been oriented towards the realisation of *Enosis*, i.e. union with the Motherland. Furthermore, Makarios had openly declared that he regarded the Zurich and

London Agreements as an outpost on their way to the completion of their national fate. This indicated that, from the very outset, Makarios did intend to gradually modify and change the Agreements (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 88–89). Be that as it may, the first major controversy concretely arose on the issue of the 70 to 30 % G/C–T/C composition of the civil service. According to Rüstem Tatar, the first Auditor General of the Republic of Cyprus, and Minister of Finance of the various T/C administrations during 1967–1976, points out that there was a major obstacle to the achievement of the 30 % T/C rule in the placements to public service posts. The T/C society could not provide the numbers of qualified candidates to fill its quota, giving Makarios the opportunity of placing G/Cs to the vacant posts. Tatar concedes that Makarios was right saying that the T/Cs did not have the people to place to the posts they wanted, but also argues that if he really were well-intentioned, the T/C side would only need a year or so to train and raise people having the necessary qualifications, so the problem would have been solved. However, the real intention there was to prevent the T/Cs from getting their rightful share of the 30 % of civil service jobs (Satan and Şentürk, 2012: 156). According to Sonyel (2003: 24), “[b]y February 1961, the situation between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots was fast deteriorating because of the municipalities and civil service staffing ratio issues.” Be that as it may, one could not yet speak of any serious crisis, at that stage. Thus, Greek Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff was sure that the Government of Turkey would honour the Agreements, and that Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük worked together quite well (Sonyel, 2003: 24–25). On the other

hand, Makarios had already been thinking that the provisions of the Constitution as to the municipalities and the staffing ratios were unworkable, that the Constitution had to be amended by capitalising on the process of the accession of Cyprus to the Commonwealth (Sonyel, 2003: 25).

- *Denktaş and Associates' Report to Turkey, dated 23 January 1961, on Cypriot Politics and T/C Economy*

On 23 January 1961, a delegation of radical-nationalist T/C leaders gave a memorandum to the Government of Turkey, which was composed by Rauf R. Denktaş and assessed the current state of Cypriot politics and of the T/C economy. After Dr. Küçük's return to Cyprus, on 17 January 1961, from a trip to Lebanon, a 'top-level' meeting was arranged, chaired by Dr. Küçük, and attended by the T/C Ministers, members of the House of Representatives and the Community Chamber. Apparently, the meeting itself was 'masterminded' by Denktaş, for the adoption and presentation to Turkey as a 'united' front of a report composed by himself, as a way of bypassing Ambassador Dırvana, to contact directly and influence the new, military rulers of Turkey. According to the account of Denktaş, Ambassador Dırvana was enraged by the report, lectured Denktaş and his associates about the virtues of abiding by the Constitution, and threatened that those who violated it were destined to share the fate of the DP leaders. He was also to find out that Dr. Küçük had informed the Ambassador through his Counsellor Cemal Müftüzade that former had actually disavowed the report. One way or another, the so-called Delegation of T/C Representatives [*Kıbrıs*

Türk Parlamento Heyeti] led by Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu departed for Turkey and delivered the report to the Turkish authorities on 23 January 1961.⁵⁰⁷

The so-called ‘Memorandum of the Turkish–Cypriot Community Delegation’ [*Kıbrıs Türk Cemaati Heyetinin Muhtırası*] started by complaining about the G/C support for ‘extreme’ statements of the autodetermination of colonies and Algeria, cooperation with communists, on the one hand, and the anti-Zurich and London, pro-Enosis words and deeds of the G/Cs, the continuance of armament, and avoidance of the demobilisation of EOKA, on the other. The basic argument of this first part of the Memorandum was that G/Cs, by trying to influence and shape up world opinion, laid the groundwork for *Enosis*.⁵⁰⁸ However, the greater part of the Memorandum was devoted to the economy, to be more exact, G/C’s planned efforts to destroy and neutralise the T/C community in the field of the economy.⁵⁰⁹ Examples were G/C obstruction of the investments for a flour mill, biscuits factory, and a liquor factory. Also, G/Cs had now taken back some of the Cyprus agencies of foreign companies they had lost to T/Cs during the period of (EOKA) ‘terror’, by means of economic pressure

⁵⁰⁷ The Delegation consisted of the Vice-President of the House of Representatives Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu, members of the House of Representatives Halit Ali Rıza, and Dr. Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Deputy President of the Community Chamber Dr. Necdet Ünel, and members of the Executive Committee of the Community Chamber Dr. Ali Fikret, and Hakkı Süleyman—close associates of Denktaş, and TMT cadres. See, for details, Akkurt (1998: 165–167).

⁵⁰⁸ “*Kıbrıs Rum Cemaati ‘meğalo idea’larına uygun olarak Kıbrıs’ın Yunanistan’a ilhakını gerçekleştirmek için dünya efkârında zemin hazırlamaktadır.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 167)

⁵⁰⁹ “*Kıbrıs Rum Cemaati, Kıbrıs Türk Cemaatını iktisadi sahada yıkmak ve tesirsiz bir kitle haline getirmeye planlı olarak çalışmaktadır.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 169)

and boycotts.⁵¹⁰ Furthermore, G/C merchants undersold T/C merchants; T/Cs were not granted permits to import automobile tire, cement and sugar, T/Cs villages could not benefit from the investments of potable water and irrigation financed out of the Development Fund [*İnkişaf Bütçesi*], and the various subsidies to husbandry financed out of the regular, central government budget.⁵¹¹ The third part of the Memorandum comprised the analysis of the state of the T/C community. Thus, under the circumstances of the period of ‘terror’, the T/Cs had come to view the problem of economic development as a matter of life or death. Yet, given the wretched state they were reduced to under the British, it was impossible for the T/Cs to undertake this task on the basis of only their own means. On the other hand, during the Republican period, private G/C businesses, and state enterprises would not give jobs to the T/Cs, and as the principle of 30 % at civil service jobs was not either applied, there was a great unemployment amongst the T/Cs. The per capita production and income of the T/C community was too low to fulfil the public services of the community,

⁵¹⁰ “*Tedhiş devrinde büyük fedakârlık ve gayretler neticesinde bazı Türklerin temin etmiş olduğu yabancı firma acentelikleri Rumların iktisadi baskı ve boykot ile olan gayretleri neticesinde geri alınmıştır.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 170)

⁵¹¹ Thus, according to the details given to the Finance Committee of the House of Representatives, the 1961 programme of £ 162,000 of projects to carry potable water to villages comprised only one single T/C village, costing £ 370. Glafkos Clerides also concedes the presence of large-scale discrimination against T/Cs in the allocation of public resources. Thus, very few T/C villages had been electrified, whereas almost all G/C villages were. T/C villages would also have been electrified, eventually, but priority was given to G/C villages. T/C experienced the same kind of discrimination in the provision of potable water, too. Houses had already been connected to potable water in all G/C villages, whereas T/Cs were still carrying water from the wells. According the Clerides, the source of discriminatory practices against the T/Cs was the constitutional principle of separate constituencies. The fact that the President was elected by the votes of the G/C community alone, made the former responsible only to the G/C constituency, which created a situation unfavourable to the T/C community, in the allocation of public resources (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 108–9).

through taxes and donations. Yet, economic and cultural backwardness required relatively larger expenditures. The final part of the Memorandum comprised policy suggestions. Politically, one of the most effective powers for the protection of the rights of the T/C community was the requirement of the simple majority of majority of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives considered separately for any law imposing duties or taxes.⁵¹² If the representatives of the T/C community failed to ensure and protect the rights of the T/Cs, they would lose the confidence of the community, and a political crisis would follow. All the rights of the T/Cs had to be protected, if necessary, by using without any hesitation to the full extent all the powers given to the representatives of the T/C community by the Constitution. Otherwise, the T/C community risked its presence on the Island as a separate entity, being fully subdued by the G/Cs. Economically, it was necessary to transform the T/C community into one which would be independent of all sorts of economic and fiscal flows, robust and resilient to all eventualities.⁵¹³ The Memorandum implied that economic aid could not be regarded as a narrowly fiscal matter, for the future of the T/C community was the ultimate testing ground of Turkness before the world public opinion. The T/C community needed an economic and fiscal programme to be executed in a planned and dirigiste manner. The goal was to be the exploitation of the full production capacity of the land in accordance

⁵¹² “*Türk Cemaatın haklarının korunması bakımından kullanılabilir en müessir yetkilerden biri, vergi ve resimler koyan kanunların kabulü için, Türk Temsilcilerin de ekseriyet reyinin gerekmesidir.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 177)

⁵¹³ “*Türk Cemaatının yukarıda arzedilen iktisadi durumu karşısında hemen harekete geçilmesi ve Türk Cemaatının iktisadi ve mali akımlardan bağımsız, kuvvetli ve her ihtimale karşı mukavim bir Cemaat haline getirilmesi gerekmektedir.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 180)

through the use of scientific methods, and the constitution of small and large industry that could survive at the given scale of the community.⁵¹⁴ In both fields, cooperatives could serve as a model, by means of either subcontracting tasks to specialised technical teams, or communal entrepreneurship.⁵¹⁵ According to the Memorandum, the realisation of all these goals required the constitution of a centralised planning committee that would make use of the knowledge and experience of technical experts in all areas. The T/C community believed that the Motherland Government would make all the sacrifice necessary to provide the monies the execution of these plans and programmed would necessitate. The proper amount of monies provided by Turkey could be combined with part of the aid the T/C community had received from the British, to constitute a development fund [*inkışaf fonu*]. The Memorandum critically pointed out that the T/C community regarded the Communal Chamber as the ‘T/C State’ organ of the Federal Republic of Cyprus. However, in order to be able to play a more effective role and to work as the full-fledged state of the T/Cs in the case of a possible crisis, the Communal Chamber needed substantial economic support. On the other hand, economic support would achieve its purpose on the condition that (i) a significant fiscal transfer was made to the planned ‘Development Fund’, to be established by the Central Bank of Turkish

⁵¹⁴ “Kıbrıs Türk Cemaatının planlı ve güdümlü olarak dikte ettirilecek iktisadi ve mali bir programa ihtiyacı vardır. Böyle bir programla, sahasına göre istihlal nispeti düşük olan emlak, fenni surette azami kapasitesine kadar değerlendirilmeli ve Cemaat çapında yaşatılabilecek küçük, büyük sanayi tesis edilmelidir.” (Akkurt, 1998: 180)

⁵¹⁵ “Böyle bir programla, sahasına göre istihlal nispeti düşük olan emlak, fenni surette azami kapasitesine kadar değerlendirilmeli be Cemaat çapında yaşatılabilecek küçük, büyük sanayi tesis edilmelidir. Bu iki sahada da kooperatifçilik, özel teknik ekiplere bizzat iş yaptırmak ve Cemaat işletmeciliği usulleri ile başarı temin edebilir.” (Akkurt, 1998: 180)

Cooperatives [*Türk Kooperatif Merkez Bankası*], using the aid given to the Communal Chamber by the British, and (ii) the yearly deficits of the Communal Chamber budget were closed. Finally, the Memorandum called for systematic and tight collaboration through the constitution of joint technical committees, to work out and monitor the plans and programmes to be followed by the T/C community. See, Akkurt (1998: 167–181).

As a matter of fact, on 20 May 1961, i.e. roughly four months after the delivery of the Memorandum to Turkish authorities, the aforementioned development fund was established.⁵¹⁶ According to the Law, the so-called Development Chest [*İnkişaf Sandığı*], as it was now called, would make part of the Turkish Communal Consolidated Fund. The monies of the Chest were constituted of (i) the 0.5 million Liras (Cypriot Pounds) worth of economic aid, paid by the British Government and deposited at the Central Bank of Turkish Cooperatives, (ii) the additional 0.5 million Liras to be paid by the British Government, (iii) any possible aid the Communal Chamber could get for development purposes from the Turkish Government in accordance with Article 180.1 of the Constitution, and (iv) any other economic aid usable for development purposes.

The Memorandum of Rauf R. Denktaş and his Associates, dated 13 Hanuary 1961 is a key policy document which analyses problems and identifies options and choices. There appeared to be four basic problems faced by the

⁵¹⁶ ‘Turkish Communal Chamber Consolidated Fund (Development Chest) Law’, Number 10/1961, signed by the Vice-President on 20 May 1961, and published on 6 October 1961. [*Türk Cemaat Meclisi Konsolide Fonu (İnkişaf Sandığı) Yasası, Sayı 10/1961*].

nationalist leadership: (i) The pro-Enosis and non-aligned politics of the G/C nationalist leaders, at home and abroad; (ii) the inability of the T/C economy to compete with the G/C economy; (iii) the problem of unemployment, and; (iv) the inability of the T/C community to contribute to the expenditures of the central and communal states.⁵¹⁷ It is most likely that, given the limits to the expansion of state employment, caused by the failure to fill the 30 % quota, as well as the sharing of the decision-making process with the G/Cs, unemployment amongst the TMT youth was a particularly serious problem faced by the nationalist leadership. Politically, Denktaş and his associates tried to make a case for confrontational and escalatory politics, where undesired G/C words and deeds would be met by quick responses, and the power of the T/C representative to obstruct the Tax Bill would be used as a basic average. On the other hand, economy and economic development were key considerations in the eyes of the T/C leadership, although part of the motive could be the pressure exercised by Turkey and Ambassador Dırvana that the T/C leadership should concentrate on the economic problems of the T/Cs, and not petty quarrels with G/C nationalists on each and every issue. Finally, the process of T/C state-building was put to core, now in terms of the strengthening of the Communal Chamber, indicating continuity with the pre-1960 politics of the T/C nationalist leadership.

⁵¹⁷ The order of the problems as listed above does not imply any degree of importance.

- *Activities Report of the Turkish Community Chamber, dated 15 September 1961, on the Problems and Economy of the T/C Community — Economic Development under the Aegis of the Common Republic of Cyprus*

Another key document was the ‘Activity Report of the Turkish Communal Chamber for the Year 1960–1961’,⁵¹⁸ read by Denктаş on 15 September 1961, at the inaugural session of the second parliamentary year of the Chamber.^{519, 520} According to the Report, during the period in question, the Community Chamber had faced with two major problems: (i) the urgent exploration of the fiscal means necessary for the provision of public services under the responsibility of the Community Chamber, and (ii) the reconsideration of the social and economic state of the T/C community, the identification of its means and needs, and the exploration of fiscal and administrative measures to ensure its development (Akkurt, 1998: 276–277). It was pointed out that all the bodies under the responsibility of the Community Chamber—namely, Education and Culture, *Evkaf* and Religious Affairs, Cooperatives and Credit Institutions, Municipalities, Community Courts, and all related departments, had tried to fulfil their tasks in the spirit of achieving maximum savings (Akkurt, 1998: 277). According to the Report, 90 % of the community budget went to Education and Culture, and the remainder, to the expenses of all other departments making part of the

⁵¹⁸ Note that the beginning of the ‘parliamentary’ or ‘legislative’ year was September.

⁵¹⁹ ‘*Türk Cemaat Meclisinin 1960–1961 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu*’, *Türk Cemaat Meclisi*, 2. *İçtima Yılıının 1. İnıkadı*, 15 Eylül 1961, *Okuyan: TCM Başkanı Rauf R. Denктаş*. See Akkurt (1998: 275–315), for the full text.

⁵²⁰ It is important to note that the Communal Chamber corresponds to a critical phase in T/C process of state-building, namely, the first exercise, on a large and systematic scale, of legislative power. “*Geçmiş yılın esas faaliyeti statümüzü tespit eden ve mes’ulü bulunduğumuz daireleri teşkilatlandıran kanunları hazırlamak ve Meclisten geçirmek olmuştur.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 275)

Community Chamber, plus the legislative organ, and Community Courts. During the parliamentary year of 1960–1961, it had not been possible to impose any extra tax liability, and the taxes under consideration could not be collected, due to the interference of the Central Government. For the year of 1960–1961, there were many citizens who had evaded the payment of education and religion taxes, as well as municipal taxes. Thus, the underlying strategy for the coming year's budget would be, more realistically, the levying of only those taxes that could be expected to collect. Whilst 'our' Motherland Government was making every sacrifice to close the deficit of our community, 'we' the T/Cs clearly could not eschew 'our' most minimal responsibilities to narrow that deficit (Akkurt, 1998: 277). On the other hand, the author(s) of the Report was/were sure that once the budgetary process was guided by this consciousness and sense of responsibility, the resultant deficits of education and culture would be met by 'our' Motherland Government (Akkurt, 1998: 277–278)

According to the Report, Community Chamber experts had been working day and night—in a spirit of full cooperation and understanding with the experts from the Motherland—for the strengthening of 'our' economic structure, and the development of the Cypriot Turkness (Akkurt, 1998: 278). Selection of the projects would be subject to strict discipline: Thus, investment decisions would be made subject to the approval of experts, and not, on the basis of political considerations. Development projects would be oriented towards, not luxury, but actual needs, and those which were most useful to the community would take the priority. Furthermore, 'regionalist'

tendencies would also be avoided.⁵²¹ Given such considerations, one half of £ 1 million provided thus far from the British Government had been allocated to the Central Bank of Turkish Cooperatives—the backbone of the T/C peasantry, and the other half to the Development Chest of the Community Chamber, laying together the foundations of communal development (Akkurt, 1998: 279).

On the other hand, one of the most serious problems was the fiscal reform of the depressed finances of municipalities, and particularly, *Evkaf* (Akkurt, 1998: 280). The technicians and consultants of ‘our’ Turkish Ambassadorship and cooperative experts of had been making constant efforts towards the establishment of agricultural industry. The Central Bank of Cooperatives had taken the necessary measures to manage its placement and credit policies in a way to allow the faster development of agricultural activities (Akkurt, 1998: 280) The *Evkaf* Administration [*Evkaf İdaresi*] had very few personnel and was seriously indebted, when overtaken by the Community Chamber. Apparently, most of the £ 255,000 of old debt had been incurred because of the construction drive of the late 1950s, in imitation, possibly, of the fashion set by the now overthrown Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, especially, in İstanbul. Two experts from Turkey had studied and reported on the state of *Evkaf*, upon which all new *Evkaf* investments had been stopped, and the ways of restructuring the debts were

⁵²¹ “*Mütehasısların tasvip ve tavsiyesi olmayan hiçbir yatırıma gidilmeyecektir. Siyasi mülahazalarla hiçbir şekilde hiçbir külfet altına girilmeyecektir. İnkişaf projelerimiz lükse değil, ihtiyaca göre hazırlanacak ve cemaatıza en faydalı olanlar ön safa alınacaktır. ... Bölgecilik zihniyeti ile hareket ederek bizi içinden çıkılmaz mali maceralara atacak tek bir Türk’ün mevcut olmadığına inanıyoruz.*” (Akkurt, 1998: 279)

being looked for (Akkurt, 1998: 281). The Report gave a detailed account of Evkaf, as tabulated below:

Table 5.5. *Evkaf Finances, September 1961 (£ Liras—Cypriot Currency)*

DEBTS	
<i>Overtaken</i>	
—Banks	255,000
—Deposit Accounts	70,000
<i>Total Old Debts Overtaken</i>	<i>325,000</i>
<i>Newly Incurred</i>	
—New Debt Incurred from Development Chest	180,000
<i>Total Debts</i>	<i>505,000</i>
BUDGET	
<i>Revenues</i>	<i>75,000</i>
<i>Expenditures</i>	<i>88,500</i>
—Interest and Reimbursements	51,000
—Religious Affairs	23,000
—Salaries	14,500
<i>Budget Deficit</i>	<i>(–) 13,500</i>

Source: Tabulated from Akkurt (1998: 281)

The Report also noted that a team had been commissioned to study the most useful and modern ways of the management of Evkaf farms, to which end technical experts had been requested from Israel (Akkurt, 1998: 281). The overall goal was to overhaul Evkaf to make it assume a leading economic role via investments (Akkurt, 1998: 282–283).

As far as schools were concerned, the Report emphasised the problem of employment caused by ‘general’ education, and the import of vocational education, as a solution. If current trends continued, the Report claimed, the T/C community would very soon face a grave shortage of workforce, in the

fields agriculture, trade, industry, and other technical fields (Akkurt, 1998: 284).⁵²²

In the part concerning the activities of the Department of Social Affairs and Municipalities, it was emphasised that keeping the municipalities alive was the national cause of ‘our’ community (Akkurt, 1998: 285).

Separate Turkish cooperatives had been founded on 13 August 1959. They were provided £ 500,000 by Turkey, and another £ 500,000 from the British compensation to the T/Cs. Furthermore, a new credit of £ 185,000 had been secured from the Motherland (Akkurt, 1998: 286). The Report pointed out that, under the circumstances, all hopes of the T/Cs for economic development were pinned on the cooperative movement. Through cooperatives, farmers, artisans, and elements of small industry would unite, and have access to credits more easily, and under better terms, than individuals (Akkurt, 1998: 287). Amongst the projected activities of the cooperatives were the establishment of one feed factory, two carob mills, and one dairy factory including its own cold storage depot and pasteurisation equipment, and the establishment of credit and consumption cooperatives where they lacked (Akkurt, 1998: 287). Tables 3.6–3.8 below, tabulated from the text of the Report, indicate that the Cooperatives had become the key economic tool, in terms of savings and credits, from the point of view of the nationalist leadership.

⁵²² Obviously, the other side of the medal was the concomitant problem of excess labour supply, and the clientalist pressure over representative politics in the field of public service.

Table 5.6. Trends in the Numbers and Composition of Cooperatives

	13 August 1959*	Today	Increase	% Increase
<i>Credit Cooperatives</i>	122	170	48	39
<i>Savings Banks</i>	7	16	9	129
<i>Consumption Cooperatives</i>	57	88	31	54
<i>Miscellaneous</i>	10	13	3	30
Total	196	287	91	46

* Transition to Independent Cooperatives

Source: *Tabulated from Akkurt (1998: 286–287)*

Table 5.7. Cooperatives: Rest-of-the-World Sources (September 1961)

Sources	£ (Cypriot Liras)
<i>Compensation from Great Britain</i>	500,000
<i>Donation from Turkey</i>	500,000
<i>Credit from Turkey (1961)</i>	185,000
Total	1,185,000

* Transition to Independent Cooperatives

Source: *Tabulated from Akkurt (1998: 286)*

Table 5.8. Central Bank of Cooperatives (September 1961) (£ Liras)

<i>Credits 1960</i>		<i>1961 (as of 15 September)</i>	
Short-term Credits	337,000	Short-term Credits	122,000
		Medium-term Credits	95,000
		Long-term Credits	72,000
		Other Current Accounts	12,000
Total	561,000	Total	301,000
<i>Credits as of the end of 1960 Fiscal Year: Cumulative Balance</i>			
Short-term		735,000	
Middle-term		153,000	
Long-term		144,000	
As Current Accounts		46,000	
Total		1,078,000	

* Credits to cooperatives, and long-term credits to persons against ipothecs

** My computations show a slight divergence with the figure given by Akkurt, which gives the total 1,048,000

Source: *Tabulated from Akkurt (1998: 288)*

The Report also claimed that the constant efforts of G/C press since the first day of the Republic to disrupt the current order, and this ever-intensifying campaign, had pushed the T/C Press into a defensive position, and caused

‘us’ to devote the greater part of ‘our’ energy to this war of nerves (Akkurt, 1998: 289).⁵²³ The organs and functions under the roof of the Community Chamber could be based upon solid economic grounds only if the members of the community could thrive materially (Akkurt, 1998: 290–291). The chamber, culture, municipalities, and the cooperatives of a poor community could not effectively develop. Thus, whilst keeping these communal institutions afloat through the aids provided from the Motherland, all ‘our’ efforts would be oriented towards (i) the study of the measures that would raise the life standards of ‘our’ people and strengthen its economic structure, and (ii) keeping its spirits up against the war of nerves engaged by the other side. Thus, the social and cultural activities making part of the ambit of Communal Chamber could not be taken in isolation from the political milieu around the T/Cs and the overall course of Cypriot politics. Consequently, measures to be taken by the Community Chamber in the fields of society and culture could not be considered in themselves, because all this social, cultural and economic structure was embedded inside a certain milieu, whose political atmosphere was rather turbid.⁵²⁴ Therefore each and every

⁵²³ “Cumhuriyetin kuruluş gününden bu yana Rum matbuatının şimdiki düzeni bozmak için açmış olduğu ve her geçen günle biraz daha ciddi ve şiddetli bir şekil alan bu kampanya, Türk matbuatını müdafî pozuna sokmuş ve matbuatımızın olduğu kadar bizlerin de bu sınır harbi içerisinde enerjimizin büyük bir kısmını bu yönde tevcih etmemize vesile olmuştur. ... Memleketteki huzursuzluğun müsebbibi biz Türklermişiz, çünkü, ayrı Maarif, ayrı belediyeler, ayrı Kooperatif mevzuunda ısrar ediyormuşuz...” (Akkurt, 1998: 289)

⁵²⁴ “Bizim bütün gayemiz, bu müesseseleri Anavatandan temin edilen yardımlarla su üstünde tutarken, diğer yandan da halkımızın hayat seviyesini yükseltecek ve iktisadi bünyesini kuvvetlendirecek tedbirleri araştırmak ve aynı zamanda, bizim bu tedbirleri almamamız için karşı tarafın giriştiği sınır harbi yüzünden halkın moralinin ve maneviyatının bozulmamasını temin etmektir. İşte bu yüzden ki Meclisimizin uhdesine düşen sosyal ve kültürel faaliyetler Kıbrıs Türkünün içinde bulunduğu siyasi havadan ve siyasi gidişattan tecrit edilemez. Cemaat Meclisi olarak sosyal ve kültürel sahada alacağımız tedbirler sadece kendi bünyeleri içinde mütalaa edilemez, çünkü bu sosyal kültürel ve ekonomik bünyenin içinde yaşadığı bir muhit vardır ve bu muhit de yukarıda izahına çalıştığım siyasi havası bulanık muhittir.” (Akkurt, 1998: 290–291) [my

member of the community had to question if his own contribution to the smooth functioning of communal affairs, the winning of communal causes, the rise and the eternal existence of Turkness in Cyprus. One had to avoid prodigality, and economise, and not expect everything from the Community Chamber, the Motherland, and *Evkaf*, by causing despair through gossip and adverse propaganda (Akkurt, 1998: 292).

According to the Report, the year 1960–1961 was the lowest possible level, and the worst. There could not be worse, and if ‘we’ worked hard, ‘our’ common efforts would enable ‘us’ to rise and get stronger. ‘We’ could not possibly regress and get weakened.⁵²⁵

It is important to note, at the outset, that the underlying tone of this text suggests that (a) the Republic of Cyprus was regarded as the final resolution of the Cyprus issue, and (b) economic development under the aegis of the common Republic was regarded as the basic challenge before the T/C society.

It is also obvious that the Communal Chamber had, from the very outset, faced two basic problems, the first being the financing of communal services, and the second, the financing of development—which roughly, albeit not exactly, corresponded to the distinction between ‘current’ and

highlights—H.A.] Notice that Denktaş now addresses in the first person, which suggests that he was the sole author of the Report, and that the latter reflected the strategic views of Denktaş alone.

⁵²⁵ “Her bakımdan, 1960–61 yılı Kıbrıs halkı için en had bir zemin temin etmişti. Bundan daha kötüsü olamaz. Çalışmamız, ve müşterek gayretlerimiz sayesinde bundan böyle bizim için yükselme ve kuvvetlenme vardır. Gerileme ve zayıflama yoktur.” (Akkurt, 1998: 293)

‘investment’ expenditures. Amongst the services, education was the biggest, due to the customarily large size of the educative organisation. On the other hand, the overall fiscal balance of the Community Chamber was in the red, in the larger sense, comprising the municipalities, and the Evkaf administration, as well.

As far as taxation was concerned, there was considerable ‘tax aversion’ amongst the populace, and the ‘extractive capacity’ of the communal state was far too low. Thus, under the circumstances, the task of closing the budget deficit fell upon the shoulders of Turkey, and consequently, the fiscal transfers of Turkey, first started in 1953, now assumed a formal, budgetary form, in which the budget deficit was expected to be closed automatically by the latter—marking the beginnings of a pattern of dependency that has lasted to this day, and often manifested itself as crises in the payment of the salaries of public employees. It is important to note that the bulk of the budget deficit was attributed to the education expenses.⁵²⁶

On the other hand, the Report was also characterised by a marked rhetoric of ‘fiscal prudence’, the importance of savings on expenditures—and not only current, but investment expenditures as well, and deficit reduction. As far as investment policy is concerned, there seems to be a bias towards agriculture-based industry. The £ 1 million of compensation, received by the British was to be used through partly the Central Bank of Turkish Cooperatives (£ 0.5 million), and partly the Development Chest (£ 0.5

⁵²⁶ Let me note in advance that this changed dramatically, after the collapse of the common Republic, when the greater part of the total T/C labour became full-time warriors.

million). Thus, the underlying development approach brought together, in the spirit of the times, (i) the process of planning; (ii) investments and production, and (iii) the means of savings and finance, i.e. public banks and funds.

Furthermore, the fact that the cooperatives—and particularly, the Central Bank of Turkish Cooperatives, were attributed and actually had the very key role in the process development clearly stands out. And, they probably became all the more important, not only because there were not separate T/C cooperatives before 1959, but also due to the severe financial crisis *Evkaf*, the leader of public entrepreneurship before 1960, that had lost all its capacity for new investments (i.e. constructions).⁵²⁷ Furthermore, the cooperative model was thought to apply to not only the peasantry, but to artisans and small businesses as well. Apparently, the understanding that once everything was done by the T/C administrators to reduce the deficit, the remainder would be closed by Turkey had been reached between the two.

The text also makes it evident that there was a certain mechanism of technical assistance inside the Turkish Embassy, that there were certain technical experts sent from Turkey—although it is too difficult now to judge about the effectiveness of this means. The Report also comprised sections on *Evkaf* and Religious Affairs, Education, Department of Social Affairs and

⁵²⁷ Incidentally, the Report notes technical experts from Israel were expected to come and give advice on the efficient management of *Evkaf* farms. It is most likely that the ‘pro-cooperative’ nationalists of Cyprus were well aware of the ‘*kibbutz*’ experience in Israel, originating in the Socialist–Zionist utopia of ideal (agricultural) community.

Municipalities, Courts, and Cooperatives, which revealed, quite clearly, the organigramme of the set of institutions constituting the embryonic T/C state.

Ambassador Dirvana's and the pro-Republican liberals' solution to the problem of the T/C society's economic development was based on increasing the competitive power of T/C society under the circumstances of the fair interplay of market forces. In contradistinction with this, the model of development suggested by the Report was based upon the centralised, political and cultural mobilisation of the T/C society. Thus, the Report linked the process development, the political situation, and cultural policies to one another. On the one hand, people's spirits would be kept up in the struggle against the G/Cs, and on the other, solidarity would be reinforced and society would be mobilised towards the goal of economic development, by means of cultural and political campaigns.

- ***First Major Crisis between Ambassador Dirvana and Denktaş and Associates***

According to the testimony of Aydın Samioğlu, then Coordinator of *Bayraktarlık*, the first great crisis in the lukewarm relations between the pro-27 May Ambassador Emin Dirvana, and the President of the Community Chamber Rauf R. Denktaş and his associates broke out even before the Republic of Cyprus completed its first year.⁵²⁸ In 1961, the Community Chamber resolves to proclaim the 7th of June, the day of the T/C's national

⁵²⁸ See, for the detailed account of the quarrel by Samioğlu, his interview to Besim (2011: 85–86).

struggle. On 7 June 1958, the office of Turkey's press agency in Nicosia had been bombed. It is important to note that the incident had provoked direct armed clashes between the T/Cs and G/Cs, setting off a series of cruel killings by both sides. As it turned out, and as Rauf R. Denktaş himself confessed many years later, the bomb was actually planted by the Turks, as a matter of fact, by one of his own friends. On 6 June 1961, members of the Executive Committee of the Community Chamber [*Cemaat Meclisi İcra Heyeti*], led by Dr. Necdet Üstel, the Acting President of the Chamber, and Dr. Şemsi Kâzım, Dr. Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Hazım Remzi, plus Aydın Samioğlu, visit Ambassador Dırvana to tell the latter of the Chamber's decision to hold the 7th of June as the national struggle day. To commemorate the day, all Turkish schools were asked to raise Turkish flags. On 7 June, Samioğlu gets a call from the Embassy, asking that all flags be lowered, but the latter refuses to comply, arguing that the Embassy has no right to overrule Community Chamber decisions. Then, Dr. Necdet Üstel gets summoned to the Embassy, and he too, refuses to abide by, saying that this people had waged a long struggle for this flag. In response, Dırvana retorts by saying that, unless the decision was called off, the Embassy would stop the 100 thousand Cypriot Liras of yearly aid to the Community Chamber, used to pay for the salaries of teachers and other civil servants. After this confrontation Ünel resigned by the membership of the Chamber, but flags were kept raised for 24 hours. According to his own testimony, Samioğlu also got penalised and banned from any contacts with Turkish journalists. Apparently, the 7 June incident marks the start of troublesome

days between the Turkish Embassy and the Community Chamber. According to Samioğlu, Ambassador Dırvana basically believed that the Republic of Cyprus ought to survive, and that its two partners ought to avoid any incitements. As a part of the transition of civilian rule, Dırvana returned to Turkey, and was replaced by, not a career diplomat, but Consultant of the Ministry of Trade Mazhar Özkol, who served as Acting Ambassador [*maslahatgüzar*], apparently as a mark of the lowered level of diplomatic relations. Samioğlu points out that these were the difficult times of TMT (Besim, 2011: 86).

Apparently, as of late 1961, the newspaper *Nacak* was engaged in a fierce propaganda against the *Rums*, indicating Ambassador Dırvana's failure to put under control Denktaş and his associates.⁵²⁹

- ***The Tax Controversy and the Outbreak of the First Major Crisis between T/Cs and G/Cs — Denktaş Challenges and his Associates Criticise Dr. Küçük — Makarios Now Raises the Possibility of Amending the Constitution***

On the way to the collapse of the common Republic, there were two critical

⁵²⁹ One of the issues raised by *Nacak* was the state of the T/C *Çarşı*, in the face of the collapse of 'From the Turk, to the Turk' campaign. As it appears, consumers had more confidence in G/C merchants than the T/Cs, possibly the effect of price overcharges during 'From the Turk, to the Turk'. Thus the 20 October 1961 issue of *Nacak* wrote: "*Vatandaş, Irkdaş; uyan artık işgal ediliyorsun. İçini de dışını da zaptediyor Rumlar. Kavga yok, gürültü yok, ölüm kalım yok ama sen yine işgal ediliyorsun. İşgalin de en acısı bu ya. Farkında olmadan gıdiverir adam körü körüne. Rumlar, 'kale ... içten fethedilmeli' düsturuna inanmışlar onu tatbik ediyorlar.*" "*Ortada dolaşan dedikoduya niye kulak asıyorsun. Türk tüccarı 'kazık atarmış'. Kim demiş onu sana? En samimi arkadaşın dahi söylese inanma çünkü 'Rum propagandası'dır o. Çelivermişler onun aklını. İnsan bu be kardeşim. Çabuk kanar. Sen kendi gözünle 'kazık attığını gör ondan sonra inan.'*" (Kızılyürek, 1988: 38). From this, Niyazi Kızılyürek concludes that economic contradictions between the 'upper' classes [*yukarı sınıflar*] were not less a factor than others, in the creation of the Cyprus issue. They played an effective role in the past of the Cyprus issue, as they still do. See, for details, Kızılyürek (1988: 39).

constitutional crises between G/Cs and T/Cs, the first in December 1961, and the second in December 1962. As a part of the claim that G/Cs had failed to honour constitutional clauses protecting T/C rights, T/C Representatives refused to vote for the budget (Crawshaw, 1964a: 339; Sonyel, 2003: 28). As a consequence, there emerged a triple system of tax collection and tax rates: Foreigners were taxed by means of legislation passed by the House of Representatives, and G/Cs and T/Cs by their own respective Community Chambers (Crawshaw, 1964a: 339). Therefore, it was no longer possible to speak of fiscal policy at the level of the central state, which led to the criticisms of macro-economic inefficiency. It is important to note that the source of the contest was the Denктаş faction. As a matter of fact, the tax laws had been unanimously approved by the Council of Ministers, i.e. Vice-President Dr. Küçük and the three T/C ministers, as well. However, eleven T/C members of the House of Representatives broke away from Dr. Küçük, formed a new political group backed by Denктаş, and once more rejected the new tax laws. Thus, Dr. Küçük was openly challenged by Denктаş, and accused by the younger elements of not taking a tough line against the G/Cs. See, Sonyel (2003: 29), and Hatzivassiliou (2005: 525)

The most important consequence of the controversy is that, on 4 January 1962, Makarios made a first public reference to the possible amendment of the 1960 Constitution, arguing that constitutions were a means to the normal management and not the obstruction of the state (Sonyel, 2003: 28, Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 525). However, Greek Prime Minister Evangelos

Averoff–Tossizza immediately reacted to this statement, by noting that Greece, as a guarantor of the Cypriot Constitution, cannot accept any view for its revision, for this automatically re-open the whole Cyprus issue. Furthermore, he instructed the Nicosia Embassy to clearly stress to Makarios Athens’ disagreement. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey held exchanges during the following days, and it became clear that both sides intended to implement the Agreements. During the talks, the Greeks side asked Ankara to use its influence to control T/C hard-liners (Hatzivassiliou: 2005: 525). Meanwhile, the pro–Enosis speech of 10 February of Georgiadis, G/C Minister of Interior alarmed the Turkish Government (Sonyel, 2003: 30).

- ***Nationalist Terror Returns, Mosques Bombed, Barristers Murdered, and Opposition Silenced, Final Showdown between Ambassador Dırvana and Denktas — Tide Turns Towards Denktas***

On the night of 24–25 March 1964, *Bayraktar* and *Ömeriye* mosques in Nicosia were bombed. Immediately after the incident, dissident newspaper *Cumhuriyet* launched a series of news and commentaries, in which the editors held openly and directly responsible of the act radical elements of the T/C leadership and TMT, which, in their view, aimed at the instigation of interethnic violence, the collapse of the common Republic, and of Turco–Greek amity. Thus, in the 23 April 1962 issue of *Cumhuriyet*, editors Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan announced that they would announce

the ‘author’ of the bombing acts.⁵³⁰ Hours later, on the very night of 23–24 April, the two barristers were cruelly murdered by masked killers. Infuriated, Ambassador Dırvana essentially believed that the Hikmet and Gürkan were executed by the T/C elements of TMT, and told Denктаş that to be ready to be investigated by inspectors from Turkey, and if found guilty, to leave his post and Cyprus, and reside in Turkey, in return for a cover-up—apparently, a deal applying to Dr. Küçük, as well. Denктаş retorted that this flagrantly meant meddling into the domestic affairs of the T/Cs, denying Dırvana’s own claims that they were independent, and asked for the opening of formal inquiry (Denктаş, 2000: 169–171). In the process, it became clear that Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan had gone to see and talk to Polycarpus Georghadjis, Minister of the Interior, told what he knew, claiming that Colonel Turgut Sunalp, Commander of the Turkish Army Contingent was one of those who had staged the act of sabotage, and pointed as his sources to Ambassador Emin Dırvana, and Mehmet Ali Pamir, Director of the Turkish News Bureau, i.e. to the Embassy.⁵³¹ Georghadjis had discretely taped the conversation, and when the tapes came out before the investigation commission, Denктаş seized the opportunity to present slain barristers as spies for Georghadjis, and blame Ambassador

⁵³⁰ “Evet tekrar ediyoruz: Bomba hadiselerinin sorumlusu alçak, adi ve satılmış herifin kim olduğunu aklı selim sahibi herkes tahmin etmiştir. Bu alçağın, bu satılmışın yüzündeki maskenin indirileceği gün yakındır. Ve o gün geldiğinde bu alçakça bomba hadiselerinden dolayı Türk toplumunun sorumlu tutulamayacağını kat’iyetle ifade edebilecek olan yine biz olacağız.” “Yirmibeşoğlu’nun Ağzından Kaçırıldığı Kıbrıs’ın Gizli Tarihi”, Hasan Yıkıcı,

⁵³¹ That Gürkan actually pointed to Pamir as a source is most curious. It is important to note that, Pamir, as a member of the T/C diaspora in Turkey and top bureaucrat, had actively worked since the late 1950s for the formal adoption of Cyprus as Turkey’s ‘national cause’, and the organisation of the T/C nationalist movement in Cyprus. Also, he apparently worked very closely with the Special Warfare Department to help coordinate the logistics of TMT activities. If anything, Pamir could be Denктаş’s man, and the agent of the Special Warfare Department.

Dırvana, for having believed in G/C leaders, rather than his own people. Apparently, he was able to drive Ambassador Dırvana into a tight corner, so Dırvana was forced to make a declaration in defence of Turgut Sunalp and Rauf R. Denктаş, and the showdown ended in victory for Denктаş.⁵³² As a matter of fact, Dr. İhsan Ali argued that, prior to the emergence of the tape records, everybody were against Denктаş, but afterwards, the tide turned towards the latter (Ali, 2002: 33–34). Ambassador Dırvana sent a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asked for the removal of the T/C leadership, but his demand was turned down and he resigned (Ali, 2002: 54). He remained in office until 26 September 1962 (Fırat, 1997: 74), to be replaced by Mazhar Özkol, Acting Ambassador. Claims vary as to who had bombed the mosques. According to Dr. İhsan Ali, the bombs had been planted by officers under the command of Police Director Lagoudontis, who was close to Georghadjis, to foster enmity between the two communities (Ali, 2002: 47–48). On the other hand, many year later, retired General Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu of the Special Warfare Department confessed that, as a part of non-conventional warfare, ‘some values’ could be sabotaged to increase the resistance of people, for instance, a mosque could be set afire, as had been done in Cyprus.^{533, 534} As for the killings of the Barristers, Hıfısiye Hikmet,

⁵³² See, for Rauf R. Denктаş’s account of the events, Denктаş (2000: 169–181).

⁵³³ “*Halkın mukavemetini artırmak için düşman yapmış gibi bazı değerlere sabotaj yapılır. Mesela bir cami yakılır. Kıbrıs’ta biz bunu yaptık. Bir cami yaktık.*” “*Kıbrıs’ta Cami Bile Yaktık. Özal’a suikastın gerisindeki isim olarak suçlanan emekli Org. Yirmibeşoğlu boş bulununca...*”, Tülay Şubatlı, (*Habertürk*, 23 September 2010). Later, Yirmibeşoğlu tried to retrieve his words, by claiming that it was all a misunderstanding—albeit not very convincingly.

⁵³⁴ Yirmibeşoğlu arrived on the Island in August 1962, and served as Officer of Operations and Intelligence under the command of Colonel Necdet Üruğ, who had replaced Turgut Sunalp (Yirmibeşoğlu, 1999: 391). Yirmibeşoğlu was the *protégé* of General Kemal

daughter of the late Ayhan Hikmet, claimed that they had been killed upon the orders of Rauf R. Denктаş. Furthermore, Şener Levent, the owner and editor of Afrika newspaper argued that there were two killers, and they were both known.⁵³⁵ The role of Colonel Turgut Sunalp in the events remains in the dark. However, according to Denктаş, they were close friends. Apparently, during his stay on the Island, Sunalp supported Denктаş, and managed to somewhat balance the Dirvana factor.

The bombings of Bayraktar and Ömeriye mosques, on the night of 24–25 March 1964, was part of a wider wave of provocative attacks, comprising, as it did, G/C monuments as well, marking the return of nationalist terror. The showdown between Ambassador Dirvana and Denктаş concluded, decisively, with the defeat of the former. Thus, the die-hard T/C nationalists were now largely freed from the constraints imposed by Ambassador Dirvana upon instigative–escalatory acts and politics. Most importantly, emergent political opposition by liberals and the left, as the product of the plural polity conceived by the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was now terminated by means of terror.

- ***Towards the End, Rift between Makarios and Averoff, Makarios Set Loose***

The so-called ‘*Geçici Merhale Planı*’ [the Interim Phase Plan], mentioned

Yamak, and the latter, the *protégé* of Sunalp. It is interesting to note that all these people, including Necdet Üruğ, were the top military and political leaders of the 12 September 1980 coup.

⁵³⁵ “*Arkasında Denктаş Var*”, Yıldırım Oğur, (*Taraf*, 25 September 2010).

and summarised above in Sub-Section 3.4.1 seems to date to the early months of 1962, when inter-community relationships were fast deteriorating in view of the tax stalemate of December 1961, and the bombings of March 1962.⁵³⁶ To recall, the Plan argued that the T/C nationalist leadership had only conditionally gave consent to the Zurich and London Agreements, on the common understanding, with the Menderes Government, that the Republic would be just an interim phase on the way towards the ultimate goal [*nihai gaye*] of full independence [*tam istiklâl*], i.e. *Taksim*. The importance of the Plan is that its overall tone seems to indicate that, as of 1962, the T/C nationalist leadership considered *Taksim* as its top priority.

According to the Report, the reasons of the T/C leadership for having refused to accept the Zurich–London Agreements and the Republic as the permanent resolution of Cyprus issue were as follows: (i) Despite all the guarantees, the 7 to 3 ratio implies that this, in the final instance, is the administration of the G/Cs, under which the T/C structure [*bünye*] would gradually erode; (ii) under the conditions of maximum collaboration, where all G/C caprices would be tolerated to avoid defiance and get on well basically meant that there would be no ‘national cause’ left to pursue, so the T/C would end up to get liquidated as a community; (iii) fiscal needs were so large, the fiscal means available were so little that the nominal separate status of the T/Cs as community would very soon be zeroised (An, 2002: 100). On the other hand, there were those who did accept the Agreements as

⁵³⁶ It seems safe to assume that they were written prior to 23–24 April 1962, since one can infer from the text makes the Barristers were yet alive.

the final resolution of the Cyprus issue, and yielded to and avoided causing any troubles for the G/Cs. Accordingly, one could no longer speak of the (separate) ‘Community cause’ [*Cemaat davası*]. If the view of the Republic being ‘the’ final resolution were successfully inculcated, the T/Cs would lose their confidence firstly in their own community, then to Turkey, and, with the help of other factors such as unemployment, lack of credits, would fall into the clutches of G/Cs. Furthermore, (iv) the Report claimed that almost none of the rights granted to the T/Cs under the Zurich Agreements had been delivered. As matter of fact, G/Cs were busy raising a new breed of leaders who actually believed that all these rights and guarantees were simply superfluous. In order to get the T/Cs worn down, tired and come apart , the G/Cs pursued a policy of putting off. Thus, municipalities still stood unseparated, and the drawing of municipal borders could take years. There were a number of problems and injustices which required ‘our’ defiance as a community. As a consequence of the systematic policy of putting down going on for the last year and a half, the spirit of struggle of the T/C had been dampened. According to the Report, separate municipalities constituted the basis of the T/Cs status of separate community. Thus, despite the fact that the separation of municipalities was the source of extra (fiscal) burden, it had to be defended as a cause. Accordingly, the author(s) of the Report asked the upper echelons to clarify if the cause to separate municipalities was a cause to defend or drop. Whatever the reply, the author(s) of the Report personally believed that the unification of the municipalities on purely economic considerations would

cause the collapse of this solid ground of ‘our’ cause of being a separate community (An, 2002: 103). G/C did not intend to add a single piaster to the constitutionally guaranteed central government contribution of 400,000 liras, which left a great portion of the needed education and Community budget of 800,000 liras uncovered. And this, despite the fact that the Greek Community Chamber had been provided some 6 million British pounds through personal channels. Thus the authors pointed out their belief into the Motherland Government that the latter would make every material sacrifice to keep the Community Chamber going, as the unique symbol of our status of separate community. If the departments of the Community Chamber could not be sustained because of material limitations, existing Agreements would surely collapse.⁵³⁷ Furthermore, those who claimed to practice opposition politics had to be dictated the fundamentals of the national cause, the Dr. İhsan Ali, Muzaffer Gürkan and Ayhan Hikmet, who had connections to the British intelligence, Greek Enosis leaders, and the communists had to be ‘silenced’.⁵³⁸ The T/Cs were at an impasse. On the one hand, there were the day-to-day problems of unemployment, lack of credit, lack of business opportunities, etc., and on the other, they were

⁵³⁷ “‘Ayrı Cemaat Statümüzün’ yegane sembolü olan Cemaat Meclislerini söndürmek için Rumların tutmuş olduğu bu yol karşısında anavatan hükümetimizin azami fedakarlığı yaparak bizi maddeten destekleyeceğine inanıyoruz. Maddi imkânsızlıklar yüzünden cemaat meclisi dairelerini idame ettiremez bir duruma düşecek olursak mevcut anlaşmaları, Rumların istediği şekilde, çökerteceğiz.” (An, 2002: 104)

⁵³⁸ Clearly, this was the death sentence of the Barristers: “Cemaat içinde muhalefet yapma sevdasında olanlara ‘milli davanın’ ana hatları dikte ettirilmeli; milli davayı baltalayacak şekilde neşriyat ve propaganda yapmaları önlenmelidir. ¶Rumların meftunu ve hayranı olduğu; İngiliz intelijensiyası ve Rum müfrit ENOSİS liderleri ile irtibatı olduğu tesbit edilen Dr. İhsan Ali ve onun heppacısı kesilen bir cinsi sapık (Muzaffer Gürkan) ile komonistlerle ilişkisi olduğu tespit edilen Ayhan Hikmet, Rum emeline hizmet eden faaliyet ve yayınlarından vazgeçirilmeli; milli bir davanın varlığına inanmıyorlarsa susturulmalıdırlar.” (An, 2002: 105)

exceedingly hesitant if there was any national cause left. Under the circumstances, they would lose all confidence in those who talked them about the rights of the ‘Separate Community’. There were no institutions that offered jobs. Only those who depended upon G/Cs could survive. ‘We’ had to create a community that believed in itself, the way ‘we’ did during 1955–1958 (An, 2002: 105). In other words, the administrators of the T/C society were to be given a ‘national plan’ to which they could adapt their words and deeds. If the line of this plan were the continuation and consolidation of the status of ‘Separate Community’, and the future rule of Turkness over Cyprus, we could continue the struggle and keep the people together. But if the plan was ‘this is the end of it, be careful to get on with the Greeks, don’t you be spoilt, don’t make a big deal out small things and don’t upset your Greek friends you beg for’, then ‘we’ would have to rethink our situation and see if we (as leaders) could undertake this responsibility under the circumstances.⁵³⁹

The so-called ‘Geçici Merhale Planı’ argued that the national cause could not be sustained under the arrangements of Zurich, since state power was dominated by the G/C majority, the spirit of peaceful collaboration would exclude the pursuance of separatist politics, and the fiscal means of the T/Cs did not suffice to meet their share of the state apparatus. Thus, the

⁵³⁹ “Kısacası, idarecilere milli bir plan verilmelidir ki sözlerimizi ve hareketlerimizi bu milli plana göre ayarlayabilelim. Eğer bu milli planın hattı ‘Ayrı Cemaat statüsünün devamı ve kökleştirilmesi; gün gele Türklüğün Kıbrıs’a hakim olması’ ise mücadeleye devam edebiliriz, halkı tutabiliriz. Eğer bu plan ‘her şeyin sonuna geldik, Rumlarla iyi geçinmeye bakınız. Şımarıklık etmeyiniz; küçük, ufak tefek haklarınız yendi diye gürültü çıkarıp, el açmak zorunda kaldığınız Rum dostlarınızı gücendirmeyiniz’ şeklinde olacaksa, durumumuzu yeniden gözden geçirmemiz ve bu şartlar altında bu mesuliyeti omuzlanıp omuzlanamayacağımızı düşünmemiz gerekecektir.” (An, 2002: 105-6)

nationalist leadership seems to have multiple concerns. On the other hand, the Report claimed that the G/C leadership had been pursuing a policy of putting off things and gradually wearing down the T/C community. It is also apparent that, a major, if not the biggest, concern was to ensure to fiscal resources for the sustenance of the Community Chamber. On the other hand, the Report clearly asked for the ending of 'plural' politics, if necessary, through the physical extermination of dissidents. It also asked for a national plan to preserve and reinforce the status of separate community, and ideally, Taksim. As it stands, economic development was emphasised as a 'derived' priority at best, as the basic instrument to support the separatist politics aiming at the fulfilment of the ultimate goal of Taksim.

- ***Towards the End — Last Attempts to Save the Republic — Municipalities, the Second Major Crisis — Rift between Makarios and Averoff, Makarios Set Loose***

In July 1962, the United States expressed concern over the build-up of tension between the two communities in Cyprus, calling for cooperation between Greece and Turkey (Sonyel, 2003: 31–32). On 4 September 1962, Makarios made a public statement to the effect that unless the minority T/Cs making part of the terrible race of the Turks was expelled off the Island, the work of EOKA heroes would be unfulfilled. Apparently, the statement widened the existing rift between Makarios and Greek Prime Minister Averoff who telegraphed the former and called his behaviour irresponsible, warning that he would not enter into any conflict with Turkey just to protect Makarios. Shortly afterwards, over 22–26 November 1962, Makarios pay a

visit to Turkey, where he complained about the obstruction of tax laws as a means of pressure for other things. Whilst Turkey agreed this was wrong and instructed Mazhar Özkol to act accordingly, Prime Minister İnönü told Makarios that the amendment of the Constitution would be considered as a most serious offence. He was also warned about the presence of extremists in top positions, irresponsible public statements, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Kemal Erkin made it clear it would be possible to speak of a partial revision, if and only if, mutual confidence could be restored by the full implementation of the Constitution's provisions concerning the municipalities, civil service, etc.⁵⁴⁰

Apparently, from the point of view of Turkey, the Makarios visit failed to serve its purpose, namely, that of softening the stand of Makarios. As a matter of fact, Hatzivassiliou claims that, after his return from Turkey, Makarios shifted to the 'short-term' option of trying to overthrow the restrictions stipulated by the Agreements, and hence the Constitution:

"It was later, especially during the period between December 1962 and February 1963 that he moved towards the short-term option."
(Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 531)⁵⁴¹

The second major crisis between G/Cs and T/Cs broke out over the dragging issue of municipalities. Nearly two and a half years had passed since the

⁵⁴⁰ See, for details, Sonyel (2003: 33–34), Gülen (2012: 395–396), and Hatzivassiliou (2005: 526).

⁵⁴¹ The long-term option was the gradual wearing down of the T/C community.

establishment of the Republic, and the resolution of the problem of the determination of final municipal boundaries by the so-called Mixed Municipal Commission was nowhere in sight. Thus, in December 1962, G/C members of the House of Representatives refused to renew the municipal law,⁵⁴² and Makarios abolished the municipalities (Crawshaw, 1964a: 339).⁵⁴³

As of the end of 1962, there was full deadlock and a critical point had been reached over the double issues of taxes and separate municipalities. Greek Government was worried that Makarios could escalate the conflict, and advised the latter restraint. As the temporary legal provisions expired on 31 December, the two sides tried to achieve a compromise. Hatzivassiliou (2005: 526) points out that “[b]y Christmas Eve it appeared that a solution could be found, based on the creation of common committees which would replace the separate municipal authorities. However, on 26 December Küçük backtracked.” Furthermore, Hatzivassiliou (2005: 526–527) attributes Küçük’s move to the intervention of Mazhar Özkol, Acting Ambassador, and argues that recent research indicates that the ‘proconsul’ role assumed by the latter in Cypriot affairs was what “...Makarios that Ankara would not allow a free intra-Cypriot negotiation, and pushed him to

⁵⁴² In 1959, the British had enacted the ‘Turkish Municipal (Temporary Provisions) Law of 1959’ empowering the T/C municipalities (Sonyel, 2003: 37). In the absence of the new law, due to the disagreements over the boundaries, it could not be replaced, so it was being extended on a yearly basis.

⁵⁴³ “On 25 December 1962, Makarios stated that the provisions of the Constitution as regards separate municipalities were unworkable, that with the expiry of the existing law on 31 December, all municipal councils would be abolished and their functions would be taken over by Government-sponsored bodies. On the same day, the Turkish Communal Chamber passed a resolution stating that it would regard the existing law as having been enacted.” (Sonyel, 2003: 38)

consider extensive constitutional revision.” One way or another, on 2 January 1963, the Council of Ministers passed a decree transforming municipal areas into development areas, despite Dr. Küçük’s and the T/C ministers’ objections. At this point, the T/C press had started to contemplate over the prospects of intervention by the Guarantor Powers. On 5 January 1963, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphed the Greek Government, to inform the latter that Turkey could have to initiate the process of intervention stipulated in the Treaty of Guarantee, in order to protect the Constitution she was the Guarantor of. Turkey suggested the simultaneous cancelation of the Community Chamber law, and the Council of Minister’s decree. In response, on 10 January 1963, Makarios declared that the issue of municipalities was completely the domestic issue of Cyprus (Sophocleous, 72–73).

On 25 January 1963, there was a strong explosion and a light damage at the Bayraktar mosque. Following that, Glafkos Clerides and Orhan Müderrisoğlu applied to the Supreme Constitutional Court, the former for the cancellation of the Turkish Community Chamber’s municipal law, and the latter for the cancellation of the application of ‘Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law’ to municipal areas (Sophocleous, 2007: 73). On 2 February 1962, Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs Spyros Kyprianou met Mazhar Özkol and complained about the extremist statements of certain Turkish citizens visiting the Island, upon which the latter denounced such attitudes. On the other hand, whilst tension over the issue of municipalities continued, tension between left and right also rose, with AKEL and PEO

members being attacked (Sophocleous, 2007: 74). By early March, the municipalities issue has become explosive enough for the British and the United States express concern over the consequences of a possible eruption of violence—the former about the Bases, the latter about the southeastern flank of NATO (Sonyel, 2003: 39–40).

The key to the turn of events in Cyprus was the relationship between Makarios and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, and the political fate of the latter. In a noted letter of 19 April 1963, written probably in consultation with Prime Minister Karamanlis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Evangelos Averoff warned Makarios that differences in Cyprus Turco–Greek alliance—all too important in the midst of the Cold War— to its very roots, endangered the security of Greece, equally endangered the well-being of the Istanbul Greek Orthodox minority and of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. He also reiterated the liberal view that new troubles and the possible of eruption of violence could block Cyprus’s road to economic development. Furthermore, Averoff argued that some provisions of the Constitution obstructing key state affairs could indeed be amended, provided that a normal course in the relationships between Greece and Turkey, and thereby, Makarios and Turkey, was pursued. This letter, and the long-term option it was for, Makarios totally disregarded (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 530; Sophocleous, 2007: 75).⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴⁴ Two options were being considered amongst G/C and Greek circles. Apparently, the short-term option of amending the Constitution in a way to reduce the T/Cs form the status of equal partner to the status of minority, if necessary through force and confronting Turkey; and the long-term option of amending the Constitution, gradually and peacefully, with priority being given to economic development. Averoff’s letter to Makarios of 19

It is important to note that the long-term option was closely connected to the liberal thesis of the primacy of (G/C) economic development. As a matter of fact, Hatzivassiliou points out that “[a]s a ‘functional’ approach, the long-term option placed great emphasis on the positive effects of economic development. In a letter to Makarios in autumn 1961, Karamanlis indicated his government’s concern to help the economic development of the island and to assist the Greek Cypriots’ ‘progress in the framework of the established institutions’. In his January 1962 message to Makarios, Averoff noted that the Archbishop’s statement on possible constitutional revision could cool off the recently proclaimed US interest in the economic development of the island. The economy promised much for the supporters of this policy: in the early 1960s, Cyprus’s standard of living was second only to Israel’s in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Thus, the so-called ‘*Geçici Merhale Planı*’ (the Interim Phase Plan) of early 1962 of the T/C nationalist leadership can be better put into its place now. The signs of the rapid economic development of the Cypriot—to be more precise, G/C—economy were already there, and the T/C nationalist leaders are likely to have thought that, under the circumstances of uneven economic growth and ever larger welfare gaps, it would be impossible to reproduce the existing relations of power, inside the T/C community.

On 25 April 1962, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the application of the ‘Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law’ to

April 1963 represented the basic arguments of the long-term option. For a detailed discussion of the debate on short- and long-term options, see the excellent article of Hatzivassiliou (2005), particularly, pp. 528.

municipal areas—the G/C move, and the Turkish Community Chamber’s municipal law were both invalid. On 8 May 1962, negotiations entirely broke down (Sonyel, 2003: 40).

On the other hand, serious differences between Prime Minister Karamanlis and the King of Greece Paul led to the fall of the Karamanlis Government in June 1963. Thereupon, Greece entered a period prolonged political crisis which only ended when Karamanlis suffered a crushing defeat in the elections of 16 February 1964 before his archival Georgioe Papandreou and his Centre Union Party. It is important to note that the political turmoil in Greece gave full scope to Makarios to pursue the short-term option of revising the Constitution (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 527).

As of mid-1962, Makarios had fully decided to go for the short-term option, i.e. that the Constitution was unworkable, that it had to be amended at all costs—which Makarios probably believed were not as great as some would tend to think. Political crisis in Greece freed him from the restraints imposed by Karamanlis. Empirical evidence indicates that the T/C leadership had been following fairly closely the debate between the advocates of the short-term and long-term options. Thus, the so-called ‘Geçici Merhale Planı’ [the Interim Phase Plan] makes it clear that, as of early 1962, the T/C nationalist leadership seriously feared that the long-term option would erode its own political power amongst the T/Cs, due to the difficulties of the fiscal sustenance of their share of the state apparatus, as well as uneven economic development between T/C and G/C economies.

Under the circumstances, they clearly opted for instigative–escalatory politics aiming at Taksim.

- ***Towards the End — Special Warfare Department Recovers its Power and Revives TMT — T/C Leadership’s Strategic Assessment Report of 14 September 1963***

Hatzivassiliou (2005: 527) points out that, with Makarios making full strides towards the promotion of constitutional revision, and the T/C side having fully reverted to *Taksim*, “[b]y the autumn of 1963 both Greek and Turkish Cypriots had plans for action against each other.” As a matter of fact, both sides had produced strategic documents comprising assessments of the various short and long-term, moderate and radical scenarios, options and choices. When captured or revealed, the documents in question were used on the international arena to prove the malevolence of the other side. Thus, the proof of G/C malevolence was the noted Akritas Plan,⁵⁴⁵ and those of T/C side, the two documents captured at Dr. Küçük’s office after the outbreak of violence, namely, the aforementioned ‘*Geçici Merhale Planı*’ of early 1962, and a second document, signed by Dr. Küçük and Denктаş, dated 14 September 1963. It is important to note that, by that time, that the top brass generals of the Turkish Armed Forces had effectively neutralised MBK and the temporary influence of lower rank officers, successfully

⁵⁴⁵ The so-called Akritas Plan of the G/C nationalist leadership was firstly disclosed by G/C newspaper *Patris*, on 21 April 1966. In his interview to Niyazi Kızılyürek, Glafkos Clerides makes it clear that the authors of the Akritas Plan were Tassos Papadopoulos, and Polycarpos Georghadjis. Papadopoulos’s contribution to its preparation was far greater, because the education and legal background of Georghadjis would not allow the latter to compose such a document. According to Clerides, Georghadjis was the commander of the ‘Organisation’, and Tassos his subcommander (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 101).

suppressed attempts at new coups to complete the betrayed Revolution of 27 May. It is very likely this shift in the balance of powers inside the Army contributed to the recovery of the Special Warfare Department of its former prestige. In his memoirs, Denktaş recalls that, in May or June 1962, he was visited by a top level officer from Ankara, who told him that they had been misled by the reports of their man in Cyprus, apologised, and told that a new leader would now be sent, asking Denktaş for assistance. And soon, the new leader arrived.⁵⁴⁶

The second document found by G/Cs at Dr. Küçük's office, dated 14 September 1963 document and signed by Dr. Küçük and Denktaş, considered possible economic and political strategies, fewer than two different scenarios of the unfolding of constitutional crisis. The first was scenario was the abrogation, *de jure*, and the second, the *de facto* non-observance of the Constitution by the G/C leadership. It is important to note that these two scenarios were basically what G/Cs called, respectively, the short-term and the long-term options. In the first case—which was the way things actually turned out, the sole choice available to the T/Cs was to found a separate republic outside the Zurich Agreements, i.e. *Taksim* (An, 2002: 106–111). In the first case, i.e. direct abrogation of the Constitution, the T/C members of the House of Representatives and the Community Chamber would get together to draft and declare the constitution of the new,

⁵⁴⁶ “1963 Mayıs veya Haziran ayında Ankara’dan gelen yüksek rütbeli bir subay randevu olarak ziyaretime geldi. Özür diliyordu. ‘Kıbrıs’ta bir adamımız vardı. Biz onun raporlarına inandık. Sizin raporlarınıza önem vermedik. Yanıldığımızı anlıyoruz. Size yeni bir lider gönderiyoruz. Lütfen yardımcı olunuz.’ gibi sözler söyledi.” (Denktaş, 2000: 168) As it appears, the only direct connection of any influence Denktaş had up to that point was Colonel Turgut Sunalp, Commander of the Turkish Army Contingent.

exclusively T/C republic. After its recognition by the Motherland, the new republic and Turkey would immediately sign trade and aid agreements, to meet the materials needs of the T/Cs. Whilst the basis of such agreements would be to provide the economic aid a basis from the point of view of international law, G/Cs would certainly react and retaliate. On the other hand, such acts of retaliation would give start to a struggle between the two communities. At this point, the T/C community, scattered all over the Island, would be forced to concentrate over and defend a certain area, to be decided in the light of a strategic plan prepared by experts (An, 2002: 109). Furthermore, it was necessary to prepare a plan to ensure the logistics of the T/C community in terms of food and other supplies, and to reinforce its ties to the Motherland. Furthermore, all T/C public servants now working for the central government had to be transferred to new posts under the new republic. Finally, it was necessary to prepare detailed plans for the fiscal requirements and the provision of the services to be provided by the new republic well ahead (An, 2002: 109–110).

The second case involved the *de facto* non-observance of the Constitution by the G/C leadership. In this case, the T/C community would not be able to respond by openly abrogating the Constitution. But, it would still continue to move towards the ultimate goal (i.e. *Taksim*), albeit at a slower pace, and get ready for the application of the first plan above, in case the G/Cs decided to abrogate the Constitution *de jure* (An, 2002: 110). From the point of view of the economy, it was necessary to make the T/C community self-sufficient, and found the essential industries that would serve that purpose.

Since those new industries would be boycotted by G/Cs, ‘we’ would find out markets to ensure their survival. Furthermore, it was necessary to link Cyprus and the Motherland by sea (ferries, etc.), and the raise the T/C population of the Island by people from Turkey who would come under tourist guise. Once fiscal and military preparations were completed and the spirits of people was raised, the T/C community would wait to take opportunity of a constitutional crisis that G/Cs would anyways create. As a matter of fact, G/Cs had already given us various opportunities, and they would surely give ‘us’ many more opportunities (An, 2002: 110–111).

It is clear that, by the autumn of 1963, the T/C leadership had unanimously decided to go for Taksim, whether the G/C nationalists adopted the short-term or the long-term option. The first plan, which presupposed the scenario of de jure G/C abrogation of the Constitution involved the signing of agreements for fiscal aid from Turkey, and the territorial concentration of the entire T/C community over one large unified area.⁵⁴⁷ Obviously, the author(s) counted upon the large-scale military intervention of the Turkey, on the basis of the Treaty of Guarantee, for a relatively low-cost operation of this scale in terms of T/C lives could not normally be carried out by TMT.⁵⁴⁸ Also, under this scenario, any plans for economic development and industrialisation would have to be postponed, indefinitely. Under the

⁵⁴⁷ The T/C leadership was not able to realise this plan for a unified territory, as the T/Cs got trapped in enclaves scattered all over the Island. The largest enclave was the Nicosia enclave, to which there had been considerable inflow of migrants from the outskirts of Nicosia and nearby villages.

⁵⁴⁸ It is important to note that these were days when Turkey seriously considered or pretended to seriously consider intervention.

circumstances, priority would be given to finance state employment—now further inflated by the transfer of public employees working for the central state—and the provision of basic staples for the population, through the fiscal aid of Turkey. The second plan, based upon de facto G/C abrogation of the Constitution, presupposed, for the foreseeable future, relatively low-key conflicts with G/Cs, and territorial stability in the absence of massive demographic dislocations. The basic elements of this strategy were: (i) Rapid economic development and industrialisation; (ii) de-linking from the G/C economy by the revival of previous ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’ policies; (iii) resolution of the problem of scale inefficiencies through exports to the Turkish market—or, integration integration into the Turkish economy, and; (iv) Turkification of the Island through population transfers from Turkey.

I would argue that the document of 14 September 1963 was Denktaş’s own vision of how Taksim would be realised, of which the basic elements never changed. As a matter of fact, it looks like a surprisingly accurate account of the many policies put into practice from 1964 to 1983, the establishment of KKTC, with the difference that they were extended over a longer period of time than that originally envisioned in September 1963.

- ***The End of the Common of Republic of Cyprus***

At the end of July and beginning of August 1962, Makarios made various pro-*Enosis* public statements, targeting at, specifically, the Treaty of

Guarantee, and calling for the amendment of the Constitution. He argued that, with the Treaty of Guarantee, Greece and Turkey had committed themselves to the protection of Cypriot independence, which actually contradicted the very idea of independence, and United Nations principles (Sophocleous, 2007: 79). On 3 August 1962, Turkey responded by giving a diplomatic note arguing that statements of this kind were contrary to the Treaty of Guarantee and Article 181 of the Constitution. G/C response came from the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kyprianou who squarely refused to discuss the domestic affairs of Cyprus with a foreign power (Sonyel, 2003: 47). By mid-August, the problem had been transformed from one of municipalities to that of the comprehensive constitutional amendment and abolition of the Treaty of Guarantee (Sonyel, 2003: 48). Meanwhile, on 17 June 1962, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis resigned from office, and Makarios probably thought there could not be a more opportune time to advance his agenda, so carried on his statements in defence of Enosis, constitutional amendment, and against the the Treaty of Guarantee (Sonyel, 2003: 48–49). According to Crawshaw (1964a: 399), “[t]he political situation sharply deteriorated after the summer of 1963. In August President Makarios announced his intention to seek the revision of the Constitution. ... [As of September] [t]he Turkish leaders now adopted a more belligerent line. Touring the districts, they warned their compatriots to be ready to fight and hinted at the possibility of intervention by Turkey in accordance with the treaty of Guarantee.” At this point, Turkey appeared to be considering intervention and *Taksim* as serious options. Thus, on 18

September 1963, Director-General of the First Department in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Tuluy told M.C.G Man, the British *Chargé d’Affaires* that “... in the Turkish view, such unilateral action by Makarios might create the conditions favourable for the execution of a Turkish plan for partition, on which the Turks were planning to fall back in the last resort.” According to Man, Tuluy’s words could be said “... to represent the present intentions and plans of the Turkish Government if Makarios tries to force the issue in Cyprus.”⁵⁴⁹ Apparently, “[i]n the middle of October, ... M. Tuluy ... was reported to have given details ..., even drawing a rough map of the island with a line dividing it into two, running from North to South. He also added that the Turkish sector would be annexed to Turkey, as by itself, it would never be a viable economic unit” (Sonyel, 2003: 53).

On the morning of 30 November 1962, and only days after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on the 22nd shook the United States and her allies, Makarios delivered his proposals for constitutional amendment to Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Sonyel, 2003: 56). In Turkey, there was a government crisis, as Prime Minister İsmet İnönü’s CHP and the two other parties of the coalition government had suffered a great defeat against Ragıp Gümüşpala’s AP, the new centre party heir to the DP of Menderes. İnönü resigned on 3 December 1963, and founded a new minority government on 25 December 1963, supported by the independents. The death knell of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus finally sounded, in the early hours of 21

⁵⁴⁹ Quoted by Sonyel (2003: 50).

December, as two T/Cs were killed at a skirmish with G/Cs in Nicosia, setting off a wave of violence between the two communities.

5.5. EXPLAINING THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON REPUBLIC: CAUSALITIES

Comprehending the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus is essential to not only the satisfaction of scholarly curiosity, but the placement on relatively solid grounds of the ongoing peace efforts on the Island as well. Collapse has been attributed, variously, to consciously instigative rhetorics and politics caused by nationalist passions and intransigence, the spiral of escalatory politics caused by a classic case of security (prisoner's) dilemma, a combination of the two, or the unfulfilled economic interests of T/C bourgeoisie, etc.⁵⁵⁰ In what follows I try to (i) test the causality models of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright, using the material available about the 1960–1963 sub-period of T/C politics and economy, and thereby, (ii) provide, in passing, a relatively more systematic analysis of the causes and dynamics that have triggered the crisis and the collapse of the common state. In so doing, I will follow, as closely as possible, the order of my exposition in the previous two sections, namely,

- '5.3. Strategic Constraints, Possibilities, Options Faced by, and the Strategic Priorities and Choices of the T/C Nationalist Leadership', and;

⁵⁵⁰ Consider, for instance, the following: "But in this context, insecurity and adversity could easily become self-fulfilling prophesies. In the Cypriot 'great game' after 1959, the extremists of each side justified their behaviour by reference to the existence of the extremists in the other; together, they were able to tilt the balance in favour of their views, forcing the moderate majority of both communities (as well as Makarios and Küçük) to follow them." (Hatzivassiliou, 2005: 535)

- ‘5.4. A Pre-Theoretical, Chronological Narrative of the 1960–1963 Period’,

the format of the three tables given in Chapter 3, namely:

- ‘Table 3.1. *Jessop’s Stylised Model of the Capitalist State*’;
- ‘Table 3.2. *Bob Jessop v. Erik Olin Wright: Theories of Causality and Elements to be Reconsidered*’, and;
- ‘Table 3.3. *An Historically–Empirically Grounded Conceptual Framework*’

A key part of the ‘initial conditions at time 0’ were the policy choices the T/C leaders had made in the preceeding period of the late 1950s, apropos of the sub-processes of state-building and capital accumulation. In the late 1950s, “[t]he nationalist drive towards state-building [had] encompassed ... the monopolization of the means of violence, concentration of political power, centralization of administration, quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to ensure capital accumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation, and the institutionalization of centralised budgetary practice.” (Arslan, 2012: 132) On the other hand, “[t]he same process also witnessed the emergence of the basic elements or tools of Turkish–Cypriot economic policies: (a) Turkey’s fiscal transfers; (b) the beginnings of, albeit at a rudimentary level, public budgets (particularly, embryonic forms of taxation and public investments by *Evkaf*); and (c) a capital strategy, based on the actuation of a process of rapid capital accumulation, around *Çarşı*, via the institution of a closed, all-Turkish circuit of capital.” (Arslan, 2012: 132–133)

As I see it, as ‘modernisers’, and as a part of their efforts to modernise the ‘traditional’ T/C society, the T/C nationalist leaders were striving to build a ‘modern’ state, which was an intrinsic part of their nationalist project. However, whether this ‘modern’ state was the modern ‘bourgeois’ (or, capitalist) state is a different matter altogether. In my review of Jessop’s theory in Chapter 3 above, ‘Table 3.1. *Jessop’s Stylised Model of the Capitalist State*’ summarises the key aspects of Jessop’s view of the articulation of economy and state under capitalism. As noted before, this table provides a yardstick against which to measure the historical–conjunctural deviations of the T/C proto-state and state formations. Significant divergences between the modern bourgeois state and the elements of the T/C nationalist process of state-building as of the late 1950s are as follows:

1. In the bourgeois state, economy is organised under the dominance of the capitalist law of value as mediated through competition between capitals. Thus, value form and market forces, and not direct coercion, shape capital accumulation. On the other hand, economic subjects are formally free owners of commodities, and exchange is regulated by the private law of property rights and contract. However, a key tool used by the T/C nationalist leadership in the process of state-building and capital accumulation was ‘From the Turk, to the Turk’, based upon the use of

coercion to build an ‘enclave’ market to support an all-T/C capital accumulation.

2. In the bourgeois state, there is the principle of the formal equality before the law of all citizens, and formal subjects of state are individuals with citizenship rights. It is important to note that formal equality and citizenship translates into politics as the principle ‘one citizen–one vote’, which constitutes the basis of competitive (free, i.e. multi-candidate, multi-party elections) representative politics, and the various other freedoms. However, the T/C leadership liquidated all forms of alternative organisations by the use of violence to centralise and concentrate political power via a monolithic (single) party–front model of politics.

Above, in Sub-Section 3.4.2.1, I have listed and studied at length the various, ‘conjuncturally given political and economic constraints and possibilities’ faced by the T/C nationalist leadership, under the polity of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. As noted before, the Republic was characterised by a duality, i.e. a *sui generis* ‘functional–federal’ state structure, in the form of the sharing of power by G/Cs and T/Cs at the level of the central state, and separation at the communal state and local state (municipalities) levels. Otherwise, it was a typically modern bourgeois state, with competitive representative politics, and a free market economy. Basically, the state of the Republic of Cyprus was, from the modern bourgeois state, different in that it involved two equalities, and not just one: (1) The equality of the two

communities, reflected in the duality of the state, and; (2) the equality of individual citizens, reflected in the economic and political rights and freedoms. Apparently, the second equality was designed to foster economic and political liberalism and the identity of Cypriotness, to check and balance G/C and T/C nationalisms. As such, the polity of the Republic of Cyprus was based upon the formal equality of (1) the communities and (2) individual citizens, representing the existing balance of power amongst Greece, Turkey, Britain and the United States. From the point of view of the policy choices the T/C leaders had made in the preceeding period of the late 1950s, the new polity implied a set of externally, conjuncturally given political and economic constraints and possibilities. Furthermore, it is important to note that one of the key links between the 'inter-state' level and the 'domestic' level is provided by the set of 'conjunctural constraints and possibilities' imposed by the former, upon the latter.

T/C NATIONALIST POLITICS: CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES

INTER-STATE LEVEL

Conjuncture of World Politics

(USA, GB, Turkey, Greece, inter-state balance of powers in Eastern
Mediterranean)



DOMESTIC LEVEL

The Polity of the Republic of Cyprus as a Set of Externally, Conjuncturally

Given Political and Economic **Constraints and Possibilities**, from the Point
of View of Domestic Actors (in this Particular Case, T/C Nationalists)

- **Constraint** on the Monopolisation of Violence (TMT)
- **Constraint** on the Concentration of Power (Plural–Competitive Representative Politics)
- **Constraint** on the Construction of a Captive Market and a Closed Circuit of Capital (From the Turk, to the Turk)
- **Possibility**: Duality of the State, and the T/C State within the State (Community Chamber, Municipalities)
- **Constraint**: Duality of the State, Some Key Ministries Go to G/Cs, Some Key State Functions, e.g. Economy, Interior Affairs in the Hands of G/C Nationalists

Generally speaking, those aspects of the new state that were based upon the principle of the formal equality of the two communities ‘generally’ favoured nationalist politics, whilst those based upon the formal equality of all citizens favoured liberal politics and economics. The latter aspects (liberal politics and economy) obviously meant constraints from the point of view of nationalist policies. However, the record of the duality of the state was somewhat mixed. At the level of the central state, the veto rights, the

requirement of separate majority votes, etc. were certainly possibilities, as demonstrated by the blockage of the Tax Bill. On the other hand, the sharing of the functions of the central state, i.e. the sharing of ministries basically implied that some key ministries and state functions, such as the economy and economic development fell under G/C control, which clearly constituted a serious constraint on the part of the T/C nationalists. It is important to note that, constraints from the point of view of the die-hard T/C nationalists were generally possibilities from the point of view of T/C Leftists and liberals (and of G/Cs, for that matter), and vice versa. Consider, for instance the differences between *Cumhuriyet*, on the one hand, and Denktaş and his associates, on the other, which mostly reflected their respective and opposite definitions of the constraints and possibilities. Thus, this seems to justify one aspect of Jessop's 'relational-strategic' state theory. Recall that the first epithet, i.e. relational, or or the idea of relationality involves three more categories, namely (i) structural constraints as opposed to conjunctural opportunities; (ii) power, and (iii) interest. Also recall that the first category of constraints-opportunities is relatively defined. Thus, one and the same element could imply a constraint for one actor (or set of actors), and opportunity for another (or another set of actors). Thus,

BOB JESSOP: STATE THEORY	
Relationality → Structural Constraints and Conjunctural Possibilities	
→	
That Constraints and Possibilities are Relatively Defined	
☑	

As far as the relationship between the inter-state level and the level of domestic politics are concerned, the implications of the Cyprus case seem to be rather interesting. The United States, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey had, through the Zurich and London Agreements, and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, determined the rules of the game domestic actors were asked to abide by, in accordance with the compromise they had reached about Eastern Mediterranean politics. As it appears, domestic actors—i.e. G/C and T/C nationalists— did not have the power to reject the setting of the basic rules of the game from without. However, the way things have turned out indicates that, if domestic actors did not have the power to reject the setting of the rules from without, they definitely had the power not to abide by. In the terms of the Bob Jessop, this basically implies that, in the case of Cyprus, the inter-state system could not dictate its own logic to the domestic system. Recall that, according to Jessop, society consisted of autopoietic systems of relations, or sub-ensembles of relations—state, markets, civil society, etc., and the lifeworld. On the other hand, state was relational, i.e. was determined by relations amongst relations. Furthermore, above the individual nation-states, there is the inter-state system, also ‘relational’, as a sub-ensemble of relations amongst relations which individual states represent. Also, recall that autopoiesis implied that each system of social relations is operationally autonomous, but materially—substantively interdependent on others. On the other hand, ecological dominance implied the structural or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organising ecology of systems to imprint its developmental logic on the

other systems. Accordingly, one can claim that, in the case of Cyprus, the inter-state system of super, great and local powers—i.e. United States, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey—failed to be ecologically dominant. Apparently, the operational autonomy of the domestic level can be strong enough not to abide by the rules imposed from without, even if cannot reject their imposition, in the first instance, due to its material interdependencies with the inter-state system. Overall, Jessop's idea of autopoiesis seems to be useful to put into their place the relations of causality between the inter-state and the domestic levels. Thus, the actors of the inter-state level were able to impose the logic of the inter-state system in terms of imposing the rules of the game upon the actors of the domestic level, in the first instance. However, domestic level actors did have enough power to not abide by the rules, and make the inter-state level actors to change them, in the last instance.

BOB JESSOP: CAUSALITY THEORY (AUTOPOIESIS, ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE)	
INTER-STATE LEVEL (System of Inter-State Relations) (USA, GB, Turkey, Greece, inter-state balance of powers in Eastern Mediterranean)	
<i>(Set the Rules of the Game)</i> ↓	↑ <i>(Disobeyed the Rules, Forcing Inter-State Actors Change Them)</i>
DOMESTIC LEVEL (The Society and State of the Republic of Cyprus) (G/C and T/C nationalisms together and separately as operationally autonomous and materially dependent autopoietic systems) ☑	

Another factor that belonged to the realm of external dynamics, and more specifically, the level of global political economy, was ‘planned economic development’ as an externally, conjuncturely given economic possibility, from the point of view of the overall Cypriot economy. As noted above, the first source of the post-1960 Cypriot economic planning was the British legacy of planned economic development in her colonies, including Cyprus, from 1945 onwards. The second was the US model of development advocated to the newly independent ex-colonies. Thus, after the founding of the Republic of Cyprus, the British, as the former ruler of the Island, extended start-up funds to both G/Cs and T/Cs, and the UN—and indirectly, the United States—assumed the guidance and the financing of economic planning. Gradually, the United States stepped in and took over all the responsibility of economic aid from the ex-hegemonic power. On the other

hand, it is important to note that the, as noted above, due to the duality of the state, some key ministries and some key state functions, such as the economy, economic development, etc. had passed into the hands of the G/C nationalists. Therefore, the duality of the state and thereby G/C control over key economic ministries and agencies implied that the the T/Cs could potentially be and actually were discriminated against in the process of the determination of priority projects and the allocation of development funds, clearly a constraint from the point of view of the T/C nationalist leadership.

However, from the point of view of the T/C economy, there was one further external dynamic to be considered. Thus, it is important to note that, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus coincided with the 27 May coup in Turkey, after which comprehensive economic planning was introduced as the organising principle of public investments and private capital accumulation, to be financed by increasing public and private savings. Accordingly, Turkey seems of have advocated to the T/C nationalist leadership a similar strategy of economic development in Cyprus. As I see it, this was both a possibility, and a constraint from the point of view of the T/C leadership. On the one hand, there was now a basic policy tool for economic development , and if backed by real resources for investment, a possibility for the T/C economy. However, the authors of Turkey's post-27 May economic planning had openly rejected and even planned to ban deficit financing, giving the priority to increasing public and private savings—clearly a constraint from the point of view of the T/C leadership. Furthermore, after 27 May, one of the major concerns of the new

governments was to solve the fiscal (and foreign currency) crisis of the state, through cutdowns in investments, so as to increase domestic public savings and close the budget deficit. Clearly, this was a constraint of the part of the T/C leadership, in terms of the availability of external funds for their own investment and current expenditures. Thus, external dynamics, i.e. the level of global political economy and Turkey's economic-development policies, plus one specific domestic dynamic, i.e. the duality of the central state apparatus, put a set of constraints and possibilities before the T/C nationalist leadership's efforts towards economic development.

To the foregoing set of constraints and possibilities, one must add three more that belong to the domestic level of economy, society and geography, namely, (i) coexistence, (ii) scale and, (iii) socio-economic formation as internally and historico-geographically given constraints. Firstly, as noted above, the establishment of a separate circuit and circulation of capital and circuit of income between the T/C peasantry, and the T/C merchants, through, particularly 'From the Turk, to the Turk' was one of the principal strategies of the T/C national for capital accumulation and development. However, the polity of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus clearly banned separatist policies aiming at the constitution of an exclusively T/C economic sphere. Furthermore, coexistence implied that G/C dominated division of labour and the competitive superiority of G/C capitals put a serious constraint before the process of the T/C capital accumulation and economic development. Secondly, the problem of small economic scale and the consequent scale inefficiencies in the case of many plants implied that

most of the key, profitable markets and economies could support only one or a few plants. As a matter of fact, the nationalist leaders of both sides appear to have aimed to capitalise on the oligopolistic and monopolistic profits and derived public revenues in the key sectors. However, the problem of small scale and the necessity of having monopoly or oligopolistic structure, together with the fact that investment permits were issued by G/C controlled ministries and agencies was a very serious constraint face by the T/C nationalist leadership. And thirdly, the T/C socio-economic formation, based as it was, upon small peasant production, plus an insignificant capitalist economy—part of which was unproductive trade activity—was devoid of the capacity to generate the surplus product/value—using a different terminology, the savings—necessary for rapid capital accumulation and economic development, a major constraint from the point of view of the nationalist leadership.

It is clear from the table of the constraints and and possibilities entailed by external and domestic dynamics that the means at the disposal of the T/C nationalist leadership were very restricted indeed.

**T/C ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CONSTRAINTS AND
POSSIBILITIES**

**THE LEVEL OF GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, TURKEY'S ECONOMIC-DEVELOPMENT
POLICIES,**

& THE POLITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

(Externally, Conjuncturally Given Economic Dynamics)



DOMESTIC LEVEL (T/C ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)

- *Constraint: British Legacy of Planned Economic Development*
- *Constraint: US Model of Planned Economic Development*
- *Constraint-Possibility: The Model of Planned Economic Development in Turkey*
- *Constraint: Fiscal Crisis and Austerity in Turkey*
- *Constraint: Duality of the State, Some Key Ministries Go to G/Cs, Some Key State Functions, e.g. Economy, Interior Affairs, in the Hands of G/C Nationalists*

-
- *Constraint: Coexistence of G/C and T/C Societies, Thereby, G/C Dominated Division of Labour and Superior G/C Competitive Power*
 - *Constraint: Monopolistic or Oligopolistic Markets and Industries Caused by Small Scale Inefficiencies and G/C Administrative Control over New Investments*
 - *Constraint: Low Capacity of the T/C Socio-Economic Formation to Produce the Surplus Product (and the Savings thereof) Necessary to Ensure Rapid Capital Accumulation and Economic Development*

DOMESTIC LEVEL (T/C ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT)



(Internally and Historico-Geographically Given Dynamics)


DOMESTIC LEVEL (SOCIETY/ECONOMY/GEOGRAPHY)

On the other hand, the most interesting consequences of the T/C socio-economic formation as of the early 1960s concerned the relationships between economy and the state. Recall that the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus implied, on the part of the Cypriot society, and particularly, the T/C society, that the size of the new state apparatus was likely to be relatively large compared to the size of the economy. Furthermore, the T/C society, due to its pre-modern socio-economic formation, was not able to generate the surplus product necessary to meet its share of the state absorption. For the purposes of this thesis, this is important on two accounts: Firstly, Erik Olin Wright's conceptualisation of 'society' as a socio-economic formation in the classic Marxist vein seems to be a useful approach in the case of the T/C economy. Thus,

ERIK OLIN WRIGHT: CONCEPT OF SOCIETY (ONTOLOGY)
Society Defined as Socio-Economic Formation ☒

Secondly, and more importantly, that the T/C economy could not generate the surplus product/value necessary to sustain a modern state implies that, as long as it remained a 'closed' economy, the modern (representative–bureaucratic) state was excluded as a possible form. Thus, recall that Erik Olin Wright defined 'structural limitation' as a pattern of determination where some social structure establishes limits within which some other structure or process can vary. A good example of structural limitation was the relationship between the economic form and corresponding forms of the

state. Accordingly, in the case of the T/C society, economic structure seems to have excluded the modern state as a form, as long as it remained a closed economy. In other words, given the T/C economic structure, the only way for the T/C national leadership to overcome the problem of structural limitation, and to build and sustain a modern representative–bureaucratic state was to have an open economy, i.e. meet state absorption via value transfers from without. As I see it, one of the basic causes of the dependency of the T/C economy upon fiscal transfers from Turkey was the financing of the modern state, which T/C economy clearly was unable to sustain by its own means. Thus,



It is one thing to identify the set of constraints and possibilities, and the options thereof, faced by the T/C nationalist leadership, and another to identify the dynamics of actual policy choices. In Jessop, the distance between constraints and possibilities and actual choices are filled up by the various elements of his relational–strategic approach, e.g, the categories of power, interest, temporal and spatial horizons, strategic selectivity. In Wright, selection, as a mode of determination, is particularly related to the process of decision–making. Furthermore, the mere identification of the set of constraints and possibilities leaves the problem of the causality between economy and politics unanswered, unless the dynamics of the making actual choices are sufficiently identified.

As far as the identification of the relations of causality between economy and politics/state is concerned, the greater question that must be asked is this: Was economy, somehow the sole, or the basic, or the major cause of the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus, from the point of view of the T/Cs? Those who attribute it to the economy generally point to the T/C *Çarşı* factor, by arguing that its failure to compete against the G/C capital was the major motive which led the T/C leadership to pursue instigative–escalatory politics and finally break away from the common state. But this presupposes, or suggests that the leaders directly represented the interests of *Çarşı*, through, apparently, personal links. As I see it, this argument involves two problems. Firstly, the proponents of this view fail to provide

any or adequate empirical evidence.⁵⁵¹ For instance, the mere fact that the leaders—most notably Dr. Fazıl Küçük— were *Çarşı* regulars, or mere statistics about the relative economic weaknesses of the T/C community and businesses do not prove the point. Secondly, they tend to equate the economy of the T/C community to *Çarşı*, and the economic problems of the society, to the problems of *Çarşı*. It is true that the nationalist leaders often put the enrichment of the T/C *Çarşı* to the centre of the core sub-process of capital accumulation; but it would be unjust to argue that they equated the economic problems they faced to the problems of *Çarşı*. Furthermore, despite the fact that economic problems were, from the outset, at the core of their basic concerns, this does not necessarily imply that economy was the ultimate motive of their decision to break away from the common state. In other words, economy could be a ‘derived’ concern—i.e. could be a major concern, still arise out of other, and more basic concerns.

Going back now to the pre-theoretical, chronological narrative of the 1960–1963 period above in Section 3.5, it is quite clear that, the post-Zurich–London concerns of the T/C leadership were not only confined to politics, but also comprised doubts and demands (from Turkey) over the T/C economy. As a matter of fact, there is a period after the conclusion of Zurich and London Agreements, when the T/C leaders gave the priority to economic development, rather than to separatist claims and work, trying to ensure the necessary funds and technical assistance from, particularly

⁵⁵¹ As I see it, the argument that personal links between *Çarşı* and the leaders was the key to the decision to break away from the common state could only be supported by way of direct testimonies, and/or the works of oral history. Unfortunately, neither are available.

Turkey. However, in the promotion of new investments, they did not only count upon the Turkish aid, and tried to develop their own policies to overcome the twin issues of low savings and the lack of capital. Thus, they particularly emphasised three institutional forms of capital accumulation and development, namely, cooperatives, public limited companies, and the promotion of wealthy people's private investments. However, T/C investments in oligopolistic/monopolistic markets dominated by G/C capital were apparently obstructed by the G/C bureaucracy, on the grounds of possible scale inefficiencies. On the other hand, it is also quite clear that the die-hard T/C nationalists, Rauf R. Denktaş and his associates, most particularly, aimed to preserve the monolithic party-front politics of former times, under the rhetoric of national unity. However, they temporarily backed off, as they realised that continuing the old politics of the centralisation and concentration of power based upon the use of violence was not feasible due to a number of new constraints. Similarly, in the economy, the use of violence as a means to capital accumulation, as was the case with 'From the Turk, to the Turk' was also constrained.

Interestingly, underlying the cleavage between the emergent opposition of liberal-Left pro-Republicans and the die-hard nationalists was the economy were the issues of economic development, and the vision of society. The former supported a politically and culturally liberal and economically state-led, planned model of development under the common state, and the latter, a politically-culturally monolithic, and economically separatist state-led model of development. Also Ambassador Dirvana and Turkey clearly

supported the first approach, giving the priority to the economic development of the T/C community.

It is important to note that 27 May had fatally ruptured the power nexus of Rauf R. Denktaş–TMT–Special Warfare Department–top brass of generals of the Turkish Armed Forces. The Department’s recovery of its former status was probably concomitant to the top brass generals’ re-taking of the control of the Turkish Armed Forces, and TMT was resuscitated in late 1962.

There were two great controversies between G/Cs and T/Cs which led to the final demise of the common state, namely, the tax controversy, and the municipalities controversy. Apparently, transfers from the central state budget and Turkey’s aid did not suffice to cover the expenses of the Turkish Community Chamber, which the die-hard nationalists regarded as the their own T/C state within the common state. Thus, the Community Chamber was forced to levy and collect taxes, to close the deficit, but the economy of the T/C community could not support double taxation, i.e. paying taxes to the Community Chamber *and* the Central State.

During the short life of the common state, the nationalist leadership (or, possibly, Denktaş by himself) produced a number of reports, for the Community Chamber, and for TMT and Ankara, which involved analyses of the key problems, and possible strategies and tactics. Looking at the Memorandum of 13 January 1961, delivered to the Government of Turkey,

one can see that, from the point of view of the economy and economic management, the three salient issues were: (1) youth unemployment; (2) the inability of the T/C economy to compete and catch up with the G/C economy, and; (3) the inability of the T/C economy to finance the expenditures of the central and communal states. The sharing of the central state apparatus with the G/Cs, the lack of qualified labour power to fill the 30 % T/C quota in public service, and fiscal constraints apparently put limits to the expansion of state employment. As of January 1961, only months after the proclamation of the common state, Denktaş and his associates had already resolved to pursue confrontational and escalatory politics, where undesired G/C words and deeds would be instantly retorted, and the power of the T/C representatives to obstruct the Tax Bill would be used as a basic leverage. Clearly, economy and economic development were key considerations in the eyes of the T/C leaders. Another key consideration concerned the process of state-building, with the reinforcement and consolidation of the Community Chamber and the separate municipalities being always put to the core, as goals to be achieved under all circumstances and at all costs.

Another key report was the ‘1960–1961’ Activity Report’ of the Community Chamber, dated 15 September 1961, where the two key challenges before the Community Chamber were identified as (i) the fiscal problems, and (ii) economic development, whilst efficacy and economy in current expenditures and investments, and the importance of developing vocational education to fight unemployment were also emphasised. The

nationalist mobilisation of the populace via cultural and political campaigns was singled out as the unique way to economic development, as opposed to the emphasis placed by Ambassador Dirvana and the pro-Republican liberals upon the free interplay of market forces. Looking at the overall tone of this Report, one tends to think that the Republic of Cyprus was regarded by its author(s) as the final resolution of the Cyprus issue, and economic development under the aegis of the common Republic, as the basic challenge faced by the T/C society. As a matter of fact, in this early period, Denktaş's own priorities seem to have swung between economic development under the aegis of the Republic as the final resolution of Cyprus issue, and Taksim, despite the fact that part—and not the whole—of the former can be due tactical rhetorics.

The first major crisis between T/C and G/C nationalists broke out of the tax controversy, in December 1961, the most important consequence of which being Makarios's first public reference to the possible amendment of the 1960 Constitution. On the other hand, the first major crisis had broken out in mid 1961, out of the Community Chamber decision to commemorate the 7th of June—the day of bombing in 1958 of Turkey's press agency in Nicosia, as T/Cs national day of struggle. On the other hand, the final showdown came in the spring of 1962, following the bombing of *Bayraktar* mosque in Nicosia, and cruel murderings of two prominent dissidents, Ayhan Hikmet and Ahmet Muzaffer Gürkan. The showdown concluded with the decisive victory of Denktaş, marking the return of nationalist terror, the end of plural politics under the Republic, and the freeing of instigative–escalatory politics

from its fetters. Furthermore, economic development was now emphasised as a ‘derived’ priority at best—as the basic instrument in support of the separatist politics aiming at the fulfillment of the ultimate goal of Taksim.

The so-called ‘*Geçici Merhale Planı*’ [the Interim Phase Plan], dating to the early months of 1962, seems to be a TMT report written by Rauf R. Denктаş. The Plan basically argued that the national cause could not be sustained under the arrangements of Zurich, since the common state was dominated by the G/C majority, the spirit of peaceful collaboration would exclude the pursuance of separatist politics, and the fiscal means of the T/Cs did not suffice to meet their share of the state apparatus. a major, if not the biggest, concern was to ensure to fiscal resources for the sustenance of the Community Chamber. On the other hand, the Report clearly called for ending ‘plural’ politics, and if necessary, through the physical extermination of dissidents.

On the G/C side, as of mid-1962, Makarios had fully decided to go for what was called the ‘short-term’ option, i.e. that the Constitution was unworkable, and had to be amended at all costs. It is important to note that political crisis in Greece had now freed him from the restraints imposed by Prime Minister Konstantinos G. Karamanlis. On the T/C side, the nationalist leadership had apparently been following very closely the G/C debate between the advocates of the radical short-term option, and the moderate long-term option. The so-called *Geçici Merhale Planı* of early 1962 indicated that they the leadership feared that the long-term option would

erode its political power, due to the difficulties of the fiscal sustenance of their share of the state apparatus, and the effects of uneven development between T/C and G/C economies. They now clearly opted for instigative–escalatory politics aiming at *Taksim*. On the other hand, by the autumn of 1963, the T/C leadership had unanimously decided to go for *Taksim*, with two alternative strategies for two alternative scenarios. It is interesting to see that, in the last instance, the leadership tied the success of both strategies exclusively to the economy. Thus, in case the G/C leadership opted for the short-term option of *de jure* abrogation of the Constitution, the T/C leadership would opt for immediate territorial partition. Under the circumstances, any plans for economic development and industrialisation would have to be postponed indefinitely, and priority would be given to finance state employment and the provision of basic staples for the population, through the fiscal aid of Turkey. On the other hand, in case the G/C leadership opted for the long-term option, i.e. *de facto* abrogation of the Constitution, the T/C leadership would delink the T/C economy from the G/C economy, engage rapid economic development and industrialisation, overcome the problem of scale inefficiencies through exports to the Turkish market, i.e. integration into the Turkish economy, and try to modify the demographic balance in its favour by population transfers from Turkey.

As I should like to point out at once, there is no evidence in the above narrative of events and summary of written documents, which supports the claim that the concerns and the ‘interests’ of the T/C *Çarşı* were the sole, basic, or major determinant of the nationalist leadership’s decision in any

sense, to break away from the common state. As a matter fact, there is no evidence left, or no indication that Rauf R. Denктаş and/or the other leaders had identified themselves with the interests of *Çarşı*. If anything, an ‘interpretative’ reading of Denктаş suggests that he only represented his own interests, which neatly fits Bob Jessop’s definition of ‘interest’

- a) as ‘comparative advantage’ that depends on concrete circumstances, particularly the given set of structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities obtaining over a period, and
- b) as something that relates to one’s conditions of existence, and interest calculation, and, by implication, to the ascertainment and/or the protection of one’s conditions of existence (see, Section 2.2.). Thus,

BOB JESSOP: STATE THEORY
Relationality → Interest → Depends on the Given Set of Constraints and Opportunities, Relates to One’s Conditions of Existence ☒

Furthermore, in the case of the T/Cs, economy actually matters, but not in a way that justifies reductionist and instrumentalist theories of the state. Clearly, the T/C leaders were, from the very outset, very deeply concerned about the economy, particularly in two areas, (i) the question of economic development, and (ii) the question of the fiscal sustenance of the state. An interpretative reading of policy papers and the like suggests that, in the face of the relatively advanced G/C economy and society, economic

development was regarded as the key to the solution of the ‘social problem’, and thus, to the integrity and stability of the T/C society. Moreover, the permanent of solution of the problem of the fiscal sustenance of the state was economic development. On the other hand, perhaps the biggest economic concern of the leadership was the inability of the T/C economy to sustain the modern state, which constituted a serious constraint before the nationalist project of state-building. To be more exact, the fact that economy was a major concern of the nationalist leadership does not imply that the ‘only’ direction of causality was from the economy to politics. On the contrary, economy was a major concern because it was the key to the realisation of the nationalist project of state-building. Therefore, the direction of causality was ‘also’ from politics to the economy. In other words, the relationship of causality was bi-directional. Overall, the T/C case of the relationship between the nationalist process of state-building and economy/capital accumulation seems to justify both Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright. Recall that, according to Jessop, society consisted of a variety of autopoietic (i.e. operationally autonomous, materially interdependent) systems and the lifeworld. Accordingly, there were different principles of societalisation, and thereby, different societal projects and types of state. Thus, social formations could be relatively unified under the dominance of religion (theocracies), military–police considerations (national security states), nation-building (new nations), capital accumulation (bourgeois societies). I would argue that, the nationalist leadership, and particularly the Denktaş–TMT nexus essentially represented the principle of societalisation

of nation-building. Furthermore, Denktaş's own interests, or the interests that he represented were those associated with this principle of societalisation—the societal project of nation–state–building. Also recall that, economy and the bourgeois societalisation had no ontological priority, and potentially, any given system could be ecologically dominant, i.e. impose its developmental logic upon the other systems. On the other hand, different autopoietic systems could be 'structurally coupled'. So, despite their institutionally separate entities, and their organisations according to different types of social logic, economic and juridico–political orders could be structurally coupled. Thus,

BOB JESSOP: ONTOLOGY AND CAUSALITY
• Society Defined as the Sum of Autopoietic Systems, Thus, Different Axes of Societalisation, Different Societal Projects, and Different Types of State ☑ • Any Given System (and its Associated Axis of Societalisation/Societal Project) Could Be Ecologically Dominant ☑ • Structural Coupling of Politics and Economy ☑

On the other hand, the inability of the T/C socio-economic formation (economy) to produce the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of a modern state apparatus meant that the economy constituted a structural limit for politics/the state, in the case of a 'closed' economy. Therefore, the only way out to overcome the structural limit in question was to resort to the

fiscal aid of Turkey, which explains why the T/C society has historically had an ‘open’ economy, financed by net foreign borrowing. Thus,

ERIK OLIN WRIGHT: CAUSALITY
Structural Determination: Some Structure Puts Limits upon, or Determines the Forms of Some Other Structure ☑

Bringing the two together,

CAUSALITY: JESSOP (AUTOPOIESIS, ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE, STRUCTURAL COUPLING) & WRIGHT (STRUCTURAL DETERMINATION)	
(The Level of Politics/State)	
T/C NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP'S PROJECT OF MODERN STATE-BUILDING ⇓ ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND/OR TURKEY'S FISCAL AID	FISCAL CRISIS OF THE T/C COMMUNITY STATE, DEPENDENCY ON TURKEY'S FISCAL AID ⇑ T/C SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION'S LOW CAPACITY TO GENERATE SURPLUS PRODUCT
(The Level of Economic Structure)	

The debate about the short-term *versus* long-term options amongst the G/Cs, and the discussion over appropriate responses in various T/C policy reports, indicate that, ‘strategy’ and ‘temporal and spatial horizons’ mattered in the struggles over the state of the Republic of Cyprus. Recall that, the two key ideas underlying Bob Jessop’s theory of the state were, in order of the evolution of his thought, ‘relationality’ and ‘strategic-ness’. Elements of the idea of strategic-ness were, that the state is (i) a ‘system of strategic selectivity’, (ii) a site where strategies are elaborated, and (iii) that structural

change is the combined effect of path-dependent and current-transformative strategies and struggles. Also recall that, strategic selectivity brought to the fore the relationship between the form of the state and political and economic strategies. Thus, the structure and modus operandi of all states are more open to some types of political strategy than others, more accessible to some societal forces than others according to the strategies they pursue to get to control the state, and more suited to some types of economic and political strategy than others, in terms of the modes of intervention and resources characterising the system. Accordingly, it is rather clear that T/C nationalist leadership attempted to modify the state structure, because the given state structure was closed to the social forces they represented, and to the economic and political strategies. On the other hand, the idea of relationality implied that agents, in accordance of the strategic selectivity of the given state; the given set structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities, and; their own identities, interests and power, are reflexive, capable of reformulating, and able to engage in strategic calculation about the current situation. As far as the case of Cyprus is concerned, the political behaviour of G/C and T/C nationalists fully justify these theoretical ideas. Furthermore, Jessop points out that strategies always involve temporal and spatial horizons. As a matter of fact, the strategic thinking of the T/C nationalist leadership critically involved temporal and spatial considerations. Under the circumstances, the ‘transformative’ strategies and struggles of the T/C involved two possible time horizons– short and long, conditional upon whether the G/C leadership would go for what they called

the short-term or the long-term option. On the other hand, there were two different spatial horizons, each associated with one of the two temporal horizons. Thus, in the case of the short-term option, the T/C leadership would immediately go for *Taksim*, and the T/Cs would move onto a new territory, which, broadly speaking, would also constitute the ‘spatial horizon’ of the new T/C state. Finally, Jessop defines power as the production of effects under the given set of structural constraints and conjunctural opportunities. Also, power is closely connected to the modes of calculation, resources, strategies, tactics, etc. of the different agents, and the relations amongst these agents, which determines the overall balance of forces. As far as the short-term option of *Taksim* was concerned, the calculations of the T/C nationalist leadership basically counted upon the (political and military) ‘power’ of Turkey to intervene, as well as their own power to compel Turkey to move. As it turned out, this was a miscalculation, given that the military capability and the balance of forces ruled out the option of military intervention.

Thus,

BOB JESSOP: STRATEGIC–RELATIONAL APPROACH TO STATE THEORY
• Relationality: Structural Constraints and Conjunctural Opportunities, Power, Temporal and Spatial Horizons of Agents ☑ • Strategic-ness (State as Site of Strategy): System of Strategic Selectivity, Path–Dependent and Current–Transformative Strategies and Struggles ☑

It is important to note that, some of Erik Olin Wright's modes of determination—namely, structural limitation, selection, and transformation—are also useful to comprehend and place into their place the set of constraints, possibilities and options faced by the T/C nationalist leadership, and the policy choices they have made. At a first glance, they appear to correspond to the categories of Jessop's strategic-relational approach, as in the case of structural determination–selection (Wright) *versus* strategic selectivity (Jessop). However, Jessop argues that his 'strategic selectivity' brings the 'relational' character of selectivity more clearly to the fore than its older alternative 'structural selectivity'. As a matter of fact, what makes the difference between the causality theories of Erik Olin Wright and Bob Jessop is that the former broadly adopts the structural approach of Althusser, whilst the latter brings subjectivity more strongly to the fore, following Gramsci and (the Gramscian) Poulantzas.

ERIK OLIN WRIGHT: MODES OF DETERMINATION
• Structural Limitation, Selection, Transformation ☑

Overall, I would argue that the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus can not be explicated by economic factors and dynamics—be they class interests, the economic structure, etc. Thus, one must consider the roles and the interrelationships of

- the different 'autopoietic' sub-ensembles/systems of social relations (particularly, the state, the political system *versus* the economy), and;

- the different axes of societalisation, and state projects (particularly, nation–state building *versus* capital accumulation).

As I see it, the dominant factor and dynamic which led to the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus was the nationalist conflicts between the nationalist agents of the two rival state projects, namely, *Enosis*/Independence, and *Taksim*. However, as Erik Olin Wright argues, the solution of one stage becomes the constraint of, and the source of crisis in the next stage. Thus, it is basically in the next stage, namely the ‘enclave’ period after 1964 that economy would become a major source of crisis.

T/C SOCIETY, POLITICS AND ECONOMY: CAUSALITIES

- **CONJUNCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS (INTER-STATE LEVEL)**
 1. *Turco–Greek Balance in the South-Eastern Wing of NATO*
 2. *Balance of Power amongst Super, Great, and Local Powers in Eastern Mediterranean*

- **POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONJUNCTURE IN TURKEY**
(27 MAY COUP)
 1. *Liberal Political Reforms*
 2. *Planned Economic Development*
 3. *Fiscal Crisis and Austerity*

- **INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY CONJUNCTURE (GLOBAL LEVEL)**
—*Planned Economic Development*

EXTERNAL DYNAMICS

↓ (together determined)

- **EXTERNALLY-GIVEN CONSTRAINTS AND POSSIBILITIES**
 - (A) **POLITICS**
 1. *Constraint on the Monopolisation of Violence (TMT)*
 2. *Constraint on the Concentration of Power (Plural–Competitive Representative Politics)*
 3. *Constraint on the Construction of a Captive Market and a Closed Circuit of Capital (From the Turk, to the Turk)*
 4. *Possibility: Duality of the State, and the T/C State within the State (Community Chamber, Municipalities)*
 5. *Constraint: Duality of the State, Some Key Ministries Go to G/Cs, Some Key State Functions, e.g. Economy, Interior Affairs in the Hands of G/C Nationalists*
 - (B) **ECONOMY**
 1. *Constraint: British legacy of planned economic development*
 2. *Constraint: US Model of Planned Economic Development*
 3. *Constraint–Possibility: The Model of Planned Economic Development in Turkey*
 4. *Constraint: Fiscal Crisis and Austerity in Turkey*
 5. *Constraint: Duality of the State, Some Key Ministries Go to G/Cs, Some Key State Functions, e.g. Economy, Interior Affairs in the Hands of G/C Nationalists*

- **DOMESTICALLY-GIVEN CONSTRAINTS**
 1. *Constraint: Coexistence of G/C and T/C Societies, thereby, G/C Dominated Division of Labour and G/C Competitive Power*
 2. *Constraint: Monopolistic or Oligopolistic Markets and Industries Caused by Small Scale Inefficiencies and G/C Control Over New Investments*
 3. *Constraint: Low Capacity of the T/C Socio-Economic Formation to Produce the Surplus Product (and the Savings thereof) to Ensure Rapid Capital Accumulation and Economic Development*

EXTERNAL & DOMESTIC DYNAMICS

↓

- **RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC CHOICES REGARDING STATE-BUILDING AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION**
 1. *Liberal Politics and Economy with Low Chances of Catching up with G/Cs,*

<i>as favoured by the Left–lebral opposition</i>	
2.	<i>Long-Term Option: Low–Intensity Conflictual Politics of Taksim with Emphasis on Economic Development through Fiscal Aid of and Economic Integration into Turkey</i>
3.	<i>Short-Term Option: High–Intensity Conflictual (Instigative–Escalatory) Politics of ‘Taksim’ with Associated Economic Costs to be Compensated by Turkey’s Fiscal Aid</i>
RELATIVE POWERS OF AGENTS BELONGING TO DIFFERENT AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS, AXES AND PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETALISATION, WITH DIFFERENT STATE PROJECTS	
	
•	<i>Strategic Choices (Reflect, Strategic Constraints, Possibilities, Options, and Policy (or, Political) Priorities</i>

CHAPTER VI

REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, ‘ENCLAVE LIFE’, THE PROTO-STATE (1964–1967)

The close of the G/C–T/C ‘common state’ of the Republic of Cyprus was marked by the constitutional crisis of ‘Thirteen Points’,⁵⁵² and the violent communal strife which broke out on 21 December 1963.⁵⁵³ The year 1964 was, tragically, a year of violent clashes. Blessed were the families of those dead who had a grave to mourn by; between 250–300 T/Cs, and about 50 G/Cs were to become the *desaparecidos* of Cyprus, buried inside the depths of dump wells and caves, and inside the river beds, and atop the hills and the mountains.⁵⁵⁴ The collapse of the common Republic was bound to have a number of fundamental consequences:

- (i) Territorially, the T/Cs were estranged—had estranged themselves from the G/Cs, inside the fortified urban neighborhoods and big

⁵⁵² Makarios transmitted his thirteen-point memorandum of proposed constitutional amendments, on 20 November 1963, to Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the British High Commissioner, and Greek and Turkish Ambassadors. See, Kızılyürek (2009: 20).

⁵⁵³ On 20 November 1963, late into the night, G/C police patrollers stopped a private car owned by T/Cs. G/C patrol commander ordered a search, to which T/C passengers objected, other T/Cs came to the site, and in the ensuing clashes, two T/Cs were killed, and a G/C police wounded. Violent clashes thence spread to everywhere T/CS and G/Cs lived together. See, Fırat (2006b: 723).

⁵⁵⁴ “SORU: Öyle değildir. Her iki tarafta da fanatikler var, iyi insanlar da var... Mesela bir örnek vereyim size: 1963’lerde Kıbrıslırumlar, çok sayıda Kıbrıslıtürk’ü öldürdüler. 1963 ‘kayıbı’ 50 civarında Kıbrıslırum varken, sanırım 250-300 civarında Kıbrıslıtürk ‘kayıp’ vardır. O zaman ‘fanatik’ kim olabilir? 1974’te de bunun ‘intikamını’ alan Kıbrıslıtürkler oldu, ellerine ‘fırsat’ geçmişti çünkü... Ben iki tarafın yaptıklarını da onaylamıyorum ancak 1963’te Kıbrıslırumlar, daha fazla sayıda Kıbrıslıtürk öldürdü... ¶YANNAKİS TİKKİS: Ancak gene de benim Türkler’den korkma hakkım vardır!” Sevgül Uludağ to G/C barber Yannakis, the son of the ‘lost’ Andreas Tikkis, of his fear of the Turks. “*Tripimenili (Tirmen) Yannakis Tikkis, ‘Kayıp’ Babası Andreas Tikkis’i anlatıyor... Konedra-Çatoz Arasında Bir Köy: Tripimeni (Tirmen)...*” Sevgül Uludağ, (Yenidüzen, 21 January 2010).

villages—the so-called ‘enclaves’,⁵⁵⁵ now under a T/C proto-state separate from the common state apparatus;

- (ii) large sectors of the T/C population fell outside of production activity, and ‘military’ labour now absorbed the greatest part of the T/C social labour, leading to full dependence upon Turkey’s fiscal and in-kind transfers;
- (iii) the common state of the Republic of Cyprus was now transformed into the G/C nation-state (Kızılyürek, 2009: 22);
- (iv) generally, the common state structure, defined by ‘The Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus’ agreed upon at Zurich was no longer regarded as a viable option by any party;
- (v) Great Britain’s influence over the Island, as the former ruler of the Island was quickly zeroised, and the United States now took the matter squarely into her own hands;
- (vi) on the part of the G/Cs, the latent tension between the two G/C variants of the sacrosanct principle of self-determination—i.e. *Enosis*, on the one hand, and complete independence, i.e. independence from Greece, as well—now became patent, in the open

⁵⁵⁵ Clearly, the concentration of the T/C population inside the enclaves was a radical nationalist–TMT strategy, a *fait accompli* to eradicate all hopes of coexistence, to create a situation that would be (i) irreversible, and (ii) the proof of the practical impossibility of coexistence. On the other hand, the G/C nationalist strategy towards the forced migration of the T/Cs was ambivalent, because, so long as they stayed on the Island, forcing the TCs out of some villages and neighborhoods brought about implied their even denser concentration in other villages/neighbourhoods, which effectively meant the partition of the Island. More on this issue, later.

conflict between Makarios and his followers, on the one hand, and the pro-Greece G/C, and Greek nationalists, on the other;

- (vii) on the part of the T/Cs, tensions arose and turned into open struggle between the different leaders, sections, and fractions of the proto-state power, involving, Vice-President Dr. Küçük, President of the Communal Chamber Denktaş, the Embassy, Commander of the Turkish army contingent [*Türk Alayı*], TMT—the TMT Commander;
- (viii) finally, the threat of war once more arose between the two strategically key members of the Southeastern flank of NATO.

The close of the period of 1960–1963 was the collapse of common state of the Republic of Cyprus—as a matter of fact, of the 1959 Zurich–London project. The close of the 1964–1967 period was marked by the armed clashes of Kofinou [*Köfünye/Geçitkale*] of 1967, between the National Guard, and TMT, and its dramatic consequences—the recall of General Georgios Grivas, and of the ‘secretly’ infiltrated 12,000 Greek troops [Greek Division] to Greece; the ending of the complete isolation inside the enclaves of the T/Cs; the establishment of *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi* [Transient Turkish Cypriot Administration]—as a key new stage of the process of T/C nationalist state-building, and the start of direct, UN-sponsored bi-communal negotiations in 1968.

This chapter comprises firstly a summary of the conjuncture of world politics, during the period of 1964–1967. It then reviews the strategic

constraints, possibilities, options faced by, and the strategic priorities and choices of the T/C nationalist leadership. Thirdly, it provides a pre-theoretical, chronological narrative of the 1960–1963 period, basically, by following the memoirs of Rauf R. Denktaş, practically the only documentary testament of the period. Finally, it reconsiders the causality theories of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright, using the historical-empirical material as relates to this specific period.

6.1. SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE CONJUNCTURE OF WORLD POLITICS

As clashes continued, the G/C side became bolder in its demands for Enosis, and openly declared it would no longer recognise the Zurich–London Agreements. Thus, on 1 January 1964, Makarios unilaterally declared the abrogation of the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty of Guarantee (Kızılyürek, 2009: 23–24). Turkey, on the other hand, notified Great Britain and Greece, that unless the army contingents on the Island of the three Guarantor States together stepped in to stop the armed clashes, she would intervene unilaterally. Great Britain called for a tri-partite conference, to be held in London, to which the other two, Greece and Turkey agreed, and the London Conference met on 15 January 1964 (Fırat, 2006b: 724). As a matter of fact, the 2 thousand strong British forces had proved ineffective in preventing the further escalation of armed conflict (Gürel, 1993: 58).⁵⁵⁶ At

⁵⁵⁶ Great Britain's deployment of troops to control armed clashes was probably her last significant act as the former ruler of the Island. Thenceforth, the weight shifted towards the United States. Nonetheless, British troops were apparently the key to the prevention of further massacres, as the late İsmet Kotak, in an interview, testifies: "*Birleşmiş Milletler, Kıbrıs'taki çarpışmalara ilk anda müdahale etmedi. Garantör İngiltere, 'Red Devil' dediğimiz kırmızı berelileri, çeşitli yörelerde çarpışmış askerlerini, itiraf etmek gerekirse*

the Conference, the theses of the G/C nationalists and Greece, on the one hand, and the T/C nationalists and Turkey, on the other, were clear and simple. The former defended the principle of unitary state—based upon ‘single citizenship’ and ‘single ballot’, and minority rights for the T/Cs, on the grounds that excessive rights granted to the minority had obstructed the smooth functioning of the state—which practically amounted to the demand of, either a G/C nation-state, or of ‘pure Enosis’. More specifically, the G/C side demanded a new constitution that would observe the interests of the majority, and be, technically, more workable. On the other hand, the latter argued for a federal state based upon the principle of geographical separation, on the grounds that the Zurich–London Agreements had not been able ensure the safety of the T/Cs, which practically amounted to *Taksim*. Great Britain proposed that a NATO force be sent, to which Greece and Turkey gave consent, but, as Makarios rejected this and only consented to the use of UN forces, efforts to keep the conflict inside the confines of NATO—to which the Soviet Union objected—were shelved.⁵⁵⁷ Thus, the London Conference had utterly failed to stop or prevent the further escalation of the clashes on the Island, and the NATO option was now clearly out. As a consequence, on 15 February 1964, Great Britain, still carrying the ‘burden’ of Cyprus, applied to the Security Council of the UN.

Kıbrıs'ta EOKA'yla çatışmış olanların hepsini uçaklara bindirip Kıbrıs'a gönderdi. Ve bunlar Ada'nın her tarafında ilk andan itibaren yaptıkları müdahalelerle Türklerin daha fazla kıyıma uğramasını engellediler. Buna bizzat tanığım. Dolayısıyla İngiltere'nin bu müdahalesini daha ciddi ve yasal hale getirebilmek için Güvenlik Konseyi derhal toplandı ...” (Satan and Şentürk, 2012: 193).

⁵⁵⁷ See, Fırat (2006b: 724–725), and Kızılyürek (2009: 21–22).

The failure of the London Conference, and the UN involvement signified two key developments:

- (1) Great Britain, as the former ruler of the Island, was no longer one of the key parties to and actors of the Cyprus issue;
- (2) G/C leadership had successfully thwarted the confinement of the Cyprus issue inside the NATO, and internationalised it through the UN as its preferred platform, where it could count upon the supports of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Soviet Union, to counter-balance Turkey, and if necessary, the United States. The Cyprus issue was thenceforth to be a UN issue.⁵⁵⁸

As a matter of fact, from the point of view of G/C nationalists and Greece, the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue through the UN proved to be of great strategic value, as successive UN resolutions radically modified and redefined the structural parameters that defined the Cyprus issue. Thus, the UN Security Council Resolution 186—the first in a long train of Cyprus resolutions to come, adopted unanimously on 4 March 1964, considering “... the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960,” asked “... the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus”; called upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint”, and finally, recommended “... the creation, with

⁵⁵⁸ See, on this point, Mavroyannis (1990: 135).

a consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.”⁵⁵⁹ Thus, despite the fact that the Resolution confirmed the validity of the Zurich and London Agreements, and by speaking of two communities and their leaders, treated Makarios as a communal leader, the key issue turned around the question of ‘who’ actually constituted and represented the ‘central government of Cyprus’, given that the T/Cs had pulled out *and* were forced out of the common state apparatus.⁵⁶⁰ Resolution 186 clearly implied that the Turkish and T/C claims that, under the circumstances, G/Cs no longer represented the Republic of Cyprus had gone unheeded.⁵⁶¹ Technically speaking, the tacit recognition of the G/C side as the rightful Government of the Republic of Cyprus had been caused by a tactical misstep of the Turkish diplomacy.⁵⁶² However, one must not miss the broader question of the loneliness of the Turkish diplomacy against the background of the uncomparable influence of G/C diplomacy. One of the clearest manifestations of this was the heavy defeat the Turkish diplomacy suffered at the ‘Second Non-Aligned Movement Summit’ held in Cairo, on 5–10 October 1964.⁵⁶³ Furthermore,

⁵⁵⁹ (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/186%281964%29, 17 August 2013).

⁵⁶⁰ “At the end of the ethnic clashes that started in December of 1963, the Turkish-Cypriot community ‘*withdrew*’ (or *were forced to do so*) from the administration of the Republic of Cyprus.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 171) [My italics—H.A.]

⁵⁶¹ See Denktaş (1996: 134–135), for instance, for the exchange between Nikolai Fedorenko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN, and Soviet Representative at the UN Security Council, and Rıfat Turgut Menemencioğlu, the the Turkish Ambassador to Washington.

⁵⁶² See, for details, Fırat (2006b: 725).

⁵⁶³ See, most importantly, Hasgüler (2007: 97–103) for a general treatment of the Cyprus issue, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the UN, and pp. 99–100, more particularly, about the Cairo Summit.

(1) the UN Security Council Resolution 193 of 9 August 1964, appealing “... to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease fire immediately”⁵⁶⁴, and;

(2) and, the UN Security Council Resolutions 194 of 25 September 1964,⁵⁶⁵ and 198 of 18 December 1964,⁵⁶⁶ and a number of Council Decisions, speaking of the Government of Cyprus as well as the representatives of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey as the three parties of the Cyprus issue,

now clearly and firmly established that the G/C leadership was regarded as the rightful Government of Cyprus; that Cyprus was now the subject of a tripartite conflict, involving the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. This basically implied, that the T/Cs were no longer being considered as party to the Cyprus issue, marking thereby a strategic retreat from the Zurich–London Agreements. As a matter of fact, this marked the start of a trend, according to which, the ‘G/C’ Government of Cyprus would constantly deny the status of equal negotiator to the T/C side, up until the bi-communal negotiations initiated in 1968, following the armed clashes of Kofinou in 1967.

⁵⁶⁴ (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/193%281964%29, 17 August 2013).

⁵⁶⁵ (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/194%281964%29, 17 August 2013).

⁵⁶⁶ (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/198%281964%29, 17 August, 2013).

Thus, the double strategy of the T/C nationalist leadership, involving

- (i) the thesis that, with the estrangement of the T/Cs from the common state, the ‘government’ of Cyprus had constitutionally ceased to exist,
- (ii) the strategy of inciting the military intervention of Turkey, on the basis of the latter’s status of Guarantor State, and thus the realisation of *Taksim*,

had utterly failed. Thus, “... [s]ince Turkey could not intervene, as expected by the nationalist leadership, neither ‘partition’ was implemented, nor could a separate Turkish-Cypriot state emerge. As the separatist, nationalist ideology failed to yield results in the 1964-1974 period, the community drifted into chaos and misery.” (Kızılyürek, 2012: 171)

How the T/C side fell outside of the common state apparatus is subject to controversy. However, it seems rather clear that the nationalist leadership preferred to estrange itself and the community, and concentrate the T/C populace inside the enclaves. In so doing, it expected that *de facto* division of Island, and the continued pressure of further losses of T/C lives would induce and force the Government of Turkey into military intervention, in her capacity of the Guarantor State. On the other hand, having approved the UN Security Council Resolution of 186, the Turkish Government of İsmet İnönü had recognised, directly, the continued existence of the ‘Government of Cyprus’, notwithstanding its insistence that what this actually implied was the common, G/C–T/C government. Accordingly, Prime Minister İnönü

asked T/C ministers and representatives to resume their posts, despite the latters' objections that it was positively dangerous trying to do so. What has happened afterwards is subject to controversy, but one way or another, they stayed out of the representative and executive organs of the Republic of Cyprus.⁵⁶⁷

As a matter of fact, from the point of view of the T/C nationalist leadership, and Turkey, the years 1963 and 1964 were characterised by a number of strategic defeats, which have come to define the key diplomatic problems of the coming years, and caused a substantive realignment in Turkish foreign policy, towards a certain autonomy. In this respect, one of the key turning points was the so-called 'Johnson letter', when, Prime Minister İnönü apparently misjudged Turkey's capacity to exploit the United States leverage, due to its value as a 'strategic partner'. Thus, "[a]s the crisis deepened during 1964, İnönü apparently decided on a policy of brinkmanship designed to induce the United States to broker a peaceful effect." (Hale, 2002: 149) Early in the crisis, Turkey had notified Greece and Great Britain that she could land troops on the Island in her capacity as Guarantor State, under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee. As a matter of

⁵⁶⁷ The standard T/C version of what has happened is that those ministers and representatives who tried to resume their posts were not allowed to do so. Thus, according to the late İsmet Kotak, T/C ministers and representatives who tried to go back to their offices were actually attacked, and they would only be allowed, provided that they accepted Clerides's condition to agree to the 13 constitutional amendments. See the İsmet Kotak interview by Satan and Şentürk (2012: 193–194). Clerides claims that what was at stake were not conditions, but only suggestions (Kızılyürek, 2007: 153–154). Overall, Clerides's argument does not appear very convincing. Since, Vice-President Küçük had already resigned from his post, the laws that were accepted by the House were to be ratified by Makarios alone. According to Kızılyürek (2007a: 154), İsmet İnönü believed that the right thing was to go back, on which point he differed from Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf R. Denктаş.

fact, on 16 March 1964, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey authorised the İnönü Government for a military intervention. As the armed clashes on the Island prolonged, on 4 June 1965, İnönü decided to inform the US of his plans to land troops onto the Island. İnönü's move was most likely to be a bluff, based upon the estimation that the US would be forced to pressure G/Cs and the Greek Government to back off, as she would not dare to take the risk of a war in the Southeastern flank of NATO (Firat 2006b: 726). However, on 5 June 1964, Prime Minister İnönü received a very curt reply from the US President Lyndon Johnson, "... warning him that the other members of NATO 'have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention', and that Turkey could not use US-supplied weapons for an invasion of Cyprus." (Hale, 2002: 149) The 'Johnson letter' clearly contradicted at least two of the underpinnings of the Turkish diplomacy's model of strategic calculation, namely, that (i) unconditional support to the Western great powers, and particularly the United States would always pay off, and, (ii) Turkey's strategic importance as the pillar of the Southeastern flank of NATO would always pay off.⁵⁶⁸

The year 1964, was also when the United States stepped in, to take the matter directly into her own hands. The Johnson letter had essentially prevented the immediate danger of war between two members of the

⁵⁶⁸ Thus, according to Melek Firat, the fundamental causes of the questioning of the traditional Turkish foreign policy in the early 1960s were, (i) the Cuban missile crisis of 1962–1963, and (ii) the Cyprus crisis of 1964. See, for a full assessment, Firat (1997: 105–172).

Southeastern flank of NATO. Meanwhile, there was a considerable shift in the policy stand of Turkey as she moved away from the thesis of a common federation based upon the principle of geography—rather than functionality. According to Kalaitzaki (2005: 113), the United States believed that the ‘independence’ solution was not workable, so the best way out was the annexation of the Island to Greece, in return for territorial concessions to Turkey. Furthermore, President Lyndon B. Johnson, hoping that the issue could be resolved through an agreement to be reached between Greece and Turkey, mediated, as in 1958–1959, by the United States, tended to exclude Makarios. On 22 June 1964, Johnson accepted İnönü, where Turkey was able to make the United States spell that the Zurich–London were still valid, and that the issue had to be handled by NATO. However, on June 1964, when Johnson now met Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreu, the latter objected to the treatment of the issue as one between Greece and Turkey, and the exclusion of Makarios. The US solution to the stalemate was to gather a conference in Geneva (9 July–31 August), under the auspices of the United Nations, headed by Sakari Tuomioja, the Finnish UN agent commissioned by U Thant, UN Secretary–General, and attended by Dean Acheson, President Johnson’s special envoy. Cyprus was also invited, but Makarios declined to participate (Firat, 2006b: 726–727). On 14 July, Acheson presented his first plan to the delegations of Turkey and Greece, according to which the Republic of Cyprus would be dissolved and the Island annexed to Greece, except for the Karpas peninsula that was to be given to Turkey as a sovereign military base, and permanently. On the other

hand, the T/Cs would be allowed to found autonomous cantonal areas where they were the majority, and elsewhere have minority rights equivalent to those of the Turks in Greece. The ‘First Acheson Plan’ was accepted by Turkey, but flatly rejected by Makarios on the grounds that it meant *Taksim*. As a matter of fact, the Plan aimed at the satisfaction of both *Enosis* and *Taksim*, the elimination of Turkey’s strategic concerns, and the putting of the entire Island under NATO control. Thus, Acheson offered a revised plan on 20 August 1964. According to the ‘Second Acheson Plan’, a smaller base area would now be leased to Turkey for a period of 50 years, rather than given as sovereign territory, and the T/Cs would be given more restricted rights. However, İsmet İnönü now insisted on having a sovereign base, and Turkey argued that the Second Plan meant *Enosis* in favour of Greece, and rejected. Consequently, the Geneva Conference ended in failure.⁵⁶⁹

Concerning the period of 1964–1967, there are two points to be emphasised. Firstly, this was a period when Greece and Turkey tried to develop a solution together by excluding Cypriot leaders. Generally speaking, Greece aspired to annex the greater part of Cyprus by giving some concessions to Turkey, and the latter did not object to *Enosis*, in return for a sovereign base. Thus, in 1966, there were a number of secret meetings between Greece and Turkey— such as the one between the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, Toumbas and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, on 17 December 1966, in Paris, that were all inconclusive due to the political instability in Greece (Kızılyürek, 2009: 27). Secondly, such efforts actually ran against the fact it

⁵⁶⁹ See, Kalaitzaki (2005: 113), Firat (2006b: 728), and Kızılyürek (2009: 24–25).

was no longer possible to impose any solution that would not be approved by Makarios, and the ‘Republic of Cyprus’. Makarios was against putting Cyprus under the control of Greece and Turkey (Fırat, 2006b: 729). Makarios and AKEL now pronounced the slogan of ‘*Atofia-Enosis*’ [undiluted, pure *Enosis*] (Kızılyürek, 2009: 26).

As a matter of fact, the 1960s generally witnessed the emergence and further development of serious differences between Makarios and Greece. Despite his rhetoric of *Enosis*, Makarios now upheld the independence of Greek-Cypriot Cyprus from Greece, the Motherland. The break between the pro-*Enosis* radical Greek nationalists, and the Greek Cypriot independentists became all the more patent during the period of 1966–1974, following the military coup of 21 April 1966 in Greece, which gave rise to the so-called ‘*Régime* of the Colonels’,⁵⁷⁰ In the summer of 1966, Athens and Ankara engaged in a secret dialogue, centered, once more, around the idea of *Enosis* for a sovereign, out of which nothing came out (Dodd, 2010: 79).

The general view is that the new junta had needed a foreign policy ‘victory’ outside in order to win support inside. Accordingly, the program of the new military government had pointed out that *Enosis* would be achieved by peaceful means with due respect being paid to the rights of the T/C minority. Thus, Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, and Konstantinos Kollias, Prime Minister of Greece met in Keşan/Turkey, on 9 September, and in Alexandroupolis (*Dedeğaç*)/Greece, on 10 September

⁵⁷⁰ Clearly, its apex was the 1974 coup in Cyprus against President Makarios.

1966. Kollias argued that *Enosis* could be realized so as not to threaten the strategic needs of Turkey, and proposed sovereign rights over the base of Dhekelia. Demirel replied that *Enosis* could not constitute the basis of negotiations, and listed, in Alexandroupolis, the conditions of Turkey as follows: (i) Turkey's security needs had to be met; (ii) the balance between Greece and Turkey, and the two communities on the Island had to be preserved; (iii) the T/C community had to be given special guarantees; (iv) the T/C community's participation to the administration on equal grounds had to be ensured; (v) the permanence of the new solution had to be ensured, and; (vi) the economic future of the T/C community had to be ensured. Clearly, the two sides would not be able to come to a common solution, so the meetings of Keşan–Alexandroupolis ended inconclusively (Firat, 2006b: 735–736).

After the failure of Turco–Greek meetings, the die-hard nationalists of the two sides set to move. On 31 October, Rauf R. Denктаş, whose return to the Island had been banned by G/Cs on his way back from the London Conference of 1964, was arrested trying to secretly land by boat onto the Island. After a 15 days long custody, Denктаş was let to go back to Turkey, provided that he would not try to unlawfully enter Cyprus. The Denктаş incident had two consequences: (1) The T/C community on the Island, sieged and expecting Turkey's military intervention since 1964, strongly protested the passive attitude of Ankara, and (2) relations between the two communities started to soften up. On 15 November 1966, disturbed by the new air of thaw developing between the two communities, Georgios Grivas,

back on the Island since 1964, led the G/C National Guard under his command in an attack on the T/Cs and TMT forces of Kofinou [*Köfınye*, or *Geçitkale*] and Agios Theodoros [*Boğaziçi*], two small villages situated at the strategic juncture of Larnaca, Limassol and Nicosia roads. Turkey reacted very strongly, with her jets flying low over the Island for a whole week, and İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs giving Greece a note on 17 December, which demanded: (i) the pulling back of Greek forces on the Island whose presence violated the Treaty of Guarantee; (ii) expulsion of General Grivas off the Island; (iii) disbandment of National Guard; (iv) recognition of the T/C community's right to found its own local administrations and police forces in the areas under its control, and (v) the compensation of T/C losses caused by the attacks. On 22 October, President Johnson commissioned Cyrus Roberts Vance, former Secretary of State Department, to mediate between Greece and Turkey. The Greek junta was pressured by Vance to yield to nearly all demands of Turkey, namely, the withdrawal of Greek forces except those allowed by the Zurich–London Agreements, compensation for the damages caused at *Geçitkale* and *Boğaziçi*, compensation to the families of those killed, and the expulsion of Grivas. Furthermore, the two sides agreed upon the confiscation of all illegal weapons and the disbandment of all illegally founded 'national' forces (Fırat, 2006b: 736–738).⁵⁷¹

⁵⁷¹ According to Asaf İnhan, Turkey's Ambassador to Cyprus between 1970–1976, Keşan–Dedeagaç meetings, and Geçitkale–Boğaziçi attacks were the two key turning points. At Dedeagaç, Greek demands for *Enosis* were categorically rejected, triggering the crisis of 1967. The next turning point was the attacks of Grivas, upon which Turkey successfully defused the crisis to her advantage by forcing Greek forces and Grivas and his 'EOKA bands' [*EOKA çeteleri*] out of the Island. See his interview to Gül İnanc (2007: 24).

The crisis of 1967 had two key consequences: 1) Turkey and the T/C leaders had a perfect opportunity to further consolidate the T/C proto-state emerged in 1964, by founding the so-called ‘Transient Turkish Administration of Cyprus’ [*Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi*—KGTY], and; 2) on 24 June 1968, the so-called inter-communal talks [*toplumlar arası görüşmeler*] started between G/Cs and T/Cs—a process that has lasted to this day. Kızılyürek (2009: 30) points out that, despite the resolution of the crisis of *Köfünye*, Turkey started to build up military capacity for a possible intervention, whilst there were all indications that she would eventually find new occasions to do so. On the other hand, Makarios now clearly shifted his policy away from the Pan-Hellenistic demand for *Enosis*, to what could be called Greek Cypriot nationalism, aiming at the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus, summed up by the distinction he made between ‘*efkteon*’ and ‘*efikton*’ [the wanted and the possible].

6.2. STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS, POSSIBILITIES, OPTIONS FACED BY, AND THE STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND CHOICES OF THE NATIONALIST LEADERSHIP

The year 1967 seems to be the point of culmination and the juncture of many conflicts and crises, namely, between (i) Greece and Turkey, (ii) G/Cs and T/Cs, (iii) G/Cs and Greece, (iv) T/Cs and Turkey, and last but not least, (v) inside the T/C community. In the process of the break-up of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, the strategic priority of the T/C leadership was Taksim. The concentration of the populace in the so-called enclaves seems to have been based upon the supposition that the Government of

Turkey, being forced to accept the impossibility of going back to the past, and under the pressure of the loss of T/C lives and thereby the nationalist public opinion in Turkey, plus through active propaganda, could be induced to engage full-scale intervention. Therefore, the temporal horizon of the T/C leadership's strategic thinking was based on the short term. However, expectations of intervention were never fulfilled, and the T/C community got stuck inside the numerous enclaves scattered all over the Island. By 1967, the economy and politics of the T/C community had become largely unstable, due to the collapse of production, and the rising burden of unproductive (military) labour, and violent struggles of power amongst the rulers. Accordingly, as a part of the relative normalisation after the *Köfünye* crisis of 1967, the T/C proto-state was reformed, through the separation of executive, legislative, and judiciary powers, and the foundation of new government agencies, including a planning office, the embryo of today's State Planning Office [*Devlet Planlama Örgütü*–DPÖ]. Furthermore, the late 1960s witnessed the formal institutionalisation of patronage towards the consolidation of the existing relations of (state) power, through the compensation of loyal TMT cadres and the wider populace for their past sacrifices for the realisation of the state-building project of Taksim.

6.2.1. Strategic Priority of the T/C Leadership after the Collapse of the Common State: *Taksim*

As it appears, by 1963, the strategic priority of the T/C leadership as a whole was *Taksim*, the precondition of which was the large-scale intervention of Turkey, by making use of her rights as Guarantor State, in

accordance with the Treaty of Guarantee.⁵⁷² After the outbreak of inter-ethnic violence on the night of 20–21 December 1963, T/C leaders made repeated appeals onto Prime Minister İsmet İnönü for military intervention, arguing that Cyprus would otherwise become ‘the next Crete’.⁵⁷³ In response, İnönü advised Dr. Fazıl Küçük that he quit the habit of trying to steer the world from Cyprus and hyperbolise every single incident, and that he keep the *mücahids*’ confidence in the Motherland up and alive.⁵⁷⁴ On the other hand, following the UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, which spoke of the Cyprus Government as the legally and internationally recognised authority of the Island, İnönü asked the T/C leaders, state employees, and the T/C people to go back to their offices, and works and posts, once the safety of the community was ensured by the United Nations.⁵⁷⁵ He argued that, otherwise, the T/C community would

⁵⁷² Glafcos Clerides also argues that Rauf R. Denktaş thought that the collapse of the common state of the Republic of Cyprus had now opened a window of opportunity to retreat from the Zurich–London Agreements and realise Taksim (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 154).

⁵⁷³ Consider, for instance, the lettre of 14 February 1964, addressed to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Cemal Erkin, by Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Dr. Şemsi Kâzım: “*Lefkoşa’da halk arasında Bayram sabahı ikinci bir Girit faciasının tekrarlanacağına dair yaygın bir endişe hâkimdir. ... ¶Anavatan Hükümetinin Garantör Devlet sıfatıyla ahdî ve manevî vecibelerini ifa etmek üzere tek taraflı fiilî müdahale hakkını kullanarak gecikmeden Adaya Türk askeri sevkini saygılarımızla yeniden arz ve talep ederiz.*” (Denktaş, 1996: 107)

⁵⁷⁴ See the letter by İnönü, addressed to Dr. Küçük: “*Mülâhazalarınızın her safhasında dünyayı Kıbrıs’tan idare etmek ve her hadiseden aşırı mana çıkarmak isteyen halin, her tedbirden evvel düzeltilmesi icap eder. Kıbrıslılar ve Yunanlılar ile karşı karşıya tedbirler bulmaya ve tatbik etmeğe çalışıyoruz. ... Sizin oradaki başlıca vazifeniz taarruza uğradığınız zaman mücahitlerin müdafaa etmesini ve Anavatanın tedbirlerine itimat havasının beslenmesini temin etmektir. ... Kıbrıs davası iki gün içinde halledilebilecek bir tılsımlı dava değildir. Sabırlı ve fedakâr insanlar uzun müddet vatan uğrunda mücadeleyi göze alacak kabiliyette olmaları ile başarıya ulaştırabilir.*” [sic] (Denktaş, 1996: 113)

⁵⁷⁵ Thus, İnönü wrote in his lettre of 9 March 1964: “*Emniyetin bu suretle sağlanmasından sonra da Türkler Kıbrıs devlet teşkilâtındaki görevlerini ve yerlerini almaya devam ederlerse Kıbrıs Rumlarının devlet işlerini tek başlarına ve Türk ha ve menfaatleri zararına yürütmesi karşısında, tarafımızdan yapılacak itiraz ve şikâyetleri cihan eşkârı haklı bulmayacaktır. ... Binaenaleyh Adada emniyetin tesisi için gerekli tedbirler alınması ve bunlar alındıkça mümkün olan en kısa zamanda, Cumhurbaşkanı Muavini ile Türk Bakanlardan başlamak üzere bütün Türklerin peyderpey devlet teşkilâtındaki vazifeleri*

stand no chance of convincing the world opinion to the justness of its demands. Denktaş notes that İnönü's attitude caused great outrage and disillusionment amongst the T/C leaders (Denktaş, 1996: 175). After all, the T/C leadership's case for *Taksim* rested upon the argument that G/Cs and T/C were no longer able to live together. Furthermore, the gap between Turkey's Cyprus policy and the expectations of the T/C leadership progressively widened up as the former soon backed off from her original thesis of a 'geographically' defined federation. Thus, Prime Minister İnönü, after his return from his meeting of 22 June 1964 with President Lydon Johnson, stated that Turkey could give her consent to the unification of Cyprus with Greece, provided that the T/Cs were assured a wide area where they could live (Kızılyürek, 2009: 24). On 27 October 1965, Süleyman Demirel became the new Prime Minister of Turkey, after his Justice Party [*Adalet Partisi*—AP] swept the general elections of 10 October 1965. However, Turkey continued to the policy of excluding the T/C leadership from key negotiations with Greece, as the latter did to the G/C leaders. On 29 October 1966, Rauf R. Denktaş, highly disillusioned by Turkey's abstinence from military intervention, and now fully marginalised by the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published his noted booklet 'Cyprus: 5 to 12' [*12'ye Beş Kala Kıbrıs: Kıbrıs Davası Hakkında Düşünceler, Notlar ve Hatıralar*] (Kızılyürek, 2009: 28). For his vocal

başına dönerek; Kıbrıs Rumlarının menfi faaliyetlerine karşı, devlet mekanizması dahilinde, anayasa ve kanun yollarıyla, sebatle ve metanetle mücadele etmeleri millî davamızın başarısına büyük ölçüde yardımcı olacaktır. ... Bilâkis, bu suretle tezimizin başarıya ulaşmasına kadar arada geçeceği tahmin edilen nispeten uzun bir süre boyunca soydaşlarımızın dayanma güçleri ve kanunî mücadele imkânları geniş nispette artacak ve haklı davamızın kazanılmasında büyük amel olacaktır." (Denktaş, 1996: 174–175).

objections to Turkey's Cyprus policies, and his publication of '*12'ye 5 Kala*', he was summoned and warned, personally by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Denктаş, 2000: 221–224).⁵⁷⁶

It is important to note that, the T/C leadership's strategy of self-estrangement from the common state was based upon the short-term horizon of compelling Turkey to full-scale military intervention and the realisation of *Taksim* by force. Apparently, the leaders knew quite well that this was bound to involve some economic and political costs, but since the time horizon in question was short term, the costs were likely to be transient and tolerable. However, because there was no intervention, the costs turned out to appear permanent and not so tolerable, after all. Thus, the T/C community sank into a deep economic and political crisis.⁵⁷⁷

6.2.2. Economy as a Constraint: Disruption of Production Activity, and Unproductive Labour

During the period of 1964–1967, economy appeared to be one of the major constraints faced by the T/C leadership. However, it is important to note that under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, the constraint was basically the lack of capacity of the T/C socio-economic formation to generate the surplus necessary for the sustenance of the modern state apparatus. During 1964–1967, the first phase of the enclave years, the

⁵⁷⁶ See, for the text of '*12'ye Beş Kala*', Denктаş (2000: 225–282).

⁵⁷⁷ Glafcos Clerides points out that he warned President Makarios about the possibility that the collapse of the T/C community under the economic embargoes carried the risk of triggering Turkey's military intervention (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 130).

problem was not simply the structure of production, but its very absence, as well as the disproportionate expansion of unproductive activities.

Thus, so far as the state of the total social labour is concerned, the few available figures are quite dramatic. Thus, during the years of 1963–1964, some estimated 25,000 T/Cs, or approximately, one quarter of the entire T/C populace were displaced, as they fled their villages for enclaves, fortified against the attacks of G/C paramilitary units. During the enclave period of 1964–1974, nearly 80 % of the T/Cs lived in militarised enclaves, where they founded their own proto-state, with its own bureaucracy and standing army (Gürel and Özersay, 2006: 351; Bryant and Hatay, 2009: 3). On the other hand, approximately 55,000 T/C were left unemployed, because they would not go to their workplaces, were displaced, or had lost their lands, becoming fully dependent upon the aid of *Kızılay* [Turkey's Red Crescent] (Plümer, 2008: 28) According to the United Nations Secretary-General's Report of 10 September 1964, citing the figures published by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber, "... the number of persons receiving some kind of assistance from the Red Crescent relief amounted to about 56,000, including 25,000 displaced persons, 23,5000 unemployed and 7,500 dependents of missing persons, disabled and others." (Ertekün, 1981: 217)

One of the most serious problems was the disruption of circulation and production. As of the mid-1964, Greek embargoe had already started to strangle the T/C populace, by blocking the routes of supply between T/C villages and T/C towns, on the one hand, and the T/C enclaves and the

world economy, on the other. Vegetables and fruits grown by T/C peasants were not let into the towns, and basic staples like flour, rice, and sugar were not let into T/C villages. Imports of food staples by T/C merchants were blocked at the port of Famagusta (Plümer, 2008: 28, 30).

On the other hand, it seems to be difficult to give accurate figures on the state of subsistence and petty-commodity production in agriculture. Tilling and sowing the lands inside the G/C areas and nearby G/C villages presented grave problems of security, particularly in those places where T/C and G/C villages and lands were adjacent. As of the end of 1964, there were 100,000 acres of T/C lands in the areas fled by the T/Cs. Fleeing T/C peasants left unpicked fruits on the trees, amounting to 150–200 thousand Cypriot Liras, and equipment and tools. In some villages, T/C produce was sequestered by, and T/C lands tilled and reaped by G/Cs.⁵⁷⁸ Livestock breeders also suffered considerable losses, as fleeing peasants left great numbers of sheep and cattle in deserted villages (Plümer, 2008: 33–34).

As far as the allocation of total social labour was concerned, there were a number of problems. Firstly, most of the refugees were cut off from any production activity or any labour activity whatsoever. Secondly, the greater part of the total social labour was now devoted to unproductive military activity. As a matter of fact, figures provided by General Kemal Yamak, former commander of the Special Warfare Department, indicate that a great part of the male labour force was devoted to military labour. Thus, prior to

⁵⁷⁸ See, for details, Plümer (2008: 30–33).

Turkey's intervention in 1974, there were 11,174 armed *mücahids*, of which half were on active duty, and counting those armed with shot guns to total number rose just above 17 thousand (Yamak, 2006: 371–371). Notice that, during most of the enclave period, *mücahit* labour was generally guard labour, which mostly consisted of students, but also of people of various ages, who sentinalled and guarded the fortifications around the enclaves.

On the part of the leadership, there were four sectors of the populace, which particularly presented problems, namely, (i) the public servants, (ii) refugees, (iii) young people—including students, and (iv) the peasantry.

- (i) Recall that, during the common state of the Republic of Cyprus, one of the most important problems faced by the Community Chamber was the provision of the fiscal resources to finance the salaries of its employees. After the collapse of the Republic, the T/C administration now had to pay the salaries of public employees working for the central state as well. On 2 January 1964, Rauf Raif Denktaş reported that there were 2,940 public servants and 260 public workers—adding up to 3,200, who could not go to work and were not being paid by the Government. Their payroll exceeded \$ 300,000, but they needed \$ 184,000 to meet their most urgent expenses (Denktaş, 1996: 6). On 26 July 1968, Rüstem Tatar, Member of Finance and Budgetary Affairs [*Maliye ve Bütçe İşleri Üyesi*], reported that, for the year 1963, T/C public employees who worked for the central government had been paid £ 1,798,000 in

salaries and wages. Under the extraordinary circumstances of 1964, the amount was reduced to £ 901,100. For the five and a half years from 1 January 1964 through 30 June 1968, the total amount equalled £ 5,303,400. As of 1968, the total number of public servants under the Republic of Cyprus was 3,320 (Denктаş, 1997d: 395–398). As of 1966–1967, the biggest problems of public employees were the low level of salaries and wages, in absolute and relative (to G/C salaries and wages) terms, and unpaid social security contributions.

- (ii) One of the biggest problems was the lack of proper housing for the refugees. Figures concerning the destruction of T/C houses during the armed ethnic clashes following 21 December 1963 can perhaps be taken as a proxy of the extent of the housing problem faced by the nationalist leadership during the enclave period of 1964–1974. The so-called ‘Ortega Report’, dated July–August 1964, and carried out by the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) covered “... [i]nformation obtained from (a) 109 villages with a total population of approximately 70,000 persons, living in approximately 20,000 houses, and (b) the towns in Nicosia and Ktima have a population of 55,000 persons, living in approximately 14,000 houses.” [sic] (Ertekün, 1981: 195). Overall, 527 village houses had been destroyed totally and 2,000 village houses looted; 38 city houses and shops had been destroyed totally, and 122 city houses and shops partially destroyed in Ktima; 50 city houses had been destroyed

totally in Omorphita, and; 240 city houses partially destroyed in Omorphita, Neapolis, Flatro and Trakhonas, amounting to estimated losses of £ 874,000 (Ertekün, 1981: 215). In many small villages refugees continued to live under the most primitive conditions, in the tents and shanties. The construction of prefabricated houses was the most urgent need (Denktaş, 1997d: 380–381). Apparently, in early 1964, the T/C leaders had projected that the issue would be resolved in a matter of months, so no one had thought that refugees would have to pass many miserable years away from their villages and houses. Those who guested refugees were also very disturbed and had now been mistreating their guests.⁵⁷⁹ Apparently, the T/C leaders felt that unless the conditions of refugees were corrected very soon, they would no longer be able to ask anybody to make any sacrifices for the national cause.⁵⁸⁰

- (iii) After the outbreak of of armed conflict on 21 December 1963, the period of secrecy for TMT ended, as it came out of the underground. The commandship of TMT, namely *Bayraktarlık* adopted Turkey's regime of conscription, rendering military service obligatory for secondary school students and graduates. Therefore, so far as young

⁵⁷⁹ See Hüseyin Kondulu's speech about the conditions of the refugees, at the meeting Denktaş had with the members of Community Chamber, on 27 September 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d, 646).

⁵⁸⁰ See, for instance, one of the two reports written by Dr. Fazıl Küçük for the Turkish authorities, dated 21 July 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d: 380–381). According to Ramadan Cemil, T/C member of the House of Representatives, one could solve the problems only temporarily by addressing the national sentiments of people. See the speech of Ramadan Cemil at the meeting Denktaş had with the members of the House of Representatives, on 29 September 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d: 648–649).

people were concerned, one of the basic problems was the interruption of their education, as scores of students were serving as *mücahids*, instead of going abroad for the university. According to Aydın Samioğlu, ‘the last *Serdar*’ of TMT, forced conscription for secondary school students had caused distress amongst the ranks of TMT (Besim, 2011: 88). According to Dr. Fazıl Küçük, now that the Cyprus issue had been dragging out indefinitely, young people were getting very concerned about their future. Furthermore, there was a serious problem of youth unemployment, and despite all the efforts to expand the administrative apparatus and jobs, this was not sufficient to meet the demand by university graduates.⁵⁸¹ There were broadly two types of young *mücahids*: The first consisting of secondary school graduates who wanted to pursue university education; the second consisting of those who had not completed secondary school, or those secondary school graduates who did not intend to pursue university education. Youth unemployment was a serious problem, and there was a big demand for public jobs.⁵⁸²

- (iv) Part of the peasants had fled their villages and become refugees, and those who stayed were left destitute of the proper means of livelihood, and of jobs.⁵⁸³

⁵⁸¹ See, for instance, one of the two reports written by Dr. Fazıl Küçük for the Turkish authorities, dated 21 July 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d: 380, 382).

⁵⁸² See the speech of Denktaş at the Community Chamber meeting of 30 July 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d: 402–405).

⁵⁸³ See, for instance, the two reports written by Dr. Fazıl Küçük for the Turkish authorities, both dated 21 July 1968 (Denktaş, 1997d: 378–379, 385–386).

Under the circumstances, the greater part of the T/Cs had become fully dependent upon income transfers from Turkey, most having turned into paid *mücahits*.⁵⁸⁴ Thus, An (2002: 24) points out that the 120 thousand T/Cs depended for their survival on the £ 10 thousand sent monthly from Turkey. On the other hand, Hatay and Bryant (2008: 439) argue that “[e]veryone who was not able to continue in his profession—especially men displaced from the countryside—was made a professional soldier and given a small salary.”⁵⁸⁵ According to the testimony of Turkish journalist Yılmaz Çetiner, 80 thousand people overall were being paid salaries by Turkey, of which 20 thousand were *mücahits*. Çetiner also gave figures from the 12 May 1960 report of the Turkish Cypriot Worker’s Unions [*Kıbrıs Türk İşçi Birlikleri Federasyonu*]: 3,500 public servants and teachers; 8,000 unemployed; 5,000 peasants and farmers; 1,000 state workers, and 5,000 voluntary workers, adding up to 23,000. Assuming that each salary earner had a family of four, one could conclude that 100,000 people lived on the aid provided by Turkey, which made up four fifth of the entire T/C population of 120,000 (An, 2002: 25).

⁵⁸⁴ “... [I]t was a time when Turkish-Cypriots were subjected to indignities at Greek-Cypriot checkpoints, when they had little access to supplies or even to fresh fruits and vegetables, and when as a result they were highly militarized and dependent on both the local Turkish-Cypriot administration and the Turkish ‘motherland.’ Extended families crowded into small houses as relatives fled their villages; supplies from the villages had to pass through Greek-Cypriot checkpoints, where they were often confiscated or left to spoil; and children of both sexes were trained at very early ages to participate in the defense that became the primary occupation of the community.” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008: 439)

⁵⁸⁵ Denктаş returned to the Island on 13 April 1968. Shortly afterwards, on 17 May 1968, he gave an interview to Özer Hatay from *Yeni Gazete* [*New Newspaper*] in which he made it clear that what stroke him the most was the full-scale militarisation of the community: “Soru: Uzun zaman ayrı kaldığınız Kıbrıs Türk toplumunu nasıl buldunuz? ¶Yanıt: Kıbrıs’ta yepyeni bir hava vardır. Kadınli erkekli herkes bir mukavemetçi olmuştur. Bunu hissetmemek imkânı yoktur.” (Denктаş, 1997d: 248)

6.3. A PRE-THEORETICAL, CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF THE 1964–1967 PERIOD

Rauf R. Denktaş, Osman Örek and Halit Ali Rıza left the Island on 7 January 1964 for Ankara, whence they fled to London, on 12 January, to attend the tri-partite conference sponsored by Great Britain. As of mid February, it had become clear that he would not be able to get back to the Island, starting his long forced sejour in Turkey (Denktaş, 1996: 33, 45, 105).⁵⁸⁶ As of 1964, and under the circumstances of armed conflict and enclave life, a new division of labour amongst the ruling started to take shape. Rauf R. Denktaş was now settled in Ankara, working for the Cyprus Department [*Kıbrıs Dairesi*] of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to his own account, he had rejected İnönü's proposal to be paid and assigned a residence by the Government of Turkey, so he and his family lived on his salary of the President of the Communal Chamber, now comprising a compensation for being abroad (Batur, 2007: 291–292). According to Batur (2007: 294) Denktaş did very well and shined at his new task: He followed the news from Cyprus, took notes, and gave statements to the Associated Press, Reuters, and *Anadolu Ajansı*, Turkey's news agency. It is likely that Dr. Fazıl Küçük was disturbed by his performance and possible influence, so he apparently sent frequent messages to Ankara asking the authorities 'to shut him out' (Batur, 2007: 294). Apparently, there were numerous rumours

⁵⁸⁶ Denktaş sent his family to Turkey a day before he left Cyprus, on 6 January 1964, for security reasons, and getting help from Glafcos Clerides, who says that he safely drove the family from the Ledra Palace to the airport, and paid for the tickets (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 135–136). Rauf R. Denktaş denied and claimed that Clerides was lying, whilst Aydın Denktaş, his wife, gave a very different account in which a military vehicle takes the family from the barricades to the airport where they are met by Clerides (Denktaş, 2000: 184–185; Batur, 2007: 217–220).

about Denктаş and his family, apparently spread by his rivals in Cyprus, including Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and the Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus in Ankara, Ahmet Zaim: That he had smuggled his wife and children to safety using his personal connections; lived in luxury, on his higher salary,⁵⁸⁷ and safely away from danger and all sorts of hardships; that he embezzled the aid money donated by the T/Cs abroad, etc. (Denктаş, 1997a: 87, 475–478; 1997b: 64, 108–109; 2000: 287; Besim, 2011: 94)⁵⁸⁸ On the other hand, on the Island, there was a serious conflict gathering pace between, particularly, *Bayraktar*, the commander of TMT, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük. Nejat Konuk, the General Secretary of the Communal Chamber, and a close aid and associate of Denктаş’s recalls that, under the extraordinary circumstances after 21 December 1963, *Bayraktar* Kenan Çoygun—code name Kemal Coşkun—had gathered all powers into his hands. However, as the armed conflict between the two communities abated, others wanted to share the powers of Kemal Coşkun, leading to a power struggle involving Bayraktar, Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, Turkey’s Ambassador Özdemir Benler, and Commander of the Turkey’s Army Contingent Süreyya Besim (Besim, 2011: 94). It is important to note that, given the enclave conditions of the 1964–1967 sub-period, TMT had assumed the tasks of communication, transportation, and all sorts of logistics. Nejat Konuk reports that, initially, the Communal Chamber had ceased to function

⁵⁸⁷ During the enclave years, all public employees were being paid 30 Cypriot Liras per capita, whilst Denктаş received 200, including compensation for being on duty abroad (Besim, 2011: 94).

⁵⁸⁸ See, for the details of the rumours, the letter of 20 April 1966, from Denктаş to Dr. Fazıl Küçük, where he responds to Küçük’s accusations in a letter of 13 April, cc The Minister of Foreign Affairs (Denктаş, 1997b: 233–243).

(Besim, 2011: 94). However, the Communal Chamber seems to have recovered some of its functions in due process. Nur Batur points out that, in the absence of Rauf R. Denктаş, his close associate Dr. Şemsi Kâzım, rather disliked by Dr. Fazıl Küçük, headed the Communal Chamber. Furthermore, the Communal Chamber not only controlled the budget, but also had close connections to TMT, as well. Apparently, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and the T/C ministers were somewhat marginalised, since their proper duties comprised functions that belonged to the central state, which no longer was there. Since TMT needed expert personnel and organisation to fulfill the functions it had assumed, it came to depend upon the Communal Chamber that had the necessary resources. Eventually, Dr. Küçük could no longer tolerate the increasing powers of Dr. Şemsi Kâzım, now the *de facto* leader of the community, and waged a war on the Communal Chamber as well as TMT. It is important to note that, whilst there was also a power struggle between *Bayraktar* and the Commander of Turkey's Army contingency, the Ambassadorship was on the side of Dr. Küçük (Batur, 2007: 304). According to Aydın Samioğlu, TMT commander and a key insider, there was a great conflict of powers amongst *Bayraktarlık*, *Elçilik* [the Embassy], *Alay* [Army Contingency], and *Yönetim* [Administration]. As *Bayraktarlık* had concentrated all power in its own hands, and some members of *Elçilik* and *Alay* could not digest it, and particularly, Dr. Fazıl Küçük had lost all control.⁵⁸⁹ On the other hand, in his memoirs Rauf R. Denктаş summarised the conflict as follows: Inside, there was a conflict between the military

⁵⁸⁹ See, for Sami Aydınoglu's interview, Besim (2011: 88).

leadership—i.e. *Bayraktarlık*—and Dr. Fazıl Küçük. The largest part of the *mücahids* supported the military leader—i.e. Bayraktar Kenan Çoygun. The acts of the military leader, who would not make any concessions to the G/Cs, and would not let others to make any, were being disliked by Turkey, and contradicted by the Ambassador of Turkey. After the commandor of the Army Contingency of Turkey supported the Ambassador and opposed the military leader, tension between the two sides rose still further. The military leader and the Vice President of the Communal Chamber Dr. Şemsi Kâzım were allies. Against the attacks of Dr. Fazıl Küçük's *Halkın Sesi*, the military wing got the newspaper *Zafer* [Victory] published (Denktaş, 1997d: 65–66).

In May 1964, the so-called General Committee [*Genel Komite*] was established. According to Ahmet An, the General Committee was established to put the civilian administrators to the fore, whilst İsmail Bozkurt argues that it was a kind of revolutionary council [*İhtilâl Konseyi*], led by TMT, and supported by the Vice Presidency and the Communal Chamber (An, 2002: 161; Bozkurt, 2012: 37). Formally, the composition of the General Committee was defined as a committee, headed by Vice President Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and consisting of the T/C members of the House of Representatives, plus the Executive Committee of the Communal Chamber [*Cemaat Meclisi İcra Heyeti*], and of other, key persons—the latter obviously implying the TMT Commander, *Bayraktar*. Its task was defined as the setting of the policy principles concerning all the activities—social, political, economic, security, propaganda—of the T/C

community, and their application via the so-called sub-committees [*Tali Komiteler*]. Formally, the members of the General Committee were Dr. Fazıl Küçük (President), Cemal Müftüzade (General Secretary), and Rauf R. Denктаş, Dr. Niyazi Manyera, Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu, Osman Örek, Dr. Şemsi Kâzım, Ümit Süleyman, Dr. Burhan Nalbantoğlu, Fazıl Plümer, Halit Ali Rıza, Mehmet Zekâ, Necati Münir Ertekün, and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu, as members (Akkurt, 2000: 112–113). According to Seyit Yolak, the General Committee consisted of the Vice President, *Bayraktar*, the three T/C ministers, members of the House of Representatives, members of the Communal Chamber, and the higher judges. Organisationally, under the General Committee, were and the sub-committees, on the one hand, and the *sancaks*, governed by *sancaktars*,⁵⁹⁰ on the other (Yolak, 1989: 74–77). It is important to note that the secondary committees were actually proto ministries, comprising the Sub-Committee of Health Services [*Sağlık Hizmetleri Tali Komitesi*], the Sub-Committee of Social Assistance and Welfare Affairs [*Sosyal Yardım ve Refah İşleri Tali Komitesi*], etc. which were later developed into the quasi-state structure established on 28 December 1967.

The conflicts amongst the ruling elite often got rather violent. Thus, as early as 6 April 1965, A. Cemal Müftüzade, General Secretary of the General Committee, wrote a letter to Rauf R. Denктаş—apparently, as the head of TMT, arguing that he had received death threats, his car been confiscated by

⁵⁹⁰ *Sancaks* were administrative units corresponding to the districts. *Sancaktars*—officers from Turkey, as TMT commanders, were the military sub-governors of the districts.

force, and his house looted and turned into a stable (Denktaş, 1997a: 125–132). On 28 June 1965, the General Committee ended the duty of Ahmet Gazioğlu, General Secretary of Turkish Cypriot Association of London [*Londra Kıbrıs Türk Cemiyeti*], and a close follower of Denktaş's (Denktaş, 1997a: 221). There were allegations that the aid monies collected in London had been misappropriated, made by Gazioğlu's rivals as well as Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Denktaş, 1997b: 199). Thus, in April 1966, there took place a very angry exchange of letters between Dr. Küçük and Denktaş. In his letter of 13 April 1966, cc the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Küçük accused Gazioğlu of misappropriation, and Denktaş, of protecting the latter, disobeying the directives of the General Committee, of indifference to the sufferings of the community, of being a distant onlooker, of having taken sanctuary in Turkey at the first shooting, and having run from Erenköy [*Kokkina*], of living a quite, opulent, and happy life in Ankara, etc. On his turn, in his letter of 20 April 1966, Denktaş accused Dr. Küçük of hiding behind the squadron of guards at his residence, whilst he was desperately trying to protect his own defenceless street by means of two shots and a pistol, and of having sent his son to study London, whilst others of the same age were guarding the posts. Apparently, Denktaş was arguing that Dr. Küçük had a character issue, being excessively fiery and hateful, and always fabricating new rivals and enemies (Denktaş, 1997b: 233–243). On 29 October 1965, the anniversary day of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the TMT *mücahids*—holy warriors—declined to salute the Commander of Turkey Army Contingent by turning their backs, in protest of the latter's

cursing of the TMT commanders. In late 1965, all the battalion [*bölük*] commanders of TMT together gave a warning note to the Embassy of Turkey, considered as ‘an iron fist in a velvet glove’ [*kadife eldiven içinde demir yumruk*] (Besim, 2011: 94–95). By early 1966, the strife between Dr. Fazıl Küçük and *Bayraktarlık* and the rumours about Rauf R. Denктаş appeared to have been growing rapidly (Denктаş, 1997b: 104). On the other hand, as of March 1966, Dr. Küçük was apparently taking new steps to bypass Denктаş, by substituting Osman Örek as chief representative before the Government of Turkey, and establishing a liaison office that would directly link the General Committee to Ankara (Denктаş, 1997b: 168, 170).

The second half of the year 1966 witnessed the rupture of the relationships between (a) Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and Bayraktar Kemal Coşkun–Rauf R. Denктаş, on the one hand, and (b) Denктаş and the Government of Turkey, on the other. On 29 October 1966, Denктаş published his book ‘12’ye 5 Kala’ [5 to 12 O’clock], which he called to be the turning point of his exile’s life in Turkey (Denктаş, 2000: 224–225). ‘12’ye 5 Kala’ comprised a very heavy critique of the Cyprus policy of the governments of Turkey. Denктаş accused the government authorities of Turkey for having backed off from the thesis of geographically defined federation, proposed at the London Conference of January 1964.⁵⁹¹ There were some xenophobic remarks accusing the Greek, Jewish, and Armenian minority merchants of

⁵⁹¹ “Londra Konferansına ‘Ayrı coğrafi bir zemine dayanan federal bir idare’ en asgari şartımızdır diyerek gittik. Milli hedef bu olmuştu artık ve bu bir fantazi talep değildi. Haklarımızı koruyabilecek en asgari bir talepti. ¶Şimdi, federasyonu almaz olduk ağzımıza. Ayrı coğrafi bir zemine dayanan yeterli ve etkili bir hal çaresi istemek de suç olacak yakında!” (Denктаş, 2000: 228)

spreading the view that drawing the 32 million citizens of Turkey into the adventure of war for the sake of a community of 120 thousand would have catastrophic consequences. According to Denktaş, the fact was that Cyprus could not be saved and the rights of the T/Cs could not be taken without the military intervention of Turkey—a truth for the mere expression of which he was being called unjustly a warmonger, he complained. The clock was ticking close to 12. Turkey had to make Greece that she was ready to engage a war to make the latter back off. Turkey should have given her consent to modify the Zurich regime, only for the sake of a geographically, as opposed to functionally, based federation. If Greece did not compromise, the only way left to Turkey would be the ‘double *Enosis*’, i.e. *Taksim* ((Denktaş, 2000: 248, 256, 278–280). Apparently, after the publication of *12’ye 5 Kala*, the relationships of Denktaş with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs worsened dramatically.

In the last days of December 1966, Dr. Fazıl Küçük wrote, in his newspaper *Halkın Sesi*, that a group of TMT warriors had conspired to overthrow himself, implying that they were connected to the TMT commander. According to Denktaş, Dr. Küçük had decided to liquidate *Bayraktar* Kemal Coşkun, and chances were that he would succeed, since Turkey would prefer Dr. Küçük over *Bayraktar* (Denktaş, 1997b: 433–434). The turning point of the strife between Dr. Küçük and Bayraktar was to be the summary execution of the TMT fighter Mustafa Alpay, on 22 January 1967. Alpay was quite a legendary—not only in the eyes of the T/Cs, but the G/Cs as well—figure, a renowned sharpshooter, and devout supporter of Dr. Fazıl

Küçük. On the night of 22 January 1967, there took place at the *Çağlayan* Casino [*Çağlayan Gazinosu*] in Nicosia, a brawl between Mustafa Alpay, and two TMT commanders, Nevzat Uzunoğlu and Fikret Kürşat, possibly provoked by the latter two. Uzunoğlu and Kürşat opened fire, and Alpay shot back, injuring both. Then he was jailed at the *Sarayönü* Police Precinct, infighting broke out amongst the TMT fighters, and he was executed in his cell, reportedly, by Bayraktar Kenan Çoygun himself.⁵⁹² As things turned out, the execution of Mustafa Alpay was to prove a critical turning point on the course of the power struggle amongst the ruling elite on the Island, and between Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and Rauf R. Denктаş.

Meanwhile, the publication of ‘*12’ye 5 Kala*’ had caused a great furry amongst the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorities (Batur, 2007: 308). Given his criticisms that the authorities had been compromising the national cause of Cyprus, Denктаş could no longer go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and his presence in Ankara was not quite welcome by the Government circles (Denктаş, 1997c: 41; Batur, 2007: 310–312). On 26 January 1967, Denктаş was summoned by İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to his office. Apparently, one of the accusations faced by Denктаş was that he had divided the TMT cadres—directed, according to Denктаş, by İlter Türkmen, who was in charge of the

⁵⁹² “94 Yaşındaki Emekli Polis Ahmet Tevfik’in Şahitliği: Alpay’ı Bayraktar Vurdu!”, Aysu Basri Akter, (Yenidüzen, 24 April 2011). See also, for the interviews of his wife, and son “*Milliyetçiliğin Öksüz Bıraktıkları: Alpay Mustafa’nın Eşi Huriye Alpay*”, Sevgül Uludağ, (Yenidüzen, 11 April 2005), and “*Milliyetçiliğin Öksüz Bıraktıkları: Bora Alpay...*”, Sevgül Uludağ, (Yenidüzen, 20 April 2005). Aydın Samioğlu, former TMT commander, also confirms, in his interview to Filiz Besim, that Alpay was executed by *Bayraktar* Kenan Çoygun. According to Samioğlu, Alpay Mustafa belonged to a special unit directly tied to *Bayraktarlık*, and after the incident, this unit was dissolved (Besim, 2011: 89).

Greek and Cyprus affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Denktaş, 1997c: 34–36). According to Denktaş’s account of the meeting, Çağlayangil and the Government were deeply disturbed by his connections to and his briefing of the leaders of opposition parties, some journalists, and his speeches at some student associations, and particularly, of the publication and the very title of ‘*12’ye 5 Kala*’, implying the loss—by the Justice Party Government authorities, obviously—of the Cyprus cause. Çağlayangil told Denktaş that there could be only one Cyprus policy, and that was the policy of Turkey, and not that of Denktaş, Dr. Şemsi Kâzım, or Kenan *bey*. Also, he pointed out that, despite the fact that the social index [*sosyal indeks*] on the Island had increased after AP came to power, Denktaş had never mentioned this in his speeches, whilst he could have said that “this cause could not have been lost as long as this government pursued it in this way”, and raise the spirits.⁵⁹³ Clearly, there was a strategic difference between the Government of Turkey, and Denktaş, about the different time horizons they had. Thus, Denktaş told Çağlayangil that, when AP came to power, they expected that the new government would move quickly to bring the cause to a good conclusion, that they were disappointed by its conversion, following the bilateral negotiations, to the rhetoric of a temporary solution, of freezing the situation. In his turn, Çağlayangil argued that the conjuncture had since changed, the situation had frozen by itself, that if they could continue the existing state of affairs for another 2 or 3 years, the cantons

⁵⁹³ “... Halbuki siz beyanatlarınızda bunu hiç tebarüz ettirmiyorsunuz. Size susunuz demiyorum. Fakat, morali yükseltmek için, “**bu hükümet bu davayı bu şekilde takip ettiği müddetçe bu dava kaybolmaz**” diyebilirsiniz.” (Denktaş, 1997c: 37)

would have to be recognised, *de facto*, as a form of government, upon which new initiatives could be built (Denktaş, 1997c: 35–38). From their conversation with Çağlayangil, Denktaş drew the conclusion that he had no longer any function left, his activities were being found harmful, and he was now in a position to be accused of treason—that he was cornered unless he found a way out (Denktaş, 1997c: 39–40). As it turned out, the solution he came up with would be attempting to enter the Island secretly.

Underlying the Çağlayangil–Denktaş meeting was, not only the stalemate in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, but also, the serious conflict of power on the Island, highlighted by the Alpay murder, and indicating that the existing state of affairs was no longer sustainable. On 19 January 1967, the daily *Hürriyet* wrote that *Bayraktar* would be called back to Turkey, and the Ankara Radio gave the news that *Bayraktar* was not the leader of TMT, that it was up to the T/Cs to appoint the director of TMT, reiterating that the leader of the T/C community was Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and the director of the Communal Chamber, Dr. Şemsi Kâzım (Denktaş, 2007c: 59). Shortly afterwards, on 24 February 1967, upon the order he received at 13:00 circa, Bayraktar Kenan Çoygun left the Island at 19:30 (Keser, 2012a: 163). According to Aydın Samioğlu, the calling back of Çoygun following the Alpay incident was due to the heavy pressures by political cadres, and particularly, by Dr. Fazıl Küçük. It is important to note that, after Çoygun, the service terms of *Bayraktars* and *Sancaktars* were restricted to two years (Besim, 2011: 89).

After the recall of Kenan Çoygun to Turkey, Rauf R. Denktaş renewed his efforts to get back to the Island, officially, and if necessary, secretly. Despite the serious tension the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government, and the defeat suffered by the recall of Çoygun, Denktaş's position was not probably so weak, given his close connections to the soldiers, and particularly, the Special Warfare Department, and to General Turgut Sunalp, more particularly. As of the mid of April 1967, there were some signs of conciliation between Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and Rauf R. Denktaş, indicated by the public statements and private messages of the diplomat Zeki Kuneralp, and the correspondance between the two leaders.⁵⁹⁴ Thus, in his letter of 4 May 1967, Dr. Fazıl Küçük told Denktaş that he and the latter could have no problems, since they shared the very same task and goal. Also, part of the letter referred to the events of the past three years and a half, speaking of those who had abused the cause, pocketed tens of thousands, polluted the honours of innocent families, stocked and sold the staples allotted to the TMT fighters, confiscated his house and looted his belongings, shadowed himself and questioned his connections, etc. (Denktaş, 1967: 143–146) On 19 May 1967, there came out the news that the houses of Niyazi Manyera, Ümit Süleyman, and Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu had been bombed (Denktaş, 1967c: 173).⁵⁹⁵ Apparently, as of the summer of 1967, there had emerged, besides the thaw between Dr. Fazıl

⁵⁹⁴ See for some of the public statements and private messages, and the correspondance, Denktaş (1997c: 72, 74, 85–87, 106–108). The tone of his letter of 15 April 1967 indicates that Denktaş had now backed off from direct confrontation.

⁵⁹⁵ According to the Associated Press news agency, all three leaders were affiliated with Dr. Fazıl Küçük (Denktaş, 1967: 173). In his interview to Filiz Besim, Ümit Süleyman pointed out that Manyera, Berberoğlu and he himself were the three members of the committee that had resolved that the occupying migrants should be pay rents to the house owners.

Küçük and Rauf R. Denktaş, consensus on the necessity of solving the social and economic problems of the T/C community, and the reform of the political institutions in a way to raise the inclusiveness of the political regime. Thus, at a meeting on 8 June 1967, Dr. Niyazi Manyera reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil that:

- a) The migrants, having now exhausted all their savings, were asking the General Committee for help;
- b) although there was no one left living in the tents, families of 5–6 had to live and sleep in a single room;
- c) fiscal aid was needed to get the non-warrior migrants to produce;⁵⁹⁶

Most importantly, Dr. Manyera warned that the time factor was the key to the resistance and the endurance of the T/C community. Should the current state of affairs on the Island continue, new problems would be added to the existing ones, leading to distress inside the community, with adverse effects on the cause. Dr. Manyera further noted that, despite the three and a half years that had passed, communal organs were still functionless; the mechanisms of justice were not still established everywhere on the Island; that it was necessary to revitalise and institute the communal organs, and; that otherwise there would be no peace inside the community and serious

According to his account, the bombing had occurred the very night of that resolution (Besim, 2011: 64).

⁵⁹⁶ Dr. Manyera got the answer that £ 35 thousand had been sent by Turkey for the year 1966 to get the migrants to produce. In response, Dr. Manyera told that it was the Communal Chamber that was in charge of the migrants' problems, that the General Committee had no information about the issue (Denktaş, 1997c: 209).

repercussions would follow. In response, Minister of Foreign Affairs Çağlayangil argued that the issue entirely concerned the domestic affairs of the community, that it was necessary to institute all the organs necessary to solve the community's problems, and to function like a true government. To that end, he asked the T/C leaders to prepare a plan of action and submit it to the Motherland government (Denktaş, 1997c: 208–211). On 28 December 1967, the so-called *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi* [Transient Turkish Cypriot Administration] was established to replace the General Committee, as a key new stage of the process of T/C nationalist state-building. The new proto-state structure was based upon *Kıbrıs Türk Yönetimi Temel Kuralları* [Basic Rules of the Turkish Cypriot Administration], the so-called miniature constitution [*Minyatür Anayasa*], regulating the administrative, executive, and legislative functions. Basically, the legal foundations of *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi* were provided by those articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus that were still applicable, plus the so-called *Temel Kurallar* filling up the gaps and replacing those articles that were not applicable. Dr. Fazıl Küçük was the President of *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi*, and Rauf R. Denktaş its Vice President (Akkurt, 2000: 130).⁵⁹⁷

Meanwhile, given the G/C leadership's refusal of all formal demands for his return, Rauf R. Denktaş was now resolved to enter the Island secretly by the

⁵⁹⁷ On 21 April 1971, the Assembly of *Kıbrıs Geçici Türk Yönetimi* [Transient Turkish Cypriot Administration] dropped the epithet 'Geçici' [Transient], considering the new circumstances. On 16 February 1973, Rauf R. Denktaş replaced his long rival Dr. Fazıl Küçük as President, ending the political career of the latter (Akkurt, 2000: 132).

sea route.⁵⁹⁸ He and Nejat Konuk, his aide, met the former TMT chief Kenan oygun, who said that the *mücahids* on the Island had been collecting money to finance his secret entry to the Island. Eventually, TL 100 thousand came from the Island, of which they spent 32 thousand to buy a speed boat (Besim, 2011: 96, 98). On the morning of 21 October 1967, at 04:00, they left Ankara for İskenderun, from where they would leave for Larnaca, accompanied by Erol İbrahim, their guide, a TMT warrior and sailer from Larnaca. Apparently, they were very poorly equipped, the speed boat was not a speedy boat, so they erred about the right place to set foot, ending up near Ayios Theodoros, on the Karpas Peninsula,⁵⁹⁹ where they were apprehended by the National Guard. Mass demonstrations took place, in Turkey, and in Cyprus. Under heavy pressure by the United Nations, Western powers, and Turkey, Denktaş and his companions were set free and fled back to Turkey, on 12 November 1967. In İstanbul, and in Ankara, Denktaş was hailed by the thousands as a hero, and would now be in excellent terms with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil.⁶⁰⁰ As noted above, this whole affair had two consequences: T/C community's protest of Ankara's passivity, and the thaw between the G/C and T/C communities. Only three days after the release of Denktaş and co., disturbed by the air of good spirit developing on the Island, Georgios Grivas launched a National Guard attack

⁵⁹⁸ According to Niyazi Kızılyürek, Rauf R. Denktaş tried to return to the Island to struggle against Dr. Fazıl Küçük, to become the leader of the T/C society (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 141).

⁵⁹⁹ Near Bafra, where Hotel Artemis is today, according to Nejat Konuk (Besim, 2011: 98)

⁶⁰⁰ See Oberling (1982: 137–138), Besim (2011: 98–99). See, for Rauf R. Denktaş's account of the events Denktaş (1997c: 387481), and Denktaş (2000: 296–339). For Glafcos Clerides's alternative account, see Kızılyürek (2007a: 135–149).

on the T/Cs and TMT forces of Kofinou [Köfünye, or *Geçitkale*] and Agios Theodoros [*Boğaziçi*]. Whilst Turkey reacted very strongly, President Johnson Commissioned Cyrus Roberts Vance, former Secretary of State Department to mediate, and the Greek junta was forced to yield to all of Turkey's demands. Thus, the way for Denктаş to get back to the Island was finally cleared. On 13 April 1968, he and his family left for Cyprus. Prior to his departure, Minister of Foreign Affairs İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil let Denктаş know that, in domestic affairs, he was free to act as he wished, and he was the sole authority in conducting the prospective negotiations with the G/Cs in accordance with the expectations of his people (Denктаş, 1997d: 157–158; 2000: 340).⁶⁰¹ On 3 June 1968, bicomunal talks started in Beirut, between Rauf R. Denктаş, President of the T/C Communal Chamber, and Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives. The first round of negotiations ended on 20 September 1971, and its second round started on 8 June 1972 and ended on 2 April 1974 (Denктаş, 1997b: 263; Besim, 2011: 60).

In retrospect, and broadly speaking, the years 1965 and 1966 of T/C politics and economy appear to be the times of emergent crisis, the first half of 1967 the times of the outbreak of crisis, and the second half of 1967, the resolution of the crisis. Accordingly, the late 1967 and early 1968 witnessed a number of demands by the contenders of the power struggle actors as the part of a bargaining process to achieve a new consensus. As noted above,

⁶⁰¹ “*Halkını bu baskıdan ve ablukadan kurtaracak manevrayı yap; iç konularda tamamen serbestsin; Sizi kurtaran, işinize gelen, halkının benimseyeceğine inandığın bir anlaşmayı yapmakta hürsün, biz seni sonuna kadar destekleriz.*” (Denктаş, 2000: 340)

there were demands, raised by mostly the civilian contenders of the power struggle, to expand the inclusive basis of politics, by means of the revitalisation and institution of the various legislative, executive, judiciary, and representative and administrative organs. One of the documents concerning the reorganisation of the community, namely a note transmitted to the Government of, dated 29 December 1967, by the TMT fighters supporting Rauf R. Denktaş is quite interesting in terms of comprehending the origins of the future relations of power based on patronage. The note firstly stressed that, in the process of the conclusion of the cause on the basis of an honourable solution, the views of ‘our community’s’ leadership, and particularly of ‘our leader in exile’, Rauf R. Denktaş must be taken into consideration, and they must be part of any meeting towards that end. According to the authors of the note, the true resolution of the Cyprus issue was the existence of the two communities as neighbours on physically delienated territories. On the other hand, the success of the cause critically depended upon the fulfilment of a number of conditions comprising the following:

- (a) People presently or prospectively occupying the post of political leadership must be prevented from dividing the community into armed groups towards the realisation of their personal interests;
- (b) the provision of all the means necessary for the economic and cultural development of the community, and of its commercial independence, as the foremost condition of a more powerful resistance;

- (c) the prevention of emigration caused by unemployment and the risk of hunger, by means of the development of new areas of employment;
- (d) the preparation of migration plans to concentrate the populace in Northern Cyprus, as a step towards the realisation of the final cause—i.e. *Taksim*, and as a necessary precondition of commercial development, and;

in case of the demobilisation of ‘our *mücahids*’,

- (e) the compensation of those fighters who had previously lost their areas of occupation, professional capital and materials, their houses, trees, livestock, etc. to enable them to earn their livelihood;
- (f) the continuation of salary payments to younger fighters who, due their *mücahitlik* services, were not able to acquire professional skills, and the giving of the priority to the younger fighters in the allocation of the new means of employment;
- (g) the provision of higher education opportunities and scholarships, to those *mücahids* who are secondary school students or graduates;
- (h) the consideration of past *mücahitlik* services as an extra qualification in the promotions at public service (Denktaş, 1997c: 507–511).

On 13 April 1968, Rauf R. Denktaş returned to the Island. He faced three key tasks: Negotiations with the G/C leadership towards the resolution of

the Cyprus question;⁶⁰² the reform of T/C politics, and administration, and, the resolution of the social and economic problems.

6.4. EXPLAINING THE CRISIS OF THE T/C PROTO-STATE

During the period of 1964–1967, the ‘social problem’ amongst the T/Cs consisted of the problems of public servants, refugees, young people, and the peasantry. Great portions of the total labour power had fallen out of production activity, or of any labour activity, for that matter. Most labour was unproductive *mücahit* (guard) labour. Therefore, there was now four economic problems, four constraints, and four sources of fiscal and economic, and political crisis:

- (i) The T/C socio-economic formation had a low capacity to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of the modern state apparatus. It is important to note that this is an **historically given** constraint;
- (ii) the T/C state apparatus had further expanded as the public employees working for the central state had now been transferred to the community’s proto-state. This is a new constraint **produced by**

⁶⁰² Niyazi Kızılyürek also points out that, as of the negotiations of 1968, the position of Rauf R. Denktaş as to the resolution of the Cyprus issue had largely changed. Basically, he now gave his consent to amending the Constitution—to the so-called 13 Amendments, in return for the administrative autonomy of the T/C community. According to the reports of the United States Embassy to the State Department, Denktaş had come to realise that the realisation of *Taksim* by means of the military intervention of Turkey was not possible, and the good treatment he had received from the G/Cs during his captivity had a good impact (Kızılyürek, 2007a: 145–147).

the past strategic choices of the T/C leadership which gave the priority to the process of nationalist state-building;

- (iii) the production activity of the T/C community had practically stalled, further reducing the capacity of the T/C economy to generate the surplus necessary for the sustenance of the proto-state. Notice that this was also a constraint **produced by the past strategic choices** of the T/C leadership, which gave the priority to the process of nationalist state building;
- (iv) the militarisation of the T/C community made the guard labour (a variant of it, more precisely) the biggest labour activity, creating a grave problem of the hypertrophy of unproductive labour. This was similarly a constraint **produced by the past strategic choices** of the T/C leadership, which gave the priority to the process of nationalist state building.

Furthermore, in this particular case, production and unproductive labour emerge as the dynamics of structural limitation.


Thus, the low level of surplus product, the further expansion of the community's proto-state, the collapse of production activity, and the hypertrophy of unproductive labour due to the militarisation of social labour were together the basic factors driving the economic and political crisis of the T/C community. It is important to note that whilst the first historically given, the other three were the economic consequences of past strategies

and of the nationalist politics of state-building, i.e. *Taksim*. The crisis was a double one: A fiscal crisis, and a political crisis, caused by the miscalculation of the time horizon by the T/C leadership, due to their expectation that the extraordinary circumstances of the enclave life would not last too long since Turkey would soon intervene to realise *Taksim*.

T/C ECONOMY AND POLITICS (1964–1967): CAUSALITIES	
CONSTRAINTS: HISTORICALLY GIVEN & (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES OF PAST POLITICAL STRATEGIC CHOICES	
• T/C SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATION: LOW LEVEL OF SURPLUS PRODUCT (The Level of Economic Structure) • FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE COMMUNITY'S PROTO-STATE (Derived Economic Consequence of the Politics of State-Building) • COLLAPSE OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITY (Derived Economic Consequence of the Politics of State-Building) • HYPERTROPHY OF UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR (MILITARISATION) (Derived Economic Consequence of the Politics of State-Building) ⇓ (1) FISCAL CRISIS & CONSTRAINT SOFTENED AT THE COST OF DEPENDENCY ON FISCAL TRANSFERS FROM TURKEY (2) POLITICAL CRISIS DUE TO THE STRATEGIC MISCALCULATION OF THE TIME HORIZON	

In the prior period of 1960–1963, the T/C leadership gave the priority to and made a strategic choice in favour of the nationalist politics of state-building. However, in the next period of 1964–1967, the consequent production crisis and the hypertrophy of unproductive labour imposed structural limits upon

the nationalist politics of state-building, leading to fiscal and economic, and political crisis, as it became clear that the leadership had made a strategic miscalculation in its estimation of the time horizon that its politics would involve. To this, one must add the stresses caused by the ‘exceptional state’ of the period of 1964–1967. It is important to note that, during this specific sub-period, the T/C proto-state and its activities had become fully identified with the TMT and its activities, at the exclusion of the various of the previous period. Therefore, as of 1966–1967, there were serious, and often violent conflicts between the various actors that had a claim to political power, or a share of the political power, involving, the Commandership of TMT, the Commendership of the Turkish Army Contingent, the Turkish Embassy, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and his followers, and Rauf Raif Denktaş and his followers. Consequently, the crisis of 1966–1967 was the consequence of economic and political dynamics, or it actually was a double crisis, an economic crisis and a political crisis. Thus, for the overall period of 1960–1967, the T/C economy and politics appear the have a causality relationship of the following type:



Finally, the analysis above appears to justify two further elements of Bob Jessop’s and Erik Olin Wright’s theories of causality. The first is Jessop’s

idea of economic determination, namely, the idea that production has a priority over the other moments of capital accumulation and the economy. Thus, during the period of 1964–1967, the collapse of production and the hypertrophy of non-production (and thereby, unproductive) activity clearly caused major problems for the other moments of the economy. The second is Jessop’s idea that the so-called ‘exceptional state’, due to its rigidity and thereby its lack of political inclusiveness, is prone to produce political crises. The third is Wright’s idea of dialectics, namely, that the solutions to the constraints of a prior phase themselves become constraints, in the next phase. Thus, it is clear that the strategic choices of the first period of 1960–1963— such as the neglect of the economy at the expense of nationalist state-building, became sources of crisis in the subsequent period of 1964–1967.

Thus,

BOB JESSOP: CAUSALITY THEORY
ECONOMIC DETERMINATION (Priority of Production over the Other Moments of Capital Accumulation, and Economy) ☒

BOB JESSOP: STATE & CRISIS THEORY
EXCEPTIONAL STATE Exceptional States Prone to Producing Political Crises ☒

ERIK OLIN WRIGHT: CAUSALITY THEORY
DIALECTICS (Solutions to the Constraints of a Prior Phase Become the Constraints of the Subsequent Phase) ☒

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The basic goal of this thesis was to study the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, for the period of 1960–1967, from the point of view of the relationships between economy and politics/the state, through, particularly, the theories of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright. Despite the fact that it appears, on first consideration, to make part of a broader class of relatively recent studies which place the emphasis upon domestic dynamics, it differs from the latter on three accounts, namely;

- 1) in its focus upon economy and politics, and the relationships between the two, from the perspective of the theories of political economy and the state, rather than identity, departing from the theories of nationalism and cultural studies;
- 2) in its attempt to expound and model the relationships between the level of domestic dynamics, on the one hand, and the levels of inter-state politics and global political economy, on the other, and, finally;
- 3) in its regard of the period of 1960–1967, as the critical episode to which the origins of the power relations and generalised crisis characterising today's T/C state and economy are to be traced back, as opposed to those studies bringing to the fore, as the decisive moment, the socio-economic arrangements of the immediate post-1974 years.

As pointed out above, in Chapter 2, the best part of the literature on the T/Cs treats the latter merely as the passive actors of the Cyprus issue. Whilst nationalist accounts of the history of the T/Cs exclusively concentrate upon the Turco–Greek and G/C–T/C conflicts, neo–realist sort of approaches more generally tend to treat the Cyprus issue as one that belongs to the sphere of inter–state relations, where states are regarded as unitary actors. It is important to note that the conceptualisation by the realist school of ‘international relations’ as ‘inter-state’ relations constitutes one of the core critiques of the students of ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’—namely, that states are treated as black boxes. Furthermore, in the specific case of the T/C society and of the Cyprus issue, domestic dynamics appear to have risen to prominence in the last two decades or so. As a matter of fact, since the Helsinki Summit and the financial crisis of late 1999, the T/C society has been riven by what I have called a ‘generalised crisis of statehood’, i.e. a crisis encompassing all the basic properties and functions characterising the modern state. As it appears, it is difficult to attribute the origins of the generalised crisis to external dynamics alone—most notably, the process of Europeanisation which has come to destabilise the T/C economy, following successful Greek and G/C efforts in the early 1990s to internationalise the Cyprus issue through the EC/EU. Overall instability and crisis appear to be due to domestic dynamics as well, and more specifically, to a number of deep–seated problems related to the nature of T/C politics/state and economy. Furthermore, domestic dynamics appear to have had major repercussions in terms of critical shifts in the configuration of existing

relations of power *and* thereby, in the field of foreign policy. Therefore, it should be useful to adopt a Foreign Policy Analysis type of approach to the study of the Cyprus issue, by way of establishing the relationships between dynamics belonging to domestic and inter–state levels.

On the other hand, there has been a marked increase since, particularly the mid 1990s, in the studies focusing upon the domestic dynamics of the T/C society, in their relationships to the Cyprus issue. However, this newly proliferated literature approaches the issue typically from the point of view of identity, and through the theories of nationalism and cultural studies. And, despite the fact that some authors bring to the fore the relationships between economy and politics as the key to the comprehension of the relations of power and the generalised crisis now characterising the T/C society, they generally tend to speak of the economy without recourse to political economy, and of politics without recourse to the theories of the state. Accordingly, this thesis distinguishes itself from the class of recent studies focusing upon domestic dynamics, through its ‘theoretically–informed’ focus upon the relationship of economy and politics, using the theories of political economy and of the state. In so doing, it usefully complements the studies of nationalist politics focusing upon the question identity, since T/C nationalists, as modernisers, aimed to reform the ‘traditional’ T/C society, not only culturally (through the constitution of a trans-communal, ‘national’ identity), but politically (by building a modern nation–state), and economically (by creating a modern capitalist economy) as well.

On the other hand, one must also note that the question of the relationships between domestic and external dynamics is a key issue underlying nearly all analyses of the Cyprus issue. Particularly critical in this respect, are the relations of power between the local actors—G/C and T/C nationalists, on the one hand, and the two motherlands, and the great powers, on the other, in the process of the determination of particular foreign policy outcomes. For instance, most students of the history of T/Cs and of the Cyprus issue tend to claim that the T/Cs, being politically and economically fully dependent upon Turkey, are simply the passive recipients and bearers of the consequences of the latter's policy decisions. This thesis rejects the kind of 'absolute' power asymmetry implied by the arguments of one-sided dependency, adopting a more 'dialectical', so to say, view of the relations between the T/Cs and Turkey, specifically, and between local and regional/global actors, generally. As a matter of fact, the theoretically-informed review above of the events of the period of 1943–1967 appear to support the view that the history of the T/Cs consists of successive episodes through which the relative weights of domestic and external actors and factors alternate. Thus, for instance, the network of T/C nationalist leadership on the Island, T/C university students and members of the T/C diaspora in İstanbul and Ankara, and the Turkish nationalists was the key to the construction of the Cyprus issue as Turkey's national cause from the early to mid 1950s. On the other hand, the Zurich and London Agreements, and the liberal political and economic order inscribed in the Constitution thereof, were imposed upon the nationalist leaderships of the two

communities as a part of the balance of power amongst the allies—the United States, Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey—and between the blocs in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, underlying the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, was the question of unfulfilled Greek–G/C and T/C nationalist aspirations for, respectively, *Enosis* and *Taksim*. However, if they firstly succumbed to the allies’ setting out of the ground rules of the new polity of the Republic of Cyprus, die-hard G/C and T/C nationalists proved, in due process, their power to defy and scrap the old rules, forcing the allies to look for the new ones.

As it appears, most students of T/C politics tend to think that the socio-economic arrangements of the immediate post–1974 years are the key to the comprehension of the power relations and generalised crisis characterising today’s T/C state and economy. As a matter of fact, these were the years when the politics and economy of the new society were instituted on the basis of a whole new social division of labour, in terms of the relations of production, distribution and class. Two particular aspects of this great transformation of the T/C society are noteworthy. The first is the expropriation of the property, the means of production and subsistence left by the fleeing G/Cs—the equivalent of the ‘primitive accumulation’ of Marx, and the equivalent of the ‘original sin’, on the part of the post–1974 T/C society. The second is the key role of the state in the sphere of redistribution, involving, most critically, the allocation of G/C property and the public monies ensured from Turkey, through, particularly, the politics of representative democracy. Institutionally, this network of patronage

relations as the basis of state power was also supported by the presence of a large public sector, consisting of public service and the so-called state economic enterprises. However, despite the fact that the resources—means of production, means of subsistence, and money—necessary to institutionalise and materially support the redistributive role of the state were largely secured after 1974, the genesis of the underlying relations of state power based upon patronage actually date back to the prior period of 1964–1974. Thus, against the common view that the socio-economic arrangements of the immediate post-1974 years are the key to the comprehension of the power relations and generalised crisis characterising today's T/C state and economy, this thesis holds that the enclave years of 1964–1974 are the key to the comprehension of the post-1974 arrangements. It is also important to note that the history of Cyprus, generally, and that of the T/Cs, more particularly, appears to conform a 'dialectical' pattern, consisting of cycles of recurrent conflicts, crises, and resolutions/transient, unstable equilibria. The pattern in question also provides the basis for the periodisation suggested in this thesis. Thus, the crisis of 1955–1958, i.e. the EOKA campaign and the British counter-thrust of Cyprus Emergency which, by mid-1958, peaked into a full-scale civil war became resolved by the creation of the common Republic of Cyprus in 1959. However, the transient equilibria ensured by the Zurich and London Agreements between G/C and T/C communities soon gave rise to new nationalist conflicts, and eventually, to the final crisis of the common Republic, i.e. the civil war of late 1963–mid 1964. A new phase of transient

equilibria followed the estrangement/self-estrangement of the T/C populace inside the heavily fortified enclaves after the collapse of the common Republic. The enclave period of 1964–1974 can be divided further into two sub-periods, namely, 1964–1967, years of strict confinement, and 1967–1974, years of relative peace and quietness. Thus, the transient equilibria of the first sub-period gave way to firstly increased conflicts and then to the full-scale crisis of 1967, amongst the T/C nationalists, amongst the G/C/Greek nationalists, and between Greece and Turkey. Once more, crisis was followed by a transient equilibria, now marked by inter-communal talks between G/Cs and T/Cs. As I see it, the roots of the relations of power based upon the institutionalisation of the redistributive role of the state on a large scale date back to the politics and economy of the enclave period, and most particularly, to the ways of the resolution of the 1967 crisis. Accordingly, in the foregoing, I have focused upon the years 1960–1967 as the key to comprehending the nature of the 1967 crisis, by way studying the two periods of 1960–1963, the years of the common Republic of Cyprus, and 1964–1967, the enclave years of absolute confinement. On the other hand, it was necessary to take the study back to the pre-Republic years of 1943–1960, in order to be able to identify the ‘initial’ conditions of the G/C–T/C conflict under the common state of the Republic of Cyprus.

This thesis evolved into its current format by passing through two stages. My first plan was to write a theoretically-informed history of T/C politics and economy, by drawing upon a number of basic ideas from the Marxist theories of the state and political economy. Emphasis would be placed upon

the writing of a comprehensive history, rather than the delving into the theory. Grand problems of the theories of the state and political economy, more particular, would have been bypassed. This changed as the Thesis Advisor suggested that the case offered ample opportunity to rethink the perennial problem of the relationship between politics and economy, and put, more specifically, the causality theory of ‘early’ Erik Olin Wright to the test. To that, I added the state theory and critical political economy of Bob Jessop, and the thesis was re-planned as the reconsideration of the problem of causality between politics and economy, in the light of the empirical material as relates to the case of the T/Cs. The distinguishment of the spheres of economy (civil society) and of politics/state (political society), and the theorisation of the relationships between the two was, notably, the basic problematic driving Karl Marx’s lifetime work. As noted above, coming early on to the conclusion that the anatomy of civil society had to be sought in political economy, Marx decided to invest the best part of his time and energy into the critical study of political economy. Furthermore, he was not able to complete his study of the system of bourgeois economy as originally conceived and write the book on ‘the State’. Overall, the legacy of Marx to the future Marxists was characterised by two problems: a) the lack of a sophisticated, and articulate theory of the state; b) by implication, the lack of a sophisticated theory of the relationships between economy and politics. Accordingly, significant parts of the theoretical work of the renaissance of Marxist theory as of the 1960s was oriented towards the study of the relationships between the so-called economic structure and the

other structures, including the state. The works of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright, two prominent scholars, in the fields of, respectively, Marxist theories of the state, and class must thus be placed into this context. The original leitmotiv of their works was the need to criticise and supersede, not only the ossified approaches of the official Marxist thought, but also, the limits of the Althusserian idea of the structured, overdetermined whole, then dominating Western neo-Marxist thought—in the case of Jessop, by its total rejection, and in the case of Wright, by its further refinement. More specifically, Jessop challenged ‘reductionist’ approaches of all sorts to the problem of the capitalist state—comprising its finer variants as the Althusserian ‘determination in the last instance’, and Wright, the ‘obscure’ and ‘speculative’ formulations of the relationships of causality between economic structure and the other elements of the ‘structured whole’. One of the key distinctions of the work of Jessop and the early work of Wright is that the former is basically inspired by Gramsci and the late, neo-Gramscian Poulantzas, whilst the latter, by Althusser. The theory of the state, of the capitalist state, and the capitalist economy is characterised by two ideas, namely, relationality, and strategicness. Relationality is defined as the relations amongst the various autopoietic, i.e. operationally autonomous and materially interdependent sub-ensembles or systems of social relations. As such, the economy—or, any other sub-ensemble of social relations, for that matter—does not necessarily have causal primacy over the other sub-ensembles. The causal primacy of the economy is only a possibility, or, using the terms of Jessop, should it hold, the ‘ecological dominance’ of the

capitalist economy is the consequence of contingent necessity. On the other hand, the state has, *vis-à-vis* all other sub-ensembles, the privileged place of being responsible of the reproduction of the whole, i.e. the society. From this, there follows another key idea, strategicness, namely, that the state is the site of strategy. As noted above, society consists of different sub-ensembles of social relations, and of different axes of societalisation. Accordingly, different sets of actors that belong to different sub-ensembles engage into strategic struggles over the control of the state towards for the dominance of this or that principle of societalisation over the rest, via different state projects. More specifically, the core elements of the approach are the ideas of structural constraints *versus* conjunctural opportunities, power, interest, and temporal and spatial horizons, and those of the strategic analysis, the idea of the state as a system of strategic selectivity, the site where strategies are elaborated, and the combined effect of path-dependent and current-transformative strategies and struggles. As opposed to Bob Jessop who seems to have placed the emphasis upon the critical elaboration of particular concepts, Erik Olin Wright seems to have concentrated upon the scientific elaboration of particular, but generally valid modalities of causal connections. Thus, the early Wright aims to provide a detailed account of the relationships of causality between deeper structures and surface phenomena, between causes and manifest effects, by elaborating Althusser's structural causality and overdetermined whole. In so doing, he breaks down the global concept of structural causality into six basic modes of determination, namely, structural limitation, selection, reproduction

versus nonreproduction, limits of functional compatibility, transformation, and mediation. Furthermore, he expands the concept of structured whole into the various models of determination, i.e. schematic representations of the complex modes of determination involved in a given structural process, comprising the various structures and agencies, on the one hand, and the various determination amongst them, on the other. Thus, he causally links together the economic structure, the state structure, the class struggle, and state policies/interventions, by means of the six modes of determination above. It is important to note that structural limitation and selection are the two modes of determination of key importance in the Marxist debates and Wright's reinterpretation of Althusser's causality. 'Structural causality' and 'determination in the last instance' are now seen to imply as some basic structures (economic structure, class structure, etc.) and structural limitation taking causal primacy over the other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination. For instance, as far as the relationships between economy and politics is concerned, causality flows from the economic structure, to the state structure, class struggle, and state policies and interventions.

In the light of Bob Jessop's theory of the capitalist state and economy, and Erik Olin Wright's theory of determinations, I have formulated an historically and empirically grounded conceptual framework to study the successive episodes of the T/C history, with a view to lay bare, particularly, the relationships of causality between politics and economy. Looking vertically, the framework in question involves, using the International

Relations terminology, multiple levels of analysis, more specifically, the inter-state (USA, GB, Turkey, Greece), and the global (International Political Economy) levels. Thus, I argue that, on a first level, the given conjuncture of world politics, political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, and international political economy conjuncture (dominant development strategies, policies and policy tools) together determine the externally-given constraints and possibilities faced by T/C nationalist leadership. On a second level, externally-given constraints and possibilities *and* the domestically-given constraints, together, determine the range of the options for strategic choices regarding state-building and capital accumulation. However, despite the fact that it broadly suggests that the various inter-state and domestic political, and economic factors together determine the range of options for strategic choices regarding state-building and capital accumulation, this conceptual framework does not make any *a priori* claims about the direction of causality, either between the various levels, or between politics and economy. As a matter of fact, the full implications of the framework as to the direction of causalities only became clear after it was applied to the empirical material of the T/C politics and economy. Temporally, the framework links the successive stages of the T/C history. Overall, strategic choices reflect strategic constraints, possibilities, options, and policy (or, political) priorities. Each strategic choice gives way to a different set of relations, and modes of determination between politics and economy, and thus, each strategic choice brings about a new set of contradictions, underlying the politics of the sub-period under study. Such

conflicts, together with the changes in the conjuncture of world politics and political and economic conjuncture in Turkey, eventually lead to change. However, the implications of the conceptual framework as to the direction of causalities only became clear after it was applied to the empirical material under study.

A key problem of this thesis at the outset was the identification of the initial conditions faced by the T/C nationalist leadership as of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. This involved two tasks, namely, (a) the identification of the T/C nationalist politics towards state-building and capital accumulation, and (b) the identification of the set of constraints and possibilities faced by the T/C nationalist leadership under the new polity of the Republic of Cyprus. The first task, I had tried to accomplish in a prior work, arguing that the process of nationalist state-building in the 1950s had encompassed the monopolisation of the means of violence, concentration of political power, centralisation of administration, quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to ensure capital accumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation, and the institutionalisation of centralised budgetary practice. On the other hand, the nationalist politics of capital accumulation was based upon Turkey's fiscal transfers, the beginnings of budgeting and, a capital strategy, based on the actuation of a process of rapid capital accumulation, around *Çarşı*, via the institution of a closed, all-Turkish circuit of capital (Arslan, 2012: 132–133). It is important to note that a key part of the constraints and possibilities faced at the outset by the T/C nationalist politics at the

domestic level were uni-directionally determined by the dynamics of the inter-state level. Thus, the conjuncture of world politics, more specifically, the inter-state balance of powers amongst the USA, GB, Turkey and Greece, and in the Eastern Mediterranean determined the polity of the Republic of Cyprus as a set of externally, conjunctureally given political and economic constraints and possibilities, from the point of view of the T/C nationalists. The common apparatuses of central state apparatus, and the unified economic sphere structure imposed constraints on the monopolisation of violence, concentration of power, construction of a captive market and a closed circuit of capital. On the other hand, the duality of the state structure was a constraint so far as some of the key economic institutions were in the hands of the G/C nationalists, *and* a possibility, so far as it offered the T/C nationalists the means of separate state-building. It is important to note that the constraints and possibilities faced by the T/C nationalist leadership at the domestic level concerning the politics of capital accumulation were doubly determined by a) the global political economy, Turkey's economic-development policies, and the polity of the Republic of Cyprus as externally, conjunctureally given economic dynamics, and b) the domestic level of the society/economy/geography as internally and historico-geographically given dynamics. The first set of constraints comprised faced by the T/C nationalist leadership comprised the British legacy of planned economic development, the US model of planned economic development, fiscal crisis and austerity policies in Turkey, and the duality of the state structure. The model of planned economic development in Turkey was both

a constraint and a possibility. The second set of constraints comprised the coexistence of G/C and T/C societies and thereby, the G/C dominated division of labour and superior G/C competitive power, the monopolistic–oligopolistic markets and industries caused by small scale inefficiencies and G/C administrative control over new investments, and the low capacity of the T/C socio-economic formation to produce the surplus necessary to ensure rapid capital accumulation and economic development. The list above of the various constraints and possibilities was complemented by a chronological narrative of the events leading to the eruption of armed inter-ethnic conflict and the demise of the common state. In so doing, I have tried my best not to be biased in the selection of the events that were to be narrated. Methodologically, what I attempted to do was to counterpose a careful study of the strategic analyses, apparent motives of and the strategic choices made by the nationalist leaders, on the one hand, and the list above of the pre-given constraints and possibilities, on the other. I thus aimed to identify the subjective and objective factors underlying the practical acts and deeds as well as the strategic policy decisions of the nationalist leaders. My inquiry led me to a number of conclusions apropos of the causal relationships between (a) politics and the economy, and (b) external and domestic dynamics. Firstly, the explication of the policy decisions of the T/C nationalist leadership in favour of breaking away from the common state on the basis of capitalist class interests and/or the needs and requirements of capital accumulation seems to be rather difficult to support. Generally, class– and/or capital–based arguments prioritising the impact of

economic factors merely juxtapose the fact that the T/C bourgeoisie, i.e. *Çarşı*, was at a serious disadvantage against the G/C bourgeoisie, and the fact that the T/C nationalist leadership opted for *Taksim*, thereby arguing that the former fact caused the latter fact. As I see it, there is no evidence whatsoever that the acts and deeds as well as strategic decisions of the nationalist leaders were personally and directly or indirectly influenced by the T/C bourgeoisie. One way of coming to terms with this problem was, on the part of the supporters of class- and/or capital-based approach, to include the nationalist leaders into the bourgeoisie via reference to some vague idea of ‘upper classes’, ‘the elites’, etc. On the other hand, all available evidence strongly suggests that the nationalist leaders, as the social and political elites holding the power of making and/or influencing communal decisions, were basically the adherents of a different sub-ensemble of relations, i.e. the nationalist movement, and a different state project, i.e. that of building a separate nation-state. As a matter of fact, the various policy papers produced by Rauf R. Denktaş discussing the matters of economic strategy seem to be the derivative products of his key concern over the future of the ultimate project of nationalist state-building. On a personal and ideological level, the driving interest of Denktaş seems to be the fortunes of the T/C elite, and of the T/C community, at large, the guarantee of whose existence he saw in the realisation of separate statehood, either by getting annexed by the Motherland, or under a T/C state. As I see it, the study of the case of the T/Cs over the period of 1960–1963 supports Jessop’s view of the political and economic spheres as autopoietic, i.e. operationally autonomous, and

materially interdependent sub-systems of social relations involving different axes and principles of societalisation. More specifically, there seems to be two reciprocal relationships of causality between the level of economy/state, and the level of economic structure:

- 1) On the one hand, the T/C nationalist leadership's project of modern state-building comprised, as derivative goals, the tasks of ensuring economic development, capital accumulation and/or Turkey's fiscal aid;
- 2) on the other hand, the low capacity of the T/C socio-economic formation to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of separate state functions gave rise to the fiscal crisis of the T/C community state, giving rise to the dependency on Turkey's fiscal aid.

Overall, the period of 1960–1963 seems to be characterised by the failure of the T/C nationalist leadership to structurally couple politics and economy towards the ultimate goal of separate state-building, its constant drive to make nationalist politics ecologically dominant.

It is important to note that the second causality above from the economy to politics can also be expressed in terms of Wright's idea of structural determination. Thus, apropos of the T/C case, the existing economic structure seems to have put a structural limit on the form of the state. As noted above, at the level of the economy, the T/C socio-economic formation was characterised by a low capacity of surplus product generation, implying a structural limitation on the form of the state, given that the possibility of a

modern state form was categorically unfeasible for a closed economy. Clearly, this was a major constraint upon the nationalist project of state-building, that could only be pursued at the cost of fiscal crisis—constraint that could only be softened at the cost of dependency on fiscal transfers from Turkey.

As far as the relationships of causality between the inter-state level and the domestic level is concerned, the picture one gets through the analysis of the T/C case over the period of 1960–1963 is clearly more complicated than the simplistic claims to the uni-directional determination of T/C politics by the Motherland. In this particular case, and following Jessop, the inter-state level can be conceived of as the system of inter-state relations, involving, the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, Greece, as well as the inter-state balance powers in Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, the domestic level can be conceived of consisting the society and state of the Republic of Cyprus, involving, *inter alia*, G/C and T/C nationalisms together and separately as operationally autonomous and materially dependent autopoietic systems. Thus, so far as the establishment of the common Republic of Cyprus is concerned, it was external actors that set the ground rules of the game for the domestic actors, with causality running from the inter-state to the domestic level. However, domestic actors, by way of defying those very rules, proved, in due process, their ability to compel external actors to revise the rules.

Overall, the case study above of the T/C economy and politics over the period of 1960–1963 provides full empirical support for Bob Jessop’s theory of society, state and economy, and partial empirical support for Erik Olin Wright’s theory of causality. As I see it, Jessop’s strategic–relational approach to the state theory certainly provides a most suitable framework to study the T/C economy and politics. The classification of the underlying conditions of the sub-period under investigation as structural constraints and conjunctural possibilities—or, opportunities, in terms of Jessop—seems very useful. The idea of defining interest relative to structural constraints and opportunities, and most importantly, in reference to one’s conditions of existence seems justified. That the temporal and spatial horizons of the key agents play a critical role in the struggles for power is also clear. His understanding of the society consisting of the sum of various autopoietic systems, thus, of different axes of societalisation, implying rival societal and state projects is also supported. Finally, the account above of the T/C economy and politics over the period of 1960–1963 attests to the relevance of the idea of the state as site of strategy, namely as a system of strategic selectivity, as well as the key role played in the struggles for power by path–dependent and current–transformative strategies and struggles. On the other hand, Wright’s idea of structural determination, that some structure—the economy, puts limits upon or determines the forms of other structures is the key to understanding the critical role played by one specific type of constraint as mentioned above, namely, the low capacity of the T/C society

to generate the surplus product necessary for the success of the nationalist project of state-building.

The basic argument of the T/C nationalist leadership in the days prior to the eruption of armed conflict on 21 December 1963 was that the common Republic of Cyprus had, *de facto*, ceased to exist, demonstrating the futility of forcing G/Cs and T/Cs to live under a single roof, and the necessity of *Taksim*. After 21 December, the T/C nationalist leadership claimed that the massive exodus of the T/Cs to the enclaves was the further proof of the non-feasibility of the restoring or reforming the G/C–T/C common state for a solution. As a matter of fact, the strategy of the T/C nationalist leadership after the collapse of the common Republic of Cyprus was doubly based upon:

- (i) the thesis that, after the estrangement of the T/Cs from the common state, the ‘government’ of Cyprus had now, *de jure*—i.e. constitutionally, ceased to exist, as well as;
- (ii) the strategy of the incitement of the military intervention of Turkey, on the basis of the latter’s status of Guarantor State, and thus the realisation of *Taksim*.

On the other hand, the calculus of the strategy above apparently entailed, for its success, the temporal–spatial horizon (a) that Turkey’s military intervention would take place promptly, and (b) that the T/C enclaves would thus constitute a relatively integrated whole, from the point of view of

security and logistics. Accordingly, the major, externally and conjuncturally given constraint faced by the T/C nationalist leadership during the period of 1964–1967 was the existing inter-state balance of power which had rendered the military action of Turkey entirely unlikely. On the domestic level, the major constraints were: 1) The low level of surplus product generated by the T/C economy; 2) the further expansion of the community's proto-state; 3) the collapse of production activity, and; 4) the hypertrophy of unproductive labour (militarisation). It is important to note that whilst the first of the above constraints was historically given at the level of economic structure, the last three were conjuncturally given, as the derived economic consequences of the nationalist leadership's politics of state-building. The constraints above led to two concomitant dynamics of crisis, the first being the fiscal crisis, and the second, the political crisis of the T/C society towards 1967. Although the fiscal constraint was somewhat softened at the cost of dependency on fiscal transfers from Turkey, its effects were very strongly felt by the various sectors of the populace. The second, the political crisis was apparently due to two causes: Firstly, given the daily ordeals and the various costs of the enclave life, the current state of affairs was hardly sustainable in the long term, and secondly, the stresses caused by the 'extraordinary state' of the period of 1964–1967. It is important to note that, during this specific sub-period, the T/C proto-state and its activities had been fully concentrated in the hands of the TMT commandship, at the exclusion of the political actors of the previous period. Therefore, as of 1966–1967, there were serious, and often armed conflicts between the

various actors that had a claim to political power, causing, once more, a state of affairs which clearly was not sustainable in the long term. As noted above, towards the end of the prior period of 1960–1963, the T/C leadership had clearly given the priority to and made a strategic choice in favour of the nationalist politics of separate state-building. The matter here is that the leadership apparently made a strategic miscalculation in its estimation of the time horizon that its politics of state-building would involve. Overall, the crisis of 1966–1967 was the consequence of economic and political dynamics, or it actually was a double crisis, an economic crisis and a political crisis. Thus, the study of the T/C case for the period of 1960–1967 as a whole indicates a more complicated causality than that suggested by the class- and/or capital-based reductionist approaches. The politics and economy of the sub-period of 1960–1963 appear to have determined, together, the politics and economy of the sub-period of 1964–1967.

The study of the T/C economy and politics over the sub-period of 1963–1967 provides further support for the various elements of Bob Jessop's and Erik Olin Wright's theories of causality. The first is Jessop's idea of economic determination, namely, the idea that production has a priority over the other moments of capital accumulation and the economy. Thus, during the period of 1964–1967, the collapse of production and the hypertrophy of non-production (and thereby, unproductive) activity clearly caused major problems for the other moments of the economy. The second is Wright's idea of dialectics, namely, that the solutions to the constraints of a prior phase themselves turn into the constraints of the next phase. Thus, it is clear

that the strategic choices of the first period of 1960–1963— such as the neglect of the economy at the expense of nationalist state-building, became sources of crisis in the subsequent period of 1964–1967.

The results of this thesis usefully can be deployed to study the dynamics of the post–1967 sub-periods, as expounded in the Introduction, and to shed light onto the origins and the causes of the current, generalised crisis of statehood of the T/C society. As a matter of fact, these two tasks constitute the very gist of my future research project on T/C economy and politics. As I see it, given the historical constraint of the low capacity of the T/C society to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state functions, there was a fundamental contradiction between the two elements of the T/C nationalist project, namely, the politics of state-building, and the needs and requirements of capital accumulation. The nationalist leadership, being unable to supersede unable to resolve this contradiction on a permanent basis, resorted to ways that gave rise to today’s heavily criticised and clearly unsustainable politics and economy. The process of state-building involves, as sub-processes, the production of ideology, the constitution of legitimate monopoly over the means of violence, the concentration of political power, the creation of economic policies and tools to ensure the capital accumulation, the construction of a centralised administrative apparatus, the creation of territory, and the institutionalisation of taxation and budgeting. State-building has positive and negative effects upon capital accumulation. On the one hand, the monopolisation of violence, the creation of territory, the constitution of

economic policies and tools, and the institutionalisation of budgeting together directly and indirectly support the process of capital accumulation. On the other hand, the creation of army and police, and the bureaucracy expand the scale of unproductive activities, and constitutes a drag on the process of capital accumulation due to its absorption of a considerable portion of the surplus product. A critical constraint faced by the nationalist leadership in its drive towards state-building was the low capacity of the T/C society to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state absorption. On the other hand, capital accumulation requires (a) the allocation of social labour primarily productive activities, and (b) political, administrative, geographical stability. However, the politics of state-building of the T/C nationalist leadership, namely *Taksim*, was based upon a strategy of political and, particularly, geographical (territorial) destabilisation, and required the allocation of critical portions of the total social labour to military activity, i.e. to non-production. According to the politics of *Taksim*, saw the co-existence of the two communities from the point of view of geography, demographics, and the various activities of social reproduction (production, distribution, and personal consumption) was a major problem. Therefore, the politics of *Taksim* was based upon the strategy of the disruption of geographical—and demographic stability, having adverse effects upon the process of capital accumulation.

The full implications of the contradiction between the sub-processes of state-building and capital accumulation caused by the historical constraint of low surplus product became clear only after the retreat of the T/C

community into the enclaves. Some eighty percent of the populace reportedly lived inside the fortified enclaves under the circumstances of strict siege between 1964–1967, partly softened between 1968–1974. After the massive exodus of 1964 to the enclaves, the greater part of the total social labour was severed from production—and some, even from any economic activity whatsoever—by being devoted to military activity. As a consequence, not only was the fiscal transfer to the T/C community from the budget of the central state was cut off, but the restricted capacity of the T/C economy to generate the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of unproductive labour now became even lower. Accordingly, the T/C community became fully dependent upon the transfer of funds, pecuniary and in kind, from Turkey. This led to the full dependency of the T/C community upon the transfers from Turkey. Despite the fact that some degree of normalisation took place after the Kofinou [*Köfünye/Geçitkale*] events of 1967, the demographic and geographical instability and the militarisation of social labour entailed by Taksim as the state-building project of the T/C nationalist leadership practically brought capital accumulation into a stall. As a part of this, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Rauf R. Denктаş appealed, for ensuring the necessary flow of funds, to the principle of ‘the priority of political considerations over fiscal considerations’, to which the governments of Turkey tried to react positively despite the existing foreign currency constraints of their own economy. As I see it, the sub-period of 1968–1974 was when the cultural and institutional basis was largely laid for the clientalist–nepotist patronage network underlying the

relationships of state power after 1974. There is circumstantial evidence that, as of 1966–1967, the hardships of the enclave life—the conditions and problems of the migrants, public servants, students, peasants, etc.—had reached a point beyond endurance. Thus, during the sub-period of 1968–1974 various programmes of rehabilitation were devised to compensate the various sectors of the T/C community for their sacrifices for the leadership’s project of *Taksim*. The distributive principle in the allocation of existing resources being loyalty to the nationalist leadership and its project of *Taksim*, priority was given to the TMT-affiliated students, shopkeepers, businessmen, etc., at the expense of dissidents and alike. The major constraint prior to 1974 preventing the full-consolidation of the patronage network was the lack of necessary resources. This constraint could only be eased after 1974, largely thanks to the net transfer of wealth—means of production and means of subsistence—from the G/Cs to the T/Cs. To that, one must add the transfer of (agricultural) labour power from Turkey, increasing the total social labour. The early years of the post-1974 period witnessed steps towards the completion of the process of state-building, through the creation of a large public sector comprising the bureaucracy and state enterprises, in the spirit of the strategy of import substituting industrialisation, the model of capitalist development then prevailing in Turkey. *Ganimet* [the loot], and extensive state employment, social policies, and the low level of taxation financed out the fiscal transfers of Turkey, considered by the leaders and the populace as rightfully earned (re)compensation for the hardships of the enclave life and the military

labour of the populace provided the material basis for the consolidation of the clientalist relations of power of the post-1974 years.

The consolidation of the clientalist relations of power on the basis of the loot and the fiscal transfers of Turkey must be comprehended as a part of the broader constitution of the class relations and state power after 1974. As a matter of fact, what has accompanied the completion of the T/C nationalist project of state-building—namely Taksim, was the constitution of a comprehensive state apparatus, a socio-economic formation, a class division of labour.⁶⁰³ As I see it, it is possible to read out the characteristics of this constitution through the legal and institutional arrangements after 1974.

Thus,

- i) The regime of citizenship via the Citizenship Code of 1975 (No. 3/1975) [*Yurttaşlık Kanunu*] complementing the Constitution of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus of 1975 [*Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti Anayasası*];
- ii) the representative regime of parliamentary democracy via the Law of Political Parties of 1975 (No. 10/1975) [*Siyasal Partiler Yasası*], and the Law of Elections and Plebiscite of 1976 (No. 5/1976) [*Seçim ve Halkoylaması Yasası*];

⁶⁰³ See, for a brief analysis of the constitution of the post-1974 socio-economic formation, and its various consequences, “*Neo-liberal Bakışın Tahakkümü Altında bir Yeniden Yapılandırma Sürecinden Geçen Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunun Siyasal İktisadına Dair Bazı Tespitler...*”, Hakan Arslan, (gaiLe, 17 July 2011).

- iii) bureaucracy via the Law of Higher Administrators (No. 53/1977) [*Üst Kademe Yöneticileri Yasası*] and the Law of Public Employees (No. 7/1979) [*Kamu Görevlileri Yasası*];
- iv) the regime of property relationships via the Law of Movable Property (Compilation and Control) of 1975 (No. 32/1975) [*Taşınır Mallar (Derleme ve Kontrol) Yasası*], the Law of Foreign Immovable Property (Control and Administration) (No. 32/1975), the Law of the Allocation and Use of Foreign Property (No. 33/1975) [*Yabancı Malların Tahsis ve Değerlendirilmesi Yasası*] and, the Law of Housing, Lands and Equivalent Property (No. 41/1977) [*İşkan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası*]—this one the noted ‘İTEM’;
- v) social policy and the regime of social security via the Turkish Cypriot Law of Social Security (No. 16/1976) [*Kıbrıs Türk Sosyal Sigortalar Yasası*], the Law of Pensions (No. 26/1977) [*Emeklilik Yasası*], and the Law of Social Housing (No. 23/1978) [*Sosyal Konut Yasası*];
- vi) development planning and the state enterprises via the Law of Public Economic Enterprises (Management, Control and Monitoring) (No. 37/1975) [*1975 Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri (Yönetim, Denetim ve Gözetim)*], the Law of State Planning Organisation (No. 26/1976) of 1976 [*Devlet Plânlama Örgütü Yasası*], and the Law of the Application of the Long Term Development Plan and the Protection of its Integrity of 1976 (No. 34/1976) [*Uzun Vadeli Kalkınma Plânının Yürürlüğü ve Bütünlüğünün Korunması Yasası*]

were legally and institutionally regulated.

The legal and institutional arrangements above were basically a design of social division of labour and class structure which directly determined the patterns of the allocation of total social labour amongst the alternative activities of social reproduction. From a different perspective, the basic, regulating principle underlying the legal and institutional arrangements above was the compensation of the T/Cs for their losses and hardships of the enclave years, their contentment and recompensation for their unlimited supply of military labour by means of the expropriated G/C property and Turkey's fiscal transfers. Apparently, the scheme was the construction of a social division of labour and a class structure consisting of a peasantry of petty-commodity producers, state workers, petty bourgeoisie (public servants, shopkeepers, etc.), the bureaucratic and political elite, and the commercial capital (former *Çarşı*). Fiscal transfers were complemented by a greatly expanded public sector comprising *Evkaf* and the cooperatives, as the traditionally T/C elements, and, of the bureaucracy and state enterprises modelled upon Turkey's administrative system, attributing the public budget a major share in the new economic order. T/C youth were recompensated with higher education at Turkey's universities, in return for their past military labour. The young, 'educated' populace of the towns appears to have played a key role in the emergence of the urban 'middle class'. This sector of the populace, constituting the upper segment of the market for labour power, and aiming at public service jobs, has put constant pressure

upon the political elite to enter and rise through the ranks of the emergent bureaucracy. Another instance of the newly conceived class structure was the Law of Housing, Lands and Equivalent Property of 1977, known by the acronym İTEM, regulating, amongst other things, the peasantry as a class of petty-commodity producers. The distributive criterion here was the provision of a yearly net income of TL 36,000 to a family of five, whose measure in terms of standard soil was 153 acres [*dönüm*] of dry land [*kuru tarla*]. Accordingly, factors of differential productivity had been computed for the different types of soil, commercial trees and livestock, specifying the equivalent of the income from the 153 acres of standard soil. Accordingly, whilst the ‘equivalence’ practice [*eşdeğer uygulaması*] aimed at the protection of existing claims to property rights, inter-class equality was also observed.

Despite considerable net transfer of wealth from the G/Cs, enlargement of the total social labour by means of the labour power of migrants from Turkey, and fiscal transfers and technical aid provided by Turkey, there was a failure to raise the capacity of the Northern Cypriot society to generate the net and the surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state activities, and the process of capital accumulation. Unfortunately, scientific studies over the causes of the failure of the economy to take off—a patent fact as of the late 1970s and early 1980s—are almost non-existent. On the other hand, it is important to note that the introduction of new economic policies in Turkey and Northern Cyprus have not always been synchronous. As a matter of fact, the neo-liberal programme of economic stabilisation and

restructuring introduced in Turkey on 24 January 1980, and applied following the military coup of 12 September 1980 was brought to Northern Cyprus with considerable delay, in 1986, by Prime Minister Turgut Özal. As noted above, as far as the relationships between Turkey and the T/Cs were concerned, Rauf R. Denktaş had defended the principle of ‘the priority of political considerations over fiscal considerations’. The first critical departure from this principle was experienced upon the initiative of Prime Minister Turgut Özal in 1986, a tendency that was reinforced by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller after the economic crisis of 1994, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan after 2009. As a part of this, not only did the weight of economic technocrats as opposed to the old school of career diplomats increase, but also, following the crisis of 1994 and, particularly, after 1997, the relationships between Turkey and KKTC were based upon the model of IMF-type conditionality, giving the priority to fiscal stability. The process of the de-construction of the model of public sector and social policy established after 1974 started with the introduction of the Protocol of Economic Cooperation [*Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolü*], dated 5 December 1986, setting the basic policy guidelines for the Second Five– Year Development Plan. The budget cuts and the privatisation programme entailed by Turkey’s Application Plan of Economic Measures [*Ekonomik Önlemler Uygulama Planı*], dated 5 April 1994, was firstly reflected into the Protocol of Economic Cooperation [*Ekonomik İşbirliği Protokolü*], dated 5 December 1996. On the other hand, the Protocol of Economic Cooperation of 3 January 1997 worked out the details of the restructuring of the state,

and introduced a new, IMF-type of close monitoring—the overhauled version of classical stand-by. Accordingly, a Monitoring Committee [*İzleme Komitesi*], as well as a Privatisation Unit [*Özelleştirme Birimi*] under the auspices of Turkey’s Presidency of Privatisation Administration [*T.C. Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanlığı*] were established, with the latter one administering the liquidation of the Turkish Cypriot Tourism Enterprises [*Kıbrıs Türk Turizm İşletmeleri*], and the Industry Corporation [*Sanayi Holding*]. As a consequence, Turkey’s corps diplomatiques added, to its customary functions of foreign policy coordination and interference into the domestic politics of the T/Cs, the IMF-like economic function of monitoring the application of neo-liberal economic policies. As noted above, the carriers of this practice were economic technocrats, accustomed to the IMF style, as opposed to the old school of career diplomats of Turkey’s corps diplomatiques.

Following the financial crises of November 2000 and February 2001, the Government of Turkey announced, on 14–15 February 2001, the so-called ‘Programme for Transition to a Strong Economy’ [*Güçlü Ekonomiye Geçiş Programı*], designed by the noted economist Kemal Derviş, and considered, by critical economists, as a programme to save finance capital. From a different point of view, the ‘Derviş Programme’ represented a new phase in the process of neo-liberal reform: The state was to be re-structured not only in terms of its directly economic functions, but in its entirety, comprising all its administrative functions, in the spirit of the theory and practice of the so-called good governance. As a matter of fact, the basic idea underlying good

governance was that the state had, in the age of globalisation, failed not only in terms of its directly economic functions, but in all its administrative functions, vis-à-vis, particularly, the private sector as the exemplary performer. Thus, the poor performance of the state consisted of, not only budget deficits, as emphasised by first wave of neo-liberal programmes, but of strategic, performance and confidence deficits, as well. Accordingly, the panacea was to reform the public administration by adopting the administrative principles of the private sector as best practices. Although the idea of good governance was firstly pronounced by the Derviş Programme, it fell to the lot of the Justice and Development Party [*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*] to introduce the measures of good governance through a number of new bills, brought to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey during the parliamentary years of 2003–2004 and 2004–2005, concerning the public administration, local government, fiscal control, regional development agencies, etc., as well as the draft bill of personnel regime.

Financial crisis hit the KKTC economy in December 1999, before the outbreak of crisis in Turkey, and the Government of KKTC announced the so-called ‘Programme of Economic Stabilisation’ [*Ekonomik İstikrar Programı*] on 4 October 2001, more than four months before the Derviş Programme. The Programme of Economic Stabilisation—revised, in September 2001, as the ‘Programme for Transition to Economic Stability and Production-based Growth’ [*Ekonomik İstikrar ve Üretim Dayalı Büyümeye Geçiş Programı*—identified the public sector as the culprit for the crisis, gave fresh impetus to the process of privatisation, and aimed at

saving finance capital, through the various measures oriented towards the reform of the banking sector. As I see it, the idea of good governance hardly came to the fore and discussed at that point in KKTC, as opposed to Turkey where there were heated debates on all its aspects. Apparently, the idea of good governance was firstly brought onto the agenda by the CTP–DP Government after the parliamentary elections of 20 February 2005, through the introduction of its key component and framework, namely the public sector reform. As is well known, the IMF observes the principle of conditionality in its agreements of stand-by and close monitoring, with loans being released on the condition that performance criteria—the primary one being the upper limit set for the budget deficit—are fulfilled. And, although the various performance criteria had always been part of the economic agreements between Turkey and Cyprus, political conjuncture never actually allowed application of the principle of conditionality prior to 2006. Conditionality itself became a well-defined part of the agreements only with the Protocol of 20 July 2006, laying the basic policy guidelines for the ‘Programme of Restructuring and Assistance for Sustainable Development (2007–2009)’ [*Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma için Yapılandırma ve Destek Programı*], to be applied on a strict basis with the ‘Programme for Increasing the Efficiency of the Public and the Competitive Power of the Private Sector (2010–2011)’ [*Kamunun Etkinliğinin ve Özel Sektörün Rekabet Gücünün Artırılması Programı*]. It is important that the latter programme was, far from being a simple plan for privatisation, a sophisticated programme based upon the principle of good governance. One

must not be misled on this point by the relatively few use of the term itself. Thus, the reforms advocated in KKTC are basically parallel to those brought onto the agenda via various bills and draft bills during the parliamentary years of 2003–2004 and 2004–2005.

Apparently, what the CTP leaders thought, during the days of the Annan Plan, was that the process of integration into the EU after a solution would save their government from the burdens of formulating proper economic policies and finding the necessary resources. Once the Plan was rejected by the G/C community, and the possibility of integration into the EU was out, they engaged themselves into growth driven by speculative market forces. The boom in the construction sector was, to a large measure, the effect of the speculative bubbles in the global finance and real estate markets. On the other hand, the material basis of speculative growth was the re-sharing of G/C property. The boom in the construction and real estate activities appear to have been conducive to a massive accumulation of capital, the emergence and enrichment of a new ‘big bourgeoisie’. It is important to note that the incomes and the wealth of the new bourgeoisie were largely non-taxed. As a matter of fact, the era of the CTP governments witnessed a big collapse in taxation. Although the ratio of total taxes to GNP appears to suggest that the tax performance of the CTP governments was better than the past, this ratio is, taken by itself, quite misleading. According to my own computations based on the data provided by the State Planning Office, the ratio of taxes to the GNP increased from 18.9 % for the period of 1990–2003, to 19.9 for 2004–2007—too low a ratio overall, despite the slight improvement of one

percentage point. Furthermore, that slight improvement is due to the rise in indirect taxes, particularly, the ‘spontaneous’ increase in imports taxes. On the other hand, the ratio of direct to indirect taxes is a better representative of the extractive capacity of the state in the sense of conscious policy choices and institutional capability. However, that ratio has, in turn, suffered a big fall, from 122.0 % for the period of 1990–2003, to 73.1 for 2004–2007. Thus, the fiscal crisis of the state under the CTP governments appears to be the consequence of its failure to tax the newly emergent big bourgeoisie.

Overall, the Northern Cypriot society, which, despite the growing of inequalities after 1974, was still remarkably egalitarian as of the mid 1990s, appears to have experienced a massive fragmentation in terms of its class structure. Furthermore, one can read out from the details of the Programme for Increasing the Efficiency of the Public and the Competitive Power of the Private Sector (2010–2011), that the dynamics of inequality are likely to favour Turkey’s pro-government capital, and at the expense of the local, T/C capital. As a matter of fact, one can clearly see that: a) The bigger investment projects, financed by Turkey, and aiming to promote infrastructure and new tourism facilities are likely to benefit the construction and tourism firms from Turkey, and; b) the big shopping centres proposed as a solution to the trade deficit with the G/Cs are equally likely to benefit the companies from Turkey, at the expense of the traditional T/C capital, i.e. *Çarşı*.

As noted above, I intend to extend the results of the study above of the period of 1960–1967 to the analysis of post–1967 economy and politics, and of the origins and causes of the current, generalised crisis of statehood of the T/C society. This project comprises three tasks:

1) As noted above, the post–1974 state power is largely based upon the clientalist–nepotist patronage networks. In this thesis, I have argued, as opposed to the dominant academic and popular view, that the period of 1964–1974 was the key to understanding the genesis of patronage. As I see it, the point of the distribution of resources by the state was the compensation, recompensation and the contentment of a populace that had endured great hardships and deprivations, and supplied military labour, in support of the leadership’s nationalist politics of Taksim, under, especially the enclave conditions of the 1964–1967 sub-period. As a matter of fact, patronage was culturally and legally institutionalised during the 1968–1974 period, and not, as largely believed and supposed, after 1974.⁶⁰⁴ Accordingly, the first part of my future project involve the study of the institutionalisation of patronage networks during the sub-period of 1967–1974;

2) the political economy of the post–1974 years yet remains to be written. After 1974, a whole new socio-economic formation, new division of labour were created, in terms of the basic activities of social reproduction, state power, and class relationships. Key to the

⁶⁰⁴ Kutlu Adalı’s short story, ‘*Çirkin Politikacı Pof*’ [Pof the Ugly Politician] pictures the portrait of a typically patron politician of the enclave years of the mid 1960s. So, the various elements of the patronage culture were already there. See (Adalı (1997a).

reproduction of state power was the comprehensive network of patronage, now supported by the loot, and generous social policies and a large public sector, consisting of the bureaucracy and state economic enterprises. As of the late 1970's, the new economy, based on a combination of state economic enterprises—established along the lines of Turkey's strategy of import substituting industrialisation, and *Çarşı* had failed to take off, apropos of its capacity to generate the net/surplus product necessary for the sustenance of state absorption. After 1986, there came the first wave of neo-liberal reforms, based upon, firstly price and trade liberalisation, and then, privatisation. After the banking crisis of 1999, there came the second wave, based upon a combination of supports for finance capital, construction and real estate activities, and the promotion of new governance reforms. Accordingly, the second task of my prospective research project involves the study of the political economy of Northern Cyprus after 1974, placing the focus upon the crises and transitions of the economy, and the origins of the generalised crisis of statehood;

- 3) efforts to enquire the politics and economy of the T/Cs are seriously hampered by a grave absence of empirical material—of not only figures, but more importantly perhaps, of the various, budgets, proceedings, policy papers, reports, plans and programmes, etc. Therefore, the third task of my future research project involves a work of economic history, accompanied by the key documents of the past, from the mid of 1940s to this day.

Appendix 1. General Elections KTFD (1976, 1981)/KKTC (1985–2009)

Annual Rates of Growth of Gross National Product (GNP)			4.8 (1986)			3.7 (1994)	7.4 (1999)		
	5.8 (1978)	11.2 (1982)	6.8 (1987)			2.6 (1995)	-0.6 (2000)		13.5 (2005)
	4.4 (1979)	1.6 (1983)	7.0 (1988)			2.9 (1996)	-5.4 (2001)		13.2 (2006)
	0.9 (1980)	6.4 (1984)	8.5 (1989)		7.8 (1992)	4.1 (1997)	6.9 (2002)		1.5 (2007)
	-7.5 (1981)	7.5 (1985)	5.7 (1990)	-5.3 (1991)	5.9 (1993)	6.0 (1998)	11.4 (2003)	15.4 (2004)	-1.9 (2008)

Inter-elections Government and Incumbent Government	Nejat Konuk Kurucu Meclis Hükümeti (13.12.1983)	Eroğlu (UBP + YDP) (02.09.1986)	→	→	Atun (II. DP + CTP) (22.05.1995)		→	Ferdi Sabit Soyer (III. CTP + DP) (03.05.2005)
		Eroğlu (UBP + Bağımsızlar) (23.05.1988)	→	→	Eroğlu (UBP + DP) (28.08.1996)	Eroğlu (UBP + DP) (11.06.2001)	→	Soyer (CTP + ÖRP) (30.09.2006)
Post-elections Government ▲ increased votes ▼ lost votes (greater partner if a coalition)	▼ Derviş Eroğlu (UBP + TKP) (25.07.1985)	▲ Eroğlu (UBP) (20.06.1990)	→	Hakkı Atun (DP + CTP) 12.01.1994	▲ Eroğlu (UBP + TKP) (12.01.1999)	▲ Mehmet Ali Talat (CTP + DP) (19.01.2004)	▲ Talat (II. CTP + DP) (11.04.2005)	▲ Eroğlu (UBP)

(by-election)

	20 June '76	28 June '81	23 June '85	6 May '90	13 Dec '91	12 Dec '93	6 Dec '98	14 Dec '03	20 Feb '05	19 Apr '09
UBP	53.7	42.5	36.7	54.7	67.1	29.8	40.4	32.9	31.7	44.1
CTP/CTP-BG	12.9	15.1	21.4			24.2	13.4	35.2	44.5	29.3
TKP/TDP	20.2	28.5	15.8			13.3	15.3		2.4	6.9
DP						29.2	22.6	12.9	13.5	10.7
DMP				44.5						
BDH								13.1	5.8	
OTHERS	HP 11.7	DHP 8.1	DHP 7.4	YKP 0.8	SDP 3.7	YKP 1.2	UDP 4.5	MBP 3.2	YP 1.6	ÖRP 6.2
		SAP 0.3	TAP 6.1		YDP 9.8	BEP 0.3	BP 1.2	ÇABP 2		BKP 2.4
		MHP 0.4	SDP 3.8		MAP 3.8	MMP 2	YBH 2.5	KAP 0.6		HİS 0.5
		TBP 5.5	YDP 8.8		BEP 1.6					

Right Votes	53.7	56.1	59.0	54.7	82.3	61.3	68.7	49.6	45.2	61.5
Left Votes	44.8	43.6	41.0	45.3	3.7	38.7	31.2	50.3	54.3	38.6
Left Votes Δ (% points)		-1.2	-2.6	4.3		-6.6	-7.5	19.1	4.0	-15.7

Appendix 2. *Summary of the Basic Elements of Alternate Theories of Causality of Bob Jessop and Erik Olin Wright*

Below, is a summary of the theories of Bob Jessop, and Erik Olin Wright, in terms of their respective (1) theoretical trajectories, (2) the *leitmotifs* of their theoretical work, (3) their theoretical inspirations and sources, (4) their key theoretical concepts, (5) their ontologies and concepts/definitions, (6) the relationships of causality involved in their theories, (7) their approaches to the key Marxist question of crisis; (8) their respective methodologies and methods of enquiry. Of the above, (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8), as denoted by the symbols (☑ ☒) comprise the elements of their theoretical claims that are to be reconsidered critically in this thesis.

BOB JESSOP V. ERIK OLIN WRIGHT COMPARATIVE THEORIES AND CHEKLIST OF TESTABLE ELEMENTS		
(I) THEORETICAL TRAJECTORY		
JESSOP: PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT	WRIGHT: BREAKS AND NEW TURNS	
JESSOP	EARLY WRIGHT (1978 book ‘Class, Crisis and the State’)	LATE WRIGHT (1992 book ‘Restructuring Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History’)
(II) THEORETICAL LEITMOTIFS		
• A NON-REDUCTIONIST STATE THEORY • DISSATISFACTION with the ALTHUSSERIAN idea of ‘ECONOMIC DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE’	• INTEREST in CLASS & INEQUALITY • RESPONDING to the hegemony of EMPIRICIST–POSITIVIST HEGEMONY in the social sciences, ORTHODOX SOCIAL THEORY’S CLAIMS TO SCIENTIFICITY • STRONG DISTASTE for both the ‘SPECULATIVE’ and the CRASS ‘EMPRICIST’ type of	• RECONSTRUCTING MARXISM upon solid grounds; confronting the kind of obscurantist arguments that have made claims to its methodological distinctiveness; translation of Marxist concepts and causal relations into a language of causes, mechanisms and effects, rather than left as elusive philosophical principles • CONTINUING INTEREST in CLASS &

	dogmatic works that plagued MARXIST THEORISING •FASTIDIOUSNESS ABOUT METHODOLOGY: Conceptual and empirical models of causality, more precise Marxist concepts and more precise causal connections amongst those concepts, in a way to produce empirically testable propositions	INEQUALITY •CONTINUING FASTIDIOUSNESS ABOUT METHODOLOGY—conceptual and empirical models of causality
III. THEORETICAL INSPIRATIONS AND SOURCES		
•GERMAN DERIVATION DEBATE •GRAMSCI's concept of the 'INTEGRAL STATE' [<i>lo stato integrale</i>] •POULANTZAS's concept of 'HEGEMONY' •FRENCH REGULATION SCHOOL—INTEGRAL ECONOMY [<i>l'economia integrale</i>] •SYSTEMS THEORY 'AUTOPOIESIS' (self-reproduction)	•MARX'S HISTORICAL MATERIALIST THEORY AND MODEL OF CAUSALITY—Marx's scheme of determination in the Preface of his 1859 book, 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' •DIALECTICS •MARX'S CLASS THEORY •ALTHUSSERIAN STRUCTURALISM, SOCIETY AS A STRUCTURED WHOLE, OVERDETERMINATION, 'DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE'	•ALTHUSSERIAN STRUCTURALISM <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—and thereby, the ideas of society as a structured whole, overdetermination, and determination in the last instance •ANALYTICAL MARXISM as a project of the reconstruction of Marxism—emphasis upon clarity and formal arguments—empirical social science—neoclassical economic analysis—plus traditional Marxist theoretical and political concerns—Analytical Marxism aims at the clarification of Marxism's core concepts and assumptions, and its foundation upon rigorous logical and/or formal arguments •RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS and GAME THEORY
(IV) KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS (☑ ☒)		
•'RELATIONAL—STRATEGIC' APPROACH to state theory •RELATIONALITY	•VALUE and SURPLUS-VALUE, and thereby, the LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE, <i>à la</i> Marx—on	•VALUE and SURPLUS-VALUE, and thereby, the LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE, <i>à la</i> Marx, <u>NOW</u>

(defined as relations amongst relations)— Elements: – STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS as opposed to CONJUNCTURAL OPPORTUNITIES – POWER – INTEREST (One of the most important aspects of Jessop’s analysis of the structure–agency issue in terms of the constraint and opportunity couplet, for the purposes of this thesis, is the notion of the TEMPORAL AND SPATIAL HORIZONS of the agents) • STRATEGIC-NESS (State as Site of Strategy) — Elements: – site of strategy, ‘SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC SELECTIVITY’ – site where STRATEGIES ARE ELABORATED – combined effect of PATH-DEPENDENT and CURRENT-TRANSFORMATIVE STRATEGIES and STRUGGLES • BOURGEOIS SOCIETALISATION—relative subordination of the entire social order to apital accumulation, in the terms of Gramsci, an ‘HISTORIC BLOC’ between the economic base, juridico–political structure and forms of consciounes • HEGEMONIC PROJECT—distinction between the question of securing the substantive INSTITUTIONAL UNITY of the capitalist state, and the question of the infusion of this institutional unity with a definite CLASS UNITY; only the successful combination of institutional	the grounds that from the point of view of the qualitative relations of the forces and classes underlying social production, a measure of value based upon hours of human labour embodied in commodities is the most useful • DIALECTICS (I) as in the dialectical relationship between structures and agents: Classes are never simply passive positions in a social structure, but social forces which actively transform social structure; (II) as contradiction and conflict; (III) ‘contradictions’ the ‘SOULUTIONS’ to a particular impediment in a particular stage of capitalist development BECOME THEMSELVES IMPEDIMENTS to accumulation • MODES OF DETERMINATION—To break down structural causality into the different types of causality • MODELS OF DETERMINATION—as ‘STRUCTURE–AGENCY’ MODELS OF CAUSALITY—namely, “... schematic representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process ...” comprising the various structures and agencies, on the one hand, and the various modes of determination amongst them, on the other.”	<u>REJECTED</u> convinced by subsequent debates that this theory has no defensible foundations, he no longer uses it in his work • DIALECTICS <u>NOW REJECTED</u> the meaning of this oft-repeated claim being notoriously ambiguous • RATIONALITY axiom RATIONAL CHOICE theories now used to derive Marxist propositions about socio-economic systems from the rational behaviour of the agents also Rational Choice Marxists; as such, they can be seen as the REACTIVE CRIITICS of ALTHUSSER’S STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT which has dominated Marxist intelligentsia in the late 1960s, as well as SRAFFIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY which has tried to reconstruct the economic theory of Marx, in accordance with a classical surplus approach, FOUNDED UPON STRUCTURALIST PRINCIPLES • DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE where some basic STRUCTURES and STRUCTURAL LIMITATION took ‘CAUSAL PRIMACY’ over the other elements of the model of determinations, and the other modes of determination <u>NOW REJECTED</u> • CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES—this idea of the causal primacy of certain structures and modes of determination over the others in his early works now called into

and class unities with a 'NATIONAL-POPULAR PROJECT' would make the state and state managers the political <i>TRAEGER</i> (support) of capitalist interests • HISTORICAL BLOC—conditions under which economic and political structures and operations can be coordinated strategically by a power bloc (comprising dominant class fractions and political elites) to guide economic and political development • SPATIAL-TEMPORAL FIX; STRUCTURED COHERENCE; HISTORICAL BLOC AS STRUCTURED COHERENCE: Historical bloc as "... the mutually implicated, structurally coupled, and historically co-evolving ensemble of economic, political, and socio-cultural relations, the construction of which depends on the activities of organic intellectuals and collective projects as well as on the gradual and emergent co-adaptation of institutions and conduct." is but one of the forms that the structured coherence could assume	• DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE where some basic structures and structural limitation clearly took 'CAUSAL PRIMACY' over the other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination • HISTORICAL MATERIALISM as the analysis of SOCIO-ECONOMIC FORMATIONS as stages of CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT	question; Thus the problem of the so-called 'causal asymmetries' • QUANTITATIVE ASYMMETRY—the idea of the relative importance of some causes over the others; QUALITATIVE ASYMMETRY—in the qualitatively different ways in which causes into particular causal processes • STRUCTURAL LIMITATION V. SELECTION type of orthodox Marxist analyses where the former has causal primacy over the latter <u>NOW REJECTED</u> • HISTORICAL MATERIALISM <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—On the basis of his late theory of causality, Wright rejects the causal primacy claims of his earlier theory, on the grounds that it is not possible to justify the Marxist idea of the base-superstructure type of causal asymmetry, in a structural, contextual, or even functional sense; as a matter of fact, the economy and the state mutually impose limits upon one another; accordingly, Wright argues that, it is not possible to defend historical materialism as a general trajectory of human history; yet, it is largely possible to defend MARXISM, on scientific grounds, AS A THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
(V) ONTOLOGY & CONCEPTS/DEFINITIONS (SOCIETY, STATE, ETC.) (☑ ☒)		
• DEFINITION—SOCIETY as a limit-process, the end product of 'SOCIETY EFFECTS', or the limit of	• DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF APPEARANCES, i.e.	• DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LEVEL OF APPEARANCES, <i>and</i> THE LEVEL OF

the process of 'SOCIETALISATION' • DEFINITION—SOCIETY as the SUM OF several AUTOPOIETIC (SELF-ORGANISING) SYSTEMS (the legal system, the political system, science, the educational system, religion, and art) • DEFINITION—SOCIETY as the systemic 'ECOLOGY' OF 'INSTITUTED' ORDERS, SUB-ENSEMBLES OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, on the one hand, and the non-systemic LEFWORLD • DEFINITION—SOCIETY Society as MARKET ECONOMY + SOVEREIGN STATE + CIVIL SOCIETY (PUBLIC SPHERE) + LEFWORLD • DEFINITION (DISCURSIVE)—STATE as an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically selective institutions, organizations, social forces and activities organised around (or at least actively involved in) making collectively binding decisions for an IMAGINED POLITICAL COMMUNITY • DEFINITION (DISCURSIVE)—STATE as state systems which "... [can be] treated as an IMAGINED POLITICAL ENTITY with its own specific boundaries, conditions of existence, political subjects, developmental tendencies, sources of legitimacy and STATE PROJECTS • DEFINITION (DISCURSIVE)—the <i>core of the STATE APPARATUS</i> can be defined as a distinct ensemble of institutions and	the everyday experiences of people, <i>and</i> THE LEVEL OF UNDERLYING STRUCTURES dynamics of social relations that are not immediately observable, such as • ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, CLASS STRUCTURE	UNDERLYING STRUCTURES <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—Wright rejects the claims of traditional Marxism, particularly of its Hegelian versions, of a conception of society as a tightly integrated 'totality'. If society were a tightly integrated whole, organised by a singular 'essence' in the sense that one key part or set of relations amongst others determines all the rest, and if that one part or set of relations were the class (relations), then there would be sound grounds for the causal primacy of class (relations), in general • SOCIETY AS A SET OF IRREDUCIBLY DISTINCT CAUSAL MECHANISMS—once one drops the presumption that class by itself is the singular determinant of the social whole, and the existence of a variety of other, distinct and efficacious mechanisms is accepted, the kind of sweeping claims to the causal primacy of the economic structure, that has long characterised the orthodox Marxist become entirely unsustainable • SOCIETY AS A SUM OF MACRO LEVEL AND MICRO-LEVEL—one must build Marxism upon solid micro-foundations, and Analytical Marxism does just that

organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a given population in the name of their ‘COMMON INTEREST’ or ‘GENERAL WILL’ • DEFINITION—CAPITALIST STATE—Defining characteristics: – INSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION between market economy, sovereign state and a public sphere (civil society) located beyond market and state; – CONSTITUTIONALISED CLAIM TO A MONOPOLY OF ORGANISED COERCION within the territory mapped by the state; role of legality in legitimation of the state and its activities – STATE IS A TAX STATE; income derives largely from taxes on economic property, actors and activities and from loans raised from market actors; tax capacity depends on legal authority + coercion. • DEFINITION (WHOLE–PART DIALECTIC)—States are just but one institutional ensemble amongst others; yet, the state is also “... peculiarly charged with overall responsibility for maintaining the cohesion of the social of which it is merely a part		
(VI) RELATIONSHIPS OF CAUSALITY (☑ ☒)		
• AUTOPOIESIS—RELATIONSHIPS OF	• MARX’S SCHEME OF DETERMINATION in	• REALISM—Wright and co espouse a ‘REALIST

CAUSALITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OS SOCIAL RELATIONS, DIFFERENT TYPES OF SOCIETALISATION—a self-organising ecology of the instituted systems that develops through the interaction between their respective OPERATIONAL AUTONOMIES and MATERIAL—SUBSTANTIVE INTERDEPENDENCIES • CONTINGENT NECESSITY— ONTOLOGICALLY, JESSOP’S KEY CONCEPT is the so-called ‘contingent necessity’, DEFINED AS THE NON-NECESSARY INTERACTION OF DIFFERENT CAUSAL CHAINS TO PRODUCE A DEFINITE OUTCOME WHOSE OWN NECESSITY ORIGINATES ONLY IN AND THROUGH THE CONTINGENT COMING TOGETHER OF THESE CAUSAL CHAINS IN A DEFINITE CONTEXT • DIFFERENT PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETALISATION, DIFFERENT SOCIETAL PROJECTS—DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATE—Thus social formations may be relatively unified under the dominance of religion (theocracies), military–police considerations (national security states), nation–building (new nations), socially constructed ‘racial’ demarcations (apartheid), capital accumulation (bourgeois societies) • REFUTATION OF ALL FORMS OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM—the refutation THAT the ECONOMIC SYSTEM (OR the dominant MODE OF PRODUCTION) HAS TO	the PREFACE of his 1859 book, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’—ECONOMIC BASE/STRUCTURE V. SUPERSTRUCTURE • ALTHUSSER’S ideas of ‘STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY’, and ‘OVER-DETERMINATION’ ELABORATED, towards the construction of a Marxist theory that would yield itself to empirical study • THUS, A MORE DIFFERENTIATED VERSION OF the ALTHUSSERIAN ‘STRUCTURED WHOLE’ i) MODES OF DETERMINATION —To break down structural causality into the different types of causality, to be more precise, a series of distinct RELATIONSHIPS OF DETERMINATION AMONG THE STRUCTURAL CATEGORIES of Marxist theory AND BETWEEN THOSE CATEGORIES AND THE APPEARANCES OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION, called the ‘MODES OF DETERMINATION’; ii) to develop ‘STRUCTURE–AGENCY’ MODELS OF CAUSALITY—namely, ‘MODELS OF DETERMINATION’, i.e. schematic	ONTOLOGY. Thus, emphasis upon ‘REAL’ CAUSES, MECHANISMS, UNDERLYING PARTICULAR PHENOMENA. IN ‘PARTICULAR’ EXPLANATORY CONTEXTS, SOME REAL CAUSES ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS • CAUSAL PRIMACY OF CLASS <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—while there are asymmetries among causes, including asymmetries that justify causal primacy claims, there is no principle that warrants the conclusion that class considerations <i>always</i> comprise the primary determinants of social phenomena • CAUSAL PRIMACY OF ECONOMIC <u>STRUCTURE NOW REJECTED</u>; SOCIETY consisting of a variety of IRREDUCIBLY DISTINCT CAUSAL MECHANISMS—once one drops the presumption that class by itself is the singular determinant of the social whole, and the existence of a variety of other, distinct and efficacious mechanisms is accepted, the kind of sweeping claims to the causal primacy of the economic structure, that has long characterised the orthodox Marxist become entirely unsustainable • MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF MACRO RELATIONS AND MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF MARXISM—one must build Marxism upon solid micro-foundations • ANALYTICAL

PROPERTIES TO ENABLE IT TO PLAY A UNILATERAL CAUSAL ROLE IN DETERMINING the form, functions or impact OF OTHER SYSTEMS OF SOCIAL RELATIONS • NO ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY FOR ECONOMY and BOURGEOIS SOCIETALISATION • NO 'ECONOMIC DETERMINATION ON THE LAST INSTANCE'; this replaced by ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE, and its economic variant, ECONOMIC DOMINATION • ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE refers to the structural and/or strategic capacity of a given system in a self-organizing ecology of systems to imprint its developmental logic on the other systems • CAPITALIST STATE NOT A NECESSITY—there is no guarantee that the 'modern state' will always (or ever) be 'capitalist', and it is perfectly possible for it to principally operate as a military power, a theocratic regime, a representative democratic regime answerable to civil society, an apartheid state, or an ethnico-political state • STRUCTURAL COUPLING and HISTORICAL BLOC—despite their institutionally separate entities, and their organisations according to different types of social logic, ECONOMIC and JURIDICO-POLITICAL orders could be 'structurally coupled', to produce a relatively unified historical bloc	representations of the complex interconnections of the various modes of determination involved in a given structural process, comprising the various structures and agencies, on the one hand, and the various modes of determination amongst them, on the other • SIX BASIC MODES OF DETERMINATION, as the basic modes of determination WHICH MAKE UP part of the global concept of STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY: i) STRUCTURAL LIMITATION; ii) SELECTION; iii) REPRODUCTION V. NONREPRODUCTIVE; iv) LIMITS OF FUNCTIONAL COMPATIBILITY v) TRANSFORMATION; vi) MEDIATION • MODEL OF DETERMINATION (I)—Wright causally links together: (1) the economic structure; (2) the state structure; (3) the class struggle; (4) state policies/interventions, by means of the six modes of determination above. It is important to note that (i) and (ii) are structures, and (iii) and (iv) relate to agency. On the other hand, this basic model of the politics/state and	MARXIST QUEST FOR MICRO-FOUNDATIONS proceeds from A DOUBLE CRITIQUE of, namely, (i) METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISTS' reduction of social phenomena to strictly individual properties, and (ii) STRUCTURAL MARXISTS' reduction of social phenomena to the aggregate properties of structures • CAUSAL LINKAGES WORK THROUGH THE MICRO LEVEL OF INDIVIDUALS—social phenomena can only explicate social phenomena to the extent that there causal linkages, or mechanisms working through the micro level of individuals. there is a TWO WAY CAUSALITY BETWEEN THE MACRO LEVEL OF STRUCTURES, AND THE MICRO LEVEL OF INDIVIDUALS—SOCIAL STRUCTURES EXPLICATE SOCIAL STRUCTURES VIA the ways they determine the properties and actions of INDIVIDUALS which in turn determine social structural outcomes. • CAUSAL PRIMACY AS CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES—there are TWO TYPES OF CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES: (1) QUANTITATIVE ASYMMETRY—relative importance (2) QUALITATIVE ASYMMETRY—qualitatively different ways in which they enter into particular causal processes

• BOURGEOIS SOCIETALISATION involves, the RELATIVE SUBORDINATION OF the entire SOCIAL ORDER TO CAPITAL ACCUMULATION— in the terms of Gramsci, this could be described as the development of an ‘HISTORIC BLOC’ BETWEEN the ECONOMIC BASE, JURIDICO-POLITICAL STRUCTURE and FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS • CONTINGENCY OF ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE—capitalism cannot be reproduced solely through the value form; it depends on other systems and the lifeworld to help close the circuit of capital and to compensate for market failures the capitalist economy is intrinsically incapable of self-closure, i.e. unable to reproduce itself through pure market forces alone; therefore, the core process of CAPITAL ACCUMULATION CANNOT EXERCISE any sort of ECONOMIC DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE over the other sub-ensembles of relations; ANY SYSTEM CAN BE ECOLOGICALLY DOMINANT • GLOBALISATION understood AS an historical trend towards ECOLOGICAL DOMINANCE OF CAPITALISM	economy relationships can be further extended by the inclusion of other elements, such as ideology. or, more complex interconnections among the elements could be posed. • TRANSFORMATION OF CLASS STRUCTURE BY CLASS STRUGGLE, in and by itself is completely DIRECTIONLESS. TO SAVE THE DIALECTICAL LOGIC OF CLASS RELATIONS FROM INDETERMINACY, AND TO ESTABLISH THE CAPITALIST LAWS OF MOTION, one must DECIPHER THE LOGIC OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, and reveal, specifically, the nature of its contradictions and the crises thereof • MODEL OF DETERMINATION (II)—The six MODES OF DETERMINATION are also used to LINK (1) CLASS STRUCTURE (defined by social relations between classes); (2) CLASS FORMATION (structural capacities and organisational class capacities); (3) CLASS STRUGGLE, towards the construction of a class model of determination. (4) CLASS MODEL OF DETERMINATION CAN INVOLVE CLASS STRUCTURE,	• QUANTITATIVE ASYMMETRY can have two variants: (1) ‘distribution-dependent causal primacy’, which implies that some causes are ‘more important’ than others in the ‘explication’ of particular phenomena, and; (2) the second, ‘causal potency’, which implies that some causes are ‘more powerful’ than others • QUALITATIVE ASYMMETRIES vary along TWO DIMENSIONS: (A) whether they are ‘SYSTEMIC’ or ‘CONTINGENT’, and; (B) whether they are ‘SYNCHRONIC’—in the sense of the simultaneous operation of several causes or ‘DIACHRONIC’—in the sense of the temporal ordering of causes. These two dimensions together give FOUR GENERAL CATEGORIES: (i) CONTEXTUAL ASYMMETRY; (ii) FUNCTIONAL ASYMMETRY; (iii) TEMPORAL ASYMMETRY, and (iv) DYNAMIC ASYMMETRY • CONTEXTUAL CAUSES This type of causes DETERMINE THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH OTHER CAUSES GENERATE THEIR EFFECTS. NOTED CASE—the so-called ‘STRUCTURAL LIMITATION’ as opposed ‘SELECTION’, which has played a significant role in the past Marxist debates on

	CLASS STRUGGLE and STATE POLICIES as well. Class structure shapes the feasible options of the state, class struggles affect the kinds of policies that occur within the set of feasible options, and class power shapes the likely outcomes of class struggles •STRUCTURAL LIMITATION V. SELECTION are the two modes of determination of key importance in the Marxist debates and the EXTENSION OF ALTHUSSER'S STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY •MODES OF DETERMINATION AND MODELS OF DETERMINATION are USED by Erik Olin Wright TO EXPOUND the CAPITALIST LAWS OF MOTION, an HISTORICAL MATERIALIST THEORY OF CLASS STRUGGLE, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION & CRISIS, and more generally of the 'STAGES' OF CAPITALISM •DIRECTION OF CAUSALITY—so far as the STRUCTURAL LIMITATION type of mode of determination is concerned, in Wright's models of determination, CAUSALITY always FLOWS ONWARDS, FROM SOME BASE STRUCTURE TO to the OTHER ELEMENTS. •MODEL OF DETERMINATION BETWEEN 'ECONOMY AND THE	causality. •PRIMACY OF STRUCTURAL LIMITATION OVER SELECTION NOW REJECTED—It is important to note that, Erik Olin WRIGHT NOW OPPOSES the ORTHODOX MARXIST VIEW that the STRUCTURAL CAUSES WHICH GENERATE LIMITS TO THE FEASIBLE OUTCOMES ARE <i>ipso facto</i> 'MORE IMPORTANT' or 'MORE FUNDAMENTAL' THAN THOSE WHICH SELECT SPECIFIC OUTCOMES OUT OF THE FEASIBLE ONES. for instance, this is the basis of the Marxist argument that class structural factors impose limits on feasible state policies, and thereby, they are most important causes of state activity •MARXIST DISTINCTION OF STRUCTURAL LIMITS V. CONTINGENT SELECTIONS STILL OF GREAT EXPLANATORY POWER, BUT NO CAUSAL PRIMACY—Overall, whilst Erik Olin Wright still thinks that the traditional Marxist distinction of structural limits and contingent selections has a great explanatory power, he rejects the view that the former is, in a scientific sense, more important or more fundamental than the latter •HISTORICAL MATERIALIST ARGUMENTS comprise a number of claims that COMBINE SYSTEMIC AND CONTINGENT CAUSES—causal primacy claims of historical

	STATE', CAUSALITY FLOWS FROM the ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, TO the STATE STRUCTURE, CLASS STRUGGLE, and STATES POLICIES & INTERVENTIONS. • 'CLASS' MODEL OF DETERMINATION, CAUSALITY FLOWS FROM the CLASS STRUCTURE, TO the CLASS FORMATION and CLASS STRUGGLE. • 'DETERMINATION IN THE LAST INSTANCE', where some BASIC STRUCTURES and STRUCTURAL LIMITATION clearly TOOK 'CAUSAL PRIMACY' over the other elements of the model in question, and the other modes of determination	materialism as outlined above revolve around the DISTINCTION OF SYSTEMIC V. CONTINGENT, which is ALWAYS RELATIVE TO DESCRIPTIONS OF SYSTEM-PROPERTIES. even if a DYNAMIC ACCOUNT OF GENERAL TRAJECTORY OF HUMAN HISTORY OF THIS KIND MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE, one can still propose DYNAMIC ARGUMENTS OF A MORE LIMITED NATURE, with respect to SPECIFIC HISTORICAL EPISODES or the histories of specific institutions. • THUS, HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS A GENERAL THEORY OF HISTORY may NOT TENABLE, BUT the MARXIST ACCOUNT OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IS basically SOUND. • CASE FOR DYNAMIC CAUSAL ASYMMETRY & PRIMACY—however, there could be a case for causal asymmetry and primacy, IF ONE COULD COMBINE DYNAMIC AND SYNCHRONIC DYNAMICS TOGETHER. Suppose that, from a synchronic point of view, economy and state mutually impose limits upon one and another. on the other hand, from a dynamic point of view, suppose that the economies contain an engine of social change, rooted in capitalist exploitation, competition and accumulation that explains the central tendencies of capitalist development from merchant capitalism to multinational global

		capitalism. finally, suppose that the state institutions are deprived of a like, intrinsic and systematic engine of change, and that its development is driven by external causes. if this characterisation of the synchronic and, particular, dynamic causes is correct, THEN, DESPITE THE SIMULTANEOUS CO-DETERMINATION OF ECONOMY AND THE STATE, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OVERALL SYSTEM OF SOCIETY WOULD BE DRIVEN BY THE ENDOGENOUS DYNAMICS OF THE ECONOMY. obviously, THIS ANALYSIS WOULD NO LONGER BE VALID, WERE THERE DYNAMIC MECHANISMS THAT GOVERN THE FORMS OF THE STATE. •OVERALL CONCLUSION—MARXIST CLAIMS TO CAUSAL PRIMACY GENERALLY, <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—It is not legitimate to automatically infer that qualitative asymmetry implies differential explanatory importance. thus, 1) LIMITS ARE NOT INHERENTLY MORE IMPORTANT THAN SELECTIONS; 2) FUNCTIONAL ASYMMETRIES DO NOT IMPLY CAUSAL PRIMACY; 3) THERE IS NO GENERAL REASON TO REGARD EARLIER LINKS IN CAUSAL CHAINS AS MORE IMPORTANT than

		later ones, and; 4) ENDOGENOUS DYNAMIC CAUSES ARE NOT IN THEMSELVES MORE IMPORTANT THAN CONTINGENT OR NON-DYNAMIC SYSTEMIC CAUSES (Wright, et al., 1992: 173) • CLAIMS TO RELATIVE IMPORTANCE CAN ONLY HAVE ONE RATIONALE, that 'any' one cause is 'QUANTITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT' than the other, in total disregard of the qualitative relationship involved
(VII) CRISIS DYNAMICS (☑ ☒)		
• POLITICAL CRISIS can be the CONSEQUENCE OF THE PROBLEMS IN ANY SUB-ENSEMBLE OR SET OF ENSEMBLES, and the CONSEQUENCE OF A MULTIPLICITY OF COMPLEX DETERMINATIONS, CAUSES AND DYNAMICS, since Jessop rejects the kind of unilateral causality which privileges the economy—or any other sub-ensemble of relations, for that matter. THUS, PLURAL TYPES OF CRISIS. • Accordingly, POLITICAL CRISIS can also arise DUE TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE RECONCILIATION OF THE NEEDS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY WITH THE OTHER SUB-ENSEMBLES by ensuring their political unity AT THE LEVEL OF THE STATE. as a matter of fact, one of the key types of political crises is that which relates to	• A GENERAL, AND HISTORICAL 'STAGES' THEORY OF CRISIS—SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS BECOME THEMSELVES IMPEDIMENTS AND SOURCE OF CRISIS—the systemic solutions to the DOMINANT IMPEDIMENTS at a given stage become the impediments to accumulation of the subsequent stage. It is in this sense that the IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCUMULATION can be considered CONTRADICTIONS IN ACCUMULATION RATHER THAN MERELY OBSTACLES TO ACCUMULATION. they are <i>contradictions</i> because the 'solutions' to a particular impediment become themselves impediments to accumulation. accordingly, the world-	• MULTIPLE TYPES OF CRISIS WHICH CAN ARISE FROM ANY STRUCTURE due to the possibility that OTHER STRUCTURES, or SETS OF RELATIONS CAN ALSO BE 'ABSOLUTELY'—as opposed to relatively—'AUTONOMOUS', i.e. the possibility that they too, can have dynamic and endogenous mechanisms which govern their own evolution has now been conceded, for at least the state, as the actor of the inter-state system of relations; • THERE CAN BE NO 'GENERAL—HISTORICAL—UNIVERSAL' PATTEERN OF CRISIS since there are no 'grand' theories of general validity to explicate society and its history

the ABSENCE OF A SUCCESSFUL 'HEGEMONIC PROJECT'. In the absence of such a successful hegemonic project, state managers could have to resort to constitutionalised VIOLENCE to secure compliance, or worse still, the UNITY OF THE STATE MIGHT COLLAPSE all together • PLURAL TYPES OF STATES AND STATE FAILURES (POLITICAL CRISES). conflicts over the rival projects THAT PRIVILEGE RADICALLY DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL PRINCIPLES as well as CONFLICTS OVER RIVAL PROJECTS based upon the same principle of societalisation	wide capitalist economic crisis of the 1970s can be understood as part of a transition from one pattern of constraints on accumulation, characterized by Keynesian solutions, to a new set of emergent constraints which were in part caused by those very Keynesian strategies in earlier crises and which are no longer amenable to Keynesian solutions.	
(VIII) METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF ENQUIRY (☑ ☒)		
• 'CRITICAL REALIST' EPISTEMOLOGY—Bob Jessop adopts CRITICAL REALISM, which he defines as A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (natural and social) THAT DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN 1) REAL STRUCTURES (mechanisms, capacities, vulnerabilities), 2) ACTUAL PROCESSES OR EVENTS (the actualization of certain potentials), and 3) EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE(traces of these events)." • MARX WAS A CRITICAL MARXIST '<i>AVANT LE MOT</i>' • THREE BASIC METHODOLOGIES IN MARXIST STATE	• THE BASIC THEORETICAL NEED TO DECODE DEEP STRUCTURES UNDERLYING APPEARANCES (EVERDAY EXPERIENCES)—Marxists have generally stressed the importance of decoding and elaborating a theory of the underlying structures of social relations, of their intrinsic contradictions, and the way in which they generated the appearances people encountered in their everyday experiences • BUT THIS REQUIRES A STRATEGY OF ENQUIRY—Yet, it is one thing to claim that scientific explication required the decoding of	• REALISM—it is important to note that Wright and co espouse a 'REALIST ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY. Thus, they are concerned with the DISCOVERY OF 'REAL' CAUSES, MECHANISMS, UNDERLYING PARTICULAR PHENOMENA. Accordingly, they try to SORT OUT THE SENSE IN WHICH, IN PARTICULAR EXPLANATORY CONTEXTS, SOME REAL CAUSES ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS, and the different ways in which these causes enter into causal processes • ANALYTICAL MARXISM AND THE DISTINCTION

THEORIES—the three basic methodological approaches to Marxist state theorisation, namely, SUBSUMPTION, DERIVATION, and ARTICULATION, each with its own ontology and epistemology, claims, and its own substantive research agenda. methodological approaches comprise ONTOLOGICAL CLAIMS APROPOS OF the relationships of CAUSALITY, and EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLAIMS APROPOS OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION • JESSOP ESPOUSES THE METHOD OF ARTICULATION—The ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF ‘CONTINGENT NECESSITY’ EPISTEMOLOGICALLY IMPLIES A DOUBLE STRATEGY OF THEORY CONSTRUCTION that REINTERPRETES MARX’S DISCUSSION OF THE METHOD OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN the Introduction to <i>GRUNDRISSE</i>. thus, “... the appropriate methodology for theory construction is one based on a dual movement: 1) FROM ABSTRACT TO CONCRETE ALONG ONE PLANE OF ANALYSIS, and; 2) FROM SIMPLE TO COMPLEX THROUGH DIFFERENTIAL ARTICULATION OF DIFFERENT PLANES OF THE REAL WORLD. • Substantively, the CONTINGENT NECESSITY of social phenomena IMPLIES a	deep structures and hidden contradictions, and another, to develop A ‘STRATEGY’ to study the social world THAT WOULD ALLOW TO LINK THE LEVEL OF STRUCTURAL PROCESSES TO THAT OF EMPIRICALLY OBSERVABLE PHENOMENA. • GENERAL MAXIMS ABOUT MOVING FROM THE CONCRETE TO THE ABSTRACT AND BACK TO THE CONCRETE are NOT VERY HELPFUL. The PROBLEM IS HOW TO MOVE from the concrete to the abstract, and how to move back.” • TO DO THAT, A CONCEPTUALLY CLEAR AND EMPIRICALLY-ORIENTED THEORY would necessitate the clarification and the FULL ELABORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN the DEEPER STRUCTURES AND THE CAUSES THEREOF, and BETWEEN SURFACE PHENOMENA AND THE MANIFEST EFFECTS THEREUPON • ALTHUSSER’S STRUCTURAL CAUSALITY AND OVERDETERMINED WHOLE RIGHT STEPS BUT NEEDS TO BE DETAILED—Althusser’s idea of ‘structural causality’, and ‘over-determination’, particularly, was the right steps towards the of	BETWEEN THE METHOD AND THE SUBSTANCE MARXISM—ANALYTICAL MARXISM COMBINES two component parts together, the SCIENTIFIC METHOD WHICH IS ‘ANALYTICAL’, AND the QUESTIONS AND CONCEPTS WHICH ARE ‘MARXIST’. what makes the theory Marxist, then, are the problematics, the concepts and the substantive theoretical arguments. thus, • THUS MARXIST PROBLEMATICS ARE EXPLOITATION, CAPITALIST DYNAMICS, IDEOLOGY and CLASS RELATIONS, and CLASS STRUGGLE and THE STATE. these are distinctively Marxist questions formulated in terms of Marxist concepts • MICRO-FOUNDATIONS OF MARXIST THEORY—Erik Olin Wright claims that one must build Marxism upon solid micro-foundations, and Analytical Marxism does just that. it is important to note that Analytical Marxist quest for micro-foundations proceeds from a DOUBLE CRITIQUE OF, namely, (i) METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISTS’ reduction of social phenomena to strictly individual properties, (ii) STRUCTURAL MARXISTS’ reduction of social phenomena to the aggregate properties of structures. on the other hand, WHILST Wright thinks that ‘METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALSIM

TRANS-THEORETICAL, TRANS-DISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AGENDA. this is BECAUSE, “[t]he concept of ‘contingent necessity’ with its apparent ‘<i>contradictio in adjecto</i>’ highlights the fact that, while the combination or interaction of different causal chains produces a determinate outcome (necessity), THERE IS NO SINGLE THEORY THAT CAN PREDICT OR DETERMINE THE MANNER IN WHICH SUCH CAUSAL CHAINS CONVERGE AND/OR INTERACT (CONTINGENCY) (Jessop, 1990:12). • REFUTATION OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM AND TOWARDS A TRANS-DISCIPLINARY THEORY—Jessop’s refutation of ‘economic determinism’ implies that Marxist analyses must be articulated with concepts, principles of explanation and assumptions drawn from NON-MARXIST THEORIES. More specifically, and in terms of the state theory, Jessop refutes all attempts to reduce the state to just one of its many determinations. • AVOIDANCE OF ANALYSIS OF CONCRETE, COMPLEX CASES BY ABSTRACT EPISTEMOLOGICAL FIAT—in his enquiries of specific questions and cases, Jessop tries to avoid one of the most frequent problems, that of trying to analyse concrete–complex issues of conjuncturally specific practical action, through abstract epistemological or methodological fiat: the ‘strategic-relational	elaboration of a Marxist theory that would yield itself to empirical study, but it was too general and aggregate to be readily applied	IS NOT GOOD SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY, he suggests that SOME OF ITS MOTIVES ARE SOUND, PARTICULARLY, its implication THAT MACRO-LEVEL THEORY REQUIRES THE ELABORATION OF ITS MICRO-FOUNDATIONS • STUDY OF MICRO-FOUNDATIONS is the The investigation of such MICRO- PATHWAYS through which MACRO-STRUCTURES have their effects. • THE LIKELIHOOD OF COMING UP WITH FINE-GRAINED EVALUATIONS OF THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE DIFFERENT CAUSES IS VERY LOW so far as the most interesting problems of social sciences are concerned, broadly speaking, for instance, so far as the RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND CLASS is concerned. • IN PARTICULAR INSTANCES, SUCH FINE-GRAINED ASSESSMENTS AMONGST IMPORTANT CAUSES MAY BE POSSIBLE. • YET, RELATIVE IMPORTANCE CONTEXTUAL, i.e. EXPLANANDA-DEPENDENT—So soon as the precise characterisation of the explananda is changed, the assessments of relative importance will also have to change. In other words, assessments of RELATIVE IMPORTANCE ARE VULNERABLE TO THE

approach' leaves these issues underdetermined on an abstract-simple level and permits their resolution through APPROPRIATELY DETAILED CONJUNCTURAL ANALYSIS		SPECIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM, which basically implies the THEORETICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF GRAND THEORIES • <u>NOW REJECTED</u>, GRAND THEORIES OF GENERAL VALIDITY to explicate society and its history; there can ONLY GENERALLY VALID METHODIC PRINCIPLES OF ENQUIRY, and PARTICULAR THEORIES, FOR PARTICULAR, CONCRETE CASES. • CLASS CONSIDERATIONS OF GREAT EXPLANATORY IMPORTANCE FOR MANY WELL-DEFINED EXPLANANDA—But it is unlikely that this condition—or anything like it—could possibly hold for 'society' in general • STUDY OF CAUSAL PRIMACY <u>NOW REJECTED</u>—social RESEARCH MUST BE SHIFTED AWAY FROM the agenda of CAUSAL PRIMACY, to that of CAUSAL IMPORTANCE, AND be focused upon the MULTIPLE CAUSES which are causally important. • CLASS ANALYSIS—PERVASIVENESS OF CLASS, NOT ITS CAUSAL PRIMACY—Concomitantly, Marxist class analysis must sustain a case for the causal 'pervasiveness of class', and not, for its causal primacy, and must ground its claim of pervasiveness in a specific explanatory agenda

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