FOR QUEEN AND SULTAN: ANGLO-OTTOMAN ADVISORS, SOLDIERS, MERCENARIES AND IMPERIAL AGENTS IN WAR AND STATE (1853-1878)

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Kraliçe ve Sultan için: Savaşta ve Devlet içinde İngiliz-Osmanlı Danışmanlar, Askerler, Paralı Askerler ve İmparatorluk Ajanları (1853-1890)

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Title: For Queen and Sultan: Anglo-Ottoman Advisors, Soldiers, Mercenaries and Imperial Agents in War and State (1853-1878)

The Crimean War (1853-1856) saw France and Britain send troops the Ottoman Empire to exercise their imperial visions and maintain the balance of power in Europe. This paper aims to reassess this Western intervention during the Crimean War by looking east and examining the role played by British officers who came to the Ottoman Empire not from England, but from India. This paper investigates the "Anglo-Turkish Contingent" and "Beatson's Horse," two contingents formed and staffed by both Ottoman and Anglo-Indian officers and soldiers. In the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878) Britain did not formally come to the Ottoman's aid, but many British officers served with the Ottoman army in both official and unofficial positions. Using sources written by these "Anglo-Ottoman" officers, this study scrutinizes both the Ottoman perception of Christian soldiers and the Anglo-Indian application of "colonial knowledge" to Ottoman soldiers and officials. This paper reveals a imperial discourse and will look at the role played within both the Ottoman and British Empires by these "imperial" officers, and examine the unique, and thoroughly modern, position these men served in the Ottoman Empire in the long 19th century. Therefore, this study will examine the careers of these Anglo-Ottoman officers, their writings, and their empires through four themes: Imperial Service, Imperial Discourse, Imperial Violence, and Imperial Ambition.

Tarih Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Joshua Shannon-Chastain tarafından teslim edilen tezin özeti

Başlık: Kraliçe ve Sultan için: Savaşta ve Devlet içinde İngiliz-Osmanlı Danışmanlar, Askerler, Paralı Askerler ve İmparatorluk Ajanları
(1853-1890)

Kırım Savaşı (1853-1856) Fransa ve İngiltere'nin imparatorluk vizyonlarını yerine getirmek ve Avrupa'daki güç dengesini korumak için Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na asker göndermelerini sağladı. Bu çalışma, Doğuya bakarak Kırım Savaşı sırasında Batı müdahalesini yeniden değerlendirmeyi ve İngiltere'den değil Hindistan'dan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na gelen İngiliz subayların rolünü incelemeyi amaçlıyor. Bu çalışma hem Osmanlı hem de Anglo-Hint subayları ve askerleri tarafından kurulan ve görevlendirilen "Anglo-Türk Kontenjan Askerleri" ve "Beatson's Horse" u araştırıyor. Rus-Osmanlı Savaşı'nda (1877-1878) İngiltere resmen Osmanlı'nın yardımına gelmedi, ancak pek çok İngiliz subayı resmi ve gayri resmi pozisyonlarda Osmanlı ordusuyla birlikte çalıştı. Bu çalışma, "Anglo-Osmanlı" subayları tarafından yazılan kaynakları kullanarak hem Osmanlı'nın Hıristiyan asker algısını hem de Anglo-Hint'in "sömürgeci bilgisi" uygulamasını Osmanlı askerlerine ve yetkililere göre incelemektedir. Çalışma bir imparatorluk söylemi ortaya koymaktadır ve bahsi geçen "emperyal" subaylar tarafından Osmanlı ve İngiliz İmparatorlukları'nda oynanan role bakacak ve bu subayların Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 19. yüzyılda hizmet ettikleri eşsiz ve tamamen modern konumunu inceleyecektir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma Anglo-Osmanlı subaylarının, yazılarının ve imparatorluklarının kariyerlerini dört tema ile inceleyecektir: İmparatorluk Hizmeti, İmparatorluk Söylemi, İmparatorluk Şiddeti ve İmparatorluk Hırsı.

INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 1915 during a brief armistice, a 61 year old Australian colonel adorned with the orders of Medjidie and *Osmanli* war medals wandered across the no-man's lands of the Gallipoli battlefield taking photos of the dead. The curiosity of the Ottoman onlookers changed to anger when they saw the Ottoman medals he wore. They raged as they discussed that in this time given to bury the dead this disrespectful Australian had been stealing honors from their dead. Overhearing the conversation the Australian turn to them and in Turkish explained that Gazi Osman Pasha had given these medals to him for his service at the siege of Plevna. Overcome with emotion a number of the Ottoman soldiers tearfully kissed the hands of the elderly Australian.

While some of the details of this increasingly popular story[1] are most likely apocryphal,[2] the basic facts are not. The aforementioned colonel was Charles Snodgrass Ryan, a recently retired surgeon from Melbourne, who nearly 40 years earlier bravely served with the Ottomans in both Plevna and Kars during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78.[3] Ryan's service in Çanakkale in 1915 was attested to in a number of contemporary accounts as well as documents from the Australian national archives.[4] Furthermore, his presence in the no-man's lands of the front was well documented by the iconic photos he took of horrors of the Gallipoli campaign.[5] Until very recently Ryan was an obscure figure - his memoir of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 has been a well-regarded source on the war, the Ottoman army of the period, and Eastern Anatolia. However, Ryan as a historical actor had not been a subject of serious study until Fikret

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[1] This story first appeared in, Haluk Oral, *Arıburnu 1915: Çanakkale Savaşı'ndan belgesel öyküler* (Beyoğlu, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2007) Since its publication this story has been repeated by a number of recent works including, Mark Day, "'Charlie's War' from The Great War," *The Great War*, n.d., accessed January 5, 2016; Fikret Yılmaz, *Anzaklar arasında eski bir Osmanlı subayı Dr. Charles Snodgrass Ryan = A former Ottoman officer among the Anzacs Dr. Charles Snodgrass Ryan*, 2015; David W. Cameron, *Shadows of Anzac: An Intimate History of Gallipoli* (Big Sky Publishing, 2013).

[2] "Kimbilir hangi şehidimizin göğsündeydi bu madalyalar?" "Kimbilir kimin göğsünden koparıldı bunlar?.." "Kimseden çalınmadı bunlar..." "Plevne Muhasarası'nda Gazi Osman Paşa'nın emrinde savaştığım için taktılar bunları göğsüme..." Oral quotes this from an article written in 1943 by Ahmet Emin Yalman. However, I have not seen Yalman's original article, nor know his source for this story.

[3] Frank M. C. Forster, "Ryan, Sir Charles Snodgrass (Charlie) (1853–1926)," in *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, vol. 11 (Canberra: National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, 1988).

[4] National Archives of Australia (NAA): B2455, *Ryan Charles Snodgrass*

[5] Frank Bongiorno, "Gallipoli: An Exhibition of Photographs by Charles Snodgrass Ryan" (Manning Clark House, 2014).

Yılmaz's *Anzaklar Arasında.*[6] Although the title, *A Former Ottoman Officer among the Anzacs Dr. Charles Snodgrass Ryan,* might indicate otherwise, the primary focus of the study is Ryan's role during and after WWI. Ryan's experience with and sympathy for the Ottomans was important in establishing the now famous memorial to the fallen soldiers on both sides of the Gallipoli campaign, and Yılmaz's work sheds light on this important event. However, Ryan as an "Ottoman officer" remains an unknown. Moreover, Ryan was more than just a young man seeking adventure when he joined the Ottomans in 1877, for after the war Ryan served as the Ottoman consul in Melbourne.[7] He served the Ottoman Empire loyally and wrote in its defense, but when the choice came between the Ottoman or British Empire, he chose the British. Ryan was not unique, since about the same time that Ryan had arrived from Australia to fight his former friends and allies, another Ottoman officer, Henry Felix Woods, better known as Woods Pasha, left Istanbul and chose the British over the Ottoman Empire he had faithfully served for 45 years. Another Ottoman officer of British origin, Blunt Pasha, had died in 1909 after 30 years of service to the Ottoman Empire; he was honored by a state funeral in Istanbul.[8] Blunt Pasha was buried near Hobert Pasha, an Ottoman Admiral, who likewise was given a state funeral and who had entered the Ottoman navy in defiance of his own Royal navy.[9] The list goes on: Mahir Pasha (George Borthwick), Baker Pasha, Hassan Bey (Eugene O'Reilly), Müşavir Pasha (Adolphus Slade), all men who served both the Ottoman and British Empires. Alongside these Anglo-Ottoman officers, hundreds[10] of British and Anglo-Indian officers fought beside and led Ottoman troops in defense of the Empire. The two most important, Robert John Vivian and William Ferguson Beatson, commanded thousands of Ottoman troops under British, rather than Ottoman authority during the Crimean War.

These men left behind numerous accounts, reports, articles, and documents. While these sources have not been completely ignored by modern scholars, there selective use has most been in the service of military history. Two works that utilize these sources, but transcend "tactical"

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[6] Yılmaz, *Anzaklar arasında eski bir Osmanlı subayı Dr. Charles Snodgrass Ryan = A former Ottoman officer among the Anzacs Dr. Charles Snodgrass Ryan*.
[7] BOA. HR.SYS3. 354/18
[8] Henry Felix Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 138.
[9] TNA: ADM 196/16/167
[10] Not to mention the thousands of British soldiers.

military history[11] are James Reid's *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire* and Candan Badem's *The Ottoman Crimean War.*[12] As the latter's name suggests Badem's book covers the years 1853-1856 and focuses on more than just the battles of the Crimean war, but also the social, political, diplomatic and economic aspects and consequences of the war. Moreover, Badem's focus on the Ottoman experience through comprehensive use of the Ottoman archives and the ability to also work with Russian and English sources gives the book a perspective that no other work on the Crimean War has. Furthermore, despite its breadth, the *Ottoman Crimean War* also has great depth. In fact, the inspiration for this study was found in a discussion of the some minor events during the Crimean War.[13]

Reid's work likewise provides great depth and breadth, but unlike Badem's relies exclusively on foreign accounts of the Ottoman Empire. Reid's goal was to describe in detail the horrors of war and the social consequences of Ottoman political and military policies. However, Badem rightly criticized Reid for his lack of Ottoman archival materials.

This study takes a middle path between Badem and Reid. The focus is on the aforementioned British officers in the Ottoman Empire and a primary concerns is their written accounts of the Crimean and the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War. However, this work is also based on extensive use of archival materials from both London and Istanbul. Moreover, the goal has been to find Anglo-Ottoman officers whose lives and works can be traced and verified through the archives.

Using these sources, while examining the lives and careers of these and other individuals, this study will focus on a number of interconnected issues related to these Anglo-Ottoman[14] officers. Beyond what these individuals wrote and what was written about them, this study will look at the role played within both the Ottoman and British Empires as "imperial" officers, and examine the unique, and thoroughly modern, position these men served in the Ottoman Empire in the long 19th century.

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[11] No that there is anything wrong with such works. One such excellent study is: Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatürk*, Praeger Books Online (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009).
[12] James J. Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire : Prelude to Collapse 1839-1878* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2000); Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, v. 44 (Boston: Brill, 2010).
[13] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 257–263.
[14] I do not use this term in an ethnic sense, but rather to refer to British officers who served in the Ottoman Empire for extended periods of time. Just as those who served in India are called Anglo-Indian.

Therefore, this study will examine the careers of these Anglo-Ottoman officers, their writings, and their empires through four themes: Imperial Service, Imperia Discourse, Imperial Violence, and Imperial Ambition. All interconnected, these themes are not discreet, but rather broad and inexact.

Imperial Ambition and Service

British involvement during the long 19th century cannot be understood without the larger context of British imperial interests in India, Egypt, and perhaps the Ottoman Empire, as well as the "Great Game" with Russia and the discourse of Russophobia that mirrored the discourse of Turcophilism. Furthermore, although never explicitly stated by British statesmen, this study will argue that there was a British discourse and (failed) projects that aimed to subordinate the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire in a similar vein to British India.

However, the Ottoman Empire was not a passive domain awaiting British colonial ambitions - the Ottomans were imperialists in their own right and fully understood the dangers presented by the nominally loyal British officers in their service. The Ottoman Empire worked to display its imperial power and equality to other European imperial powers. Selim Deringil has argued that in the late 19th century the Ottoman elite in Istanbul promoted a (Islamic) civilizing mission and modernization projects on the eastern peripheries of the Ottoman Empire similar to those of British in India. In part this was a defensive act, as a "colonizer" could not be "colonized." Claims to the Caliphate and representation of all Muslims could be used as a tool to compete with other European powers, but this not necessarily anti-colonial in rhetoric, in Africa the Ottomans essentially offer themselves to African Muslims as the lesser of two colonial evils. Moreover, this was not simply an imitation of western forms of imperialism, long-standing centralization projects to control and settled nomadic populations in the Ottoman empire were imbued with a civilizing mission that was wholly Ottoman.[15]

Imperial maps, tribal schools, and tribal regiments were symbols of a modern empire, but the most visible examples of imperial modernity were the physical monuments constructed by the state. The schools, hospitals, barracks, and state offices built by the Porte were testimonials to the Ottoman's imperial power. The buildings were built not just as functional arms of the state or manifest examples of state centralization, but the buildings themselves represented the imperial

[15] Selim Deringil, "'They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery': The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 311–42.

state in the structures' sublime magnificence and grandiosity. Moreover, Zeynep Çelik argues that while many of these structures utilized French colonial architectural styles, they were not in fact copies of either French architectural or imperial designs. That rather that French and the Ottoman empires were engaged in parallel imperial projects. Especially in regards to Ottoman use of these structures at the margins of the empire, that instead of coping French imperial style and displaying it in the capital, the Ottomans exhibited the power of the state on the margins of their empire.[16] However, said structural displays of power did not limit flexibility. In the long 19th century the Ottoman Empire worked to strength and centralize its domains. This lead to both military reforms that worked to create a Franco-Prussian style professional army, and also to the utilization of marginal elements of the empire to enable and enforce modernization and centralization, and in times of war, reinforcements. In military terms these "marginal elements" were *basıbozuks,* irregular horsemen who fought under their own commanders when called by the central state.

The military crisis of the 18th and 19th century, while perhaps not making the Ottoman Empire a "garrison state," were at the heart of the various legal, educational, political and social reforms of the long 19th century. [17] The Ottoman military was at the very heart of state thought and policy so a study of the military can be a study of Ottoman state culture and society. However, the purpose of this study is not to do military history, despite the fact that a great deal of the focus of this thesis is on war and conflict and the very soldiers who carried out that conflict. But this is a study of empire. The subjects of this study were imperialists, not in high office dictating empire wide policy, but the men on the ground implementing that policy; men who for the most part had no influence on the policy despite their desire to.

Converts and renegades, soldiers of fortune, military advisors, adventurers, imperialists, and opportunists - the long 19th century was witness to a "new" kind of subject, an imperial subject or citizen of empire. This study will trace the lives of a new group of military men who served the Ottomans or served with the Ottomans. The first group was not unique to this century, they were exiles or refugees who "became" Ottoman, either in the case of Eastern European officers who converted, or the Caucasian irregulars who found new homes and livelihoods in the

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[16] Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914* (University of Washington Press, 2008), 159–215.
[17] Virginia H. Aksan, "The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (2007): 259–72.

Ottoman Empire. Likewise the soldiers of fortune who would serve the Ottomans were not new. But alongside these men were military advisors, adventurers, and imperialists of foreign states who fought with and often lead Ottoman troops, but who did not fight *for* the Ottoman Empire. This seems to be a new development in the 19th century and one that has not been addressed. Furthermore, I will focus on a few men who proudly fought for the Ottoman Empire, some of whom were buried in Istanbul by the Ottoman state with the highest military honors, but who undoubtedly thought of themselves as British or at least not fully Ottoman, men who could perhaps be labeled "trans-imperial" officers.

The term "trans-imperial" was coined by Natalie Rothman to describe 16th century Ottoman-Venetian subject who navigated both a physical and ideological "borderland" between the two states.[18] This concept has been useful in describing Levantine families[19] in the Ottoman Empire and a recent work on 19th century British *dragomans* in Istanbul further refined the idea by categorizing Anglo-Italian-Ottoman *dragomans* as "inter-imperial" subjects, not *of* multiple states, but rather of no state, *between* empires.[20]

However, I have come to think of the Anglo-Ottoman officers in this study as solider of empire, as imperialists, in the purest sense of the word. Although they served both the British and the Ottoman Empires they were not trans-imperial, they were just "imperial." Anglo-Ottoman military cooperation during the long 19th-century allowed them to serve both empires loyalty, but this did not mean that they were *of* both empires. They served the Ottomans because it served general British interests. They were sympathetic to the Ottoman Empire and wrote in defense of the Ottomans in the British press, but they did not become Ottoman. They maintained their British identity, and while some of them married into Levantine families, they were British first. However, there were not simply expatriates, they were more than British officers living in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, as I cannot fit them into any historiographical category, I think of them as soldiers of empire, officers who faithfully served two different empires.

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[18] E. Natalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).

[19] Levantine families lived in port cities of the Ottoman Empire and held multiple subject / citizenships, often a combination of Greek, French, British, German and Ottoman. They spoken multiple languages and while generally Christian, were not defined by their religious or linguistic identity. They used their status within and between states to "forum shop," use the privileges of one state to protect or defend against the laws of another state. I think the term trans-imperial is applicable as both ideologically and legally they held an extraterritorial status.

[20] Frank Castiglione, "'Levantine' Dragomans in Nineteenth Century Istanbul: The Pisanis, the British, and Issues of Subjecthood," *Journal of Ottoman Studies* 44 (2014): 169–95; Rothman, *Brokering Empire Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul*.

Therefore, this is what I term imperial ambition and service, the British and Ottoman empires were often allies during the long 19th century and cooperated military, but they both had imperial ambitions that also made them rivals. The British officers who served in the Ottoman Empire sometimes expressed the ambitions of the Ottoman Empire, but some hoped to act in the interests of the British Empire at the expense of the Ottomans. However, as previously stated the Ottomans were imperialists and not unaware of the danger the men who served them could pose.

Imperial Discourse and Violence

The Anglo-Ottoman officers who are the focus of this study had a unique perspective on the Ottoman Empire. Their experience and knowledge of the language, culture, politics and society gave them insights that most travelers to Ottoman domains lacked. However, as already discussed, they were imperialists, many of them with experience of British India and ideas about how "oriental" and Muslim states and societies behaved. However, neither the theoretical construct of orientalism nor colonial knowledge fit the discourse produced by the subjects of this study. Therefore, while this topic will shortly be discussed in greater detail, the term discourse or imperial discourse will be used to describe the writings of these officers.

Finally, there is a recurring theme in this discourse about the use of state violence and how the violence carried out by the Ottoman state was no more egregious than the violence carried out by other European states. Consequently, there will be a discussion of what can be termed imperial violence.

Contents

This study has been organized into six chapters and a conclusion. Chapters one will analysis and examine British discourse on the Ottoman Empire with a focus on orientalism, colonial knowledge, and other aspects of the sources used including style and content. Chapters two, three and four will look at the period of the Crimean War and two Anglo-Ottoman projects that saw large numbers of Ottoman troops placed under direct British command. In particular, the conflicts and problems with Ottoman *başıbozuks* under British command. Chapter five will cover the period between the Crimean War and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and will examine events in Syria, and the arrival in the Ottoman Empire of Hobart and Woods Pasha. Chapter six will look at the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78 and the service of Ryan and Baker as well as other British adventures. Finally, the conclusion will serve as an epilogue tracing Woods and Ryan and others whose careers extended past 1878.

CHAPTER 1: BRITISH DISCOURSE ON THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE PRIOR TO THE CRIMEAN WAR

In a recent study on the discourse of 19th century British Turcophilism, Dogan Gürpinar traces the phases of British intellectual response to Ottoman policies starting with the reign of Mahmud II, through the *tanzimat*, and into the early years of the First World War.[21] This analysis of discourses closely matches the traditional diplomatic relationship between the Ottomans and the British established by recent historiography, i.e. Anglo-Ottoman relations greatly strengthened in the 1830's due to British fears of Russian encroachment following Russian aid against Mehmet Ali in 1833, confirmed by the 1838 treaty of Balta Limani. The apex of Anglo-Ottoman relations was the Crimean War, which saw a Franco-British alliance fight on the Ottomans' behalf against the Russian Empire. The period following the Crimean War was understood as a general cooling in relations culminating in the "Bulgarian Horrors" (massacres of Bulgarian Christians by Ottoman forces in 1876) and British unwillingness to directly support the Ottomans during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878. The subsequent treaty of Berlin in 1890 and British claims to the protectors of Ottoman-Armenians, along with the British take over of Egypt and Cyprus, left the Hamidian regime distrustful of England.[22] This study makes no attempt to revise this view, rather, in line with Gürpinar's recent work, seeks to provide some nuance and detail to this discourse in a few selective periods of Anglo-Ottoman relations in the 19th century—the British view of Ottoman Empire prior to the 1838 treaty of Balta Limani, the Crimean War, and the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878.

However, before delving deeper into this it is worth considering the British discourse that came before the 19th century, in particular because those writing in the 19th century were keenly aware of the literary discourse on the Ottoman Empire. In fact, it was this awareness that make many of their works highly relevant sources to Ottoman historiography today. They were highly concerned with accuracy, detail, and objectivity. To prove that a work was reliable and that the

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[21] Dogan Gürpinar, "The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses: Visions of the Turk, 'Young' and 'Old,'" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no. 3 (December 1, 2012): 346–71.
[22] This is of course a gross generalization. However, both recent and not so recent works on the Ottoman long nineteenth century more or less follow this view. For example see: M. Sükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

author could write about the Ottoman Empire with authority and authenticity, the quest for objectivity led to some very modern critiques of fellow authors.

Take for example Linda Darling's recent critique of Paul Rycaut's *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire.*[23] Written in 1665, Rycaut's view of the Ottoman Empire was colored by his own view of the English Restoration. Rycaut's criticisms of the Ottoman Sultan were as much allegory for his criticisms of absolutism in English monarchy, despite his royalist background. However, Darling is quick to point out that despite Rycaut's rhetorical analysis of the Ottoman system to criticize his own, his work should not be dismissed by historians as he not only provides descriptive and factual details, but also shows us that both 17th century Ottoman and British states were not as distinct from one another as we might imagine.[24] Rycaut's work has long been part of Anglo-Ottoman historiographical canon. However, while they were certainly read by British visitors to the Ottomans who came after him, they were by no means free of criticism.

A more famous writer to come after Rycaut in the early 18th century, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, was both deeply familiar and disdainful of Rycaut's works.[25] Moreover, Montagu made a similar critique to that of Darling, writing that Rycaut's account of Ottoman Christians was more likely written to compliment the English court in 1679 than to provide accurate detail of the worship of Eastern Christians.[26] Lady Montagu has been a valuable source for modern historians as her access and writing on Ottoman women was rare for the time.

However, in her own time her work was subject to the criticisms of her countrymen, Alexander and Patrick Russell. Doctors for the Levant Company, like Lady Montagu, their work *The Natural History of Aleppo*, addressed the historiography in which they wrote. Drawing upon their knowledge of Arabic, close connection to important members of Ottoman society (like the *vali* of Aleppo, Ragib Pasha) and many years in Aleppo, they critiqued and criticized works by Lady Montagu and Constantin-François Volney.

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[23] Sir Paul Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire: Containing the Maxims of the Turkish Politie, the Most Material Points of the Mahometan Religion ... Their Military Discipline, with an Exact Computation of Their Forces Both by Land and Sea. Illustrated with Divers Pieces of Sculpture, Representing the Variety of Habits Amongst the Turks* (J. Starkey and H. Browne, 1670).
[24] Linda T. Darling, "Ottoman Politics through British Eyes: Paul Rycaut's 'The Present State of the Ottoman Empire,'" *Journal of World History* 5, no. 1 (April 1, 1994): 71–97.
[25] While discussing a point of religious doctrine she wrote, "Sir Paul Rycaut is mistaken (as he commonly is)," Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, *The Letters of Lady Wortley Montagu*, ed. Sarah Josepha Hale (Roberts brothers, 1869), 74.
[26] Ibid., 365.

To take the latter first, Volney's work, *Travels Through Syria and Egypt, in the Years 1783, 1784, and 1785,*[27] was not only important to the later Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, but has also been widely used by modern historians. However, Patrick Russell was quite critical of Volney, and of Volney's knowledge of gender and Islam. Russell wrote: " M. Volney, has adopted the vulgar error." Muhammad, according to Volney, although very much fond of women, has not treated them in the Quran as even belonging to the same " '…human species; he does not so much as make mention of them either with respect to the ceremonies of religion, or the rewards of another life.' " Patrick Russell called this statement, and Volney's further assertion that the Quran was " '…as being merely and Chaos of unmeaning phrases,' " remarkably "cavalier" as he stated it seems that Volney had never actually read the Quran.[28] Patrick Russell then went on to quote a number of passages from the Quran to refute what he again termed Volney's "vulgar error."[29] This critique of Volney is extremely interesting as Russell was essentially accusing Volney of orientalism two centuries before the term was ever coined.

In a text on the *Turkish Harem* (emphasis Russell) Russell discussed the letters of Lady Montagu. While Russell seemed to have had a greater respect for Lady Montagu's work, he took issue with some of her descriptions of Ottoman bathing culture. [30] With utmost deference Russell wrote that he had discussed Lady Montagu's account with a long time patient, an Ottoman women of high rank from Istanbul who was in the harem of the Kadi of Aleppo. This Ottoman woman of rank assured Russell that this account was in fact quite inaccurate.[31]

It is not the goal of this study to determine the veracity of these divergent accounts, but rather to observe the rhetorical devices used by these early modern authors to critique each other's works. Lady Montagu was in a position to criticize Rycaut because like Rycaut her

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[27] Constantin-François Volney, *Travels Through Syria and Egypt, in the Years 1783, 1784, and 1785: Containing the Present Natural and Political State of Those Countries, Their Productions, Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce; with Observations on the Manners,customs, and Government of the Turks and Arabs. Illustrated with Copper Plates* (G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1788).

[28] Alexander Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo: Containing a Description of the City, and the Principal Natural Productions in Its Neighbourhood. Together with an Account of the Climate, Inhabitants, and Diseases; Particularly of the Plague*, ed. Patrick Russell (Gregg International, 1794), Note LXVIII, 425.

[29] Ibid., 425–427.

[30]She described an experience she had in the baths of Sophia, in which the women of the Turkish *hamam* uninhibitedly walking around the bath and lounging upon cushions, while eating sherbet and drinking coffee, completely naked. These activates went on for at least five hours, included much gossip and pretty young slave girls aged seventeen to eighteen. Montagu, *The Letters of Lady Wortley Montagu*. Letter VI, from Adrianople (Edrine) April 1, 1717, 68-71.

[31] Russell, *The Natural History of Aleppo*, 380–381.

writings were based on her experiences as part of a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman court. Her authority stemmed from her first-hand observations and connection within the Ottoman Empire. Likewise the Russell brothers could draw on their combined 31 years in Aleppo, knowledge of Arabic, and their close connections and access to the ruling Ottoman elite. These factors gave Patrick Russell the authority to challenge Volney, a well-respected French scholar, and Lady Montagu, whose work was not only prominent, but who had access to the Ottoman *harem* in a way most male writers would find impossible to match. Knowledge of language, access to high officials, and first hand observation and experience in the Ottoman Empire would be rhetorical strategies repeatedly used by authors to denote their authenticity, and most importantly, their authority. However, there are limits to the usefulness of such accounts.

Take for example the story of Mustapha, a janissary, dragoman, and tour guide to the British traveler in the Ottoman Empire. In 1821 Robert Walsh become the chaplain to the new British ambassador, Lord Strangford, to the Ottoman Porte.[32] Five years later Walsh was still in Istanbul and a witness to the destruction of the Janissaries.[33] More than just a witness, Walsh was an acquaintance of a Janissary, named Mustapha, who served as an honor guard for the embassy. Due to his regular communication with members of the embassy Mustapha had acquired a basic knowledge of English.[34] It seems this association with the British embassy allowed Mustapha to survive the destruction of the Janissaries and in time thrive as a dragoman in the employment of the British.[35]

Swiss in origin, as a young man Mustapha worked for a merchant in Leghorn, Italy, he was enslaved by Barbary corsairs, sold in Cairo, passed from master to master until "he turned Turk; and so was redeemed from a state of slavery and enjoyed all the immunities and privileges of a follower of the Prophet." However, unlike most renegades, Mustapha was well disposed towards Christians and grateful to have the opportunity to serve them.[36] Mustapha was a fixture among

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[32] Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama : British Travellers in 19th Century Turkey* (Amsterdam ; Atlanta, Ga: Rodopi, 1999), 406.
[33] Robert Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England* (Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1828), 72–95.
[34] Ibid., 152.
[35] James Baillie Fraser, *A Winter's Journey (Tâtar), from Constantinople to Tehran: With Travels through Various Parts of Persia, &c* (R. Bentley, 1838), 167–168.
[36] Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England*, 3–4.

British travelers in Istanbul for more than two decades, serving as trusted translator and guide.[37] Such was his fame that he was immortalized as a character in Victorian novels.[38]

However, despite his literary fame, and multiple accounts by British travelers of his life and service,[39] we cannot "speak" for Mustapha. A lack of written material by Mustapha, or archival documentation about Mustapha makes the anecdotes of British travelers insufficient to "speak" for Mustapha. Intriguing questions about how his connections to the British embassy allowed him to not only survive the destruction of the Janissaries but to become a dragoman cannot be answered. Likewise, his story of slavery and conversion serves as little more than a fascinating anecdote. Moreover, the "touristic" nature of those who wrote about Mustapha makes their insights superficial and easily cast as orientalist.

Therefore, it is important to denote the differences and different kinds of British accounts of the Ottoman Empire. This study will focus almost executively on accounts written by British military officers. Naturally some accounts written by military officers do not differ at all from other "travel literature" as the author was little more than a tourist in the Ottoman Empire. However, this study will look at two types of British military officers in the Ottoman Empire; the first were officers from British East India Company who came to the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War. While most only spent a year or two in the domains of the Ottomans their accounts, reports, and activities, are interesting due to the fact that they served alongside Ottoman forces while viewing the Ottoman Empire through the lens of British India. The second group were those who either stayed in service to the Ottomans after the Crimean War, or came during the interwar period, or came with the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878. Their accounts are interesting from both the perspective of the time they spent in the Ottoman Empire and their perspective on wider imperial politics including comparisons between the British and Ottoman imperial projects, imperial power, and imperial violence. Therefore, while these accounts cannot be cast as "touristic," their value and discourse must be considered in the context of an orientalist analysis.

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[37] John Fuller, *Narrative of a Tour through Some Parts of the Turkish Empire* (Printed by R. Taylor, 1829), 82; John Auldjo, *Journal of a Visit to Constantinople, and Some of the Greek Islands, in the Spring and Summer of 1833* (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown & Longman, 1835), 76–77; Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England*, 3–4.

[38] Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama*, 49.

[39] Including his dealings with Ottoman officials on behalf of his British patrons, for example see John Carne, *Letters from the East* (H. Colburn, 1826), 36-3; and information about his family, his sons in-laws became dragomans in British service, see Fraser, *A Winter's Journey,* 167-168.

Orientalism and the Archives

As already discussed and as Gerald Maclean argues in *The Rise of Oriental Travel,* British travelers before the era of the British Empire were no more biased by the popular prejudices of the day than the orientalist prejudices of the 19th century. Moreover, for many British travelers "life within the Islamic Mediterranean" was a very "attractive alternative to life in the British Isles. Many went and stayed." Many who returned wrote accounts and "the experience of going had changed what it meant to be English."[40]

This view is echoed in Reza Pirbhai's study of the travels and writing of a late 18th century British officer, Captain Donald Campbell. Campbell's account of his travels in British India, the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in the 1780s were colored by his class, family ties, Protestantism, enlightenment thinking and situation, but his account was not dominated by them. Campbell was horrified by the Ottoman slave trade he observed in Aleppo and Diyarbakir while still sympathizing with the Ottoman merchant who sold the slaves. He condemned the system while humanizing the merchant who was only part of the system, not an oriental villain. Pirbhai clearly articulates that in Campbell's writings he does not succumb to the self versus others dichotomy associated with the British colonialism and imperialism. In his work there is not "a clean separation of 'the Self/Other oppositions charted by Said.'"[41]

Moreover, as Reinhold Schiffer (who examined 160 British travel accounts of the Ottoman Empire) argues, British observers of the Ottoman Empire did not share a monolithic view based on imperialism, racism, male sexism, or essentialism. Naturally their views were colored by pre-existing prejudices, but these may have been ones of class, religion, or gender, and they were in no way uniform to all observers. Moreover, while British travelers often shared certain cultural assumptions, "Orientalist attitudes were neither altogether dominant in the course of the 19th-century nor an inevitable part of the cultural baggage of individual travelers." Therefore, for social historians, Schiffer argues that a great deal of the writing was factual rather than ideological in form and nature.[42]

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[40] Gerald Maclean, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580 - 1720* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), xiii–xiv.
[41] M. Reza Pirbhai, "Empire and I: Reading the Travelogue of a Late Eighteenth-Century British Army Captain," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 661–77, doi:10.1080/00856401.2013.833070.
[42] Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama*, 1–3.

Therefore, while orientalism is important to our understanding and analyses of these sources, when taken to an extreme, it makes all sources worthless, trapping us in a maze of constructivism. Naturally these writers constructed some of their tales, saw what they expected to see and wrote as male, Anglo, Christian, imperialists, but so did their, male, Ottoman, Muslim, imperialist counterparts. This idea was discussed in relation to the work of Deringil, but Ussama Makdisi, has taken it a step further and made a case for Ottoman orientalism. From Istanbul the Arab east was as much the Orient as it was from Paris or London. Looking at Mount Lebanon after the ethnic violence of 1860, Makdisi makes the point that the Ottoman administer sent to resolve the situation, Fuad Pasha, was in every way a modern "tanzimat man." He identified the problems as the result of age-old tribal rivalry and the ignorance of the local Muslims. The swift punishments carried out by his army were just and modern in comparison to the savage and ignorant violence carried out by the locals.[43] Therefore, the issue is not who was orientalist or who was not, but rather we must judge the author and source on their own faults and merits.

Moreover, the value of archival document over the journal or account must be reconsidered. The romance of the archive is sullied when it is considered that the documents containing secrets of the state was written by the same officer, administrative or military, who pen an account of his time in the foreign land from which he also wrote memorandum now in the vast holds of a state archive. Moreover, the reports found in an archive cannot be considered more trustworthy or accurate than the well-written account of men who lived and served in the Ottoman Empire for decades. Furthermore, the supremacy of place must not influence the value after the source. A document found in the archives of Istanbul or an account written in Ottoman Turkish is no more valuable than the report found in London or the account written in English. This is not to excuse the many works of history, both past and modern, sourced and written in Britain on the Ottoman Empire or India, but rather to reevaluate authors and materials that have been mostly passed over in the historiography of the British and Ottoman Empires.

Second, we cannot lump all accounts together into one pile and call them orientalist. As previously discussed, writers were acutely aware of the bias, constructivism, and unreliability of their contemporaries. Certainly such charges by authors were rhetorical strategies used to enhance their own accounts, but that does not mean their criticisms were unfounded.

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[43] Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 3 (June 1, 2002): 768–96, doi:10.1086/532495.

We should also not forget the use of "primary source" in accounts. They were used, as they are today, to validate the author's views. We can see this in a number of accounts, where authors used contemporary government documents to support their claims.

Rather than looking through an orientalist lens, this study will examine the discourse of both accounts and archival documents. Therefore, the best term to describe discourse is not orientalism, but colonial knowledge.

Colonial Knowledge

Colonial knowledge, which has become central to the study of the British Empire, is the "from and content of knowledge" which facilitated and was created from the commerce, conquest, colonization, and exploitation of South Asia and Africa by the British Empire.[44] It is, according to the Bernard Cohn, the creation of officialdom by European states, the control of "defining and classifying space," creating a separation between public and private areas, the counting, recording and registration of property, population, births, marriages, deaths, and by the standardization of "languages and scripts." Moreover for the Victorian conquerors of India it was the belief that governments could be understood and represented by facts. Facts were considered self-evident, "as was the idea 'that administrative power stem from the efficient use of these facts.'" The world was knowable and empirical. The laws of nature could be understood and governed. India could be ruled by knowing the previously unknown.[45]

However, there is an obvious tension between colonial knowledge—information gathering, knowledge production and application in India by the British, specifically the British East India Company—and orientalism. If this so-called knowledge production and application was little more than a construct of what India was in the 18th and 19th British imagination, then it cannot be an effective means to exploit and control India, but rather a justification for European conquest. However, as C. A. Bayly persuasively argues, the idea that the British never knew or in fact could never know "anything significant about indigenous societies" because of their "conceptual biases," is absurd. Colonial knowledge of the Other was not "a mere web of rhetorical devices designed to give legitimacy to conquest," but rather based upon the very people they rule. Most

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[44] Tony Ballantyne, "Colonial Knowledge," in *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives*, ed. S. E Stockwell (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2008), 177–97.
[45] Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge the British in India*, Princeton Studies in Culture/power/history (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3–4.

of the knowledge came from native sources, as actual British control of India was very limited and based upon previous Mughal structures. At the same time a vast debate in the English language in the public and the press, libraries of written works and opaque archives "transformed Indian society in the nineteenth century more thoroughly than colonial capitalism transformed its economy."[46]

Written communication was central to the management of the East India Company, to the point that officials and clerks of the Company formed long-distance relationships with men that they had perhaps never met in person. There was a systematic attempt to gather and understand as much information as possible as it was a "firmly held belief that the possession of information represented the key to effective administration." This belief lead a commitment to improve governance and promote an intellectual culture that developed scholarship in "agriculture, botany, literature, linguistics, science" and any other tools that would help expand the empire. Moreover, these intellectual pursuits, although designed to improve the company's power and position in India, were championed by allies of the company as "a virtuous an enlightened commitment to the advancement of the nation's knowledge and learning."[47] The written form of this knowledge lead to high standards of bookkeeping and an attention to detail in record keeping and reports[48]—a fact that explains the often mind numbing minutia found in the British National archives.

Furthermore, one area in the study of colonial knowledge that has been largely overlooked, but is highly relevant to this study was the discourse produced by the military officers of the East India Company. While scientific, ethnographic and linguistic studies were not the priority for military officers there were a number of incentives that saw a great number of East India Company officers participate in the production of colonial knowledge. First, was that publications were respected and could help an officer advance in the somewhat meritocracy of the Company. Second, the boredom that often overcame officers stationed in India prompted them to an intellectual pursuit that not only kept mind occupied but also earned respect and promotion. While some of this literature was more military in nature, a number of officers were involved in purely scientific, linguistic or historical pursuits that saw publication in both India

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[46] Bayly, *Empire and Information*, 5–9.
[47] H. V Bowen, *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 151–153.
[48] Ibid., 157–160.

and London. While the Anglo Indian officers published in both India and Britain,[49] the Anglo Ottoman officers of this study published almost exclusively in Britain and for a Western European audience. Some of this literature is relevant to the study, as understanding how Anglo-Indian officers understood the society in which they lived and the troops under their command can help understand their assumptions about what they saw as familiar aspects in the Ottoman Empire.

Case in point is a work by Captain Charles Farquhar Trower (who lead irregular cavalry in Nizam of Hyderabad) titled, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry: Its Conformation, Management and Use in Both a Military and Political Point of View*.[50] Written in 1845 before the reorganization of the East India Company army after the 1857 mutiny, but prior to the Crimean War when a number of Trower's brother officers would lead Ottoman irregular cavalry, the work gives insight into how experienced Anglo-India officers would have viewed the Ottoman irregulars under their command. However, while Trower's ideas may have been based on years of experience by him and his fellow offers and relevant to the effective organization and command of the irregulars in India, it did not mean that said ideas and experience translated to seemingly similar circumstances in the Ottoman Empire. Colonial knowledge produced in India by Indians or acculturated Anglo-Indians may have been reflective and relevant to its time and place and help to facilitate effective British rule, but this did not mean it translated to other domains inside or outside the British Empire. While there is a larger point here, it is outside the scope of the study, but as we will see, experience commanding Muslim irregulars in India did not translate well to commanding Muslim irregulars in the Ottoman Empire.

To reconnect orientalism to colonial knowledge, what was true in Hyderabad was not true in Istanbul, and when such attempts were made to apply knowledge of from India to the Ottoman Empire I would argue that said concept ceased to be colonial knowledge and became orientalist.

However, colonial knowledge has not been used as a form of analysis for British discourse on the Ottoman Empire, since the Ottoman Empire was never a colonial possession of Britain. Despite this, many of the British officers serving in the Ottoman Empire had served in India and were part of the same literary environment that produced the colonial discourse coming out of

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[49] Dr Douglas M. Peers, "Colonial Knowledge and the Military in India, 1780–1860," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33, no. 2 (May 1, 2005): 157–80, doi:10.1080/03086530500123747.
[50] Charles Farquhar Trower, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry: Its Conformation, Management and Use in Both a Military and Political Point of View* (W. Thacker, 1845).

India and Africa. British officers in the Ottoman Empire carried out the same kind of information gathering and knowledge production in the Ottoman Empire as their compatriots in the rest of the British Empire. I do not wish to try to coin a new term and call this "imperial knowledge," but across empires there were imperial agents, often serving multiple imperial states, gathering and producing knowledge. These empires were often in competition with one another in terms of both territorial control and the control of discourse. The discourse produced by these imperial agents defined and classified their environments while trying to teach their countrymen how to understand, and perhaps even exploit the Ottoman domains.

Anglo-Ottoman Military Discourse During the Long 19th Century

> In the present multiplicity of books, to obtrude a new work upon the Public argues an opinion in the Author, that it either contains some new information, or if the matter is old, that it is in a dress which is both original and advantageous. […] Attached in a professional capacity to the British Military Mission which accompanied the army of the Grand Vizier in its route through Turkey, Syria, and Egypt during the late memorable campaign, he was certainly in a situation peculiarly advantageous for observing the manners, customs, and habits of the Turkish nation, not only in peace, but in war. His profession afforded him many opportunities for improving these advantages by an intimate communication not only with the Grand Vizier himself, but with the principal personages of the Ottoman empire[51]

> His situation affording him a particularly favourable opportunity of knowing many things with accuracy, either from his own observation, or from authentic documents, it was his constant practice to commit them to paper daily as they occurred. […]The kindness of several brother officers furnished him likewise with the best information respecting those occurrences, at which he could not be present, as the operations of the campaign were carrying on in different parts at the same time.[52]

The aforementioned campaign against Napoleon's invasion of Egypt (1799-1802) was the first instance of Anglo-Ottoman cooperation to defeat a common enemy. Moreover, it was the first time troops from India would be used by the British to fight an enemy in Egypt and Syria. It was also the first time British military officers would not just serve with, but write about the Ottoman military. British observers had long written about the Ottoman military, going all the

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[51] William Wittman and Sir Richard Phillips, *Travels in Turkey, Asia-Minor, Syria, and Across the Desert Into Egypt During the Years 1799, 1800, and 1801, in Company with the Turkish Army, and the British Military Mission: To Which Are Annexed, Observations on the Plague and on the Diseases Prevalent in Turkey, and a Meteorological Journal* (R. Phillips, no. 71, St. Paul's Church Yard. By T. Gillet, Salisbury Square., 1803), v–vi. This belongs on the previous page

[52] Thomas Walsh, *Journal of the Late Campaign in Egypt: Including Descriptions of That Country, and of Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, Marmorice, and Macri; with an Appendix; Containing Official Papers and Documents* (T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1803), v–vii.

way back to Paul Rycaut's 1665, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*,[53] but these works were written by diplomats (like Rycaut or Lady Montagu), merchants, doctors (like the Russells), priests and missionaries, and travelers. However, for the first time, British officials, officers and soldiers served alongside their Ottoman counterparts, and wrote detailed accounts of their experiences and observations. As previously discussed and as seen in the above quotes, first hand observation and association with principal Ottoman officials were used to buttress the reliability and authority of written accounts. However, in the case of Witman's *Travels* such strategies did little to prevent contemporaries from heavily criticizing the work.[54] This has not stopped modern historians from using Witman's work, but it is important to consider the literary environment and milieu in which these authors were submitting their works. The later work by Walsh employed an innovative, and modern, rhetorical device to support the works authority: official documents. Walsh's *Journal* contains 58 original documents, covering more than 140 pages. These consisted of mostly reports of military actions, but also copies of captured French orders and French proclamations to the local Egyptians against the British. These captured documents were provided in both the original French and with an English translation.

However, this first Anglo-Ottoman alliance proved short lived, for by 1802 peace had been established with Napoleonic France and in 1805 a defensive agreement had been made with Russia. However, a subsequent conflict with Russia would result in a direct confrontation with the British in 1807 when the British Navy blockaded Istanbul in the show of force.[55] This action lead to the treaty of Çanak, also called the Treaty of the Dardanelles,[56] signed in early 1809, in which the Ottomans promised the British to close the straits of the Bosphorus and Dardenelles to all foreign warships.[57] Shared Russophobe slowly brought the Ottomans and British together over the next few decades, but the Greek war for independence and subsequent battle of

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[53] Rycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*.
[54] In the July 1803 edition of the *Edinburgh Review* an anonymous reviewer viciously panned Whitman's account. The reviewer criticized Wittman for lacking details about many events he claimed to have witnessed, over-generalizing Ottoman practices and culture, and generally disputing the claim that the book offered any new or important information about its subject. Sydney Smith et al., *The Edinburgh Review: Or Critical Journal* (A. Constable, 1804), 330–337.
[55] M. Sükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 49.
[56] For a British perspective as well as another account that uses official documents in order to give authority to the authors claims, see: Robert Adair, *The Negotiations for the Peace of the Dardanelles in 1808 - 9: With Dispatches and Official Documents : Being a Sequel to the Memoir of His Mission to Vienna in 1806 ; in Two Volumes* (Longman, 1845).
[57] Guy Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of the Crimean War* (Scarecrow Press, 2002), 70.

Navarino was a breaking point in Anglo-Ottoman relations. However, another Russo-Ottoman War in 1828 brought renewed British interest and (limited) military assistance to the Ottoman Empire.

British military observers / advisors were with the Ottoman army during the war, but the most famous of these observers / advisors was not British, but the Prussian Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. This period also brought renewed British writings on the Ottoman military and society.

A particularly interesting observation made by Gürpinar is how British opinion of Sultan Mahmud II changed after the propagation of the *tanzimat*. Prior to which Mahmud II's destruction of the Janissaries and subsequent reforms were casted as cruel and unjust, while after which Mahmud II was envisioned as the father of the *tanzimat,* and one of the most able and energetic Sultans, an Ottoman "Peter the Great."[58] Walsh for example, likened Mahmud II to Peter the Great, labeling the Janissaries as a praetorian guard, and like Peter and the Strelitzes, Mahmud had to remove the Janissaries in order to enact long desired European reforms for his troops.[59]

Gürpinar points out that contemporary English observers, essentially military advisors or observers (like Charles MacFarlane and Adolphus Slade, both having arrived shortly after the destruction of the Janissaries) saw Mahmud II's actions against the Janissaries as horrific and his reform program arbitrarily brutal. Summarizing the reign and achievements of Mahmud II, MacFarlane observes that if one considers the success of Mahmud II's reforms as the benchmark by which to judge him then he should be greatly admired. However, if one looks at the means by which Mahmud II achieved said reforms then one can never have admiration for Mahmud II. MacFarlane saw Mahmud II actions as incredibly cruel, especially as Mahmud II acted with extreme injustice in the pursuit of justice. In his attempt to reform the Ottoman state and society into a rational and just order Mahmud II strictly enforced the rule of law upon all segments of Ottoman society, except upon himself. The laws he proposed freed his subjects from the tyranny of the *ayan*s and *ulama*, but he "showed that the laws… were not to bind *him*." He in effect became the new tyrant. In my reading MacFarlane is sympathetic to the plight of Mahmud II, bemoaning the fate that has befallen him, as if in 1829 Mahmud II was a character in a Greek

[58] Gürpinar, "The Rise and Fall of Turcophilism in Nineteenth-Century British Discourses," 351–353.
[59] Walsh, *Narrative of a Journey from Constantinople to England*, 80.

tragedy—trying to do good, but unable to escape his ultimately fate as the villain in this Ottoman drama.[60]

Adolphus Slade

Born in 1802 and educated at the Naval Collage in Portsmouth, Adolphus Slade began his relationship with the Ottoman Empire at the Battle of Navarino in 1827. However, Slade would quickly become pro-Ottoman in his outlook, coming to Istanbul in 1829 with the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829, he would spend the next two decades in and around the Ottoman Empire, both as a traveler and as liaison between Istanbul and the British fleet in the Mediterranean. [61] Sometime in or around 1850, the exact date is unclear, he become special adviser to the Ottoman Navy, and fittingly, was given the title Müşavir Pasha or "advisor" Pasha. Slade would remain with the Ottoman Navy until 1866, retiring as rear-admiral.[62] Slade wrote a number of important works on the Ottoman Empire, including an important narrative on the Crimean War, of which he was a first-hand participant and observer of, but his works were largely ignored by both his contemporaries and historians until very recently. This was due to Slade's pro-Ottoman, but often anti-reform, perspective and pension for criticizing the consensus opinion on the Ottoman Empire.[63] However, he is a critical source on the Ottoman Empire due to both his first- hand knowledge and his objectivity and has become a key source for an Ottoman perspective on the Crimean War.[64]

Slade had a keen understanding of Ottoman state and society and certainly came to embrace Ottoman culture.[65] Moreover, he was both loyal and sympathetic to the Ottomans and in fact up until his death on November 13 1877, he was writing letters and articles in the *Times* in defense of the Ottomans at the outbreak of the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War;[66] a fact that was well

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[60] Charles MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828; a Residence of Sixteen Months in the Turkish Capital and Provinces: With an Account of the Present State of the Naval and Military Power, and of the Resources of the Ottoman Empire.* (London: Saunders and Otley, 1829), 300–332.
[61] Bernard Lewis, "Slade On Turkey," in *Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East*, New ed., rev. and expanded (Chicago: Open Court, 2002).
[62] Candan Badem, "Amiral Adolphus Slade'in Osmanli Donanmasindaki Hizmetleri Ve Osmanli Imparatorluğu Üzerine Gözlemleri," *Türkiyat Mecmuasi* 21, no. 1 (2011): 115–40.
[63] Lewis, "Slade On Turkey."
[64] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010.
[65] Woods wrote that Slade lived like an Ottoman, the only difference being he had no harem. Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* 1924, 2:135.
[66] Badem, "Amiral Adolphus Slade'in Osmanli Donanmasindaki Hizmetleri Ve Osmanli Imparatorluğu Üzerine Gözlemleri."

known and was greatly appreciated by friends and officials of the Ottoman State.[67] However, there is also no doubt that Slade's first loyalty was to the British Empire, and while its scope is unknown, there is no doubt that he passed intelligence to the British during his service to the Ottomans.[68] Perhaps this was a given at the time and a form of intelligence sharing between nominal allies, but it will be a reoccurring issue with these Anglo-Ottoman officers.

Slade's Second Empire

Looking at Slade's view of the Ottoman State prior to the Crimean War we find an appraisal that is surprising similar to Baki Tezcan's "Second Empire" thesis. Tezcan referencing both Slade and Bernard Lewis' work on the works of Slade,[69] argues that Slade believed that Sultan Mahmud II had revoked a long standing Ottoman constitution and subverted the traditional liberties of Ottoman subjects. To quote Tezcan, who was quoting Lewis:

> These expressions are strikingly reminiscent of the language used by the pro-Parliament jurists during the English Civil War of the 17th century and its aftermath. The doctrine of the ancient constitution of England and the immemorial rights of Englishmen are central to the arguments which were used to justify Parliament against the King in the Civil War and, in a different way, in the ensuing struggles of the later 17th and 18th centuries…Slade applied these characteristically English doctrines to the Turkish situation, and pursuing them in great detail, found that they fitted.[70]

I have repeated this quote at length as I found it problematic that Tezcan made few references to Slade, and instead used Lewis' elegant words to justify his view.[71] However, after reading a number of books by Slade, especially his work *Turkey, Greece and Malta,*[72] I must completely agree with both Lewis and Tezcan's view. In fact, what I now find most surprising is not that Tezcan makes reference to Slade, but that he did not further elaborate upon Slade's work. I would speculate that after reading Lewis, Tezcan took only a cursory glance at Slade's works as his goal was to introduce a precedent for his work, rather than an in depth study.[73] Nevertheless,

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[67] Aleko Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 24, August 1876 Dispatch No. 6240/259, Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 15 September 1876 Dispatch No 6255/274, Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha in London, 17 May 1877 Dispatch No. 6688/267, Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Constantinople, June 6, 1877 Dispatch No. 47 813/173: Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 1st ed.., vol. 8 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009).

[68] Badem, "Amiral Adolphus Slade'in Osmanli Donanmasindaki Hizmetleri Ve Osmanli Imparatorluğu Üzerine Gözlemleri."

[69] Lewis, "Slade On Turkey."

[70] Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8–9.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Adolphus Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta*, vol. 1, 2 vols. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1837).

[73] Tezcan cites pages 303 and 305-306 from Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta*, and page 10 from Adolphus Slade, *Turkey and the Crimean War;* While these pages are relevant to the issue, they are a bit random as in Turkey,

I think a future study examining in some detail Slade's view of the reforms of Mahmud II would they both complement Tezcan's thesis and provide some nuance to Gürpinar's view of British discourse on the Ottoman state.

Gürpinar argues that prior to the *tanzimat* British writers tended to dismiss the reforms of Mahmud II as cruel and despotic—as previously demonstrated by the writings of MacFarlane. However, Slade, writing in 1837, repeatedly stated that his readers would find his criticism of Mahmud II surprising as the current outlook among commentators of the Ottoman Empire was far more positive than his.[74] This critique is interesting when we consider the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman treaty, or the treaty of Balta Limani, which preceded the *tanzimat* and was signed during a period when the Ottomans faced a renewed threat from Mehmed Ali and his Egyptian army.

Slade diverges from his account of his surroundings to pontificate on the danger of trusting Turkish sources. "An oriental has generally too much tact to show ignorance; too much indifference to display knowledge." Ask him anything and he will provide the answer you seek, disagree with him and he is sure to concede that you right. Those who published were likely to greatly mislead their readers based on the authority of locals. A story, "offspring of a leading question, is retailed as fact to every succeeding traveler," growing longer and more outlandish with each telling. Slades wrote that wise travelers in Albania now disregard stories of Ali Pasha told by the Greeks of Yanina. Because many of them had "originated in the fanciful questioning of Franks."[75]

> Let a man unfortunately have a theory in his head about Turkey, he will find "confirmations strong" in every town; will establish it "most satisfactorily," on "undeniable evidence," by the adroit or innocent use of leading questions.

Slade quoted phrases like "most satisfactorily" as they were taken directly from David Urquharts'[76] book *Turkey and its Resources.*[77] A work Slade attributes to having been written in

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Greece and Malta Slade spends a good 50 pages on the issue of old regime, constitution, and the Janissaries. While in Turkey and the Crimean War this topic is a minor issue that Slade discusses as background on the Ottoman Empire prior to the war between pages 9-18.

[74] Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta*, 1:viii-xi.

[75] Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta*, 1:293–295.

[76] David Urquhart (1805-1877) first came to the Ottoman Empire as a champion of Greek independence, but after being sent to Istanbul with Stratford Canning in 1831 he developed an affinity for the Ottoman state. This combined with his Russophobia lead him to advocate on behalf of the Ottoman Empire and write a pamphlet in 1833 called Turkey and Its Resources. Following his return to England he was elected as member a of Parliament and served until 1852 after which he was a staunch opponent of the Crimean war believing that the Ottoman empire did not

just such a fashion. Slade took fault with Urquharts' work in particular because he believed that it had become an authority on the Ottoman Empire. Slade carefully critiqued Urquharts' two main points; the resources of the Ottoman Empire and the aptitude and ability of the people of the empire to utilize them. Pointing out the resources of the empire, wrote Slade, was like "showing a forest, […] and saying, 'There is a fleet for you.' But I have no carpenters, no saws [to give you]." Urquhart, wrote Slade, spent a great deal of time searching history for, and discovering "municipal institutions" in the Ottoman Empire, but while said institutions existed, "they *no longer exist* [emphasis authors], save where upheld by revolt."[78]

It is here where Slade's work moves beyond a simple critique of authority in British travel writing and moves into a "timeless" sense as Slade outlines the arguments for Baki Tezcan's "Second Empire" thesis more than a century and half before it was written.

> I am aware that I am treading on delicate ground. So unanimously have writers agreed on one point, viz. that the Janissaries were the scourge of Turkey, a cancer which ate into her heart, that it may appear presumptuous in any one to hold a contrary opinion.[79]

Therefore after giving a brief history of the Janissaries,[80] Slade made his point about the Janissaries and popular will. The early Sultans, wrote Slade had been sent to the provinces to rule and therefore learned that the people had basic rights, however once the Sultans became disconnected from the people, it was the Janissaries who protected the will of the people. The Janissaries lived among the people, had "the same interests and occupations," and were part of the same "*esnaf*s (corporations)" as the people. They became independent from authority of the Sultan and rather took their authority from the civil rights of the people. The sultans created them from Christians, but they took them in as Muslims for protection against the sultan. They came to serve not the will of the sovereign, but the will of the people. They were "as a chamber of deputies." "Elected by the people," they defended the rights of the people, "the preservation of which depended on *their* [emphasis authors] existence." However, with the destruction of the

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need British aid in its own defense. In 1855 he founded the Free Press which was later renamed the Diplomatic Review. He became connected to the Young Ottoman movement and was an associate of Ali Suavi in particular who wrote for the Diplomatic Review. See: Edward Irving Carlyle, "Urquhart David," ed. Sidney Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography, 1885-1900* (London: Elder Smith & Co., 1899); Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London; New York; New York: Tauris Academic Studies ; Distributed in the United States and Canada by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[77] David Urquhart, *Turkey and Its Resources: Its Municipal Organization and Free Trade [&c.]*., 1833.

[78] Slade, *Turkey, Greece and Malta*, 1:295–299.

[79] Ibid, 299-300.

[80] Ibid, 300-301.

Janissaries a great number of men were executed because the people lost "their representatives" and were unable to impeach the government ministers who oppressed them. [81]

Discourse in Documents: Balta Limani

While Gürpinar makes no mention of the treaty of Balta Limani, it is worth considering, as it has been traditionally viewed as having been signed by the Ottoman state during a time of weakness, as the Ottomans desperately needed help from the British to halt the invasion of Syria and Eastern Anatolia by Mehmet Ali's modern Egyptian army. For this reason the treaty is commonly viewed as written with British economic interests in mind.[82] However, while free trade was certainly a cornerstone of British policy, it has been pointed out that at least some factions within the Ottoman state were in favor of it as they believed it would help increase trade. Moreover, the treaty with the British was not unique as the Ottomans had similar free trade agreements with both Russia and the United States.[83] Furthermore, when looking at the treaty from the perspective of British imperial discourse, from within the Foreign Office, the idea, implicitly or otherwise, that the Ottomans signed the treaty under duress is not evident. The greatest priority of the British seemed to have been making sure that Russian economic interests were blocked while ensuring that any privileges granted to British merchants were upheld in practice by the Ottoman state.[84]

From this end, an interesting discourse can be observed in how the Foreign Office officials negotiated the literal language of the treaty with their Ottoman counterparts. Apparently the treaty was written side by side in Turkish and English, with London receiving the final draft in Turkish and Istanbul keeping the final draft in English. This approach to cross-linguist standardization was not without its faults as there was some variation between the two copies in their respective capitals. A meticulous analysis of the differences between the two drafts done by Stratford De Redcliffe, the British ambassador to the Porte, found that while there were many differences, most were minor. However, a few led to serious disparities in how the treaty was understood and would be applied by the two parties. A phrase like "and in any manner of trade

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[81] Ibid, 301-308.
[82] Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 76. See also: Bülent Özdemir, *Ottoman Reforms and Social Life: Reflections from Salonica*, 1830-1850, 1st ed (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2003), 99-100.
[83] Reşat Kasaba, "Treaties and Friendships: British Imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and China in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of World History* 4, no. 2 (October 1, 1993): 219–222, doi:10.2307/20078561.
[84] Correspondence with Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, respecting the Commercial Convention with Turkey of August 16, 1838. TNA: FO 352/61

therein," included in the British copy, but missing from the Ottoman version, left the Ottomans to argue that British merchants had no rights to engage in retail trade, a right the British felt was implicit in the treaty. The point here is not how these negotiations over language and meaning eventually played out, but in the discourse British officials like Stratford used to describe the representatives of the Ottoman state. Ottoman officials were casted as duplicitous, and intentionally misunderstanding or misinterpreting the language of the treaty.[85]

Furthermore, like Slade, Stratford demonstrated his knowledge and authority. His readership would have been a much smaller then those publishing for the general public, but not unlike other authors writing about the Ottoman Empire, Stratford worked to prove his value to his readership. The members of the foreign office and government ministers who read Stratford's reports may not have always liked Stratford or his policies, but there was no doubt about his expertise on the Ottoman State.[86]

Imperial Discourse

Slade, Stratford, the Russells, Walsh and Whitman did not write what they had read in British guidebooks in London about Istanbul, they wrote about what they saw and when possible tried to give concrete examples, sources and documents to support their claims. Moreover, they were not just trying to prove their bona fides, this was not mere competition for readership and respect, they were engaged in a project to produce colonial knowledge. All officers of one sort or another of the British Empire, they were looking for truth, for objective facts that would help them understand and gain influence in the Ottoman Empire. They did not all think alike, or were part of a "foreign office mind,"[87] but they were all part of imperial discourse that valued objectivity, accuracy, authenticity and authority.

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[85] TNA: FO 352/61: Inc. 1-5 in No. 10.
[86] Steven Richmond, *The Voice of England in the East: Stratford Canning and Diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire*, 2014.
[87] Thomas G Otte, *The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865-1914* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

CHAPTER 2: FOR QUEEN AND SULTAN: ANGLO-OTTOMAN ARMIES AND OFFICERS DURING THE CRIMEAN WAR

Ottoman Army

It has been pointed out by scholars like Virginia Aksan that with the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 the new Ottoman Army, the *Muallem Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammadiye* (Victorious Muhammadan Soldiers), while being based on a European structure and model of conscription, was strictly Muslim. In other words, an army of Sunni Muslim soldiers guided by faith rather than a loyalty to the state. [88] Therefore, the inclusion of Ottoman Christian soldiers in the ranks of the army was considered by both soldier and state as an undesirable element. In fact, contemporary observers went so far as to compare Muslim attitudes towards Christians soldiers as analogous to American attitudes towards black soldiers during the same period. Likewise, Ottoman Christians had little interest in being conscripted into an army of a state that was ruled by a Muslim elite. Although, there were Ottoman Christian officers, Armenians and Greeks, who primarily served as doctor in the Ottoman army. [89] However, this raises a number of interesting questions about the role non-Muslims played in the Ottoman army. First, it seems odd that while Muslim soldier would object to fighting alongside Christians, they had seemly no problem being patients of Christians. Moreover, there are numerous cases of Christian, often non-Ottoman, officers leading Muslim troops in battle. So if it was offensive to serve with a Christian, would it not be more egregious for an Ottoman Muslim to be led into battle by a Christian.

There are abundant examples of this during the Crimean war. Particular during the Siege of Kars, during the Crimean War, when in September 1854 Lt-Colonel Williams Fenwick Williams of the Royal Artillery was sent to Kars to assess the situation there. He was given the title of *ferik* (Lt-general) by the Porte, and with this rank became in effect the overall commander of Ottoman forces in and around Kars. A position he would hold until his surrender of the city on the 27th of November 1855. This is significant as Williams, and other British officers were in direct command of entire Ottoman armies. In addition to British officers at Kars, the war saw the

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[88] Virginia H. Aksan, "The Ottoman Military and State Transformation in a Globalizing World," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 2 (2007): 265–267.
[89] Erik Jan Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice," in *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775-1925*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher (London ; New York : New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed by St. Martin's Press, 1999), 88.

formation of the Turkish Contingent or the Anglo-Turkish Contingent[90] and a related *başıbozuk süvari askeri* or *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry.

The latter was an irregular cavalry division formed by Lt-Colonel William F. Beatson, who as a major in the Indian army had raised similar levies of irregular cavalry from the local population in India. The Turkish Contingent (not to be confused with the British medical mission that served the Ottoman Army, also called the Turkish Contingent[91]) gave 20,000 Ottoman soldiers to the British. These soldiers were fed, clothed, and equipped by officers of the Indian army.[92] While Beatson's irregular cavalry was mostly made of "marginal" Ottoman forces, the soldiers of the Turkish Contingent were regular *nizamiye* and *redif* troops[93] completely under foreign Christian officers. Moreover, Ottoman military ranks were given to all British officers in both the Turkish Contingent and *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[94]

Of the two projects the Turkish Contingent was conceptually much more interesting for what it was and what it could have been, but the Contingent did not do anything, and with the exception of a few minor's skirmishes had no involvement in the war.

The Osmanlı Irregular Cavalry likewise took no active part in the war, but due to their miss-adventures left a far more interesting historical record to examine.

Therefore, while there are thousands of pages of reports, letters, memorandums, account records and logbooks in the archives of London (and perhaps a hundreds in Istanbul) on the Turkish Contingent, there are no reports of conflict between the Ottoman soldiers and their British officers, no issues concerning pay, food, conditions, or discipline. While there is some evidence of desertion, this only comes up in a general accounting of troop numbers rather than individual reports of desertions. The lack of conflict seen in the archive was the result of the type of records that were kept. Moreover, the records were primarily concerned with the British officers, so when names of individuals appear they are almost entirely British. It is exceedingly

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[90] The Ottomans never used the word "Turkish" rather referring to it as Ottoman troops under British command or the kontenjan askeri Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 259.
[91] John A Shepherd, *The Crimean Doctors: A History of the British Medical Services in the Crimean War*, vol. 2 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 559–633.
[92] February 3, 1855. BOA HR. SYS. 1192/2
[93] *Nizamiye* were trained and experienced regular Ottoman conscripts. *Redif* were reserve soldiers who had finished their enlistment as *nizamiye* and were required to serve as reserves. However in practice *nizamiyes* were often untrained and *redifs* were not veterans but other conscripts or men too old to serve as *nizamiye.* Zürcher, "The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice."
[94] BOA: İ.HR.123.6166

rare to find an Ottoman name within the records of the Turkish Contingent; this despite the fact that the British secured the right to promote from within the ranks of their Ottoman soldiers.[95]

The records for the *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry on the other hand, while far less extensive, do provide a small glimpse into the lives of the *başıbozuk*s who served under British command. This is entirely due to the conflicts and troubles caused by the *başıbozuk*s themselves. Although these records, often court-martials and inquires into misdeeds, are not without their own faults. The "voice" of the *başıbozuk*s were presented indirectly, either through an interpreter or through the voice of a British Officer, but nevertheless, court records, petitions and incidence reports do exist.

British Army

At the outset of the Crimean War the Napoleonic Wars still very much defined the nature of the British Army. In fact, Lord Regan, the elderly commander-in-chief of the British Army, had been a secretary to the Duke of Wellington and lost an arm in the Battle of Waterloo. Not only did the British soldiers wear fancy shakos and tight tunics that were more fitting to the parade ground than the battlefield, but also the officer core was still largely aristocratic as the sale of commissions was common. On the other hand, professional officers and soldiers who had been tempered in the fires of the Algerian conquests filled the French Army.[96] Moreover, the French Army numbered around 70,000 troops, while the British Army numbered around 13,000 troops.[97] The inequality between the British and French military forces in the Crimean War, and therefore respective influence within the Ottoman state was a key motivation to form the Turkish Contingent.[98]

Service in the Ottoman Army

At the start of the long 19th century there were two paths to service for a foreigner in the Ottoman Army. The first was as a renegade, a convert who, for whatever reason, "turned Turk," fully embracing Ottoman cultural, political and religious thought and lifestyle. Depending on their merit and connections such a man could rise to the highest levels of the Ottoman state.

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[95] February 3, 1855. BOA HR. SYS. 1192/2
[96] Orlando Figes, *The Crimean War: A History* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 144–146.
[97] Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage, v. 44 (Boston: Brill, 2010), 259.
[98] Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, vol. 2 (London, New York, Longmans, Green, 1888), 409–410, http://archive.org/details/lifeofrighthonou01lane.

Ömer Pasha being a classic example. The second was as a military instructor, Baron de Tott, a French military instructor in the late 18th century, being a good example of this.[99] During the war some attributed the success of the Turkish artillery to Baron de Tott, despite clear the temporal distance.[100]

As the Ottoman state saw the need to reform the army men with modern military knowledge, although often dubious qualifications, were recruited to help train the reforming Ottoman military. However, especially with the rise of Mehmet Ali in Egypt, who paid better and offered higher ranks, such men were few, and their rank or status within the Ottoman state was never that high.[101] The difference between the renegade and the instructor was their Ottoman identity, the former who became Ottoman, and the latter who kept his foreign identity, which in the period meant whether or not they changed their religious identity. This is not to say that there were not other paths for foreigners to serve the Ottoman state, and this is not considering the many individuals and families who were neither completely Ottoman nor completely foreign, i.e. trans-imperial subjects. In the British case the Levantine families were a good example of this. However, such trans-imperial subjects and other were effectively outside the Ottoman military, they were doctors, diplomats, merchants, and translators, not soldiers and generals. A good example of this was Julius Millingen, a doctor who came to the Ottoman Empire with the Greek War for independence, attended to Lord Byron on his deathbed, was captured by the Ottomans, brought to Istanbul, [102] set up a medical practice and became the personal physician to the Sultan, married a local Armenian girl and fathered Frederick Milligan, who we will have cause to discuss, divorced his first wife and married into a prominent Levantine family, and went to be the doctor who proclaimed Sultan Abdul Aziz's death as suicide.[103]

However, the 19th century saw a radical shift in how foreign military officers would come to engage with the Ottoman military. This change was due to Anglo-Ottoman military cooperation, alliance, and mutual self-interest and set the stage for later cooperation and alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Germany culminating in WWI. The German influence on the Ottoman

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[99] Virginia H. Aksan, "Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott: Reframing the Question of Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1760-1830," *The International History Review* 24, no. 2 (June 1, 2002): 253–77.
[100] "The Turkish Army," *The Illustrated Magazine of Art* 4, no. 22 (January 1, 1854): 201–2.
[101] Avigdor Levy, "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826-39," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, no. 1 (January 1, 1971): 21–39.
[102] Julius Michael Millingen, *Memoirs of the Affairs of Greece, Containing an Account of the Military and Political Events Which Occurred in 1823 and Following Years* (London, J. Rodwell, 1831).
[103] Irvin Cemil Schick, "Introduction," in *Thirty Years in the Harem* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2005).

army is well remembered because of WWI, but it should not be forgotten that Ottomans fought two major wars, the Crimean and Russo-Ottoman war 1853-1856 and 1877-1878 respectively, along with numerous revolts, rebellions, and military campaigns both direct and indirect British support.

Starting with the Anglo-Ottoman campaign to drive out the remainders of Napoleon's forces from Egypt at the turn of the 19th century until the outbreak of the First World War, British officers played key roles in the Ottoman military and state. Although the British were not at all times on the Ottomans side, the Greek war of independence, and later the Cretan revolt being two examples.

Starting in 19th century we see a new kind of relationship between foreign officers and the Ottoman army, that of the advisor / observer. The famous Prussian officer Helmuth von Moltke is a good example as is the British officer Charles MacFarlane.[104] These officers were agents of a foreign state both observing and advising the Ottoman Army, whatever diplomatic or political arrangements had lead to their time with the Ottoman Army there was no doubt that their loyalty, whatever their sympathies were to the Ottomans, lay with their home countries. These were foreign military advisor to the Ottomans. While common today, this seems to be the first real example of this in the modern period.

However, it was the evolution of this the advisor / observer which is a major focus of this study, these "soldiers of empire." These men, of which Slade was the first, filled the role of both foreign advisor and high-ranking Ottoman officer—without converting. Their identity was mixed, sometimes Levantine, and like the Levantines enjoyed the protection and status of both the British and Ottoman Empires.

Renegades

During the Crimean War Ottoman forces were lead by Ömer Pasha. Born in 1806, Michael Lattas in Janja Gora, a village in the Lika region bordering the Ottoman Empire, of the Habsburg Empire. Son of military officer, young Lattas attended a military school, learned German and Italian and by 1827 was a sergeant in the Habsburg army. In 1827 he crossed the border and after making friends with some of the Muslim elite of Bosnia learned Turkish and changed his name

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[104] Charles MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828: A Residence of Sixteen Months in the Turkish Capital and Provinces: With an Account of the Present State of the Naval and Military Power, and of the Resources of the Ottoman Empire* (Saunders and Otley, 1829).

to Ömer Lütfı. After coming to the attention of the Ottoman military authorities, he was made a *subaşı* and made an instructor in Istanbul at the War Academy. After a chance meeting with Sultan Mahmud II he was brought to the palace and made a teacher to the Sultan's son, Abdulmecid. During his time in Istanbul it was reported that he stayed away from the Europeans living in Istanbul and instead made strong connections with the *ulema* and those in the palace. When his student became Sultan in 1839 Ömer received the title pasha.[105] This distain for fellow Western Europeans and embrace of Ottoman culture were no doubt important in Latas "becoming Ottoman" and his eventual high rank and status. Certainly the support of his former student, Abdulmecid, helped his career, but the fact that Ömer Pasha had so embedded himself in Ottoman political, military, and religious life that he was able to become a key minister of state. Ömer Pasha was able to achieve the highest offices of the empire through his adoption of an Ottoman lifestyle. His biographer reported that he not only embraced Islam, but also "lived according to the customs of the Ottoman world." Moreover, he stayed in touch with this family and both his nephew and order brother would join him in both the Ottoman army and as converts to Islam.[106]

After his promotion to Pasha his career follows a typical arc, he served across the empire fighting both internal and external enemies and served as governor in a number of providence before becoming the supreme military leader of the Ottoman army during the Crimean War.[107]

However, in 1848 this "traditional" system would be upended when hundreds of Hungarian soldiers sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire after the failed revolution in Hungary. As enemies of Russia with military skills they were welcomed into the Ottoman Empire. Although not required, conversion to Islam offered a number of benefits to these émigré officers. In addition to better conditions, officers who enlisted were given their original rank in the Ottoman army. "This enabled the converts (or the renegades (*renegdtok*), as they were referred to in Hungarian) to live more comfortably than the rest."[108] However, although by the fall of 1849 some two hundred and

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[105] Markus Koller, "Omer Pasha Latas: From the Balkans to the Crimea," in *The Crimean War 1853-1856: colonial skirmish or rehearsal for World War? : empires, nations, and individuals*, ed. Jerzy W Borejsza (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo "Neriton", Instytut Historii PAN, 2011), 39–43.
[106] Ibid., 51–52.
[107] Ibid., 44–47.
[108] Helena Toth, "Emigres: The Experience of Political Exile for Germans and Hungarians, 1848--1871" (Ph.D., Harvard University, 2008), 160, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.csus.edu/pqdthss/docview/304600387/abstract/E2C4B007DF76462BPQ/1?accountid=10358.

fifty common soldiers, four generals, and more than thirty officers of other ranks converted to Islam,[109] these conversations seemed superficial at best.

Converts were allowed to put-off circumcision and beyond receiving new names, there seemed to have been little change. For example, according to Helena Toth, General Gyorgy Kmety, known as Ismail Pasha converted, but what is interesting is that a number of European accounts I read reported that Kmety did not convert, which speaks to his superficial conversation. Generally when European writers met an Ottoman officer who had converted they would make a point of it. Those who had not converted were referred to as a Hungarian, Pole, or Austrian in "Turkish service." For example, when the Prince of Wales rode visited Syria in 1862 he wrote that he rode with "Colonel O'Reilly (Hassan Bey) who is an Irishman in the Turkish service."[110]

However, despite the superficial nature of his conversation Kmety would serve heroically at the siege of Kars during the Crimean war and later be given supreme command over all Ottoman land forces in Beirut immediately after the crisis in 1860.[111] In fact, he was so trusted that the aforementioned Fuad Pasha that he wrote "I do not pretend to have great skill in military tactics; but I can rely on an authority… [that everyone recognizes]… of Ismail Pasha *ferik* (General Kmety) who assisted me in person in all these operations."[112]

The fact that Kmety was given the name Ismail Pasha, does not prove that he converted. In this period it appears that any foreign officer who served *with* the Ottomans was given an Ottoman name. For example, Slade was given the name Müşavir Pasha (Advisor Pasha), and in 1854, before the British army arrived in the Ottoman Empire, when British officers volunteered to serve with the Ottomans, they were given Ottoman names. Two good examples of this were Beatson, who was know as Shemshi Pasha,[113] and Henry Astbury Leveson[114], who was known as Kara Bey.[115] However, once Beatson was no longer serving *with* the Ottomans, but rather had an

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[109] Ibid., 161.
[110] Albert Edward, "The Prince of Waless Journal: 6 February - 14 June 1862" 1862, https://www.royalcollection.org.uk/exhibitions/the-prince-of-waless-journal-6-february-14-june-1862-0.
[111] Abro Sahak Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Beirut Barracks, July 28, 1860. Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 1st ed.., vol. 9 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009).
[112] Fuad Pasha to Âli Pasha Beirut, January 2, 1860. Ibid.
[113] Richard Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny: The Turbulent Career of a Victorian Soldier* (I.B.Tauris, 2015).
[114] Henry Astbury Leveson served with the Madras Army, See: Madras Service Army Lists 1847-1859, IOR/L/MIL/11/50-66. February 24 1854 was appointed to the general staff of the Ottoman Army in Bulgaria and Wallachia. Fought in a number of cavalry engagements, was awarded by the Ottomans, TNA: FO 352/61
[115] TNA: FO 352/61

independent command from the Ottomans, he no longer used his Ottoman name. Likewise, while both General Williams and Vivian were given the title *ferik,* neither took Ottoman names.

Therefore, we can see that those who served with or under Ottoman command were given Ottoman names, but those who commanded Ottoman troops under with Ottoman permission, but under the authority of the British military did not. The Ottoman desire for émigrés to convert seems like an act of political submission, rather than a statement about religious belief.

In the words of one émigré, those who converted were given higher ranks and taught the language and religious rituals of the Ottomans, they were treated as equals, but "the circumcision— no pleasant token of devotion—was wisely postponed to another time." The Ottomans were content to take off the Hungarians' names, "together with their worn-out clothes and to give them the well-sounding names of Turkish heroes: Murad, Mehmed, Ali, Iskender and others."[116]

In other words, an émigrés conversion to Islam showed loyalty to the Sultan, while his rejection of his former lands religion demonstrated a withdrawal of loyalty from his pervious ruler. Moreover, conversion allowed the renegade more than just an opportunity to switch loyalties, by becoming Muslim he become not only Ottoman but a member of the *askeriye*, the military elite of the Ottoman state.[117]

The case of Frederick Millingen is a perfect example of renegade who showed loyalty and identity through religious conversion. Born to the aforementioned Protestant father (Julius Millingen) and an Armenian mother, he converted to Catholicism alongside his mother after she devoiced his father and went to Rome. Frederick Millingen Returned to the Ottoman Empire after his mother married Kıbrıslı Mehmed Pasha and converted to Islam, he took the name Osman Bey, served in the Crimean War, and later led Albanian irregulars against Kurdish irregulars on behalf of the Ottoman Empire in the 1860's. Then after his mother left Kıbrıslı Pasha and fled the Ottoman Empire for England, Millingen took on a British persona. Then after falling out in England left the British for the Russian Empire, converted to Orthodoxy and took the name Vladimir Andreevich. He then fought against Kurdish irregulars defending Ottoman lands while serving the Russian Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Later he left the

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[116] Quoted in: Toth, "Emigres," 160–161.
[117] Tobias P. Graf, "Of Half-Lives and Double-Lives: 'Renegades' in the Ottoman Empire and Their Pre-Conversion Ties, Ca. 1580-1610," in *Well-Connected Domains towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. Pascal Firges, 2014, 133.

Russian Empire and reassumed his Anglo-Ottoman identity, using both Frederick Millingen and Osman Bey as names.

After the Crimean War a number of foreign officers served with the Ottomans, some took Ottoman name, other did not, but regardless it does not appear that any of them converted, even if they had a "Muslim" name. For example, Eugene O'Reilly who served with the *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry would enter Ottoman service after the war and take or be given the name Hassan Bey, but despite the slander of the famed Richard Burton (an episode which will be discussed shortly), it does not appear that he converted. However, even the nominal practice of foreign officers in Ottoman service taking Ottoman names seems to have changed after the Crimean War. In the 1860s, after the retirement of Slade, two important and long serving British naval officers entered Ottoman service, Hobart and Woods Pasha. Although both used the title pasha, neither took Ottoman names, unlike Slade; this despite the fact that both served the Ottoman Navy for decades and had close personal relationships with high Ottoman officials and Sultans. Also interestingly, two men who served in the Ottoman Gendarmes after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, George Borthwick and James Blunt, would be known as Mahir Pasha and Blunt Pasha respectively. Why Borthwick had an Ottoman name and not Blunt is unknown. It can be said with certainty that neither converted, and both men entered Ottoman service at the same time.

However, while there was certainly a change in Ottoman attitudes about names and conversation, some Hungarian and Polish officers did truly convert and followed a similar career path to Ömer Pasha. For example, Konstanty Borzecki, who, in addition to being a prolific author and writer a key work of Turkology—*Les Turc anciens et modernes*, was an Ottoman army officer of Polish decent who rose to the rank of *ferik* as Mustafa Djelaleddin Pasha. Like many other he left Paris for Istanbul in the wake of the 1849 Hungarian uprising. Converting to Islam like Jozef Bem, who became Murad Pasha. He served in the Crimean war, the pacification of Iraq in 1858, Montenegro in 1861-62, and Crete in 1867. He was killed in Montenegro in 1876.[118] While this figure is outside the scope of this study, he was another good example of the classic renegade who seems to have embraced his Ottoman identity.

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[118] Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, "Whose Nation? Mustafa Djelaleddin between Ottomanism and Turkism," in *The Crimean War 1853-1856: colonial skirmish or rehearsal for World War? : empires, nations, and individuals*, ed. Jerzy W Borejsza (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo "Neriton", Instytut Historii PAN, 2011).

Imperial Service

At the outset of the Crimean War British officers were leading and fighting with the Ottoman. In 1853 at the very outset of the war seven British officers from both the British and Indian armies "found their way to the camp of Hassan Pasha," and freely joined the Ottoman Army. In one of the first engagements of the war three of these officers were killed in action.[119]

Yet these British officers who came to the Ottoman Empire after Slade did not convert. Their status was not based on their religious identity, but on their military acumen and political loyalty. In this era of Anglo-Ottoman military cooperation they were patriots and military advisors in the most modern sense of the words.

[119] Thomas Buzzard, *With the Turkish Army in the Crimea and Asia Minor: A Personal Narrative* (London: John Murray, 1915), 4–5.

CHAPTER 3: THE TURKISH CONTINGENT

The Turkish Contingent was officially formed on the 3rd of February 1855 by the terms of a treaty signed by the Ottoman and British Empires. The treaty gave 20,000 Ottoman soldiers to the British. These soldiers were led, fed, clothed, equipped, and paid by the British. The Turkish Contingent was commanded by Major-General Robert John Vivian of the Indian army.[120] However, unlike the regular British army, the Turkish Contingent was staffed and led by British officers of the Indian Army[121] who had spent their careers helping the East India Company systematically conquer India. Giving them an experience with not only warfare, but with commanding colonial troops. However, Slade believed that their experience commanding Indian troops was detriment as they expected Ottoman troop to act in the same subservient manner as their Indian Sepoys.[122]

Adolphus Slade

Slade's keen observations and analysis of the Crimean War are worth dissecting in some detail, he suggests that had the Ottoman army transferred from the Crimea to the Caucasus that they could have very easily driven out the Russians and instead of the Russians being given the Caucasus during the Paris peace negotiations they would have had to forfeit all claim to them, which would have spared the catastrophe which befell half-a-million Caucasians who were expelled from their homes

> …for the crime of having fought in defence of them for thirty years and humanity the pain of seeing their misery traded on by cupidity and lust: the cupidity which conveyed the exiles from shore to shore in ill-conditioned vessels, as closely stowed as Africans in slavers, and the lust which culled girls of all ages from destitute crowds in border towns of the Black Sea.[123]

Moreover, Slade made the point that the Porte could not afford to leave such a great army sitting in the Crimea. Not only was supply and transportation extremely costly, but it also deprived the Empire of men and material it needed on other fronts. Slade reported that every region of the Empire was destitute for the lack of troops, for example Baghdad was garrisoned by only 700 regulars, inviting a possible Persian attack. This strain, wrote Slade, was further exacerbated by the requirement that the Ottomans provide troops for the Anglo Turkish

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[120] "BOA HR. SYS. 1192/2" February 3, 1855.
[121] IOR E. 4/830 February 7, 1855.
[122] Adolphus Slade, *Turkey and the Crimean War; a Narrative of Historical Events* (London, Smith, Elder and co., 1867), 380.
[123] Ibid., 377.

Contingent.[124] Slade reported that the required number was 25,000 troops, but all reports I have seen including the treaty itself say only 20,000.

Like his "second Empire analysis," Slade offered a thoroughly modern interpretation of the formation, organization and use of the Turkish contingent. He provides a very nuanced analysis, writing that while the British expected these troops to be ready immediately for service, the Porte was reluctant and perhaps not a bit regretful at having agreed to the arrangement. However, having agreed to the treaty and not having "the firmness to state its reasons" in opposition to the contingent, the Porte instead acted slowly in providing the promised troops.[125] Slade wrote that for both religious and national reason Ottoman society was widely opposed to the contingent. Slade suggested that the British thought "to raise an Anglo-Turkish army after the Indian model," but that the Ottomans were unambiguously opposite to such an "amalgamation."[126]

However, while the Ottomans did not give the British the raw-recruits that could be molded into the kinds of armies, which served the British in India, the contingent was still staffed by Indian officers. Slade wrote that such Indian officers were "accustomed to rule haughtily a subject race," with few exceptions, they were not men who could "act judiciously with a dominant race, imbued with traditions of military renown." These officers arrived in Istanbul expecting an army waiting to be commanded, but instead found only a handful of troops. Still, wrote Slade, they talked of Istanbul as Calcutta and the Ottomans as the Indians.[127] The sight of Ottoman soldiers under British officers was disturbing to the locals of Istanbul so the Porte hoped to find a place "out of sight out of mind" for the contingent. Slade wrote that Kertch (on the Crimean peninsula, but far in the rear of the fighting) was chosen as the best location for the contingent both by the British and French and the Ottomans. Slade, like others reports that the petty jealousies of the British and French commanders resulted in a contingent not being sent into action, but also said that the Ottomans did not want to contingent serving alongside other Ottoman troops. The reason for this was clear, the Ottomans did not want their own troops comparing their meager rations provisions and a late pay to their comrades in the contingent. Slade suggested that despite the *esprit de corps* of the regular Ottoman soldiers and officers, who

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[124] Ibid., 378–379.
[125] This was a recurring request from both Canning and Vivian for the Ottomans to provide the troops they promised. See: Stratford Canning to Saffet Effendi, BOA HR. SYS. 1192/2 April 19, 1855.
[126] Slade, *Turkey and the Crimean War; a Narrative of Historical Events*, 379.
[127] Ibid., 380–381.

had long served together, that under British command, and with British surgeons, and adequate pay and provisions have the contingent input near an enemy army they would've proved to be an extremely effective fighting force. Moreover, Slade suggested that had the contingent been sent to Kars, as many had suggested, they would have played a significant role and perhaps change the outcome of the war in the East.[128]

These arguments echoed the parliamentary debates after the fall of Kars. Some at the time argued that had the Turkish Contingent and Beatson's *başıbozuk*s been sent they would have saved Kars and secured victory for the allies in the Caucuses. The reasons for the contingent deployment to Kertch and not in combat, was similar both attributed to British officials who did not believe that the contingent was ready and to Ömer Pasha, who while initially supported front line deployment, later came to vehemently oppose putting the Turkish contingent on the front lines. He even argued that he could not send troops to reinforce Kars because the contingent was not able to support his forces in the Crimea.[129]

Anglo-Indian Officers of the Turkish Contingent

The Anglo-Indian officers who served in the Turkish Contingent were motivated by simple career advancement. Some were Russiophobic, but most saw service as an opportunity for career advancement as they offered one rank higher than their rank in India by serving in the Ottoman / British Army.[130] However, they were clearly not equal to their native British colleagues coming from England, rather they were seen as second-class with in the hierarchy of the British military. However, their service in the Crimean war and with Ottoman army was clearly a badge of distinction and useful for their careers back in India.

Typical career of an Anglo-Indian officer who served in the Turkish Contingent was like John Baillie's. Joined the 26th Bengal Light Infantry in 1843, fought against the Sikh Empire of the Punjab at the battle of Mudki and Ferozeshah in 1845, and the battle of Sobraon in 1846. Took a furlough in 1854, shortly after returning to England volunteered for the Turkish Contingent. Was a Brigade-Major in the Turkish Contingent, was honored for his service in the

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[128] Ibid., 380–384.
[129] HC Deb 28 April 1856 vol 141 cc1594-688
[130] TNA: WO 43/976 March 1855: Officers of the East India Company army who may except service in the east either in the staff of the British Army or in the discipline of the Turkish levees.
Those officers assisting in disciplining the Turkish levies will be allowed one step of local rank higher than that which they hold or may have held in the East India Company service, and they will receive the British pay and allowances of such advanced local rank.

Crimean War and returned to India in time to fight in the Mutiny of 1857, stayed in the Indian army until his retirement in 1875.[131]

John Luther Vaughan

Although it is easy to track the many of Anglo-Indian officers who served in the Turkish Contingent across multiple achieves, little can be learned beyond a basic outlines of their careers. However, John Luther Vaughan is an exception to this, because he was one of the very few to write about his experience in the Turkish Contingent. While there are records on Vaughan spanning three continents, the UK, Turkey, and India, they prove little more than he was when and where he said he was in his account.

Vaughan's father died when he was young. From school received a cadetship in the Bengal Army and left England for India in 1840. Quickly studied the native language, passed an exam, and by 1841 was serving in the Bengal infantry. Puts in his account that he participated in serious campaigns in Maharajpore and Punniar in 1843, apparently bloody, but wrote he would not write about the horrors of battle, but rather than wishing to forget and celebrated the glory of it.[132]

Expressed the same kind of martial race ideas about Sikhs and Muslims as other officers, but very little about natives under his command.[133]

In 1854, after more than 14 years in India he returned to England for health reasons,[134] and with Crimean war already at its height, heard about the Turkish Contingent from an officer of the Madras army in Bombay. With this officer he went to Istanbul and met with Vivian, their qualifications and credentials were good but Vivian had nothing yet to offer them, continued to England but as soon as he arrived was recalled by Vivian and given a commission as an assistant adjutant quarter master general[135] with local rank of major.[136]

As the Turkish Contingent took no part in the war, neither did Vaughan. Received 4th class Medjidee medal for his service in the Ottoman Empire,[137] but wrote that peace was disappointing

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[131] Alexander F. Baillie, "Obituary: Major-General John Baillie, F. R. G. S., H. M. Bengal Staff Corps.," *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography* 11, no. 4 (April 1, 1889): 246–47.
[132] John Luther Vaughan, *My Service in the Indian Army, and after* (London, A. Constable, 1904), 2–18.
[133] Ibid., 20–48.
[134] Bengal Service Army Lists: IOR/L/MIL/10/36-67
[135] Vaughan, *My Service in the Indian Army, and after*, 49–51.
[136] BOA İ.HR 123/6166
[137] General Orders Queens Troops, 15 June 1858, No.59, page 231, NAI

and he had wanted to be in the thick of the war, the reason he had taken service with "*Osmanli*" troops.[138]

The Turkish Contingent and British Ambitions

It is interesting to consider to what degree British imperial ambitions may have influenced the formation of the Turkish Contingent and if the use of Indian Army officers to train and command Ottoman troops was an attempt to establish some type of semi-colonial relationship with the Ottoman Porte. In a report on the Turkish Contingent in early 1856 the War office asked General Vivian how the Turkish Contingent could perpetuated and if so would it be "political or moral advantages" for Christianity or civilization?" That exactly this question implies is not completely clear, but Vivian's answer seems to suggest British "political advantages" in the Ottoman Empire.

> I consider the Turk constitutionally much less adapted to suit himself to our views and feelings than the Indian or Sepoy. […] The Sepoy has been improved under our command, [but British rule has long been in India] the same effect may be produced in the Turk, but it can only be bought about in time.[139]

Vaughan wrote in a similar vain that while Ottoman soldiers lacked the "smart appearance of which Western nations think so much," they were in both mind and body excellent soldiers. This combined with "excellent and plentiful rations" and reliable pay led the these soldiers to quickly develop "respect and obedience to their English officers." Moreover, these troops were veterans who had been trained and served under Ottoman officers for many years, not the raw recruits of India who received their "first training from English officers." However, despite fears to the contrary, the troops of the Turkish Contingent were a "machine" that worked in perfect harmony with their British officers.[140]

Vaughan made this point in part to praise the virtues of the British officer, but writing with hindsight also made the point that just as British officers had successfully taken over the army of Egypt, the same could have been accomplished in the Ottoman Empire. Although this was not a political analysis, rather an imperialist praising the qualities of British Empire, it is not far-fetched to imagine a counterfactual history where after failure to repay loans, or to "protect" Christian minorities, after an initial occupation of Istanbul by the Indian Army, a cadre of British

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[138] Vaughan, *My Service in the Indian Army, and after*, 63–64.
[139] TNA: WO 33/2A, Inc. 1, February 12, 1856.
[140] Vaughan, *My Service in the Indian Army, and after*, 59–61.

officers organized and lead regular Ottoman soldiers in the "defense of the Sultan" as they did in Egypt. I am not trying to argue that the Ottoman Empire should have been a British colonial possession, or could have been, but rather pointing out what British imperialist themselves saw, that the British Empire was very good at using local troops to control the local population in both India and Egypt. Moreover, in WW I the British had no problems leading Muslim soldiers against the Ottomans in the Mesopotamian campaigns. Furthermore, even today in Turkey there is the lingering fear of Western imperialism and I believe that this is rooted in the 19th century Ottoman experience with European colonial powers. And while the Ottomans were certainly imperialists themselves, there is no doubt that they were cautious about British designs on the Ottoman Empire as the examples of Egypt and India gave them every indication of what the British were capable of. Therefore, as I will discuss in the Russo Turkish war, I believe the Ottomans make sure that no British officer was in command of a significant number of Ottoman troops which could have been used against their own empire.

In late 1856, as the war was coming to an end, Stratford De Redcliffe a chief architect of the Turkish Contingent, nearly convinced Sultan Abdülmecid I to take the Turkish Contingent into Ottoman pay, after the British government had decided to no longer fund it. Stratford argued to the Sultan that the Turkish Contingent could be used as a means to enforce the *Hatt-ı Hümayun,* and protect the Sultan from possible resistance to it. However, the Sultan prudently refused, as in the magisterial words of Harold Temperley,

> A Turkish Imperial Guard, officered by Englishmen, would have protected the Padishah against all attack. But a sultan, surrounded by Stratford's praetorians, would have been the prisoner, or the instrument, of England.[141]

While I do not suggest that there was some kind of British plan to use the Turkish Contingent to seize control of the Ottoman state. At least some British officers viewed the Ottomans as potential colonial clients; if nothing else, evidence of a colonial discourse in regards to the Ottoman State.

Reflecting on the Turkish Contingent and the *Osmanli* irregulars, Stratford wrote that the war ended before these soldiers under "Christian officers" were able to distinguish themselves. However, the Ottoman troops were so well disposed to serving under British officers that after

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[141] Harold Temperley, "The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855-8," *The English Historical Review* 47, no. 186 (April 1, 1932), pp. 234-236.

their return to the provinces "it would have been easy to raise an auxiliary force" to help put down the 1857 Indian Mutiny, even thought it would have meant fighting against other Muslims. In fact, Stratford claimed that the Sultan confirmed this, saying that Ottoman troops would fight for the British understanding that the "question in India is not one of religion."[142]

Even the *başıbozuk*s he believed could have been successfully lead by British officers.[143] Skenes wrote that he often asked Ottoman soldiers "if there was any hope of England taking over the whole Turkish army." Ottoman soldiers of the Turkish Contingent loved and feared their British officers, and under them would never even dream of stealing food or money.[144] British officers in both the Turkish Contingent and irregulars were required to learn commands in Turkish, and many learned a great deal more.[145] There is good reason to believe that a number of officers learned proficient Turkish in their time serving in the Ottoman Empire, especially those who seem to have a talent for language and had already learned Arabic, Urdu and Persian in India.[146]

Imperial Ambition

Slade's was offended that the Anglo-Indian officers who came to Istanbul expected their Ottoman soldiers to behave like Sepoys, believing that the Ottomans would not tolerate such humiliation.[147] However, Slade may have not grasped the full extent of this assertion, Anglo-Indian officers may have wanted their troops to be subservient, but officers like Vaughan saw their Ottoman troops as valuable, the "best troops in Europe," an asset that could be used to the advantage of both the Ottoman and British Empires.[148] After all, prior to the great Munity of 1857 the Sepoys of the Indian army were in many cases allies of the British, forces who fought with the British to fight their own enemies. It was not the British who had conquered India, by

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[142] Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, 2:410–411.
[143] Ibid., 2:410.
[144] James Henry Skene, *With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War* (London : R. Bentley, 1883), 43, http://archive.org/details/cu31924028535825.
[145] Ibid., 54.
[146] Frederic John Goldsmid, who served as an Assistant-Adjutant-Gerneral in the Turkish Contingenti is a goof example of this. T. H. T., "Major-General Sir Frederic John Goldsmid, K.C.S.I., C.B.," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, April 1, 1908, 619–29.
[147] Slade, *Turkey and the Crimean War; a Narrative of Historical Events*, 380.
[148] Vaughan, *My Service in the Indian Army, and after*, 53.

Indians who had conquered India.[149] The Turkish Contingent would fight not just for the British, but for an Ottoman ruling faction allied with the British.

British observers both contemporary and modern saw the Ottomans as foolish for not using the Turkish Contingent. However, this ignores Ottoman interests outside of the war, the Ottomans likely didn't want the Turkish contingent to go to Kars because they didn't not want so many Ottoman troops under British command concentrated in one area. The sheer number of British officers and Ottoman troops that were reasonably loyal to them might have made this a frightening prospect. Not a threat like Egyptian Army in that this British lead army would have marched from Kars to Istanbul, but that as the war was drawing to an end such a concentration of British officers essentially part of the Ottoman military structure would have been a threat to later negotiations with the European powers and given the British a dominated position within the Ottoman Empire.

[149] G. J. Bryant, "Indigenous Mercenaries in the Service of European Imperialists: The Case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army, 1750-1800," *War in History* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 2–28, doi:10.1177/096834450000700102.

CHAPTER 4: THE OSMANLI IRREGULAR CAVALRY

On the morning of September 26, 1855, a group of irregulars camped on the Dardanelle Peninsula awoke to find themselves surrounded by hostile forces. In the hills above the valley of their camp 400 regular Ottoman soldiers with supporting artillery were drawn up in battle formation,[150] to their rear French troops were landing, and on the coast a British gunboat was poised ready to open fire. Anglo-Franco-Ottoman cooperation was one of the things that made the Crimean war unique, but this situation was even more unique as the irregulars in question were not Russian Cossacks, but Ottoman irregulars under the command of British officers.

Contemporary observers were not surprised by this turn of events, for the Ottoman irregular horsemen in question were known as *başıbozuk,* which roughly translates as "crazy-headed." So called because they were notorious for their lack of discipline, violent demeanor, and practice of raiding whatever local community they were stationed in, regardless of whether the civilians were enemies or allies. However, the British officers of the East India Company who had recruited them believed that they were superb soldiers, and that with leadership, training, discipline, British arms and pay they would be a valuable asset to the war effort.

This belief was based on the experience of these Anglo-Indian officers leading irregulars in India. In the armies of the East India Company these irregulars had many names, but were most often referred to as *silladars,*[151] meaning "bearer of arms" in Persian. Their irregular status was not based on their lack of professionalism, but because they bought their own arms. By the period of the Crimean War the East India Company had multiple *silladar* regiments in the Bombay Army, Madras Army, and Bengal Army.[152] However, the most respected and prestigious *silladar* regiments were in the Nizam of Hyderabad[153] (the Princely State allied with the East India Company), the same regiments Beatson had served in before coming to the Ottoman Empire.[154]

Silladar regiments were small, about 400 native cavalrymen, and lead by only a handful of British officers. The relatively few British officers allowed for numerous and high-ranking native

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[150] BOA. HR. MKT. 114/1 BOA. HR. SYS. 1337/35 suppression of the British government's *başıbozuks*. mentioned that these troops were Albanian. Ottoman forces were commanded by Miralay Muhiddin Bey
[151] Trower, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry*, 18–19.
[152] Sumit Walia, "Origin of Cavalry in Indian Army and the Silladar System," *Indian Defence Review* 26, no. 1 (June 3, 2014), http://www.indiandefencereview.com/origin-of-cavalry-in-indian-army-and-the-silladar-system/.
[153] Trower, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry*, 12–17.
[154] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.

officers within each regiment. This, combined with regular *darbars* (meetings of the regiment) where everyone had right to speak on all matters, led to a close-knit "family" connection within each regiment.[155] Beatson applied this organizational system to his Ottoman *başıbozuk* regiments. He did this in part because he lacked sufficient numbers of British officers to staff his regiments,[156] but also because he believed that a similar promotion and trust in native officers would foster the same kind of unity and loyalty he experienced in Hyderabad.[157]

Therefore, when the complaints from locals and allies flooded in to Beatson and increased to such a point that Ottoman troops were sent to put down Beatson's *başıbozuks,* Beatson and his officers claimed that their regiments were not under attack for the theft, rapes and murders committed by the *başıbozuks,* but rather because of their notorious reputation. Moreover, these British officers argued that the violence carried out by their men was no different, and in fact less serious, than the crimes of regular French and British troops. This is particularly interesting as there was no doubt that *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry had attacked, stolen, raped and murdered British, French and Ottoman subjects. The position of these Anglo-Indian officers aside, their *başıbozuks* were not the *silladars* they were used to commanding. In the Nizam of Hyderabad, *silladars* came from the Muslim ruling elite, therefore the *silladars* were not only from the highest social ranks,[158] but were also Muslim, the best martial race for irregular cavalry.[159] However, in the Ottoman Empire while *başıbozuks* were Muslim,[160] they were certainly not among the Ottoman elite. In fact they were often from the peripheries of the Empire and from tribal elements that did not speak Ottoman Turkish. They had horses and arms, which meant that they were not from the lowest segments of Ottoman society - a fact that may have led their British officers to believe that their status was higher than it actually was. However, politically *başıbozuks* were on the absolute peripheries of Ottoman state and society, unlike the men that filled the ranks of the *silladars*.. Moreover unlike the *silladar*, a *başıbozuk* was not a member of

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[155] Walia, "Origin of Cavalry in Indian Army and the Silladar System."
[156] W. F. Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," *Bristol Selected Pamphlets*, 1856, 6.
[157] Ibid., 35.
[158] Trower saw the wealth, class and pedigree of the troops as critical to the success of the silladar system. Trower, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry*, 25–35.
[159] At the time it was written "martial race" theory had not yet been explicitly developed in British India, but nevertheless Trower wrote that Muslim "made the best Irregular Cavalry." Ibid., 41.
[160] Although I have seen it claimed that a good number of the Albanian başıbozuks were Christians. M. E. Durham, *Through the Lands of the Serb* (Рипол Классик, n.d.), 96–97.

an elite rank that could be passed from father to son or sold to generate income,[161] and in fact there is a great deal of ambiguity as to just what a *başıbozuk* actually was.

Başıbozuks

Başıbozuks were "bands of warriors, or semi-autonomous regiments" who fought for the Ottomans after the breakdown of the "classical" Ottoman military in the 17th century. In the classic age of *janissaries* and *sipahi*s they were auxiliaries known as *sekban, sarıca, levend,* or *deli.* However, as the old system broke down the army was reformed, and these mercenary bands were increasingly called on by the central state. Often raised by tribal chiefs or provincial elite, the central Ottoman State essentially created private military contractors.[162] In the 18th and early 19th century the Ottoman Empire faced threats from provincial elites, sometimes little more than brigand chiefs who grew powerful enough to challenge the Ottomans in their local areas. These *derebey* or "lords of the valleys" could be found across the Empire, from the *armatole*s of the Peloponnese, to Laz tribal leaders near the Black Sea, to Kurdish chieftains in Eastern Anatolia, or to Bedouin chiefs of Syria. While all different they all controlled large groups of irregular troops that could either be a threat to the Ottoman Empire or an asset to be utilized (often against other bands of irregulars).[163]

As the Ottomans worked to centralize and limit the power of local elites (*ayan*s) and tribes (some formerly known as *derebey*) in the mid-19th century the goal was not necessarily to destroy irregular forces, but rather to bring them under Ottoman control. Reşat Kasaba has shown that while the Ottoman state uses its modern *nizam* troops in an attempt to suppress the power of local *ayan*s and tribes—who often rotated from loyal subjects to bandits depending on their relationship to the state at the time—the state also compromised with the very enemies it was seeking to crush. Although the Ottoman army was trained and a professionally equipped force, and larger in comparison to its enemies, it lacked the monetary and political resources to occupy a large unfriendly territory. Therefore, commanders like Cevdet Pasha, in the 1860's, used his military resources strategically, brought defiant tribes and "brigands" to battle during the summer campaign season, and displayed the power of the central state. With this display of power he would then negotiate with remaining enemies to bring them over to the Ottoman side

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[161] Trower, *Hints on Irregular Cavalry*, 25–35.
[162] Virginia H. Aksan, "Mobilization of warrior populations in the Ottoman context, 1750-1850," in *Fighting for a Living: A Comparative Study of Military Labour 1500-2000.*, ed. Erik Jan Zürcher, 2014, 332.
[163] Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, 109.

and empower them as agents of the state. Perhaps the most famous example of this was the establishment of the *Hamidiye* Kurdish tribal regiments in 1892, which saw the state provide arms, training, and legal immunity to tribes that served the state.[164]

Therefore, these tribal fighters, brigands, mercenaries, and irregulars were employed by the Ottoman Empire both as auxiliaries in time of war and as garrison troops in time of peace. It was not that these irregulars were preferred to regular troops, but they were far cheaper than regular troops and much easier to recruit.[165] When the name *başıbozuk* was attached to these irregulars is unknown, but by the time of the Crimean war the name had become infamous,[166] although during both the Crimean and Russo-Ottoman War the official term used by the Ottomans for *başıbozuks* was *asakir-i muvazzafa.*[167]

Notorious for their lack of discipline, looting, cowardice and desertion, and crimes against non-Muslim Ottoman subjects, *başıbozuks* were often victims as well as victimizers. Rarely paid and fed, and victims to the whims of whatever local Ottoman official was stealing the pay meant for them, *başıbozuks* often had little other recourse than to loot and desert.[168] What the average *başıbozuk* thought about this situation during the Crimean and Russo-Ottoman Wars is unknown since while there were many accounts of *başıbozuks,* there are no accounts written by an actual *başıbozuk* (there are a number of accounts by British officers who served with *başıbozuks* and called themselves *başıbozuks,* but none by an Ottoman *başıbozuk*). However there is an account from the early 19th century written by a *deli.*

Like *başıbozuk, deli* means crazy. However, this does not seem to offend our author, Mustafa Vasfı Efendi of Kabud (a town near Tokat in central Anatolia), who referred to himself and his compatriots as *delis*. During the classical period *delis* acted as scouts and skirmishers for the regular Ottoman Army, however in this account the actions of Vasfı Efendi and his *delis* seem much more like those of irregulars or *başıbozuks* fighting in lieu of regular Ottoman soldiers. The account of Vasfı Efendi is dated April 2, 1834, and is an autobiography covering the years 1216-1248 (1801-2 to 1832-3, although the parts after the early 1820s have been lost). Nothing is known about Vasfı Efendi besides what he wrote and the fact that he likely went on Hajji, as he

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[164] Reşat Kasaba, *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants, and Refugees* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), 84–112.
[165] Frederick Millingen (Osman Bey), *Wild Life among the Koords* (Hurst and Blackett, 1870), 334–335.
[166] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 4.
[167] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 379.
[168] Millingen (Osman Bey), *Wild Life among the Koords*, 335–338.

called himself Hacci Mustafa Vasfı Efendi of Kabud. He called his account a history (*tevarih*) of war and death. His account is filled with episodes of hardships, suffering, death, and betrayals as well as looting and atrocities against both infidels and other Muslims. But it is also a story of friendship, bravery and heroism. His account is not romantic, it is a history of war and death told by a man who first went to war at age eight. I do not claim that Vasfı Efendi's account is representative of the experiences of the *başıbozuks* during the Crimean and Russo-Ottoman Wars, but it at least gives us some insight into the life and experience of an irregular Ottoman soldier who not only repeatedly deserted, looted, and committed atrocities, but also fought bravely for the Ottoman Empire.[169]

Using Vasfı Efendi's account along with a number of accounts from British officers who were in *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry, this study will explore why on the morning of September 26, 1855 a combined Anglo-Franco-Ottoman force was prepared to open fire on an Anglo-Ottoman force of *başıbozuks* known as Beatson's Horse.

Beatson's Horse

William Ferguson Beatson was born in 1804[170] in Rossend Castle in the town of Burntisland, on the south coast of Fife, Scotland. With a number of important family connections in India, Beatson joined the Bengal infantry at the age of 16 in 1820. He served in the British Legions in Spain in 1835-36, where he was made a Lieutenant-Colonel, and he was seriously injured leading troops there and subsequently awarded the Cross of San Fernando by Queen Isabella. He returned to India in 1837 and was involved in a number of important campaigns over the next few years that further enhanced his career and reputation in India.[171] In 1849 he was appointed to a prestigious and highly respected command in the Nazim Cavalry.[172] However, Beatson was still only a major in the Bengal Army and he desired a position that would catapult him into the upper ranks of the Indian army. In 1853 with the war on the Danube having broken out between Russians and Ottomans, Beatson believed he had found such an opportunity. Traveling between the Ottoman Empire and London he tried to position himself for an independent command in the

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[169] Jan Schmidt, "The Adventures of an Ottoman Horseman: The Autobiography of Kabudli Vasfi Efendi, 1800-1825," in *The Joys of Philology: Studies in Ottoman Literature, History and Orientalism, 1500-1923* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2002), 165–210.
[170] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[171] William Ferguson Beatson Laurie, *Distinguished Anglo-Indians* (Asian Educational Services, 1888), 93–95.
[172] "Beatson, Major W.F., Appointed to Command of Cavalry Division of Nizam's Army," 1849, IOR/E/4/801, p42.

Ottoman Empire.[173] In 1854 he was given the rank of colonel in the British army in the Ottoman Empire.[174] Beatson was actually involved in the famous "Charge of the Light Brigade" at the Battle of Balaclava on October 25, 1854, as he rode with the heavy brigade on the most famous day of the Crimean War (in the British popular imagination). Although he was specifically mentioned and praised in the dispatches of his superiors, and later awarded for it,[175] he was not celebrated alongside the other British officers who fought on that day. This was perhaps because he was not a British Army officer proper, but rather an Indian Army officer serving with the British army in the Crimea.[176]

Earlier that year Beatson was involved in an ultimately failed project to raise a force of *başıbozuks* under British command. This first attempt to organize a force of *başıbozuks* came in response to a French plan to raise, train and arm Ottoman *başıbozuks* under the command of General Yusuf. Yusuf was born Joseph Valentini to a Bonaparist family in 1808, he was captured by Barbary pirates and made a slave to the Bey of Tunis, and he later escaped helped in the French invasion of Algeria as an interpreter. In time he became leader of the *Spahis d'Orient*, the French led Algerian irregular cavalry.[177] The French hoped to raise Ottoman irregulars similar to their Arab irregulars in Algeria. The plan was to integrate the Ottoman irregulars into the *Spahis d'Orient.*[178] While initially successful, and more than 5000 men were raised, the plan quickly proved disastrous. To start, the French assumed that the Ottoman irregulars would act as their Arab regiments did, but this colonialist assumption combined with lack of discipline led to mass desertions and conflicts between and the *Spahis d'Orient,* the regular British and French forces. Multiple incidences occurred including the kidnapping of a Bulgarian child for ransom,[179] and a fight between some Scottish soldiers and the *Spahis d'Orient* resulting in the death of at least one Scottish soldier.[180] In another incident a French officer led his Ottoman irregulars against a unit of Cossacks only to find that all of his men fled once the Cossacks joined the

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[173] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[174] "Beatson, Lieutenant Colonel W.F., Employed by H.M.s Government in Turkey," 1854, IOR/E/4/829, pp. 661-662.
[175] Laurie, *Distinguished Anglo-Indians*, 96.
[176] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[177] Ibid.
[178] For more on the Spahis d' Orient in both Algeria and the Ottoman Empire see: Louis Robert Jean Noë, *Souvenirs d'Afrique et d'Orient: Les bachi-bozouks et les chasseurs d'Afrique : la cavalerie régulière en campagne* (Paris: M. Lévy frères, 1861).
[179] "The War: The British Expedition," *The Times*, July 21, 1854, 7.
[180] Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, 127–131.

battle, leaving him alone to be killed by the Cossacks.[181] Moreover the French calls for volunteers, in fact a call to *jihad*,[182] was ignored by Ottoman soldiers, and those forces that the French did acquire were given to them by Ömer Pasha, who is said to have given them the worst troops under his command.[183]

Despite the ultimate failure of the *Spahis d'Orient* in the Ottoman Empire, the initial French success lead Stratford to demand that the British be allowed to raise an equal number of Ottoman irregulars and likewise arm them with the same type of modern weapons the French planned to arm their troops with. To this end Beatson was given the Ottoman rank of *ferik,* a rank that he could hold in the British army as he was a Major, but Stratford did not want the British *başıbozuks* led by a Colonel while the French were led by a General, so it was accepted that Beatson held the local rank of General under the command of Ömer Pasha.[184]

Now under the command of Ömer Pasha and with the name Shemshi Pasha, Beatson was authorized to raise troops under British pay to augment Ömer Pasha's forces.[185] However, while Beatson was successful in raising some troops, Ömer Pasha wanted nothing to do with either Yusuf's or Beatson's *başıbozuks.* Moreover, while Beatson was also initially successful at recruiting his troops, they likewise quickly dissolved away when British pay proved to be later than promised.[186] Nevertheless, there was a concerted effort in London among friends of Beatson's and allies of the project to properly fund Beatson's *başıbozuks,* and unbelievably even an effort by Beatson's own *başıbozuks* to obtain British funding. In a letter to the *Times* titled "An Appeal from the Bashi-Bazouks" a *başıbozuk* serving under Beatson begged for the British government and people to pay his promised salary. It is difficult to believe that this letter was actually written by a *başıbozuk,* as it not only appeals to the greatness of the British Empire, rivalries with the French, and besmirched British honor in India if soldiers were not paid, [187] but also quotes a line, "feed, clothe, but don't hang them," written by Beatson in another letter.[188] However, the letter also includes details about Ottoman society and hierarchy that seem at least

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[181] Arnold, *Historical Dictionary of the Crimean War*, 20.
[182] Although a group of Indian Muslim on Hajji did responed to the call for jihad, but as soon as they arrived they were transfered to British command. Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[183] Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, 129.
[184] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[185] June 21 1854, TNA: FO 78/1043. IOR: E/4/830 p.1426
[186] "The War: The British Expedition," *The Times*, August 8, 1854, 7.
[187] "An Appeal from the Bashi-Bazouks," *The Times*, August 28, 1854, 10.
[188] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.

plausible for an educated *başıbozuk* to write about. Moreover, the author claims that the crimes that were reported in the newspaper to have been committed by *başıbozuks* were not carried out by him or his comrades, who were from the East, but rather by Albanian *başıbozuks.*[189] This is an interesting detail as Beatson thought highly of Albanian *başıbozuks,* so if he did write the letter, or have it written, his opinion of Albanian *başıbozuks* would soon change. It is reasonable to suggest that the letter was written by Beatson or one of his officers, but in consultation with one or more of the *başıbozuks* under his command. Regardless, the campaign to support Beatson's *başıbozuks* in 1854 came to naught, and like Yusuf's *başıbozuks* the project was eventually abandoned.

However, the following year along with the Ottoman agreement to form the Anglo-Turkish Contingent, the Ottomans agreed to allow for the formation of an independent *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry. Critically, the British were authorized to independently recruit the troops from the provinces of the Empire for this regiment.[190]

Like the Turkish Contingent the British officers would be drawn from the East India Company and employed at the discretion of the *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry's new commander, Colonel Beatson.[191] Like the officers who served in the Turkish Contingent, the officers who served in what would come to be known as Beatson Horse are easy to trace across archives, but similarly tell us little about them.[192]

However, some of the officers of Beatson Horse led fascinating lives that can be better traced today. The most famous of these was Richard Francis Burton, the British explorer and orientalist who would serve as Beatson chief of staff.[193]

However, more interesting for this study was Col. Eugene O'Reilly. O'Reilly began his career in Ireland as a revolutionary, but like his fellow 1848 brethren was forced to cope with the

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[189] "An Appeal from the Bashi-Bazouks."
[190] Stratford Canning to Âli Pasha, BOA HR. SYS. 1192/2 February 3, 1855.
[191] No longer under Ottoman command, Beatson was demoted from General to Colonel, but in fact it was a promotion in the eyes of the Indian army from Major to Colonel. Although Beatson would continue to call himself General.
[192] For example records on John Falls can be found in both London and Delhi, but provide only basic biographical information: Born 1826, served in the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry and the Turkish Contingent, and was later made pay master of the 8th Foot, serving in India. See: TNA: WO 76/191/16. General Orders Queens Troops, 21 August 1858, No.94, page 346. NAI
[193] Although the work was completed by Isabel Burton, the section on Beatson's house was written by Richard, Isabel acting as only the editor, and via footnotes a commenter. Isabel Burton, *The Life of Captain Sir Richd F. Burton* (London [England] : Chapman & Hall, 1893), 225–250.

failure of his uprising. However, unlike the Hungarian officers in the Ottoman Empire, O'Reilly had not been forced to flee Ireland in 1849 - rather due to his apparent high status and family connections he was pardoned for his actions and formed a close relationship with Lord Palmerston, a fellow Irishman. Under Palmerston's direction, O'Reilly volunteered in the Sardinian army while sending regular reports to Palmerston.[194] It is impossible to categorize O'Reilly - he seemed to be a soldier of fortune, but wherever he served he acted as a British agent. Like Beatson he arrived in the Ottoman Empire in 1854, ready to fight the Russians before the British army had mobilized.

Major O'Reilly was assigned to Beatson on Febuary 14, 1855, making him one of the few non Anglo-Indian officers in the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry, and shortly thereafter was sent by Beatson to recruit 1000 men in Sinop. A week prior Frederick Walpole and Major Brett were sent to Beirut to recruit from Syria. The next day Capitans Rhodes and Foord left for Salonika to raise men from Albania and Bosnia. Finally Major Havelock was sent to Rumelia to recruit 1000 men. Beatson hoped that each of these groups would return with 1000 men each, bringing the total of this regiment to 4000.[195]

By early June recruits started to arrive - first around 750 Albanians from Salonika who set up their tents and began to be drilled by Major Bruce, an experienced officer from the Bombay Army. These initial recruits were soon followed by more from Rumelia and Syria as well as additional recruits from Salonika. Each group set up tents and began training under their British officers. Beatson set up his headquarters in a house on the outskirts of the Dardanelles in view of the camp and claimed to visit the camp every morning and evening.[196]

It was impressive that these British officers were able to bring their recruits from such distances across the Ottoman Empire to the Dardanelles camp. O'Reilly for example, rode with his men from Sivas overland to the Dardanelles. However, in Damascus where Colonel Walpole went to recruit soldiers, chaos, fear and violence followed. By mid-May Walpole had raised some 500 men, but his recruits soon began to terrorize the inhabitance of Damascus. They molested women and attacked shopkeepers while refusing to obey Ottoman authorities. Despite multiple requests from Ottoman authorities to move his men outside the city, Walpole brazenly

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[194] Timothy J. Regan, *The Lost Civil War Diaries: The Diaries of Corporal Timothy J. Regan* (Trafford Publishing, 2003), 335.
[195] Beatson to Newcastle, 16 February, 1855. Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 6–8.
[196] Ibid., 8–9.

refused to listen, and stated that the troops were under British command, which was part of the reason they were so uncontrollable, as they no longer respected Ottoman command. Eventually dragomans for the British consul along with the Austrian, French, Sardinian, and Iranian consuls in the area got involved to demand that Walpole move his troops from the city.[197] It seems that Walpole was forced to linger in Syria as he made deals with Kurdish chieftains to enlist their man, only to find that once some money had been paid, all of the troops would desert.[198]

Walpole would eventually make it back to the Dardanelles with his men, but soon the problems that had plagued Damascus would also come to the Dardanelles. However, while this study will focus on *başıbozuks* under British command, the incidents in Damascus and the Dardanelles were not a result of British command. Across the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War *başıbozuks* looted, raped, and murdered the very Ottoman subjects they were raised to protect. Desertion was similarly not a problem unique to the French or British - *başıbozuks* under Ottoman command were just as likely to desert.[199]

At the Dardanelles Camp

Although Beatson was able to effectively recruit, his men were left with little to do in the Dardanelles Camp and began to prey on the local population. Beatson rationalized the actions of his men by writing "…the men behaved in as orderly a manner as raw recruits, the rough produce of wild districts marched into the vicinity of a town, placed under imperfect surveillance, and exposed to the vicious influence of political intrigue, could be expected." Moreover he wrote that it was the custom of *başıbozuks* to come together "during the campaigning season" under a leader who would lead them against the enemy. Then in winter the men would "return to their homes and families." His men had "enlisted to fight, not to sit idle" in a camp. "This excitement led to a few irregularities."

Beatson emphasized that it was only a "*few* irregularities," and the crimes committed by his troops were equal to the crimes committed by any British or French army under the same circumstances. In fact, he argued that the crimes of his *başıbozuks* were less than would be expected of any "civilized army."

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[197] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 389–391.
[198] Reid, *Crisis of the Ottoman Empire*, 275.
[199] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 377–389.

The problem, argued Beatson, was not the crimes of his *başıbozuks*, but rather the machinations of local forces who spread false rumors and slandered the *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry in Istanbul, and the international press, all of whom help his men to desert. These local forces were comprised of the French consul, who was jealous of Beatson's success compared to the failure of General Yusuf, the British consul who refused to help Beatson, and the local Ottoman Pasha as well as the Turkish, Greek, Jewish, and German population of the Dardanelles.

While Beatson's grand conspiracy theories of local collusion against him can be easily dismissed, there were conflicts with each of the groups and individuals listed above. Moreover, Beatson's first point that idle troops near a civilian population was a recipe for disaster was certainly a valid point, and not a problem unique to *başıbozuks*.[200] However, whatever the cause, the few thousand *başıbozuks* camped in Dardanelles proved to be a serious threat to the civilian population, allied soldiers, and their fellow *başıbozuks*.

Beatson held courts of inquiry and court-martials staffed by his own British and Ottoman officers, and later was forced to establish a mixed commission of British, French, and Ottoman officers from both his own regiments and from the outside to investigate the crimes of the men in the *Osmanlı* Irregular Cavalry. While not all of these records survive, those that do provide a unique view into the thoughts and actions of Ottoman soldiers during the Crimean War (with all of the caveats attached in using court records, and with testimonies that were translated, and records which were written in English).

The first major incident investigated by a court of inquiry took place on June 21, 1855 to investigate a drunken fight between Albanian troops, in which four were killed and seven were wounded.[201] The basics of the incident were that after returning from town drunk the men of the 4th regiment came to quarrel with the men of the 5th regiment over the location of their tents which Abdullah, *mulazim* (Lieutenant) of the 4th regiment, considered too close to theirs. According to the testimony of multiple witnesses *mulazim* Abdullah was heard giving the order for his men to fire, and he was subsequently convicted by the court and sent in chains to Istanbul

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[200] An examination of British court-martials during the Crimean War reveal that it was common for regular British soldiers to carryout the same crimes as Beatson's *başıbozuks*. *See:* TNA: WO 28/128

[201] Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry assembled by Order of Major-General W. F. Beatson, Commanding " Beatson's Horse," to Investigate and Report on the Quarrel which took place last night in the Camp of the 1st Regiment of " Beatson's Horse." *President.*—Colonel F. Bruce. *Members.*—Major H. H. Foord and Lieutenant W. H. Ward. *Interpreter in Attendance.*—Osman Agha. June 22, 1855. A complete transcript of this trail was published in Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks,"11-14. However parts of the proceedings and letters about this court of inquiry can be found in TNA: WO 32/7511.

where he was to be put to death.[202] Two other members of *mulazim* Abdullah's regiment were convicted and sentenced to death, but one, named Ali, escaped, and the other was pardoned by Beatson after he learned that the boy had seen both his brothers killed and had not hit or wounded anyone when he fired his pistol.[203]

Despite the fact that all of the witness were Albanians, and some certainly knew the accused, everyone's testimony seemed fair and did not excuse the actions of their countrymen. The court heard testimony from nine different witnesses, all Albanian *başıbozuks*, but all of different ranks. Only the names and ranks of the witnesses were given, but the testimony of each witness was in its own way unique and personal.

Of particular note in this record was *binbashi*[204] Mehmet Ağa of the 1st regiment and the translator Osman Ağa. Both men had been recommended for the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry by British consuls and representatives. Furthermore, both men must have had fairly good connections with high Ottoman officials as Osman's father had been a highly respected Ottoman commander[205] and Mehmet was put in charge of suppressing Arab tribal rebellions in Syria in 1857 after his service with the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[206] While this first incidence was limited to intra-regimental violence, the fact that blood could so easily be spilled over something as minor as the position of a tent shows the potential for far worse atrocities.

Over the next two weeks there were two serious incidents involving Albanian *başıbozuks.* Sometime before July 5, 1855, a *mulazim* of the 1st regiment named Husayn raped the wife of a *katib* named Said Effendi who was working for Beatson. [207] Then on July 5th Beatson was approached by a number of troopers of the 1st regiment who complained about their *kolağası* (senior Captain) Adem Ağa. Beatson promised to look into the matter and appointed Captain

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[202] Beatson did not have the authority to execute the men under his command, a fact that Beatson felt undermined his authority. However it was also questioned if Beatson had the right to hold courts of inquiry under his own authority.
[203] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 15.
[204] Translated as head of 1000, which was equivalent to the rank of Major and commander of a regiment
[205] Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.
[206] Mehmet Ağa was also the only Ottoman member of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry whose career I was able to trace after his service in the Crimean War. Skene to Stratford, Aleppo, June 16, 1857. No. 7. TNA: FO 195/416
[207] "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry appointed by the warrant of Major General Beatson dated the 24th July 1855, and composed of Lieut-Colonel Blacklin, Consul Calvert and Consul Skene." (14 August 1855, Dardanelles), TNA: WO 32/7511. This Court of Inquiry turned into a much larger investigation of Beatson and the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry and in the end the report was not completed until August 14th and was 96 pages long with the testimony of dozens of British and Ottoman members of *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry. Furthermore, by the end of the investigation Lieut-Colonel Blacklin had taken sick and was replaced by Brigadier-General Neill.

Foord to investigate. "Perfectly satisfied" the troopers kissed Beatson's hand.[208] Captain Foord and Major Bruce carried out an investigation and wrote to Beatson that Adem Ağa was one of their best officers and believed the complaints were the result of the agitation of the regiment's *binbashi*[209] (the aforementioned Mehmet Ağa). The next morning around 11am Adem requested an audience with Beatson, but Beatson refused to meet him as Adem was under official investigation. Adem was apparently fearful of the investigation, and offered to serve Beatson in any manner, even as a horse-keeper. Around 4 pm Osman Ağa (the aforementioned interpreter) reported to Beatson that Adem and a number of his men were preparing to desert, as they believed that Adem was going to be punished. Beatson ordered Osman to inform them that the Court of Inquiry had not yet finished deliberating, and that no decision had been made. However, this did not mollify Adem and his men and shortly thereafter Osman returned to inform Beason that Adem and about 100 of his men were on their way to his headquarters. When Adem and his men, all Albanians, arrived Beatson found them drunk and mounted on their horses and discovered that they had released the prisoner *mulazim* Husayn, who was now among them. Beatson, unarmed, and with the help of Osman Ağa, agreed to listen to their demands. The Albanians respectfully stated that they believed Adem to be innocent, and protested his punishment. Beatson responded that the investigation was ongoing and that he had not come to any decision. Osman informed Beatson that the men wanted the arms of *mulazim* Husayn which were in Beatson's horse. During this confrontation Said Effendi, the *katib* whose wife had been raped,[210] came out of the house holding Husayn's pistols and sword.[211] It is not clear why Said Effendi did this (Beatson testified that it was done without his orders),[212] so it was likely that Said Effendi feared for his life and hoped this would peacefully resolve the situation. An Imam from the regiment arrived and helped negotiate an agreement to deescalate the situation. Husayn was given his weapons back and released into the custody of his regiment. After Husayn received his weapons, Adem dismounted from his horse, kissed Beatson's hand and promised to return his men to his camp and await the decision of the Court of Inquiry. However, as soon as

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[208] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 16.
[209] Bruce to Beatson, 6th of July, 1855, Dardanelles. Ibid.
[210] Beatson did not seem to think much of the rape committed by Husayn as in his testimony he said that Said Effendi's "wife had been insulted" - as if Husayn's crime was being rude to her, rather than raping her as it was clear that he did.
[211] "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry appointed by the warrant of Major General Beatson dated the 24th July 1855," TNA: WO 32/7511.
[212] Ibid.

he returned to his camp, Adem and 147 men from the 1st and 2nd regiments deserted. The deserters looted and plundered the local area as they made their escape.

Beatson believed himself highly knowledge about Albanians and castigated those whose lack of knowledge led them to draw the wrong conclusions about the actions of his Albanian troops. For example, immediately upon the return of his weapons *mulazim* Husayn proceeded to load his pistols. However Beatson did not take this action as a threat, rather stated that those who knew the manners and customs of Albanians knew that the act of loading pistol was not a hostile act, But rather came from the simple fact that an Albanian soldier never carry "his weapons unloaded or unprimed."[213]

It is also interesting to consider the actions and the motivation of Adem Ağa. He was either guilty of the charges against him and knew that he would be punished, or he had no faith in the objectivity of the British Court of Inquiry. Either way, while it is easy to speculate why he freed Husayn (who was likely either a friend of Adem or his men), the real question is why he then rode with his men to Beatson's headquarters to retrieve Husayn's weapons. Perhaps his ability to secure promises and Husayn's weapons from Beatson raised his status with his men. Or perhaps, as Beatson asserted (Beatson's repeated claims to be an authority on Albanians will be discuss at the end of this chapter), Albanian *başıbozuks* were inseparable from their weapons and the loss of a man's weapons was a grave dishonor. By returning Husayn's weapons to him, Adem was restoring Husayn's honor.

Beatson called on *binbashi* Mehmet Ağa and other regimental leaders to pursue and capture the deserters, but while Beatson received promises from commanders of the *başıbozuk* regiments, their attempts were halfhearted and ineffective. Beatson commented that while his *başıbozuks* were prepared to fight the Russians, they were not willing to fight their friends.[214]

Although Beatson's men were not prepared to track down the deserters, local Ottoman regulars under the command of Suleiman Pasha were dispatched to stop the plundering and capture the deserters—despite Beatson's objection that it was an internal matter to his command.[215] Beatson later wrote that many of the men who deserted with Adem Ağa later

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[213] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 18–19.
[214] Beatson to Newcastle, Dardanelles, August 25th, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7512
[215] "Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry appointed by the warrant of Major General Beatson dated the 24th July 1855," TNA: WO 32/7511.

quietly returned to camp, or wrote to Beatson from Monastir (where they had been recruited) and asked permission to return.[216]

Beyond the material damage and danger posed by marauding *başıbozuks*, Adem Ağa's desertion was a public relations disaster for Beatson, as not only the news of the events rapidly circulated (spreading fear in the surrounding areas), but it was also reported that the deserters had killed Beatson during their flight. While the rumor of his death was quickly dispelled, the impression in the Dardanelles, Istanbul, and London was that Beatson could not control the men.[217]

Two farms belonging to the family of the British consul, Frederick William Calvert, [218] were among those attacked and plundered by the deserting Adem Ağa and his followers.[219] As both a victim of Beatson's *başıbozuks,* and a member of the Court of Inquiry that look into Beatson and his men, it is not hard to understand why Calvert was an opponent of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry and why Beatson him saw him as an adversary. Beatson also attributed Calvert's opposition to the fact that Calvert was a supply contractor for the British Army, and the contract to supply the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry had be awarded to Frederick Whittall.[220] Beatson further asserted that Calvert or his associates were corrupt and profiteering from public contracts.[221] After the end of the Crimean War Calvert was accused of wrongdoing, however it appears that he was not a war profiteer, rather he was victim to the disorganized British supply system, and was not only cleared of all charges, but awarded for his service by the end of 1860.[222]

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[216] There is no evidence to support either claim, and if Beatson did receive letters it is difficult to believe that Albanian başıbozuks would've been able to communicate with Beatson without the help of British Consular agents. However, as British consular agents helped recruit many of these men in Monastir it is not impossible. Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 20.
[217] Ibid., 19–20.
[218] Frederick William Calvert was a well-connected member of the Calvert family, a Levantine family which had been brought to the Dardanelles in 1829 by his father, James Calvert, who was British consul there. Frederick had five brothers and one sister, all six brothers had long and extensive diplomatic and commercial careers in the British and Ottoman Empires. Frederick married into the Abbott family in 1846, one of the most significant Levantine families. He spoke English, Greek, Turkish, Italian, and French, and had good relationships with the local Ottoman administrators. He was also connected to Stratford Canning as at the time of theses events his younger brother Edmund was working for Stratford. Susan Heuck Allen, *Finding the Walls of Troy: Frank Calvert and Heinrich Schliemann at Hisarlik* (University of California Press, 1999).
[219] Calvert to Stratford, Dardanelles, July 7th 1855. TNA: WO 32/7511.
[220] Another member of an important Levantine family
[221] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 44.
[222] Allen, *Finding the Walls of Troy*, 85–90.

Another man who could have been Beatson's ally, but who became his enemy was James Henry Skene, appointed to be Stratford's representative to the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[223] Skene had served Stratford as a consul in Istanbul and written a not particular inspired book on Ottoman politics in 1851.[224] Skene seems to come with no other agenda besides that of supporting the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry. However, Beatson considered him a spy for Stratford and before long Skene sent reports which detailed the crimes of Beatson's *başıbozuks*.[225] French complaints soon followed, and the Albanians were singled out as the source of the trouble.[226]

In a letter to Earl of Clarendon, written July 23, 1855, Stratford wrote that due to the actions of the Albanians in Beatson's Horse that it was necessary to take immediate action "to protect the neighborhood, punish the guilty and to get rid of doubtful characters." He requested aid from the Ottoman authorities and the Porte sent 320 regular infantry and 225 regular cavalry, along with a few hundred men for the artillery. He further wrote that Beatson had mishandled the Court of Inquiry and had requested that an Ottoman magistrate be appointed. Stratford also detailed complaints from the French officers and the French ambassador.[227] Stratford made it clear to Beatson that Ottoman regulars would be needed to help control his *başıbozuks*, especially those that had deserted and were now outside of Beatson's control.[228]

The *seraskier* (Ottoman minister of war) agreed that Beatson's internal Court of Inquiry was unsuitable for Ottoman subjects, and therefore "Mixed Commissions" were created to investigate and try crimes in the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry. These commissions were staffed by independent British and Ottoman officers as well as officers from within the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[229]

Over the next few weeks leading up the events of September 26th there continued to be regular desertions and conflicts between Beatson's *başıbozuks,* and the locals and French troops that were stationed nearby.

However, many of the incidents between the *başıbozuks* and French soldiers were not the fault of the *başıbozuks,* which affirms Beatson's point that the actions of his men were no different than those of regular British or French soldiers.

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[223] Straford to Beatson, Therapia, July 21st, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7511
[224] James Henry Skene, *The Three Eras of Ottoman History, a Political Essay on the Late Reforms of Turkey, Considered ...* (s.n, 1851).
[225] Skene to Stratford, July 14, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7510
[226] July 17, 1855 No. 533. TNA: WO 32/7510
[227] Stratford to Clarendon, July 23, 1855. No.532. TNA: WO 32/7510
[228] Stratford to Beatson, July 24, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7510
[229] Straford to Beatson, July 24st, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7512.

In one instance, at the end of July 1855, an Albanian and French soldier quarreled over a miscommunication which resulted with the Albanian wounding one French soldier with a pistol while being stab in the back by another French soldier. Both witnesses in the case were Ottomans, a police officer named Javan (who broke up the fight and arrested the soldiers), and Hussein, a grocer. Each reported that both sides were at fault in the incident.[230] In the end the Albanian, Mahmoud, escaped and was never found, while the wounded French solider was decorated.[231] In another incident at the end of August 1855, four drunk French soldiers coming out of a cafe attacked a group of *başıbozuks,* but to the amazement of the witnesses the *başıbozuks* did not fight back. The witnesses were the Italian café owner and his wife, an Austrian at the café, a Greek employee of the café, and Frederick Whittall, who lived near the café. This multinational group of witnesses all praised the restraint of the *başıbozuks,* and condemned the criminality of the French soldiers who left the café without paying.[232]

Finally, between August 22 and August 28 a series of confrontations occurred between the soldiers of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry and the soldiers of the French Nagara Hospital. The source of these conflicts were the vineyards between the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry's camp and the Hospital. Beatson had ordered his man to patrol and defend the areas around the camp, including the vineyards. The result was multiple skirmishes between the patrolling *başıbozuks* and the French soldiers who were plundering the vineyards. Moreover, a number of these skirmishes resulted in French soldiers being taken prisoner by *başıbozuks* and their British officers. Although the objectivity of the Ottoman and British officers should be considered, it seems that in every instance the French soldiers were guilty of looting and the *başıbozuks* acted professionally and in the interest of protecting the vineyards. Moreover, the *başıbozuks* were

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[230] "Proceedings of a Court-Martial assembled at the Dardanelles, by Order of Major-General Beatson, for the Trial of such Prisoners as may be brought before it." President.—Brigadier-General Neill, Turkish Contingent. Members. Lieut.-Colonel Sankey, 4th Regiment, Beatson's Horse. Captain Forrest, Acting Assistant-Adjutant- General. Colonel Mohadim Bet, Turkish Cavalry. Bin Bashee Ebrahim Effendi, Turkish Cavalry. Commissioner on the part of the British Embassy.—Mr. Skene. Commissioner on the part of the Porte.—The Civil Pacha. Dardanelles, 29th July 1855. Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks,"45-47.

[231] Ibid, 47.

[232] FO 195/488 Although I have copy of this document it is in French, so I have been much aided by a translation found in: Charles Malouf Samaha, *Nassif Mallouf: Dragoman and Orientalist (1823-1865)* (Isis Press, 2010), 83–85 Appendix B.

restrained in the use of violence whereas French soldiers severely wounded and possibly killed a number of troops of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[233]

Despite the fact that the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry were not always at fault in their conflicts with the French, their harassment of the civilian population continued and by the end of September it came to a head. On the 25th of September 1855, Ottoman regulars attempted to arrest *mulazim* Abu Bekr of the 1st regiment for his misdeeds in town, but when they attempted to disarm him he fire his pistol at them and wounded one in the thigh. Abu Bekr was tackled, beaten, and thrown in town prison. Beatson hearing of the incident asked that Abu Bekr be released to his custody fearing that Abu Bekr would die of his wounds in the Ottoman prison.[234] The Pasha then declared that no member of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry would be allowed to enter the town armed. However, Beatson refused issue such an order to his men.

The next morning, Septemeber the 26th 1855, the Pasha responded in force to Beatson refusal to disarm his men. Awaken to find themselves surrounded by hostile forces beets and mustard his men and deployed them in combat formation. A tense a few hours ensued as both sides wonder if the other would attack, but the Pasha made it clear that it was not his intention to attack, but simply to prevent the troopers of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry from entering the town arm. The situation was finally de-escalate in a number of troopers approach the Pasha's lines and requested to enter the town, the Pasha said he would allow it if they would surrender their weapons, They agree to these terms and stated that Beatson and had told them that the Pasha has come to permanently disarm them and that they should refuse any attempts to do so. However, they were willing to temporarily surrender their weapons in order to enter the town.

With the agreement of these troopers and hand the Pasha sent his *miralay* (a Pasha's second in command) Muhieddin Bey, with a translator to discuss the situation with Beatson, but Beatson refused to meet with an officer of junior rank. During the exchange between *miralay* Muhieddin Bey and Beatson's representative, J.B. Giraud who reportedly spoke Turkish, Giraud claimed that the Muhieddin Bey insulted Beatson by calling him a "tradesman." Upon hearing this Beatson demanded that the Pasha arrest his *miralay* for the insult, but the Pasha refused, saying that Muhieddin Bey had not directed the expression at Beatson and therefore he would not arrest

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[233] This is the summary of dozens of pages of letters and court proceedings which can be found in TNA: WO 32/ 7510, WO 32/ 7512, FO 78/1093 and FO 78/1095. Printed copies of the court proceedings can be found in Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks,"63-80.
[234] Beatson to Stratford, Dardanelles, September 27th 1855. TNA: WO 32/7295

him. Subsequently five of Beatson's senior officers, including Richard Burton, rode to the Pasha's lines and challenged *miralay* Muhieddin Bey to a duel. Muhieddin Bey, surprised refused these challenges by again stating that he had never insulted Beatson.

That evening the Pasha sent a letter to Beaton stating that he believed his objectives has been achieved and that he would withdraw his troops, but his troops would be at the ready should Beatson's men again try to enter the town armed.[235]

Due to the severity of this event General Smith, the cavalry commander of the Turkish Contingent, was sent with a regiment Ottoman regulars from the Turkish Contingent to take command of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry.[236] Beatson had been seriously injured in a riding accident and was in bed on September the 29th when Smith arrived. Therefore, Smith's letter relieving Beatson of command[237] was read aloud to the to Beatson's assembled officers at his bedside on September 30, 1855. Then, according to Colonel O'Reilly, Captain Burton began discussing resistance to Beatson's replacement upon which O'Reilly declared that he was a solider and such talk was mutinous and left the room.[238] What transpired in Beatson's room and what Burton did or did not suggest is unknown, but around the same time a petition was circulated among the *başıbozuks* regiments protesting Beatson's replacement by General Smith.[239]

Petition from the Başıbozuks

In his report General Smith attached a copy of the petition. This copy, from 1856, [240] was in French, but it is unclear whether the native officers signed the petition in Ottoman Turkish, which was then translated into French, and then transmitted to the British officers, or a petition in French was drawn up and then signed by the native officers. The copy provides the names and ranks of the officers who signed it, but not their actual original signatures. It was suggested at the time that the petition was not instigated by the native officers themselves but rather by Burton or by another British officer. The chief interpreter, Mr. Giraud, stated that he did not prepare the petition, nor did he know of any British officers who "conveyed" the petition to their troops. Nassif Mallouf, who showed the petition to General Smith, did not write it, but he

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[235] Skene to Stratford, Dardanelles, September 27th 1855. TNA: WO 32/7295
[236] To General Smith and Beatson, September 27th 1855, TNA: WO 32/7512
[237] Smith to Beatson, September 30th 1855, TNA: WO 32/7515
[238] Colonel O'Reilly Evidence. TNA: WO 32/7515
[239] Smith to Panmure, April 5th 1856. TNA: WO 32/7515.
[240] A Son Excellence le Major General Beatson, October 14, 1855. TNA: WO 32/7515

stated that he did not believe that the petition was a "spontaneous act" by native officers, but rather that they were "induced to sign it." Mallouf translated the petition and claimed that he heard Captain Burton tell Colonel Morgan to get his men to sign it. General Smith believed that another interpreter, Abidullah Tabid prepared the petition, but later spoke to Tabid who said that while he was aware of the petition, and knew it was being signed by the native officers, did not prepare it and did not know who did.[241] Colonel Morgan testified that he was aware of a petition being signed, but did not know who instigated it and did not know of Captain Burton's involvement.[242]

Whether or not these petitions were actually initiated by the native officers, or written at the behest of their British officers, the fact that their intermediaries were Anglo-Ottoman dragomans, means these petitions were no different when any other Ottoman petition that was through the intermediary of an *arzuhalci*.[243]

The role of the native officers who reportedly signed the petition has been completely discounted by both the officers who investigated the case at the time[244] and by later historian.[245] However it is worth considering their agency in these events and examining the petition not from the perspective of British officers who were trying to protect their positions, but from Ottoman soldiers who saw their own position threatened and wrote a petition in defense of their rights and status. While there are examples of Ottoman subjects (who were often also British subjects or clients) petitioning agents of the British state to protect their interests vis–à–vis local powers (mostly on matters of trade and in consular courts), this is a unique instances Ottoman officers petitioning British officers for redress. This is the only case I have found, in the British archives, and while it seems likely that Ottoman soldiers in the Turkish Contingent would have petitioned their British officers, none survive due to the nature of afore-discussed British records. There are

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[241] Smith to Panmure, April 5th 1856. TNA: WO 32/7515.
[242] Colonel Morgan's Evidence. TNA: WO 32/7515
[243] There is a great deal of literature about Ottoman petition writers and the difficulties for historians in using petitions, see: Gülden Sarıyıldız, *Sokak yazıcıları: Osmanlılarda arzuhaller ve arzuhalciler* (İstanbul: Derlem Yayınları, 2010); James E. Baldwin, "Petitioning the Sultan in Ottoman Egypt," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 75, no. 03 (October 2012): 499–524, doi:10.1017/S0041977X12000535; Yuval Ben-Bassat, *Petitioning the Sultan: Protests and Justice in Late Ottoman Palestine* (I. B. Tauris, 2014); John Chalcraft, "Engaging the State: Peasants and Petitions in Egypt on the Eve of Colonial Rule," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37, no. 3 (August 1, 2005): 303–25, doi:10.2307/3880103.
[244] Smith to Panmure, April 5th 1856. TNA: WO 32/7515.
[245] Samaha, *Nassif Mallouf*; C. M. Samaha, "Richard Burton and Nassif Mallouf," *Notes and Queries* 57, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 226–226, doi:10.1093/notesj/gjq042; A. D. Harvey, "Richard Burton in the Crimean War," *Notes and Queries* 55, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 476–80, doi:10.1093/notesj/gjn159; Stevenson, *Beatson's Mutiny*.

many instances of Ottoman subjects requesting redress from British consuls across the Ottoman Empire due to the crimes of *başıbozuks*, including those raised by British officers for Beatson's horse in Syria,[246] but this is the only case of *başıbozuks* petitioning British officers. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878 there were numerous reports sent to British consuls about the crimes of *başıbozuks* against Christians (the foundation for the so-called "Bulgarian horrors"), but Ottoman Muslim subjects also sent petitions to British consuls and military officers about crimes committed against them by Bulgarian and Russian partisans.[247] These petitions asked British representatives to act on the behalf of Ottoman Muslim peasants, why these petitions were addressed to the British government rather than the Ottoman Porte is an interesting question which is largely outside the scope of this study, however like peasants in Egypt after British rule the British authorities were likely seen as the best agents to address the concerns of Muslim subjects, regardless of what official hierarchy existed.[248] Just as these *binbaşi*s and *yuzbaşi*s saw British authority rather than ultimate authority as the most likely avenue to maintain their independence, rights and privileges

In Beatson's "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," two different versions of this petition can be found. However, only one version has been found in the archives.[249] The petition was from the 5th regiment. Beatson's translation of this document only differs in that it rather than giving the names of the native officers, it ends with "Signed by Twenty Native Officers."[250]

> To His Excellency Major-General Beatson, Commander-in-Chief of the Irregular Cavalry, called " Beatson's Horse."
> Yesterday evening we have heard that your Excellency had given up the command of " Beatson's Horse," and that this command had been transferred to General Vivian, Commander-in-Chief of Regular Troops at Constantinople; this report has grieved us all, and we hasten to address to you this petition, which we beg of you to forward to the Government of Her Majesty, our august Queen.
> When we offered our services to the English Government, through the channel of Colonel Brett, the officer commanding our regiment, he gave us to understand that we should be employed in the following manner:—That we should remain Bashi Buzouks, preserving our national dress; that we should not become *Nizam,* or regulars; that we should not undergo the drill of regulars ; and that we should not be brigaded with regulars; but that all our chiefs should be English officers ; that we

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[246] Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, 2010, 377–391.
[247] Adrianople, November 19th 1878. TNA: FO 195/1185 There are a number of interesting examples of group petitions from Ottoman-Muslim subjects fleeing the violence, the petitions were written in Ottoman-Turkish and translated into English by British officials in Adrianople.
[248] Chalcraft, "Engaging the State."
[249] TNA: WO 32/7515
[250] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 114–115.

should be in British pay; that we should bear the name of " Beatson's Horse" ; and that your Excellency should be our commander-in-chief.
Under these conditions we enlisted for this. service, because England is sacrificing its troops and money in the defence and for the protection of our Government. We were certain that the words of Colonel Brett were those of the British Government; on the faith of this conviction we entered the service.
We now learn that the chief command is transferred to General Vivian, and that we shall be under his orders with regular troops. This is contrary to what Colonel Brett told us. It is not credible that England should not keep its word; our corps dreads being incorporated with regulars, lest its present organization be interfered with We only flock to your standard to be under your command, and to be honoured by the name of " Beatson's Horse."
We entreat your Excellency to forward our present petition to the British Government, and to support our claim, to be honoured by your command under the name of " Beatson's Horse."
(*Translation.)* Signed by Twenty Native Officers.[251]

The other version of this petition found in Beatson's "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," was form the 1st regiment, was slightly shorter and refers to their recruitment and promise of service by Major Rhodes rather than Colonel Brett. This version was less flattering to Beatson, but the primary concern was still the fear of being made regulars, and preserving their "national costume." This version was signed by 17th native officers.[252]

A third, but different version of the above petitions was also published in "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks." Written at the same time as the others but in Ottoman Turkish and with the names of the officers who signed it. However, this document did not address any concerns about the being made into regulars or losing their traditional dress. Rather it was simply praise for Beatson and his command:

Bryanstone Square, *November* 22nd, 1855.

The Turkish Minister presents his compliments to General Beatson, and has the honour to return him the document, written in the Turkish language, which General Beatson left at the Embassy, with a desire that it might be translated into English; such translation having accordingly been made, accompanies the original document sent herewith.

Third Regiment;

The undersigned Officers of the 3rd Regiment wish to make known that when they heard that a corps d'armee would be formed for the service of Her Britannic Majesty, composed of the

[251] Smith to Panmure, April 5th 1856. TNA: WO 32/7515. A Printed copy of this letter can be found in: TNA FO 352/48
[252] Petition from the 1st Regiment of Beatson's Irregular Horse. Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 113–114.

> irregular troops of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and that this corps would be placed under the command of General Beatson, they met together according to the Imperial firman, and proceeded to the Dardanelles. That they were quite satisfied and contented while under the command of the above-mentioned General, and much pleased with his regularity in paying them and the soldiers under their command. His ability in the command of the Bashi Buzouks, and above all his kindness and amiable conduct towards them was such, that if he should again return to the command, all the Bashi Buzouks would address prayers to God for the English Government for their satisfaction at this event; and the undersigned are sure, if this event happens, the Bashi Buzouks will serve with more fidelity and devotion.
>
> They have delivered this writing, in order to express their satisfaction with their General's conduct.
>
> Dated October 12th, 1855.
>
> (Signed)
>
> HASSAN, *Colonel.* ALI, *Major.* AHMED, *Imam.* AHMED SAKIB, *Secretary.* HHOWICHID, *Captain.* AHMED, *Second Captain.* NOURI, *Lieutenant.* ESSEID HUSSEIN, *Lieutenant.* VELY, *Lieutenant.* HASSEIN, *Lieutenant.* HUSSEIN, *Lieutenant.*[253]

It is difficult to say who organized, wrote and circulated these petitions, but it seems unlikely they were solely the initiative of the men of the *başıbozuk* regiments. Like the "Appeal from the Bashi-Bazouks" written the year before, I would argue that they were likely a collaboration between some of Beatson's officers and the men under their command. Moreover, I would suggest that while language was largely the product of British officers, some of the concerns were those of their men. For example, the desire to remain *başıbozuks*, "preserving our national dress; …not become *Nizam,* ...not undergo the drill of regulars," not be organized with regulars, and that their officers and pay remain British, all seem like legitimate concerns for these *başıbozuks.* The phrase "preserve our national dress" sounds like something an Anglo-Indian officer would write, but the sentiment was legitimately Ottoman.

One of Vasfı Efendi's recurring themes was his struggle to remain a *deli*. In one instance he lost his horse and was forced to fight is an infantryman, much to his consternation. Moreover, he and his fellow *delis* resistant attempts to be organize with other units and while loyal and motivated to fight, were fiercely concerned with maintaining their organizational independence. Furthermore, their freedom to join or desert from a campaign was clearly a great advantage. When there was pay, booty and glory to be won it was worth sticking with the campaign, but

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[253] Beatson, "The War Department and the Bashi Buzouks," 118.

when the going got tough or there was no pay being an irregular horseman Vasfı Efendi and his *delis* a level of freedom that an infantry soldier or even regular horsemen did not have.[254] Is reasonable to assume that the *başıbozuks* under British command had similar ideas, not only was the pay more reliable and the discipline more lax under the British, but if the situation did go bad as a irregular horseman they could easily desert, as many did when they faced possible punishment. Therefore, being transferred to the Turkish Contingent that was made up of Ottoman regulars threatened their status as *başıbozuks* and lead them to fear that they would be integrated into the regular Ottoman Army. Furthermore, the organizational structure of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry, which was similar to the organization of the *silladars* in India, not only gave the great deal of freedom, but also offered the Ottoman *başıbozuks* higher ranks and an active role in the command of their own regiments that they were unlikely to have under a more regular military system.

However despite these fears, the integration of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry into the Turkish Contingent did not cause any more desertions than under Beatson's command. In fact little changed other than the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry marching to Shumla in Bulgaria which removed the *başıbozuks* from regular conflicts with the local population (as Shumla was near the frontlines removed from a large civilian population). This is not to say that desertion and other crimes did not continue. However, there were no major incidents prior to the disbandment of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry in 1856.

Imperial Discourse and Violence

There was the repeated refrain in Anglo-Indian discourse that a small number of British officers could manage and lead a larger number of native troops. Beatson was criticized for his extravagant demeanor and uniform, [255] but he defended these actions by quoting Col. James Skinner, the famed leader of Indian irregulars who said that it was important to impress the native soldiers.

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[254] Schmidt, "The Adventures of an Ottoman Horseman: The Autobiography of Kabudli Vasfi Efendi, 1800-1825."
[255] One of Skene chief criticisms of Beatson was that he did not understand the "Turkish mind" and the level of discipline required to manage Ottoman soliders. This lack of knowledge was likewise reflected in the officers Beatson hired and promoted. In fact, the high ranks given to these Indian officers were completely undeserved deserve. Skene, *With Lord Stratford in the Crimean War*, 48–56 It is also interesting to compare Skene's account which is short, to his presence in the British archives, which is extensive. His reports were professional and detailed, which is in stark contrast to his later account which was vague and not very reliable.

This was a prevalent notion in the Indian army, it was important to project the power, professionalism and prestige of the British army to the natives. That a visible militarism was needed to maintain creditability, pure force of arms might not be sufficient to maintain power in India, but the impression of great military power would be enough to convince the Indians of British omnipotence. According to a pamphleteer in the 1840s, the "empire of opinion" was only meaningful if the natives believed in British "superior military skill and power."[256]

Both Beatson and Vivian believed that crimes committed by their soldiers were no different than the crimes committed by the regular British and French troops during the Crimean war. Beatson further argued that the crimes of his *başıbozuks* were no greater than any other soldiers of any other nations, rather it was their name: *başıbozuks*, a name that he explicitly tried to have changed that led to their suppression by regular Ottoman and French forces.

However, from the Ottoman perspective a large number of *başıbozuks* forces in the Dardanelles, a strategic and commercial area, was clearly dangerous and was not surprising that they acted in the way they did. Had Beatson found a better place to garrison his *başıbozuks* he might not have suffered any of the issues he did.

Moreover, it seems that the average British officers did a fine job both recruiting and leading their troops, minor disturbances aside, furthermore after Beatson's departure there were reports that the force was in good hands and did not commit any further crimes. Giving credence to Beaton's idea that in fact the force was quite manageable and ready to go to the aid of Kars. Likewise the Turkish Contingent had its initial problems but once a significant number of men and officers were put together it seems that these problems were quickly overcome. Those who reported on the Turkish Contingent said that there was good cohesion between the regular Ottoman soldiers and their British officers.

Another theme of this study is the idea that Muslim soldiers would not serve under Christian. This study has shown that were many examples of successful collaboration between senior British officers and their Muslim troops. Moreover, there seem to be very little religious conflict between the two groups. If anything the British officers wrote in praise of the Islamic religion, there were no polemics against Islam or touting the superior of Christianity. This might have been due to the inherent bias of these officers, they naturally assumed that Christian civilization

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[256] Douglas M. Peers, "Soldiers, Scholars, and the Scottish Enlightenment: Militarism in Early Nineteenth-Century India," *The International History Review* 16, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 460.

was superior to Islam and therefore there was no need to point this out, but it is interesting that there is almost no mention of the superiority of their own civilization. Rather they praised the "native" Islamic culture. Although again this may part of a martial races theory which judged Muslims to be good soldiers.

Furthermore, there was no mention of Ottoman troops having any problems with their Christian officers or any conflict with Ottomans soldiers performing religious ceremonies as desired. Finally, this issue of imperial violence needs to be further analyzed, all of these military men understood that this was the nature of troops and did not see the Ottomans as anymore savage or brutal or Oriental than any of their European counterparts. In fact, it was here that the Oriental comparison was dropped and the Ottoman army was directly compared to European armies.

CHAPTER 5: IMPERIAL SERVICE BETWEEN WARS

From British to Ottoman and Back Again, From the Crimean War to Syria:

In a report to Stratford, on Ottoman suppression of nomadic Arab tribes in Syria, Skene (now British consul in Aleppo) wrote that the campaign was "under the command of Arnaout Mehemet Aga, who served as a Major in the Irregular Cavalry raised by Her Majesty's Government in Turkey."[257] Accompanying this force was Lieutenant Colonel Sankey, "late of the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry," who was with the Ottoman *başıbozuks* fighting the Arab tribes.[258] Initially Sankey role seemed to be as an advisor or observer with the Ottomans, but he offered "to assist" the Ottoman authorities in their efforts to subdue the nomadic Arabs they were in conflict with. Skene discussed this offer with Emin Effendi who eagerly accepted, "and is decided at once on placing now in the field against the Arabs under the orders of Colonel Sankey." Whereby, Sankey was commissioned as a colonel in the Ottoman Army. Skene further recorded that Sankey had commanded a regiment of Arab cavalry during his service with the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry, that he spoke perfect Arabic, and that he had long experience of "Eastern character in Egypt and elsewhere." Skene wrote that he had no doubt that Sankey would be of "great value to Turks."[259] However, Sankey would not just be of value to the Ottomans, for included in his regular reports to Stratford, Skene included long and detailed reports sent to him from Sankey about his service with the Ottomans, which gave detailed geographical, military, and political information on the Ottoman Empire.[260] This was perfectly in line with British foreign policy in this period. British economic and political interests in Syria, Egypt and Iraq were twofold - to promote stability in the region by encouraging Ottoman centralization, while also trying to "civilize" both the Arabs and the Ottomans.[261]

Finally, in September of 1857, as the great munity in India raged, Skene wrote a fascinating letter to Stratford that was forwarded on to London. In it he remarked that based on his experience with *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry during the Crimean War and his repeated contacts

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[257] Skene to Stratford, Aleppo, June 16, 1857. No. 7. TNA: FO 195/416
[258] Skene to Stratford, Aleppo, July 15, 1857. No. 21. TNA: FO 195/416
[259] Skene to Stratford, Aleppo, July 25, 1857. No. 27. TNA: FO 195/416
[260] Sankey to Skene, on the right bank of the Euphrates, July 19, 1857. TNA: FO 195/416
[261] J. P. Parry, "Steam Power and British Influence in Baghdad, 1820–1860," *The Historical Journal* 56, no. 01 (2013): 157–158, doi:10.1017/S0018246X12000568.

with the same Arab tribes in Syria that were recruited for said cavalry during the late war, he believed that "thousands of these excellent light troops might be raised in a very short time for service in India." He felt it was his duty to suggest this idea and asked if Stratford believed it would be politically acceptable by the Porte—assuming that the British government would agree.

"Of the Hamadi tribe alone," wrote Skene, "fifteen hundred horsemen might be enlisted at Aleppo in a fortnight." The Hamadi tribe was the most loyal, "best behaved, and bravest" among the Bedouin tribes. Their loyalty to Britain was assured based on the good treatment they experienced in British service during the late war.[262] What Stratford and officials in London thought of the scheme is unknown, but considering the considerable trouble that Arab *başıbozuks* caused during their initial recruitment to the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry in 1855, it seems unlikely that this would have been as simple and easy as Skene believed. It is also interesting to note that after so many problems with Beatson and his Albanian *başıbozuks*, that Skene would so readily embrace the idea of recruiting irregulars to be sent to India. It is also an open question if said Arab Bedouins would have been willing to travel and fight abroad for the British Empire. However, this idea very much goes to the Imperial mind which connected the Ottoman Empire, and especially Syria and Egypt, to India. Although circumstances worked out differently, the idea of sending troops from Syria and Egypt to India, just as later Indian soldiers would be sent to the same regions, was not illogical. It also speaks to Skene's confidence that Muslims of one empire would readily fight Muslims of another. However, as previously stated, this was not only the belief of Stratford, but of the Sultan as well.[263]

O'Reilly

> "One officer whose name has been mentioned in connection with this matter is Colonel O'Reilly—a man of perfect honour and the highest integrity, who was distinguished for his ardent desire to improve himself in his profession, and who with that view served as a volunteer in the Sardinian army, and also in the armies of other countries. He afterwards went to Turkey, where he was appointed to the command of the Turkish cavalry. As far as anything communicated by General Shirley originated with Colonel O'Reilly, I am confident, therefore, that the latter stated only what he believed to be strictly correct."[264]

After his service with the *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry, Palmerston recommended O'Reilly for service with the Ottomans in 1857.[265]In 1857 O'Reilly took or was given the name Hassan Bey.

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[262] Skene to Stratford, Aleppo, September 19, 1857. No. 45. TNA: FO 195/416
[263] Lane-Poole, *The Life of the Right Honourable Stratford Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe*, 2:411.
[264] Viscount Palmerston, HC Deb 29 July 1856 vol 143 cc1497-9
[265] BOA: HR.SFR.3 33/2, April, 1857

Burton later claimed that O'Reilly converted to Islam before entering Ottoman service, but this seems unlikely, and Burton made the claim to slander the reputation of O'Reilly. [266] Between 1857 and 1860 O'Reilly's whereabouts are unknown, however with the 1860 civil strife on Mount Lebanon he appeared on the staff of Fuad Pasha, where he was again put in charge of irregular cavalry. [267] He also helped Fuad Pasha investigate crimes committed in Sidon.[268] Moreover, O'Reilly was made member of an extraordinary tribunal formed to try perpetrators of crimes against Christians in Damascus (Sir Henry Bulwer, the British ambassador to the Porte, was informed of this fact by the Ottomans).[269] In 1861 O'Reilly was commissioned to raise and command two squadrons of irregular cavalry in Syria.[270] In 1862 O'Reilly was put in charge of the new Ottoman gendarmerie in Syria.[271] That same year the Prince of Wales visited Syria and rode with the Serasker of Syria, the British consul, and with O'Reilly, who he described as "Colonel O'Reilly (Hassan Bey) who is an Irishman in the Turkish service, & is a pleasant & conversable fellow."[272] After 1862 O'Reilly's life and career becomes difficult to follow, and according to French sources in 1863 he was recalled to Istanbul to answer charges that he was involved in a plot against the Ottomans in Syria.[273] However, letters to and from Lord Palmerston and Col. Eugene O'Reilly were exchanged between 1860-1866 while O'Reilly was in Syria. [274] Therefore it seems likely that O'Reilly was still in Ottoman service in Syria after 1863 and that he continued to send intelligence reports to Palmerston. However, for certain O'Reilly's career as an Ottoman officer and British agent ended in 1868 when he was involved in a revolt

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[266] Burton, *The Life of Captain Sir Richd F. Burton*, 236–237.
[267] Lieutenant Colonel Hassan Bey, aide-de-camp to His Excellency, was appointed commander of a battalion with orders to go to Hasbayya and Rashayya Sidon to protect the retreat of the Christians of these districts will be directed to Beirut . The leader of a tribe of métévallis Ali Bey, put at the disposal of Hassan Bey. Franco Couzza Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Damascus, 15 August 1860. Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[268] Sahak Abro Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Sidon, 17 February 1861. Ibid.
[269] Sahak Abro Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Beirut, August 12, 1860. Ibid.; Sahak Abro Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Beirut, 30 December 1860. Ibid.
[270] Sahak Abro Effendi to Cabouly Effendi, Beirut, 25 April 1861. Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[271] "Turkey," *The Times*, March 18, 1862, 26; See also: L. Schatkowski Schilcher, "The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s: A Chapter in the Rural History of Modern Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13, no. 2 (1981): 165.
[272] Edward, "The Prince of Waless Journal."
[273] Schilcher, "The Hauran Conflicts of the 1860s," 171, footnote 60, p.178.
[274] TNA: BUL 1/277/1-43 568 x 8 1860-1861. TNA: BUL 1/374/1-49 568x 8 1862. TNA: BUL 1/374/1-49 570 x 8 1866

against Ottoman authorities.[275] This incident was not well understood at the time and has not become clearer in recent years. However, it involved Prince Halim[276]of Khedivate Egypt, the last living son of Muhammad Ali and next in line for Khedivate throne, until Ismail changed the law of succession to favor his own sons. Halim made contact with British officials and seemed to have received some kind of support or assurances. However, his plotting was uncovered and he was exiled from Egypt.[277] The key evidence against him was a document found in O'Reilly's private papers which outlined plans for the delivery of men and arms.[278] It appears that O'Reilly's attempt to lead a revolt in support of Halim was unsuccessful and that he was captured. However, his role, his connection to Halim, and the role of the British and French merchants and government remains unclear.[279] Despite being captured by the Ottomans, O'Reilly was released and would return to Britain.

O'Reilly died in 1874 at the age of 48 - he had been living in London and died in Morocco "while on a mission for some English capitalists."[280] His obituary in the *Irishman* noted that he was one of the 1848 revolutionaries, but that he had left behind his Irish brothers and pursued a career with the British and Ottomans, and that his life therefore should be celebrated from the years 1848 to 1850.[281]

It is difficult to classify O'Reilly. He was no renegade, he did not enter Ottoman service to escape his failed revolutionary career, nor can he be strictly labeled as a mercenary (although at the time of his death his friends labeled his actives in Morocco as a mercenary), but without further details it is impossible to know whether his work for some "English capitalists" was also on behalf of the British state.[282] Likewise his "rebellion" in Syria was likely approved by elements within the British, French, Egyptian, and Ottoman governments. Whether or not he had

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[275] "Turkey," *The Times*, October 19, 1868, 10.
[276] Not to be confused with his son, Mehmet Said Halim, was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress and was grand vizir from 1913 to 1917. Arthur Goldschmidt, *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 5.
[277] Jacob M. Landau, *Parliaments and Parties in Egypt* (Routledge, 2015).
[278] Blanchard Jerrold, *Egypt Under Ismail Pacha: Being Some Chapters of Contemporary History* (S. Tinsley & co., 1879), 100–102.
[279] The most detailed account of these events is filled with wild suggestions and conspiracy theories, and reads like the plot for a modern-day soap opera. "The East. A Curious Chapter of Recent Turkish History. The '68 Syrian Filibustering Fiasco.," *The New York Herald*, July 4, 1870, 8.
[280] Regan, *The Lost Civil War Diaries*, 335.
[281] "Death of a 'Forty-Eight Man'-Eugene O'Reilly (Hassan Bey)," *Irishman*, March 28, 1874.
[282] The lines between private and state interests are difficult to distinguish, but there is no doubt that the British Empire had interests in Morocco.

British approval, he was not persona non grata in London - rather it seems that he was received with open arms in Britain after his embarrassing episode in Syria. Moreover, his military career in Italy, with *Osmanli* Irregular Cavalry, and in Ottoman service were sanctioned and promoted by Lord Palmerston. In a letter published by the *Illustrated Times* in 1862 attributed to O'Reilly, he praised the British army and criticized his former Irish revolutionary compatriots for fomenting further unrest in Ireland. [283] His loyalty was clearly to the British first, but until 1868 he seemed to have served the Ottomans loyally and effectively.[284] In an era of Anglo-Ottoman friendship and cooperation, O'Reilly was an imperial soldier, and a soldier for both the British and Ottoman Empires.

Sailors of the Empire

As O'Reilly was leaving the Ottoman Empire two new men were beginning their imperial service, but these men were not cavalry officers, rather naval officers, Henry Felix Woods[285] and Augustus Charles Hobart-Hampden, know as Woods and Hobart Pasha respectively. Woods service was requested by the Ottomans and approved by the foreign office. On the 14th of July 1869, the Ottoman foreign minister, Mehmed Emin Âli Pasha (1815-1871), asked Henry Elliot, the British ambassador to the Porte permission to hire Woods.[286] Elliot replied a few months later and granted Âli Pasha's Pasha's request. "Woods should be one of the five British naval officers for whom permission was requested to enter the Turkish service. I have the honour to inform you that HMG have no objections to Woods accepting an appointment under the Turkish government."[287] Four days later Woods signed an argument with the Porte to train cadets and serve in the Ottoman Imperial Navy.[288] The other four officer mentioned by Elliot are unknown, Hobart may have been one of them, but he joined the Ottoman Navy with out permission from

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[283] *Illustrated Times: Weekly Newspaper*, vol. XIV, 1862, 55.
[284] It is also possible that his actions in 1868 were at the behest of elements within the Ottoman government.
[285] The only records on Woods which I have found in the National Archives give his date of birth, 6 June 1843, and the his date of his enrolment in the navy, 05 June 1858. TNA: ADM 196/73/95; TNA: ADM 196/79/1187
[286] Âli Pasha to Elliot. 14 July 1869, BOA. I.HR.241/14307
[287] Elliot to Âli Pasha. 18 October 1869, 14 July 1869, BOA. I.HR.241/14307
[288] The agreement was written in Ottoman, French and English, but only the English copy was signed by Woods. Furthermore, based on the handwriting and the lack of formal language it appears that Woods wrote a summary of what he understood the agreement to be and signed that. Moreover, it appears he was to be paid 50£ a month for service in the Imperial Navy and another 150£ for training cadets. 22 October 1869, BOA. I.HR.241/14307

the foreign office. It is likely that they were never hired; Woods wrote that his commission with the Ottomans was delayed due to Anglo-Ottoman conflict over how to response to the revolt on Crete,[289] and there was no further mention of other British naval officers other than Woods and Hobart.

The Ottoman desire for British officer was due to the fact that by the inter-war period the Ottoman navy had became the third largest in Europe, however the Imperial Naval Engineering School provided few commanding officers, and had no training for subaltern officers, engineers, and crew.[290] This problem was compounded following the retirement of Slade in 1866.

As discussed in the introduction, Woods would remain in Ottoman service until the First World War, however much of his career is outside the scope of this study. Hobart Pasha's life and career could be a manuscript all its own and therefore is also beyond the scope of this study, but there are a few important aspects of Hobart's service with the Ottoman navy that should be considered.

As already alluded to, Hobart joined the Ottoman Navy during the Cretan crisis and lead the Ottoman effort to blockade the island of Crete.[291] However despite this action against the British Empire he was never formally reprimanded (although he was not given his pension from the British Navy, a fact that was debate in the British parliament) and he was celebrated by the British press as a gallant British adventurer in Ottoman service. Furthermore, although he he died in retirement in Italy, his body was returned to Istanbul and he was buried at Scutari Cemetery in an Ottoman state funeral attended by high British dignitaries. [292]

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[289] Henry Felix Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 11–12.
[290] Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatürk*, 176.
[291] Âli Pasha to Photiadès Bey Constantinople, July 7th, 1869 Dispatch No. 25198/63 Sinan Kuneralp, ed., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 1st ed.., vol. 2 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009).
[292] "Romantic Marriage of Hobart Pasha.," *Burra Record*, September 21, 1886.

CHAPTER 6: IMPERIAL AGENTS & ADVENTURERS IN THE RUSSO-OTTOMAN WAR OF 1877-1878

> In contrast to the Crimean War, the employment of numbers of foreign-born officers was limited, and their contributions were minor. The administration actively tried to enlist or hire only foreign doctors, but it did not refuse the applications of various foreign officers, who mostly sought adventure and fame. There were only a couple of foreign-born generals available, like the veteran of the Crimean War Hungarian émigré Feyzi Pasha and the British adventurer Valentine Baker Pasha. We know that about 100 foreign junior or middle-ranking officers enlisted and served in the Ottoman military, mostly at the field grade level. The number of Germans exceeded all other nationalities and, surprisingly, there were also several Russian-trained officers available, like the famous Ossetian tribal chief Musa Kundukov Pasha and the Russian Military Academy graduate Omer Pasha. Some figures like William von Herbert achieved fame (after the publication of his memoirs), but the impact of most of the foreign-born participants still remains unknown. In short, non-Ottoman commissioning sources did not fill the officer shortage as they had done during the Crimean War.[293]

> I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, in recent months, and especially since the beginning of the war with Serbia and Montenegro, I get almost daily letters from different officers and English doctors expressing the desire to take service in the imperial army, as well as letters from different people offering to sell the Imperial Government of weapons and ammunition of all kinds, and I decline all these offers, replying that the Imperial Embassy has no instructions on the subject.[294]

During the Crimean War Anglo-Ottoman military collaboration was overt, British officers in Ottoman service or in command of Ottoman troops were sanctioned both both governments. However, during the Russo-Ottoman War British officers in Ottoman service were either men employed by the Ottomans prior to the outbreak of the war or adventurers who came of their own accord to serve with the Ottomans. These adventurers sought fame and glory, but were also motivated by a patriotic zeal to defend the interests of the British Empire against Russian encroachment. These British adventurers, who were often journalists, who served with or alongside the armies of the Ottoman Empire can be broken into three broad groups. The first were anti-Russian and arguably sympathetic to the Ottomans. The second group was certainly anti-Russian but less sympathetic to the Ottomans, seeing them more as a necessary evil or proxy in the "Great Game" against the Russians. The third group was anti-Ottoman, they supported the independence of the Bulgarians, Romanians or Serbians against Ottoman domination, but did not wish to see these lands under Russian control. The second and third groups were both on the side of Eastern Christians, what divided them was how Russo-phobic they were. Those more

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[293] Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatürk*, 198.
[294] Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 25 July 1876 Dispatch No. 6197/216: Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.

sympathetic to the Ottomans were often highly critical of Eastern Christians, and thought their complains regarding Ottoman rule were unfounded. However, overall the best understanding of British feeling towards the Ottoman Empire can be summed up in a quote from Queen Victoria, who said before the beginning of the war: "It is not the question of upholding Turkey; it is the question of British or Russian supremacy in the world!"[295]

Discourse

The discourse in this chapter is exclusively the product of written accounts of the war. However, the works, in two volumes, of by Colonel Valentine Baker (better known as Baker Pasha) read very much like official reports. Baker Pasha served on the staff of Mehmet Ali Pasha,[296] the commander the Ottoman western front (the Danube frontier, Bulgaria, and Thrace). Baker's accounts are a chronological report solely focused on the military events of the war. They are strategic reports with observations and recommendations; they are neither colorful nor descriptive unless the descriptions are of geographical features important to a battle or military personnel and equipment. Political or personal issues were only addressed in regard to their effect on the military situation. In addition to a study of Baker's work, Baker Pasha's career with the Ottomans is a focus of this chapter.

Another account, written by Frederick William von Herbert covers a nearly identical time and geographical area, but was written from the perspective of a low ranking officer rather than one in the Ottoman high command. Herbert's service with the Ottoman army and his account are fascinating as he was a foreigner who learned enough Turkish to graduate from the Ottoman military academy.[297]

The third account, written by the aforementioned Charles S. Ryan covers his service in both in Rumelia and in Eastern Anatolia. His account is unique as he is one of the few to have served

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[295] Quoted in: Leslie Rogne Schumacher, "A 'Lasting Solution': The Eastern Question and British Imperialism, 1875-1878" (Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 2012), 142, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.csus.edu/pqdthss/docview/1037992277/abstract/F23C0C9E04BB480FPQ/4?accountid=10358.

[296] Born Ludwig Karl Friedrich Detroit in Brandenburg. German in origin, came to the Ottoman Empire as a young man, converted and embraced an Ottoman lifestyle. He was killed in September 1878 by rebels in Albania. See: Herbert, The Defence of Plevna, 1877, 452. Also the great great grandfather of the Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet.

[297] Frederick William von Herbert, *The Defence of Plevna, 1877* (London Longmans, Green, 1895), 29–34.

in both the Eastern and Western theaters of the war. Like Baker Pasha, Ryan will be a focus of this chapter.

A fourth account, by Edward Vizetelly gives a different perspective of the Eastern front of the war as Vizetelly, an adventurer, fought with a group of Circassian *bashibozuks.*

Also with the focus on the Eastern front of the war I have used two accounts written by British journalists, Charles Williams and Charles Boswell Norman, for the *London Evening Standard* and *Times* respectively. Williams had a strongly anti-Russian and seemly pro-Ottoman bias, going so far as to state that Christians receive better treatment than their Muslim neighbors, while deriding the Armenians for being arrogant and unfit for the autonomy Britain seeks for them. However, Williams did not see the Armenians as traitorous towards Ottoman rule, rather he argued that while the Armenians may not have been happy living under Ottoman rule, they have no desire to be under Russian rule, as they would be forced to serve in Russian army.

These accounts taken together there are a number of themes which all of these accounts touch upon that I have chosen to focus on in this chapter. As in my chapters on the Crimean War I examine the place of these British officers within the Ottoman army i.e. their role as either agents of the British state, Ottoman officers, or adventurers. Second, the discourse they produced on the Ottoman Empire with a focus on their views about imperial violence. Finally, in the case of Valentine Baker, there is a discussion on British imperial ambitions during and after the war.

As previously discussed, there are inherent problems with all of these accounts. However, what is interesting is not that these authors had clear biases, but that their prejudices were in no way uniform, and it is their unique characteristics that make them both interesting and a reason why these particular accounts have been chosen.

Imperial Discourse and Women

However, there is one area where they these authors were uniform, their failure to acknowledge women. Gender was not discussed in pervious chapters because men like Slade, Vivian and Beatson had virtual no interactions with the female sex (besides Beatson's dismissal of the rape charges against one of his clerk's wife). They lived and worked in military encampments that were almost entirely male. However, many of the British officers during the Russo-Ottoman war had far greater contact with the civilian population thereby interacting with women and witnessing crimes against women. Yet to say that these texts, whether state

documents, letters, accounts, or newspaper articles underrepresented women would be a gross understatement.

The sources examined for this study were authored entirely by men, who if they wrote about women at all confined them to a few narrow archetypes. Wives or daughters who at best were mentioned in passing, often nameless and devoid of even the slightness biographical details.[298] A man's mother, who would often also remained nameless, but at least receive a few lines of reverent platitudes. A friend's wife or daughter, again often nameless, but noted with some affection. In fact, I have often learned that an author, whose account or autobiography I have spent hours pouring over, was married or had children, not from the author himself, who failed to even mention his family in passing, but from the account of a friend who recalled a particular dinner or occasion when he meet said author's family. Furthermore, to my surprise I have often found more details about a man's family in the records of the Ottoman Archives, than in his own monograph.

By far the largest place women hold these texts were as object of the male gaze. Young beauties danced with at a ball, talk to on a train or boat, leered at in taverns, or glimpsed for a few seconds in the harems of the Ottoman pasha who hosted the author in his home. For instance, Charles Ryan ended his long account filled with the horrors of war with his meeting of victorious Russian General Duhoffskoy. Despite the cold, disease and death around him Ryan devoted a few pages to the General's wife.

> Princess Duhoffskoy was then about twenty years of age, and to my youthful imagination, with her beautifully chiselled features, complexion of exquisite fairness, and large blue eyes that looked me frankly in the face, she seemed like a visitant from another world. For a year and a half almost the only specimens of womanhood that I had seen were squat and swarthy Bulgarian girls, frowsy Armenians, or Turkish women closely veiled in their yashmaks. It was no wonder that this lovely Russian, with her delicate, refined beauty and her frank and gracious manner, made a profound impression upon me, and set my heart beating quickly with mingled surprise and delight.

After describing Princess Duhoffskoy in much detail, Ryan went on to recount in gleeful detail that he and the Princess were left alone to talk. This private time with the Princess was filled

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[298] For example, Woods mentioned his marriage in passing: "I joined the Naval College at Halki, married a few months after, and settled down to a shore life [...on the an island] in the Marmora." No details about his marriage, not even his wife's name. One of his daughters was named Lucy, but his detail was only given because it related to a story about his commanding officer Said Pasha Henry Felix Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), 12–14.

with nothing more than ideal conversation, but Ryan seemed to have wanted his readers to revel alongside him in having been in such "intimate" contact with such a beautiful woman.[299]

Moreover, whiles wives received very little attention, the civilized, yet still exotic Greek, Armenian, or other Eastern-Christian girl who the author met by chance and the called upon, perhaps even persuade for marriage, or was engaged to, often took up pages of the author's story. Anything more than vague romantic interest was never mentioned, a kiss on the check was rare and celebrated event, certainly nothing explicitly sexual was ever described. However, I have no doubt that the adventurers and soldiers who wrote these account were as proud of their romantic exploits as their military achievements. Therefore, I cannot but help to think that their contemporaries read through the lines and understood that the author was bragging about a romantic exploit, whether it was believed or not, but a description would be in poor taste for such a gentlemanly audience. If nothing else it is clear that these authors were boastful of their encounters, if only visual, with the beautiful women of the Orient.

Finally, the last female archetype, and the most rare, was the victims of violence. As statistics, women and children killed were reported alongside the men. However, women subject to violence were rarely described and then only in the vaguest of terms. Violence against men on the other hand was regularly described in graphic detail. I think it is important to note that although this study is filled with reports of violence, crimes, and atrocities carried out by Russian and Ottoman irregulars, these reports focus almost entirely on male victims.

I do not want to be salacious, but to make this point, a newspaper report from the *Jewish Chronicle,* October 5, 1877, sent to the Earl of Durbay from the Anglo-Jewish Association, stated that in the village of Kyzanlik, Bulgaria the local Jewish community was rounded up and held in the local synagogue by Bulgarian-Christian irregulars and Cossacks. After being robbed of all of their possessions the drunken soldiers "outraged" the young women and girls. While there should be no expectation that this mass rape would be described in any detail, what was described was not the suffering of the women being raped but the suffering of one of the fathers who was forced to watch.

> The elder of the town, Aaron ben Kanetti, the richest of the community, saw his two daughters seized in their turn, and prayed that he might be spared the horrible sight by being killed at once. The response to his prayer was that two men who

[299] Charles S Ryan and John Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent: Adventures of an English Surgeon with the Turkish Army at Plevna and Erzeroum, 1877-1878* (New York: Scribner's, 1897), 398–400.

> were armed with hay-forks placed a prong in each ear and threatened that if he attempted to turn away his head, they would thrust them into his brain. It is declared that the maddened father then seized one of the forks and thrust a fork into his own eyes rather than witness the shameful outrage on his offspring, and as he fell in agony at the feet of the Bulgars who had him in charge, they mercifully ended his torment by prodding him to death with the forks. [300]

Here the report focused not on the victimhood of the women, but upon their male relations. In the hundreds of reports I have read of atrocities by probably less than half a dozen make reference to female victims. And then only a single reference made to a crime "against her honor," or that she was "outraged" or "ravished." This in contrast to vivid account of men being shot but not killed, dismembered, beheaded, tortured, or graphic details of their wounds. Although this study will not focus on such details, if it did, the sources utilized in this study would leave one with the impression that the horrors of war in the 19th century were visited solely on the male population of the Ottoman Empire.

Imperial Discourse in the Archives

Although this chapter makes limited use of the British archives it is critical to consider that a clear line cannot be drawn between the account and archival documents. Often these accounts were little more than the same type of records that one would find in an archive. In fact the very documents that are found in the archive were reprinted in these accounts. Moreover, men like Baker Pasha who were writing military accounts wrote in a style that was at times no different from a report you would find in an archive. This has proved especially true for the UK National Archives, in many cases one cannot draw a line between "archival documents" and published documents, the only difference being that one copy is handwritten and the other was typed. Although in a number of cases even this does not divide "archival documents" from public sources. Furthermore, the kind of official and unofficial or state and private works produced by Victorian imperialists were so clearly a product of colonial knowledge that to distinguish one type from another is virtually impossible. Therefore, when reading in account by a man like Baker Pasha British state documents cannot be used to verify the accuracy or reliability of Baker's "personal works." Comparing the literary works of Baker to his correspondence with members of the British government or document and correspondence about Baker between state officials only confirm each other. Even records of discussions about Baker between British and

[300] TNA: FO 195/1184

Ottoman officials, recorded by the British state, confirm all other British sources about Baker. While a fine history could be written about Baker Pasha's service to the Ottoman Empire with such sources, it would have an inescapable British perspective on events.

However, the Ottoman archives can serve as a "reality check" on said British perspective and on the egos of such men. Not just by what is in the Ottoman archives, but what is no there. It is telling that many of the individuals that have been and will be discussed in this study have very little "footprint" within the Ottoman archives. Many with only a dozen or a half a dozen documents apiece to their name, so the stories these men told about their exploits should be put in context of a larger Ottoman reality in which they were merely minor players. Although, even minor players had contact with some of the most important men of the Ottoman Empire and were involved in some of the most critical events of the Empire.

For Queen, and Sometimes Sultan. British Officers and Adventurers In the Russo-Ottoman War

Valentine Baker

> Eight squadrons of Turkish Regular Cavalry came out from behind a low hill on the Turkish right. They were led by a man on a fine grey Arab, the finest horseman I have ever seen. They came round the hill at a trot, then broke into a gallop and came swooping down on the left flank of the Russians, tearing through them like an express train through a flock of sheep. […]
>
> Some bodies of the Russian Cavalry came out to meet him […] But there was no holding back Baker and his Turks, and the Russian cavalry was soon tearing back as hard as they could go, to get under the shelter of their guns. The Turkish cavalry followed them hard like tigers who had once tasted blood and longed for more. I saw a shell explode within a few yards of Baker Pasha; his brave horse fell, and down he came. That was the end of the grey Arab, but not of his master, for Baker was up in a moment, on the charger of a common trooper, in the middle of his men, hacking like a very Hercules.
>
> An old Turkish artillery officer who was standing quite close to me, laid down his field glasses, and said: 'I swear by the Prophet, that the Infidel who commands our cavalry fights with the courage of ten thousand tigers.' 'And yet,' said another young artillery officer, 'Allah has smitten the English with such blindness that they allow a man like him to leave their Army.'[301]

The above passage from a history of the Tenth Royal Hussars is emblematic of the life and career of Col. Valentine Baker in the Ottoman Empire. The passage is mostly accurate in its description of one of the military contributions Baker made to the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman war. However, Baker's admittedly heroic service during the war was far more

[301] Quoted in: Anne Baker, *A Question of Honour: The Life of Lieutenant General Valentine Baker Pasha* (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 104–106.

glorious than invaluable. Furthermore, no doubt apocryphal quotes by the Ottoman artillery officers are a hallmark of not only the classically orientalist descriptions of Baker's career and accomplishments in the Ottoman Empire, but utterly gloss over why Baker left the British Army.

Baker was a raising star of the British Army, in addition to respectable military service in the Crimean War and India, Baker wrote book about and testified to Parliament on the organization, equipment, tactics and use of cavalry.[302] He had been made colonel in the Tenth Royal Hussars and was personal friends with the regiment's patron, the Prince of Wales. In 1875 Baker published an account of his recent travels in Central Asia, complete with strategic recommendations for the defense of India against Russian encroachment; a classic "Great Game" text. However, on May 17 Baker assaulted a young woman on a train in Britain, his subsequent arrest and very public trial, notwithstanding the light punishment he received, ended his career in the British Army. Apparently, Queen Victoria herself declared him persona non grata and ordered him stripped from the army lists, despite the pleading of the Duke of Cambridge, the head of the British army who did not want the army to lose such a fine officer, and her son, the Prince of Wales.[303]

Reports of the assault and the ensuing trail, like many later incidence in his career, were highly sympathetic to Baker, he was often portrayed as the victim of a hysterical young woman, his social class and distinguished military career along with influential friends resulted in the all male jury of his peers acquitting him of attempted rape, and only convicting him of simple assault. And this only due to the fact that the young woman in question was of similar class and had established her honor by nearly jumping off the train in her attempt to escape from Baker.[304]

It seems clear that Baker was guilty of more than just asking for her name and a little kiss, as many later account reported.[305] Baker's biography in the *The Memoirs of the Tenth Royal Hussars,* makes no mention of the incident, rather simply stating that in August 1875 "...he

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[302] Great Britain Parliament House of Commons, *Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons and Command* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1873), 151–157; Valentine Baker, *British Cavalry ...* (London: Longman, 1858).
[303] Baker, *A Question of Honour*, 91–95.
[304] Kim Stevenson, "Unearthing the Realities of Rape: Utilising Victorian Newspaper Reportage to Fill in the Contextual Gaps," *Liverpool Law Review* 28, no. 3 (October 4, 2007): 421–422, doi:10.1007/s10991-007-9027-0.
[305] This can be seen in both later Victorian accounts, see: John Pendleton, *Our Railways; Their Origin, Development, Incident and Romance,* (London; Paris; Melbourne: Cassell and Co., 1894), 22–23; And in modern works, see: Baker, *A Question of Honour*, 79–80.

ceased to serve with the British army."[306] A literary figure no less than Mark Twain made mention of Baker's case in his famed travelogue *A Tramp Abroad*. Commenting that while Europeans look down on American manners, in America a young woman can walk down the street or take the train by herself without fear. That these so called gentlemen like Baker, were nothing of the sort. London was full of such men, who would have been hanged if had the crime been committed Arkansas.[307] Newspaper reports of the day provide fairly graphic details of Miss Rebecca Kate Dickinson's testimony against Baker, she testified that after refusing Baker entreaties he sat next to her and put his hand around her waist and tried to kiss her, this caused her to leap up and try to ring the ball in the carriage, at this point Dickinson reported that "[Baker] …pressed me back against the carriage, …himself being in front, and placed his face on mine and kissed me on the lips. […] Then he sank down [very close to] …me, and I felt. His hand underneath my dress, on my stocking, above my boot." After which she literally climbed half-way out the nearest window and screamed loud enough that passengers in the next car were able to hear and come to rescue her. [308] Such details are exceedingly rare for most Victorian accounts and as mentioned with account of the Russo-Ottoman war violence against women by either side in the war is generally mentioned in passing and with little details besides vague references to innocence and honor. It was thanks only to the very public trial that the victim's voice was heard, despite this fact that the Baker only real punishment was the end of his career in England.

Baker's career as a soldier in England was over, but his career as an imperial solider was not. In 1876 the Duke of Cambridge recommend Baker to Musurus Pasha, the Ottoman ambassador to London.[309] In a lengthy dispatch, dated 25 July 1876, to Safvet Pasha, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Musurus Pasha advised that the Sublime Porte should accept the offer of service from Colonel Baker and make him either a cavalry commander of one of their corps, or a senior

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[306] Robert Spencer Liddell, *The Memoirs of the Tenth Royal Hussars (Prince of Wale's Own): Historical and Social* (Longmans, Green, and Company, 1891), 368.
[307] Mark Twain, *The Writings of Mark Twain* (P. F. Collier & Son Company, 1907), 208–209.
[308] "The Charge Against Colonel Baker.," *Queanbeyan Age*, August 21, 1875.
[309] Constantine Musurus (1807-91) Ottoman ambassador in London 1851-85, from a important Phanariot family, "never had a solid command of Ottoman Turkish," communicated with Mustafa Reshit Pasha in French. Christine Philliou, "The Paradox of Perceptions: Interpreting the Ottoman Past through the National Present," *Middle Eastern Studies* 44, no. 5 (2008): 661–75.

staff officers to one of the generals of the imperial army. [310] Musurus Pasha noted that Colonel Baker, was younger brother of "Baker Pasha,"[311] Samuel White Baker, who at the time was operating under Imperial *firman* to suppress the slave trade in Egypt.[312] Moreover, Musurus Pasha wrote that Baker had an impressive career in the Crimean War and India, and was considered one of the best cavalry officers in the British Army, this he had been assured of by the Duke of Cambridge. Furthermore, wrote Musurus Pasha, if Colonel Baker entered the service of the Sublime Porte, his future would be forever linked "to the glory of the imperial army"[*…rattacherait exclusivement son avenir à la gloire de l'armée impériale*], because he had been dismissed from the British military and had no hope to continue his military career in England. This was due to a conviction in a civilian courts by the "complaints of a young lady whom he had taken liberties with in a railway wagon" [*…sur les plaintes d'une demoiselle envers laquelle il s'était permis des libertés dans un wagon de chemin de fer*]. [313]

This letter between Ottoman officials about Baker shows the complexity of Baker's future service in the Ottoman Empire. On the one hand Baker was a "classic renegade," a distinguished and highly competent and military officer exiled from his former homeland in search of service with the Ottoman army. But on the other hand, was being recommended to the Ottomans by the very highest levels of the British State. Therefore, it seems clear that the Ottomans were happy to take into service such a competent officer, they must've understood his connections with the British Empire, connections that could be both useful and dangerous. Clearly the Ottomans saw Baker as a valuable asset who came with high recommendations and perhaps more importantly had good political connections which the Ottomans knew they would need should war break out again against the Russians.

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[310] Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 25 July 1876 Dispatch No. 6197/216: Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[311] Due to Valentine Baker's service in the Ottoman Army and later the Egyptian Army the name Baker Pasha is mostly attributed to him, rather than his older brother.
[312] See: Samuel White Baker, *Ismailia; a Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Organized by Ismail, Khedive of Egypt* (London, Macmillan, 1879), http://archive.org/details/ismailianarrativ00bake.
[313] Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 25 July 1876 Dispatch No. 6197/216: Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.

Baker was duly appointed to a command in the gendarmerie,[314] and was charged with helping to reform them. A draft proposal for reforms was presented to Baker in early 1877 which included the idea for a company of gendarmerie composed of both Muslims and Christians in a number of regions of the Empire, and also proposed was the inclusion of non-Muslim subjects in military schools.[315] As part of this reform 12 British officers were recruited and employed to command the gendarmerie in various regions. This endeavor was carried out at the behest of British officials who believed that the safety and security of non-Muslim subject of the Empire would be better maintained under British officers. However, this was a short-lived reform, and as soon as the war broke out in April 1877 most of these officers were reassigned to the staff of Ottoman generals. After the war the reforms was not revived and most of the officers recruited by Baker left the Ottoman Empire within a few years, the sole exception being Blunt Pasha,[316] who I will have more to say about later. Many who left the Ottoman Empire found new positions in British occupied Egypt.

While I do not doubt these proposals and reforms were sincere, it also seems that they were political chips offered to the British government, through Baker, to promote better relations rather than address some deep seeded concerns. It was as much Baker's political connections as his military acumen that the Ottomans desired. Both his ability to recruit officers and soldiers—there was mention of a trip to Italy by Baker on behalf of the Ottomans to raise troops[317]—and his relationships with key members of the British State. For example, after a few months in Istanbul Baker returned to London and there he help to organize a campaign to raise money and provide supplies, like warm clothes, for Ottoman soldiers. This was supported by the Duke of Sutherland, who accompanied by Baker, came in person to the Ottoman embassy to announce the campaign's induction. Reporting on this to Safvet Pasha, Musurus Pasha noted that the Duke

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[314] For more on the Ottoman Gendarmerie see: Nadir Özbek, "Policing the Countryside: Gendarmes of the Late 19th-Century Ottoman Empire (1876-1908)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 47–67.
[315] Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, Constantinople, 8 March, 1877 Telegram No. 46 775/68: Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[316] Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid* (London, Constable, 1917), 187–189, http://archive.org/details/lifeofabdulhamid00pearuoft.
[317] Fitzio Effendi to Aleko Pasha Semlin (Zemun?), 26 November 1876 Dispatch No. 467: Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.

of Sutherland was head of one of the riches and most influential families in England and was a close friend of the Prince of Wales.[318]

Another key political connection was Lord Saulsberry, who strongly supported the Ottomans against Russia. During the Berlin congress negotiations Salisbury suggested that Russian fears of atrocities by Ottoman troops in Rumelia after the withdrawal of Russian troops could be resolved by placing foreign officers in command the of Ottoman troops; apparently with Baker in mind.[319] Ottoman statesmen made certain to let Saulsberry know when they promoted Baker. For example, a letter was sent to Lord Salisbury to inform him that Valentine Baker Pasha has been appoint to Anatolia to work on reforms.[320] Therefore, it is clear that despite his "exile" Baker maintained contacts with friends and associates in the British military and political establishment. These contacts were both high and low, so in addition to his well-documented relationship with the Prince of Wales, a one J. Butler, prior relationship to Baker unknown, wrote a letter to the Porte requesting a position in the Ottoman army as a doctor under the command of Baker Pasha.[321]

However, while these political connections were greatly valued, it must be remembered that Baker was as much and agent of the British Empire as he was the Ottoman Empire. His aforementioned trip to London in fall 1876 was, regardless of any support he established for the Ottomans, as a British agent providing critical intelligence on events in Istanbul, the Ottoman military, and relations with Russia to the British government.[322] Moreover, in a letter to the Queen the then Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli wrote that he had personally interviewed Baker during his stay in London and suggested that Baker should be put "at the head of a Turkish Contingent of 50,000 men."[323]

Furthermore, shortly after his return to Istanbul and with prospects for war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia looming, in early November, while encamped near lake Derkos (near Istanbul on the Black Sea) Baker sent a letter to the Prince of Wales outlining the current strategic situation and recommendations for British war planning. Showing great foresight, Baker predicted that with the bulk of Ottoman troops tied up far from Istanbul in the heart of

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[318] Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha, London, 12 December 1876 Telegram No. 6400/419: Ibid.
[319] William Norton Medlicott, *Congress of Berlin and After* (Routledge, 2013), 222–223.
[320] BOA.HR.SFR.3 268/36, 22 November, 1879.
[321] BOA.HR.SFR.3 268/84, 08 October, 1879.
[322] Baker, *A Question of Honour*, 100.
[323] Quoted in: Ibid., 114.

Balkans the capital would be vulnerable to a Russian advance. Having studied the strategic situation in detail since his arrival in Istanbul, Baker suggested that Britain, even without allies, could intervene to block a Russian occupation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

> I have been devoting myself to this object and I have found a most admirable military position about twenty-five miles from Constantinople, which stretches from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora. This might be so strengthened in a short time by fieldworks, that a force of 100,000 men could protect Constantinople against any numbers that could be brought against it. No difficulty arises in protecting the narrow approach to the Dardanelles. If Russia invades Turkey, England should be prepared to immediately occupy this position.
>
> Any difficulty in producing so large a force as 100,000 might be met by taking Turkish troops into British pay and giving them a proportion of British officers. There are no finer soldiers in the world than the men of the present Turkish Army, and English service might be so popular that we might raise any number of them. The fortifications of these lines and the secure command of the Straits and the Black Sea which they would give to our Navy, would make English interests perfectly secure, and we could then calmly await events, without the necessity of any allies, who must only fail and hamper our activities.
>
> In case of Russia declaring war on us, we might simply hold this position, and blockade all her ports until she gave in.[324]

As in the Crimean war, British officials were captivated by the idea of using Ottoman soldiers to defend British strategic interests from the Russian Empire. It is interesting that the Disraeli and Baker thought such a proposal plausible as during the Crimean war the Ottomans had grudgingly given and the British, an then quick disbanded, a mere 20,000 men, nowhere near of the 50,000 or 100,000 proposed by Disraeli and Baker respectively. Furthermore, this speaks to the British imperial mindset, which seemed to imagine that one day like in India or later Egypt, the British Empire would command contingents of native troops in the now subjugated Ottoman domains. As an aside, Baker himself achieved both infamy and fame leading Egyptian troops in Sudan in 1884 in the first and second battle of El Teb against Mahdist forces.[325]

However, even after the fall of Disraeli's government and the rise of Gladstone's, Baker expected not only to be put in command of the defense of Istanbul by the Ottomans after the retreat from Plevna, but moreover expected support from British troops landed by the British Navy stationed in the Sea of Marmara. It was to his great shock and disappointment that neither the British Navy nor the Ottoman command materialized.[326]

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[324] Valentine Baker to the Prince of Wales, 6 November 1876, Royal Archives, Windsor, found in: Ibid., 101–102.
[325] William Carr, "Baker, Valentine," in *Dictionary of National Biography: Supplement*, ed. Sir Sidney Lee (Smith, Elder, & Company, 1901), 110; Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, 137.
[326] Valentine Baker, *War in Bulgaria: A Narrative of Personal Experiences*, vol. 2 (S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1879), 287–223.

Mahir Pasha (General George Colville Borthwick)

Younger brother of Lord Glenesk, owner of the *Morning Post,* who, according to Woods helped bail George Borthwick out time and time again during financial hardships, i.e. Borthwick was always running up debts, which is maybe part of the reason he was in the Ottoman rather than British army.[327] Son of Peter Borthwick, MP, accompanied Lord Dufferin to Syria in 1860 and subsequently entered the Imperial Ottoman Army. [328] 1862 Borthwick requested to be a battalion commander in the Ottoman army.[329] Like O'Reilly, In 1864 Lord Palmerston recommend George Borthwick to the Ottoman Empire.[330] He married Sophie Schylowskála, daughter of Captain Schylowskála of the Imperial Russian Guard in 1884.[331] He died in January 1896 at age 56.[332]

It is interesting that there is no mention of Borthwick in Baker, Ryan, or Herbert's works, Furthermore, thus far I have found his presence in the Ottoman archives, but limited to but a few documents. I would speculate that the reasons for this were because he was closer to the Ottomans than to the British, and tasked with the managing of refugees, and sick and wounded, which, critically meant the well-being of Ottoman subjects, rather than attached as a staff officer or adviser to one of the Ottoman generals in battle. [333] Therefore, his involvement in the less glorious parts of the war saw his absence from memoirs and newspaper accounts. His low-profile in the Ottoman archives might be due to the fact that while he was a high official in Rumelia he was tasked with internal security rather than at any high-level policymaking or diplomatic correspondence. However it is interesting to note what the Pall Mail says about the high position of Borthwick compared to Baker: he had been in Ottoman service much longer and was more trusted.[334]

Mahir Pasha (Colonel Borthwick), this is how he is referred to in the reports, appeared to be attached to, or was aiding the Stafford house hospital in Varna in summer 1877, notes that he

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[327] Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* 1924, 2:139.
[328] Edmund Burke, *The Annual Register of World Events: A Review of the Year* (Longmans, Green, 1897), 134.
[329] BOA. HR.SFR.3. 68/52
[330] BOA. HR.SFR.3 87/37
[331] Burke, *The Annual Register of World Events*, 134.
[332] L. G Pine and Bernard Burke, *The New Extinct Peerage, 1884-1971; Containing Extinct, Abeyant, Dormant & Suspended Peerages with Genealogies and Arms* (Baltimore: Genealogical Pub. Co., 1973), 162.
[333] George Borthwick, "A Retreat From Adrianople.," *Evening Post*, April 6, 1878, Papers Past.
[334] "The War in the East," *The Pall Mall Budget*, October 26, 1877.

was great assistance in the transport of the sick and wounded.[335] Mehmet Ali sent back four English gentlemen including Baker Pasha because they had not been given the proper commissions or *firman*s and could not officially recognize them. It was also feared that if they should fall into Russian hands it would be a problem. Maj. Gen. Baker and his officers, however, have a formal engagement and a knowledge position they have proved that much value, as the late Commander In chief has acknowledged, and they've remain serving with Süleman. "Colonel Borthwick (Mahir Pasha), also, the only Englishman on staff of the Turkish army, accompanied Mehmet Ali in most of his reconnaissance…" "being the only English-speaking officer of high rank, he has also had the general superintendence of hospitals, Turkish and international, confided to him."[336]

In 1881 a London report noted that the Queen granted Borthwick "Royal license and authority… to accept and wear the Insignia of the Third Class of the Order of the Medjidie," which had been bestowed upon him by the Sultan in recognition of his service. However, while Borthwick clearly had sought royal approval to accept the honor, indicating his alliances to the British Empire, the report stated that Borthwick, who was a Major-General in the Ottoman Army, had "been actually and entirely employed beyond Her Majesty's Dominions in the service of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan."[337]

In 1904, after his death, there is a reference to the governor of Urfa providing a salary to Mahir's Pasha family.[338]

Blunt Pasha

Colonel Blunt was one of the officers recruited by Baker for the Ottoman gendarmerie, but unlike Baker would spend the next 30 years in the Ottoman Empire. During the Russo-Ottoman War he was with the Red Crescent helping to feed refugees from near Edirne.[339] In 1893 Blunt

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[335] Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers, *Report and Record of the Operations of the Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers : Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78* (London : Spottiswoode, 1879), 16–17, 59, http://archive.org/details/reportrecordofop00staf.
[336] "The Pall Mall Budget."
[337] Whitehall, January 3, 1881. Found in: T Walker, ed., *Bulletins and Other State Intelligence* (Compiled and arranged from the official documents published in the London gazette., 1881), 1.
[338] BOA. ŞD. 19/992 Date:15/Za/1321 (Hicrî)
[339] Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers, *Report and Record of the Operations of the Stafford House Committee for the Relief of Sick and Wounded Turkish Soldiers*, 82.

Pasha requested to be made a general.[340] A few years later he was given an award.[341] Died in Istanbul, 1909, age 74 of a stroke.[342]

Charles S. Ryan: Imperial Service and Discourse

> I was devoted to the Turkish army and the Turkish cause. I never spared myself in carrying out my duties, and I was bound by the strongest ties of attachment to my patients, as they were also, I felt and knew, to me. I positively loved the great, rough barbarians who bore their sufferings with such noble fortitude in my hospital, and during the whole of my time in Plevna I never had the slightest unpleasantness with a single one of them, and received always the greatest gratitude from them all. At that time there was no Turk in Plevna more Turkish in sympathies than I was. I threw my whole heart and soul and all my energies into the Turkish cause, and no one could have gone through all that I had without being impressed with a feeling of the most profound admiration for the patience, courage, and heroic patriotism of the Turkish private soldier.[343]

Ryan, was very proud of this service in the war, Woods wrote some 40 years after the war that Ryan talk about his time in Plevna so much that people called him "Plevan Ryan."[344] However, he was also quick to contradict those who exaggerated his for their own stories of the war.[345]

I find Ryan to have one of the more reliable accounts of the Russo-Ottoman War, even though it was written in 20 years after the fact. Published in 1897 Ryan addressed the 20-year gap between the narrative and the manuscript. He noted that it was only at the instance of John Sandes (a prolific author in his own right), that he published this work and only with Sandes' help. Second, he said the reason he reason he did not publish before was because he was a hard-working surgeon with very little leisure time. In the conclusion to his preface, Ryan wrote that he hoped that with the Eastern Question consuming Europe and the existence of the Turkish Empire under threat that his work would show the military virtues of "Ottoman troops."[346] So it is clear that he was writing in support of the Ottoman Empire in a time when reports of Armenian massacres were doing serious harm to the public perception of the Ottoman State.

Under the Red Crescent is an important account. There're a number of reasons for this, first he is probably the least egotistical of all the writers. He recorded his own actions fairly

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[340] BOA. Y.PRK.EŞA 18/100 Date: 26/Ca/1311 (Hicrî)
[341] BOA. İ.TAL 1317/205 Date: 23/Za/1317 (Hicrî)
[342] Sadly little else is know about Blunt, he was a friend of Woods and was often mentioned in newspaper articles along with Woods, but he did not write a memoir and leave any written records besides what few documents can be found in the Ottoman archives.
[343] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 295–296.
[344] Woods, *Spunyarn from the Strands of a Sailor's Life Afloat and Ashore; Forty-Seven Years under the Ensigns of Great Britain and Turkey,* 1924, 2:157–158.
[345] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 193.
[346] Ibid., vii–ix Interesting that he wrote Ottoman and not Turkish as he did in the rest of his work.

dispassionately and as no different than others. The 20 year gap between the events and the book is problematic and it is clear reading *Under the Red Crescent* that Ryan read other accounts of the war. However his use of these accounts is commendable. For example, in some cases he cites his own figures for how many dead and wounded there were after battle, but also gave other references with different figures noting that his figures might be inaccurate.[347] He also seemed to have read some Russian sources, probably in French, and again made reference to the situation from the other side of the battle. He also noted numerous newspaper articles and the foreign correspondents who wrote them who he met during his time with the Ottoman Army. He made reference to their articles to either elaborate on his own story or provide subtle nuance between his own memories and those of the correspondents.

It should also be considered that during the writing of this account Ryan was an Ottoman Consul, giving him a clear pro Ottoman bias. However, he does not demonize the Russians and he is quick to point out the crimes committed by the Caucasians and other Ottoman irregulars as well as Russian Cossacks. He was also more sympathetic to the Ottoman pashas then other writers. Also, refreshingly, he did not critique Ottoman military strategy, instead his narrative was much more focused on the day to day and even hour by hour actions of the Ottoman soldiers under his care, only commenting more generally on the grand strategy when explaining why they moved from one place to another, or for the start or stop of some large campaign. This is not to say he doesn't sometimes criticize, but he tries to put it in context of the situation, like the lack of medical supplies or lack of troops.

The tenor and style of Ryan's account of Erzurum was significantly different from his account of Plevna. Not only much shorter, but also with far less detail. Although, he said that the horrors of Erzurum were far worse than Plevna, he did not recount them in much detail. Perhaps due to the fact that he contracted typhus fever while serving in Erzurum and his subsequent delirium caused his memories of Erzurum to be less vivid.

It is also important to note that significant parts of Ryan's experiences were published in 1879, however these articles were only about Plevna.[348] Furthermore, in many places the account of Plevna in the book and the articles printed 20 years earlier were the same. Therefore, it is also

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[347] Ibid., 101, 137.
[348] Charles S Ryan, "Experiences During the Siege of Plevna," in *The Melbourne Review* (S. Mullen, 1879), 21–32, 188–205. This is the only example I have been able to find, but it appears that there were further texts in other volumes.

possible that the difference in length and detail between Plevna and Erzurum was the existence of notes and written materials from the time. Like Herbert, Ryan was eyewitness too much of the battle and siege of Plevna and his book is a valuable source for military historians.

Ryan was not without his flaws, and there was differently a youthful-romantic current in his work. For example, after a long time living in the army camp Ryan went to Kalafat, a Romanian town of about 3000 people. Come from camp to a café of the "European fashion," wrote Ryan, felt like "Robinson Crusoe transplanted…" from the desert island to a fine hotel.[349] There was also definitely an Orientalist gaze; Ryan writes that during his time stay in Istanbul he visited the bazaars,

> Where solemn old Turks in baggy breeches sought to swindle me with polite decorum, and where the whole atmosphere breathed of the *Arabian Nights*. One half expected to see Prince Camaralzaman come swaggering down the street, with his scimitar clanking on the pavement behind him; or Amina or Zobeide, heavily veiled, and with only her dark eyes showing through the yashmak's folds, slide past demurely with a sidelong glance at the stranger from the West.[350]

However, despite his classical education Ryan did not seem to bring too much of the "literary East" into his descriptions of the Ottoman world. Although, Ryan was a bit of grave robber and on more than one occasion got men from his regiment to dig up Byzantine tombs and took the vases and coins.[351]

However, unlike some adventurers or journalists, Ryan suffered alongside the Ottoman troops he cared for, in addition to the long hours and physical and emotional stress of war and siege, hunger and a lack of provisions, Ryan was wounded a number of times, But most seriously when a Russian shell exploded near him sending shrapnel into his back and neck.[352]

Ryan also displayed a great deal of personal courage and bravery as he often attended wounded soldiers during the heat of combat, not just back in the hospital. There were multiple examples of this including a charge with the cavalry. But also he spends a great deal time on horseback riding from one Turkish position to another helping the wounded. In one incident he claimed to have rallied a group of fleeing Turkish soldiers, and I am inclined to believe him because in the next part he recalls being complemented by two old Turkish men who said to him: "'Sen choki adam' which means, 'You are a noble fellow,' Or words to that effect. Remember

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[349] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 80–81.
[350] Ibid., 16.
[351] Ibid., 107–108.
[352] Ibid., 280–283.

this incident because it was one of the highest complements I have ever received."[353] This was also telling because it showed Ryan's understanding of Turkish, which he spells phonetically, rather than many of his English contemporaries who worked to make sure that their Turkish words were properly spelled. But it is clear from his phonetic spelling what the two old men said, "Sen choki adam" (sen çok iyi adam). As stated Ryan was very personally brave, but did not see war of all glory and moonshine, as he did not hesitate to discuss the horrible things he saw as a field doctor. "The redoubt was literally choked up dead and dying man, and the ground was ankle deep in blood, brains, and mutilated fragments of humanity."[354] The horrors of war described by Ryan is another reason *Under the Red Crescent* is an important source.

Ryan was educated at Melbourne University for three years, finished his medical courses in Edinburgh, at the age of 21.[355] Shortly after his graduation he saw an advertisements in the *times* "announcing that the Turkish government has vacancies for 20 military surgeons and inviting applications."[356] With letters of recommendation from professors in Edinburgh and an introduction at the Ottoman Embassy, Ryan was soon on his way to Istanbul. Although there is no record of Ryan's meeting at the Ottoman Embassy in London or his employment by the war office, there is no doubt that the Ottomans were actively recruiting British doctor during the war. [357] After arriving in Istanbul he went to the War Office and was given credentials and told to be ready to be sent to front.

> I was no longer a civilian. I was now commissioned as a military surgeon in the service of the Sublime Porte, and engaged in a practice which included some three hundred thousand patients more or less, of whose language I was entirely ignorant, and of whose manners all previous impressions had taught me to be suspicious. It is right to say here, at the outset, that my experience of over two years among the Turks proved to me that the estimate formed of their character by other reputedly more civilized nations was entirely false and misleading. […] Scutari was the burial-ground where the bones of those English officers and men who died in hospital after the Crimea lay buried, and I felt that with the brave dead of my own race so near me I was in good company.[358]

After 17 months, mostly at the front, Ryan left Plevna for Istanbul, he wished to see his mother who was at the time in Europe. Although, he only left after more doctors arrived at

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[353] Ibid., 227–230.
[354] Ibid., 236.
[355] Ibid., 3.
[356] Ibid., 6.
[357] Musurus Pasha to Server Pasha London, August 2, 1877 Dispatch No. 6826/405 Sinan Kuneralp and Gül Tokay, eds., *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 1st ed.., vol. 10 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009).
[358] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 12–15.

Plevna and Osman Pasha gave his permission. However, while in Istanbul Plevna fell and unable to return to his comrades there Ryan accepted a position with Stafford House Relief Committee, which offered better pay and more freedom, to serve in Erzurum. Ryan seems to have felt some guilt for having not been in Plevna with the Ottoman army in its darkness hour, so instead of going to Europe to see his mother he immediately left for Erzurum.[359] While in Istanbul Ryan, like Baker, noted that the bravery and skill of the Ottoman Army was without peer, but the political and military high command in stumble failed to properly support or utilize the resources at their disposal. While perhaps cliché Ryan, like others, essentially argued that had the war been left to the generals and soldiers on the front and not to the politicians in Istanbul, the Russians never would have come to Istanbul.[360]

In Istanbul Ryan found to a surprise that he was somewhat famous for his service at Plevna and popular with the many British adventurers who swarmed city. Ryan wrote that he met many Englishmen of the "dare-devil class that has done so much to build up our own empire," all trying everything they could to get service with the Ottoman army.[361] Ryan identified these Englishman as good imperialists they may have been adventurers and a bit of rogues, but were the kind of men who helped build the Empire. Ryan wrote that the names of Englishmen who he met in Istanbul would fill many pages if he were to recount them all, so rather he only named the most prominent ones, chiefly Valentine Baker. Ryan recounted that Baker organized a picnic near the Gulf of Ismet where the British fleet was station. There Ryan wrote, he felt a great deal of pride being under the British flag once again while singing the "Russians shall not have Constantinople."[362]

Ryan noted that he like most Ottoman soldiers had not received his salary in many months, however, probably unlike many Ottoman soldiers, with the support from an Englishman who had lived in the a stumble for a long time Ryan was able to receive his entire salary, paid in silver coins.[363]

Ryan in Erzurum

> At first we had no cases of sickness, and none but wounded men to treat. Our death-rate was low in the first week we only had six deaths out of three hundred patients, and we sent thirty men out cured to rejoin their

[359] Ibid., 294–314.
[360] Ibid., 305.
[361] Ibid., 304–308.
[362] Ibid., 306–309.
[363] Ibid., 310–311.

> regiments. After the hideous experiences in Plevna, this state of things was a blessed relief, and we became quite light-hearted. But before I left Erzeroum I had seen sufferings and horrors before which the sufferings and horrors of the Plevna hospital paled into insignificance. [364]

The horrors of Erzurum was not just the siege, the cold, and the lack of supplies, but the scourge of disease which included with an outbreak of typhus and cases of typhoid. Ryan wrote that more men died from "typhus, pyaemia, pneumonia," and the cold than Russian shells. For example, Mukhtar Pasha told Ryan that when he retreated from Kars he had 2000 men, but only 317 reached Erzurum alive.[365] During January 1878 Ryan reported that the daily and death rate due to disease and cold was 200, and on one particularly awful day the mortality rate was 302. On about January 8 Ryan contracted typhus he fought the disease and ultimately survived for over a month, often refusing to stay in bed and determined to work in hospital, in his darkest hour he lost consciousness and was cared for by some of the other British doctors. He survived, but Ryan wrote that 27 doctors had contracted the disease, and of them less than half survived.[366]

After the fall the city Ryan and the other British doctors for well treated by the Russians. Ryan seemed not to fear the Russians perhaps because he felt protected by his British citizenship. While under a loose Russian captivity, Ryan wrote that he any other British doctors were quite popular with the Russian officers and were counts a number of occasions when they dined together with Russian officers. I find these accounts interesting because despite Ryan's clear allegiance to the Ottomans when he sat as a British officer alongside Russian officers the war seemed nothing more been a friendly game of chess between two imperial rivals. And after being escorted from the city by a group of Cossacks, Ryan wrote that despite the terrible stories about the Cossacks he would always have a warm place in his heart for them.[367]

Ryan received the fourth order of Medijidie, and later the fourth order of *Osmanli* and a "Turkish war medal" for his service.[368] Ryan's Medjidee medal and others speak to his "Heroic Masculinity" like a soldiers. [369]

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[364] Ibid., 327–328.
[365] Ibid., 327–333.
[366] Ibid., 348–360.
[367] Ibid., 363–382.
[368] Ibid., 379, 392.
[369] Michael Brown, "'Like a Devoted Army': Medicine, Heroic Masculinity, and the Military Paradigm in Victorian Britain," *Journal of British Studies* 49, no. 03 (2010): 592–622, doi:10.1086/652000.

Edward Vizetelly

Unlike the British officers under Ottoman command before the war, or the doctors recruited during the war, Edward Vizetelly was an adventurer of the highest order. A solider and journalist he produced a fascinating account[370] of the war from the perspective of a *başıbozuk.* Vizetelly was highly sympathetic to the Ottomans and Islam. He basically took up the *başıbozuk* lifestyle, for example getting a stolen horse without any qualms and demanding food and shelter from villagers on the road.

Vizetelly remembered the Crimean war as a child, hated the Russians, and was determined to "enlist in the Sultan service."[371] On his way to enlist he traveled through Russia and discussed with Russians the geopolitical situation. He told a Russian officer that Russia and Britain were natural enemies because of India, and that despite reports to the contrary, most of England was with the Ottomans who were remembered as old allies.[372] During his travels to Ottoman lands many people he met believed that he was an English officer in disguise on his way to take command of Turkish forces.[373] On the eve of war he arrived in Istanbul and reported that English merchant ships were unloading American rifles and Krupp cannons. "The names of Hobart and Valentine Baker were on the lips in English circles, although Turks and foreigners were not so much impressed by them."[374]

Pera was swarming with "Hungarians, Poles, Frenchman, Germans, Swiss, Italians; Carlists, Communists, and other revolutionaries of various denominations. All sought occupation and excitement; all wish to enter the Ottoman army and proceed to the front; but owing to questions of religion and language, which were fatal obstacles, very little encouragement was given them by the Turks."[375] Vizetelly reported he tried to get Colonel Borthwick, who he called Tahir Bey (perhaps he misunderstood the name Mahir Bey), to take him with him to the Danube, but was unsuccessful.[376] He was briefly involved in an incident with a number of the ex-patriots who wanted to form their own legion, which they named the Polish Legion. This was not because there were many Poles, but to try to capitalize on the long standing relationship between the

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[370] A version of this story, Vizetelly's time in Trabzon and the ride to Erzurum, appeared in: Edward Vizetelly, "How I Became a Bashi-Bozouk," in *The English Illustrated Magazine* (Macmillan and Company, 1895).
[371] Edward Vizetelly, *The Reminiscences of a Bashi-Bazouk.* (Bristol: Arrowsmith, 1897), 9.
[372] Ibid., 17.
[373] Ibid., 19–20.
[374] Ibid., 40.
[375] Ibid., 48.
[376] Ibid., 49.

Poles, the Ottomans, and the Russians. This legion ultimately came to nothing but it helped Vizetelly make contacts with individuals who did eventually get him into Ottoman service.[377] With the help of these acquaintances a decision was made to travel into Anatolia where they would be fewer foreigners and therefore less competition for possible service, so they traveled to Trabzon and met with Alfred Biliotti, the British consul.[378]

Upon his arrival in Trabzon he reported that the locals of the Black Sea region were in a panic, not because of the war, but because 1200 Circassian horseman had gathered in the city. According to Vizetelly, the Circassians had been granted land by the Sultan after their expulsion from Russia, land grants they repaid with their military service - whether it was to suppress a rebellion or engage in "legitimate warfare." "Each chieftain or Bey" arrived with his men, numbering from as little as 10 to 100. The men brought their own horses, equipment, and weapons, but the State equipped them with rifles and gave them rations and pay until they reached the front - at which time they paid themselves with plunder. "But pay or no pay," they would plunder.[379] The Circassians gathering in Trabzon were led by two Ottoman majors, Hassan and Yusuf, although Circassians themselves both were officers in the regular Ottoman army. Vizetelly and his companion joined the regiment after meeting the *vali* (governor) of Trabzon who was eager to have these young Englishmen fighting on his side. Vizetelly wrote that the Ottoman opinion of Englishmen was so high that one could travel for hundreds and hundreds of miles without fear with only a few magic words: "Ben Inglesi." They were provided horses, which they could not afford on their own, and joined the regiment.[380] Vizetelly was well treated and respected by his new comrades in arms, "Circassians and Turk alike, seem to have a deeply-rooted conviction that the English infidel was alright." "No doubt" wrote Vizetelly the defense of Kars by General Williams was still fresh in their minds.[381]

From Trabzon the *başıbozuk* regiment marched to Erzurum. At first Vizetelly wrote that the reputation of his companions for "plundering and pilfering" was undeserved, but it wasn't long before he was proven wrong. Once they began to pass through countryside that was predominantly Armenian, the regiment began to live off the land, or in more

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[377] Ibid., 50–53.
[378] Ibid., 58–68.
[379] Ibid., 63–66.
[380] Ibid., 66–72.
[381] Ibid., 75–76.

military terms: practiced forced requisitions. Vizetelly was introduced to the poor Armenian peasants they came across as "English Pasha" and his Circassians companions hinted darkly that if he was not treated with the utmost hospitality there would be violent reprisals for such disrespect. In practice this meant that they took any sheep and food they could, and gorged themselves on the countryside.[382]

> Hassan and Youssouf Bey placed themselves at the head of the regiment, side by side; next came all the Dere Beys, then the standard-bearers, with the green and crimson banners taken (stolen) from the mosque at Trebizond, and now unfurled for the first time; immediately behind the colours Cowan and myself, and following us the twelve hundred Circassian Bashi-Bazouks. In this order we marched to Erzeroum.[383]

Vizetelly wrote that their arrival was celebrated in some English Newspapers, but the English consul told him that "England was not at war with Russia," and he thought of Vizetelly as little more "than a cut-throat, and that if I was caught and hanged it would serve me right; adding that in such an eventuality he would not raise a finger to save me."[384]

Vizetelly's career as a *başıbozuk* did not last long. After the deaths of Youssouf and Hasan Bey, the regiment descended into chaos. Without clear leadership each Bey acted independently with his own men. This disorder culminated in the eventual desertion of all 1200 *başıbozuks.* After entering an Armenian village and evicting everyone from their homes, a few members of the regiment rode into a farm, stole a lamb, shot the protesting peasant, looted his home, and "ravished the women." This crime was reported by the local Armenians to Ahmed Muhtar Pasha (1839-1919, was grand vizier in 1912) who quickly tracked down the guilty and sentenced them to hang. The Beys begged and threatened to leave if their men were killed, but Muhtar Pasha carried out the order, upon which the 1200 Circassians *başıbozuks* promptly deserted.[385]

Vizetelly observed that while the Russians had "thousands and thousands" well equipped and disciplined cavalry at their command, the Ottomans (Muhtar Pasha) had only "a wild, undisciplined horde of irregulars," who would desert at any time (just like his own regiment). Like other observers he praised the regular Ottoman soldiers, and called them "the finest fighting material in the world." However, the most talented officers and best-equipped regiments were either in Istanbul, or only existed on paper.[386]

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[382] Ibid., 99–103.
[383] Ibid., 118.
[384] Ibid., 124.
[385] Ibid., 183–188.
[386] Ibid., 225–227.

Baker Pasha & Imperial Ambition

Most of Baker's second volume recounts the fighting retreat from Bulgaria to Constantinople after the fall of Plevna. The book gives a blow-by-blow account of the retreat with every sortie, counterattack, march, and conditions of the retreat given in detail. However, another key element of the work was Baker never-ending stream of advice to the Ottoman high command on the course that should be taken to prevent a Russian march on Istanbul. To Baker's great dismay all of his advice was rejected. However we must consider this was not a product of Ottoman incompetence, as Baker clearly thought, but rather that the Ottoman political and military elite were not going to allow a high-ranking British officer with strong political connections to direct Ottoman state policy. Therefore, while it is clear that Baker was a higher ranking staff officer and did play an important role in the local theaters he served in and his bravery and fighting skills should not be overlooked, it is also clear he never had any real influence on the greater strategic operations of the war. Likewise Baker's final failure to get the command of the Istanbul defense force was not due to Ottoman politics or incompetence, but the rather the fact that the Ottomans would never allow such an individual to have such a critical command. Moreover, when reading British sources one gets the impression that Baker was far more at the center of Ottoman war and politics, than he actually was. But in reality he was a staff officer with dreams of a larger command.

However, because Ottoman officials and diplomats "shined on" British politicians and diplomats with promises of high commands for British officers in an attempt to get greater British support. The only way Baker would have ever gotten an independent command like General Williams got in the Crimean war was if England had sent troops on the ground. Which was something that Baker himself expected to happen. Therefore, when we read from British sources that Baker was going to be appointed commander of the armies outside Istanbul, that he was going to be put in charge or the entire gendarmerie, be made the military governor of Eastern Anatolia, or had the ear of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, but was in each case undermined by the political intrigues of jealous courtiers, he appeared to be at the very heart of Ottoman war and politics. However, from an Ottoman perspective all of these offers were just that, offers, had the British Empire given greater support to the Ottomans during the war or after during the treaty of Berlin, perhaps such positions would have be given to Baker Pasha, but instead we see only the political gambits on behalf of Ottoman statesmen trying to get British support. Clearly when we

look at the archival sources in both Istanbul and London Baker's "historical footprint" was small. However, whatever loyalty Baker had to the Sublime Porte he was not above sharing critical defense intelligence and Ottoman maps with his former masters.[387]

This was very shrewd use of British officers, while promoting them into important positions within the Ottoman army they made sure to deny these men control over large number of troops. The Ottomans were happy for Baker to write up proposals for the reform of the gendarmerie, experienced British officers so needed to staff the army, find, organize, and train troops, Service advisor to Ottoman generals in the field, command small cavalry detachments, command the rear guard and fight bravely in the defense a retreating army, but never command the kind of troop numbers Baker and the British political classes desired. For example, while Hobart Pasha had real military command and Mahir Pasha was given jurisdiction over all of eastern Rumelia, Baker received no such extraordinary command. Likewise those British officers seen more loyal to England then to Istanbul were put in advisory roles or put in command of smaller cavalry detachments. Therefore while Baker, Lord Salisbury and others in England would have been more than happy to pay for an Ottoman Army under British officers it seems highly unlikely that the Ottomans would've ever allowed such a thing in 1878. The Turkish Contingent of the Crimean War was an arrangement between two allies actively fighting a war barring the British officially entering the war on the Ottoman side; I don't think such a thing would have been possible. The Ottomans shrewdly made sure that loyal Ottoman troops were under the command of loyal Ottoman officers. This own makes sense as in regards to my earlier comment that Ottoman troops were the most loyal element of the Ottoman army, therefore seems unlikely such a loyal soldier should be put under the auspices of what amounted to a rival empire.

Finally, Baker ended his service to the Ottoman Empire the day after the British Empire occupied Egypt. He left in secret without even so much as a goodbye to Abdul Hamid II, who it was claimed considered Baker a trusted advisor, or any other Ottoman minister or officer many who were said to have greatly admired and trusted Baker. Shortly after his arrival in Egypt he was made commander of the Egyptian gendarmerie.[388] Although Baker was grateful for this post, it was not the command he had first been offered, military governor of Egypt, as his past

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[387] TNA: FO 925/3435

[388] Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, 136–137; Edwin Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople : The Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, 1873-1915* (London : H. Jenkins, 1916), 93–94, http://archive.org/details/fortyyearsincons00pear.

discretions continue to haunt him as Queen Victoria would not allow him to be reinstated to see British Army list.[389] However, his command in Egypt officially returned him to the arms of the British Empire and his family who came to live with him in Alexandria, having remained in London during his time in Istanbul. Baker was no renegade, he was a soldier of the empire who for a time served as an informal agent of state in Istanbul, but as soon as the opportunity to rejoin the Empire in an official capacity presented itself he quickly abandoned whatever loyalties he had to the Ottoman State.

Imperial Service and Identity

When it became clear that there would be war between the Ottomans and Russians British officers began volunteering to the Ottoman Embassy in London to serve with the Ottomans and fight the Russians. [390] So many that Ottoman officials in London did not know how to response to all of them and turned most of them down because they could not speak Turkish. [391] Although Ryan reported that more than a few of the British officials, officer, and doctors who volunteered were Levantine, men of "English parentage, who were born in the Levant and spoke Turkish like a Turk."[392]

However, some officers were recommended by important member of British state and society like the Duke of Sutherland. Some were recommended because of their experience in the Turkish Contingent during the Crimean War.[393] These officers were accepted into the Ottoman Army, but most of the rest were turned down.[394] This did not stop many of the most eager adventurers from traveling at their own expense to Ottoman domains in search of service. Some officers, wrote Ryan, from London and India came simply for the sake of adventure.[395] These men came from all over the British Empire to serve, yet they all identified with the empire: "'we

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[389] Great Britain Parliament, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard, 1882).
[390] Musurus Pasha to Safvet Pasha London, 21 June 1877 Dispatch No. 6745/324 Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[391] Musurus Pasha to Aarifi Pasha, London, 27 July 1877, Encrypted telegram No. 6817/398 ibid.
[392] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 285.
[393] Musurus Pasha to Aarifi Pasha, London, 27 July 1877, Encrypted telegram No. 6817/398 Kuneralp and Tokay, *Ottoman Diplomatic Documents on "the Eastern Question,"* 2009.
[394] This despite the fact that despite strong support from the Ottoman state for modern military education and the promotion of the military academy, by 1877 only 1600 of the 20,000 regular officers of the army were graduates of the academy. Moreover, in the seven field-armies there were only 132 staff officers who were graduates of the academy. Uyar and Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatürk*, 177–178.
[395] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 283–284.

are Englishmen, but not born in England,' responded Hiems. 'I was born in Ireland.' 'And I in India,' I said"[396] Many, like Vizetelly, were able to find service after arriving in the Ottoman Empire.

At one point Baker was called to Süleyman Pasha's headquarters because the Russian government had complained to the Porte that noncommissioned officers and private soldiers from the British army were serving with Ottoman forces in the Danube. There was a list of 14 or 15 names with the ranks of each soldier, and Baker wrote that he was able to deny any of the Russian allegations.[397]

Taking Baker, Ryan and Vizetelly as models I think we can categories the type of service these British officers and volunteers engaged in. As discussed, all fought based on some combination of Russophobe, loyalty to the British Empire, adventurism and genuine support for the Ottoman Empire. Baker fought *with* the Ottomans but *for* the British, he was an agent of empire, he faithful served Ottoman interests because they aligned with the British interests. Once the war was over and Egypt was occupied he continued to serve British interests in Egypt. Ryan likewise served the Ottomans because it served British imperial interests. This is especially interesting as Ryan was and Australian, a true member of Empire. However, Ryan also genuinely supported the Ottoman Empire and while he may have started his service looking for adventure and career advancement, in the end he loyally served the Ottomans because he sympathized with the Ottoman state and people. Finally, Vizetelly was first and foremost and adventure, But he was also driven by anti-Russian "Great game" sentiments and an appreciation for Ottoman history and culture.

Imperial Violence

While recounting his time in Erzurum Ryan told two pretty horrible stories about a one Edmund O'Donovan, war correspondent, adventure and quintessential representative of the British Empire,[398] who Ryan called one of "the wildest, most brilliant, and original geniuses who ever left Ireland." In the first O'Donovan cooked a large meal and invite a group of Circassians

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[396] Alfred Wright, *Adventures in Servia; Or, The Experiences of a Medical Free Lance among the Bashi-Bazouks, Etc.*, ed. Alfred George Farquhar-Bernard (London: W.S. Sonnenschein & Co., 1884), 12.
[397] Valentine Baker, *War in Bulgaria: A Narrative of Personal Experiences*, vol. 1 (S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1879), 304.
[398] William Wallingford Knollys, "O'Donovan, Edmund," in *The Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. Sidney Lee (Oxford University Press, 1909), 447–448.

to dine with him, after the meal when the soldiers congratulated him on the feast he revealed to them and they all just eaten a suckling pig. In the ensuing brawl O'Donovan shot one of them in the arm. Shortly after this incident, for whatever reason O'Donovan decided to shoot a dog in the street, after unloading multiple rounds at the dog he managed to hit a Turkish woman in the arm rather than the dog. Ryan had to stitch up the woman who Donovan gave £10 for the inconvenience.

Ryan seemed have found these stories darkly amusing, and finished these anecdotes with O'Donovan's final fate which was to die in Egypt with the army of Hicks Pasha, a "soldier's death."[399] Vizetelly, also in Erzurum, told a version of this story and likewise found it dearly funny. Such events were seemly normal in war.

After his *başıbozuks* deserted Vizetelly became a war correspondence for the *Standard*. Writing about the press censorship of Muhtar Pasha he noted that it was no different from what any European commanders would have done. [400] Vizetelly further commented that many of the Armenians in Erzurum were afraid, however he criticized the character of Armenians. He wrote that even though the Circassians were brigands along with anything else you could say about them, they were bold and useful, but Armenians had all the "vices of the Turk, and not one of his qualities. He is, moreover, cowardly, cringing, fawning, deceitful, proverbially dishonest, and the most shame-faced liar I have ever come across." This sentiment was shared by other correspondents like O'Donovan, who in the *Daily News*, wrote that Armenians would "cheat you and lie to you, with their faces wreathed in the most angelic of smiles, and are never to be trusted." [401]

Vizetelly had an interesting perspective on Kurdish, Armenian, and Ottoman relations, and imperial violence. First, he noted that the Kurds were hard for the central state to control as they were on the peripheries of the Empire and could move between Persia and the Ottoman Empire. He went on to analysis how the Armenians were treated by the Ottoman state, and wrote that the Ottomans did not hate the Armenians, but could not trust them. In rebellion the Ottomans "clubbed" them in Istanbul and let the Kurds "loose on" them in the provinces. This system to

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[399] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 338–340; Vizetelly tells the same story, likewise found it darkly funny, but did not mention Ryan, or any doctor. Vizetelly recalls the many men from this period who went to Egypt and died fighting with Hicks Pasha. Vizetelly, *The Reminiscences of a Bashi-Bazouk.*, 42, 56, 202.
[400] Vizetelly, *The Reminiscences of a Bashi-Bazouk.*, 315–316, 319.
[401] Ibid., 340–347.

suppress rebellion created public outcry among the British public, especially when stories were embellish by "ignorant Churchmen." However, how different were such actions for the more civilized European power questioned Vizetelly:

> In India, during the mutiny, we bound our prisoners to the cannon's mouth and blew them in fragments into eternity. […] Pelissier smoked the insurgent Arabs in the caverns in Algeria, as we cure bacon at home. […] Europe witnessing all these atrocities, stood still and did nothing ; why, then, should there be such a fuss about the butchery of a few Armenians in open insurrection ?
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> […] Certainly the untutored Turkish mind is unfamiliar with the refined methods of cruelty we practice in Western Europe. The *Osmanli*s have not yet adopted the plan of riddling the turbulent masses with buckshot, as Forster did in Ireland. […]The position of the Turk in regard to the Armenian, is very like our own in India on a smaller scale…[402]

This idea, that the Ottomans acted no differently than any other European power, was repeated by virtually all of the men who witnessed the Russo-Ottoman War. This is especially interesting as there was no doubt that Ottoman irregulars carried out truly horrible crimes against both the Russians and the Ottoman civilian population, and sensational accounts of beheadings were have been expected by the reading public, which associated the Ottoman "Orient" with brutality and blood.[403]

Ryan wrote that he was surprised how well the Ottomans treated the Bulgarians, he thought it was important to point this out as European assumed the opposite. Furthermore, he made the point that Ottoman soldiers were more civilized that any other nation and any atrocities committed by either the Ottomans or the Russians were only due to the crazy of battle, but even that was no less than what the French would do.[404]

Charles Williams spoke well of the regular Ottoman troops and blamed any atrocities committed during the war on the irregular Kurdish and Caucasian soldiers. "Englishmen would be mightily indignant if the conduct of the native irregulars in the Peninsular war were laid at the door of the Duke of Wellington," just because they were on the same side. Likewise, it was unjust to blame the regular soldiers of the 4th Ottoman Army for the actions of "some predatory

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[402] Ibid., 353–358.
[403] Reinhold Schiffer, *Oriental Panorama*, 79.
[404] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 26–27.

[Kurdish] tribe" far from the frontline that "wreaked upon helpless villagers the vengeance they were too cowardly to inflict upon the enemy."[405]

Baker likewise noted that no one reported the atrocities committed upon Muslim villages in Bulgaria (atrocities inflicted by both Bulgarians and Cossacks, but not by regular or Russian troops). However he said that it should be remembered that Cossacks were not irregular soldiers and that they were led by regular Russian officers. This is in obvious contrast to the Ottoman *başıbozuks* who were entirely irregular. Likewise he noted that the crimes committed by Ottoman forces must be confined to the Circassians and the *başıbozuk*.[406]

Ryan commented after he witnessed a Circassian beheading a wounded Russian that "though it shows the Turkish irregulars in very lurid colours," he could attest to "similar and even worse atrocities" carried out by Cossacks. A British doctor serving with the Russians wrote that captured *başıbozuk* were never taken prisoner, rather always killed and beheaded.[407]

Osman Pasha himself admitted that he could put no reliance upon the Circassians. At the same time he pointed out that the savage excesses of the Circassians were equaled, if not surpassed, by the exploits both of the Cossacks and the Bulgarians, who never allowed an opportunity of massacre or pillage to escape them. At the same time, while admitting the excesses of the Circassians, he was careful to point out that the regular Ottoman troops were kept in a thorough state of discipline by their officers. " We can affirm," he declares, " that the Turkish regulars never committed an act similar to the massacre of the defenders of Lovtcha, nor to the inhuman treatment of which the Turkish prisoners were the victims after the fall of Plevna."[408]

Finally, writing 20 years after these events and commenting on the Ottoman occupation of the Greek city of Larissa, G. W Steevens wrote that the discipline displayed by the Turkish soldiers would be unmatched in any other nation in the world.[409]

The point is not to absolve Ottoman commanders or soldiers of atrocities, but rather to observe that British observer's of said atrocities considers them lesser or equal to those that their

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[405] Charles Williams, *The Armenian Campaign: A Diary of the Campaign of 1877, In Armenia and Koordistan* (London: C. Kegan Paul & CO, 1878), ix–xiii.
[406] Interesting these are not the same thing, like Kurds, Circassians and basibozuks
[407] Wright, *Adventures in Servia; Or, The Experiences of a Medical Free Lance among the Bashi-Bazouks, Etc.*, 213–215.
[408] Ryan and Sandes, *Under the Red Crescent*, 98–99.
[409] G. W Steevens, *With the Conquering Turk: Confessions of a Bashibazouk* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1897), 181.

own empire and allies would carry out. The significance of this was the acceptance of such violence as a norm of the imperial rule. It was not profound that these worldly individuals would not hold the Ottomans to a higher standard than the British or French, but rather that they felt this standard was commonplace in all empires.

CONCLUSION

On 8 November 1889 Ryan was made Ottoman Consul in Melbourne. It seems he had been acting in unofficial capacity for some time, but now it was official. He was not a member of the foreign office, but a representative primarily concerned with commercial interests and with the protection of Turkish subjects in the colonies. Ryan made his own consular seal which he sent to Rüstem Pasha (The Ottoman ambassador in London) to approve. Ryan also sent a piece of music for the Sultan.[410] A month later Ryan received instruction on how to give passports and information on fees and tariffs.[411] One month after that Ryan wrote: "I fully understand it is my duty to protect the interests of all Turkish subjects in the Australian colonies." He also acknowledged the receipt of Turkish passports and a copy of the Ottoman consular tariffs and promised to make sure that that they would only be issued to genuine Ottoman subjects.[412]

Over the next few years Ryan would serve his duties to the best of his abilities. From the serious: he intervened in a case involving a Syrian shopkeeper who tried to kill his associate, with Ryan's help the Syrian sentence of death was commutated to 12 years.[413] To the mundane: of researching the value of Ottomans bonds bought by Australian subject[414] or helping form commercial partnerships.[415] In Early 1893 Ryan's wrote to Rüstem about the influx of Syrian emigrants to the colonies, and apparently wrote an articles published in an Arabic newspaper in Syria and Lebanon telling poor immigrants not to come to the colonies.[416]

These were the actions of a British subject who loyally served the Ottoman Empire. The actions of a busy man who had a successful career in Australia, but he did not serve the Ottomans only, when the Frist World War started he was given the rank of Honorary Surgeon General in the Australia Army and as describe in the introduction played an active role in the war.[417] His service was not just recognized in Australia, after the war he was knighted.[418] Ryan

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[410] Rüstem to Ryan, November 8, 1889. BOA. HR.SYS3. 354/18
[411] Rüstem to Ryan, December 10th 1889. BOA.HR.SYS3. 354/19
[412] Ryan to Rüstem, January 20, 1890. BOA. I HR.SYS3. 372/3
[413] Rüstem to Ryan, August 6, 1891. BOA.HR.SYS3. 383/105
[414] Rüstem to Ryan, March 30, 1892. BOA.HR.SYS3. 390/45
[415] Ryan to Rüstem, May 19, 1892. BOA.HR.SYS3. 396/92
[416] Rüstem to Ryan, February 13, 1893. BOA.HR.SYS3. 354/16
[417] National Archives of Australia (NAA) : B2455/1, Ryan Charles Snodgrass
[418] NAA: B2455/21, Ryan Charles Snodgrass

was an servant of empire, the kind of man who could be trusted by the Ottomans as long as Anglo-Ottoman interests were not too far apart.

Ryan's friend Woods Pasha also served the Ottoman's until the First World War, although he was semi-retired after the Young Turk Revolution as he had been close to the Hamidian government. In fact Woods was a stanch defender of Abdülhamid the 2nd. He wrote letters to the times disputing the claims of Canon Liddon about Ottoman rule in the Arab lands. Moreover, Woods said that any criticisms that could be made of the Ottoman rule of Arab lands were no different than English rule in Ireland.[419] Woods was criticized for this argument and it was suggested that he was impartial due to his service with the Ottomans.[420] But Woods was not easily quieted; he gave counterarguments and presented the Ottoman position that reports published by the British government were the product of eastern Christians who misrepresented Ottoman rule. He again brought up claims of atrocities in Ireland and asked why if the Ottoman atrocities were so readily accepted were not British atrocities in Ireland.[421] Woods published pamphlets defending Ottoman policies in Eastern Anatolia and supported his arguments using Ottoman census data.[422]

Yet despite his defense of the Ottoman government in the British press he did not cease to be British, in fact he was engaged in the very kind of imperial discourse his contemporaries in India were engaged in. Moreover, he was not disconnected from British state and society, nor were his Ottoman patrons. Rüstem Pasha arranged on behalf of Woods for Wood's daughter to meet the Queen and for the Queen to give her a position in court.[423] Woods did favors for the Duke of Edinburgh[424] and the Prince of Wales.[425] This show that Woods was no social outcast, he was certainly a part of the British political elite, his name appears time and time again along with high officials of state and the royal family at events (weddings, funerals, dinners, state visits,

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[419] Pasha Woods, "What Canons Saw: To the Editor of the Times," *The Times*, November 29, 1887.
[420] H.P. Liddon, "What Canons Saw: To the Editor of the Times," *The Times*, December 2, 1887.
[421] Pasha Woods, "What Canons Saw: To the Editor of the Times," *The Times*, December 9, 1887.
[422] Henry Felix Woods, *Blackmailing the Sultan. Refutation of the Calumnies in Osman Bey's [i.e. F. Millingen's] Anonymous Pamphlet [entitled: "The Armenian Question and the Rule of Abdul Hamid," Etc.]*. (Pp. 4. C.D. Collet: London, 1890); Henry Felix Woods, *The Truth about Asia Minor* (London: Published by C.D. Collet at the office of the "Diplomatic review," 1890).
[423]BOA. HR.SYS3.385.31
[424] BOA. HR.SYS3.375.27
[425] BOA. HR.SYS3.369.47

state balls).[426] At the funeral for a Sir Nicholas O'Conor, the British ambassador, "the pall-bearers where the principal members of the British Embassy," which included Woods.[427] Despite the perceived German take over of the Ottoman military the British press still acknowledged Woods: The Germans "…have penetrated into almost every branch of the Sultan's service, always excepting his Navy, where the distinguished presence of Woods Pasha still means acknowledgement on the part of the Sultan…" of the "…superiority of the British Navy…"[428]

Woods was was also connect to the Levantine families[429] and was a pall-bearer at the funeral of William Whittall in Scutari.[430]

Likewise Woods name, and Blunt, was often found in summaries of state visits to the Ottoman Porte.[431] But not just with European embassies and parties. He was also present at meetings between the Ottoman Sultan and the Japanese Imperial household.[432]

Woods serve the Ottoman Empire for 40 years, and he did more than just train generations of Ottoman Naval officers, he took part in multiple naval campaigns and bravely risked his own life and well-being in defense of the Ottoman Empire. He claimed to be friends with Abdülhamid, but was still well respected by the Young Turks since he had trained so many of them. However, he was also connected at the highest levels of the British Empire and served the British by serving the Ottoman. Like Ryan, it was only when war between his two Empire began that he was forced to choose one side. And leaving his home of 40 years he chose the Empire he was born into, because he never converted to the one that had become his home.

Summing up with an example of both imperial violence and discourse Stevens' wrote that when the Ottoman Army arrived in Volo they found a collection of British and French consuls with several American and British journalists coming to tell the army that the city had been evacuated and to please not hurt the remaining inhabitants. Stevens comments that this was an interesting request as the consuls minds were filled with Greek stories of Turkish cruelty, but had they know how absurd this request sounded considering the discipline of the Turkish army and

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[426] *The Times*, May 21, 1890, *The Times*, January 12, 1890, *The Times*, January 7, 1893, *The Times*, July 9, 1897, *The Times*, July 7, 1902, *The Times*, July 25, 1906, *The Times*, July 28, 1906.
[427] *The Times*, March 24, 1908.
[428] "The German Emperor at Constantinople," *The Times*, November 4, 1889.
[429] Woods' son married into a Levantine family.
[430] *The Times*, April 13, 1910.
[431] *The Times*, December 25, 1891, *The Times*, November 7, 1892, *The Times*, May 14, 1894,
[432] *The Times*, January 9, 1891,

the fact that no one was going to be massacred in a city that was within sight of warships from half of Europe.[433]

British ambitions aside, the Ottoman government was never going to let a British military officer have command of large number of regular Turkish forces, the Turkish Contingent was an exception to the extraordinary circumstances of the Crimean War, however as soon as the war ended the Ottoman State disbanded the Turkish Contingent. The Ottomans were never going to allow the Turkish Contingent to be a praetorian guard under British command able to influence Ottoman policy. Baker Pasha's fantasy that another Turkish contingent would be established under his command during the Russo-Ottoman war was just that, a fantasy.

Therefore, while the Ottomans were perfectly willing to give British commanders control over large quantities of irregular forces they were never going to give them significant field commands over regular forces that would have been a threat to the state.

Finally, Anglo-Ottoman cooperation in the long 19th-century should not be overshadowed by the Ottoman alliance with Germany in the First World War. Mustafa Aksakal points out in his excellent book that the Ottoman alliance with Germany was no sure thing unit it was.[434] For a more historical perspective after traveling with the Ottoman army in 1897 Steevens wrote that it was assumed in England that the Ottoman army was officered by and directed by the Germans "but how many German officers were there really with the Turks I was asked by all my friends and it when I returned I can answer confidently not one. This is a silly fiction and easy to refute."[435]

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[433] Steevens, *With the Conquering Turk*, 232–233.
[434] Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[435] Steevens, *With the Conquering Turk*, 295.

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