THE EUROPEAN UNION
&
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Submitted by **Sabiha Senyücel**

April 2003

İSTANBUL BİLGİ UNIVERSITY

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Faculty of Social Sciences

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MA in EUROPEAN STUDIES

In the Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies in the Name of the Discipline

April 2003

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&
Crisis Management

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CHAPTER I: The Importance of Crisis Management

1.1 Introduction

Crises pose one of the main problems of modern societies. Globalization and integration in Europe have made the societies more vulnerable to any kind of crisis. Globalization made everything move around the world very quickly. The societies have become more interdependent; the doors between societies are not closed anymore. Any crisis takes place in the world arena can easily pass through these open doors and its effects can be felt all over. Especially with the internationalization of trade, the rest can easily feel a crisis takes place anywhere in the world. Although this thesis is going to deal with military and security crises, BSE and Dioxin cases are good examples showing that national borders cannot contain the problem. These two cases created great panic all over the world concerning public health. Even a national crisis such as BSE or Dioxin can affect multi-level European system (Grönvall, 2001: 170).

There are optimistic views saying that in the existing world structure there is no need to be afraid of tragic crises because the structure of the world is no longer threatening for the world citizens. It is easy to criticize this view by just looking at the events taking place in the modern world. Four main reasons can be listed why crisis are still likely to happen (Youngson, Vol. XV, 2001: p. 38-39);

1. The rise of intra state conflicts;
2. The proliferation of high-tech weapons and the personnel to develop them
3. Regional powers no longer feel subdued by the 'big stick' from major powers;

4. The speed and extent to which nations are affected by crises because of increasing and deepening links through trade;

The recent crises in the Balkans (Macedonia, Yugoslavia and Kosovo cases) did not take place in the geographical area of European countries but they still had an influence on them; the European powers had to intervene in order to prevent the spread of the conflict. India and Pakistan are two powers posing threats; they both have biological and chemical weapons. A minor conflict between these two is enough to drag the rest of the world in a crisis. The tragic events, which took place on 11th of September 2001, demonstrate how an attack on one nation affected all the others if only in an economic and political sense. It proved once more that crises are on the agenda and are here to stay.

Governments are expected to deal with the consequences of crises. But the scope, effects and duration of crises make it harder and harder for a single state to deal with these consequences. There is a need for international cooperation, which places the international organizations on the top of the agenda. The European Union (EU) is the organization where European powers put together their powers. The EU has become a dynamic actor in economic issues but is still not a dynamic actor in security issues. In other words: European countries become increasingly vulnerable to modern crises.

1.2 The Aim of this Thesis

This thesis deals with the problems of crisis management in the EU. The aim of this thesis is to explain why the EU has remained weak in crisis management. The EU's weakness will be shown in chapter four by crises cases that the EU involved.In this thesis, I'll concentrate on the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. The Maastricht Treaty but the common policies that the Treaty envisaged have hardly been applied created the institutional framework for a common security policy. The EU still fails to be effective in crisis management. "The question is why the EU cannot be effective in crisis management?"

In search for an answer to this basic question, the division of power between the institutions of the EU and the EU and the member states, in other words, the balance of power in decision- making, will be examined. This thesis is not only about the EU and its institutions but also about the nature of politics in Europe, as the answer to the question is found in the non-convergence of national interests. I define the convergence, following Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999) as the adaptation or adjustment of policy-making patterns in the member states under the influence of European integration towards a uniform, Union-wide policy (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000: 202). The non-convergence will be a failure to achieve the above-mentioned adaptation.

1.3 Definitions of Crisis and Crisis Management

In order to gauge the crisis management capacity of the EU, we first need to clarify what is meant by crisis management. I use Winn's (1996: 20) definition:

> "A crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions, derived from a change in a state's external or internal environment. All three conditions are perceptions held by the highest-level decision-makers of the actor concerned:
>
> 1. threat to basic values, with a simultaneous or subsequent
> 2. high probability of involvement in military hostilities, and the awareness of
> 3. finite time for response to the external value threat."[1]

Crisis management pertains at all the effects aimed at handling a 'crisis' situation. More precisely:

> "crisis management is concerned .....with .....procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war.."(Gilbert and Lauren, 1980: 647)

According to this definition, effective crisis management helps to bring the situation under control and avoid a larger conflict or a war. I'll follow the categorization of American Federal Emergency Management, which divides the crisis management activities into four phases:

1. mitigation/prevention
2. preparedness

[1] Brecher, M. (1980) Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973 (Berkeley University of California Press), p.1.; Brecher, M. (1989) Crises in the Twentieth Century (New York, Pergamon) Volume 1, p.3., cited in Winn (1996), p.20.

3. response

4. recovery

(Rosenthal, Charles and Hart, 1989: 14).

Mitigation and preparedness are pre-impact functions, and response and recovery are the post-impact ones. The first two phases, mitigation and preparedness, provide some degree of protection for the society in case of a possible crisis.

I would not consider the first category 'prevention' a criterion to adjudicate a crisis management activity in terms of being successful or not. In the definition of crisis it is explicitly stated that crisis is a sudden situation, which causes a surprise effect. In a complex world it is not possible to forecast where the danger will come from. The second category 'preparedness' can be achieved to some extent because without knowing the direction of the danger only partial preparation can be made.

In my efforts to determine the effectiveness of European Crisis management, I'll focus on the last two categories, which are response and recovery, while determining the criteria for effective crisis management. I'll speak of effective crisis management, if it can intervene in disputes on time and prevent the increase of violence. In addition, good crisis management involves a strategy to keep long-term peace. Good crisis management should come up with long-term plans, which will keep the stability and peace in the area.

1.4 European Crisis Management

The EU, the potential of its fifteen members, usually fails to take the lead in crisis management. Recent cases include the Grenada Crisis in 1983, the Libya bombing in 1986, the crisis in the Balkans in the early 1990s. In these cases rather than reacting with its own mechanisms, the EU tends to follow the United States's strategies or individual initiatives were taken. In the Libya Crisis, the EC foreign ministers met three times in April 1986 and still could not put forward a collective response to the crisis, because London pursued a unilateral policy, and Paris was not keen to formulate anti-terrorism policy in European political Cooperation (EPC) (Winn, p. 243). In the Balkan Crisis, the EU member states failed to pose a common position and prevent the crises from spreading. In the Grenada Crisis, London had a distinct policy because of its intimate links with the East Caribbean and it did not want to compromise for the sake of European unity in political cooperation (Winn, p. 243). Even if we look at the crises inside the EU, such as BSE crisis, it took the EU a long time to develop a common position towards the crisis (Grönvall, 2001). The member countries preferred to act in a unilateral way. The same scenario has been seen after the 11th of September events. There is a need to strengthen the EU 's capacity of crisis management because the recent crises and the EU's reaction towards these crises showed that the EU is far from being effective. The EU will lack credibility as an international actor since it is unable to offer a seamless web of responses, ranging from mediation to peacekeeping in a variety of crisis scenarios (Duke, 2002: xv). The EU must strive to be in a position whereby it can respond to a variety of different levels, ranging from the diplomatic, to different forms of economic leverage (both positive and negative), to the credible threat of military force to, if necessary, the actual use of military force (Duke, p. xv).

The reason why the EU cannot act as one in crisis management is found in the complex decision-making structure and the divergent preferences of member states, which prevent the EU from achieving common policies on security and politics. The institutions of the EU, with the regulations and laws they pass, try to minimize the differences in various policy areas among member states. They are trying to increase the scope of cooperation. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an example, which has brought changes in participating member states leading to a more or less uniform arrangement of monetary policy-making (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, p. 202). But the EU has been able to develop only a few policies, which lead to deep integration as EMU at national levels. It is hard to say that there is one EU common foreign policy or security policy. Member states are hesitating to transfer power to the supranational EU institutions in security and politics, which are regarded as sensitive areas.

1.5 Structure of This Thesis

This thesis is structured as follows. I will start with introducing the institutions and decision-making mechanisms of the EU in chapter 2. The arguments in the thesis are based on the structure of the EU, so a general understanding of the EU dynamics is essential to understand the argument laid out in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 will present the theories that allow us to formulate the hypothesis of our research. Chapter 4, which contains the argument, applies the hypothesis to three cases. Chapter 5 will be composed of the concluding remarks and suggestions.

CHAPTER II: The European Union: An Overview

In order to apprehend of the development and integration of the European Union (EU) it is integral to figure out the balance of power and how mechanisms work in the EU structure. This chapter provides an overview that enables such an understanding. This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section is concerned with the general nature of the EU, discussing what kind of an organization it is. The second part will be focused on the development of the EU, which is followed by the description of institutions and the decision-making process. Then the pillar structure and the role of institutions in each pillar will be handled in order to make it clear which set of activities of the EU this thesis will deal with. The next part will be about the balance of power between the EU and the member states. In the final section of this chapter, the integration process of the EU will be briefly described to provide background knowledge about the conditions from which the EU system was born, and further developments, which make it possible to understand the environment within which decisions concerning crisis management are taken.

2.1 The European Union as a Political System

The EU is regarded as a political system, not as a state. The study of international relations and political science offers many explanations for political systems. At this point I will refer to Almond (1956) and Easton (1957) who were the first to develop formal frameworks for defining and analyzing political systems (Hix, 1999: 2). Their characterization of democratic political systems consists of four main elements:

1. a stable and clearly defined set of institutions for collective decision-making and rules governing relations between these institutions;
2. citizens and social groups seek to achieve their political desires through the political system, either directly or intermediary organizations like interest groups and political parties;
3. collective decisions in the political system have a significant impact on the distribution of economic resources and the allocation of social and political values across the whole system; and
4. there is a continuous interaction (feedback) between these political outputs, new demands on the system, new decisions, and so on (Hix, p. 3)

The EU has these four characteristics. The EU has institutions, decision-making rules, in short a governing structure. The second element refers to delegation of power to the political system, which the institutions of the EU have to a certain degree. However, the governments of the member states of the EU are the main actors, the member states are not a monopoly in terms of power. Third, the decisions and policies of the EU do not only affect the members of the Union, they also have effects on the outside world.

Finally, the EU has a functioning political life. There are regular meetings at which the issues according to the agenda are discussed and decisions are taken. The Committee of Permanent Representatives composed of the heads and deputies of the member states' permanent representations in Brussels meet at least weekly to discuss items on the Council agenda, and to identify those that need to be discussed by ministers (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 17).

The EU is not a state in the traditional Weberian meaning of the word. This is because the EU does not have a "monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion" (Hix, p. 5). But the EU works as a political system without being a single state. The political system of the EU is based on voluntary cooperation among member states. Even if its institutional structure is based on separation of powers, similar to the separation of powers in a nation-state, there are differences. The Council consists of representatives of member states, and it is the legislative body of the EU empowered to take any decisions on each subject. Qualified majority voting is used in some matters but most of the decisions are taken by unanimity. The European Parliament, which is directly elected by the peoples of the member states, does not have many legislative and executive powers even if Amsterdam Treaty (1997) increased its role. The Commission of the Union is the main executive body, which has the right to take initiative and apply legislative policies. In addition hundreds of Committees, which were originally constructed to control delegation of powers from the Council or the Commission, are in operation. This kind of a system may blur the constitutional distinction between legislative and executive powers. The role of each institution will be described in more detail while dealing with the institutions and decision-making process later on in this chapter.

The European Union is not a state based on a defined territory, it has no territory of its own, no common taxation system, but it is much more than a system of cooperation where a couple of states come together to achieve certain goals. It is more than just an international cooperation but it is not a new state.

One way of looking at the EU is seeing it as a functional organization aiming to achieve collective goals. However, the EU cannot be seen as a simple functional economic and intergovernmental organization. The system in the EU and the EU as an organization is more complex than that.

2.2 Development of the Community

The EU was originally made up of three separate Communities, which all had their own structure, power and policy. With the Merger Treaty of 1967, the institutions of the three Communities were combined under one single structure. These three Communities are:

1. the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris.
2. the European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.
3. the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), founded in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.

(Wallace and Wallace, p. 4)

The Community has three pillars introduced by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), known as the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. Three Communities are known as the European Community and form the first pillar. The second pillar, which is the Common Foreign and Security Policy, is actually introduced by the Single European Act but got its formal shape in the Maastricht Treaty. The third pillar is Justice and Home Affairs, which, aims to develop closer cooperation in home and justice affairs. The pillars and the role of each institution in each pillar will be described under a separate title, after I briefly talk about the development of the EU and the role of the institutions.

The Community had six members when it was founded by the Treaty of Paris: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. After Pompidou took office as a successor of Charles de Gaulle, who was blocking the enlargement, the Community expanded its geographic area.

The enlargement process went as follows:

1973 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom

1981 Greece

1986 Portugal and Spain

1995 Austria, Finland, Sweden (Wallace and Wallace, p. 5)[2].

[2] Current candidates are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey.

The major treaties and amendments are summarized in **Table 2.1**

Table 2.1: The main treaties and treaty reforms

Year Treaty	Outcome
1951 Treaty of Paris	European Coal and Steel Community
1957 Treaty of Rome	European Economic Community European Atomic Energy Community
1965 Merger Treaty	Combines institutions in a single set
1986 Single European Act	more qualified majority voting(QMV) in the Council, legislative power for EP, new Court of First Instance, introduces cohesion, expands policy scope
1992Treaty on European Union (Maastricht/TEU)	three pillar structure of the Union, formalizes European Council, some co-decision for EP, new Committee of Regions, introduces subsidiary and citizenship
1997Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA)	more legislative powers to EP, introduces flexibility, modest extra QMV in Council, incorporates Schengen
1997Consolidated Treaty on European Union	simplifies the treaties by combining into a single set

Source: Helen Wallace and William Wallace, 2000, *'Policy-Making in the European Union'* p. 10

2.3 The Institutions of the Community and the Decision-Making Process

The division of responsibilities between the institutions of the Union shapes the balance of power. The Council of Ministers and the Commission are the most important actors of decision-making process. The European Parliament also has powers in decision-making and its role has increased during the last years but it is still considerably less effective than the Council of Ministers and the Commission. The Court of Justice is also influential. These four institutions are the main mechanisms of Community decision-making.

The Council of Ministers is the primary decision-making institution of the EU. It is an institution with collective EU functions and the creation of the member governments (Wallace and Wallace, p. 16). It is composed of ministers from the member states representing their country. There is a single Council, but in practice it meets in many different configurations. Each Council consists of 'a representative of each member state at ministerial level, authorized to commit the government of member state' (Article 203, [former 146], TEU). In the Treaty it is stated that the role of the Council is to 'ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the member states' and that the Council has 'power to take decisions' (Article 202 [former 145], TEU).

The Council exercises policy-making power together with the Commission. The Council may normally only act on the basis of a proposal from the Commission and after consulting, cooperating or co-deciding with the European Parliament (the relevant procedure determines the method of voting, whether unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority) (Cram, Dinan and Nugent, 1999: 26). However, the Council may ask the Commission to prepare a draft and start an initiative. It is important to keep in mind that the Council is the body of the EU, which belongs to the member states. And since only the member states have voting power, the Council is the body where final decisions are taken. That's why it is the key institution of the EU. The ministers in the Council are assisted by the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper)[3]. The structure of the Council is summarized in Table 2.2.

[3] Coreper: a permanently sitting meeting of the Council of Ministers. Coreper coordinates the complex negotiations on policy proposals between the Council, the Commission, other institutions of the European Union and the member states.

Table 2.2: Structure of the Council



Each member state assumes the Presidency of the Council for period of six months. The presidency speaks in name of the Council in relations with other international organizations or with other countries.

The heads of government of the member states and their foreign ministers meet in the European Council. The European Council was first established as a separate body, which

deals with the outside matters of the EU and in order to enhance the political side of the EU. But with the Single European Act, it has become a part of the EU structure.

The Commission plays an important role in the policy process. The European Commission is the body that serves the general interests of the Union as a whole. It's key functions are:

- Guardian of the founding treaties
- Formal initiator of EU policy, including legislative proposals
- Executive implementer of EU policy

These are the formal duties of the Commission. However, the Commission plays important informal roles, including acting as a broker of interests, gatherer of research and information, formulator of deals that are acceptable to the Council and the European Parliament, and encourager of whistleblowers to report failures to implement legislation (Cram, Dinan and Nugent, p. 45). The proposals and decision of the Commission are agreed on by simple majority voting.

It is composed of twenty commissioners nominated from the member states[4]. A Directorate General (DG) assists each Commissioner. The Commissioners are accountable to the European Parliament. The Parliament can censure the Commission with a two-thirds vote (Wallace and Wallace, p. 12).

The European Parliament consists of representatives of 'the peoples of the states brought together in the EU' (Mesquita and Stokman, 1994: 24). untill 1979, the members of the

[4] The five large member states nominate two and the other one Commissioner.

Parliament were appointed by their national parliaments. In 1979, the first time the members of the EP were elected democratically. Since then, elections are held every five year in the member states. The EP now has 626 members.

The Parliament is the body in the Community that has changed more radically than the others. The EP exercises the advisory and supervisory powers conferred on it by the treaties (Mesquita and Stokman, p. 24). The Commission and the Council have to consult the Parliament on most proposals and policy initiatives. It has the power of veto over some agreements made between the Community and other countries. EP has budgetary powers as well. It can try to modify 'compulsory' expenditures and amend 'non-compulsory' expenditures (Mesquita and Stokman, p. 24).

The Single European Act, introducing the cooperation procedure, increased EP's role in decision-making. Both the TEU and Amsterdam Treaty continued this trend; the revisions of both treaties changed the role of the EP in 1990s (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 62). Looking at the institutional triangle of EU decision shaping and making – Commission-Council-EP- the EP has emerged from its former role of junior partner and has firmly established itself as a co-legislator, a forceful arm of the budget authority, and a body of democratic control (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 80,81).

The Court of Justice (ECJ) is composed of fifteen judges and nine advocates general. The Court of Justice ensures that the law is observed in the interpretation and application

of the Treaties[5]. As the judicial institution of the Union, it checks the application of treaties and regulations, laws in the member states.

The ECJ is accessible to individuals as well. In 1986 a *Court of First Instance* was attached to the ECJ, which deals with complaints brought by individuals and companies.

Besides these four institutions, the Union has advisory committees helping the main bodies. The most important one is *the Court of Auditors*, which examines the revenues and expenditures of the EU (Mesquita and Stokman, p. 25). *The Economic and Social Committee* is also important in the sense that it deals with employers, workers, and consumer interests. The other relatively important ones are *the Committee of Regions, the European Investment Bank* and *the Ombudsman*.

2.4 Pillar Structure of the EU

Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has been characterized by a three-pillar structure. *The first pillar* covers the old European Community activities. These are mainly the common market, common agricultural policy, regional and social policies, environmental policy, which are internal matters. But the first pillar also concerns the relations with non-EU countries and international organizations in issues such as trade, development, enlargement. *The second pillar* is devoted to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The aim of this pillar is to prepare the necessary conditions for a better cooperation among member states and common decision-making to achieve a common foreign policy including security matters. Therefore, this thesis is concerned with one of the second pillar activities, crisis management. The *third pillar* deals with questions

[5] www.europa.eu/institutions/court/index_en.htm; official web site of EU Institutions.

related to justice and home affairs, which cover asylum and immigration policy, crime policy. With regard to crisis management, the second pillar is the relevant pillar. The third pillar has a crisis management element but is limited to international police missions such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania for instance; the EU can only rely on its established cooperation in this area (Schneckener, 2002: 5).

The three major EU institutions, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, have different roles and rights in each pillar. The first pillar is dominated by supranational element, since in all areas, it requires decision-making according to the Community method relevant to the issue. Furthermore, the Council decides on many of the issues by qualified majority voting or by simple majority. By contrast, the second and third pillars are highly intergovernmental. Here, the Council acts as the only decision-making body. The Commission is allowed to make proposals or is responsible from the implementation of the Council decisions. The Parliament has symbolic roles, which is limited to consultation or advise.

2.5 Community Decision-Making

The EU has a complex decision-making structure. Main actors of the decision-making are the institutional triangle formed by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission[6]. There are three main procedures, which are used depending on the issue to be discussed upon;

- The codecision procedure: The codecision procedure was introduced by the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992) and is governed by

[6] www.europa.eu.int/institutions/decision-making/index_en.htm. p. 1

Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. It was simplified and its field of application extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). It provides for two successive readings, by Parliament and the Council, of a Commission proposal and the convocation, if the two co-legislators cannot agree, of a "conciliation committee", composed of Council and Parliament representatives, with the participation of the Commission, in order to reach an agreement. This agreement is then submitted to Parliament and the Council for a third reading with a view to its final adoption[7].

- Assent: The assent procedure was introduced by the Single European Act (1986). It means that the Council has to obtain the European Parliament's assent before certain very important decisions are taken. Parliament can accept or reject a proposal but cannot amend it[8].
- Simple consultation: Under the consultation procedure, the opinion of the European Parliament is sought. Once it has received this opinion, the Commission can amend its proposal accordingly. The proposal is then examined by the Council, which can adopt it as it is or amend it first. However, if the Council decides to reject the Commission proposal, this must be a unanimous decision[9].

Various actors started to be involved in the decision-making, especially after the mid-1980s as a result of integration. The EU and the governments of member countries were not the only line of interaction anymore. The interest groups in the member countries,

[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.

individuals have involved at the decision-making process. This carried the EU decision-making at a multi-level governance stage.

2.6 Who speaks for the Union?

From the decision-making structure, it is understood that, even if the Commission seems to be influential in decision-making and there is a multilevel governance structure, the final decisions for the policies of the Union are made by the intergovernmental body of the Union, which is the Council.

However, it cannot be said that the Council is the representative of the EU member states. When it comes to the sensitive issues, such as politics and security, the nations are the 'leaders'. In order for the Council to be the sole representative of the EU, member states should be able to have a common position on every matter. So that the Council can represent the combined, common positions. However, as discussed in this thesis, this is not the case. The question is whether there is a single representative of the EU or not? In his book "Years of Upheaval", Kissinger mentioned that the West had failed to create a single decision-maker with whom he could contact and negotiate (Kisssinger, 1982). His concern was how to deal with Europeans when there is no European unity and he also emphasized that leader of each member state can talk for the European Union but there is no one or no entity to speak as a representative of the EU: "If every European leader was a spokesman for Europe but could not represent it, and those who represented Europe were civil servants with no authority to negotiate, who then could act authoritatively?" (see Kissinger, p.157.)

Twenty years have passed since Kissinger made this statement but not much has changed. The European Union still lacks leadership. The member states and the European institutions stayed as spokesman for the EU, none of them could manage to be the spokesman of the EU. The EU does not have a common foreign policy to let one be the spokesman. If Kissinger were in power today, he would face no less uncertainty about which of them to call (see Peterson and Sjursen, 1998)

In the 1990s, there was a search by the member states for a common European voice. The Commission presented itself as the candidate to replace offices at national level and combine them under a European office. The Council and the Commission became rivals on the issue. The Commission was very ambitious to form a common EU foreign policy, but during that time the EU member states were not willing to make necessary budget contribution. The TEU gave the Commission a clear interest in abolishing the pillar structure and bringing all external policy under the EC wing (Peterson and Sjursen, p. 56). The Amsterdam Treaty did not solve the problem but favored the Council. The issue stands still between Commission and Council. The central focus required to identify and pursue the Union's external interests cannot be created in Brussels if it cannot be created informally between national capitals and there is no chance of creating a European 'state' with a traditional 'government' (Peterson and Sjursen p. 57-58).

The questions Delors[10] asked in 1991 still remain unanswered:

1. Do the EU member states recognize common interests?

[10] Jacques Delors: Former European Commission President

2. Are they prepared to work together?

3. Will they commit the necessary sources?[11]

It seems that the road of creating an effective European voice passes through transferring power Brussels, but it does not seem that the member states are ready to do it. So, the question 'who speaks for the Union' is still a complex problem for European integration.

2.7 Analysis of European Integration

Since the foundation of the European Communities, a debate has been going on with regard to the direction of the integration process. The roots of European integration theory are usually traced back to David Mitrany's 1943 book *A Working Peace System* (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 8). Basically, Mitrany argued that increasing cooperation between countries in functional areas will have a spillover effect and the cooperation will be carried to other areas.

In contrast to idealistically motivated federalists who focused primarily on political federation, functionalists were skeptical of the role of politicians in the development of international cooperation (Mesquita and Stokman, p. 28). In the view of functionalists, the experts on the issues should be given the responsibility, which is seen as a more rational option for them. Political integration was perceived as an outcome developing indirectly, as a result of economic cooperation. Functionalism, as a theory was helpful to explain the integration process of the Community during the foundation years. The Community started merely as only economic cooperation; with the introduction of new treaties the scope of the Community expanded. The countries saw the benefits of

[11] Delors 1991 and also 1997, cited in Peterson J., H. Sjursen, "Common Foreign Policy for Europe", 1998, p. 58.

cooperating and the willingness grew for further cooperation (Mesquita and Stokman, p. 28).

In the 1970s, there was a stagnation of increasing cooperation, mostly because of French government's preference for intergovernmental cooperation. The functionalist theory failed during these times because there was a shift in the Community to an intergovernmental structure rather than supranational. Nationalism was on the rise again. The intergovernmentalists believed that national politicians have to stay in control of the integration process and the nation-state should be the main actor. In the early 1980s, facing a serious international economic crisis, the nation states realized that there is a need for mutual cooperation to solve the problems. The integration process again sped up with the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty.

There are clear examples of dominance and protection of national interests in the EU structure. The integration process of the Union has not followed one straight track. The functionalist theory presupposes a supranational body, which means transferring sovereignty from member states to the institutions of the EU. The balance of power between supranational and intergovernmental actors is important to understand the distribution and balance of power at the EU institutions and the member states. The Commission and the Parliament are the supranational bodies in the EU that are mainly influential in the decision-making process, but if the balance of power between these two and the Council is analyzed, the Council still has the last word on decision and it is an intergovernmental structure. Any amendment of the treaties of the Union has to be ratified in each member state, and unanimous voting is used on issues such as

enlargement, security policies, which means that any member state can block the decision-making process.

The process of integration of the EU is understatement. The balance between the supranational and intergovernmental aspects of the EU is unstable and continuously changing.

A brief look at the integration process of the EU shows us that the EU is a complex organization in the sense that the balance of power between the EU and the member states is a complicated issue since the beginning. Knowing about this unstable and ambiguous structure helps us to understand the reasons of weakness in crisis management, which are examined in detail in the next and fourth chapter. I will first introduce the theories, which direct us to an answer to our research question in the next chapter and then move to the case studies in the fourth one.

CHAPTER III: Common Foreign Security Policy and Theoretical Explanations

This chapter introduces the theories that are useful in answering the research question; helping to explain why the EU cannot be effective in crisis management.

I'll use two theories to explain the failure of the EU in crisis management, which are intergovernmentalism and rational choice. Intergovernmentalism is one of the main theories, which is used to explain the system of the EU. The theory is helpful to explain the dynamics of the decision-making structure and balance of power in the decision-making structure. As it will be better understood after the theory is described in this chapter, intergovernmentalism explains the deadlock in the decision-making structure, which will help to answer our research question. The second selected theory helps us to understand the tendency of member states at national level. Before coming to Brussels, each member state determines its preferences, which is going to be explained with rational choice theory in this chapter. The theory helps us to understand the divergent national choices of member states, which will also help us to answer the research question.

I'll start this chapter by explaining what the position of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) is in the EU decision-making structure. The reason why I'm doing this at the beginning of this chapter is that the theories will be applied to this structure. After the CFSP part, the theories will be introduced, which is the second main part of this chapter.

The theoretical part will result in the hypotheses that will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

3.1 Union's Decision-Making in Common Foreign Security Policy

First of all I must explain why I talk about Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is the branch of the Union that deals with crisis management issues. For this purpose, before moving into the theories it is important to understand the structure of the CFSP.

CFSP is concerned with defense and diplomacy, which are part of the core of state sovereignty. It deals with potential crises, on-going conflicts and post-conflict situations. CFSP decision-making procedures are intergovernmental and therefore different from those governing external economic relations. Heads of state and government in the European Council agree on common strategies and objectives to be achieved in areas where member states have important shared interests. Foreign ministers of the member states decide the specifics. The European Commission participates in all discussions, can make proposals, and has a right (but not the sole right) of initiative. The European Parliament is regularly consulted but has no direct powers.

Although the European Union started as an economic one, it always had the aim of being a political union. But development of cooperation and joint action in the field of foreign and security policy has remained largely an intergovernmental affair.

The formulation of CFSP has been on the agenda for a long time. The idea first surfaced in 1954 with European Defense Community (EDC)[12]. During that time there was strong opposition to the transfer of power to the Community institutions and the idea died. Hopes of achieving the coordination of foreign policy lingered for a while but evaporated in 1962 and remained dormant for nearly a decade[13]. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was the first successful initiative towards a political integration and CFSP. However, it operated as an intergovernmental activity quite differently from the supra-national structures of the Community. All decisions required unanimity.

The Union could not set up a single common foreign policy. What it looked like was more cooperation in some international issues. The Single European Act of 1987 brought political cooperation on the agenda but it was the Treaty on European Union of 1992, which brought CFSP into being and achieved changes in the system.

3.2 Does Maastricht Matter?

The history of the CFSP can be analyzed in terms of a credibility gap. The EU can play a strong role in the international system, if the member states believe in and work for the common good. Unfortunately, the member states were motivated more by national interests than by the common good. The member states were following a strategy, which allows them to reduce the contribution if they think the outcome of the common action will not be profitable enough for their nation. There were no necessary institutional arrangements to force member states to limit their national ambitions. The unwillingness of member states to cooperate created a vicious circle (table 3.2), which led to external

[12] http://www.ecdel.org.au/eu_guide/cfsp.htm
[13] Ibid.

and internal credibility gaps. The weakness of the EU was recognized not only by the ones involved in the system, such as politicians, diplomats, but ordinary citizens recognized it as well. In the description of crises around the world - in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Somalia or the Gulf- the citizens practically never observe the Union to be a major single actor (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, 1997: 4). The United States is always seen as the major actor; one of the member states might be mentioned, but not the EU (Ibid).

The institutional and material burden-sharing among member states, which includes the perennial issue of making a sacrifice or at least limiting national sovereignty, turned out to be of major importance (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 4). Without efficient and effective institutions, the EU member states fell into the trap of creating procedures and structures that suited their national perceptions and apparently offered possibilities to pursue the common good without, however, really being prepared to offer adequate means for the common undertaking (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 4).

There was a lack of individual investments from member states and the existing system did not have the power to force the member states to act for the common good. This created internal inefficiency because the system led the member states act according to their own national choices. In such an environment there was no internal confidence. The outcome was failures in regional and international security issues. In former-Yugoslavia and southern part of the Mediterranean, the EU did not come up with a credible policy that would match the Europeans' own ambitions (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 4). The external credibility of the EU was far from to be perceived as a new global actor. The objectives of the EU were clear but no effective action was

taken. Solidarity and joint action in the EU were limited. There was a need of parallel use of national forces and international networks in order to overcome the vicious circle.

For the reason of gaining internal efficiency and external credibility in the foreign policy and security field, the member states should make a quantum jump: Switch from mere cooperation to a common policy (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 5). The aim, with the Maastricht was get rid of the limitations of political cooperation and move to one step further in order to achieve and effective common foreign policy. The objectives of the Maastricht Treaty were integrating external policies and make the decision-making process easier by limiting unanimity. The member states realized that with weak obligations it is not possible to have an effective common foreign policy. The twelve member states aimed to get rid of the vicious circle (table 3.2) by procedural arrangements and strengthening instruments, which was expected to erase the limits of political cooperation. The internal reform would strengthen solidarity and efficiency and lead to success and external credibility. The member states were to abandon a vicious circle accentuating the limits of their external solidarity, enter into a virtuous one, leading to an upgrading of their collective efforts on the international scene (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 6).

Table 3.2: The "Vicious" Circle Before Maastricht



Source: Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, 1997, "Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, p.5

Table 3.3: The "Virtuous" Circle After Maastricht



Source: Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, 1997, "Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, p. 7

Besides the institutional arrangements and the CFSP's becoming an independent second pillar, which are developments that could not be underestimated there were, still significant problems: The most important one is the distinction between the objectives and the actions taken. As Christopher Hill[14] has noted, it is extremely difficult to:

> 'sustain the distinction between policy (to be decoded by unanimity) and implementation (to be subject to majority voting. A position, which states set out as a policy goal in itself has the habit of soon becoming a step towards something else, in an unending chain of undistinguishable ends and means.' (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, 1997: 92).

This quote shows that it is not easy to balance the objectives and actions and to maintain them in the real international world.

The Maastricht Treaty, despite making an improvement did not clarify the division of labor between the Union institutions. The Commission's role and majority voting aimed to be extended but still the Council remained the dominant actor in CFSP decisions. The Treaty also introduced "joint actions" but the application of these in practice remained minor. The second pillar remained intergovernmental.

[14] Christopher Hill: The first United States ambassador to Macedonia.

During the post-Maastricht period, many expectations within and outside of the EU were disappointed. The EU had failed "to assert its identity on the international scene" due to the following reasons[15]:

1. The implementation of the new CFSP could only begin in November 1993 when the Treaty was finally ratified. By that time, the EU was already heavily involved in the Balkans, most notably in Bosnia, but was lacking the necessary internal structures.
2. The Member States continued to pursue their own national foreign policy goals.
3. The establishment of the CFSP inevitably led to considerable turf battles between foreign offices, between the EU bodies as well as between individual foreign offices and European institutions.
4. Since CFSP decision-making was based on consensus and organized in a purely intergovernmental framework, the key question was always how to get the member states to agree on a common policy rather than to contribute most effectively to the solutions of problems in the world outside the EU.
5. The Council of Foreign Ministers - also known as General Affairs Council (GAC) - as the central body in the CFSP was heavily overburdened and had to cope with overcrowded agendas, which led "to a lack of focus".

3.3 How Does The EU System Work: Theoretical Explanations

The political system of the EU can be categorized into two:

- institutional level

[15] Schenecker, U. ,2002, "Developing and Applying EU Crisis Management Test Case Macedonia", p. 9,10.

- individual level

Institutional level has both supranational and intergovernmental characteristics. Before explaining how these two approaches take role in the EU process, I'll talk about the theories.

Intergovernmentalism is associated with the work of Stanley Hoffman (1966) (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p.10). It emphasizes the role of national governments, and keeps the role of supranational institutions at a minimum. Hoffman reminds us that national governments might allow a certain degree of spill over to take place in areas of 'low politics' (economics and welfare policies) where spill over did not threaten their vital interests and indeed where cooperation might enhance their position within the international environment (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p.11). However, in areas of high politics (such as foreign policy, security and defence) national governments would be much more wary and would swiftly put a stop to any attempts to encourage spill over (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 11).

The role of the intergovernmentalist theory in this thesis is to direct us toward understanding the balance of power in decision-making structures of the EU, which is important for answering our research question. Intergovernmentalism explains how member states see deeper integration as a threat to their national sovereignty and national governments' ambitions to possess the necessary powers to control and determine their own policies in high policies.

Intergovernmentalism, therefore, argues that the first aim of governments is to protect their vital interests, such as national security. In addition, decision-making at the European level is a zero-sum game, where losses are not compensated by gains on other issues: nobody wants to be fooled (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 11). Consequently, against the logic of integration, intergovernmentalists see a logic of diversity, which, suggests that, in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer the certainty, or the self controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of the untested blunder (Cram, Dinan, Nugent, p. 11). Keeping in mind that, the second pillar, CFSP, has an intergovernmental structure, this theory brings us to the conclusion that one of the reasons why the EU cannot be effective in crisis management can be explained in terms of member states being the dominant actor in 'high politics' and the effects of this to the decision-making process.

The clash of interests between the member states and this leading to a lack of common decision in the Council brings us to the second level of European political system: the individual level. Rational choice theory explains the dynamics of member states, which are rational actors and have their own preference sets and their own aim to achieve the outcome that serves best to their interests. Rational choice theory is useful to understand the motive behind decision-making at the national level.

I'll outline rational choice theory and try to explain how decisions are made at the national level and why they differ.

Rational choice theory is based on the idea that individuals act for a particular purpose, that is to maximize their utility. Rational choice theorists argue that politics begins with the behavior of individuals. According to them, policies are not made by governments but by people in certain positions who are motivated by their own interests. The theory assumes that every individual knows what to desire and are all able to rationally consider the possible options and choose the best one to achieve their desires. In its simplest form, rational choice theory states that given a number of options people do what they believe is best for them.

The major criticism of rational choice theory is made towards the theory's approach to collective action. The question asked to rational choice theorists is 'how do they explain individuals being a part of organizations?' The answer of rational theorists is: individuals are forced to join an organization by the ones in power or if they are a member of a voluntary organization, like a trade union, they are there to protect their own personal interests and because they perceive to be in an organization as the best option. So, nobody desires or aims the common good in their decisions. This is how rational theorists explain the reasoning behind collective action. According to them, behind every action that is for collective interests, lies individual interest.

If this theory is applied to politics, then states as being the actors of the political system are assumed to be rational ones. This means that actors have a clear set of preferences about what outcomes they want from the political system. For example, party leaders want to be re-elected; bureaucrats want to get higher budgets; interest groups want to have policies according the their own interests. And all these actors act in a rational way

to achieve their aim. For example, party leaders campaign to attract the attention of their voters, interest groups do lobbying in order to get what they want.

Actors also keep in mind that they have to consider the preferences of other actors as well. They should have information about the preferences of other actors and prepare a strategy for bargaining. Strong rational choice theorists assume that actors have perfect information about the preference ordering of the actors in the system, and consequently that actors can accurately predict the result of a particular strategy (Hix, p. 10). I do not agree with the assumption that actors have perfect information about the preference ordering of the other actors, because internal dynamics of each actor can change at any moment and this cannot not be seen all the time by outside actors. Rather than these actors most of the time cannot get perfect information about the actors preferences and the result is the same as in prisoners' dilemma. But anyway the outcomes are determined as a result of bargaining between actors.

If the member states of the EU are considered, each member state tries to estimate the way the others will take their position. Before a decision is discussed at the EU level, the potential dialogue starts individually between member states. Each member state tries to convince the other to obtain its own rational choice, which serves the best to its interests. This bargaining process can be concluded with positive results in some areas such as economy. For example, the arguments on Common Agricultural Policy have always been tough but at the end a decision is more likely to be taken. When the issue comes to the security and political issues, the member states are more possessive and with the claim of vital interests, the bargaining is usually not enough to obtain a decision. The

member states being rational actors leads to the outcome that when the subject is high politics, their national preference sets do not intersect and effective crises management actions cannot be taken.

In the political system of the EU, the individual level actors are the rational member states, which are located in the Council and institutional level actors are mainly the Commission and the Parliament. The member states come to the Council arena with already determined rational decisions for themselves and try to convince others that is the best one. The bargain starts at this point and theirs outcome depends on the bargain power of the involved parties. If the issue is sensitive and has vital importance for all the member states, then it is more likely that the outcome is no decision. So, assuming that the member states are rational actors, they all take decisions according to their 'rational choice', which means what is good for their nation. When it comes to the point that these national choices needed to be combined, the interests of the member states clash at one point or the other. And this is more likely to happen in the areas concerning security and politics because these are the areas that the member states regard as 'vital interests' for their nation. The crisis management activities go under the category of vital interests because they concern policies on security and politics. Due to the reasons stated above the lack of a common decision or position in politics and security policies lead to the outcome of ineffective crisis management.

Rational choice theory directs us to the second central argument of the lack of effectiveness in crisis management: the non-convergence of national interests. Because

they are rational actors, the achievement of common policies in security matters including so the crisis management activities is prevented.

The institutional level actors play the role of limiting the power of individual level actors, but they are not allowed to intervene in each case and they have a limited power to effect or change the outcome.

Then we end up with two possible solutions in order to achieve a decision:

- the rational actors changing their preferences,
- the institutional level actors gaining more power in decision-making process.

This can be summarized as;

- if preferences change, outcomes will change, even if institutions remain constant; and
- if institutions change, outcomes will change, even if the preferences remain constant (Hix, p. 12).

This means that, in order to achieve a common policy in security matters, which will lead to improvement of capabilities in crisis management, there is a need of transformation of more power to the EU institutions and reform in the decision-making process, which will reduce the power of member states and give more power to supranational bodies of the EU. This is one way of preventing the deadlock in high politics and opening the way to common policies and actions in politics and security issues. The other way is, a possible motive such as a common threat or common interest to push the member states to have common preferences, which will lead to convergence of national interests. This directs us

to the conclusion that being ineffective in crisis management is an outcome of clashing national interests, which find the chance to represent themselves in the intergovernmental structure of the EU.

To end up, the two theories of intergovernmenatlism and rational choice help us to formulate these hypotheses:

- Assuming that the member states of the EU are rational actors and make their decisions according to their national preference sets, there is a divergence of national preferences in the EU. This existing scene prevents the member states formulate a common policy on security and politics, so the crisis management activities are not sufficient and successful.
- The intergovernmental structure of the EU gives the member states the opportunity to create deadlock in the decision-making if any decision does not coincide with their national preference sets. This constitutes the other reason for the lack of effective crisis management.

In the following chapter these hypotheses will be examined by looking at the selected crisis cases the EU has been involved in.

CHAPTER IV: The Limits of European Crisis Management

As the high representative of the EU, Solana, put it correctly: "the world is not waiting while we get our own house in order". In fact, while the development of EU crisis management was 'work in progress', the severe conflict in Balkans emerged and challenged the EU's capability and willingness to respond adequately to a crisis. The conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and the question of Macedonia represent two excellent test cases for the crisis management capacity of the EU. . After the examination of the EU's role in ex-Yugoslavia and Macedonia, the 11th of September terrorist attacks to the United States will be taken as a third case to see whether the EU improved by time or not. The reason we look at the cases is to illustrate the basic problems CFSP has faced, it is facing, and will likely face in the future.

4.1 The Conflict in ex-Yugoslavia and the Question of Macedonia

Concerning the ex-Yugoslavian case, it is possible to say that the EU took its first common action by sending peace monitors (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p. 98). It might be too much to expect from the EU to be active in military sense, such as taking the lead in peacekeeping operations while the other international organizations, namely the United Nations and NATO were available with long standing experiences. The crisis in Yugoslavia started just after the Maastricht Treaty. The EU had just taken decisions for joint action and had moved towards a common foreign policy. They were not ready to handle a peacekeeping operation. As President Mitterand put it in 1991, the EC:

" must not be accused of trivializing the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia" (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 174).

The situation in the Balkans was so sensitive that the EU had to take some action. Otherwise the conflict could spread and affect the European countries. Also Europe cannot just be an outside watcher to the crisis taking place at its back door. The member states were afraid that the conflict there, the ethnic and irredentist movements could cross their borders. In addition two EU member countries (Greece and Austria) were border countries with Yugoslavia. The EU could not just stand out and watch the conflict settle down, it had to step in and calm down; the situation as much as possible. The crisis' coming just after the decision for a CFSP taken in Maastricht made the sense of stepping in stronger. The immediate response of the EU to the aims of Slovenia and Croatia to become independent was emphasizing the importance of territorial integrity. As the Luxembourg foreign minister, then president of the Council, put it, Yugoslavia "could have expectations with respect of its association with the Community if its territorial unity and integrity are safeguarded. Any other attitude could jeopardize internal frontiers in Europe"[16]. Indeed, the two, Slovenia and Croatia, declared independence in June 1991 and the EU failing its aim of keeping the Yugoslavia integrated, had to take a new position. The EU sponsored a peace conference under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, a series of unsuccessful cease-fires, and a constant mediation by Lord Carrington, then Lord Owen and last Carl Bildt (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p. 98-99). There were two sets of problems to be solved in ex-Yugoslavia. The first one was peacekeeping operations, in other words, question of force. The second one

[16] Agence Europe, 10 April 1991, cited in Regelsberger, Tervarent and Wessels, 1997, p. 175.

was the question of recognition of new states. As said above, concerning peacekeeping operations, the EU was not expected to take place at the first place and the situation in Yugoslavia so worsened that the declaration of independence of new states cannot be charged to the EU as a failure. Where the EU dramatically failed was the recognition of new states. From the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the member states failed to pose a common position and recognize the old Yugoslavia was doomed to disappear (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p. 98-99).

The cohesion started to crack once Germany pushed for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The German policy created divisions among the twelve member states. Especially the division within France and Germany appeared to reflect more profound concerns, with French suspicious of long-term German aims in Central and Southern Europe being deeply resented in Germany (Regelsberger, Tervvent and Wessels, p. 177). Just after the Maastricht Treaty with ambitious initiatives for a CFSP, the common position of the EU did not work and collapsed. The decision taken in Maastricht to promise recognition if certain criteria have been met on 15 January 1992 did not last long (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p. 99). Germany announced that it was going to recognize the two new states, Slovenia and Croatia regardless of their passing the test By Badinter Committee[17] (23 December 1991). According to the Commission Report, Croatia did not meet the human rights criteria, but Germany did not care and recognized them unilaterally.

[17] Badinter Committee: a group of European jurists set up by the European Union to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria for recognition.

After the efforts of building a CFSP, the failure of the EU to pose a common position was a disappointment. Despite Croatia's being recognized without meeting the necessary criteria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not recognized although it did meet the criteria. Below, while discussing the case of Macedonia, this will be mentioned in more detail. Germany's unilateral recognition took reactions especially from UK and France, which did not start official diplomatic relations immediately with their recognition. But despite strong pressure and opposition from the UK and France, Germany's determination to recognize the two new states succeeded. Chancellor Kohl was able to obtain French and British approval by granting concessions relating to the EC Monetary Union and Britain was allowed to opt out of the treaty's social charter[18]. The activism of national driven policies within the framework of CFSP cannot be easily ignored. Germany's attitude towards Slovenia and Croatia is a clear example of this. During that time Chancellor Helmut Kohl's ruling party was under severe pressure politically and he needed an initiative to restore the party's standing. The opposition party Social Democratic Party (SPD) had been advocating recognition and Kohl wished to seize the initiative and capture the issue for his own party[19]. In addition, the Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, had been criticized for reluctant and belated support for the Gulf War[20]. Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would show that Germany was capable of taking foreign policy initiatives on its own.

The Maastricht Treaty ended up with an agreement to promote a CFSP but the divergence in national interests and the EU's lack of necessary institutions with necessary powers

[18] www.eltax.net/bissett/western/recognition.htm
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.

blocked success in the sense of achieving a common position. Governments are still ready to make their choices according to their rational choices. The Macedonian case we'll see below is also a proof example of this. This affected the EU's external credibility. It is arguable that the EU's way of handling the crisis worsened the situation. The early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was a sign that the conflict in Yugoslavia would not be solved by peaceful means.

The trend of nationalism showed itself in ex-Yugoslavian case and continued with the problems Greece created in the question of Macedonia, which are discussed below.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990's, the Republic of Macedonia saw the chance to get its independence. A referendum was held on September 8 1991[21] and the majority chose to be independent[22]. Russia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia recognized the new Republic but the EU refused because of pressure from Greece claiming that the Macedonian name and flag, a sixteen pointed sun dating back to Alexander the Great, belongs to Greece[23].

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[21] Taking as the points of departure the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national and social freedom as well as the creation of their own state, and particularly the traditions of statehood and legality of the Krushevo Republic and the historic decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia, together with the constitutional and legal continuity of the Macedonian state as a sovereign republic within Federal Yugoslavia and freely manifested will of the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in the referendum of September 8th, 1991, as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia.

[22] www.geocties.com/~makedonija/indep.html

[23] Ibid.

Greece imposed unexpectedly and unilateral embargo on Macedonia on 16 February 1994, and the commonality of the EU was broken again by Greek vital interest claims (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p.100). According to the European Community's Arbitration Commission (the Badinter Commission) on January 11, 1992:

- "The Republic of Macedonia fulfilled the conditions laid out by the guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union as well as by the Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 16 December 1991."

The Committee's decision was clear saying that there was no reason to block the recognition of the Macedonia, according to the already agreed criteria of the member states. Greece broke the decision by its refusal of recognition and unilateral embargo. However, the new state entered the United Nations, the name agreed in April 1993 was that of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p.100). The name of the new state was accepted as temporary to overcome the Greek opposition. And it is said that negotiations would continue to find a solution. The EU member states continued to apply the decision taken in Lisbon in June 1992, which says that they're not recognizing FYROM formally, but relations were de facto entered into force once FYROM joined the United Nations.

On 15 October 1993, the new Greek government of Andreas Papandreou (PASOK won the early elections of 10th October 1993) took the decision to withdraw from the United

Mossialos, Morgan and Machin, p.100).

With this unilateral withdrawal of the Greek government, the EU's Lisbon decision was also broken and the EU again lost its common position. After the unilateral act of Greece, starting with Belgium, which was holding the Presidency at that time, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK announced that they recognized FYROM.

Despite the reactions to the Greek withdrawal and embargo, the EU was unable to convince Greece and force it to stay in the agreement. The mechanisms of foreign policy in the EU do not have the power to stop one member state acting unilaterally. This situation was seen by the third states as another failure of the EU to react to a crisis.

4.2 The Lessons of ex-Yugoslavia and Macedonian Question

"The international community is still quite helpless as far as the causes of conflicts are concerned...There is preventative diplomacy but in practice we often see too little too late" Klaus Kinkel[24] could easily have focused his remarks on the EU, rather than on the international community.

It is often mentioned that after the Soviet threat disappeared, there has been a trend started back to 're-nationalization". This has been mostly seen in security and defense policies. The states began to act as more individual actors and go after their own

[24] Klaus Kinkel: Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (since 1992).

interests. The initiatives taken in Maastricht were not enough to create a system, which has no divergent security challenges.

The conflicts in the Balkans showed the limits of a common action of the EU system. Jan Zielonka (Zielonka, 1998: 13,14,15) gives five explanations for Europe's being unable to act in international politics:

1. 'Back to the future' scenario for Europe: the old type of power game among major nations is responsible for the EU's failure to develop a CFSP. With the end of the Cold War, Europe is again back to national ambitions.
2. Natural divergence of national interests in Europe: European states are not necessarily pursuing power and hegemony, but their interests stem from different historical experiences, geographic locations, patterns of economic interdependence, and cultural links with the outside. Because of these reasons it is difficult for the diverse EU members to reach common ground in deciding upon foreign and security policies.
3. Strategic confusion after the Cold War: States have face unknown and new challenges with the change in the world structure. How can a foreign and security policy of the EU be achieved if Europe does not know what kind of order it intends to have?
4. The ability of modern European states to cope with a new set of internal and external challenges: The European democracies find themselves in a deep structural crisis, which effectively prevents them acting actively in the international framework. The long-lasting consensus on the basic notions of national interest, the utility of international involvement, and the usual hierarchy

of values guiding foreign and security policies is undermined by the assertion of sectarian interest groups. And a dominant state centric model of democracy makes it difficult to legitimize common European attempts, especially in the sensitive field of foreign and security policy.

5. The weakness of the institutions of the EU: it argues that common foreign and security policies area victim of the EU's ill-structured decision-making process. The disaggregated policy process of institutional regional integration has proved to be especially inadequate for the anticipation and management of military and diplomatic crises.

The role the EU undertook during the Balkan crises proved the explanations above to be true. The problems faced during ex-Yugoslavian and Macedonian conflicts showed the weaknesses of the EU. Those crises could be a good opportunity for the EU to apply a changed system but this opportunity was missed due to lack of a coherent policy and uncertain institutional structure of the EU. As Jacques Delors has suggested: "the lessons to be learned here is that a strategic planning and analysis capability is needed at the European level" (Regelsberger, Tervarent, Wessels, p. 190-191).

To sum up, the ex-Yugoslavian and Macedonian cases showed the intergovernmental structure of the EU prevents a common decision and the member states do not act together with the EU, if the position of the EU is not favorable for their national interests. The procedural arrangements made by the Maastricht cannot be enough by themselves produce a common position for the EU. There is a need of reforms in the institutional structure to backup the procedural arrangements. The member states were motivated with

their own rational preferences. If the necessary motive cannot be created for a coherent policy, national perspectives continue to dominate the formulation of a European foreign policy and failure in crisis management continue to be ineffective.

Insufficient political commitment by the member states and the lack of necessary policy instruments severely hindered the effectiveness of the EU's crisis management capability during these crises.

4.3 Progress or Not: 11th of September 2001

In the previous part, we pointed out the weaknesses of crisis management by looking at two cases. This part will evaluate if there is progress or not in the crisis management capacity of the EU. The dramatic events in the United States, which happened on 11th of September 2001, pose a good example to measure whether the EU has developed itself or not.

Have the terrorist attacks of 11th of September 2001 changed the world? Arguments in the international agenda after the 11th of September attacks claim that the world has become more vulnerable to any kind of threat, international peace and security has become more vital and challenges for security have increased. Whether this argument is true or not, there is one explicit reality which is that the attacks of 11th of September made it clear that the international security needs to be paid more attention and new policies or mechanisms are required to keep the world secure.

One other aspect, which cannot be denied, is the United States' demonstrating once more its power. From a European perspective it has to be asked to what extent the EU's foreign policy and security is affected, whether an impulse has been created to strengthen the EU's role as an international actor, or whether the EU been successful in responding the crisis or the EU will play a rather marginal role (Algieri, 2002: p. 1).

The EU reacted to the terrorist challenge in a differentiated way and with specific measures; apart from the broad agreement to support the coalition against international terrorism and corresponding statements, a Plan of Action was adopted by a special European Council on September 21st 2001, comprising diplomatic efforts, police and judicial-cooperation, humanitarian aid, air transport security, economic and financial measures and emergency preparedness.[25] A new briefing paper, EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update[26], finds that the EU has made progress in developing crisis management competence. However, its CFSP still cannot function properly because of member states have not yet mastered the art of speaking with a single voice and given adequate resources to their fledging European Security and Defence Policy.

On the positive side; the EU responded quickly to increase internal cooperation and civil protection after the terrorist attacks in the United States. The EU is a major aid giver in Afghanistan. By a statement on 8th of October 2001, the EU and its member states stated that they are urgently responding to the humanitarian crisis in and around Afghanistan and decided to make available 316 million euros[27]. And with the same statement on 8th

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[25] See European Commission, External Relations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/110901/ .
[26] 'EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update', Issues Briefing, 29 April 2002, Brussels
[27] www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01101214.htm

of October 2001, the declared full solidarity with the United States. Statement by the EU's General Affairs Council:

"full solidarity with the United States and...wholehearted support for the action that is being taken in self-defence and in conformity with the United nations Charter and UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 1368".

The member states contribute to the international security force there, however as in the Middle East, the EU play at most a secondary role, complementing and sometimes modifying United States policy but rarely guiding events in a manner commensurate to its potential[28]. Diplomatic effort was increased after 11th of September with the goal of being more effective against terrorism but it could not reach tangible results. While the EU activities was developed, questions came out concerning the CFSP. The EU was willing to take a role as a crisis manager in Afghanistan but there were doubts about its internal coherence. For example, at the same time the EU Troika was on a diplomatic mission in Islamic countries, Britain took individual initiatives. On 7th of October, Blair declared that Britain is taking place in attacks of the United States towards Afghanistan:

"Britain kept its promise to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States against terrorism, adding its firepower to the first wave of attacks Sunday against Afghanistan. Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking live on television, announced that British missile-firing submarines joined the operation[29]".

[28] www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects
[29] Associated Press, London, October ,7, 2001

On 8th of November Britain was the only member state to have taken part in the military action[30]. Most Europeans regarded Britain in a much more leading position in the current crisis than other European leaders or the EU as a whole. The European leaders travelled to Washington after the attacks on the World Trade Centre. The visits by France's President Jacques Chirac[31] and UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair show that the European leaders did not a wait an EU initiative and took the leading role by themselves.

The reality is that the European Union is still basically an intergovernmental entity as far as security is concerned. This was confirmed by the fact that when the European Commission President Romano Prodi and Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstat met with President Bush on September 27[32], after a whole week of visits of foreign leaders, the Washington press did not even mention the meeting. The individual voices of member states were louder than the EU one.

It is all very well to observe that national interests will dictate the policies of the major powers; the question is 'whose interests?' Without the common enemy of communism, the security interests of the member states do not always coincide anymore and they do not feel obliged to cooperate with the United States anymore. France for example, does not always agree wit the United States' strategy to manage crisis, partly because it does not like US hegemony in Europe and partly because of the economic interests. In the

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[30] Economist, 8th November 2001, 'Guess Who Was Not Coming To Dinner"
[31] President Chirac's visit to Washington was already scheduled before the tragic events. The confirmation of his agenda served to reinforce France's protagonism in European – US relations. For declarations of the French leaders:
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/dossiers/attentatsusa/declarations.html#1
[32] http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2001/2001072.htm

recent 'Iraq crisis, the Unites States perceives Iraq as a potential regional threat whilst France views it as a client for its arms and therefore a source of revenue (Youngson, p. 39). On the contrary, Britain supports the United States policy. Britain is often labelled as by the other European countries, America's 'poodle' when it lends support to its old ally (ibid.). Therefore, due to the divergent national interests the scepticism regarding the EU's common foreign and security policy continues.

The other two reasons of weak crisis management, besides the clash of national interests, concerning the EU's capability of handling the crisis of 11th of September, are the limits of military capabilities of the EU and financial problems. Actually these two are highly related to each other. The EU took a decision in 1999 Helsinki European Council, which says that: "the EU should make itself able to achieve the headline goal[33]". Whereas the results of the capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001 showed that the EU is far away to achieve its aim. In order to overcome the problems the member states

[33] "To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces." Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, Annexes to the Presidency Conclusions, Annex 1 to Annex IV.

agreed on a European Capability Action Plan[34], but still we cannot expect that the existing problems can be solved in a short period of time.

In budgetary terms, there are three possible categories of crisis management operations[35]:

a) operations under a Community instrument, which are financed under the appropriate Community budget;

b) CFSP operations not having military or defence implications, which are financed under the CFSP budget line;

c) ESDP operations having military or defence implications, which fall outside the Community budget.

The first problem concerning the budget is each category has a different financing procedure, which prevents the EU react rapidly. First the category of the crisis has to be agreed on. The second, the current procedures related to CFSP operations within the budget are too cumbersome for crisis situations. Even if, the EU had agreed on a joint action to Afghanistan, there would not be sufficient sources in the present budget. Also to achieve the aim of improving military capabilities, there is a need to develop new procedures to finance crisis management needs.

With the 11th of September attacks, the EU realized that security policy deserves more attention and military capabilities must be extended. However, this is not possible without the common will of the member states. What is still lacking is the 'common

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[34] See General Affairs Council with the participation of the Ministers of defence of the EU, Statement on improving European military capabilities, European capability action plan, Brussels, 19 November 2001.

[35] Commission of the European Communities, 'Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Financing of Civilian Crisis management Operations', 28.11.2001, Brussels.

interest' to achieve effective EU crisis management. To close the gap between 'common' and 'intergovernmental' there is a need of a harmonization of conflicting national interests.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

This thesis concerns itself with the capabilities of the European Union in crisis management. The thesis question was;

"Why the European Union is weak in crisis management?"

After first having studied the EU mechanism, the theories of intergovernmentalism and rational choice were presented. As well the place of theories in the EU structure were shown.

By means of three case studies, the EU practice of crisis management was described. The case studies were analyzed and if could be concluded that the EU is not capable of managing crisis with its existing structure and mechanism.

I offered two levels of explanations for this weakness:

- The institutional structure of the EU
- The divergent national interests of the member states.

All the events that have been described above represent that the initiatives taken to improve the crisis management capability of the EU made limited progress and the necessities still remain not materialized. The CFSP rhetoric was not matched by the reality. There were a series of Intergovernmental Conferences held to develop the structure if the EU and move to a more effective international crisis manager actor. Nevertheless it will be still not possible to say that a satisfactory model has been found

for the decision-making process through which the EU's foreign and security capabilities can be improved.

There are two major challenges standing regarding the decision-making process. The first point is, there is a need to develop a functioning concept for the interaction between the different actors and institutions involved, both in a vertical (between the national and supranational level) and in a horizantal direction (on supranational level, e.g. between Council and Commission, as well as on the national level, e.g. between the member states (Algieri, p. 4). The second, closely linked with the first task, the decision-making procedure has to avoid deadlocks, which brings us up to the question of an extension of majority voting and leads, furthermore, to the aspect of differentiated integration (Algieri, p. 4).

A very popular proposal to overcome the deadlock is the introduction of majority voting on foreign and security issues and ending the use of national veto. The Maastricht Treaty has already provided the extension of majority voting; therefore what is required is an extension of existing arrangements. Another proposal is to reconsider the relationship and division of responsibilities between the High Representative for CFSP in the Council and the Commissioner for External Relations and ultimately merge both functions, linking it to a vice president of the Commission.[36] It has been critically remarked that the tension between intergovernmental and Community competencies cannot be overcome with an actor like the High Representative for CFSP in the Council Secretariat, because

[36] See amongst others the European Parliament's report concerning the reform of the Council, A5-0308/2001 final, 17 September 2001.

such a structure inevitably creates more institutional complications.[37] The High Representative, for his part, defined his role primarily as an actor assisting the presidency and the member states.[38] Rivalries amongst these two actors do not give the sense of institutional uniformity. "One thing is clear, that unless a way is found of merging the bureaucracies, the problem of 'institutional' consistency will continue to exist".[39]

In case the decision-making and decision-taking mechanisms remain without being reformed, they will not be answering the needs of effective crisis management in a sufficient way. The single member states will continue manipulating their own policies and without the necessary mechanism, the EU will not be able to preventing member states acting unilaterally, surrounded with national ambitious. And CFSP will remain a 'paper tiger', but far from reaching the expectations in practice.

I have also shown that the persistent divergence of national interests shadow the development of the CFSP, and this can be regarded as the major criticism to the reform proposals. The mere fact that the existing provisions for majority voting have not been used shows that there is a much more fundamental problem that prevents the emergence of a common European foreign policy: namely, the divergent views among member states on a vast number of international issues (Stavridis, Mossialos, Morgan, Machin, p. 110). Regardless of all global pressures that are pushing towards a commonality of the policies

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[37] See in this context also the communication by Chris Patten, External relations. Demands, constraints, priorities, in: Agence Europe, Europe Documents 2193, 10 June 2000, p. 3.

[38] See Javier Solana, The development of a CFSP and the role of the High Representative, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 11 February 2000,

[39] See Simon Nuttall, Consistency and the CFSP, London School of Economics, EFPU working paper 2001/3, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU%20Working%20Paper%203.pdf

rather than individual ones, if different national interests ask for different national policies, a single body cannot represent all the divergent interests and satisfy them all.

The current proposals can be made having an optimistic view that the procedural arrangements will go deeper and give the chance to the European foreign and security policy to be materialized. So that, the EU can be effective in crisis management. I would like to pose here my optimistic views but unfortunately I cannot see any existing motive or clear will that will direct the member states towards harmonization of national policies. And without the will to cooperate or the willingness of member states to have effective crisis management mechanism, the amendments on the paper will not matter. To quote from the draft Council Report of April 1997, "the provisions of the existing treaties cannot alone provide ready-made solutions to problems, but only the means to tackle them".

Looking at the existing facts the future development and application of the EU crisis management depends on improvements in four major areas (Schnecker, 2002):

1) Political will of the member states

It has vital importance that the EU member states speak with one single voice. In the case of the missing of this criterion any attempt to prevent conflicts will fail. Indeed, the member states since the end of 1990s, expressing their willingness to have a common ground (CFSP) that can represent the interests of the EU. But what is said is never been applied. At this point, the only development is the establishment of high representative,

which can be a major improvement if member states stop jumping a step further the high representative and let it be the spokesman.

2) Coherence within the EU

Another important issue refers to the coherence among the EU institutions and services as well as between the member states' policies and the EU policy. When the issue is crisis management, a variety of actors are involved, which regulate their competences in different ways. For example, measures taken by the Council of Ministers and by the Commission may not be linked, may follow different purposes, budget lines or time tables or at worst, may even contradict each other.

3) Building Capacities

The will by itself is not enough; the EU has to able to responding the crisis. In the areas of giving development aid, human rights activities, cooperation programs the EU is highly active in recent years. The missing part has been civilian and military instruments for crisis management activities. In this field, despite its enormous economic and political potential the EU has in fact been rather a 'weak' actor. The expectations from the outside world increased to see the EU as a global actor, but the EU could not increase its capability of crisis management. The expectation and capabilities gap extended due to the rivalry between the national and the European levels in foreign policy matters. Most capacities and powers remained at the nation level and a small amount is transferred to the EU level.

4) Cooperation with other actors

Whatever the EU will do in crisis management it will always have to cooperate with other actors, in particular with other international organizations. The regular exchange of information, combining comparative advantages sharing training experiences and most importantly the development of joint political approaches to a crisis is essential to enhance the opportunities for success.

It's the author's belief that, the European Union slowly moves from rhetoric to substance, but it is still at the very beginning of achieving a comprehensive approach to crisis management.

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