

THE COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALIZATIONS BETWEEN THE  
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE REIGN OF SULTAN SULEIMAN THE MAGNIFICENT  
AND THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AT THE REIGN OF AKBAR SHAH

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The Comparison of the Political Institutionalizations between the Ottoman Empire at the Reign of Sultan Süleiman the Magnificent and the Mughal Empire at the Reign of Akbar Shah

(Muhteşem Süleyman Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Siyasal Kurumsallaşmaların Ekber Şah Döneminde Babür İmparatorluğu'ndaki Siyasal Kurumsallaşmalar ile Kıyaslanması)

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Thesis submitted to the Institute for Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
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## **ABSTRACT**

An Abstract of the Thesis of Hatice Seda Şenvarıcı, for the degree of

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Title: The Comparison of the Political Institutionalizations between the Ottoman Empire at the Reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and the Mughal Empire at the Reign of Akbar Shah

The Ottoman Empire and Mughal Empire as the two Muslim states at the same time had very similar characteristics related to the specific visible causes. Both the reign of Akbar Shah and the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent were the rising periods of these two empires because of that they had provided their empires to be developed in terms of the administrative, fiscal, military and judicial aspects in a very similar way to each other. It can significantly be remind that these two emperors were shared the same years; between 1556 [Akbar Shah had come to the throne] and 1566 [Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent had died].

Nevertheless, the comparative studies on them have been so limited that unfortunately, there are a few examples. One of the major cause of this situation is that the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire had also been very limited until the reign of Shah Jahan without some earlier contacts; for example, at the reign of Humayun Shah and at the reign of Akbar Shah. Of course, these limited relations cannot be a reason in order not to

compare these two empires. Because of that there are similar applications and concepts among them.

This thesis compares these two empires in terms of the political, fiscal, military, and judicial institutions. I argue that these institutionalizations had contributed to the empires to be improved and provided the life spans of the empires to get longer.

This thesis is composed of the five major parts. The first one introduces the comparative history, Ottoman and Mughal historiography. The second part tells the establishing period of the two empires and backgrounds of them one by one. The third one mentions the aristocracy and nobility, political organizations and the Mughal-Ottoman relations. The fourth part is the political institutions; that is, these four institutions told in previous paragraph is explained one by one. The last part shows the general and specific conclusions in the light of the previous sections.

Keywords: The Comparative History, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, Akbar Shah, '*Din-i Ilahi*', The Imperial Council, '*Dawlat-khanah-i 'am wa khas*', '*Mansabdari*' System, '*Timar*' System, '*Jagirs*', The Mughal Court, The Ottoman Court.

## ÖZET

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü'nde Tarih Yüksek Lisans derecesi için Hatice Seda Şenvarıcı tarafından Eylül 2016'da teslim edilen tezin özeti

Başlık: Muhteşem Süleyman Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Siyasal

Kurumsallaşmaların Ekber Şah Döneminde Babur İmparatorluğundaki Siyasal

Kurumsallaşmalar ile Kıyaslanması

Aynı zaman diliminde bulunan iki Müslüman devlet olarak Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Babür İmparatorluğu belirli, görünür sebeplere bağlı benzer özelliklere sahipti. Hem Ekber Şah'ın hem de Muhteşem Süleyman'ın dönemi her iki imparatorluğun yükselme devri idi. Çünkü her ikisi de imparatorluklarının siyasi, mali, askeri ve adli yönden birbirine oldukça benzer şekillerde gelişmesini sağlamıştı. Şunu önemle hatırlatmak gerekir ki bu iki imparator 1556 [Ekber Şah'ın tahta çıktığı yıl] ve 1566 [Muhteşem Süleyman'ın vefat ettiği yıl] arasındaki on yılı paylaşmışlardır.

Ancak, onlar hakkındaki karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar oldukça sınırlıdır ve maalesef bu konuda çok az örnek vardır. Bu durumun ana sebeplerinden biri bazı erken dönem örnekleri, Humayun Şah ve Ekber Şah dönemleri, dışında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Babür İmparatorluğu arasındaki ilişkilerin Şah Cihan dönemine kadar bir hayli sınırlı olmasıdır. Tabii ki, bu sınırlı ilişkiler bu iki imparatorluğu kıyaslamamak için bir sebep olamaz. Zira, her ikisi de birbirleri arasında benzer uygulamalara ve kavramlara sahiptir.

Bu tez her iki imparatorluđu siyasi, mali, askeri ve adli kurumlar bakımından kıyaslamaktadır. Kanaatim şudur ki, bu kurumsallaşmalar imparatorlukları geliştirmiş ve imparatorlukların ömrünün daha uzun olmasını sağlamıştır.

Tez beş ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm karşılaştırmalı tarihi, Osmanlı ve Babür tarihçiliğini tanıtmaktadır. İkinci bölüm her iki imparatorluğun kuruluş dönemini ve arka planını anlatır. Üçüncü bölüm aristokrasi ve soyluluk, siyasi yapılanmalar ve Babür-Osmanlı ilişkisinden bahseder. Dördüncü bölüm siyasi kurumlardır ki bir önceki paragrafta söylenen bu dört kurum birer birer açıklanmaktadır. En son bölüm önceki kısımların ışığında genel ve belirli çıkarımları göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Karşılaştırmalı Tarih, Muhteşem Süleyman, Ekber Şah, '*Din-i İlahi*', '*Divan-ı Humayun*', '*Dawlat-khanah-i 'am wa khas*', '*Mansabdari*' Sistemi, '*Timar*' Sistemi, '*Jagirler*', Babür Mahkemesi, Osmanlı Mahkemesi.


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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

This work is a kind of the comparative history and it aims to compare the political institutionalization in the Mughal Empire at the reign of Akbar Shah with the political institutionalization in the Ottoman Empire at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. Because of that both of two empires were risen up at the reigns of these two emperors and their reigns were the most important ones. For example, both of them improved their empires as to be institutionalized, politically, economically, military and judicially. In other words, they had set up the bureaucracy in their own countries. Therefore, to begin with, it is necessary to define institutionalization.

The institutions and systems were older than the reigns of these two leaders; that is, they did not invent new system. In other words; for example, '*mansabdari*' system had been used for many centuries in India by the native settlers before the Mughal Empire; in similar to the Ottoman '*timar*' system. Because, this kind of system was also used in Late Byzantine Empire with the name of '*Pronaia*'; moreover, another highly similar one was used in the Seljuks. That is the institutionalization does not mean to create the institutions or systems. Apparently, institutionalization means the institutions to be gained functionality within the bureaucratic frame. Naturally, institutionalization and bureaucracy fed up with each other. For instance; although the institutionalization can be dated in the reign of Sultan Mehmed II in the Ottoman Empire, it had been become a part of the politics when the Ottoman bureaucracy had been started to be improved at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman. Here, 'a part of the politics' means that the institutions had been improved according to the necessities and obligations of that time in order to provide the administration to be more effective. In similar to this statement, Akbar Shah had revised the institutions to

control over the people effectively. Both of these two political institutionalization movements will be analysed within the comparative historical frame. Therefore, it is necessary to explain what the comparative history is and brings to us.

First of all, the comparison had gained the importance; especially, at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is thought that the comparative studies were not the tools of the sociology; it was the sociology of itself. The societies could not be understood without any comparison.

Firstly, some of the sociologists had been aware of its importance, and one of the major sociologists is Michael Mann as his definitions will be used in the following lines.

Michael Mann describes two basic concepts of the sociology: The social power and collective one in order to analyse the dynamics which are the background and basics of the society.

“*Social power* carries two more specific senses. The first restricts its meaning to mastery exercised over other people. An example is: Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance (Weber 1968: I, 53). But as Parsons noted, such definitions restrict power to its *distributive* aspect, power by A over B. For B to gain power A must lose some- their relationship is a “zero-sum game” where a fixed amount of power can be distributed among participants.”<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, Michael Mann continues to explain “*collective power*”. The social organization and division of labor are the major points to explain the collective power.

Actually, the social organization is based on the division of labor which is consisted of all different types of people who can be employed according to their abilities.

Therefore, some of them are superior to others. This kind of division creates a

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Mann, “*Societies As General Organized Power Networks*” in *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power From The Opening To A. D. 1760*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 6

‘networking society’ including the interaction and communication. This system provides the superior person to control over the entire organization.<sup>2</sup>

“It enables those at the top to set in motion machinery for implementing collective goals. Though anyone can refuse to obey, opportunities are probably lacking for establishing alternative machinery for implementing their goals. As Mosca noted, “The power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority.” (1939: 53). The few at the top can keep the masses at the bottom compliant, provided their control is *institutionalized* in the laws and the norms of the social group in which both operate. Institutionalization is necessary to achieve routine collective goals; and thus distributive power, that is, social stratification, also becomes an institutionalized feature of social life.”<sup>3</sup>

Michael Mann explains ‘the four sources and organizations of power.’ These sources and organizations are ideological, economic, military and political power and organization. All four of them will be the basics of this thesis which consists of the comparisons about the administration, economy, military, and administration of justice.

First of all, “*ideological power derives from three interrelated arguments in the sociological tradition.*”<sup>4</sup> First one is ‘*concepts and categories of meaning*’. “The second social organization of ultimate knowledge and meaning is necessary to social life, as Weber argued.”<sup>5</sup> Second one is the ‘*norms*’ which are commonly accepted by the society as the common moral values. Third one is ‘*aesthetic/ ritual practices*’.<sup>6</sup>

According to Mann, “*ideological organization comes in two main types.*”<sup>7</sup> “In the first, more autonomous form it is sociospatially transcendent. It transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, military, and political power and generates a “sacred” form of authority (in Durkheim’s sense), set apart from and above more secular authority structures.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23

“The second configuration is ideology as immanent morale, as intensifying the cohesion, the confidence, and therefore, the power of an already-established social group.”<sup>9</sup>

“Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature.”<sup>10</sup> These aspects cause the concept of class to be born and a dominant class can get general collective and distributive power in societies as to monopolize control over production, consumption, distribution and exchange.<sup>11</sup>

Military power is necessary to defense physically and it is useful for aggression.<sup>12</sup>

Military organization is based on the human power and it is obvious in wartime.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless to say that while military organization creates a powerful group as the military elites, it also creates a weak group, on the one hand. If this weak group started to gain power, the military organization would be challenged to secure itself. Therefore, the military organization must be one of the major actors to secure the society also in the peace time as much as in the war time.

Besides, it should be added that military power is the most important element of the power sources of the governments in all time and it is the decisive factor in terms of the superiority. Although it is so essential that it could change the destinies of the governments at the time of gunpowder empires, it had been started not to be the most significant item when the politics, and bureaucracy were started to gain importance at that time as it will be explained in the next chapters.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. , p. 25

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. , p. 26

Political power derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations.

Michael Mann divides the political organization into two major groups which are the “international” organization and the geopolitical diplomatic organization.

Additionally, he also separates the second one into two groups which are “the hegemonic empire dominating marcher and neighboring clients, and varying forms of multistate civilization.”<sup>14</sup>

The comparative studies which had been started in the sociology for the first time, had been tried to be used in history which was a collective social conscious. Therefore, some scholars like Lucien Febvre and Marh Bloch thought that this method could have been adopted into history. Lucien Febvre was one of the pioneers thinks that history had to be known totally; that is, history was the total of economy, politics, societies’ values and norms, events, etc. in the past. They institutionalized their ideas as to publish a new periodical that would have been called as ‘*Annales*’ which had given a new approach in the history.

The school of Annales is so important for this thesis because of that it provided the approach of ‘*total history*’ which means to explain the past within the economical, social, demographical, geographical aspects as a total complex, etc. This thesis is composed of the political, fiscal, military and judicial comparisons. Therefore, the school of Annales is the backbone of these kinds of studies and it had provided a new approach in history to be improved because of that it had also led the comparisons to be used in history to know what happened was in reality in the past. Some of

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid. , p. 27

historians applied this theory into the history were Marh Bloch and Lucien Febvre. In addition, they institutionalized their idea with the school of *Annales*'.

They used it as a modal the journal; 'Annales de geographie' of Vidal de Blache and they gave the name of their journal as '*Annales d'histoire economique et sociale*'.<sup>15</sup> It can be said that via this way they gave a clue about that this journal was different one. In addition, the editing office of this journal was made up of not only the modern or ancient historian but also the sociologist, geographer, economist and the political scientist.<sup>16</sup>

In the following years, these two men started to work in the different universities and the *Annales* was institutionalized at that time, and this institution provided the historians to have the different perspectives.

The school of *Annales* had gained popularity at the 1980s. After the 1960s; the new conversations about the perception of history were opened. Then, the perception of history started to be changed and the century historians started to lose their importance in contrast to the field historians such as the economical historian, art historian or the political historian started to gain popularity.

On the other hand, the comparative history had become a new historical approach and it had been turned into an interdisciplinary program at the universities in the following years. For instance, just two universities in Turkey have the program of comparative studies whom in Dokuz Eylül University in İzmir and Koç University in İstanbul.

Both of them provide the master degree for the students.

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<sup>15</sup> Peter Burke, *Fransız Tarih Devrimi: Annales Okulu Translated by Mehmed Küçük*, (Ankara: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 2002), p.50

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* , p. 50-51

Hopefully, the interesting in Indology studies and comparative approaches has become more popular day by day. Therefore, the gap in this field will probably be filled with the new studies. Absolutely, one of the major aims of this thesis is to fill in this gap.

This study attempts to answer three questions. The first one is what happened in the east side of Iran at that time; of course, the conquest movements were overthere but the east side of Iran had been ignored by the Ottomans and Ottoman historians for many years. Unfortunately, both some of the Ottoman scholars and some Ottoman historians had thought that the east side of Ottoman Empire had been consisted of just Azarbaijan, Iraq and Iran. Although the Mughal Empire was a Muslim state dated on the same period with the Ottoman Empire, there was neither hostility nor friendship among them. The second is what the similarities were between the Ottoman Empire and Mughal Empire. The last but not the least is how these two empires were politically institutionalized in a very similar way.

This thesis aims to this field as to compare the Ottoman Empire and the Mughal Empire in terms of administrative, military, fiscal and judicial aspects in order to represent the political institutionalizations. These categories have been selected because of that all of them are the common points between the two empires. On the other hand, the social institutions which consist of the waqfs, educational institutions, or the architectural monuments as the public service or the religious temples, have been ignored. Because, this part is not a common one, there are so many differences so the comparison on this field is impossible.

Here, it is necessary to explain why the Mughal Empire has been chosen. First of all, the items which will be compared must have the similar specializations. For example,

there are so many similarities between the Safavids of Iran and Ottoman Empire.

Nonetheless; although the period of the Mughal Empire was dated on the same period with the Ottomans, information about the Mughals had been so limited in the Ottoman's world at that time. The major cause of this situation is the limited relations between the two empires which were neither friend nor enemy of each other at that time.

There are three major causes to choose these two empires.

Firstly, there are some similarities between them. For example, they were Sunni Muslim and they had the multicultural people; that is, they had the '*zimmi*' (protected people) who were the non-Muslim that they had the different religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, these two empires had the Central Asian traditions.

Secondly, their administrative systems were similar to the each other. Their administrative systems were based on two major items. The first one is '*shari'a*' and the second one is '*urf*'. '*Shari'a*' was based on the Sunni Islam and the Hanafi School of Sunni sect in both of two empires. '*Urf*' means the rules which were based on the traditions. These two items were the major parts of the administrative systems and judicial ones. Although there were some differences in their economic systems, there were also some similarities between them. For instance, the '*mansabdari*' system and '*timar*' system can be given as the examples of this statement. [Of course, there were some differences between them although they had based on the similar structure.]

Thirdly, both the Mughal Empire and the Ottoman Empire had the similar characteristics in order to legitimize themselves and to provide their authorities. For example, both of these terms were the most efficient ones in their own region in terms of the history of art because of that the architectural monuments were used as a kind

of media and they showed the power of the sultans and the empires. For example, Akbar Shah had the architectural monuments, showed the Central Asian Mughal characteristics had Persian impact, built up in the different cities at that time.

“His Majesty is the builder of edifices, who by way of clothing his glories and symbolising his greatness, has built excellent buildings at Ajmer, and grand edifices at Fatehabad [Fatehpur] Sikri, and a fort of red stone of excessive strength in the capital city of Agra and one entirely of *pucca* brick in the city of Lahore, and buildings in many cities of India. The designs of these wonderful structures, with novel forms, marvellous engravings and quality of minute details, are such that a much travelled observer would not see in all the seven climes.”<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, the artistically valuable monuments that showed the power of the empire had been built at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I.

India was not a part of the Islamic world for many years. However, Islam had been seen in India since the beginning of the 8<sup>th</sup> century because of the Arab merchants.

Although India was a part of the Islamic world since the beginning of the 8<sup>th</sup> century, there were so limited relations between India and the other countries either western ones or the eastern ones.

Nonetheless, the Mughals enlarged their territories; for example, they controlled over Afghanistan and they became the neighbours of the Safavid Empire and Uzbeks in Central Asia. Although the political relations between the Mughal Empire and Ottoman Empire had been so limited for a long time, there were trade relations among them as it will be explained in the following chapters. Unfortunately, these relations – either trade ones or political ones- had been nearly ignored for many years by the Ottoman historians. It is necessary to look at the Ottoman historiography to know the cause of this last statement.

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<sup>17</sup> Abu'l Fazl in Shireen Moosvi, *Epidodes in the Life of Akbar*, (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2007), p. 78

First of all, it may not be totally right that the perspectives of the scholars can be classified into three major groups which are the Ottomanists, nationalists, and orientalist.

‘Ottomanist historians have almost never generated the paradigms with which they work.’<sup>18</sup>

“In the 1980s, Europeanist historians and historical sociologists began to react against the historiography of the previous twenty years, during which economic and social history had held pride of place, By Bringing the State Back In. Ottomanists in due course also became interested in this historiographical current.”<sup>19</sup>

It is a paradoxical situation because of that the Ottomanist historiography had been mostly the state-centered in all time; nonetheless, the traditional Ottomanist state-centeredness was based on the new Marxist historiography and non-Marxist theories of state formation.<sup>20</sup> The first major problem for the Ottomanists who are interested in the governmental structure from the Marxian point of view is whether the state bureaucracy could operate independently from the society that surrounded itself or not.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, landholding was strictly controlled by the Ottoman government; that is, there was not any ruling class outside of the state so the question had to be reformulated.<sup>22</sup>

The Ottomanist historians who were interested in state formation without the Marxist approach were interested in Charles Tilly.<sup>23</sup>

“Tilly’s ‘national’ state is an organization controlling a multiplicity of cities and regions, and possessing a strong bureaucratic armature with a degree of autonomy from the society governed. It is

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<sup>18</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.

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<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13

thus not coterminous with the nation-state, which Tilly regards as a state whose people share a 'strong religious, linguistic and symbolic identity'.<sup>24</sup>

After collapsing the Ottoman Empire, the new states were found and called as the nation-states and this process led the problematic Ottoman historiography to be occurred.<sup>25</sup>

“On the positive side, historians disillusioned with the nation state model have discovered the advantages of plural societies. For a long time, the limited amount of interaction between different ethno-religious communities, or even just populations sharing the same urban space, was considered an irremediable defect of Ottoman society. But this evaluation has now changed. On the one hand, recent research has shown that intra-urban interaction was often more intensive than had been assumed earlier. More importantly, the willingness with which empires such as the Ottoman down to the eighteenth century accommodated separate and unequal communities had gained respectability.”<sup>26</sup>

Apart from the nationalism, the orientalist approach is also tricky one for the Ottomanist historian. Orientalism has a tendency to define the Islamic world as the 'other' and it does not accept that Middle Eastern societies have a history and dynamics of their own.<sup>27</sup>

Thanks to the debate on world systems theory, the Ottomanist historians are able to enter the historical discussions easily.<sup>28</sup> Also, they have an opportunity to search on the new branches of history with the new perspectives in the light of the pioneer works.

After this Ottoman historiography briefing, it does not wrong to classify the Ottoman scholars worked on the Ottoman-Mughal researching that is the first one (Yusuf Hikmet Bayur) may be defined as 'nationalist' because of that he emphasized on the

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. , p. 13

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. , p. 14

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. , p. 14

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. , p. 15

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. , p. 18

Turkic background of Babur Shah and his empire), and the second one (İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı) may be defined as ‘Ottomanist’.

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur was one of the major important scholars because of that he was the pioneer of Indian studies in Turkey for the first time. Therefore, his biography was also important as much as his works because of that it gives information about his education, life and academic career in order to understand his method and the process of his studies.

On the one hand, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı was another important scholar for the Ottoman Studies. His biography shows that there was not any specific sources about the Ottoman history that could be told in the schools in the young Turkish Republic at that time. Also, it can be seen that the first scholars had spent the great efforts to write history in order to tell to the new generations. As it will be seen on the following pages, Uzunçarşılı had used the archival documents for his studies and they were informative sources on this field as Bayur’s ones about the Mughal Empire.

The works of these two major scholars had been used for this thesis like that Bayur’s sources were used for Mughal Empire and Uzunçarşılı’s ones were used for the Ottoman Empire. It is necessary to say that both of them neither made critics nor compared; they just told.

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur graduated from ‘*Galatasaray Sultanisi*’ [Galatasaray High School] in 1909. Then, he went to Sorbonne University, faculty of science for higher education and he stayed overthere between the years 1909 and 1913. After coming

back to Turkey, he had become a teacher at Galatasaray High School and he gave the lectures until 1920 and then he went to Ankara.<sup>29</sup>

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur was one of the members of Turkish Historical Society and he contributed it to be developed. He met with Atatürk and worked with him. Prof. Bayur believed in that it was necessary to know the Late Ottoman Era in detail in order to understand the young Turkish Republic. Due to the fact that he tried to explain especially Hamidian Era, The Second Constitutional Era and the process until 1918 year by year with the archival documents.<sup>30</sup>

On the other hand, he had joined the Lausanne Conference as a consultant and in the following years, he was a counselor in an embassy in London; then, he became an ambassador in Belgrade two years later. In 1928, he was sent to Afghanistan as an ambassador. During these days, he started to collect the documents about Afghanistan and India.<sup>31</sup> He stayed there for four years; then, came back to Ankara. At this time, his book '*Hindistan Tarihi*' [History of India], consisted of Persian and French sources, was printed. In the following years, he had completed the three volumes of this book.<sup>32</sup>

He is a pioneer historian who worked on the history of India in the 1940s; for the first time, in Turkey. He wrote *Hindistan Tarihi* (History of India) in three volumes that were published in different times. The first volume is the History of India: From Ancient Times to the Establishment of Gurkanlı [Mughal] Government '*Hindistan Tarihi: İlkçağlardan Gurkanlı Devleti'nin Kuruluşuna Kadar 1526*)' published in 1946, the second volume is the History of India. The Golden Age of Gurkanlı

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<sup>29</sup> *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1985), p.35

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2-3

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76

[Mughal] Government (1526-1737) '*Hindistan Tarihi: Gurkanlı Devleti'nin Büyüklük Devri (1526-1737)*' published in 1947 and the last third volume is the History of India: From the Campaign of Nadir Shah Afshar to the Independency and Republican Era (1737- 1949) '*Hindistan Tarihi: Nadir Şah Afşar'ın Akınından Bağımsızlık ve Cumhuriyete Kadar (1737-1949)*' published in 1950.

The major important one of these three volumes is the History of India: The Golden Age of Gurkanlı Government (1526-1737) as one of the secondary sources of this thesis.

The first section of this book is the first period of Gurkanlı Government, the reign of Babur and the reign of Humayun; the second part of it is the rise of Gurkanlı Government, the reign of Akbar, the reign of Jahangir, the reign of Shah Jahan, the reign of Aurangzeb and the third part starts from the death of him and it ends with the campaign of Nadir Shah. The last part of this book is the government, culture and daily life in the Second Delhi Turk Sultanate and he gives information about the administration, external relations, military, education, architecture and miniature.

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur had focused on the Turkic origin of Babur and he claimed that the Gurkanlı Government had been based on Turkic background. Moreover, he said that Babur had defined himself as a Turk and he had been proud of being Turk.<sup>33</sup>

Nevertheless, this claim is so debatable that there was not certain information about it in *Baburnama*, for example. However, Bayur gives some examples about his this claim.

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<sup>33</sup> Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Hindistan Tarihi 2*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1947), p. 2

“Babur Shah had invaded India in 925 (1519) and he told that some cities such as *Behre, Hoşap, Çanap* and *Cenyut* were controlled by the Turks at that time so taking these cities would not have been difficult for him.”<sup>34</sup>

In addition, Bayur gives another example that Babur sent the ambassadors to the Sultan İbrahim Lodi and he said to him that we had thought that the cities where Turks lived belonged to us. Therefore, they had not been destroyed.<sup>35</sup>

Yusuf Hikmet Bayur claims that Babur was proud of being Turk as a result of these examples.

His other claim was also debatable. He argued that the government which was founded by Babur had been named as *Gurkanlı* in contrast to the European definition, the *Mughal*. Because, the dynasty of Timur sons were called as ‘*Gurkani*’ and the name of ‘*Chatai*’ (*Cagatai*) was used to define the people governed by them. Also, it was used for the Turkish people who lived in between the *Seyhun* and *Hindukush*; additionally, it was related to the *Mongols*.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, he argued why Europeans had called this government as the *Mughal Empire* and he said that they named it like that in order not to say ‘*Turk*’.<sup>37</sup>

Nevertheless, this debate was occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. In other words, nobody says ‘*Gurkanlı*’ Government, now. Also, the Indian historians define this empire as the *Mughal Empire*. On the one hand, they do not emphasize on the *Turkic* background of the emperors. Because, the most of the Indians were *Hindu* and the *Hindu* population is the highest one.

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid. , p. 2

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. , p. 3

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. , p. 1

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. , p. 6

In contrast to this, Bayur thought that the name of Mughal was not suitable for defining Babur's government so the '*Gurkanlı Devleti*' (Gurkanlı Government) had to be used.

On the one hand, he had focused on the Central Asiatic tradition and Turkic origin. Moreover, it can be said that he was proud of that the Turks had controlled over India and many parts of Central Asia. Also, it should be reminded that this book was printed in 1947; therefore, his ideas reflect the major tendencies of the youngest Turkish Republic.

Also, he criticised the European historians because of that they were not objective; moreover, he claimed that they did not want to use the name of Turk as.<sup>38</sup>

This book is an informative source that he gives information about the Gurkanlı governments, institutions, events, and Gurkanlı-European relations, or others. Unfortunately, he also says that the Ottoman-Gurkanlı relations were so limited that it is difficult to find an archival document contains the earlier ages before the reign of Shah Jahan. He argues that the relations of Timur and Bayezid could be a reason for this situation.<sup>39</sup>

This source is the most significant one because of that it is not only the pioneer work on this field but also it covers a long timeline.

Additionally, he contributed to the Indology studies in Turkey as a pioneer lecturer. In 1934, he gave the lectures about the history of revolution at Ankara University and he also gave the lectures about History of India at the faculty of language, history and geography [*Dil-Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi*]. One of the first departments of this

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid. , p. 5

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. , p. XXVIII

faculty was Indology. Yusuf Hikmet Bayur had worked very well in order to develop this department.

Apart from Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı who was a scholar worked on the Ottoman History mentions the Central Asia although he had written about it in a small section in his book, *The Ottoman History [Osmanlı Tarihi]*.

Uzunçarşılı was born in Istanbul in 1888. He was graduated from ‘*Mercan İdadisi*’ (Mercan High School) in 1904<sup>40</sup> and he continued to ‘*Dar al-Funun*’ [Istanbul University], the department of literature in 1910.<sup>41</sup> After graduating from the university, he went to Kütahya as a teacher.<sup>42</sup> He stayed here for eight years; then, he was sent to Trabzon as a teacher who would give the lectures of history in 1922.<sup>43</sup>

On the other hand, he gave the lectures at Istanbul University at the department of history.<sup>44</sup>

He was a member of Turkish Historical Society. At that time, it was decided to write history of Turkey by this office and Uzunçarşılı wrote the history of the Ottoman Empire from the beginning through the end of the eighteenth century.<sup>45</sup>

His works were neither the political history nor the chronology of Ottoman history.

Uzunçarşılı had succeeded to tell the history in terms of social, cultural and intellectual aspects. His detailed works such as the ‘*Kapıkulu Ocakları Teşkilatı*’ [Kapıkulu Soldiers Organization], ‘*Osmanlı Saray Teşkilatı*’ [Ottoman Palace Organization], ‘*Osmanlı Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilatı*’ [Ottoman Central and Naval

<sup>40</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’ya Armağan, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), p. XIII

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. , p. XIV

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. , p. XV

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. , p. XVII

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. , p. XVIII

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. , p. XVIII-XIX

Organization], '*Osmanlı İlmiye Teşkilatı* [Ottoman Science Organization] and '*Mekke-i Mükerreme Emirleri*' [Amirs of Makkah].

His book '*Osmanlı Tarihi*' (The Ottoman History) contains some information about the government of Bukhara and Samarkand, the relations between the Ottomans and Uzbek Khans, the relations between the Ottomans and the sultans of India, etc.

There are some common items between the Yusuf Hikmet Bayur's work and Uzunçarşılı's one. First of all, İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı also defines the government, founded by Babur Shah, as the '*Gurkanlı Devleti*'. However, Uzunçarşılı defines like that more general than Bayur's one. Another important common point is that the relations had been limited until the reign of Shah Jahan.

This work is one of the major sources of this thesis in terms of the Ottoman history, Ottoman politics, and external affairs, political, fiscal or social institutions. He starts from the reign of Fatih Sultan Mehmed and continues with the reign of Sultan Bayezid II, Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver and he finishes with Sultan Murad III. Also, the author gives information about the economic, social, and military institutions at the reigns of these sultans.

Uzunçarşılı mentions the Ottoman-Mughal relations in the second part of the third volume of his book, 'Ottoman History' under the title of the relations with some Muslim states. He starts with the Ottoman-Iran relations, Ottoman-Uzbek Khan relations and he tells Shaybani and Cani Dynasties in Samarqand and Bukhara; then, he continues to the Ottoman-Mughal relations. The last title has three main subtitles which are the relations with *Gurkanlı* Government (*Timuriler*) in India, the relations with Shah Jahan and the ambassadorship of the son of Maan, Hüseyin Bey (*Maan-oğlu Hüseyin Bey'in Sefirliği*).

Uzunçarşılı says that the Ottomans had contacted with Bahmanid Kingdom in Deccan, the sultan of Gucerat, and; lastly, Gurkanlı Government since the reign of Fatih Sultan Mehmed. Although this relations had been broken, sometimes; they had been continued as they were renewed from time to time.<sup>46</sup>

Also; at the reign of Bayezid II, the Ottomans had continued to the friendlier relations with both the Bahmanids and Gucerat emperor.<sup>47</sup>

At the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, Bahadur Shah who spent an effort to capture the Mughal throne had wanted both the Ottoman sultan and Portuguese to help himself because he was defeated by Humayun Shah, the son of Babur Shah. Nonetheless, Bahadur Shah had killed by the Portuguese. After that the local governor of Egypt, Hadım Süleyman Pasha and the new emperor in Gucerat had succeeded to protect Dio but Kanuni Sultan Süleyman had not met with Hadım Süleyman Pasha because he killed the amir of Aden. Thus, Süleyman Pasha had been obliged to leave over there because of that he could not take help.<sup>48</sup>

At the reign of Akbar Shah, the secret agent who was sent to India by Hasan Pasha had informed to the Ottomans that Akbar Shah would have attacked with the Portuguese on Yemen ports. On the one hand, Akbar Shah had taken Gucerat which would have been turned into the city; however, he had never gone to Yemen and worked with the Portuguese after that.<sup>49</sup>

Uzunçarşılı continues to the reign of Sultan Murad IV and Shah Jahan. Then, he finishes with the ambassador Hüseyin Bey.

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<sup>46</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi Cilt III*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1977), p. 261

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. , p. 262

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. , p. 263

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. , p. 264

He claims that the Ottomans did not set up political relations with the Mughals because of the long distances among them. However, the Ottomans were opposed to Iran so they were in a friendlier relation with Uzbeks against Iran; therefore, the Mughal Empire, thought that the rising of Uzbeks would have probably been a threat for the Mughals so they had been opposed to the Ottomans. Also, the letter which was sent to Abdullah Han by Akbar Shah is an evidence of this situation.<sup>50</sup>

Actually, the subject of Ottoman-Indian relations was just a little part in his book.

Another main significant scholar is Halil İnalçık who studies on the Ottoman history. He gives information and makes critics. For example; Uzunçarşılı tells the events and institutions unlike Halil İnalçık focuses on the reasons and results. Although both of them are scholars of the same field, each of them has the different approaches. Additionally, İnalçık's works were also used in many times for this thesis.

Halil İnalçık was born in Istanbul in 1916. His family migrated from Crimea to Istanbul; then, they moved to Ankara. He completed his early education in Ankara and he was graduated from '*Necatibey Muallim Mektebi*' [School of Teaching of Necatibey] in Balıkesir. After that he continued to his education at Ankara University. He became a student at the department of history at the faculty of language, history and geography. He was affected by his instructor Fuad Köprülü. After graduating from university in 1940, he had become an assistant at the same department.<sup>51</sup> In 1943, he had taken the title of associate professor with his thesis "*Viyana'dan Büyük Ricat'e Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Kırım Hanlığı*". In 1947, he had been chosen as a

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid. , p. 268

<sup>51</sup>Selim Aslantaş, "Halil İnalçık'ın Akademik Bibliyografyası" in *Halil İnalçık Armağanı-I Edited by Taşkın Taşı, Suna Aksoy*, (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2009), p.12

member in Turkish History Society.<sup>52</sup> In 1972, he had been retired from Ankara University.<sup>53</sup>

In 1972, he was invited as a guest professor from the University of Chicago and he had given the lectures until 1986.

In 1973, he published his work “The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson) that would have been one of the fundamental works for the Ottoman history.<sup>54</sup>

Here, it is necessary to mention his approach to history. Although İnalcık accepts the concepts of ‘*total history*’ and ‘*longue duree*’ in terms of the methodological aspect, he claims that these concepts cannot truly be adopted into the Ottoman history. Therefore, he avoids any generalization and general explanation.<sup>55</sup>

Halil İnalcık claims that the sociological concepts and generalizations led us to think that we solve the historical problems via specific formulas. Thinking that the big problems of the Ottoman history were solved with some sociological generalizations without having the necessary requirements and information to search the original sources has become a fashion. Our discipline is not to make any timeless and spaceless generalizations; it is to search the events within the concepts of time and place.<sup>56</sup>

It can be said that İnalcık was affected by the school of Annales when he was in Paris where he met with Fernand Braudel. For instance, Fernand Braudel says that the European history could not be written without the Ottoman history. Because, the

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. , p. 12

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. , p. 14

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. , p. 14-15

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. , p. 18-19

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. , p. 19

Ottoman Empire which had controlled over the eastern Mediterranean, had some similar points to the west in terms of the social, economic and demographical aspects. There was a parallelism between the Ottomans and Europe. Therefore, it is wrong to think that the Ottoman Empire was an abnormal structure that was against Europe and outside of it. On the other hand, Fernand Braudel asked some questions about the Ottoman history but he could not be answered. Fortunately, each of these questions led the historians to search on the new fields of history.<sup>57</sup>

Similar to Braudel, Halil İnalçık has also spent an effort to put the Ottoman history into the world history.

The works of İnalçık can be divided into the four major categories which are the methodological writings, political history, social and economic history. For example, he mentions the school of Annales and the impact of it on the Ottoman history in his article with the title off “*The Rise of Ottoman Historiography*”, *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. P. Holt- B. Lewis, London, 1962, s. 152-167<sup>58</sup> and he criticized the two basic paradigms about the establishment of Ottoman Empire; that is, he improved a new different way. He showed that the stories or information about the establishment of Ottoman Empire and Osman Gazi were composed of two divisions. The first one was based on the chronological sources which were consisted in the 14<sup>th</sup> century and the second one was based on the late Ottoman historians’ writings.<sup>59</sup>

Also, he searched on Bursa kadi sicills and he researched on the city life in Bursa.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid. , p. 18

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. , p. 19

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. , p. 20

Halil İnalcık has worked on the different fields of Ottoman history like that and he has spent an effort to understand truly and clearly the Ottoman history and historiography within the world history context.

According to İnalcık, history should be evaluated as a complete structure.

Unless the comparative history would show the total frame and it provided the readers to know what happened and what it was in real at that time, the comparisons were not necessary but if the comparative history was made correctly, it was useful.

There is the best example on the comparative history studies which was made correctly as İnalcık's defined in the previous sentence.

This work is the book of the '*Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*' written by Stephen F. Dale.

The author gives the panorama in India, Iran and Anatolia from the tenth century to the sixteenth one; then, he continues with the rise of Muslim empires and the legitimacy of monarchs and the institutions of empires and he gives information about the economy and imperial cultures.

These three governments has been compared and contrasted in this book.

The author has compared the three emperors: The Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II, Shah Abbas I and the Mughal Akbar. He criticised their impacts of personality on the empire, their conditions, their backgrounds, etc. He finishes with the end of these empires and he concludes the events after they had been collapsed in the last part. He starts form the tenth century and he finishes in the 1920s.

Dale's this work is highly similar to this thesis in terms of the comparative perspective but the timeline of this study is different from his book and this thesis will be focused on the Ottoman-Mughal comparisons, only.

There is another source which is similar to this work. Its name is '*Tarikh-i Elfi*' written by Qadī Ahmad Tetevi and Isfahan Qazvini. The timeline of this book contains the years of 850 (1447) and 984 (1577). It has four copies in the different place like Tehran University Central Library, Astan Kuddus Rızvi Library, Meclis Library and Elhayat Library. This source tells Iran, India and Ottoman Empire year by year. In other words, it starts to mention Iran under the Timurid rule and finishes to tell Shah Ismail II. It tells the reign of Babur Shah, Humayun Shah and Akbar Shah and it consisted of information about the Ottoman sultans from the beginning of Sultan Murad II until Sultan Murad III. Maybe, this work can be accepted as the earlier example of comparative history although it is debatable. This source does not criticize, it just tells three of them.

Here, it is necessary to look at the Mughal historiography in order to understand the historiographical studies about these two empires because the methodology of these historiographical works is the bone structure of this thesis.

“By the middle years of the eighteenth century, when the English East India Company began its conquest of eastern India, its administrators had to contend with a veritable Mughal library made up not only of histories and books of advice to princes, but literature on a vast variety of other subjects- from norms of comportment, literature, and prosody to astrology, cuisine, and the management of agrarian resources- all of which formed part of the potential curriculum for the novice administrator.”<sup>60</sup>

*A'in-i Akbari* of Abu'l Fazl, the *Gulshan-i Ibrahimi* of Muhammad Quasim 'Firishta', and the *Insha'-i Harkaran* were translated into English in these years.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Writing the Mughal World*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 2

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

“Historians of other parts of the Islamic world working at the turn of the twentieth century, or even later, on political narrative or agrarian-fiscal history, whether themselves administrator-scholars or not, would surely have recognized themselves in some of what they did; one may think of the work of Ann Lambton on Iran or Ömer Lütüfi Barkan in the Ottoman Empire.”<sup>62</sup>

In the first half of the twentieth century, Jadunath Sarkar (1870-1958) who was born into a *zamindar* family in eastern Bengal, and educated almost exclusively in Calcutta was noted for being something of a cultural nationalist and he also famously complained that “*India cannot afford to remain an intellectual pariah, beggar for crumbs at the doors of Oxford or Cambridge, Paris or Vienna.*”<sup>63</sup>

The major approaches on the Mughal historiography can be classified into two major categories which are the Muslim and Hindu communalists and liberal nationalists.

“The views of the Hindu Communalist historians, such as Jadunath Sarkar and others, by and large, subscribed to the view that Akbar’s principle of political toleration was the foundation of the empire and Aurangzeb’s abandonment of toleration brought the empire down.”<sup>64</sup>

“In the South Asian context, however, a struggle played itself out between the different tendencies. A simplistic reading of the struggle would view it as a binary one between a ‘communalist’ and ‘secular’ historiography, the former committed to reading the Mughal period in terms of the logic of its religious and ideational conflicts and the latter seeking more materialist and universal schemes of explanation. On this view, there would also be an implicit complicity between Hindu and Muslim communalist readings, the former located for example in the multi-volume *History and Culture of the Indian People* edited by K. M. Munshi and R. C. Majumdar, and the latter in various works produced in Pakistan by authors such as I. H. Qureshi (1903-81). However, a closer inspection of the record reveals a far more complex picture.”<sup>65</sup>

The liberal-nationalist tradition contains the first generation of post-1950 historians, like S. Nurul Hasan and Satish Chandra. Saiyid Nurul Hasan (1921-93), had played a significant role as to give a new perspective to history writing in India, especially

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. , p. 10

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. , p. 10

<sup>64</sup> Salma Ahmed Farooqui, *Islam and the Mughal State*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005), p. 36

<sup>65</sup> Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Writing the Mughal World*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2012), p. 12

before, and after Independence.<sup>66</sup> “His vision of history was shaped by the ‘nationalist’

Allahabad school of history writing, Marxism to which he was attracted during his student days, and his family traditions.”<sup>67</sup>

“Hasan and Chandra continued even in their later writings to owe much to it (whatever their ostensible allegiance to Marxism). Thus, Satish Chandra’s early work was marked by its critique of Sarkar’s ‘representation of Aurangzeb as a religious fanatic and [his] view that in a truly Islamic state religious tolerance was an impossibility’, while Nurul Hasan consistently insisted on the existence of a complex view of rural middling groups- what he termed ‘primary’ and ‘intermediary’ zamindars- rather than a simple opposition between an incubus like state and an impoverished peasantry.”<sup>68</sup>

The other liberal-nationalist man is Muhammad Habib whose interpretations of Indian and Islamic history bear the mark of a succession of intellectual influences upon him as Simon Digby says.<sup>69</sup> However, his works had gained the Marxist tendency step by step from the early 1950s.<sup>70</sup>

It is necessary to say that the Aligarh Muslim University which had the liberal-nationalist approach had played a great role when the Mughal studies had been shaped, especially in the late 1950s; moreover, this tendency is continued by a member of next generation.<sup>71</sup>

“This was Irfan Habib’s *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (1963), initially submitted as a D. Phil. Thesis to Oxford University. This work was immediately received with acclaim, though some discordant notes may also be found in reviews, such as two by the Karachi-based historian and Aligarh alumnus Riazul Islam (1919-2007), published in the same year (to which we shall return below). In a glowing review, Tapan Raychaudhuri, who had earlier written on the history of the Mughals in Bengal, declared: ‘Once in a very long while something happens to stir the shallow, turbid and yet extensive waters of Indian historiography. The publication of

<sup>66</sup> Satish Chandra, ‘Introduction’ in *Religion, State, and Society in Medieval India* Edited by Satish Chandra, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 1

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. , p. 1

<sup>68</sup> Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *Writing the Mughal World*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 13-14

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. , p. 14-15

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. , p. 15

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. , p. 15

Irfan Habib's *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* is generally recognized-even in the most unlikely quarters-as one of these rare occasions."<sup>72</sup>

After that, Iqtidar Alam Khan, M. Athar Ali and Shiren Moosvi added to the work of Irfan Habib, while the production of a separate mimeographed 'Aligarh volume' dominated by the perspective of Irfan Habib was seen each years' *Indian History Congress*, now.<sup>73</sup>

In briefly, historians have seperated the Mughal era into three categories which are the colonial era, the postcolonial one, and the quasi-Marxist Aligarh School and they have defined the empire as a highly centralized bureaucratic despotism with a greedy Leviathan [with an] unlimited appetite for resources, as Streussand says.<sup>74</sup>

"In perhaps the most definitive statement of that position in an article addressing its critics, M. Athar Ali states, "The picture of the Mughal Empire in its classic phase, as a centralized polity, geared to systematization and the creation of an all imperial bureaucracy... still remain[s] unshaken. Steven Blake developed the concept of the Mughal Empire as a "patrimonial- bureaucratic state", occupying a middle ground between traditional patrimonial monarchies, ruled essentially as family possessions and modern bureaucracies. J. F. Richards supports this position in the most important book on the Mughals, his volume of the New Cambridge History of India. All of these conceptions focus on the central government and, to a lesser degree, the imperial ideology of the Mughals. Farhat Hasan, Douglas E. Streussand, and others, looking to the provinces as well as the centre, come to different conclusions."<sup>75</sup>

In the light of this information, it can be clearly said that the Mughal historiography has been improved with these different approaches and it will be continued to be developed and this development will have been reinforced to the readers and researchers.

Also, it is necessary to define the timeline of this project. Firstly, both of the Mughal Empire and Ottoman Empire were risen up at the reigns of these two emperors, the Mughal Akbar and the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman I, and their reigns were the most significant ages because they provided their empires to be institutionalized; in other

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. , p. 15-16

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. , p. 18

<sup>74</sup> Douglas E. Streussand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottoman, Safavids, and Mughals*, (Philedelphia: Westview Press, 2011), pp.205-206

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. , p. 205-206

words, they had improved the bureaucracy in their countries in parallel to the enlargements of their territories and the new necessities.

The major sources of this thesis can be divided into two main groups which are the sources written by chroniclers and the other ones written by scholars. Here, it is necessary to clarify that Baburnama written by Babur Shah and Humayunnama written by Gulbadan Begam can be defined as the Mughal chronicles' works. Also, the third one which is the most important work of the chronicles of the Mughal Empire, Abu'l Fazl wrote '*Akbarnama*'. *It is the history of the reign of Akbar Shah and it was translated into English. Nonetheless, "Abu'l Fazl's account of the Ottoman dynasty is inaccurate. This probably indicates the chronicler's lack of interest in the Ottoman affairs."*<sup>76</sup>

Unlike to Akbarnama [Akbar Shah had commanded Abu'l Fazl to write this book], there was not the similar works in the Ottoman Empire. Of course, there were many '*Süleymannames*' written by the different authors at that time but Sultan Süleyman did not command to be written a book like Akbar Shah but there are many sources tell his reign. For example, Mühimme registers in BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) are the oldest sources made up of the documents of the dispatches from the Ottoman sultans, Sheikh al-Islam or the Grand Vizier to provincial, military, and religious officials in all over the empire.

On the other hand, both the Indian scholars and Ottoman ones' works are so helpful for this thesis that they provided me to improve this study chapter by chapter.

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<sup>76</sup>Naimur Rahman Farooqui, "Mughal-Ottoman Relations A Study Of Political And Diplomatic Relations Between Mughal India And The Ottoman Empire: 1556-1748" (Ph. D. diss. University of Wisconsin, 1986), p.10

This thesis separated into the four main chapters. The first one discusses the aim of this thesis and the pioneer works on this field. The second one explains the backgrounds of these two empires and the signs of the imperial power. The third chapter tells the aristocracy and nobility, political organization, and relations among them. The fourth one mentions the political institutions such as administrative, fiscal, military, and judicial ones. Finally, the last one summarizes all of them in the light of these informations and it concludes as to find the answers to some questions like what this comparison contributes to the readers and historical studies and what the aim of this project is.

It is necessary to say that some libraries which are ISAM, IRSICA, Boğaziçi University, İstanbul Bilgi University and Middle East Technical University, provided so many sources for this project.

At the end of this work, I hope that this project will become an example among the comparative historical studies and these comparisons will contribute to these two empires to be known very well as to underline the differences and similarities among them.

## CHAPTER II

### ESTABLISHING OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

#### From the Frontier Principality to the Empire

Before the establishing of the Ottoman Empire, there were many principalities in Anatolia and the Eastern Roman Empire had continued to survive at the west side of Anatolia and the little part of the Balkans at that time.

“In the Ottoman Empire, the first phase- in which the ruler relied primarily on nomadic tribal elites- is to be seen in the Ottoman beylik (late thirteenth century on 1396) and early sultanate (1396 to mid-fifteenth century), a recently past-nomadic Turkish polity of the steppe type. The bey’s authority was based primarily on Turkish groups, although the military success of Osman (1280-1324) and his son Orhan (1324-1359) attracted adventurers from other Anatolian cultural strata, including agrarian elements from the Byzantine Empire.”<sup>77</sup>

In other words, “in the early fourteenth century violent internal crises were shaking the great empires situated between the Golden Horde in the Eastern Europe and the Byzantine Empire in the Balkans and western Anatolia. By the end of the same century, the descendants of Osman, a frontier gazi and founder of the Ottoman Dynasty, had established an empire stretching from the Danube to the Euphrates. The ruler of this empire was Bayezid I (1389-1402), known as Yıldırım, the Thunder-bolt. At Nicopolis in 1326 he had routed a crusader army of Europe’s proudest knights; he had defied the Mamluk sultanate, at that time the most powerful Islamic state, and captured its cities on the Euphrates. Finally, he challenged the great Timur, the new ruler of central Asia and Iran.”<sup>78</sup>

Nevertheless to say that there is an important question that how Osman Gazi combined all the principalities and he fought against the Christian Eastern Roman Empire and indirectly to the Christian world. Before giving an answer to this question, it is necessary to say that Osman Gazi was a legendary figure, especially in the first writings and the chroniclers who wrote the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire told him like a super hero and they told his period like a fairy tale. To be a fair, the unification and development of the Ottoman government can be dated on the reign of Sultan Orhan. One of the possible answers to these questions is

<sup>77</sup> Joseph Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia Edited by Beatrice Manz*, (Hampshire: Variorum, 1995), p. 243

<sup>78</sup> Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire Classical Age 1300-1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 5

that the Mongol invasions were the most important factor for this unification at the 1220s.

Here, it is necessary to explain the Ottoman-Mughal relations. Also, it is necessary to discuss the Mongols in the Ottoman historiography although the Ottoman chroniclers hardly ever talked about the Mongols. This is an interesting and a partly understandable point.

When Osman Bey started to attack Byzantine Bithynia (in northwestern Anatolia, to the east of the Marmara Sea) around 1300, Ilkhans established in Azerbaijan by Genghis Khan's grandson Hulagu who conquered Baghdad in 1258 and caused the Abbasid Caliphate to an end, had controlled over most of Anatolia.<sup>79</sup>

Nevertheless, most the Ottoman historical sources did not mention the Mongols or they identified them just as the troublemakers in Anatolia.<sup>80</sup> On the one hand, the Ottomans has casted "into a relationships of vassalage with the Anatolian Seljuks when they became vassals of the Ilkhans before gradually disappearing from the political scene altogether."<sup>81</sup>

Baki Tezcan argues that "some of the earliest Ottoman historical narratives reflect a different way of imaging the Mongols."<sup>82</sup>

"According to this alternative historical construction, the Mongols were the cousins of the Ottomans and the Ottomans did not need the blessing of the Seljuks to establish political rule in Anatolia. This particular depiction of the relationships among the Mongols, the Ottomans, and the Seljuks was

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<sup>79</sup> Baki Tezcan, "The Memory of the Mongols in Early Ottoman Historiography" in *Writing at the Ottoman Court: Editing the Past, Fashioning the Future* Edited by H. Erdem Çıpa and Emine Fetvacı, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), p.23

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. , p. 23

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. , p. 23

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. , p. 23

forgotten in the fifteenth century, the early years of which witnessed the last remnants of Mongol power in Anatolia leaving the land.”<sup>83</sup>

The Ottomans had identified themselves as the noble Turcomans; additionally, the close relationship between the Ottomans and Mongols in the fourteenth century was forgotten in the fifteenth century.<sup>84</sup> Moreover, the Ottomans had started to be the protectors and supporters of Sunni Islam in the sixteenth century and in the early twentieth century, the origin and genealogy of the Ottomans had been tried to be discussed but some alternative ideas like Zeki Velidi Togan who said that the Ottoman genealogy was probably based on the Mongol origin, were ignored by a builder of nationalist school of historiography for the young Turkish Republic.<sup>85</sup>

Although the Mongolian origin had been rejected by some scholars, there was an alternative source that supported this extraordinary idea.

Aşıkpaşazade demonstrated that “most Ottoman chronicles produced in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries display a conscious effort to distance the Ottomans from the Mongols and connect them with the Seljuks.”<sup>86</sup>

“It is important to underline the singular nature of the story, which suggests that this particular genesis story in Aşıkpaşazade probably circulated during the time of Orhan, Osman’s son and the second ruler of the Ottoman dynasty. Aşıkpaşazade identifies are of his sources as a chronicle by Yahşi Fakih, the son of Ishak Fakih, who, in turn, was the imam of Orhan. Whereas some scholars thought that Yahşi Fakih’s chronicle must be the source of those parts of the text of Aşıkpaşazade that were shared by other early Ottoman historical works, such as the corpus of texts known as the “anonymous chronicles”, Victor Menage demonstrated that Yahşi Fakih’s chronicle should be sought in those passages of Aşıkpaşazade that “have no counterpart in the ‘Anonymous chronicles.’ Thus, if Aşıkpaşazade’s genesis story is indeed unique, it could well be ascribed to Yahşi Fakih, who must have reflected the sensibilities of Orhan’s reign when his father was the imam of Orhan, who was counted among the frontier vassals of the Mongols. That is not to say, however, that all Mongols mentioned by Aşıkpaşazade are friendly. Yet when Mongols are mentioned negatively, there is always a reason why they deserve reproach, as in the case of the “Çavdar” Mongols, who attack

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid. , p. 23

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. , p. 29

Ottoman territory only to be defeated by Orhan (yet Osman makes a truce with them), and treacherous Mongols, who join Timur's forces during the Battle of Ankara."<sup>87</sup>

The major important cause why the early Ottoman chroniclers did not mention the Mongols is the Mongolian massacres in Anatolia. Thus, the Ottomans had seemed to relate to the Seljukids.

Besides, the Mongol invasions caused the Turcomans, the nomadic Turkish tribes to migrate. At that time, they firstly moved from the central Asia to Iran and they removed to the eastern Anatolia as focusing on the frontier between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Seljukids.

As Halil İnalçık says that the frontier region became a place of refuge for troops and political figures fleeing the Mongol government and, at the same time, a place where many destitute villagers and townsmen sought a new life and future. As a result, the population of the frontier districts against the Eastern Roman Empire was increased day by day and it was subjected to be sieged frequently. Therefore, the numbers of warriors that were gathered around gazi leaders of various origins were also increased.<sup>88</sup>

It can be said that the major important point of the foundation and development of the Ottoman State was *'the idea of gaza', 'Holy War'*. Also, the huge parts of the incomes of these principalities were provided from these holy wars. Therefore, these wars had been so desirable that all the independent principalities founded by the Turcoman tribes in the western Anatolia were willingly participated in them because of that they could have gained the incomes and the great prestigious. It should be reminded that by the end of the thirteenth century the Turcoman gazis in the western Anatolia had spent the efforts to a general invasion.

"Insofar as the gaza ethos played a role, it must be remembered that the Ottomans were not only ones who could claim to be fighting in the path of God. A similar point can be made about "tribalism" or any other notion, concept, ethos, principle, ideology, or institution that one can neither show nor logically expect to be uniquely Ottoman. In other words, the investigation of the rise of Ottoman power must always proceed comparatively."<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid. , p. 29

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. , p. 6

<sup>89</sup> Cemal Kafadar, *Between the Two Worlds*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1995), p.119

In addition to the Ottomans' idea of gaza and tribal structure, Osman Gazi's fame had been widespread among the other tribes in Anatolia and this fame had made him to be a charismatic leader.

Osman Gazi who was the founder of the government enlarged the territory of the government to the north, the nearest to the Eastern Roman Empire closely and to the Balkans. However, the certain date of the foundation of the state was dated in 1301 formally. The date of 1301 was the date of the siege of Nicea (İznik) where the previous Byzantine capital. The mercenary army of the Byzantine emperor was defeated at Baphaeon in 1301 and the fame of Osman Gazi was spread and this victory impressed all the principalities, especially the frontier ones that they had given a name as '*Osmanlis*' to themselves after that. In addition, this victory provided to the other principalities from the various origins to be participate into the other wars with this famous gazi. Therefore, it can be said that the Ottoman principality was certainly founded after this siege.<sup>90</sup>

“During the reign of Orhan Bey, the Ottomans attained the reputation of being the vanguard of the gaza. The old Karesi lands extending around the Bay of Edremit as far as the Sea of Marmara were at last a frontier Ottoman region, the administration of which was given to Prince Süleyman. Furthermore, the marriage in 1346 of Orhan Bey to the daughter of Cantacuzenus who had pretensions to the Byzantine throne, and Orhan's alliance with Cantacuzenus facilitated the crossing to Gallipoli. At the same time this new development brought about widespread Ottoman-Byzantine cooperation. In the start run it constituted the beginning of the process of permanent Ottoman settlement in Rumelia. Indeed, as a result of all of this, Ottoman forces gained the opportunity to get to know the Gallipoli Peninsula and Thrace quite well.”<sup>91</sup>

Sultan Murad I had the victories in the Balkans and Anatolia.

“The regions of Thrace, Macedonia and north eastern Bulgaria became a base for conquest and were subject to the colonization of Anatolian Turks. While dense Turkish settlement was taking place in these parts, the islamification of Bosnia and Albania would provide for a secure Ottoman presence in the Balkans. This secure presence was even able to weather the

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid. , p. 6

<sup>91</sup> Feridun Emecen, “From the Founding to Küçük Kaynarca” in *History of the Ottoman State, Society, Civilization Edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2001), PP. 10-11

major crisis which hit Anatolia in 1402, and would also play an important role in the future advance of the Ottomans to Buda.”<sup>92</sup>

This Ottoman frontier principality had started to be turned into the government [may be it can be called as the ‘frontier government’ until the reign of the Sultan Bayezid the Thunderbolt.]. Due to the fact that he was captured by Timur at Ankara war in 1402, the Ottoman princes had fought with each other to take the throne. Therefore, the Ottoman Interregnum, called as ‘*Fetret Devri*’, and had been started in 1402. Prince Mehmed I had defeated Prince Isa who was killed by Prince Süleyman in 1403. In 1404, Süleyman had controlled both Anatolia and Rumeli but in 1409, he was obliged to fight against his brother Prince Musa; however, Prince Süleyman was executed. After that Prince Mehmed and Musa appeared on the scene as the major actors of war of throne. In 1413, two armies which were Prince Musa’s army with his Wallachian support and Prince Mehmed’s one with men from the emirate of Dulkadir in south-east Anatolia and Prince Musa was killed by one of Mehmed’s commanders.<sup>93</sup> The Ottoman Interregnum was ended up by the Sultan Mehmed I in 1413.

After that some of Balkan lands had been conquered by the Ottomans at the reign of Sultan Murad II. On the other hand, his son, Sultan Mehmed II had conquered Constantinople then he declared his well known kanunname known as ‘*Fatih Kanunnamesi*’ in order to regulate political affairs and daily life.

“One of Mehmet’s significant acts that had long-term implications for the empire and the modern Middle East was his continuation of the earlier Muslim practice of recognizing the integrity of non-Muslim subject communities and granting capitulatory privileges to foreigners- in his case, Genoese merchants. Immediately following the conquest Mehmet issued an *ahd-name* or “imperial covenant”, in which he guaranteed the autonomy and commercial privileges

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid. , p. 15

<sup>93</sup> Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 31-33

of foreign, non-Muslim merchant settlements as well as the safety and autonomy of indigenous, non-Muslim populations and the commercial privileges of the merchants.”<sup>94</sup>

It can be said that he was aware of that the military victories were not enough to live in peace. The laws regulated the social and political lives were also necessary.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman sultans had been interested in the military victories rather than the political affairs at the establishing period. This situation may probably have two major causes that the Ottoman Empire was a frontier principality; based on the holy war culture, therefore; the wars were more important than the diplomatic relations and the military superiority was enough to win the wars until the sixteenth century. However, the diplomatic relations had been gained more significance at that time because of that the political balance in the world had been changed; thus, the political institutionalization had been improved the importance in order to make up of the diplomatic affairs and this institutionalization period had started at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I in the Ottoman Empire as it will be mentioned in the next chapters.

### The Panorama of the Sultan Süleyman I

Sultan Süleyman was born in 1494 and he ascended to the throne in 1520 when he was twenty-six years old. He was well-educated man.

Süleyman studied reading, writing, arithmetic and music. In addition, he learned archery. When he was eleven years old, he left from harem and his mother and he started to live in his single room, called as ‘*daire*’. Also, the servants were sent to him and he started to take a sum of money. Additionally, he improved his skills intellectually; for example, he read ‘*Kırk Haramiler*’ (The Forty Thieves), The

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<sup>94</sup> Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 84

Adventures of Captain Sinbad, The Arabian Nights and *Kelile and Dimne*. Moreover, he learned Arabic and Persian.<sup>95</sup>

When he was fifteen years old, his grandfather Bayezid sent him to Şebinkarahisar as a '*sancak beyi*', a governor of the province. However, Ahmet who was accepted as a successor of the emperor and was the son of Bayezid wanted him to be sent to the other town because Karahisar was closed to Amasya, the town of Ahmet. Therefore, Süleyman would be sent to Bolu; nevertheless, Ahmet rejected this decision again.

Due to the fact that Bolu was in between Amasya and İstanbul so it means that when Ahmet had gone to İstanbul from Amasya, Süleyman could not have given permission to him to go to İstanbul. Thus, Süleyman was sent to Kefe in Crimea in 1509 and he stayed there for three years.<sup>96</sup>

When Süleyman was seventeen years old, his father Selim was sent him to İstanbul as a kind of the district governor; then, he was sent to Manisa as a '*sanjak beyi*' and he stayed here until he came to the throne.<sup>97</sup>

When he came to the throne, he had not only the wealthy government but also the external problems like Iranian conflict as the heritages.

After the age of Sultan Mehmed II, the Ottoman principality had started to transform into the empire. On the other hand, there were so many developments on the judicial, economic, administrative, educational and social aspects through the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century. This progress, started with the Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror, had been risen up and completed at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. He was also important for the European politics as much as the internal improvements.

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<sup>95</sup> André Clot, *Muhteşem Süleyman Translated by Turhan Ilgaz*, (İstanbul: Epsilon, 2005), p. 34

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. , p. 34

<sup>97</sup> Ibid. , p. 35

Since his grand-grandfather Mehmed II, called as “Mehmed the Conqueror”, died in 1481 and “*his patrimony on the western and northern fronts has been consolidated, but the main expansion had come in the east and the south.*”<sup>98</sup> As Metin Kunt says that at the turn of the sixteenth century the Safavi Sufi brotherhood of Azerbaijan had taken the final step in its politicization, and their dynasty of sheikhs had become shahs, supplanting the Akkoyunlu Empire in eastern Anatolia and western Iran.

When Suleyman’s grandfather Bayezid II had come to throne, he defeated this Safavid domains by suppressing Safavi sympathizers among the sultan’s subjects, often removing them forcibly from their ancestral Anatolian postures to resettle them across the Aegean in the Morea and elsewhere in Rumeli.

After Bayezid II, Suleyman’s father Selim I ascended to the throne in 1512 and his first action were to move to the Safavids with his army. In 1514, he defeated the Safavid army and this situation led the charisma of Shah Ismail to be damaged in Çaldıran War at Çaldıran, near to the Lake Van.

When Sultan Süleyman I ascended to the throne, Emperor Charles V of Habsburg was the major power in Europe and the Safavid Shah Ismail was the major power in Iran. Also, Sultan Süleyman preferred to march on the west rather than going to the east. There were two possible causes of opting for going through to the west. First of all, there was not a main significant power in Europe although there was a powerful one like Habsburgs. In other words, Europe had not been united at that time.

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<sup>98</sup>Metin Kunt, “Towards Süleyman’s World Empire” in *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age* Edited by Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, (London and New York: Longman, 1995), p. 22

“In 1520 Süleyman ascended to the throne and decided to launch a general assault on Hungary (and the West). Just a few years, the Ottoman army had occupied all the main fortress of the southern defence zone, including Belgrade (1521), the key to the whole system.”<sup>99</sup>

Hungary, especially Belgrade, had become so strategically important place for the Ottomans that they could have attacked on Europe easily because of the district governors (sanjakbeys).

“The defeat at Mohacs opened up a new era in the history of Hungary. The country lost not only its ruler, but almost the whole of its southern defence system, including both the network of border fortresses and the neighbouring parts supporting them with their field troops. All this resulted in the establishment of Ottoman rule in Hungary, the coronations of John Szapolyai I (1526-1540) and Ferdinand I (1526-1564) as kings of Hungary, and the division of the country into three parts. Though the sovereignty and independence of the country did not entirely disappear in the following centuries, its territory became the battleground of two great powers, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empire. In 1526, however, the question was whether Hungary would be able to organize a new defence system or whether it would share the fate of what had been its vassal states in the Balkans. And if the country was to succeed, in which part of it, in what framework, and under whose leadership would the new defence system come into being.”<sup>100</sup>

The movement of Ottoman army in Hungary was exactly arduous. Many large rivers surrounded them. Therefore the conquest of Vienna [that it had been turned into the frightfully frustration for the Ottomans] in 1529 meant the logistical difficulties because of heavy rains and floods so the Sultan’s forces to reach Buda from Istanbul could move nearly in four months. On the other hand, the Ottoman supply-line was very long and the Ottoman soldiers were so exhausted.<sup>101</sup>

Also, it is necessary to remind that although the Austrian Habsburgs were not so powerful but they were supported by the Spanish Habsburgs because of that there were familial relations among them. On the one hand; at that time, Spain had an impact both on the Philippines and America because silver had been getting from

<sup>99</sup> Géza David and Pal Fodor, “Introduction” in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe* Edited by Géza David and Pal Fodor, (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2000), p. XV

<sup>100</sup> Géza Pálffy, “The Hungarian-Habsburg Border Defence System” in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe* Edited by Géza David and Pal Fodor, (Leiden, Boston, and Köln: Brill, 2000), p. 16

<sup>101</sup> Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream*, (London: John Murray, 2005), p. 124-125

these areas into Spain so she was one of the major power in Europe. Moreover, due to the fact that Spain helped to the Austrian Habsburgs when Vienna had been sieged by the Ottomans, they had been faced to face with the terrible frustration. Also, the European princes had preferred to pay the taxes to the Habsburgs rather than the Ottomans who would probably capture their lands after the conquest of Vienna.

On the other hand, there were so wealthy agricultural lands between the middle and west Europe that Habsburgs had enough money to improve the army and secure themselves.

“The Habsburgs improved in the course of the fights of subsequent decades, and in the second half of the sixteenth century it was they who took up the initiative by introducing elements of so-called ‘military revolution’ to the Hungarian theatre of war. By the end of the century the Habsburgs had surpassed the Ottomans in the application of the new fortification techniques and the mass use of hand firearms. Moreover, the Habsburgs also undertook the modernisation of their military administration. Together with other improvements, these innovations were enough to equal out the numerical and logistical superiority of the adversary and to prevent further Ottoman expansion in Central Europe. Habsburg modernisation attempts also had a substantial effect on the Ottomans, who recognised the necessity of equipping their soldiers with small arms and of increasing the relative size of the infantry within the army. Thus, the Hungarian front may be regarded as one of the main areas of military acculturation and transfer in the period. In addition to direct military engagement and the taking of booty, an important role in this process was also played by smuggling.”<sup>102</sup>

The second important cause of the Ottomans’ interests in the west was that Shi’i Iran was the potential threat for the Ottoman Empire because there was a huge amount of Alevi population in the different parts of the Ottoman Empire consisting of Anatolia and Mesopotamia.

In briefly, one of the major aims of the Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent was to cope with this conflict. Here, it is necessary to say that he had partly succeeded with his policy because of that he captured the Safavid centers such as Mosul, Baghdad and Basra. Nevertheless, this competition had never been come to an end.

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<sup>102</sup> Géza David and Pal Fodor, “Introduction” in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe* Edited by Géza David and Pal Fodor, (Leiden, Boston and Köln: Brill, 2000), p. XVIII

Kanuni Sultan Süleyman had been interested in not only military or political affairs but also the social and daily life as he had commanded the various rules on the social, economic, political and administrative aspects in order to regulate not only political or military affairs but also daily life as it will be explained in the following chapters.

It is necessary to say that Kanuni's orders display the Ottoman institutionalization at his reign. Nevertheless to say that the institutionalization process had been started at the reign of Sultan Mehmed II especially after the conquest of Constantinople as to build a New Palace (*Saray-i Cedid-i Amire or Yeni Saray*) known as the Topkapı today in Istanbul. On the one hand, this New Palace meant to make of an imperial image that brought new institutions.

“The palatial complex gradually evolved into a processional sequence of three successive courts with three main gates, fronted by a walled hanging garden, and surrounded by an outer garden with kiosks contained in a castellated enclosure. The first two courts were reserved for the public services of the sultan's household, which regulated his relations with the outer world through governmental service buildings, offices, and an elaborate public ceremonial. The third court, lying beyond the third gate, which was the dividing line between the outer public zone and the inner, private one, contained the residential quarters of the sultan, subdivided into male and female sections. The small fourth court of the hanging garden and the outer gardens with kiosks were extensions of this Private royal domain.”<sup>103</sup>

Apparently, the construction of Topkapı Palace or finishing the full complex of this structure was not easy because of that the sections of this palace were added when the new buildings were necessary in different times.

“The most intensive periods of construction fall in the mid 1460s and late 1470s, when Mehmed II was resting from his campaigns and devoting himself to cultural pursuits and the organization of his state.”<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>103</sup><sup>103</sup> Gülru Necipoğlu, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, (New York: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 8

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14

Fatih Sultan Mehmed had contributed to the centralization much more than the other sultans because he had opportunities to make the government to be centralized.<sup>105</sup> For example, he renewed the military system as to find ‘*sekban ortası*’ and ‘*bölük ortası*’.<sup>106</sup>

Also, he reformed not only on military (*seyfiye*) but also on education (*ilmiye*) because he spent an effort to set up a central authority over both of them.<sup>107</sup> In other words, Sultan Mehmed II had succeeded to control over the soldiers and officials as an only authority at the top.

As a result, starting of the Ottoman institutionalization can be dated on the reign of Fatih Sultan Mehmed who had shaped the major institutions as a bone structure. Because, the institutions had been renewed and developed according to the necessities of the empire in parallel to the changing of the borderline at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman.

Here, it is necessary to say that there was a similar situation in the Mughal Empire. For example, it can wrongly be thought that the Mughal political institutionalization had been started at the reign of Akbar Shah. However, it can be seen in Baburnama written by Babur Shah that there was the institutionalization there at the reign of Babur Shah; furthermore, the institutions in India were older than the Mughals. For instance, the ‘*mansabdari*’ system used by the native Indian settlers for many years had been adapted to the Mughal politics as the land administration, fiscal and military institution. All of them had been improved and renewed. Nonetheless, it does not wrong to say that the Mughal political institutions had become the bone structure at

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<sup>105</sup> Murad Belge, *Osmanlı’da Kurumlar ve Kültür*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), p. 58

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59

the reign of Akbar Shah because his reign was so long that he could be interested in both the political and social affairs in addition to the external politics. Also, his reign was the stabilized period so he could have contributed to his empire to get bigger and stronger.

To conclude, these two emperors had contributed to their imperial politics to be improved in order to administrate easily and efficiently.



## ESTABLISHING OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

### The Mongolian Era

Before explaining the period of the establishment of Ottoman government, it is necessary to talk about the Mongols that they were the competitors of the Ottoman Empire. Because of that the Mongols who were the ancestors of the Mughals invaded to the Anatolia at the period of both the Seljukids and the Ottomans.

“Timur was born in a Turkicized, Islamized tribe of Mongol origin. Of modest social background, he married a princess of the house of Jenghiz Khan, a claim to greatness proudly inscribed on his tomb in Samarqand. He led mixed Mongol and Turkish armies, in which the former were the dominant element but the latter the great majority. Unlike the earlier Mongol rulers, Timur was, or claimed to be, a pious Muslim and despite enormous destruction was careful to show due deference to the places and personnel of the Islamic faith. His conquests were, if anything, more destructive than those of Hülagü, and represented the last convulsion of the Altaic invasions. With his death, the great movement of the steppe peoples that had begun in the tenth century and had transformed the Middle East seems to have come to an end- though the infiltration of tribes continued, and, what is more important, the seepage of nomads already in the Middle East into the structure of urban life and civilization.”<sup>108</sup>

The myth of Temur was the major basic of the Turkic dynasties because of that they followed the Timurids in the Middle East and Central Asia. Also, it had been continued until the nomad conquests in the Middle East was completed. Both of the Seljukid and Temür’s successors had become the part of a mature cultural complex. [This mature cultural complex was composed of Turco-Mongolian culture by the Seljukid and Mongolian through the history. However, the rising of the Ottomans was dated on the same period with the decline of the Anatolian Seljuks so Baki Tezcan argues that the Ottomans were under control of the Ilkhanids.] The Ottoman, Safavids, and Mughals which were the great empires of the early modern era, had been shaped on this complex.<sup>109</sup>

Temür had risen to power and his conquests were the products of the Mongol Empire. His goals, ideology, and methodology were defined by the Mongol history and

<sup>108</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East*, (New York: Scribner, 1995), p. 103

<sup>109</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 2

traditions. By the middle of the fourteenth century the Mongol empire had fallen apart but much of Eurasia still bore its imprint.<sup>110</sup> Although the Chingisid dynasty had been declined, the steppe nomads did not lose much of their power and prestige. They protected their ancestral Mongolian heritage in a new shape.<sup>111</sup>

The Mongolian rulers had created a new culture which was made up of the steppe traditions and the necessities of their regions.<sup>112</sup> Also, they had never lost their steppe traditions although they were in contact with the settled one.

“Although they were Muslims, the Timurids, like all Turco-Mongolian tribal groups, also adhered to their own customs and traditions, which remained a potent force in Timurid political culture until the end of the dynasty. Usually referred to by such locutions as “the triumphant *töra*” (*töra-i sahib-giran*), the Timurid *töra* represented Turco-Mongolian custom as practised by Temür, his descendants, and their Chaghatay followers. This is evident from the fact that it is also often referred to as the “rule” (*dastur*) of the Timurid sultans, or the “regulation” (*qa’ida*) of the Chaghatayids, or simply as the “ancient custom” (*sunnat-i qadim*).”<sup>113</sup>

Although “*töra*” was the inevitable part of the Mongolian politics judicial and social rules, the “*shari’a*” was also important as much as “*töra*” after the 1300s because of that Ilkhanids had become Muslim as Gazan Khan had turned into Islam at that time and the ‘*shari’a*’ had been adopted; thus, the *shari’a* in İstanbul was naturally different from the other Muslim countries.

“As noted by Zahir al-Din Muhammad Babur (d. 937/ 1530), the founder of the Timurid empire in India and a keen observer of Timurid and Mongol traditions, the *töra* was also flexible and could be adapted to changing circumstances:

Previously our ancestors had shown extraordinary respect for Chinggisid custom (*töra*). They did nothing to contradict it either at their formal audiences or at court or at banquets and feasts or in [the etiquette they observed in] sitting and standing. But Chinggisid custom is not a definitive text (*nass-i qati*) that a person must adhere to. If someone instituted a good regulation (*qa’ida*), it should be followed, but if an ancestor leaves behind something bad, then something good should be substituted for it.”<sup>114</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. , p. 2

<sup>111</sup> Ibid. , p. 2

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. , p. 3

<sup>113</sup> Maria E. Subtelny, *Timurids in Transition*, (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), pp. 15-16

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. , p. 17-18

There were some differences between the *törü* and *shari'a*. For example, the consumption of horsemeat or the drinking alcohol was not acceptable according to the *shari'a*.<sup>115</sup> But the judicial concerns were solved according to the sharia of Hanafi sect of Islam. Also, the government was administered with Hanafi point of view. Although it seems that the *shari'a* was more important than the *törü* in terms of the judicial and political aspects, it is difficult to say that which one is more important than the other one in terms of the social aspects. The '*shari'a*' was important as much as '*töra*' but it could not be seen like that in the Ilkhanids until Gazan Khan.

Nevertheless, the rise of the Mongolian Empire was not only based on these two causes but also the charisma of Timur was the other important item to rise of the empire.

“Timur, or Timur Beg, usually called by the Asiatic Amir Timur, and by Europeans Tamerlane, or Tamerlane, evidently a corruption for Timur Leng, or Lane Timur, an epithet applied to him on account of a certain degree of lameness, was born about 1336, in a village in the vicinity of Samarqand. According to some, he was only the son of a herdsman; but a more probable account is, that he was the son or grandson of a Tartar or Mughul chief. He himself traced his descent from Chinghiz Khan. On the downfall of the Mughul dynasty of Chaghatai, he managed to obtain the supremacy, and made Samarqand his capital. Possessing the ambition as well as the talents of a conqueror, he had overrun Persia, and extended his dominions over Central Asia, from the wall of China west to the frontiers of Europe, and even beyond, to Moscow. He was not yet satisfied; and in 1398, when his age must have exceeded sixty, he made his appearance on the west bank of the Indus, at the head of a mighty host.”<sup>116</sup>

Of course, his dissatisfaction would lead him to desire to capture some parts of the Central Asia, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia, etc. Moreover, he succeeded to realize his plan as it can be seen on “*Zafername*” which was written by Nizam al-Din Şami with the order of Timur.

This source can be divided into four major sections like the birth of Timur and the reign of him [especially it tells how he came to the throne], the second one is the

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid. , p. 27

<sup>116</sup> Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1986), p. 114

events and conquest in the Central Asia, the third one is the events and conquest in the Mesopotamia and the last one is the events and conquest of Anatolia.

It can be said that his conquests in Anatolia left the terrible memories of the settlers at that time. Moreover, he had led the Ottoman throne to be shaken, terribly.

To begin with, the Mongols had lived in the north of the Caspian and Black Seas, Persia, Syria and Iraq in the thirteenth century. However, they were called as 'Tatars' at that time. Of course, it was not totally right.

“Barthold says that after Cengiz Khan, the title Mongol replaced 'tatar': "Tatar", Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: 1034) IV, P.701. But the title 'Mongol' was used in the eastern part, and the title 'Tatar' continued in the western part. So, the Pechenek, Kıpçak and other Turkish peoples living under Tatar (Mongol) administration were also called 'Tatar' after their administrators. This fact explains why the Turks living north of the Caspian and Black Seas are called 'Tatar' even today.”<sup>117</sup>

Firstly, one of the oldest invasions was occupied in Erzurum, an Anatolia town, in 642/1242 with the Mongol commander Bayju Noyin against to Seljukids. The Seljuk Sultan, Gıyaseddin Keyhusrev II went to Sivas; however, his army was defeated in Köseadağ in 641/1243. After that the Seljukids were obliged to pay the tax and to give the animals per year to the Mongols.<sup>118</sup>

Nevertheless, they tried to administrate the some parts of the Anatolia after the death of Gıyaseddin Mesud in 1308. However, they did not have enough power and population to capture all parts of the Anatolia.<sup>119</sup> Also, many Turkish principalities were taken a place after the collapsing of the Seljukids Empire and there was not any authority in Anatolia for a short time.

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<sup>117</sup> Mehmet Maksudoğlu, *Osmanlı History and Institutions* (İstanbul: Ensar Yayınları, 2011), p.18

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20

On the other hand, it is necessary to remind that the Mongol invasions or the conflicts between the Mongols and the Ottomans were continued until the period of Yıldırım Bayezid. The well-known fact, Battle of Ankara in 1402, was occurred between the Mongol leader Timur and the Ottoman one Yıldırım. At the end of this battle Yıldırım Bayezid had been captured by Timur. According to *Zafername*, Timur would have given permission to him to turn back to his throne and Timur aimed to show his compassion and greatness to the world via this way. Nonetheless, Sultan Yıldırım had been getting worst because of his illnesses and he died before he had gone back his throne although Emir Timur had the famous doctors get to him and he had taken care of him so much that he had the best foods and drinks made for him.<sup>120</sup> Timur had not settled overthere, he had just destroyed and gone out.

. The major population of Central Asia which was covered the mountains lied on to the Central Asia, Kura and Tibet from Siberia in the north, also Seyhun River and the Caspian Sea in the south and ranging to the Japanese Sea from the coast of Volga was consisted of the Turks, Tatars and the Mongols until the beginning of the thirteenth century.

“Timur was a great conqueror, but no empire-builder. After his death, his vast possessions fell apart. In Anatolia and Syria, the Ottomans and Mamluks resumed their sway. In western Iran, Mesopotamia and eastern Anatolia, two clans of Turcomans, known as the Black Sheep and the White Sheep, succeeded in establishing control. Only in eastern Iran and Transoxiana did the line of Timur continue to rule. Their capitals, Bukhara, Samarqand, and especially Herat, were centers of a brilliant civilization.”<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Nizamüddin Şami, *Zafername Translated by Necati Lugal*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), p. 322

<sup>121</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East*, (New York: Scribner, 1995), p. 104

The last Mongolian leader, Timur had heard that some tyrants in India had behaved terribly worst towards the people live there after the death of Firuz Shah so he had gone to Dehli.<sup>122</sup>

Princes and amirs informed Timur that many the infidels, Zoroastrians, idolaters were captured and Timur ordered that all of them had to be killed and they were killed so widely that their bloods were turned into the torrents. Their animals were plundered and their wives were imprisoned and then Timur a guardian with controlling them.

After that he commanded to go to the city side.<sup>123</sup>

They captured the Hindus of '*Dehli-i köhne*' (Old Dehli), Siri, and Cihanpenah in Dehli and started to fight. Many of Hindus fired their own homes, goods, wives, and children, and themselves. Soldiers plundered all things whatever they found.<sup>124</sup>

Many of places in Siri and Cihanpenah had been plundered and Many of Hindus were killed so that there were great deals of Hindus' skulls.<sup>125</sup>

Although Timurid era –of course, Timur did not settle in India, he plundered and then left there- was very bloody, the following rulers were not similar to him although there was a blood tie between the Mughal emperors and this Mongolian leader.

## The Mughal Empire

### The Reign of Babur Shah

“The Mughals (r. 1526-1858) were the greatest, richest, and longest-lasting Muslim dynasty to rule India. Their enormous wealth, which dwarfed that of their contemporaries in Iran and Turkey, derived ultimately from agriculture, for in this well-watered subtropical land a very

<sup>122</sup> Nizamüddin Şami, *Zafername Translated by Necati Lugal*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), p. 227

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232

large number of corps could profitably be raised, ranging from foodstuffs to fibers for an extensive textile industry. Babur (r. 1526-30), the founder of the dynasty, was a Chaghatay Turk descended on his father's side from Timur and on his mother's from Chingiz Khan. Babur's father, 'Umar Shaykh, had ruled a small Timurid principality in the Ferghana Valley in Central Asia, but the rising power of the Uzbek Turks forced Babur to the east. In 1504 he took Kabul and swiftly began raids on India, defeating the Lodi sultan at Panipat in 1526 and the Rajput chiefs at Kanwa near Agra in the following year."<sup>126</sup>

Sheikh Omar took the throne after his father died. Babur Shah said that in the month of Ramadan, in the year of the eight hundred ninety nine he had become a king in the city of Fergana when he was twelve years old. However, the Uzbeks invaded into Samarkand and took this city at that time. Thus, Babur Khan wanted to retake this city from them. Then, he decided to capture the Indian peninsula firstly and then Samarkand would have been retaken more easily.

At this time, he cooperated with the Sultan of Bukhara, Sultan Ali and the Sultan of Hisar Sadiman, Mesut Mirza in order to fight against the Sultan of Samarkand, Baysungur Mirza. In the autumn of 1497, this battle had been continued but Sultan Ali and Mesut Mirza left from the field and Babur had besieged Samarkand by himself. Therefore, Baysungur wanted Uzbek Muhammad Shaybak of Turkistan to help him but he did not succeed against Babur Shah although Muhammad Shaybak had help to him. Then, Baysungur escaped from Samarkand to Kunduz and Babur took Samarkand on November of 1497. In other words, when he was fifteen years old, he had captured the capital of his ancestor Timur.<sup>127</sup>

“Although they thought of themselves as belonging to Timur's lineage, Babur and his family became known as Mughals, the Perso-Arabic term for Mongols, since they were also descended from the great Mongol conqueror Genghis Khan. By the late fifteenth century the courtly culture of Timur's successors, including the production of architecture and illustrated manuscripts was considered the most refined and sophisticated in the entire Islamic world. Thus, the Mughals, especially in this nascent period, wished their own achievements to equal those of the Timurids and their capital to rival the great city of Samarqand, Timur's home.”<sup>128</sup>

<sup>126</sup> Sheila S. Blair and Jonathan M. Bloom, *The Art and Architecture of Islam 1250-1800*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), p.267

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. , p. 9-10

<sup>128</sup> Catherine Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 116

When Babur's remarkable conquest at Panipat had been compared to the earlier conquests of Mahmud of Ghazni and the Ghurids, all of whom had controlled India. Babur's victory was so phenomenal that his army had been far smaller than that of the Lodis. There were two major reasons of this victory. The first one was the use of light cannon and guns and the second one was Babur's fast-moving cavalry. After the Battle of Panipat in 1526, the Delhi Sultanate virtually disintegrated, and Babur would have had the entire territory down to the mid Gangetic plain.<sup>129</sup>

Babur Khan tells his wars, successes, defeats, and the intrigues at the reign of himself; in addition, he also mentions about the Timurid era in his memoir, called as "*Baburnama*".

"We know much about Babur's parties, habits, likes, and dislikes through his remarkable memoirs known as the *Baburnama*, written by his own hand in a form of Turkic. The text commences with events when Babur was about 10 years old and continues on, with some gaps, until about a year before his death in 1530. These writings bring to life an affable yet charismatic prince in search of a kingdom. In them we learn about an enormous range of things, including his family relationships, his passion for a young boy of the camp, detailed discussions of how battles were won and lost, his love of gardening, and what he liked and disliked about India or just simply found fascinating."<sup>130</sup>

Therefore, his well-known memoir covers the whole or some parts of the Turkish and Islamic countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and India.<sup>131</sup> Also, this source gives the information about the social and political life on these areas at that time.

The first part tells Fergana and Transoxiana, the second part tells Kabul and the last part tells Hindustan.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. , p. 116

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. , p. 118

<sup>131</sup> Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur Mirza, *Baburnama Edited by, Şinasi Tekin, Gönül Alpay Tekin, Translated by W. M. Thackson, Jr. , (Harvard Uni. , Yakın Doğu Dilleri ve Medeniyetleri Bölümü, 1993), p. vi*

Also, Babur Shah gives the information about his family and sisters and brothers. He also mentions about the Chaghatayid Khans in briefly and he continues to tell the events of the year 900 and he finishes with the events of the year 908 at the first part.

The last part tells India and he writes the rulers over there. One of these five rulers was the Afghans in Delhi and Jaunpur, the other one was Sultan Muzaffar in Gujarat, the third ones were the Bahmanids in the Deccan, the fourth one was Sultan Mahmud in the province of Malwa and the last one was Nusrat Shah in Bengal.

It cannot be said that Islam was an only religion in all these countries told by Babur Shah. Because, there were other religions like Hinduism or Jainism, and Hindustan was filled with the many rays and rajas and some of them were close to Islam but some of them were not as Babur Shah mentioned. When Babur Shah had come to India, the local settlers in the towns and villages were the Hindus although the elites were Muslims. Also, the population of Hindus were apparently higher than the Muslims.

Also, he mentions the tax revenue region by region. Also, he tells the major events year by year and he finishes with the event of the year 936.

When Babur Shah entered into India as he called as Hindustan, there were Hazaras, Turks, Persians, Turcomans, Afghans, Turcoman Hazaras and Indians (Hindustani as he mentioned in the book) over there. In addition, although Islam was in existed but it was not widespread all sides of the India at that time and there was also a small group of Shi'is there.

The major religions in Hindustan were Hinduism and Islam at that time. However, it should be added that there some different religions like Jainism and Buddhism although there were not many Buddhists in India.

In other words, Hindustan was so colourful that it had the different ethnic groups, too. Therefore, Babur Shah wore like a hajji and walked on the streets like that in order to understand the perception of religion in India and to understand the people.

First of all, he captured Delhi Sultanate and he had got the largest territory with this conquest.

At that time, many Tatars came to Delhi from Samarkand and Persians came there, too; thus, the population of the Muslims was increased day by day.

Nevertheless, the reign of Babur had filled with the political fluctuations. For example, Samarkand had taken by Babur in two times because he lost his city in two times, too. Another example is Fergana that was lost once and it was retaken in two times.

Also, there was not the unification there. Because, the Afghan leader, Ibrahim Lodi, had struggled with the rebellions of the Afghan begs. Therefore, Babur had taken a chance to capture this region.

The sovereignty of Babur Shah was less than five years in India but it had been continued thirty-four years from 1496 to 1530, totally. Additionally, he had cultivated stability and for that purpose he tried to improve economic and social lives; for example, he had the way between Agra and Kabul measured and he had a caravanserai on the each of the twenty- seven kilometres. Also, he had a hammam, garden and pool built up in Agra and Firozpur. On the one hand, he had also spent an effort to provide the political stability. For instance, he had pardoned the Afghan begs in India and he had made a donation of the stamp tax to the Muslims.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid. , p. 26

Although Babur's reign in India had continued for a short time, he had worked to succeed so many things like that.

Babur Shah had passed away on December the twenty-fifth in 1530. Then, Humayun Shah took the throne when he was twenty two years old.

### The Reign of Humayun Shah

The major important source that tells the reign of Humayun is the '*Humayunnama*' which was written by Gulbadan Begum who was the sister of Humayun and the aunt of Akbar Shah and a daughter of Zahir al-Din Mohammad Babur Shah.

Birth place of Gulbadan is not known but she was born in about 1523 when her father had been lord in Kabul for nineteen years.<sup>133</sup>

“The remaining records of Gul-badan Begam's life are few and scanty. When she was seventy, her name is mentioned with that of Muhammad-yar, a son of her daughter, [Salima] who left the court in disgrace; again, she and Salima join in intercession to Akbar for Prince Salim; again, with Hamida, she receives royal gifts of money and jewels. Her charities were large, and it is said of her that she added day unto day in the endeavour to please God, and this by succouring the poor and leedy.”<sup>134</sup>

Gulbadan had been probably well-educated. [It can be said that actually educated woman in the Mughal haram were numerously higher than the Ottoman Empire at the reign of Babur Shah.]

According to her memoir, Babur Shah said that he loved Humayun and he did not love his other sons as much as him. Nevertheless, this part of her memoir is debatable because Humayun was the father of Akbar Shah and Gulbeden was the aunt of him; therefore, her ideas about her father and brother may be subjective.

In other words, Gulbadan Begam was more than sixty years old when she wrote this manuscript. Thus, she had written just her memoirs; nevertheless, it is impossible that

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<sup>133</sup> Gulbadan Begum, *Humayunnama Translated by Annette Beveridge*, (Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publications, 1987), p. 1

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1

she could have remembered all the events with all details of them, naturally. On the one hand, her relation with Akbar was so close that she was to him like a mother.<sup>135</sup>

In the light of this information; although we cannot be sure whether Gulbeden had a political target or she did not have but it can be said that her writing had contributed to the legitimacy of Akbar Shah because of that she had highly praised both her father, Humayun Shah and her nephew, Akbar Shah as it can be seen in her memoir.

Firstly, she summarizes the events at the reign of Babur Shah, her father and then she continues the birth of Akbar. After that she tells how Humayun ascended to the throne after telling the conquests of India and Rana Sanga of Babur Shah.<sup>136</sup>

Also, there is another source about the reign of Humayun Shah. It was written by Sidi Ali Reis. When the Ottoman naval army had gone to Dio, Humayun was not there at that time but when Sidi Ali Reis went to India to cope with the Portuguese, Humayun had captured many places in India and he enlarged his territory. In 943, when Humayun Shah and Bahadır Shah had fought each other in order to capture India, the Portuguese had occupied Bender Dio in Gucerat.<sup>137</sup> At the same time, Sidi Ali Reis had been sent to the Indian Ocean for the final battle in 1553 after three unsuccessful attacks over there. Actually the result of fourth attack of the Ottoman Empire in the Indian Ocean is debatable because Sidi Ali Reis had sold the navy over there and he had turned back to the Ottoman Empire after four years. [The reason and results of these four attacks in the Indian Ocean will be told in the following chapter.]

On the other hand, he was so good at diplomacy rather than the navy as he said that he had contacted with very important people in the different places where he went on so

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid. , p. 220

<sup>136</sup> Gülbeden, *Hümayunname Translated by Abdürregab Yelgar and Eymen Manyas*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), pp. 115-215

<sup>137</sup> Seydi Ali Reis, *Mir'at'ul Memalik*, (Dersaadet: İkdam Matbaası, 1313), p. 2

the letters, collected from the emperors and/or very important people, and the gifts which were presented to the Ottoman sultan were brought by Sidi Ali Reis to Istanbul.

Sidi Ali Reis was a child of wealthy family and navy was a familial job for him so he had been a navy man as the familial heritage. He had officially become a scribe of Azabs, for the first time.

He had participated in the naval activities of the Ottoman Naval Army in the Mediterranean with Barbaros Hayr al-Din Pasha since the conquest of Rhodes.<sup>138</sup>

In 1551, he has also participated in the conquest of Tripolitania with Sinan Pasha. Then, in Aleppo, Sidi Ali Reis had become the captain of Hind.<sup>139</sup> After that he would have stayed outside of the Ottoman Empire for four years.

He had been in the difficult conditions and he had faced to face with the terrible disasters and he had succeeded to reach Edirne after the road trip in many difficulties. Sidi Ali Reis had represented the letters given by the eighteen Islam sultans and beys to the Ottoman sultan. He was not punished; moreover, he was sent to Diyarbakır as an officer of timar. Then, he was sent to Istanbul as a head officer of Galata.<sup>140</sup>

Sidi Ali Reis tells the events in *Mir'atü'l Memalik* (The Mirrior of Countries) chapter by chapter with the headline of the countries where he went on, and firstly, he starts to explain the cause of writing this book.

Sidi Ali Reis said that he had become the captain of Egypt, and firstly; he had been sent to Basra to get the Ottoman naval army to Egypt. Thus, he had gone to Basra.

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<sup>138</sup> Ibid. , p. 13

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. , p. 13

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. , p. 13

Then, he and his men had gone through to Egypt from Hürmüz with the fifteen galleys.

Nonetheless, they could not go to Egypt because of the worst weather conditions, and accidentally, they went to India. It was not possible to go to turn back via sea way; therefore, he and some appreciative men who had devoted themselves to the Ottoman sultan had gone through to the Ottoman Empire via the highway.

They had gone to Gucerat, Hind, Sind, Zabilistan, Bedehşan, Huttalan, Turan, Iran; that is, Transoxiana and Khorasan, Harezmi, and Deşt-i Kıpçak. Finally, they had reached to Baghdad as they passed from Qazvin and Hamadan via the route of Irakeyn.

All friends of him said that these travels were exactly more difficult than the journey to Mecca and Jiddah. In similar to this statement, Sidi Ali Reis said whether the Indian Ocean had been ink and the forests of Sind had been the pencils, they could not have told the terribleness of dangers that they had lived. Therefore, his friends insisted on him to write what they lived over there; at least, the cities where they travelled, interesting and shocking places, cemeteries where they visited had to be told in a book. Hence, Sidi Ali Reis wrote this book, *Mir'atü'l Memalik*.<sup>141</sup>

Sidi Ali Reis had gone to Delhi in 1555 and he and his men had passed to Agra. Humayun Shah had given presents to him and he wanted him to stay there but Sidi Ali Reis rejected kindly and wanted permission to go back. He had stayed there until the rainy season was ended up. Sidi Ali Reis provided the relations between Sultan Mahmud and Humayun Shah to get better. At those days, he had learned Chatayid language very well. Moreover, he had gain the pleasure of Humayun Shah because of

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<sup>141</sup> Seydi Ali Reis, *Mir'atü'l Memalik*, (Dersaadet: İkdâm Matbaası, 1313), p. 10-11

his poet in Chatayid. Humayun Shah called Sidi Ali Reis as “*Mir Ali Şir-i Sani*” as a compliment.<sup>142</sup>

*Mir’atü’l Memalik* is made up of the thirteen major chapters which are Basra, Sea of Hürmüz, Indian Ocean, Gucerat, Sind, India, Zabulistan, Bedehşan and Hotlan, Tranxosiana, Harezmi and Deşt-i Kıpçak, Khorasan, and Irak-ı Acem and the last section which tells the last event.

He wrote that the Muslim people in Gucerat had become very happy his and his men’s visitings and these Muslims said that they had come to Gucerat on time to help.<sup>143</sup>

Also, they said that a powerful commander on navy had not come there from Diyar-ı Rum to India since the age of Adam and they had hoped that –if God wished- Gucerat had become a part of the Ottoman Empire and the Indian ports had been tried to be taken from the enemies.<sup>144</sup>

The major significant part of *Mir’atü’l Memalik* for this thesis is the section of India under the title of ‘*Diyar-ı Hindistan’da Vaki’ olan Ser-güzeşti Beyan Eder*’ [It tells the events in India].

Sidi Ali Reis mentions Humayun Shah who was pleased with him. He behaved very well towards Sidi Ali Reis and his men, and he gave the presents to Sidi Ali Reis and sent the letters to İstanbul. According to him and his writings, Humayun Shah wanted to contact with the Ottoman Sultan in a friendlier relation. For example; one day, Humayun Shah asked whether Vilayet-i Rum was big or India was big. Sidi Ali answered that India was so smaller than the countries controlled under the Ottoman

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid. , p. 24

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. , p. 29

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. , p. 29

sultan.<sup>145</sup> Then, Humayun asked him whether a sultan had had the places in the seven climes on earth and Sidi Ali said that Yemen was in the first clime, Mecca was in the second clime, Egypt was in the third clime, Aleppo was in the fourth clime, the capital Constantinopolis was in the fifth clime, Kefe was in the sixth clime and Budin and Beç was in the seven clime and, the beylerbeys and kadis of Padişah-ı Rum were in each of them, and they had governed over there.<sup>146</sup>

Sidi Ali Reis gave another example that in Surat port in Gucarat, he heard that two men named as Hoca Bahşi and Kara Hasan wanted to pray for the Bairam in China so they wanted the khutbah to be read for their own sultans.<sup>147</sup> Then, they met with the Chinese Emperor and said that their sultan had been the sultan of Mecca and Madina. After that; surprisingly, the Chinese Emperor gave permission to them<sup>148</sup> and they had the khutbah read for their sultan and prayed. Later, Sidi Ali Reis asked whether there had been another sultan in similar to this one.<sup>149</sup> Finally, Humayun Shah said that really, the title of sultan of earth had belonged to Hüdavendigâr and he had prayed for the sultan.<sup>150</sup>

When Sidi Ali Reis had prepared to go, Humayun Shah had accidentally died. At this time, Sidi Ali advised them to hide the death of Humayun Shah until his son came to the throne similarly when Sultan Selim Han died, his death had been hidden until Sultan Süleyman had come to the throne and Mughals had done like that.<sup>151</sup>

Also, Sidi Ali Reis had met with Jalal al-Din Muhammad Akbar Mirza Han Hanan. Then, Sidi Ali Reis wanted permission to go back to Istanbul from Akbar Mirza but

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid. , p. 51

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. , p. 51

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. , p. 52

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. , p. 52

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. , p. 52

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. , p. 52

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. , p. 56

he did not accept because of his father's death. Then, Sidi Ali wrote a poem about the death of Humayun Shah so he had been gifted again and he had taken some money after that he and his men had started to prepare for their ways.<sup>152</sup> Then, they moved to Kabil and they went to Zabilistan as to pass from Behre, Hoşap and Nilab<sup>153</sup> and finally, they had come back to Istanbul.

Then, he continues to tell Zabilistan and he finished with 'Irak-ı Acem' in his book.

Sidi Ali Reis was proud of being a servant either as a navy commander or a diplomat as it can be felt in his writings and he emphasized that he was good at diplomacy rather than the navy.

His book was so significant source that it was made up of his travels from Basra to Iraq as he spent many times in Central Asia and he gives information about India at that time so it may be said that *Mir'atü'l Memalik* is the oldest sources, written by an Ottoman author, about the east of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, the earlier diplomatic relations between the Mughals and Ottomans had been set up with the contacts of Sidi Ali Reis for the first time according to his memoir. Of course, there were trade relations among them before the diplomatic relations. Especially, the Ottomans had sent not only soldiers who could use the fire arms but also the military supplies such as the weapons or heavy cannons to India against the Portuguese when they had worked to capture the Indian sea ways as it will be explain in detail in the next chapter under the title of Mughal-Ottoman relations.

It is necessary to turn back to Humayun Shah, it should be reminded that his reign was not long as much as his son's one, and unfortunately, he was not successful as

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid. , p. 55-56

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. , p. 25

much as his father Babur, on the other hand. For example, he made a political mistake.

“The source of one of his major problems was another of Babur’s legacies. In keeping with the appanage system of the Timurids, Humayun distributed provinces to administer to each of his four brothers. In the northwest Mirza Suleiman obtained Badakhshan, and Kamran governed districts to administer. Within a year, Kamran, with the support of his brother Askari, occupied the Punjab and forcibly removed Humayun’s governor. He then forced Humayun to agree to his possession of the province. Humayun was thereby denied access to the resources of both the Punjab and the Central Asia bases of the Mughals.”<sup>154</sup>

On the other hand, Humayun Shah had also the external threats without the internal problems. For example, the Afghans who held the Lodi throne were the potential enemy of Humayun in the east and Bahadur Shah was the other dangerous man for him in the south. He, was the ruler of Gujarat, challenged Humayun in order to take control over the Sultanate of Malwa.

Humayun had organized a campaign the Gujarat ruler in 1535 and the Mughal army defeated the Gujarat one. Also, they could capture the fortress of Champanir in Gujarat for a short time. “But delay and indecision on Humayun’s part, largely brought on by opium use, forced him to withdraw from Gujarat without deposing Bahadur Shah or formally annexing the kingdom. Further danger from Gujarat ended with the untimely death of Bahadur Shah at the hands of the Portuguese.”<sup>155</sup>

However, the Afghan enemy of Humayun, Sher Shah Sur, had spent an effort to control over the southern Bihar when Humayun had fought against Bahadur Shah. This conflict between Sher Shah Sur and Humayun had been continued for a long time, approximately ten years.

Sher Shah Sur had become a leader of the Afghan revolts against the Mughals and he invaded Bengal and besieged the ruler of Bengal, Mahmud Shah, at Gaur. Then,

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<sup>154</sup> John F. Richards, *The New Cambridge History Of India*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 9

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10

Humayun had wanted to march on to the east because of the power of Sher Shah.

Nonetheless, he could not be successful.

In 1539, the Mughal army had been face to face with the Afghan sudden attack then Humayun could escape from the field alive. After that Sher Khan had gained the title of Shah because of that he defeated the ruler of Hindustan.

In 1540, both of two armies had fought again and Humayun went to Agra then Lahore but his brother Kamran rejected him to take refuge in Kabul.

Humayun had spent his time as he had hidden during the next fifteen years.

“In 1544, he crossed the border to Herat and sought refuge with Shah Tahmasp, the Safavid ruler in Iran. At the Safavid court, Humayun, under extreme duress, accepted the Shia faith in order to keep himself and several hundred followers alive. After this initial test, Shah Tahmasp grew friendlier and eventually agreed to underwrite Humayun’s attempt to regain power. With fresh troops and funds Humayun led a combined Mughal-Persian force which seized Qandahar and then occupied Kabul. There followed an eight-year war between Humayun and Kamran for dominance in Afghanistan. Finally, in 1533, the royal exile reoccupied Kabul as its unchallenged ruler. Kamran became his brother’s captive and was blinded to render him incapable of rule.”<sup>156</sup>

In addition, Humayun had started to regain the power. For example, he captured Punjab and he entered Delhi then he had completed the restoration as he worked to retake his missing by the mid-1555.

In conclusion, it can be said that the reign of Humayun was the effort of taking back the missing. In other words, there were not any political, economic or social reforms or the new regulations on these fields at the reign of him. May be, the reign of Humayun can be defined as the age of restoration unlike the reign of Akbar which can be defined as the age of reformation. Because the reign of Akbar was the risen period of the Mughal Empire especially in terms of the political and economic aspects as it will be discussed in the following chapters.

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid. , p. 11

## The Panorama of Akbar Shah

Akbar Shah was one of the major figures in the history of the Mughal Empire. “Many consider Akbar the most brilliant emperor of the Mughal house, while others include him among South Asia’s three greatest leaders, the other two being Ashoka, who ruled from 273-232 BCE, and Jawaharlal Nehru, who was the prime minister of independent India from 1947 to 1964.”<sup>157</sup>

“Akbar might be called a child of the desert, having been born at Amarkot, on the edge of it, on the 14<sup>th</sup> of October, 1542, after his parents, with a few followers, had traversed it as homeless wanderers, under almost unparalleled privations.”<sup>158</sup>

When Humayun who was the second leader of the Mughal Empire had lost his control over the empire against the Afghan leader, Sher Shah Suri, Akbar who was the son of Humayun was born at this time.

Anthropologically, he was similar to Turkish with his high cheekbones and his small eyes. It should be remembered that Akbar’s genealogy was based on both Timur and Chingiz Khan; therefore, he was normally similar to his ancestors.

Jalal al-Din Mohammad Akbar Shah had come to the throne when he was thirteen years old and his reign had had the Mughal throne for fifty years.<sup>159</sup>

“The achievements of Akbar were many; until his death he was continuously refining his ideology of the state, as well as the practical means through which this concept was executed. Through his reforms of administration and taxation Akbar created a sound and enduring foundation for Mughal governance, while his tolerant attitude and inclusive policies toward Hindus and Jains helped create a state that was more Indian in character. Akbar’s court patronage of the arts placed Mughal art and architecture on a par with that of the contemporary Safavids and Ottomans.”<sup>160</sup>

<sup>157</sup> Catherine Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 124

<sup>158</sup> Henry Beveridge, *A Comprehensive History of India*, (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1986), p.147

<sup>159</sup> Hayrullah Efendi, *Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Matbah-ı Amire, 1273), p. 7

<sup>160</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 124

<sup>160</sup> Burton Stein, *A History of India*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.167

When Akbar was fourteen years old, he became the ruler of the small part of India. He spent his time as he ride a horse, he was interested in sports and is known that he liked pictures and books. However, he could neither read nor write although he composed a few Persian verses himself in the classical style.

Akbar (*Jalal Al-Din Muhammad Akbar*) also known as *Shahanshah* (King of king)

*Akbar-e Azam* or *Akbar the Great* was the third ruler of the Mughal Empire.

“Akbar’s reign began shakily in 1556 with the accidental death in Delhi of his father, Humayun. Akbar’s childhood was spent in Afghanistan, protected by trusted warriors. The twelve year old prince was crowned by a group of Humayun’s principal officers led by the general Bairam Khan, who became regent and safeguarded the fragile regime from the Afghan followers of the Sur clan. It took several years before the Mughals became masters of the great fortress cities of Agra, Delhi, Lahore and Jaunpur, and this broadbased triangle-shaped territory defined their political and economic heartland.”<sup>161</sup>

Bairam Khan was a major figure in the Mughal Palace because of that Akbar Shah was just twelve years old.

After that he had Adham Khan who was a general of Akbar and the younger son of Maham Anaga, was blamed for murdering the Prime Minister in a palace, thrown his death from the palace walls and then Akbar was free to rule in his own way.

After death of Adham Khan, Akbar told it to Maham Anaga. “Maham Anaga (Angah-Begah) said “Your majesty has done well. I and my other sons belong to you. He had committed an offence. You have done justice; and he has received punishment.”<sup>162</sup> It shows that Akbar Shah had arrived at an opinion himself.

Akbar’s first major aim was to dispose the threat of Sher Shah’s dynasty and he decided to go on to the strongest one, Sikandar Shah, in Puncab.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Shireen Moosvi, *Episodes in the Reign of Akbar*, (New Delhi: National Book Trust, 2007), p. 34

<sup>163</sup> Colonel G. B. Malleeson, *Rulers of India Akbar and the Rise of the Mughal Empire*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899), p. 61

The Hindu king Hemu was a Hindu commander who fought against both Afghans and Mughals and captured Delhi on 6 October 1556 and Bairam Khan urged Akbar to reclaim Delhi. Akbar's army controlled by Bairam Khan was faced to face with the huge army of Hemu in medieval times in the Second Battle of Panipat.

Hemu was the son of a Hindu priest and he became Chief of Army and Prime Minister of Adil Shah Suri of the Suri Dynasty. He is well-known with his battles against the Mughal forces of Akbar and Humayun in Agra and in Delhi.

He had the throne of Delhi under the Hindu title of Raja Vikramaditya on 7 October 1556 and his *Rajyabhishek* means coronation as *Samrat* was held at *Purana Quila* which is the citadel of the city in Delhi.<sup>164</sup> He reestablished the Hindu rule in the North India after about 350 years of Muslim rule and he struck coins bearing his title.

After Hemu's victories were heard in the Mughal army, the commanders rejected to fight against him; however, Bairam Khan who was the advisor of Akbar, insisted him on fighting Hemu to take control of Delhi. Then, these two forces were faced with each other at the historical battle field, Panipat, on 5 November 1556. Bairam Khan encouraged his army with an effective religious speech and Hemu came to the battle field with his army. He was wounded in the eye by an arrow and he fall down; therefore, the chaos took place among the soldiers and there were not any commanders to take a decision among them.<sup>165</sup>

Hemu was captured by Shah Qulin Khan and get him to the Mughal camp for execution. As a result of this, Akbar had the title of '*Ghazi*' (holy warrior) and Hemu was killed by Bairam Khan and Hemu's headless trunk was sent to Delhi and it was

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<sup>164</sup> André Wink, *Akbar*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), p. 18

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18

shown on a gibbet there. Also, his head was sent to Kabul and hung on the Iron Gate there.<sup>166</sup>

After that Bairam Khan organized the army to massacre of the followers of Hemu and thousands of people were killed at that time.

Akbar was also known as a 'military genius' at his reign.

“Historians of medieval India generally attribute the impressive expansion of Mughal Empire under Akbar and his successors to their military superiority. Akbar’s conquests are seen as pre-eminently military ventures where the highly centralized and well- equipped forces of their adversaries. Consequently, the debate has tended to center on the role of military technology. Some historians, such as Marshal G. S. Hodgson and William H. McNeill have argued that it was artillery that gave the –as also the other Asian contemporaneous empires, such as the Ottomans and the Safavids- military superiority. Others suggest that it was not artillery but cavalry that made the Mughals invincible in the Indian sub-continent.”<sup>167</sup>

He renewed the new system of the military administration known as the *mansabdari* system which was predated the Mughal era.. This system was a kind of the feudal system. It means that the different grades of *mansabdars*, who were the holders of command, were employed by Akbar and given the sections of the lands to administrate. These mansabdars were responsible for collecting the taxes from the peasants and they had to supply the men and horses for the Akbar’s army. From this point of view, it can be said that this system is highly similar to the Ottoman *timar* system as it will be told in the following chapters.

On the other hand, Akbar also used the political conflictions for his external enemies. For example, he supported the Safavids against the Ottomans and the Ottoman- Mughal relations were not a comparable level with the Safavids ones but he saw the Ottomans as a potential threat; therefore, he applied the balance politics according to his rivals as the continuation of Timur politics.

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid. , p. 18

<sup>167</sup> Farhat Hasan, *State and Locality in Mughal India Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572-1730*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 21

On the other hand, the revolutions of Akbar Shah were not limited with this event.

“To all these ingenious efforts to fix the loyalty of his subjects to himself and his house and to blunt divisions among Muslims and between them and the majority of his subjects, Akbar added other, more pragmatic, elements. The corps of mansabdars who carried out his military orders and commanded some 150,000 heavy cavalymen were supported by grants of village income (jagir) which provided the salaries fixed by their rank, and were intended also to maintain the troops under their commands. These arrangements were maintained by masters of the mints as well as minister of defense, since a high-quality currency was necessary to mediate all the complex relationships of Akbar’s regime.”<sup>168</sup>

Akbar was also successful in the administration as much as in the military. He allowed defeated Hindu leaders to continue to administrate their territories to maintain the stability of the empire. On the other hand, he got married with the Hindu princess to reconcile his country after his conquest and he tried to legitimize himself and to cope with his enemies.

Akbar had many wives and hundreds of women in his harem. Marriage was a way of precluding the rebellions; therefore, he married with the princess of his rebel leaders. Although it is thought that his principal wife was Hindu Princess, Jodha Bai, mother of Akbar’s successor Jahangir (r. 1605-27) who got married with him in 1562,<sup>169</sup>

Ruby Lal claims that the name of Jahangir’s mother was not known and it cannot be seen on the sources.<sup>170</sup>

“Mughal Women and men were partners in the production not only of heirs but also of imperial genealogies and new royal rituals, in the establishment of new traditions, and even the practice of governance. Paradoxically, however; women are depicted as being so invested in the future of the empire – in the form of giving birth to illustrious progeny, and in the maintenance of “established” traditions- that their own present tends to be erased in the very performance of their royalty and womanhood. In a classical replica of patriarchal norms, women’s lives are not for living, but for creating other lives, for preserving and nurturing the future of the generations past, and the generations to come.”<sup>171</sup>

<sup>168</sup> Burton Stein, *A History of India*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 173-174

<sup>169</sup> Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of India*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.17

<sup>170</sup> Ruby Lal, *Domesticity and Power in the Early Mughal World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 170

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1

“The haram as well-structured physical quarters- and as distinct feminine space demarcated from more clearly marked male domains- came to be institutionalized only during Akbar’s reign”.<sup>172</sup>

Akbar also used the religious tolerance in order to reconcile the different groups under his administration.

“If his grandfather Babur had dismissed “Hindustanis” as a strange and unfamiliar race of people and remained steadfastly Timurid and Central Asian in his orientation, Akbar’s father was determined to lay the foundations for a Mughal empire in which those very Hindustanis had some stake. When Humayun appointed a tutor for his young son Akbar, his duty was to coach the prince in the “manners and customs of Hindustan” and introduce him to Indians (ahl-i Hind). As a consequence, the *Akbarnama* (ca. 1598) tells us, Akbar learned to enjoy Indian ways.”<sup>173</sup>

Akbar abolished the *jaziyya* tax which was collected from the non-Muslim groups.<sup>174</sup>

It can be said that Akbar Shah had been far from the shari’a because of this way.

Additionally, he contributed to the non-Muslim temples to be built and he joined the non-Muslim celebrations with his Hindu wives.

#### Akbar and His Sufism: “*Din-i Īlahi*”- The Divine Faith

“As young man had several mystical experiences, one of which occurred in conjunction with hearing songs (qawwali) about the Chishti saint of Ajmer, Muin al-Din. Shortly after this experience in 1562, the young ruler resolved to visit Muin al-Din’s tomb at Ajmer, thereby launching a seventeen-year period of devotion to this shrine in particular, and the Chishti order of Sufis in general. Akbar’s high regard for the Chishti grew even greater when Shaikh Salim Chishti predicted the birth of sons to the heirless 27-year-old ruler.”<sup>175</sup>

The years between 1571 and 1580 are important for the improvement of Akbar’s religious ideas. Throughout these years, Akbar Shah had experienced to search the spiritual truth and understanding in order to decide his own way. In addition, this era is the period of migration from Iran.

“Northern India experienced some limited contact with Shi’ism, and Iranian immigration, over the century. In Kashmir, in the late sixteenth century, the Chack clan formally adopted Shiism. In 1589, Humayun’s son Akbar used Sunni reaction to this move as an excuse to add the region to his growing empire. Although Iranians did serve in many capacities during

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. , p. 3

<sup>173</sup> Munis D. Farooqui, *The Princes of the Mughal Empire, 1504-1719*, ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 136

<sup>174</sup> Ibid. , p. 18

<sup>175</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 129

Akbar's reign, he tolerated but did not promote Shiism. Shii scholars were invited to debate Sunnis at court, and when a Sunni mullah attacked a Shii mullah the Sunni was executed. Sunnis perceived Shii influence as growing, and some were concerned at the presence of ranking officials who were Iranians."<sup>176</sup>

The two sons of Maulana Abdul Riza Gilani, Hakim Abu'l Fatih Gilani and Hakim Nuriddin came to India and worked under the patronage of Akbar. Shah Tahmasp had suspected them to be Sunnis so their father had been tortured so he died.<sup>177</sup>

"By his intelligence and good manners Abu'l Fatih soon became a close companion of Akbar and exercised considerable influence at the court. By 1575 Shaikh Mubarak's son, Abul Fazl was also admitted to the Court. Hakim Abu'l Fatih Gilani, and Abul Fazl soon became friends. Badauni who was also then admitted to the Court tells us about what Akbar's mental state was at the time:

Questions regarding Sufism, learned discussions, enquiries into subtleties of philosophy and fiqh increasingly attracted His Majesty's attention. He spent whole nights repeating the name of Almighty God; he continually occupied himself, pronouncing 'Ya Huwa' (O God) and 'Ya Hadi' (O Guide) which he had learnt through the Divine inspirations. His heart was full of reverence for him, who is the True Giver. Moved by a feeling of gratitude for his past successes, he would sit many a morning alone in prayer and meditation on a large flat stone from an old ruined building, which lay near the palace in a lonely spot, savouring the bliss of early hours of dawn."<sup>178</sup>

"Abu'l Fazl supported Akbar Shah to create this new united religion and he expected the king to be the spiritual guide of his people and Akbar Shah was an ideal monarch according to Abu'l Fazl because of that Akbar Shah was born with a spiritual and temporal destiny."<sup>179</sup>

Akbar Shah had wanted to learn all the religions like the Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, Buddhism or Judaism in order to understand which one of them was more suitable for his country and which one of them was more united than the others.

"After the birth in 1571 of Prince Salim, the future Emperor Jahangir, Akbar commenced the building of a palace, known as Fatehpur Sikri, at the Shaikh's humble abode 38 kilometers from Agra. Akbar's interest in religion continued to be manifest at Fatehpur Sikri, and in 1575 he ordered the construction of a building, called the Ibadat khana, to facilitate religious discussions. These discussions were initially held only among various Muslim theologians, but

<sup>176</sup> Andrew J. Newman, *Twelver Shiism*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), p. 170

<sup>177</sup> Iqbal Husain, "Iranian Ideological Influences at Akbar's Court in *A Shared Heritage The Growth of Civilizations in India and Iran* Edited by Irfan Habib, (New Delhi: Tulika Books, 2002), p. 119-120

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. 119-120

<sup>179</sup> I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of The Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. 172

by the end of the decade non-Muslims, including Brahmins, Parsis (Zoroastrians), Jains, and Portuguese priests who had settled in Goa, were also invited to participate.”<sup>180</sup>

“In 1584, Akbar declared a new calendar so-called as “Tarikh-i-Ilahi” or “Divine Era” the year of his accession, 1556, and not 1563, the year in which the regency came to an end, was retroactively turned into Year One.”<sup>181</sup>

Nevertheless to say that it is thought that Akbar was ‘*ummi*’ means illiterate.<sup>182</sup>

Nonetheless, it is a debatable issue because of that this argument has the two meanings. The first one is that Akbar was defined as *ummi* due to the fact that he could neither write nor read despite of his best memory. The second one is that this definition as *ummi* was based on the Sufi Islam. That is, many Sufis identified themselves as an illiterate although they could read or write many pieces in Persian or Arabic.<sup>183</sup>

It can be said that Akbar was in touch with Sufism.

“Akbar was seen as a master (*pir*) in the Sufi sense and his devotees were like students (*murids*). The highest-ranking nobles answered directly to Akbar just as these nobles’ officers answered to them, thus guaranteeing downward and upward flows of loyalty.”<sup>184</sup>

On the one hand, the Mughal Empire had been introduced with the different tendencies and ideologies of Islam, for example Nuqtawiya. Many Nuqtawis had immigrated to the Mughal Empire from the Safavid one even before the massacre of

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<sup>180</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 129

<sup>181</sup> André Wink, *Akbar*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2009), p.16

<sup>182</sup> Annemarie Schimmel, *The Empire for The Great Mughals*, (Lahore: Sang-e-Leel Publications, 2005), p. 32

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33

<sup>184</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 130

1002/1593-1594.<sup>185</sup> They had found a refuge in the Akbar's court and Abu'l Fazl Allami (the author of Akbar-nama) had been a volunteer listener of them.<sup>186</sup> Although the Nuqtawi revolt in Iran had been crushed in its inception, it had been moved into the Mughal court and intellectually contributed to the court culture of the Mughals in India.<sup>187</sup> The Iranian Nuqtawis and their sympathizers had faced with the great emperor, the 'millennial king' who had had the religious tolerance and respect to the different religions and they had get chance to explain their ideas and approaches in the court of Akbar via the convention among the representatives of variable religious communities like Portuguese Jesuit missionaries or Zoroastrian Parsis.<sup>188</sup> "Abd al-Qadir Badauni, the chief chronicler of Akbar's era and himself, a staunch Sunni, holds the Nuqtawis in Akbar's court responsible for the dissemination of millenarian prophecies."<sup>189</sup> The Nuqtawi views had so influenced the emperor, Akbar Shah that Bada'uni implies that he declared himself as the prophet of the 'divine religion' (*Din-i Īlahi*) and advocated the doctrine of 'universal conciliation' (*Sulh-i Kull*).<sup>190</sup> In addition, it can be seem that the source of intellectual inspiration for Akbar and his minister Abu'l Fadl 'Allami who was the architect of 'universal conciliation', had been based on Mir Sharif Amuli, a prominent Nuqtawi scholar and a refugee to the Mughal court.<sup>191</sup>

"Amuli and other Nuqtawis in Akbar's court drew upon Mahmud Pisikhani's prophecies to speculate on the advent of a 'remover of falsehood' in the year 990/1582 which, as they saw it, implied the abrogation of Islam by Akbar at the end of the millennium. Khwaja Mawlana Shirazi, a Nuqtawi specializing in *jafr*, offered to Akbar a *Risala* presumably from the sharifs of Mecca, which, on the bases of the Islamic hadith, predicted the impending doomsday, and the advent of the Mahdi at the end of the seventh millennium from the time of Adam. Corresponding to Mahmud's super-cycles, the idea of seven millennial cycles was long popular among Isma'ilis and other Shi'i communities. Similarly, among other 'Shi'i

<sup>185</sup> Abbas Amanat, "The Nuqtawi Movement of Mahmud Pisikhani and His Persian cycle of Mystical-Materialism" in *Mediaeval Isma'ili History and Thought Edited by Farhad Daftary*, (Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: University of Cambridge, 1996), p.292

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. , p. 292

<sup>187</sup> Ibid. , p. 292

<sup>188</sup> Ibid. , p. 292

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. , p. 292

<sup>190</sup> Ibid. , p. 292

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. , p. 293

superstitions', so Bada'uni puts it, the Nuqtawis relied on a chiliastic quadrant attributed the Isma'ili poet and philosopher Nasir-i Khusraw:

In the year nine hundred and ninety by the ordinance of the fate,  
Gather all the stars in one place.  
In the year Leo, month Leo, day Leo,  
Walks out from behind the curtain the God's lion."<sup>192</sup>

Bada'uni thought that it was such insinuations that led Akbar 'to claim prophethood (*nubuwwa*) in all respects but name', for he was the 'lord of the age' (*sahib al-zaman*) and 'God's lion' (*asad Allah*) who, as Nuqtawis insisted, removed the communal barrier between the seventy-two nations (*haftad-u du millat*) of Muslim and Hindu persuasions.<sup>193</sup>

After that he decided to declare his own religion, known as '*Din-i Ilahi*'. "The Sufi creed of the *Din-i Ilahi* was promulgated in the beginning of the year 1582"<sup>194</sup>.

He combined all the major principles of these religions under this title. According to the *Din-i Ilahi*, there were three major principles about the faith. The first one was that there was a certain God here. The second one was that the Sun was the benediction of the world and the last one was that Akbar Shah was the leader of the materialistic and the spiritual worlds; therefore, everybody had to follow and believe in him, too.

Although Akbar did not force the people to believe in the same religion; that is, they gave them the religion freedom and he had to find the new way to control these different people via this way.

The *Din-i Ilahi* was the well-known and extra-ordinary way to unite all the people who were the members of the different religions in the empire.

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<sup>192</sup> Ibid. , p. 293

<sup>193</sup> Ibid. , p. 293

<sup>194</sup> Makhan Lal Roy Choudhury, *The Din-i Ilahi or The Religion of Akbar*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, 1985), p. 177

Despite the fact that Akbar was thought not to be interested in art or literature, he loved both of them and his reign became the most productive term in the literature, music, art, and architecture.

He commissioned many paintings and miniatures and his commissions demonstrated his tolerant attitude towards other religions in these manuscripts. On the other hand, it can be said that these architectural monuments and the art were used as a kind of the media in order to show the sultan's power and they were used for displaying the legitimization of the sultan.

### 'Akbarnama'

Although Akbar didn't write his biography as his grandfather Babur because he was unable to read, probably he was dyslexic but his court chronicler, Abu Al-Fazl, kept an account of his actions and thoughts in the book known as *Akbarnama* or *Ain-i Akbari*.

“The *Akbar Nama* of Abu'l Fazl forms the foundation of the study of Akbar's institutions. It is a mistake to begin with the *A'in-i-Akbari*, as is generally done. The latter work embodies the result of the experiments made during the reign of Akbar and is a record of isolated facts. The spirit which led to the establishment of the institutions, the initial difficulties encountered in bringing them into existence, and the capacities of ministers who worked them and gave them final shape can only be fully understood after a patient, sustained and connected study of the nearly 1.700 pages which the *Akbar Nama* contains. Though the two works are distinct yet they are not unrelated. The two should be read together, for, as Mr. Moreland has rightly pointed out, ‘neither tells as all we want to know, but nearly all is contained in one or the other.’<sup>195</sup>

In other words, the *Akbar Nama* was a certain record of the different actions of the state because of that some major factors such as the author's position, his training on the administration, his personal relations to the Empire or his access to the official records led this source to be one of the more valuable ones.<sup>196</sup>

<sup>195</sup> Ibn Hassan, *The Central Structure of The Mughal Empire*, (Karaçi: The Civil and Military Gazette, 1967), pp.7-8

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

The most significant section of this source is relating to the revenue. The first book contains the “*Treasury; the Mint; Statistics of Prices; the Arts of Peace and War; the rules for Elephants, Camels, Horses and Oxen; regarding Etiquette, Flavours and Perfumes; and lastly, on Religion.*” The second book tells the military regulations, the admiralty, and the Chase. The third book mentions about the finance; “*beginning with an account of the Computations of time in use among various nations; then follow chapters on Tribute and Taxation, on Measurements of Land, and of the famous “Settlements” of the Land-revenue under Todar Mal.*” The fourth one is related to the Gazetteer of India and “a treatise on various subjects of interest connected with its inhabitants.” The last one is made up of Akbar’s teachings.<sup>197</sup>

On the other hand, it should be remembered that the *A'in-i-Akbari* was the third part of the *Akbar Nama*.

The reign of Akbar was the brilliant term of the Mughal Empire.

Nevertheless to say that the Mughal Empire was ignored as a part of the Islamic world by the Ottoman emperors and this situation had been continued for many years by the Ottoman historians. Probably, one of the major causes of these situations is that the Mughal Empire could not be seen as a threat for the Ottoman Empire therefore it was not necessary to take care of them. Also, the relationship between the Ottomans and the Mughal Empire had been so limited until the reign of Shah Jahan. Furthermore, it cannot be said that these relationships were getting improved after him. Nonetheless, there was a balance between these two empires. For example, the Mughal Emperor, Akbar Shah, supported to the Safavids against the Ottomans although he did not have

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<sup>197</sup> Henry George Keene, *The Turks in India*, (Honolulu: University Press of Pacific, 2001), p. 71-72

any relationship with the Ottomans. Thus, it can be said that Akbar Shah had not known the Ottoman Emperor Süleyman I as a caliph.



## CHAPTER III

## ARISTOCRACY AND NOBILITY

## The Nobility in the Mughal Empire

The administrative and religious policies at the reign of Akbar, especially between the years of the 1560 and 1580, are written by a number of historians. It can be said that the administrative institutionalization was started at the reign of Akbar Shah and he was in touch with the religious communities in order to provide his legitimacy and to protect his authority over them. Moreover, an important aspect of this transformation was the evolution of culturally unified nobility and religiously heterogeneous elements brought together by Akbar.<sup>198</sup>

“Official sources for Akbar and his empire, the *Akbarnama* and the *A'in-i-Akbari*, tend to divide the people of his empire, excluding the nobility and its dependants, into two classes, namely, the sub-ruling groups and the ‘subjects’: the former are styled *zamindars*, *bumian*, *marzbanan* and *aqwam*, and the latter *ra'iyat* and *mardum*. The terms did not have any religious connotation, and Akbar, being the emperor (supreme to all), considered it his task to look after the interests of both categories. His concern for the first led him to integrate the ruling groups within the Mughal imperial system. On the one hand, by defeating independent rulers, Akbar curtailed the power of local ruling groups; on the other, he increased their power and prestige by turning them into a part of an imperial ruling class.”<sup>199</sup>

“Much of the Mughal nobility was, after all, descended of Persian or Turco-Mongol semi-nomadic warriors and empire builders, for whom the peripatetic court (even mobilized, as was Jahangir's, for the carefully justified pursuit of an endless round of hunts and drinking parties) was a well-established and respected tradition. In addition, as the overlords of India, the performance of politically legitimizing actions that would resonate with the Rajput nobility and majority Hindu population would have been of great value to the Mughal kings. In this the descendants of Timurid kings were extremely fortunate, for there existed in India ancient and respected precedent for their peripatetic court.”<sup>200</sup>

There were not only Hindu nobles but also Persian ones like Mirza Khan and Mirza Nijat who was the officers did not have any influence on the governmental politics. Of course, Bairam Khan was an important person at the beginning of the reign of Akbar but after the death of Bairam Khan, the new groups was started to be seen in

<sup>198</sup> Richard Eaton, *India's Islamic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.

<sup>199</sup> S. Inayat A. Zaidi, “Akbar and the Rajput Principalities: Integration into Empire” in *Akbar and His India* Edited by Irfan Habib, ( New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 15

<sup>200</sup> Lisa Balabanlilar, *Imperial Identity in the Mughal Empire*, (London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2012), p. 96

the governmental offices in 1560-1575. These new groups were the Rajput chiefs and the Indian Muslims.

“To reduce the number of Central Asian nobles, Akbar replaced them primarily with Persian amirs and secondarily with Indian-born nobles drawn from a variety of backgrounds, excluding Afghans who were still contesting Mughal sovereignty at the fringes of empire in eastern India. The Indian nobles were drawn from leading Muslim families who could be depended on to raise large kin-based contingents for the Mughal army. Central Asians continued to be the largest group at court, however, and some of them were very close to Akbar.”<sup>201</sup>

The Mughal government was composed of the Afghan, Iranian and Turk *beys* and native Indian Muslims as the military and political elites. Although the elites, who administrated, were officially Muslim, Hindus –most of them Rajputs and Marathas– were the twenty percent of the Mughal aristocracy. Hindus as the military *beys*, administration officers, financiers, traders and the land owners were important. Hindu officers had generally shared the Iranian cultural style with the Muslims.<sup>202</sup>

“The Mughal nobility was multi-ethnic. Athar Ali identifies the major groups: ‘Turanis (Central Asian), Iranis (Persian), Afghans, Shaikhzadas (Indian Muslims, consisting of a number of sub-groups), and the Rajputs, etc. Later on, in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, with the advance of Mughal power in the Deccan, there was an influx of the Deccanis, i.e. Bijapuris, Haiderabadis and Marathas. The army commanders were mainly ‘Mongols, Turks, Uzbeks, Persians, Afghans, Arabs, Rajputs and other Hindus and Feringhis [...]. In addition, the Mughal nobles had diverse religious backgrounds: ‘Sunnis (Turanis and most of the Shaikhzadas), Shia (including may Iranis) and Hindus (Rajputs).’”<sup>203</sup>

In 1562-1567, the Persians had gain the importance unlike the Turanis were started to lose their popularity in the traditions and the perceptions of the governmental institutionalizations. After the years between the 1562 and 1567, the rate of the Persians became higher.

<sup>201</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 125

<sup>202</sup> Ira M. Lapidus, *İslam Toplamları Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 610

<sup>203</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power*, (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p. 60

“Akbar also let the Rajput chiefs into the highest ranks of the nobility by assigning them high administrative offices such as those of subahdars (governors), faujdars (commandants), diwans (revenue officers) and qil’adars (castellans), in different parts of the empire.”<sup>204</sup>

However; after the rising of the Indian Muslims, the categories of the nobles were changed again. Moreover, Muslim communities started to gain popularity and they were supported. Furthermore, the *Department of Sadarat* had been supported by Akbar in 1570s because of that he had sympathy towards the north Indian upper class Muslims.<sup>205</sup>

According to Badayuni, ‘if the bounty of all former kings of Hind were thrown into one scale and the liberality of this age into the other, yet this would preponderate.’ It is evident even from Badayuni’s bitter denunciation of the policy of resuming excessive land from grants carrying more than 100 bighas of land (1575) that this measure was aimed not so much at curbing the theologians as at extending state patronage to a larger number of influential and leading Indian Muslims, without any particular distinction between ‘the learned’ and ‘the illiterate.’<sup>206</sup>

On the one hand, the numbers of the Muslim mansabdars were higher than the other religious communities and the numbers of the Turani mansabdars were approximately at the top on the other Muslim mansabdars.

In briefly, the religious division was not the key point of this kind of transformation although it had one of the major roles. Nevertheless to say that the rates of the Jain mansabdars or Hindu ones were comparatively different in contrast to the Muslim mansabdari land owners. Therefore, the numbers of the mansabdars whose religions were known cannot give the clues about the population. However, it can give the information about the economic resources because of the taxation.

Here it is necessary to explain what exactly a mansabdar was.

<sup>204</sup> S. Inayat A. Zaidi, “Akbar and the Rajput Principalities: Integration into Empire” in *Akbar and His India Edited by Irfan Habib*, ( New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 17

<sup>205</sup> Richard Eaton, *India’s Islamic Tradition*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 124

<sup>206</sup> Ibid. , p. 124

“The word denotes ‘someone possessed of a certain rank, ‘mansab’. Therefore, everyone who held any rank at all in the military hierarchy was a mansabdars. However it is not clear what the qualifications for these ranks were and what these confusing titles actually mean. What were a 5.000-zat/ 3.000 suwar officer? Did he have command of 5.000 soldiers and 3.000 cavalymen with horses? In fact; it was for more complicated than that soldiers were organized decimally; the lowest rank was the dih bashi; ‘Leader of Ten’ and above that was the seldom mentioned bisti, ‘Leader of Twenty’. Above that was the yūzbashi, ‘Leader of a Hundred’, and this was further elaborated in very complicated ways. The holder of a rank of 500-zat and above was called an amir (plural umara). Among these were the omrah, which are mentioned in reports by European travellers. Above these were the officers from 1.000-zat (mingbashi) to the 7.000-zat. The highest ranks of all –up to 12.000-zat- were reserved for the princes, who at a very tender age held high office and had ‘command’ of between 7.000 to 10.000 troops. There was a general tendency to inflate titles and ranks, so that under the rule of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb there was even a rank of 36.000-zat. Various insignia distinguished the ranks, for example an amir of more than 2.000-zat received a kettle-drum. Flags with one to three yak tails, tüman tügh, were also used to differentiate the ranks.”<sup>207</sup>

In conclusion, from this point of view, it can be said that there are some similarities between the Mughal mansabdari system and the Ottoman timar system of the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, both of them provide the mansabdars and timar holders to gain popularity as they represented the government on the local area. Because, they were responsible for applying imperial rules overthere, collecting taxes from the people who lived under their controls, and providing man power and military equipment for the imperial army.

### The Nobility in the Ottoman Empire

Although there are some similarities between two systems, there are also some differences. For example, the nobility was important to be a mansabdar in the Mughal Empire. However, this situation was not seen on the Ottoman one.

It should be mentioned that these timars had not been given as an example of the nobilities of the holders in contrast to the Mughal mansabdari system. Since the ethnic backgrounds of the people had been ignored by the Ottomans because of that the religious identity determined the societal categorization that was divided into the two

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<sup>207</sup> Annemarie Schimmel, *The Empire of the Great Mughals*, ( Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2005), p.82

main branches like the ‘*askari*’ (military or translated as the ruling class) and ‘*reaya*’ (flock). Here, it is necessary to explain these groups. Firstly, ‘*askari*’ was consisted of the people who was responsible for carrying arms and did not pay the taxes, a Greek Orthodox metropolitan or archimandrite, a Muslim ‘*müfti*’ or ‘*müderris*’, a Bulgarian voynuk known as warrior sipahi, a Jewish chief rabbi and a Greek Phanariot at the Sublime Porte; that is, all these people hold the ‘*askari*’ status.<sup>208</sup> However, both Muslim and Greek peasant, and craftsmen had ‘*reaya*’ status.<sup>209</sup> On the other hand, the Ottoman state had ruled its non-Muslim subjects with the millet system. In general, millet means religiously-defiend people.

“Although in the Quran (9:16) it refers to pre-Islamic community, milat Ibrahim, “the people of Abraham”, and although in medieval usage it may mean Jews, Christians, or Muslims, its most common Ottoman Turkish usage, before the period of reform, denotes the community of Muslims in controistinction to dhimmis. It was in that sense that it appears in a legal opinion ascribed to the Şeyhülislam, Ebu Suud Efendi (1490-1574), the highest religious authority under Suleyman the Magnificent and in the common phrase for the Ottoman Islamic community, *din ve devlet, mülk ve millet*, “religion and state, realm and people.”<sup>210</sup>

“Within this overall structure, the Ottomans incorporated non-Muslims as *millet*s (literally, “community”), although the system did not become formal until the nineteenth century. Each *millet* had its own communal leadership, civil law, and legal system and provided its own social welfare and educational system. In the period under study, Ottomans recognized three *millet*s aside from Sunni Muslims: the Greek Orthodox *millet*, which included most of the subjects of the empire in the fifteenth century, united Slavic and Romanian, as well as Greek-speaking subjects of the empire.”<sup>211</sup>

These communities as they have been mentioned before, was also known as the ‘*ahl-i kitab*’ (People of the Book); in other words, the ‘*ahl-al-dhimma*’ (Protected People).<sup>212</sup>

“The practice of living alongside non-Muslim communities began at Medina before emergence of the Islamic empire (the period beginning with the conquests under the second caliph Omar) and at the very start of the Islamic state and its history. In the home of Islam (Dar’ul Islam) non-Muslim subjects of monotheistic religions had to pay dues and taxes

<sup>208</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınlar, 2010), p. 17

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. , p. 17

<sup>210</sup> Benjamin Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire Edited by Benjamin Braude*, (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), p.69-70

<sup>211</sup> Douglas E. Streussand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottoman, Safavids, and Mughals*, (Philedelphia: Westview Press, 2011), p. 31

<sup>212</sup> Ibid. , p. 84

(*haraç* in agriculture) and a poll tax (*cizye*). However, various details need to be borne in mind on the subject of these taxes. In the first century of the Islamic empire tax revenues had already dropped because non-Muslim subjects required to interpretation was therefore developed to the effect that the tax was not levied on the taxpayers themselves, but on their land, and the tax as thereafter classified as a land of *haraç* (*arazi-i haraciyye*).<sup>213</sup>

“Members of the different religious groups were also required to wear different clothes. Non-Muslim groups went along with obligations such as wearing different clothes and living in different neighbourhoods because these prevented them from mingling with Muslims and thus allowed them to preserve their own religion and traditions. This is a very important point. The millet system under the Ottoman Empire and the individual’s membership in a religious community differ from the status and psychology of minorities in the modern world in both objective and subjective terms.”<sup>214</sup>

In conclusion, the nobility in the Ottoman Empire had the different meanings changed in time to time. For example, the meaning of the nobility at the classical age was different. First of all, a family had been a family of ‘*cherif*’ or ‘*seyyid*’ [a person descendants of the Prophet Mohammad], they would have been the special status. On the other hand, it could be seen that the nobility which was based on the same blood in the Giray families. Also, this situation could be seen in the Kurdish *beys*. For instance; if a *bey* had been dismissed, a person who was a member of the same family with him, would be assigned to this ex-position. The last one is the principalities connected to the Ottoman Empire. There was a same situation like the Mughals. On the one hand, the family of *qadi* had to be known. Unlike to this, to become a student at *Enderun* that opens to the doors of the *Palace* and to give the chance to be an officer, it was also ignored because all the people were the ‘*kul*’ (a kind of slave) of the sultan.

In the Ottoman Empire, to be close to the Palace was so important that it could provide people who were close to it to have the different opportunities but this closing was not related to the ethnical or the religious identities, it was related to the personal relations, actually. Therefore, there is a difference between the perception of the Mughal nobility and the Ottoman one. The major difference is that the nobility in the

<sup>213</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010), p. 16

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16-17

Mughal Empire was based on the ethnical background but it cannot be claimed for the Ottomans.

As a result, both the two empires had the networking society and to be in a relationship with the focus of power that was related to the definition of the nobility was the key factor to be a part of this society.

## THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

### The Political Structure of Ottoman Empire

“The institution of kingship was endowed with ‘farr-i izadi’ according to the Mughal chronicler at the reign of Akbar Shah, Abu’l Fazl. The word ‘padshah’ was a compound word as he thought. That is, ‘pad’ means the stability and possession, and the ‘shah’ means the origin and lordship. He considered that the padshah was neither the ‘sultan’ nor was he the Mahdi (Sahib al-Zaman or Lord of the Age), whose prophesied appearance at the close of the first Islamic millennium (1591-2) had produced instability in the minds of many Muslims. Abu’l Fazl’s ‘padshah’ or ‘shanshah’ (kings of kings) - another term taken from ancient Iranian royalty- was a unique personality; he was the ‘perfect man’ and was the real vicegerent of God on earth.”<sup>215</sup>

On the other hand, the belief of ‘Kut’ had highly been an acceptable idea by the Central Asian Turkic speaking groups in the earlier times to the Ottoman era, classically; meant to be chosen by the God, to govern the people according to the Turks who lived in the Central Asia. Moreover, this idea can be seen on many of the governments that had the Turkic background such as the Mongolians, the Mughals, the Seljukids, and the Ottomans.

“Turks and Mongols made conquests of varying durations in the lands of Eurasia’s sedentary civilizations: China, India, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Historians have suggested that in each of these settled regions, Turkish and Mongolian political tradition left their mark.

It is contended, for example, that is Rus’ the Tatar yoke crushed the comparatively free feudalistic society of Kiev and nurtured in its stead the despotic centralism of Muscovy. Similar arguments have been made for China, where the Jurchens and Mongols can be seen to have converted the budding proto-capitalism of Sung into the retrogressive despotisms of Ming and Ch’ing. In India, after collapse of Mauryan rule in the late third century B. C., no real empire emerged at all until Turkish invaders laid a groundwork for political unification in the Delhi sultanate, and the Mughals, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, completed the job. Similarly, in the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire and to some degree the Safavid

<sup>215</sup> S.A.A Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa&Co, 1993), p.161

brought Turkish and, it could be claimed, Mongolian traditions into the stuff of everyday life.”<sup>216</sup>

In other words, there are some similar structures and practices on the politics and administrative methods between the Ottomans and the Mongolians due to the fact that they had the similar steppe traditions.

Moreover, each of them were the mostly centralized ones and the sultan or khan was at the top as it can be seen on the reign of Akbar Shah, too. For example, it can be said that the emperor was a chosen man.

It can be said that the king ‘*padshah*’ was at the top of the government as a chosen man by the God.

First of all, the political organizations will be mentioned one by one to explain these differences.

To begin with, at the reign of Sultan Selim II, the *jihad* was widespread into the new areas and the northern Africa had become not only battle field of the Ottomans and Habsburgs. Yavuz Sultan Selim had continued to the conquest movements as his ancestral heritage and he had enlarged the Ottoman Empire and his son Sultan Süleiman I had also continued to these movements and he provided the empire to be enlarged again. These conquest movements had been reached to the top with the conquest of Vienna [of course, the result of this last one had become just a frustration]; that is, the Ottomans had been into Europe. Thus, Sultan Süleiman had truly become a legend *gazi* for the Ottomans.

After the death of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottomans had lost their legend *gazi*. [Moreover, his death showed on the miniatures, extraordinarily.]

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<sup>216</sup>Joseph F. Fletcher, *Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia Edited by Beatrice Manz* (Hampshire: Variorum, 1995), p. 236

Because, he not only spent the effort to gain the military victory but also he tried to reshape the governmental structure.

It is necessary to analyze these Ottoman institutions and the Ottoman society in order to understand the progress from the frontier principality to the Islamic empire. First of all, the Ottoman Empire had so powerful self-confidence that the Ottomans had probably thought that the Ottoman Empire was an only super power over the world at the reign of Sultan Suleiman I as it can be seen on the international diplomatic letters or the documents. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire consisted of Albania, Greece, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Crimea, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunis, Yemen, and Yugoslavia, etc. when Sultan Suleiman died.

Nevertheless, the other side of the coin was not better than this one. For instance, the terrible rebellions had been occurred at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Suleyman such as the Jalali Rebellions, Baba Zunun or Kalender Çelebi Ones. All these rebellions were politically organized although it seems just like the inner problems. Moreover, the Safavid impact was seen on all of them either directly or indirectly. It can be said that the internal politics of the Ottoman Empire at that time was so rough that the sultan had been obliged to spend the great effort to cope with these rebellions.

After 1540s, the problems that had not been seen easily for the first time in the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman had started to be turned into the negative impacts in Anatolia day by day. Anatolian settlers had supported Şehzade Mustafa (Kanuni's first son), firstly and then, they had supported Şehzade Bayezid (Kanuni's other son)

against the sultan. There was a major reason of this situation that was the economic reason.<sup>217</sup>

To begin with, the trade routes had been naturally changed after the geographical discoveries. In other words, the Atlantic Ocean had become the new trade destination in contrast to the Mediterranean routes. Therefore, the Ottoman foreign trade had been affected negatively at the beginning of the sixteenth century. However, this situation had not been terrible at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman although its negative impacts on the Ottoman economy had started to be felt at that time.<sup>218</sup>

The Ottoman government had to find much more money because the numbers of governmental officers had been increased and the Ottoman borders had been enlarged. Thus, the necessity of valuable mines had generally been increased. At this time, Europe and Iran had also tried to cope with the similar crisis due to the fact that the valuable mines and money had been so limited over there because of that these valuable mines had been sent to the east; that is, they had been overflowed from the wealthy countries that they had these kinds of materials to the poor ones where such these mines, not enough to contribute to the economic circulation, were so limited. Hence, these mines and indirectly, gold and silver coins had been decreased.<sup>219</sup>

On the other hand, the peasants who owned in agriculture had also affected negatively so that they could not pay the taxes. Nevertheless, '*Tekalif-i divaniye*' [It collected from the people in a serious crisis] had been turned into the regular tax because of the war series and naval attacks. Furthermore, the government had increased the fee of this tax. Thus, the tax-farmers had been faced to face with losing their lands because

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<sup>217</sup> Şerafettin Turan, *Kanuni Sultan Süleyman Dönemi Taht Kavgaları*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1997), p.19

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p.19

of that the people who had money had helped to the farmers in order to pay their taxes as they borrowed money from these awfully helpful people. Because, the farmers had been subjected to leave from their own lands in order to pay money back to the helpers.<sup>220</sup> Moreover, some *kapıkulus* who lived in the cities and some of the higher ‘*dirlik*’ owners had started to give money with usury. They started to pay a debt with the highest income rate like 50 % or 60 % informally rather than the formal rate which was 15 %. The terrible part of this situation was that the people who borrowed money from them had given their lands as the guaranties but they could not retake their lands so they had obliged to leave their villages and they had been called as ‘*çift bozan*’ who had left from his village and been workless in the cities. Unfortunately, this ‘*çift bozan reaya*’ had been increased day by day and it affected the agricultural productivity negatively so the number of people who were not happy with the administration had been increased in parallel to the numbers of *çift bozan reaya*.

On the other hand, there was an inequality between ‘*timarli sipahis*’ (*timariots*) and ‘*kapıkulu*’ soldiers (janissaries). The janissaries’ salaries had been paid from the imperial treasury, directly so they had never been faced to face with the monetary problems. However, timariots had been suffered from the economic crisis because their incomes had directly related to the tax-revenue. Also, they could not pass to the ‘*umera*’ class in contrast to the janissaries who could become higher officers in the *umera* class. Therefore, the timariots had insistently wanted to be *kapıkulu* soldiers in order to have the better life.

As a result, the economic standards that had been getting worst day by day caused the timariot soldiers to conflict with both the peasants and janissaries.<sup>221</sup> This statement is

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid. , p.19

<sup>221</sup> Ibid. , p. 20

the most important one in terms of the politically organizational division. Because, the timariots had supported Şehzade Mustafa, firstly after that they supported Şehzade Bayezid against their father Kanuni Sultan Süleyman. At the same time; unlike the timariots, the janissaries had continued to be controlled under Sultan Süleyman I and his son Selim II.<sup>222</sup>

Şehzade Mustafa was the first son of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman who had eight sons. Thus, the general idea about Şehzade Mustafa was that he would have become the sultan according to the idea of '*ekber evlad*' (oldest son). On the other hand, Mustafa had been sent to Manisa as a sanjak governor. Manisa was near İstanbul; that is, when the sultan had died, the şehzade could quickly go through İstanbul as a new owner of the Ottoman throne. Therefore, Manisa was the most important sanjak and sending Manisa as a '*sanjak beyi*' had been a problem among the sons of sultan. Moreover, the major example of this competition can be seen at the reign of Bayezid II.

Kanuni Sultan Süleyman had been subjected to choose an only son to be sent to Manisa and he had his son Mehmed whose mother was Hurrem Sultan sent to Manisa so Mustafa had been sent to Amasya.<sup>223</sup> It means that Şehzade Mustafa could not have been a sultan. Although Şehzade Mehmed had died after he had been sent to Manisa, the relations between Mustafa and Sultan Süleyman I had been getting worst and Mustafa had been killed in 1553.<sup>224</sup>

Secondly, the beginning of this age was the period of the rise of the diplomacy all over the world because of that the military power had not been enough to win the wars without any diplomatic relations. Therefore the diplomatic relations and

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<sup>222</sup> Ibid. , p. 21

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. , p. 22

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. , p. 29

bureaucratic progress had been occurred at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Suleiman. In addition, it can be said that this reign was partly successful in terms of the political [both internal and external] affairs such as the, social, economic, or military institutions, etc.

The power of the sultan who governed the thirty millions [it is difficult to say certain things about the population but it can be guessed that the total population was approximately thirty millions in contrast to the Akbar's world because of that the population of the Mughal Empire was nearly a hundred millions at that time; therefore, the income of the taxation was much more than the Ottomans.], was based on the three main sources which were the Middle Asian traditions, the idea of *Gaza*, and the traditions of the Islam which was effected by the Persian style.<sup>225</sup>

### The Political Structure of the Mughal Empire

A Persianized bureaucracy can be seen on both of the two empires and it should be added that the Persian impact can be dated on the earlier times in India like the pre-Mughal time and in Seljukids.

“Despite the great cultural similarities among the post-Seljuk polities and their common Sunni orientation, however, no motive for unification was strong enough to override the rivalries between multiple claimants to the sultanate. While such disunity may have had few immediate consequences at the local level -and, as we have seen, some of those consequences may have been positive- it left the region easy prey to Mongol invaders by making it impossible for anyone ruler to harness its full military potential. On the other hand, the integration of shariah and *ghaza* with the Near Eastern concept of state linked Islamic opposition to the pagan invaders with defense of the state and may have strengthened political loyalties.”<sup>226</sup>

“Surveying the Mughal Empire after it had been constituted; one comes across a large number of principalities under the control of autonomous and semi-autonomous chieftains who ruled hereditarily.

<sup>225</sup> Norman Itzkowitz, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İslami Gelenek*. Translated by İsmet Özel, (İstanbul: Şule Yayınları, 2002), pp.67-68

<sup>226</sup> Linda T. Darling, *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 101

Sytleed *rajās, ranas, rawats, raos* and by other similar designations, but appearing in the Persian chronicles generally as *zamindars*, these chiefs formed a formidable class.”<sup>227</sup>

Akbar Shah had succeeded to control over all the *rajās, zamindars* and the *chiefs* and there was not any conflict among the different religious groups or the ethnically different people. The key point of this situation was the Akbar’s peacefully attitude towards these non-Muslim groups because of that he did not enforce them to turn into Islam, for example. Also, he had given permission to them to be free for their religion; moreover, he had abolished the *jaziyya* tax in order to provide them to be respectful to him. In other words, Akbar Shah had controlled over them via this way. Of course, this abolition was not an only factor to turn into the empire from the settled government.

“The relative weakness of centralized, bureaucratic institutions in India is somewhat unexpected when yet another element of the Indo-Islamic order is considered. That is the importance of Persian as a language of high culture and latterly of government. Ancient Persia’s elaborate bureaucratic tradition had lasted until the time of the last pre-Muslim rulers, the Sassanids, who fell before the Arab Muslim armies around 540 CE, and some of it did reach India along with other Irano-Arabic ideas and institutions after the eleventh century. Balban, the longest-lived king of the ‘Slave Dynasty’ of Delhi, claimed to have retrieved the ‘lustre of the Persian kings’, but neither he nor his successors sought to replace the mamluk order with a Persianized bureaucratized structure of the sort adopted in Safavid Persia and Ottoman Turkey, notwithstanding the wealth of scribal talents available to them in India. Explaining this failure and other limitations of the transformation of India under the Islamic onslaught of later medieval times requires the recognition that, in the encounter with the Islamic world, the weight of tradition and historical inertia remained with Indian ways and their pre-Muslim course. Indeed, pre-Islamic values and institutions were not broken down by the encounter; instead, they hardened and formed even more conservative and rigid cysts, eclaves of pre-Islamic culture in the Muslim Empire.”<sup>228</sup>

The success of Akbar Shah was based on the three items: The Central Asian Traditions, the Islamic Culture with the Persian impact and an extraordinary charisma of Akbar Shah. All these three items were parallel to the basics of the similar success of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman.

<sup>227</sup> Ahsan Rıza Khan, *Akbar’s Initial Encounters with the Chiefs: Accident vs. Design in the Process of Subjugation in Akbar and His India* Edited by Irfan Habib, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1

<sup>228</sup> Burton Stein, *A History of India*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 160-161

Nevertheless to say that Kanuni Sultan Süleyman was luckier than Akbar Shah because of that he had come to the throne of the wealthy and powerful government so he was not obliged to fight the enemies to capture the throne; additionally, the Ottoman Empire was highly stabilized in terms of political power at that time. For example; Yavuz Sultan Selim had get not only the Sacred Relics but also the title of Caliph of Islam to the Palace; therefore, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman had become not only the Ottoman sultan but also the Caliph of Islam. In contrast to this, Akbar Shah was the third emperor of the Mughal Empire. After his father Humayun died, he came to the throne and he was obliged to cope with the pressure of his enemies such as Hemu, Afghans or Uzbeks. Despite of these conflicts, Akbar Shah had succeeded to win the wars and he had provided the Mughal throne to be turned into an imperial one as to establish the political institutions in order that he could be aware of that the administration was the basic part of setting an authoritative power over the empire; that is, the military victories had to be supported with the administration politics in order to stabilize and to strength the power of the empire.

“In the received histories of the Mughal rule, Babur and Humayun are passed over rather quickly, although the institutions and symbolism of Mughal rule as it was developed in later times are read back even into their reigns. Yet the proposition that the Mughal Empire” as we know it today came into being in Akbar’s time needs to be qualified in at least two ways. First: it could hardly be the case that the construction of Mughal institutions and practices was completed for all time in Akbar’s reign (or that of any one ruler, however innovative). Second: it is important to stress the considerable element of uncertainty and experimentation that marks the making of regimes. ...

Mughal histories speak of Akbar the Great and his many accomplishments. Central to these accomplishments are his record of unbeaten military campaigns, which led to the establishment of a far-flung sovereignty, easily the most powerful kingdom on the Indian subcontinent. Akbar’s supreme military authority was based upon a great array of cannons, forts, and elephants, as well as trained armies now maintained as crucial arms of the empire, not gathered together when the need arose. He consolidated his political authority through the reorganization and expansion of the agrarian system that he inherited from Sher Shah, the Afghan Chieftain who displaced Humayun for a while on “the throne” of Hindustan. Akbar’s *mansabdari* system, and the accompanying panoply of *jagirs* and titles, has been much acclaimed.”<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> Ruby Lal, *Domesticity and Power in The Early Mughal World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.140

Akbar Shah had not invented a new system but he had puzzled with both the ancestral and local traditions. At the end of his combination, he would have found a system which united the people in the country and was related to the emperor so he would have controlled over the center and provinces. Thus, he had also strengthened his authority via this way.

Institutionalization at the reign of Akbar Shah was seen on the two basic fields: The central administration and the provincial administration.

The other chance of Sultan Süleyman was probably that he was nearly twenty-seven years old when he had come to the throne. However, Akbar Shah was just thirteen years old when he had become an emperor. Therefore, Sultan Süleyman was probably more authoritative than Akbar Shah because of his age and experiment on the sanjaks. Nonetheless, it can be said that Akbar Shah could be more authoritative than his first ten years on the throne after the death of Bairam Khan who had been one of the major figure at the reign of Akbar Shah.

Nevertheless to say that Akbar Shah had highly become successful on his plan because of that he had enough money to use for his plan. Because of the taxation income due to the high rate of population was the major economical source for the Mughal Empire.

In the light of this comparison, it can be said that the Ottoman political stabilization was older than the Mughal one. Also, the powers or successes of these two empires were based on the administrative politics; in other words, political institutions.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that the Ottoman political organizations were based on three main categories such as the '*ilmiye*', '*seyfiye*', and '*kalemiye*'.

'*İlmiye*' refers to the mainly educational and partly social institutions, '*seyfiye*' refers to the military institutions, and the last one '*kalemiye*' is refers to the bureaucratic institutions. All three of them will be explained with the comparison of the political institutionalization in the Mughal Empire at the reign of Akbar Shah.

### THE MUGHAL-OTTOMAN RELATIONS

The Ottomans were one of the major actors in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf in the sixteenth century. Of course, the other one was Portugal. The Portuguese had gone to the western India at the end of the fifteenth century in order to control over the trade routes from India through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean world. After the battle of Marj Dabıq, the Ottomans had took Egypt and controlled over the Red Sea. At the reign of Sultan Süleyman I, Baghdad was conquered and the Ottomans had in touch with the Persian Gulf, naturally.<sup>230</sup>

“Before the arrival of the Ottomans in the southern Arab lands and the shores of the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese reached western India at the end of the fifteenth century with the landing of Vasco da Gama and his crew, after rounding the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. They established themselves at various strategic points around the Indian Ocean seeking to dominate the ancient trade which ran from the south-east Asia and India to the Mediterranean world through the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and adjacent lands.”<sup>231</sup>

After the conquests of Egypt and Syria, the Ottomans had the new lands and seas where the Mamluks had controlled for centuries so the new period had been started.

This new period led the Ottomans to contact with the Portuguese.<sup>232</sup>

“Ties between the Holy Cities in the one hand, and Damascus and Cairo on the other continued to exist, but Cairo was now no more than a provincial center. Major political decisions, such as the

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<sup>230</sup> Salih Özbaran, *Ottoman Expansion Towards The Indian Ocean in The 16th Century*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), p. 3

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 61

institutions and occasionally deposition of the Sherifs of Mecca, were from now on made in İstanbul.”<sup>233</sup>

Nonetheless, Egypt was highly important in terms of political, strategic, and economical aspects for the Ottomans. A way between Damascus and Hijaz was also important one because of that it was the route of the Pilgrimage caravan which was clearly significant for not only religious aspect but also economical one. The major significant religious point was that the Ottoman sultan had taken over from the Mamluks the title of the Servitor of the two Noble Sanctuaries, Mecca and Medina (Khadim al-Harameyn al-Sharifayn). Mecca was an important trade center where all the Muslims could have had the opportunity for trade. The Ottomans had taken from the Mamluks the function of protecting the Red Sea against the Portuguese and partly Hijaz [They did not directly do that but *sharifs* did]. Egypt had been a significant for military operations on Yemen, Abyssinia, and the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.<sup>234</sup>

“Among the motives which turned the Ottomans’ attention to the southern territories and seas were their ambitions against the Mamluks and Safavids as much as their response to the military, religious and commercial goals pursued with equal determination by the Portuguese. To gain access to the parts on the trade routes linking the Levantine world with the Indian Ocean was not, however, a major concern during the reign of Sultan Selim I (described as the Grim in some western literature) even though some commercial activity took place.”<sup>235</sup>

While Sultan Selim’s major aim was to destruct the Safavids and their Shi’i followers, the Ottomans had seemed to be eager to set up the commercial relations in order to have political superiority in the southern Arab lands and seas around them in the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. Also, there were the diplomatic relations between the Safavids and Ottomans; for example, the Shi’ite people wanted to visit not only Meca and Medina but also the tombs of the grandchildren of Prophet Muhammad in Iraq but Yavuz Sultan Selim did not give permission them to visit because the Ottomans

<sup>233</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, *Pilgrims & Sultans*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994), p. 32

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66

thought that they were sent there as the agents.<sup>236</sup> On the other hand, the relations with another great empire of the Islamic world, the Mughal Empire that had commanded the northern India until 1526, were so limited and these limited religions were related to the cities of Mecca and Medina.<sup>237</sup>

At the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, the Ottomans tried to conquer the coastlands of the Indian Ocean.

The Ottomans attacked on the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean in 1538 for the first time. Hadım Süleyman Pasha, commander of Ottoman naval army, had succeeded but the other commanders were not successful as much as him. In 1551, Piri Reis had attacked with thirty pieces naval army for the second attack; unfortunately, this movement had been turned into the so terrible frustration that Piri Reis was killed. In 1552, Murad Reis was sent to Hürmüz and he fought against the Portuguese but he could not win so he was dismissed in Basra. In 1553, Seydi Ali Reis had gone through the Indian Ocean for the final battle.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire could not have had the victory on these attacks. There are four major reasons of this failure. Firstly, the distance was very long. Secondly, the navy was not enough to cope with the Portuguese. Thirdly, the navy men were not qualified as much as their competitors. The last but not the least one is that the Ottoman Empire was not a naval government although the Ottomans could have the great and powerful navy [as much as their rivals' ones, especially at the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman]. The possible reason of this situation is that the Ottomans did not grow up the men for the naval army; that is, the men who was grown up as the

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<sup>236</sup>Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi Translated by Ercan Ertürk*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010), p. 51

<sup>237</sup>Ibid., p. 51

navy men as either their familial heritages or personal interests were recruited by the government as they were employed in the Ottoman naval forces; therefore, it does not totally wrong to say that the education of the naval forces could not enough to win the wars against the Portuguese that was good at navy and had gone over there earlier than the Ottomans. [It should be added that after these four unsuccessful fights, the Ottomans had been interested in the reasonable targets like the conquest of Cyprus or Rhodes and they had become successful.] Also, the Ottomans did not tried to fight in India face to face in the battle field like Timur. There are five major possible reasons of this situation. Firstly, India had ruled by the Muslim rulers. Secondly, these Muslim rulers could be supported by the Shi'ite Persians, mostly. Thirdly, the Mughals had the Timurid heritage. Fourthly, the distance was so long that dispatching of troops and equipments was so difficult and to feed up with the men in the army was also difficult in the long distance. Finally, there was a stabile power over there through the end of the reign of Sultan Süleiman the Magnificent [It is not necessary to say that there was not any major power in Europe without Habsburgs, of course.]. In other words, when Akbar Shah was the owner of the Mughal throne, the owner of the Ottoman throne had been changed in four times; that is, Sultan Selim II, Sultan Murad III, Sultan Mehmed III, and Sultan Ahmed I had respectively came to the throne through the reign of Akbar Shah.

“In 1555, shortly after before his death, Humayun got an oppoturnity to establish formal relations with the Ottomans. This was provided by the arrival of Sidi Ali Reis, the Ottoman admiral.”<sup>238</sup>

“The admiral was accorded a brilliant reception at the Mughal capital. No less a person than Khan-i-Khanan Bairam Khan, along with four hundred elephants and one thousand men, was sent by Humayun to receive him. The Sidi was offered a jagir and the governorship of a district; this he politely refused. During his stay in Delhi, the admiral strove to impress upon

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<sup>238</sup> N. R. Farooqui, *Mughal-Ottoman Relations*, (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 2009), p. 15

Humayun and his courtiers the superiority and primacy of his master, the Ottoman sultan, among the Muslim monarchs.”<sup>239</sup>

In 1556, Humayun Shah had suddenly died before his letter could be presented to the Ottoman Sultan. The new Mughal emperor, the son of Humayun, Jalaluddin Akbar was not as favorably disposed as his father was to cultivate friendly relations with the Ottomans.<sup>240</sup>

Here, it is necessary to talk about that there are the six documents between the Mughal Empire at the reign of Akbar Shah and the Ottoman Empire at the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. There is an important article on this subject which is ‘*Six documents on Mughal-Ottoman relations during the reign of Akbar*’ written by Naimur Rahman Farooqui.

“The six documents [considered in this paper were issued by Sultan Murad III (ruled 1574-95) and] cover a time-span of approximately a decade from 1578 to 1588. Five of these documents deal with the activities of Indian pilgrims in Makka, including the ladies of Emperor Akbar’s household who had accompanied the Mughal Hajj caravans to the Hijaz between 1577 and 1580, while the sixth document refers to Akbar’s alleged alliance with the Portuguese and the proposed Mughal-Portuguese invasion of the ports of Yemen. The first and second documents, which are practically identical with minor modifications here and there, are addressed to the authorities of the Holy Cities of Makka and Madina. The next three documents are imperial letters, issued between February and August 1580, to the sharif of Makka. The last document is addressed to Hasan Pasha, the governor-general of Yemen.

The first five documents were issued in response to the reports submitted to the Ottoman court by Masih Pasha, the governor-general of Egypt; the sixth document delineates the Ottoman sultan’s reaction to Hasan Pasha’s communiqué regarding Akbar’s imminent invasion of the Ottoman ports of Yemen.”<sup>241</sup>

On the other hand, there was a trade between the Mughal Empire and the Ottoman one, of course. Especially, cotton, silk, spices and weapons and heavy cannons were the main significant trade goods among them.

“In this context, evidence on the important trade between India and the Ottoman provinces of Syria and Egypt had attracted historiographical attention. André Raymond, K. N. Chaudhuri, Halil İnalcık, Halil Sahillioğlu and Katsumi Fukazawa have highlighted the importation of

<sup>239</sup> Ibid. , p. 16

<sup>240</sup> Ibid. , p. 17

<sup>241</sup> N.R.Farooqui, *Six Ottoman Documents on Mughal-Ottoman Relations During the Reign of Akbar*, (Journal of Islamic Studies 7, 1 (1996), p.33-34

cotton textiles, rice, and spices, and the imitation of Indian fabrics by local producers unwilling to relinquish their accustomed market shares.”<sup>242</sup>

Unfortunately, it has been thought that the relations among these two empires had formally been started at the reign of Shah Jahan in terms of the diplomatic relations. Unlike to this statement, the major issue of these letters that was the security of Haj routes and transportation show us that there were some writings between them earlier than the reign of Shah Jahan.

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<sup>242</sup>Suraiya Faruqi, *Approaching Ottoman History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 9

## CHAPTER IV

### THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

#### The Administrational Institutions

##### The Administration under Sultan Süleyman I

“Ottoman chronicles, whether written anonymously or by known authors have a common characteristic. Almost all of the chronicles which describe the 14<sup>th</sup> century were produced during the second half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, the contents have many characteristics in common. These chronicles exalt the era of the foundation and the following century and a half of an empire which had reached its zenith by mid 15<sup>th</sup> century. Further, the chronicles reflect the warrior and romantic spirit of the founding days. This approach, while nurturing the 15<sup>th</sup> century imperial ideology of consolidating the empire, somewhat misleads both Turkish and foreign modern Ottoman historians. After Paul Wittek’s study, it has become very fashionable to account for the foundation and rise of the Ottoman Empire with the *ghaza* (Holy War) factor. At the same time, anonymous Ottoman chroniclers constantly praise the fact that the warriors fought on an equal position and with a spirit of equality. They also emphasize a tribal and the Turcoman tradition whereby even the booty was shared equitably between the warriors.”<sup>243</sup>

The Ottoman historiography, written by the Ottoman chroniclers, was the narrative history at the earlier times; that is, the sultan was the center of such these stories and he was an excellent man so his decisions could not have been criticized in the Ottoman historiography. Fortunately, the age of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman was an efficient period in terms of writing historical events. Either the texts about his reign which were written at the reign of him or the other ones written after his reign, tells the events; especially and generally, about the military campaigns. On the other hand, the tones of these texts were generally complimentary; that is, neither the reign of sultan nor he as a sultan had been criticized by the authors. [Here it is necessary to say that there were some poems and folk songs that were produced in Anatolia and Mesopotamia criticized the empire and the sultan at that time.]

However, such these texts do not give an answer about the question of why his reign was brilliant or successful. But, here, there is another question is come up what the

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<sup>243</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004), p. 57

success means in terms of the successes of the sultan or empire. It is necessary to mention that the authors did not write to give an answer for this kind of question. Therefore, it can be said that there was not a methodology in the historical texts so they were similar to the literary ones. After this short explanation about the absence of methodology in the Ottoman historiography, it is necessary to turn back to the first question.

Why the reign of Sultan Süleyman was the age of rising in the history of the Ottoman Empire?

Actually, this question can be answered with neither the result of the military campaigns nor the enlargement of the imperial territory.

Although many people think that the diplomatic relations had been started in the sixteenth century; therefore, the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman was the period of establishing diplomatic offices because of these international contacts, the earlier diplomatic relations in the Ottoman history was dated into the period of the Mamluks. The letters and gifts were the major parts of these relations.

“Diplomatic correspondence between Mamluks and Ottomans is regularly documented from the reign of Bayazid I. The earliest reference dates to 1388, when an Ottoman embassy arrived in Cairo with an unspecified gift.”<sup>244</sup>

These giftgivings had been continued to the battle of Marj Dabiq in 1516.

“The presents to the caliphs and other dignitaries may have been meant to pave the way for his taking control of the Mamluk state with its apparatus and the transfer of the Abbasid caliph to Istanbul. Indeed, Selim was interested in maintaining a certain administrative continuity after the conquest of Egypt and Syria, where he appointed a Mamluk emir as the first Ottoman governor. This was indeed the most ironic gift exchange of Mamluk history. Al-Ghawri, still hoping to avoid a military confrontation, reciprocated with an unspecified gift package worth

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<sup>244</sup> Doris Behrens-Abouseif, *Practising Diplomacy in the Mamluk Sultanate*, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2014), p.85

10.000 dinars and a message offering peace. This was the last Mamluk embassy to an Ottoman sultan, while al-Ghawri was already near Aleppo.”<sup>245</sup>

The battle of Marj Dabiq led the Mamluks to fell down and this battle had become the last relation between these two states.

In other words, the diplomatic relations so older that the offices which were responsible for the international meetings had been turned into institutionally organized bureaus at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I.

Thus, the officers were well-educated. Here, there are two important words which are education and officers. Education was the key factor for the officers to be grown up and they did their job best.

In this section, the education in Palace and Palace officers will be explained in order to understand the political institutions.

The Palace had been consisted of three major divisions like ‘*Harem*’ (the residence of the family of sultan), ‘*Enderun*’ (the Inner Service), and ‘*Birun*’ (the Outer Service).

#### ‘Enderun’ and ‘Harem’

‘*Enderun*’ was the school of the non-Muslim children gathered from their town and villages as the ‘*devshirme*’ to recruit them as the soldiers or palace officers. Here, it is necessary to explain the ‘*devshirme*’ system based on the ‘*kul*’ system.

“The *kul* system, an institution partly inspired by slave soldiers used by such Islamic states as the Abbasids and the Mamluks, augmented the dynasty’s autocratic regime by curbing the rise of rival aristocratic families. The levy of Christian children (*devşirme*) enabled non-Muslim subjects converted into Islam to attain the highest positions in the military and bureaucracy, ordinarily denied to those born as Muslims. Besides, the fief holding cavalry (timarlı sipahis), by far the most common career paths open to Muslim-born subjects were the religious bureaucracy and the scribal ranks.”<sup>246</sup>

<sup>245</sup> Ibid. , p. 92-93

<sup>246</sup> Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), p.36

Some of them were recruited in ‘*Acemi Ocağı*’ (the Novice Corps), and some of them were recruited either in ‘*Bostancı*’ (Body Guard), ‘*Cebeci*’ (Armorer) or ‘*Topçu*’ (Artillery) or as the men for the naval army.<sup>247</sup> Then, they who were more talented and clever than others would have been employed in the Palace according to the necessities.

“It was during Süleyman’s reign that palace-educated pages- captured slaves or novice boys recruited by the *devşirme* system- infiltrated the upper ranks of the ruling elite to an unprecedented degree. Trusted kuls with whom the sultan had developed a personal relationship in his palace tried together the imperial system at multiple levels. Mustafa Ali notes how Süleyman exclusively promoted former servants of his private inner palace (enderun) to the empire’s highest posts: ‘Making the viziers his sons-in-law and selecting the majority of the grandees among the fortunate ones existing from his inner palace was his innovation; in his reign no other [type of] accomplished and judicious person was given the vizierate.’ From the twenty-three viziers of Süleyman’s reign (nine grand viziers and fourteen viziers), only four were born as Muslims; the remaining nineteen were converts who had served as pages or white eunuchs at the sultan’s inner palace.”<sup>248</sup>

‘Harem’ was the residence of the sultan and his family and the dorms of the concubines. His sisters, children, and mother had been stayed here. The concubines (female slaves) were also recruited here and they had also been turned into Islam. They were well-educated; for example, they learned Turkish very well, they could play a musical instrument and they would have been well-trained. The supervisor of Harem was the ‘*Harem Ağası*’ (the Agha of Harem) who was the black eunuchs. Also, there was a hierarchy in Harem.

Harem residents can be categorized into three major divisions within the institution. The first one was composed of the members who carried the title ‘sultan’ such as the ‘*valide sultan*’, ‘*haseki sultan*’, princes and princesses. The sultan’s wet nurse known as ‘*daye khatun*’, the harem stewardess, and chief officer of the institution ‘*kethüda khatun*’ had also become the member of this group after 1629. The second group was

<sup>247</sup> Mustafa Çetin Varlık, “Ottoman Institutions of XVI. Century and Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire” in *the Reign of Süleyman the Magnificent in Ottoman Empire Edited by Tülay Duran*, (Ankara: The Historical Research Foundation, 1988), p.17

<sup>248</sup> Gülru Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, (London: Reaktion Books, 2005), p.36

consisted of the harem's administrative and training staff and other women of some status.<sup>249</sup> “The third one was the rank-and-file service corps.”<sup>250</sup> In addition, the *haseki* and *valide sultan* who was at the top were the two major figures in Harem.

In addition, Harem was an organized structure and it was similar to Enderun.

“The transformation of the imperial harem into a coherent and highly articulated institution was a principal feature of post-Süleymanic dynastic politics. This transformation was the result of changes that occurred during the reigns of Süleyman and his successors, in particular the consolidation of the royal family in the capital.”<sup>251</sup>

By the end of the sixteenth century, neither male nor female royal family member left the capital without the sultan. However, they had gone to Hijaz because of Haj duty but just female member could have gone to Hijaz and the Ottoman princes could go overthere when they were abroad; for example, Cem Sultan. Additionally, it is a well known fact that the Ottoman sultans had never gone to Hijaz.

“Sons as well as mothers became permanent inhabitants of the inner world of the palace. As the sixteenth century progressed, the ranks of the royal residence steadily grew, first absorbing the suites of royal concubines and then those of princes, and adding service staff to accommodate the needs of the harem's increased population. The soaring of palace expenses in the late sixteenth century, generally thought to be result of the devotion of past-Süleymanic sultans to a life of pleasure, was primarily the result of the dynastic family's consolidation into a single household.”<sup>252</sup>

The rise to power of the imperial harem was based on two major reasons which were to the presence of the royal family in the capital and to the integration of the domestic (and principally female) side of the royal household into the imperial residence.<sup>253</sup>

It should be remembered that the members of the Harem had stayed in the Old Palace known as ‘*Saray-i Atik*’ until the reign of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman.

<sup>249</sup> Leslie P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 125

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 125

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119

*'Birun'*, the Imperial Council, and Palace Officers

*'Birun'* was the outer service which consisted of the scholars, physicians, the chief surgeon, the ophthalmologist, and the astrologer like *'Müneccim Başı'* (a head of the astrologer). On the other hand, *Birun* had also consisted of the *'Emins'* (the Commissioners) such as the *'Şehir Emini'* (the Commissioner of the City), the *'Darphane Emini'* (the Commissioner of the Mint), the *'Matbah-ı Amire Emini'* (the Commissioner of the Imperial Kitchen) and the *'Arpa Emini'* (the Commissioner of the Grains).

Another basic central administrative institution was the Imperial Council, *'Divan-ı Humayun'*. *'Divan-ı Humayun'* had met every day at the reign of Conqueror; the meeting days had been limited in four days in the second half of the sixteenth century. The other two days without these four ones were accepted as the *'arz'* (petition) days.<sup>254</sup>

The Imperial Council had met at Topkapı Palace under the *'Cupola'* (*Kubbealtı*). The members of this council were the Grand Vizier, the *Kazasker* of Rumelia and Anatolia (the Military judge of Rumelia and Anatolia), the *Nişancı* who was responsible for putting the ciphers on the documents, the *Defterdar* (the head of the fiscal officer) and the *Kaptan-ı Derya* (the head of the naval army). Moreover, the viziers of *'Kubbealtı'* were also the members of the Imperial Council.

The viziers of *'Kubbealtı'* were the members of *kalemiye* class of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Additionally, the *'Nişancı'* and *'Defterdar'* were also the members of the same branch.

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<sup>254</sup> Mustafa Çetin Varlık, "Ottoman Institutions of XVI. Century and Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in the Ottoman Empire" in *the Reign of Süleyman the Magnificent* Edited by Tülay Duran, (Ankara: The Historical Research Foundation, 1988), p. 35

“Nişancı” or “Tevkii” was a member of the Imperial Council who was charged with the duty of putting the “NİŞAN” (mark, seal) of the Sultan which meant his signature, on the head of the official documents of the state such as “ferman”, “berat” (title of privilege), “menşur” (Imperial letter), “Name” (message), “mektup” (letter), “Ahid-name” (convention) and “Hüküm” (decrees) which action was also called, then, “Tuğra Çekmek” (writing the Sultans monogram on documents).”<sup>255</sup>

“This central department where the responsibility for the clerical work of the State was born was under the control of “Nişancı”. “Nişancı” was a member of the Imperial Council whereas the “Reisülküttap” had no seat in the Council; he served on foot.”<sup>256</sup>

There were twenty five major scribes in the ‘*Divan-ı Hümayun*’. All of them recorded the documents that were sent to *Divan-ı Hümayun* and they also recorded the copies of the decisions, made in *Divan*, on the registers known as ‘*kütük defterleri*’.

The scribes of *Divan-ı Hümayun* had also been called as “*hacegan-ı Divan-ı Hümayun*” (teachers of *Divan-ı Hümayun*). In addition, “*tezkereci efendi*” was at the top of them and he would be ‘*reisü’l-küttap*’.

‘Reis Efendi’ (headmaster of these scribes) read all the documents sent to *Divan* and he wrote a copy of the decisions of *Divan*; then, the scribes wrote these decisions. After that he recorded a copy of it into the registers and he sent it to the related person via ‘*divan çavuşu*’.

It is necessary to say that all the ‘*emirs*’ had been written as the speech of sultan.

On the other hand, the foreign ambassadors had seen the ‘*reisü’l-küttap efendi*’ for the first time. In other words, the first meeting was in between the *reisü’l-küttap* and foreign ambassadors and they could meet to sadrazam if reis efendi had given permission them to meet. Moreover, he had convened with the delegation about the war and/or peace conventions after the wars. At that time, there were also the

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<sup>255</sup> Ibid. , p. 44

<sup>256</sup> Ibid. , p. 48

translators on the meetings with him. The translators in Divan-ı Hümayun were known as '*Divan-ı Hümayun tercümanı*' and they had generally been the non-Muslims, especially Phanariot Greeks until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nonetheless, this last statement is not right for the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. Because; in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, all the translators in the Palace were the Muslims who were turned into Islam from Christianity.<sup>257</sup>

The responsibility of translator was so important in İstanbul that they were used for the official meetings although a foreign diplomat, who was participated in these meetings, had known Turkish.<sup>258</sup>

The translators were the non-Muslim settlers in İstanbul; that is, they were obliged to learn the language of the people who conquered their cities where they lived.<sup>259</sup> For instance, Greek Teodor Paleologos or Pantolone Coressi who had made the translations between Istanbul and Venice in the first half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>260</sup>

In other words, a Muslim man did not learn a non-Muslim's language. However, there were many languages such as Arabic, Persian, Greek, Turkish, and Hebrew which were spoken in the Ottoman Empire.

In the last 16<sup>th</sup> century, although the translators of Ottoman Empire could have talked to the western emperors in western languages, they had spoken in Turkish and the documents were also in Turkish because non-Turkish documents were not valid for the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, there was also another translator at the meetings in

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<sup>257</sup> Maria Pia Pedani, *Doğu'nun Kapısı Venedik Translated by Gökçen Karaca Şahin*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2015), p. 175

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174

order to have enough time to understand and give an answer to the question.<sup>261</sup> These translators had joined in the meetings for the peace treaties at the highest level.

The head of the translators had carried the title of '*baştercüman*' (head of the translators) and all these translators including *baştercüman* were under control of '*reisü'l-küttap efendi*'.

Briefly, the *reisü'l-küttap efendi* was the head of the '*Divan-ı Hümayun Kalemî*' (The bureaus of *Divan-ı Hümayun*).

He had controlled over three main branches such as the '*Beylikçi or Divan Kalemî*' (The Bureau of Imperial Council), the '*Tahvil or Nişan Kalemî*' (The Bureau of Bill Office) and the '*Ruus Kalemî*' (The Bureau of appointments).

These three bureaus have shown that the bureaucracy had been constituted and it had been enlarged day by day. Also, all of them were the parts of the '*kalemiye*'; that is, they were '*ahl-i kalem*'.

'*Kalemiye*' was a class whose members were responsible for the official secretariat occupations. Also, they included "secretaries of the state, ministers, councillors, legal and financial administrators exemplifying traditions of professional expertise and fidelity to royal interest."<sup>262</sup>

First of all, it can be said that one of the major reason of this kind of institutionalization in the global transformation at that time (in the sixteenth century) because of that the more centralized administrations could be seen in most of the empires such as the Safavids, Mughals, and Ottomans. According to this new trend,

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<sup>261</sup> Ibid. , p. 149

<sup>262</sup> Kaya Şahin, *Empire and Power In The Reign of Suleiman Narrating in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.217

the new group known as '*kalemiye*' defined as the secretaries had been occurred.

“Secretaries were promoted, mostly from the lower ranks of elites and nobilities, to assist the monarchs in the diplomatic correspondence, histories and the political treatises.”<sup>263</sup>

Nevertheless to say that this class could not have been turned into the aristocratic one but it can also be said that this class succeeded to turn into the bureaucratic class through the end of the sixteenth century in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>264</sup>

Some of the major members of this class were the scribes, the scholars or the judges in the earlier times. However, these three groups would have been separated from each other at the reign of Sultan Suleiman I.

“What distinguishes the sixteenth century from the fifteenth in terms of personal is, first, the near-exclusive recruitment of secretaries from among the graduates of Ottoman madrasas and/or the sons of the '*askeri*' class. In the earlier periods, scholar-secretaries were mobile because they could offer their services to other Muslim rulers, whereas slave-secretaries remained members of the sultan's household. The new secretaries working for the Ottoman administration during Mustafa's professional career were, in this sense, more Ottoman and local. This allowed for further cohesion, as some secretaries studied together, belonged to the same local networks, the same religious orders, and so forth. It also facilitated their identification with the political and cultural agendas of Ottoman imperialism. Unlike the slave-secretaries of the previous century, on the other hand, the new secretaries did not belong to the sultan's household and constituted a separate entity. Although they were madrasa graduates, they were differentiated, through the nature of their work, from the religious scholars as well as the administrators and military commanders, most of whom were of *devshirme* origin. It is true that patronage played an important role in recruitment; moreover, some secretaries continued to engage in *extra muros* economic activities. Despite these dynamics, which may be seen by a strict Weberian approach as hampering the formation of a distinct bureaucratic apparatus, the secretarial career continued to evolve in to a distinct professional, cultural, and political trajectory in Süleyman's reign.”<sup>265</sup>

The importance of the official secretaries had increased parallel to the increasing of the wars. Because of that these wars led the diplomatic relations and the results to be born thus the diplomatic language had also gained the importance.

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid. , p.214

<sup>264</sup> Ibid. , p.214

<sup>265</sup> Ibid. , p.216-217

It can be said that one of the major reasons of this effort was the diplomatic communication that led the diplomatic transformation to be occurred in the sixteenth century. In addition, this diplomatic communication also led the global competition to be taken a place at that time. Because of that this class had started to become institutionalized although it could not be turned into the aristocratic one.

On the other hand, the documents; for example, the letters written at the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent can give the information about the Ottoman attitudes towards the foreign powers. Due to the fact that the writing style (the tone of documents) is important as much as the content of document, actually. Therefore, these documents were the most significant ones in terms of the political situations and the diplomatic relations at that time.

To conclude, the Ottoman bureaucratic offices had been started to be more institutionalized at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I. These bureaus were improved in parallel to the diplomatic relations. Also, these diplomatic relations had provided these offices to gain more importance than before.

#### The Administration under Akbar Shah

“The emperor, styled as *padshah*, was recognized as the caliph within his realm. He, therefore, owned no allegiance to the Ottoman caliphs who claimed to have inherited the mantle from the Abbasid caliphs of Egypt” as I. H. Qureshi says.<sup>266</sup>

It doesn't seem that whether Akbar was related to the Ottoman caliph or he did not accept him as the caliph of Islam but it is certainly be known that the Akbar's attitude

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<sup>266</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p.172

towards the religion had been changed in time to time. The most probably, Akbar Shah was not connected to the Ottoman Caliphate.

On the other hand, “Akbar’s claim to be the caliph, which was never given up, could be sustained only by the Sunni schools of jurisprudence; this did not suit Abu’l Fazl. No school of Islam could really serve his purpose; therefore, he put forward a theory which he thought would satisfy all. According to him, “royalty is a light emanating from God”, which “is communicated by God to kings without the intermediate assistance of any one”; and “no dignity is higher in the eyes of God than royalty”. The inspiration for this theory seems to have come from the Shi’ah theory of the imamate, which of course, Abu’l Fazl could not adopt in its entirety, because of Akbar not belonging to the line of the hereditary *imams*.”<sup>267</sup>

It should be added that Akbar was a Sunni man although he sometimes supported to the Safavids against the Ottomans because of the political reasons, it was not related to the religious ones. There are two possible reasons of Akbar Shah’s this attitude.

The first major one is that the relationships between the Iranians and the Mughals were the ancestral heritage for Akbar Shah. For example, his father, Humayun Shah, was in contact with the Shah of Iran, Shah Tahmasp, who helped him to cope with the both his brother, Kamran’s conflict against him and Afghan pressure on him.

Humayun Shah had captured Kabul again with the help of Shah Tahmasp although he had hidden approximately fifteen years. On the other hand, the Ottomans had strictly marched to the east; in other words, they had tried to capture the right side of the Black Sea which lied on the Middle Asia [In many times later, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had thought that the Hazar Sea and the Black Sea could be combined with the project of Don-Volga which facilitated the naval forces could have passed easily or the trade ships could also have used this route.], the area of the Iranian impact would have become smaller and may be this situation would have led the Iran to be subjected to the Ottomans’ attacks, apparently.

In briefly, the political attitude of Akbar Shah was based on the friendlier relationship with the neighbor who was not the rivals. Therefore, it can be said that Akbar Shah

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<sup>267</sup> Ibid. , p.173

was successful about the external politics; also, he was successful as much as the internal politics that he provided the empire to become more centralized with the political institutionalization.

“He evolved from a twelve-year-old Timurid prince supervised by his own *atabeg*, the Qara Qyunlu Turk Bairam Khan, to the triumphant status of a dominant South Asian emperor, himself a *Padishah* in reality rather than in aspiration, as Babur had been when he assumed this title while ruling uneasily in Kabul in 1506. Akbar at least began with the advantage of his Turco-Mongol, that is Timurid-Chingizid, geneology, which he had court historians and artists repeatedly publicize in the relative calm of his boon companion and court historian, Abu'l Fazl 'Allami, like the nearly contemporary Safavid historians of Isfahan, proclaimed that Akbar himself possessed or radiated the pre-Islamic Iranian divine essence, the *farr*. ...

First, he integrated the Rajputs, the dominant north Indian Hindu warrior class, into the empire through intermarriage, imperial appointments, and concessions to Hindu sensibilities. Secondly, Akbar sought to define himself not just as a Timurid or as a Muslim ruler but more broadly as an Indian monarch by publicizing his non-secretarian piety, shaped partly by a profound interest in Hinduism and such other Indian religious traditions as Buddhism and Jainism.”<sup>268</sup>

Akbar Shah had played a specific role as an extraordinary ruler so that he worked to control over the different subjects lived under the sovereignty of him as he emphasized on his Timurid-Turkic background and Persian influences on him, Islam and native Indian culture and religion was shaped his reign; also, he shaped the governmental tools.

### The Mughal Central Administration

One of the most significant offices was '*wizarat*' whose members were '*vizir*'. In generally, the major responsibility of the vizir was to assist the sultan in order to administrate both imperially and provincially. In addition to this, he was also responsible for keeping control over the financial, military and the judicial situations.<sup>269</sup>

<sup>268</sup> Stephen F. Dale, *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.80

<sup>269</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire And Its Decline An Interpretation Of The Sources Of Social Power* (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p.67

At the reign of Akbar, the role of vizir that was called as the ‘*vakil*’ by the Mughals had been changed and he created the new offices which had the different functions so the effects of these vakils on the state administration had highly been reduced.<sup>270</sup> In other words, the transformations in this group like that the power and the authority of Akbar Shah to be increased when the vakils get become passive rather than before.

It is necessary to say that Akbar Shah was a highly creative emperor. For example, he had the balcony which was known as the ‘*jharokah-i darshan*’ made up in order to show him to the populace every morning similar to the Hindu practice.<sup>271</sup> Also, he practiced the custom of ‘*Tuladan*’ or weighing of himself in gold or silver and distributing this amount among the poor. This was basically a Hindu practice alien to Islam.<sup>272</sup> Akbar Shah had participated in the Hindu rituals and festivals so the Hindus were close to him.<sup>273</sup> On the other hand, he had practically legitimized himself to the different religious groups via this way.

“In the fortress palaces of Agra, Delhi, and Lahore, there was provided a balcony overlooking the open space lying between the moat and the river, where a large concourse of men could collect without let or hindrance. Akbar was the originator of this idea. A sect, called the *Darshaniyahs*, grew up among the Hindus, who considered it auspicious and an act of worship to behold the face of the emperor before transacting any business; they neither ate nor drink until they had seen the emperor. Any person who had any plaint to make to the emperor or sought redress of some grievance could raise his hand and men attached to the department of *mazalim* would collect those petitions and escort the petitioners into the emperor’s presence in the *diwan-i ‘am* or, sometimes, *diwan-i khas*.”<sup>274</sup>

*Dawlat-khanah-i ‘am wa khas*; in shortly, *diwan-i-am* was used to define the hall of public audience. “All business of a formal nature was mostly transacted here. The

<sup>270</sup> Ibid. , p.67

<sup>271</sup> Salma Ahmed Farooqui, *Islam and the Mughal State*, (New Delhi: Sundeep Prakashan, 2005), p.98

<sup>272</sup> Ibid. , p. 98

<sup>273</sup> Ibid. , p. 98

<sup>274</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p.175

*diwan-i-a'la* or the chief *diwan*, the first *bakhshi*, the royal princes, the higher officials of the state and the *mansabdars* were in attendance.”<sup>275</sup>

The high officials had to stand close to the throne in order to make the political and financial reports. The *bakhshi* presented the petitions of the *mansabdars* whom of them received the orders to promote or assign the new responsibilities. Also, they came from the provinces and the remote parts of the empire paid their respects as I. H. Qureshi says.<sup>276</sup>

“It was here that the *ahadis* were presented through their *bakhshi* and the *mir atish* brought the mounted musketeers for review. Matters regarding the *khalisah* and the *buyutat* were reported by the *diwan* and *mir saman*. The petitions of the princes and governors of provinces were presented here; the emperor read the important applications himself, while those from officials of lower grades were read out to him by the officers. The *sadr* presented the applications of the provincial *sadrs* and made recommendations regarding the stipends and grants for the learned and the pious. The emperor reviewed the beasts belonging to the imperial stables. The officer in charge of *'ard-i-mukarrar* received confirmation of the previous orders.”<sup>277</sup>

On the other hand, it can be said that the four major officers in the various state branches such as the *diwan* or *wazir* was responsible for revenue and finance, the *Mir Bakhshi* was responsible for the administration and organization of the army, the *sadr* was the head of the religious and judicial department, and the *Mir Saman* was the Chief Executive Officers in charge of factories and stores maintained by the state.<sup>278</sup>

### The Mughal Provincial Administration

The Mughal Empire can be divided into the six major groups in terms of the administrative division. This division was based on the territorial one. For example, the Mughal Empire was divided into the provinces like the Ottoman Empire. All the provinces were divided into the *sarkars* which was divided into the *parganas* or *mahals*. In addition, the provincial administrative system was highly to the central

<sup>275</sup> Ibid. , p.175

<sup>276</sup> Ibid. , p.49

<sup>277</sup> Ibid. , p.49

<sup>278</sup> Andre Hintze, *The Mughal Empire And Its Decline An Interpretation Of The Sources Of Social Power* (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p.67

one. For example, there was a hierarchical order in the provinces like in the centre as Andrea Hintze mentions.

Firstly, the '*nizam*'; in other words, '*subahdar*', controlled the huge part of the province, was at the top of this hierarchical order. However, if the province had been more important, the sultan could have sent the high important mansabdars to there. The major responsibilities of these people who governed in the town and if it had been necessary to punish the people who rejected the orders, they could punish them.

Secondly, there was also '*diwan*' like in the center. This *diwan* was the second officer in the province and he was directly responsible to the imperial *diwan*. There were the distinctions between these officers; however, the *diwan subahdar* worked together, closely. "The staff of this provincial diwan consisted of the *peshkar*, *darogha*, *munshif* and *tahwildar*. He and his staff were responsible for collecting the taxes and the expenditure of the different departments on the *sarkars* and *pargana* levels."<sup>279</sup>

Thirdly, the *bakhshi* cooperated with the mansabdars and he was responsible for supporting the military necessities like the horses, soldiers, etc. "*He issued the pay bills for the mansabdars.*"<sup>280</sup>

Fourthly, the provincial judicial system had consisted of two main offices. The first one was '*sadr*'; related to the religious matters, and the second one was '*gazi*'; related to the judicial affairs.

The fifth one was the '*faujdar*' who worked for the '*amil*' in order to collect the taxes. The '*amil*' was a person in contact with the peasants and took the reports about the cultivated lands.

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<sup>279</sup> Ibid. , p.69

<sup>280</sup> Ibid. , p.69

On the other hand, the *gazi* of a *sarkars* took the main significant religious responsibilities without administrating the jurisdiction like distributing the religious funds, conforming the *madad-i ma'ash* grants and, later on, being put in charge of the collection of the religious taxes –*zakat* (legal alms) and *jiziah* (poll tax levied on non-Muslims).<sup>281</sup>

Another important figure was the '*mir-muhalla*. He was an appointed man to register all the people lived there and to provide the regulation of the town markets, “to keep records of prices”, to control the trade and the merchants. Also, he was responsible for controlling prostitutes, preventing and “prosecuting forcible *sati* (the burning of widows)” and regulating the animal slaughtering. Additionally, the *faujdar*; sometimes, could have taken the criminal responsibility. Here, it is necessary to explain what '*muhalla*' means. The '*muhalla*' was the smallest parts of the '*kotwal*' which was subdivided into the wards (*muhalla*).

The last one was that a *shiqdar*, an *amin*, a *qanungo* and a *gazi* who were supported by their respective staff, administrated the *pargana* was made up of the villages. The *shiqdar* was at the top.

“He had to register the residents of the rural area under his supervision, write reports on each person or family and take notice of arrival and departures. The *shiqdar* had to assist the *amin* in the collection of the revenue (*hasil*), especially in the cases of recalcitrant peasants who tried to evade taxation. The *amil* and his staff carried out the actual assessment (*jama*) and realization of the revenue. The *qanungo* was the accountant of the *pargana*.”<sup>282</sup>

He was responsible for “keeping records of the taxes”, “the size, and value and changing ownership of land”, “of corps and farms”, “and of the assessment methods themselves.” The two of them which were the *amil* and the *qanungo*, were responsible

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<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, p.69

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, p.70

for directly communicating with the village officials and the cultivators because of that they collected the taxes.<sup>283</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that this kind of administrative system facilitated to govern all parts of the empire; therefore, it helped the sultan's authority to be felt over the provinces although they were far away from the centre and it helped the political unity and continuity to be provided.

### The Fiscal Institutions

#### Fiscal Institutions and Land Administration at the Reign of Akbar Shah

The Mughals had developed a well-organized financial system that was based on mostly the Islamic theory and the ancient tradition and the local Indian customs although Akbar Shah had changed the system as an extra ordinary emperor.

First of all, it is necessary to explain the classification of the taxes collected at the period of the Mughals according to Islam.

To begin with, the legal sources of the incomes of the states had separated into the two major groups such as the taxes paid by the Muslims and the other ones were paid by the non- Muslims.

Taxes were divided into two groups. The first one was that a Muslim paid as his religious obligation and the state collected to expend in an organized and orderly manner. The second type consisted of the legitimate taxes. In other words, the state collected to administrate the affairs of the settlers of the area under its control. The

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<sup>283</sup> Ibid. , p.70

first one was used for '*ushr* and *zakat*. The second one consisted of the *jiziah*, *kharaj* and the other taxes like that as the state could legitimately rise.<sup>284</sup>

“As a rule the property assessable for *zakat* should have been in the owner’s possession for at least for at least one year. This law, however, enabled some property owners to evade payment with impunity. For example, Makhdumu’l-Mulk used to transfer all his property to his wife towards the end of the year and then repossess it before the year had run out. Similar tricks are ascribed to several Muslim dignitaries. *Zakat* money is paid specifically to different categories of poor people and was not a source of revenue for the rulers.”<sup>285</sup>

In contrast to this, pious traders consciously paid their *zakat* because of that some of them believed that it protected them and it provided their incomes to be increased although some of them had also rejected to pay it.<sup>286</sup>

“The Mughal government generally demanded taxes on the import and export of commodities by traders and merchants, though a distinction in rates was made between the various denominations of traders: while Muslims paid only 2,5 percent on the value of imported commodities, Christian and Jewish traders paid 3,5 percent, whereas Hindu traders were required to pay duties at a rate of 5 percent. Various inland tools and custom duties were charged on roads, river ferries, sea ports, etc. for all sorts of merchandise and transport, though a number of articles, especially essentials such as foodstuffs, various textiles, medicine, necessary utensils for daily living, were exempted. Special duties were levied on minerals and certain categories of treasure trove. Taxes on commodities were important since in some regions they were the main source of state revenue.”<sup>287</sup>

These taxes on merchandise were collected and transferred to the imperial treasury by a special administrative office.

“All sales of goods had to be made in prescribed market places which were divided into separate areas for different commodities. These *kathehrah*s were supervised by an amin who arbitrated in cases of disputed assessment. He was assisted by an accountant (*mushrif*), a treasurer (*tahwildar*), a record keeper (*qanungo*), and a person who assessed the prices of commodities (*muqim*).”<sup>288</sup>

After that a *daroghah* had been added as the superintendent and head of the organization. A *waqa’i’niga* recorded all the news which included the prevailing prices. Also, he sent this document to the court. An officially accepted headman or

<sup>284</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. 141

<sup>285</sup> S. A. A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1993), p. 180

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180

<sup>287</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire And Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power* (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p. 75

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75

*choudhari* watched the interests of the traders. In addition, the *choudhari* ‘was enjoined to keep the traders happy with his considerate behavior and conduct’.<sup>289</sup>

The jiziah had been used to define the poll tax which was obliged to be paid by the non-Muslim residents of the Muslim state. In other words, ‘*Jizya* was levied on Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, who were known as protected subjects (*zimmis*).’<sup>290</sup>

The Muslims had adopted the poll tax into themselves when they conquered the new lands because of that it had been used by both the Eastern Roman Empire and the Sassanian one. Therefore, it can be said that it was an ancient tradition on the similar areas. For example, Muhammad bin Qasim said that both the Hindus and Buddhists were the *dhimmis* and they had to pay this tax as the *dhimmis*.<sup>291</sup>

“The jiziyah was imposed only upon those who were capable of bearing arms for the state and who did not actively serve it in any capacity. All women, minors, slaves, religious hermits and priests were exempt; so were blind, those incapable of work, the insane and the incapacitated. If a person had been ill for half a lunar year or more, he was not required to pay. Those who served the state either in a military or a civil capacity were also exempt. The view, therefore, that the jiziyah was a tax paid in lieu of service to the state which the assesse would have been called upon to defend if he were a Muslim is correct. The monarch could call upon any able bodied Muslim to fight for the state and it would be his religious and legal duty to do so; after accepting the jiziyah from the *dhimmis*, the monarch could not ask him to render any service; if the *dhimmis*, of his own accord, decided to serve the state, the monarch, after accepting the offer of service could not demand the jiziyah from him.”<sup>292</sup>

In 1564, Akbar abolished the collection of jiziyah.<sup>293</sup> Although Akbar’s advisers had opposed him, he had not been imposed by their oppositions. There were the two main causes of this new application. Firstly, Akbar thought that there was not any justification to collect the jiziyah and his treasury was filled at that time. In other words, he did not need to the jiziyah taxes to become wealthier his treasury and he also thought that remitting the collection of jiziyah provided Akbar to be seen as a

<sup>289</sup> Ibid. , p. 150

<sup>290</sup> S. A. A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1993), p. 182

<sup>291</sup> Ibid. , p. 182

<sup>292</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. 143

<sup>293</sup> S. A. A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1993), p. 182

more charismatic emperor in front of the non-Muslim citizens because of that this non-Muslim population contained the Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Christians, etc. was not least at that time. On the other hand, it should be remembered that this abolition had been continued to the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan.

Another important reform was ‘*Todar Mal’s Bandobast*’.

“Starting in the 1560s, with further refinements made in the 1570s by Akbar’s revenue minister Todar Mal, land and tax reforms initially instituted by Sher Shah Sur were reinstated in an improved form. All land was measured according to a uniform imperial standard to determine the agricultural yield rate. Then, based on data gathered from a ten-year period on the yield and price of crops in any particular locality, tax rates were established with greater accuracy than ever before. The taxes, which amounted to about half of the total yield, had to be paid in cash, hence continuing Sher Shah’s emphasis on cash payment and his introduction of a standard, uniform silver coinage. The revenue was collected by middlemen known as *zamindars*. The term *zamindar* literally means landholders but it was also used in a second sense as a designation for local notables. These men essentially retained their traditional role as chiefs or leaders at the local level by paying tribute to the Mughal court, which led to little change in village or community life, while enhancing considerably the imperial coffers. Zamindars typically also maintained their own armed forces, totalling perhaps 300,000 horsemen by the mid seventeenth century.”<sup>294</sup>

“In 1570-71 Muzaffar Khan Turbati and Raja Todar Mal were asked to revise the land revenue assessments according to estimates framed by local *qanungoes*, and checked by ten officers at the head-quarters. ... In 1573, Todar Mal made his famous systematic survey of all the lands in Gujarat, which became the basis of his later reform known as Todar Mal’s *Bandobast*.” “There is no name in medieval history,” says Lane-Poole, “many renowned in India to the present day than that of Todar Mal, and the reason is that nothing in Akbar’s reforms more nearly touched the welfare of the people than the great financier’s reconstruction of the revenue system.”<sup>295</sup>

The empire had been divided into 182 equal fiscal fields in 1576-8 without Bengal, Bihar and Gujarat. Each unit yielded revenue of a *kror* of tankas or Rs. 250,000.

Actually, this perfectly well-organized system had been worked in theoretical but it had soon to be discarded because of that it could not be worked in practice.<sup>296</sup>

<sup>294</sup> Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, *India Before Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 128

<sup>295</sup> S. R. Sharma, *Mughal Empire In India 1526-1761-Part I*, (Bombay: Karnatak Printing Press, 1934), p.312

<sup>296</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 312

The other important financial source is *kharaj*; that is the land revenue. This one had not been known before the thirteenth century and it had been started to be occurred in India by the Arab rulers of Sind and the Ghaznavid rulers.<sup>297</sup>

“The owners of cultivated land were not dispossessed, but and land, particularly that near the capital, whose owner had been killed in battle or was not traceable was allotted to Muslims. The Muslim owners paid one-tenth (‘*ushr*’) of their produce in tax on land watered by rain, but on land dependent for irrigation with buckets or wheels only one-twentieth of the produce was paid as a levy. These blocks of land were known as ‘*ushri*’. The land left with its known Hindu owners and that allotted to Hindus was known as *kharaji* or *kharaj-paying* (land-revenue paying) land. Other terms used for *kharaj*, especially under the Mughals, were *hasil* or *mal*. In the thirteenth century a collective assessment of revenue was made on the villages. Their chiefs, known as *ranas*, *ra’is* and *rawats*, paid revenue to the *iqta’* holders.”<sup>298</sup>

### Land Administration in the Mughal Empire

Another important main point in the Mughal Financial resource was the agrarian administration. Because of that the Mughal economy was mainly based on the agriculture due to the two major reasons. First of all, the Mughal Empire had the largest territories which contained the largest agricultural lands and secondly, the most of the Mughal population was made up of the peasants who engaged in farming in the villages. Therefore, the production was mostly based on the agricultural goods.

Before the Muslims entered the subcontinent, there was a well-organized system.

The peasants had to be protected; encouraged and helped in order to produce and share the products with the state because of that the agriculture was the basic source for the economy.<sup>299</sup> Therefore, the Mughals had tried to increase the agricultural efficiency although sometimes the rebellions had affected the system awfully.

“Agrarian administration has received the closest attention of various governments established in the subcontinent throughout history; only when anarchy or disorders made efficient government impossible, did agrarian administration receive a setback. Sher Shah devoted considerable attention to it after the breakdown following the anarchy preceding his reign;

<sup>297</sup> S. A. A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1993), p. 183

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 184

<sup>299</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p.162

therefore, Akbar did not have to search very far for previous traditions. He, however, increased its efficiency and introduced some far reaching reforms.”<sup>300</sup>

The Hindus had improved various methods to produce and share the goods between the emperor's and the peasants. The major principal was to separate the produce among them.

“When the crops were reaped, they were stacked and then the share of the state was taken out.

This could be done before or after thrashing; Abu'l Fadl calls the former *bata'i* or *bhaoli*, and the latter long *bata'i*. If the crops were divided while still standing by dividing the area of the field, it was called *khet bata'i*.”<sup>301</sup>

Although this system has been seen as the simplest one, there were some difficulties throughout the process such as lengthy and cumbersome. Thus, the most trustable way had been found for assessing the share of the state.

“With experience the appraisers would be able to determine the likely yield fairly accurately. In any case, the peasant could always ask for actual division of the crops if he was dissatisfied. In course of time the appraisers as well as the peasants came to know how much of a commodity a unit area produced in a locality; they had only to measure the area cultivated to determine the yield. This method was called measurement.”<sup>302</sup>

The sharing in different methods, the appraisalment and the measurement had been the three basic elements of these methods. They had been improved in the antiquity and mentioned in the *jatakas*.<sup>303</sup>

The agricultural lands had been divided into the three main categories such as the *ushri*, *kharaji* and *sulhi lands* by the Muslims.

The first category's lands had belonged to the religious men or the Muslim scholars who had been responsible for paying *ushr* to the state although some of them did not have any responsibility to pay such this tax. The second one had belonged to the non-

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid. , p. 161

<sup>301</sup> Ibid. , p. 162

<sup>302</sup> Ibid. , p. 163

<sup>303</sup> Ibid. , p. 162

Muslim groups. The last one was the sulhi lands. “As these lay outside the subcontinent, there is no need to discuss their nature.”<sup>304</sup> After that the Muslims had created a new category, called as *ard-i mumlikat* means that the ownership vested in the state. “There is no mention of this category in the historical literature of the Muslim period in the subcontinent. This category, also may, therefore, be dismissed. The only two categories found during the Muslim rule in the subcontinent are the ‘*ushri* and *kharaji* lands.”<sup>305</sup>

On the other hand, the land revenue in the Mughals’ world had three categories such as the ‘*khalisa*’ lands, ‘*jagir*’ lands and the ‘*madad-i ma’ash*’ lands.

‘*Khalisa*’ lands; in other words the ‘crown lands’, had been organized by *amils* who were also known as *karoris* in the *khalisa*. [Here, it is necessary to say that the Mughal *Khalisa* lands were similar to the Ottoman ‘*Has*’ lands.] These taxes from the *khalisa* lands were sent to the imperial treasury directly and these sources had to be used for the emperor, his household, his own army and the cash payments of the salaries to *mansabdars*.<sup>306</sup>

These *khalisa* lands had been enlarged day by day at the period of the Mughal Empire. Furthermore, these lands were the largest part of the empire at the reign of Akbar Shah.

‘*Jagir*’ lands; in generally, meant to the cash salaries for the service of the *mansabdars*. The *jagirdars* appointed their own *amils* and other staff for the collection of land revenues, which relieved the central government of an enormous administrative burden.

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<sup>304</sup> Ibid. , p. 164

<sup>305</sup> Ibid. , p. 164

<sup>306</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire And Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power* (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p.77

It is necessary to mention about the ‘*watan-jagirs*’ that was the ancestral lands of subordinate rulers in Rajasthan and Deccan. It had been constituted the third category of land.<sup>307</sup> “These jagirs were bequeatable, but the emperor had the right to nominate the successor raja. Besides, the rajas had to adopt, at least outwardly, the Mughal pattern of administration in their domains, as they were a part of the empire.”<sup>308</sup>

“The Mughuls tended gradually to encroach upon the autonomy of such rulers; a well-known method was to enroll them as mansabdars and to give them their hereditary territories as jagirs.”<sup>309</sup>

“However, in this form the system would have given unlimited freedom to the *mansabdars*, who by misusing their military power and over-exploiting the resources of their jagirs would easily have been able to undermine the power of the emperor and destroy the financial basis of the state. In order to secure an efficient and loyal imperial service and to limit their power, the mansabdars were personally supervised and their privileges checked by a firmly established, parallel control system. The effective supervision of the jagirdars, as has been described, was provided by the various institutions of the administration and built-in control mechanisms which aimed at a basic balancing of interest between traditional local power holders (zamindars and village magnates), the peasants and the jagirdars.”<sup>310</sup>

The Mughal check-balance system had been based on the many basic imperial principles. First of all; while the jagirdars prevented the foundation of any permanent land rights and local ties, the jagirs had been transferred after short periods and the average time of tenure was limited approximately three or four years only. Secondly, the hereditary rights of descendants of the nobility were blocked by the empire in general.<sup>311</sup>

Neither the *mansab* nor the *jagir* were hereditary and the emperor could legally confiscate the property of his officers after their deaths. This principle ensured that the *mansabdars* were employed on an individual basis according to their loyalty and competent service. Also, neither rank nor property could be passed on to their heirs; thus, this situation was useless for them to amass wealth. Thirdly, the government took advantage of the indigenous social control system by employing representatives of the traditional village administration and integrating them into the *imperial* administration. The village elite, local chiefs, *zamindars* and other leaders functioned as institutions of control because their own interests and that of their

<sup>307</sup> Abraham Eraly, *The Mughal World: India's Tainted Paradise*, (London: Phoenix, 2008), p.270

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 270

<sup>309</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. p. 172

<sup>310</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire And Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power* (Aldershot, Bradfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate Publishing, 1997), p. 77

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78

clients, the peasants, were immediately endangered by any mismanagement by the *jagirdars*.”<sup>312</sup>

Nevertheless, there was a conflict between the zamindars and jagirdars although both of them were responsible for the agricultural production and collecting the taxes. “Any financial pressure on the *jagirdars* resulted in increasing efforts to pass their losses on to the *zamindars*, while at the same time any resistance from the *zamindars* to the tax collections of the *jagirdars* meant an increasing pressure on the latter.”<sup>313</sup>

Although there was a conflict or destruction could be seen on the system, it had been continued to survive for a long time. For example, when these two groups were the representators of the government on the local area, they could start to be the local power which was against the government.

“The resulting frequent conflicts with recalcitrant local zamindars who resisted the growing tax demands intensified the pressure on the jagirdars and multiplied their problems: delays in the payments of troops, for example, lessened their capacity to crush local revolts in their jagirs and, above all, the prolonged process of revenue realization and frequent military conflicts in the localities significantly increased the overall collection costs. These problems tended to disunite the Mughal ruling class and contributed much to the growing political factionalism at court.”<sup>314</sup>

On the other hand, this system was so functional and pragmatic that the government could have controlled over the local areas via this way.

The other important tax “was the madad-i ma’ash which was distributed as grants to scholar, religious learned men, to poor and destitute ‘holy’ men and religious leaders, and to persons of noble origin with no other source of income.”<sup>315</sup>

“Although Akbar had granted a few madad-i ma’ash lands to non-Muslims, the large majority of beneficiaries were Muslim families who settled in the interior of India amongst the local Hindu population.”<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>312</sup> Ibid. , p. 78

<sup>313</sup> Ibid. , p. 78

<sup>314</sup> Ibid. , p. 79

<sup>315</sup> Ibid. , p. 80

## Fiscal Institution and Land Administration at the Reign of Sultan Süleyman I

“Numerous scholars have attempted to conceptualise the Ottoman economy. With the exception of the Asian Mode of Production, based primarily on Marxist ideas, which is basically deductive, all of the relevant models are inductive; in other words, they attempt to generalize on the basis of historical observations. We will now focus on the known facts about the Ottoman economy in its political context and refer to these models whenever pertinent.

Beginning with Ömer Lütfi Barkan, several scholars have published and analysed Ottoman annual account books, for which in our field the term “budgets” has become customary; some of these accounts may refer to periods shorter or longer than a single year. Most recently, Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar have summarised earlier studies and expanded them through their own work on Ottoman budgets. As a result, we now possess a reasonably good idea about the size and other characteristics of Ottoman imperial revenues and, albeit indirectly, of the economy that produced them.”<sup>317</sup>

The Ottoman economy had been changed in time to time because of the newly conquered territories. For example, the revenues and expenditures had been increased clearly throughout the sixteenth century.<sup>318</sup> There is a big difference between the income and expenditure rates at the reign of Sultan Bayezid II and the same rates at the reign of Sultan Süleyman I when the Ottoman governments treasury incomes and expenditure have been analyzed in terms of the ‘*akche*’ and the silver content of it. Between the years of 1509 and 1527, the Ottoman government central treasury income had been quadrupled; on the one hand, the expenditure had also been tripled. Certainly, the major cause of this increasing was the conquests of Syria and Egypt at the reign of Sultan Selim I because the taxation income in the treasury had also been increased with these conquests. Through the sixteenth century, the Ottoman economy had achieved the highest rates of central treasury incomes in the economic years of 1527, 1581 and 1582 in terms of the silver content of ‘*akche*’.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid. , p. 80

<sup>317</sup> Ebru Boyar, “Ottoman Expansion in the East” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey II, The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603* Edited by Suraiya N. Faroqhi & Kate Fleet, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 246

<sup>318</sup> Ibid. , p. 246

<sup>319</sup> Mehmet Genç, Erol Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesi Kurumlar ve Bütçeler 1*, (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), p. 208

The sixteenth century was the century of economic enlargement both in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire. Not only the fiscal incomes but also the expenditure had seriously been increased in Europe at this time.

### Land Administration in the Ottoman Empire

The land administration was one of the most significant parts of the administration that it was an inevitable part of the taxation in the Ottoman Empire. Also, the land administration was not limited with the taxation that means it also contains the provincial administration. In other words, it was the reflection of the central administration on the province.

“From the earliest period of the Ottoman sultans had always appointed two authorities to administer a district- the bey, who came from the military class and represented the sultan’s executive authority, and the kadı, who came from the ulema and represented the sultan’s legal authority. The bey could not inflict any punishment without first obtaining the kadı’s judgement, but the kadı could not personally execute any of his own sentences. In his decisions and his application of the şeriat and kanun, the kadı was independent of the bey. He received his commands directly from the sultan, whom he could also petition directly. The Ottomans considered this division of power in the provincial government as essential to a just administration.”<sup>320</sup>

The Ottoman land administration system had been made up of three different divisions known as the ‘*hukumet sanjaks*’, ‘*salyanah provinces*’, and the ‘*timar*’ system’.

### The Ottoman ‘Sanjaks’

The Ottoman territory was divided into the ‘*sanjaks*’ and they were administrated by a military governor, called as ‘*sanjak beyi*’. The Ottoman princes were sent to these sanjaks in order to learn the administration; that is, they were trained to rule the government as they had experienced like that. In other words, a sanjak beyi was the symbol of the major authority in the province. However, there was another power

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<sup>320</sup> Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire Classical Age 1300-1600. Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber*, (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1973), p. 5

over these sanjak beys; it was called as the '*beylerbeylik*'. The first beylerbeylik was established in Rumelia at the reign of Sultan Murad I.

Then, his son Bayezid who was sent to Kütahya as a governor, created a new beylerbeylik whose capital was Kütahya and it contained all the western sides of Anatolia. After that he also established a new beylerbeylik in Amasya which was the most important one in the empire. As a result of this, the Ottoman Empire had had the three beylerbeyliks until the middle of the fifteenth century. Moreover, these territories had continued to constitute the '*backbone of the empire*.'<sup>321</sup>

It is necessary to remind that the numbers of the beylerbeyliks had been increased in parallel to the new conquests. For example, there were just six beylerbeyliks when Sultan Süleyman had come to the throne in 1520. In contrast to this; there were the sixteen beylerbeyliks when he left from the throne.

#### 'Salyanah Provinces'

“The government could implement the timar regime only in those areas where the sanjak system, Ottoman law and Ottoman administration were firmly established. The timar system was not in force in the provinces of Egypt, Baghdad, Abyssinia, Basra and Lahsa, which therefore preserved some local autonomy. The sultan stationed Janissary garrisons in each of these provinces and appointed a governor, defterdar and kadi. The provincial revenues were not distributed to sipahis as timars, but the governor, after paying all the military and administrative expenses of the province, had to remit to the capital a fixed annual sum, known as *salyane*. These provinces came to be known as *salyane* provinces.”<sup>322</sup>

The Ottoman government had aimed to have the cash money with this *salyanah* system. Although it was seen as the best solution to have cash money, first of all, it had been turned into the '*iltizam*' system in the long run.

“Ottoman land theory, generally derived from the traditions of the Islamic world, gave the sultan ultimate control of all lands. There were three main categories of land: *miri* (*miri*), *mulk*, and *vaqf* (*vakf*). In all three categories, the peasants on the land received the right to cultivate it in return for the payment of taxes to a recipient designated, or at least approved, by the sultan. The Imperial Treasury controlled the revenue of *miri* land, receiving it directly, farming it out in return for cash payment, or assigning it as salary. *Mulk* land was granted by

<sup>321</sup> Ibid. , p. 104

<sup>322</sup> Ibid. , p. 105

the sultan as heritable and alienable freehold. *Vaqf* land paid their revenues to charitable endowments that served either religious or social welfare purposes. Obviously, much of the income, thus the power, of the empire depended on the amount of land in the *miri* category. Strong and aggressive rulers like Bayezid I, Mehmed II, and Suleyman I sharply curtailed *mulk* and *vaqf* holdings. Such rulers as Bayezid II, Selim II, and Murad III made and allowed more *mulk* and *vaqf* assignments. In 1528, 87 percent of the land was *miri*. Even during periods of central weakness, however, most of the empire's land was *miri*.<sup>323</sup>

These lands were separated into two groups which are the *timar* and *khass-i humayun*.

Approximately half of the *miri* lands were consisted of these lands where the highly efficient territories in term of the agricultural activities.

“The central treasury formed out most of *khass-i humayun* to wealthy individuals, either from the capital or from the locality involved, in return for advance payment in cash. This division made no difference to the peasants. They paid various fixed duties, including a marriage tax, and a percentage of their produce in cash and the rest in kind. The recipients of the revenue, whether tax farmers, *sipahis* or other assignment holders, had the burden of converting what revenue they did not consume themselves into cash.”<sup>324</sup>

#### ‘*Timar*’ System

Another important type of the Ottoman land was the ‘*timar*’ which was a basic structure under the Ottoman economy and the military power.

The ‘*timar*’ lands were held by the *sipahis* who had some rights and responsibilities of control over there.

“A typical *timar* consisted of a village or group of villages, and the fields around them, which the sultan had allocated to a cavalryman, who had the right to collect the taxes from his peasants and, in return, provided the sultan with military service. In addition, he was responsible for maintaining order on his land, with the right usually to pocket half the fines for misdemeanors. This duty clearly required him to reside at least within his *sanjak*, and usually on the *timar* itself, where he would also enjoy a plot of land for his own use. The *timar* holder did not, however, own the land from which he drew his revenues. Rather he held it as a grant which the sultan could revoke, and would do so, especially if the cavalryman failed to appear for military service.”<sup>325</sup>

It can be said that these *timar* holders were the backbone of the Ottoman army from the late fourteenth century to the late sixteenth.

<sup>323</sup> Douglas E. Streusand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottoman, Safavids and Mughals*, (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2011), p. 99

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99

<sup>325</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publication, 2002), p. 194

It is necessary to say that this type of the system could have been laid on to the earlier times like the reign of the Sultan Orhan. Because of that both of them had gone through to the west side of Anatolia, the closest territories of the Late Byzantine Empire and they had seen this system over there which was set up by the Romans and it was called as the “*Pronoia*”. In other words, this timar system was exemplified from this Pronoia system by the Ottomans.

“There are also striking similarities between vocabularies of Byzantine and Ottoman fief-holding. The Greek word *pronoia* means literally ‘care-attention’; the Turkish term *timar* means exactly the same thing. The Greek word for a peasant-holding on a *pronoia* is *zeugarion*, meaning literally ‘yoke, pair (of oxen)”; the Turkish terms for a similar holding, *chift* or *boyunduruk*, mean the same. The Byzantine unit of land measurement, of forty paces is *stremma*. The word means literally ‘twisting’ with reference to the measuring rope. The Ottoman equivalent for a plot forty paces square is *dönüm*, a word which means, literally, ‘turning’. The Ottoman term for ‘incidental taxes due to a timar holder’ is *bad-i hava* or ‘wind of the air’, a phrase which would be puzzling were the Byzantine terms for a similar group of taxes not *aer* or *aerikon*. These terms which are fundamental to Ottoman fief-holding, suggest a Byzantine model for the system.”<sup>326</sup>

In 1487, Sultan Bayezid II had been aware of the necessity of a new order in order to control the land administration and the taxation.

“The reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512), when there was a need to consolidate the conquests of his father Mehmed II (1451-1481), the first major effort in this direction: the 1487 saw laws-book- or *kanunname*- for the district of Hüdavendigâr around Bursa became the model for later codes.”<sup>327</sup> “The reign of Bayezid II also saw the compilation of a general Law Book, that aimed to summarise the rules which define membership of the military- that is, the non-tax paying class, most of whom were timar holders, services owed by fief holders, the obligations of tax-paying subjects, tax regulations, and other matters, including criminal statutes.”<sup>328</sup>

This *kanunname* contained in detailed the taxes, tax-payers and the relations between the peasants and the fief holders.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid. , p. 195

<sup>327</sup> Colin Imber, *Warfare, Law and Pseudo-history*, (İstanbul: The Isis Press, 2011), p. 42

<sup>328</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publication, 2002), pp. 199-200

The oldest '*kanunname*' had been occurred in about 1499 and it had been reforms from time to time such as the reign of Selim I and Suleyman I in order to restore the land rules after the Jalali rebellions in 1608.<sup>329</sup>

There are the major points on this *kanunname* in general.

First of all; a sipahis could have one *çift* of land for his necessities like animal's needs or his own ones. "A *çift* is taken as consisting of 70 or 80 *dönüms* of good land, 100 *dönüms* of land middling quality and 130 to 150 *dönüms* of poor quality land. A *dönüm* is an area of 40 normal paces lengthwise and breadth wise (Barkan 1943:6)."<sup>330</sup>

"The head of a reaya family could hold a *çift* large enough to support a single family but could receive no more. On his death his sons worked this holding jointly but a *çift* could not be broken up. In addition to the tithes, the peasant holding a *çift* paid the sipahis the *çift resmi*, an annual tax of twenty-two akçes. This tax, originally in lieu of services, was the equivalent of the hay, fodder, wood and services which the peasant had owed the fief-holder in Byzantine days."<sup>331</sup>

On the other hand, if a peasant had started to work as a craftsman in a town, he had to pay to the sipahis that was known as the "*çift bozan akçesi*".

"The land survey registers of Suleyman I's reign show a significantly greater amount of cultivated land than earlier registers. The value of land and land revenues increased. The laws against peasants who abandoned the land became less stringent, encouraging a flow of population from the village to the towns. It seems that in this period the area of land under cultivation had reached the limits which the technology of the age allowed."<sup>332</sup>

In briefly, the *timar* system had the two major aims to administrate and control over the provinces in order to increase the agricultural activity or cultivation and to support the military power when the sultan needed. Also, this system had regulated the daily life of the provinces like the punishment for the criminals or the relations between *reaya* and *timar* holder.

<sup>329</sup> Colin Imber, *Warfare, Law and Pseudo-history*, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2011), p. 42

<sup>330</sup> Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600 Translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), p. 110

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111

### The Military Institutions

It can be said that one of the major reasons of the successes of these two empires were based on their powerful and well organized military powers. Of course, it is a debatable issue that which one was more powerful or well organized than the other but there is certain information that both of these two empires' armies were –nearly- newly organized at their reigns. In other words; both Akbar Shah and Kanuni Sultan Suleiman had reformed on their military powers. It can be said that the unity and the continuity of the imperial powers were mainly based on the military aspects and the economical ones, first of all.

In this part of the thesis, the two of them will be explained in terms of the comparison of their military powers.

#### Military Power of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent

The major military power of the Ottoman Empire consisted of the timar holders- cavalymen- and the janissaries whose rate was less than the first one.

Nonetheless, the major information about the numbers of the timariots until the 1525 has not certainly been known. However, the total number of them could be 50.000 because of that it was understood that there were 10.618 men in Rumeli provinces and 17.200 men in Anatolia and Syria according to the empire's incomes and expenditures as Colin Imber says.<sup>333</sup>

The janissary corps was founded in the fourteenth century and the one of their major responsibilities was to guard the sultan. For instance, the janissaries were the main

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<sup>333</sup> Colin Imber, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1300-1650: İktidarın Yapısı Translated by Şiar Yalçın*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2006), p.235

actors in most of the wars in the earlier times such as the Ankara Battle in 1402 or the Varna in 1444, as Colin Imber says.

First of all, the troops had to be few but they had to be excellent as Lutfi Pasha, Grand Vizier, says and the last but not the least, the powers of the janissaries had to be restricted in order not to be turned into a threat against the sultan.<sup>334</sup> Secondly, it should be remembered that these janissaries had caused to the rebellions in many different times. Thirdly, they had become the major power as to change or manipulate the governmental affairs at the later times of the empire because of that they were the inevitable part of the imperial power and nobody could protect the sultan without them.

In contrast to these two basic forces; *timariots* and janissaries, the '*kapıkulu*' means the slave of the gate; in other words, the slaves of the sultan, was the other important element.

The elite parts of the *kapıkulu* soldiers were the Six Division of cavalry and this class was consisted of the men who were educated in the Palace School. They served to the sultan in the campaigns and ceremonies. It cannot be known when this branch was established but it can certainly be said that there were the *kapıkulu* soldiers at the reign of Sultan Mehmed II.

Here, it is necessary to mention about the background of this *kapıkulu* system. First of all, the *kapıkulu* soldiers were recruited as the '*devshirme*'.

The *devshirme* system was the key factor of the Ottoman education, army and the administration.

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<sup>334</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Publication, 2002), p. 257-258

“The two typically Ottoman socio-political mechanisms, allowing conquered military groups into their own *askeri* without first classifying them as *zimmi*, and levying *zimmi* youths through the *devşirme*, should be studied against the backdrop of Ottoman views of society as these views developed through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Only against such a backdrop can these typical Ottoman mechanisms of inducting *zimmis* into the military and administrative groups be properly appreciated.”<sup>335</sup>

The Christian boys were gathered from all parts of the empire in order to be grown up as they were turned into Islam in the Palace School called as ‘*Enderun*’, and then, they would have become the soldiers or the officers at the Palace. However, all the Christian boys could not be taken as the *devshirme* because there were some rules to choose them. For example, he had to be healthy both physically and mentally and he had to have a brother. Moreover, an only son in the family could not be taken in order to damage the agricultural regulations over there.

When they had been getting into the Palace, they did not interrupt their relations with their families. Moreover, they; sometimes, used their statues to assist their family members; for example, well-known grand vizier, Sokullu Mehmet Pasha.

After they were recruited, they were separated into the two groups such as the ‘*iç oğlani*’ and the ‘*sipahis*’. In other words, they become either the soldiers of janissary corps or the officers at the Palace. Moreover, it should be added that the Janissaries were the huge part of the army; their numbers were much more than the others.

Another important branch of the army was the ‘*Azabs*’.

“These two were infantrymen, recruited according to Iacopo di Promontorio in 1475 ‘from among craftsmen and peasants’. Ottomans chroniclers refer to the existence of Azabs already in 1389, but this may be anachronistic. It is clear, however, that the Corps of Azabs was in existence at the time of the Hungarian wars in the 1440s, and may well date from before 1400. The method of recruitment to the Corps, at least in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, is clear from Bayezid II’s Law Book of 1499.”<sup>336</sup>

<sup>335</sup> Metin Kunt, “Transformation of Zimmi into Askeri” in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire* Edited by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, (New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), p. 55

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid.*, p.259

According to the texts, it is understood that these Azabs were recruited from the towns and the local judge and '*subashi*' were responsible for choosing men. Also, all the imams of each towns and a representator from the local people were in contact with them when they decided. They gathered all the young men who were able to fight and they would spend an effort to learn who they were under the age, unhealthy or slaves. Then, they had chosen the men to be the Azabs. On the other hand, the local people had to supply their expenses up to a limit 300 aches per Azab.

“The system of apportioning the levy of both men and cash was by number of households, as the Law Book explains: ‘If, for example, it falls to twenty households to provide one Azab, from among the twenty people [provided by the twenty households] in that quarter, one suitable one should be enrolled for Azab service. Expenses for him should be collected from the remaining nineteen [household]...’<sup>337</sup>

“The Ottoman sources had registered that there were both the janissaries and the azabs in the fortresses throughout the 16<sup>th</sup> century. However, the Azabs started to lose their importance form the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>338</sup>

In briefly, the Ottoman army was consisted of the, janissaries, timariots, the Six Division Cavalrymen and the Azabs and these structures had been continued until Sultan Mahmud the Second who had certainly reformed on the military.

### Military Power of Akbar Shah

“The dynastic setting and the environment- physical, social and cultural requires careful explanation in order to make the Mughal success comprehensible. This section describes the multiple contexts in which the Mughal Empire developed and then summarizes the most characteristics of the Mughal polity.”<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>337</sup> Ibid. , p.259

<sup>338</sup> Ibid. , p.260

<sup>339</sup> Douglas E. Streaussand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*, (Philedelphia: Westview Press, 2011), p.201

Although the Mughal Empire had been established by Babur Shah, known as '*Firdaus-makani*', "dwelling in paradise", in 1526 and the military structure had not been changed until the reign of Akbar Shah. However, the gunpowder techniques made the Timurids the greatest power in the subcontinent; provide Babur Shah to win the great battles. Nonetheless, Akbar Shah had reformed on the military, too and these reforms led him to cope with his rivals.

"Akbar is known and termed 'Great' more for his statesmenlike qualities and as an administrator, than as a soldier. But he contributed more to the military science of his age than any other single individual."<sup>340</sup>

Before explaining the military power of Mughal Empire at the reign of Akbar, it is necessary to mention about the cause of these reforms. The major possible cause was to enlarge the empire's territory so they needed to the new administrative strategies in order to control over these new territories. That is, these new territories caused the population consisting of many people who had the variable religions; therefore, these new reforms were the inevitable results of these enlargements due to unite and control over this population.

Another important cause was related to the inner factor. It means that Akbar Shah need to these kinds of new systems in order to legitimize him and to provide his authority to be strengthened against his enemies and rivals and to control over all parts of his country, effectively.

It can be said that the institutionalization on the military structure was necessary in order to act as a well-organized army.

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<sup>340</sup> Raj Kumar, *Military System of the Mughals*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2004), p. 17-18

“The military system of the Mughals reflected in many respects the entire organizational structure of the empire and so illustrates particularly clearly the virtues as well as some of the structural deficiencies and weaknesses of the imperial system. Likewise, the Mughal army had offensive and defensive functions. It was an instrument of the imperial centre deployed to fight external enemies, to defend against invaders and to pursue its expansionist imperial policy. It was also used in internal politics, as an important means by which to check internal rivalling powers and autonomous movements, to put down resistance by individual officers and all forms of rebellions, and often simply as a police force to maintain law and order.”<sup>341</sup>

The ruling class of the Mughal Empire was formed by the Mughal *mansabdar*. A ‘*mansab*’ was a rank in the administration hierarchy constituting an essential structural principle of the Mughal imperial state and he rewarded any service for the state, civil or military.<sup>342</sup>

“It has not been possible to establish the exact numerical strength of the armed forces under the Mughal emperors. Military commentators are also not agreed on the number of armed forces committed to any particular battle. This is attributed to the peculiar system of recruitment, muster, training and discipline. Soldiers, it is said, were not in the ‘Service of the State’ as in understood by the words today. For the most part they joined service with some chief or leader. These chiefs were ranked according to the number of men that they could raise. In this way, originated the system of ‘Mansabs’, first introduced by Akbar. This mode of recruiting the army through these or leaders rendered it necessary to begin by a statement of the manner in which these officers themselves were appointed or graded. In A’in-i Akbari, sixty-six grades of ‘Mansabs’ are mentioned. They begin with commanders of 10,000 and end at those set over ten men. The highest ‘Mansab’ that could be held by a subject not of the Royal House, was that of a commander of 7,000 men, though in later and more degenerated times, instances of promotion to 8,000 or even 9,000 men are found.”<sup>343</sup>

Mughal officers called as mansabdars; that is, officeholders were responsible for controlling over the manpower of the empire, collecting and disbursing most of its revenue.<sup>344</sup> Therefore, the authority or the governmental control in the provinces had been provided, indirectly. However, this *mansabdari system* provided a network between the state and the provinces to have been set up, on the one hand. Also, it provided the military power for the sultan because of that these mansabdars were responsible for supplying the soldiers and the equipment for them.

<sup>341</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power*, (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1997), p.58

<sup>342</sup> Ibid. , p.58

<sup>343</sup> Raj Kumar, *Military System of the Mughals*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2004), p. 4

<sup>344</sup> Douglas E. Streussand, *Islamic Gunpowder Empires Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*, (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2011), p.206

The military structure of the Mughals had mainly been exemplified from the Persians. Abu'l Fazl, the Mughal chronicler at the reign of Akbar, said that this administrative system had the three major characterizations which were '*the branding regulation*', '*the conversion of the imperial territories into crown lands*', and '*the fixing of the grades of the officers of the states*.'<sup>345</sup>

“Up to that time the districts and provinces were granted to the chieftains as ‘jagirs’ (fiefs), and according to the revenue that the ‘jagir’ was expected to produce, the holder (‘jagirdar’) had to keep a certain number of cavalry and defray all expenses, maintaining the roads, forts and so on. It was not the land that belonged to him, but only the taxes which were exacted from the people. The ‘jagirs’ were not hereditary, and often enough the ‘jagirdar’ was transferred from one ‘jagir’ to another, deliberately in some completely different part of the empire in order to prevent the formation of a coalition, a practice which led to their quota, or mounted some idle vagrants on the first baggage horse to hand, to present them as soldiers when a review of their troops was due.”<sup>346</sup>

The Mughal Army was composed of the cavalry, infantry and the artillery. Abu'l Fazl classified the army into three major groups which were *Mansabdars* (with the horsemen who were controlled by them), *Ahadis* (gentlemen-troopers), and *Piadagan* (infantry, which was a great miscellany including, among other things, artillery).<sup>347</sup>

The cavalymen had the horses and the elephants and they served as the strategically power in the army.

“Mughal army was essentially and army of horsemen” as William Irvine says.<sup>348</sup> “Mughals from across the Oxus were accustomed to fight on horseback only.”<sup>349</sup> “According to Orme, ‘Under Mughals, the strain of all war rested upon the numbers of horsemen and goodness of the horses which were found in the army.’ The Mughal bowmen were especially expert with their weapons. It is said that a Mughal Horsemen could shoot six times before a musketeer could fire twice.”<sup>350</sup>

Also, they were so adoptable that they could be adapted to the army’s mobility. These men wore the body armour that protected their bodies and shields, additionally; they

<sup>345</sup> Michael Prawdin, *The Builders of the Mogul Empire*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd Şti, 1963), p.144

<sup>346</sup> Ibid. , p.144

<sup>347</sup> Abdul Aziz, *The Mughal Court and Its Institutes*, (Lahore: Al-Faisal, 2002), p. 147

<sup>348</sup> Raj Kumar, *Military System of the Mughals*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2004), p. 5

<sup>349</sup> Ibid. , p. 5

<sup>350</sup> Ibid. , p. 5

had weapons like bows and arrows, spears, lances, swords and daggers. Therefore, these cavalymen needed a huge amount of the necessities for their horses, imported from Arabia, Persia, Turkistan or Afghanistan. On the other hand, the army had to carry the fresh water, reserve horses, a large supply of fodder, etc. which led to the limitations on the mobility.<sup>351</sup>

“When the Mughals had arrived in India, the art and science of gunnery had not been very advanced over there; thus, they knew was [probably] mainly borrowed from the Turks and from Constantinople. In other words, the Mughal emperors had been dependant for artillery on the help and instructions of ‘Rumis’, Mohammedans from Constantinople or ‘Ferangis’ principally runaway sailors from Surat or, Portuguese half castes.” according to William Irvine.”<sup>352</sup>

The artillery was divided into the subtitles such as the manufacture, artillery in use, arsenals or magazines and fortress artillery. The *topkhana* concerned two officers which were the Khansamah as the Lord Steward and the Mir Atash (the lord of fire) or the “*Daroghah-i-topkhana*” (Superintendent of the cannon department).<sup>353</sup>

“The general name for artillery under the Mughals was ‘Topkhana’. It was generally divided into two categories: the heavy and the light artillery. The latter was given several names. More frequently used names in the Mughal military nomenclature were Topkhana-i-Rezah, or ‘small artillery’, ‘Topkhana-i-Jumbshi’, or ‘movable or mobile artillery’, ‘Topkhana-i-Jinisi’, ‘miscellaneous artillery’. The various departments in the service were: (1) Manufacturing Department. (2) Magazine or Ordnance Department. (3) Field Artillery in actual use. (4) Guns in use with the forts and fortresses. The Mughals they gave them very pompous names. According to Dr. Horn, ‘Under Akbar, the artillery reached the highest point of efficiency which it ever attained during the existence of the Mughal empire. According to William Irvine, however, ‘artillery was much more perfect and numerous in Alamgir’s reign that it was under his great-grandfather, Akbar’.”<sup>354</sup>

“This arm of service held a very inferior position and was of little or no consideration. According to Orme, the infantry consisted of a multitude of people assembled without regard to rank or file; some with swords and targets, who could never stand the shock of a body of horse; some bearing matchlocks, which in the best of the order, could produce, but a very uncertain fire; some armed with lances, too long or too weak to be of any service even if ranged with the utmost regularity of discipline. The main service of the infantry under the Mughals seems to have been night watches and plunder of defenceless people. ‘Their main raisons d’etre in the armed forces were the chief or the nobles who received a fixed sum for every man and hired every man at a different and lesser price.’”<sup>355</sup>

<sup>351</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power*, (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1997), p.60

<sup>352</sup> Raj Kumar, *Military System of the Mughals*, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 2004), p. 6

<sup>353</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155

<sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6

The Mughal infantry was also classified into several categories which included the *darbans* (porters) and the *khidmatiiyas* (palace guards). The *khidmatiiya* caste was originally notorious highway robbers whom the earlier sultans had been unable to control, according to Abu'l Fazl. Nevertheless, Akbar took them into his service and domesticated them. In addition, he recruited the natives of *Mewat*, known as *mewras*, who made excellent spies. Irani and Turani boxers and wrestlers could be employed as the infantrymen. The infantry had also included the slaves. Due to the fact that Akbar did not want to use the name of 'slave', he called them *chelas* or disciples. Also, he hated the custom of Muslims buying Hindus for slaves and vice versa. Palanquin bearers, and others, carried heavy loads on their shoulders, were part of the infantry.<sup>356</sup>

One of the other major important factors in the Mughal army was the elephants. Using these animals had some advantages although it had also some disadvantages. First of all, they were so useful that they could carry the heavy materials.<sup>357</sup> Also, they were more powerful than the horses. However, it was difficult to transport the elephants to the battle field and to feed up with them was expensive.

In conclusion, the Mughal army was composed of the two main sections which were the mansabdars and the personal army of the emperor. The first one was also in the service of the emperor. However, they composed of their own troops and supplied the equipment which they needed. The second one was a little bit small and they were recruited by the sultan and they were paid out of the imperial treasury.<sup>358</sup>

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<sup>356</sup> S. A. A. Rizvi, *The Wonder That Was India*, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co, 1993), p. 178

<sup>357</sup> Andrea Hintze, *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline An Interpretation of the Sources of Social Power*, (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney: Ashgate, 1997), p.60

<sup>358</sup> *Ibid.*, p.63

As a result, both of the two empires' armies had been composed of the same basic structures although there are some differences in terms of the tools or the strategies. However, both of them were nearly the same structures. For example, there were the people who had the different ethnicities in the military like that the Mughal army consisted of local recruits and foreign adventurers including Persians, Central Asiatic Turks, Afghans, Hindus and Indo-Muslims. Although the imperial regulations limited the numbers of ethnically homogeneous contingents and the mansabdars were obliged to mix their troops with at least on other racial group.<sup>359</sup>

On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire had also multi-ethnic structure. However, the Ottoman imperial army was not based on the ethnic division because of that all the Christian children were recruited and they were grown up as the Muslims. Thus, it can be said that the ethnicity was ignored by the Ottomans.

Before finishing this part of the thesis, it is necessary to say that both of these two empires had succeeded to survive for a long time with their military powers as much as the political ones.

## The Judicial Institutions

### The Ottoman Judicial Institutions in the Reign of Sultan Süleyman I

“The reasons and rewards of good kingship were described as a ‘Circle of Justice’: ‘There is no king without an army, no army without wealth, no wealth without material prosperity, and no material prosperity without justice. *Adalet* was of course interpreted in a variety of ways, yet in its most general from described the ruler rewarding those who do good and punishing those who do evil. The ‘medieval Islamic theory of kingship’ found support across the popular consciousness and became the most universally recognized trope of Islamic rule, public deference to which supported all of the region’s ruling dynasties.”<sup>360</sup>

“Turkish political thought had analogies to the Perso-Arabic synthesis; agrarian administrative procedures and social structures differed greatly from tribal customs, but the steppe concepts of the ruler’s divine appointment, charismatic leadership, and care for his people were similar

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, p.63

<sup>360</sup> Lisa Balabanlilar, *Imperial Identity in the Mughal Empire*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), p. 145

to Near Eastern ideas. Three Seljuk advices [*The Book of Ka'us (Qabusnama)*, *The Book of Government (Nizam al-Mulk)*, and *The Book of Counsel for Kings (al-Ghazali)*] are famous for their quotation of the Circle of Justice.”<sup>361</sup>

The circle of justice is also defined in Kutadgu Bilig like that it is necessary to have many soldiers and army to capture the cities. Also, it is necessary to have the great amount of money and treasure to feed up with these soldiers. Therefore, the citizens must be wealthy in order to pay the taxes. In addition, it is necessary to give the suitable laws for the citizens to become richer. If one of them had been ignored, the four of them were destroyed. If all four of them had been ignored, the government was started to be collapsed.<sup>362</sup>

Kutadgu Bilig was written by Yusuf Has Hacip in 1069-70 at the time of the Karahanids and this book written in Uygur language, was presented to the Sultan of Karahanids, Tabgaç Buğra Karahan. This source was written after being turned into the Islam and it is so important that gives much information about the perception of the politics of the Turks, political and social traditions, and the old Turkish laws. Furthermore, Kutadgu Bilig means the knowledge of administration and it aims to explain the secret of the best administration to the governmental officers; additionally, it gives the advices them to govern very well and to be fair.<sup>363</sup>

Kutadgu Bilig is a kind of an example of the tradition of ‘*siyasatnama*’.

This siyasatnama tradition had been laid on 1071 that was the year of completing to write Kutadgu Bilig. Also, *Ayn-i Ekberi* is an example of like that.<sup>364</sup>

<sup>361</sup> Linda T. Darling, *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 91

<sup>362</sup> Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000), p.75

<sup>363</sup> Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, *Osmanlı Hukuku*, (İstanbul: Arı Sanat Yayınları, 2008), p.59

<sup>364</sup> Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*, (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000), p. 45

The process of constructing the governmental law was based on the three main sources. Firstly, many of *kanuns* and *kanunnames* were based on the local traditions and habits in terms of their sources. The sultan took them up and legalized them, only. In other words, the authority of the sultan was a key point that he had turned the local traditions into the governmental law. Secondly, the sovereign power of the sultan had transformed the applications and concepts that were laid on the Old Iranian and Turkish sources, into the governmental law. Thirdly, the *fermans* those were prepared according to the kanun when they consisted of the general rules.<sup>365</sup>

It seems to be clear that there is a parallel situation between the Mughal Empire and the Ottoman Empire. If it is necessary to remind that both of them had the same origins which was laid on the Central Asian Turkic traditions so this parallelism is understandable. It is also necessary to remind that Babur who found a great empire in India [of course not just in India], came from the Timurid origin and he wrote his memoirs in Chatayid dialect of Turkish as a kind of an example of *siyasatnama*, known as *Baburnama*.<sup>366</sup>

Before continuing to the Ottoman legal system and the judicial institutions, it is necessary to explain the two basic concepts which are the *siyasatnama* and *kanunnames*, mentioned in the text.

“*Siyaset*” is one of the most equivocal terms in Ottoman legal language. In its widest sense it seems to denote ‘punishment’ in general, which may include strokes and banishment. As a technical term, however, it generally means either execution or severe corporal punishment of both.”<sup>367</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> Ibid. , p. 45

<sup>366</sup> Ibid. , p. 45

<sup>367</sup> Uriel Heyd, *Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law Edited by V. L. Menage*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 260-261

“Most *siyasetnames* are decrees of the *nişan* type, i. e. orders of the sultan addressed not, like a firman, to a certain person (or certain persons) but to all officials whom it might concern. After the usual opening formula, *nişan-i hümayun* (or *şerif*)... *hükmi oldur ki*, they state that they are issued in response to the request of a sanjakbeği, beylerbeyi, or vizier, who has asked for such a criminal code for the punishment of the law-breakers in his district or province or on his *hass-fiefs*. Unlike many *kanunnames*, the *siyasetnames* are not sent to cadis, though, as will be explained later on, the cadi is ordered to co-operate in their execution. For a copy of a *siyasetname* a fee of 3-4 gold pieces was charged in 985/1577-8 (by the Imperial chancery).”<sup>368</sup>

“In the Ottoman sources the term *kanun* is used in four different meanings:

- a) legal rules or prescriptions generally, including those of the religious law of Islam: e.g. *kanun-i şer'*, *kavanin-i şer'îye*;
- b) a single statue of secular law enacted by the sultan, a regulation: e.g. *bu kanun kanuna muhalifdir*, ‘this *kanun* (statue) is contrary to the *kanun* (in the meaning of (d))’;
- c) a collection of such regulations relating to a certain matter or certain matters, a code or *kanunnames* : e. g. *Kanun-i Yürükan*, *Kanun-i Alay*;
- d) The whole body or institutions of such secular state law; as opposed to the *shari'a*: e.g. *şer'a ve kanuna muhalif*.”<sup>369</sup>

“The Ottoman *kanunnames* are collections of statutes (*kanuns*) which, as is well known, were originally in most cases short summaries of firmans and other decrees of the sultan, each dealing with a particular case, the details referring to individual persons, places, and events having been eliminated. In the Criminal Code and in many provincial *kanunnames*, remnants of firman formulas or even almost complete firman texts have been preserved.”<sup>370</sup>

The *kanunnames* were generally hidden in the Imperial Place or in the offices of the Central Government, especially Chancery of the Imperial Divan and the Treasury.

Therefore, the archival documents are the major informative sources of the Ottoman judicial system.

The other important informative sources of the Ottoman judicial system are made up of the *fikh* (Fıkıh) books, journals of *fetvas*, court registers (*kadı sicills*), journals of *kanuns*, chronicles, *siyasetnames*. All these sources can be used to search about the Ottoman judicial system.<sup>371</sup>

To begin with, the Ottoman judicial system was based on the two major principles; one of them was ‘*örfi*’ *kanuns* (common usage) and the other one was the *şer'i* *kanuns*. In generally, all the governments had made up of the ‘*örfi*’ rules which were

<sup>368</sup> Ibid. , p. 17

<sup>369</sup> Ibid. , p. 167

<sup>370</sup> Ibid. , p. 171

<sup>371</sup> Ekrem Buğra Ekinci, *Osmanlı Hukuku*, (İstanbul: Arı Sanat Yayınları, 2008), pp.89-94

based on the concept of *'töre'* (or tradition) in order to regulate the public life.

However, these örfi ones in the Muslim countries were also consisted of the Islamic rules.

Nonehtless, Islamic law was not monolithic. There was a difference between the law of the Sunnis and the law of the Shi'is. Also, the law of the Sunnis was separated into four schools which were the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali ones. All of them were called s the founders' names. There were not the great differences among these schools. However, once established; then, each one had influenced to the others.

Loyalty to a school had been a characteristic of Islamic jurists.

The Turks provided the Islam to be spread in Anatolia and they had adopted the Islamic laws into themselves. Nevertheless, these laws were especially the Hanafi school of Islam. This branch had started to be seen in Anatolia at the period of the Seljukid. Moreover, it became a dominant one of Islamic law in the Middle East at the time of the Ottomans.<sup>372</sup> Nevertheless, the foundation of colleges to train the professors, muftis and judges were demanded in order to establish a legal system.<sup>373</sup>

“The Mufti was a jurisconsult who offered authoritative opinions –fatwas- on all questions of law which anyone, from the monarch to his humblest subject, might ask. In many part of the Islamic world, he achieved his position informally through reputation for learning, although in the Ottoman Empire after the fifteenth century muftis were usually official appointees. It was the mufti who acted as mediator between the divine law and the affairs of mankind and in this capacity occupied the next rung of esteem, below the writing jurist. Like the writing jurist, he had no executive powers. A fatwa is an opinion, not an edict, and to put it into effect requires its enactment by a judge or governor.”<sup>374</sup>

However, it is difficult to define the role of muftis in the Ottoman legal establishment.

During the sixteenth century, the Mufti of İstanbul had risen to become not only the Chief Mufti, but also the senior figure in the religious and legal hierarchy. The college

<sup>372</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian Publication, 2002), p. 225

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 225

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224

professors had played the roles as muftis in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>375</sup>

Here, it is necessary to talk about the hierarchy in the Ottoman State.

“On a deeper level, it will be shown that the case for the traditional view of the Müftilik- essentially that it rose from a position of relative unimportance to become, in the time of Süleyman, the principal office in the learned hierarchy- rests largely on premises conditioned by what one might call the ‘hierarchical’ viewpoint. Among the pieces of evidence advanced for the traditional view, for example, are the facts that until late in the reign of Süleyman the Müftis were considerably less well-paid than the kazaskers and that the Müftis did not sit in the divan whereas the kazasker did. These facts are indeed significant, but they are susceptible of a rather different interpretation when it is accepted that importance and success amongst the ulema in the earlier period did not depend upon one’s position in the hierarchy- or concomitant matters like salary or membership of the divan- to anything like the same degree that they did in later times.”<sup>376</sup>

The judges were the other most important figure in the Ottoman daily life, both in the centers and the provinces.

“Every city, town, village and settlement within the Empire came under the authority of a judge, and every individual within the judicial district, whatever his or her religion had the right of recourse to the judge’s court. Furthermore, the absence of lawyers and the fact that the public seem to have had access to the judge or his deputy at all hours, ensured that the courts dealt with business very quickly.”<sup>377</sup>

The judges had the two basic functions. The first one was to administrate in most parts of the empire according to the *Hanafi* law. The second important function was the Ottoman judges had served as the notaries; that is, he ensured the observance of the proper legal forms and he provided written records of marriage, divorce, the sale and purchase of real estate, or the foundation of trusts.<sup>378</sup>

On the other hand, the *qadi* (judge) was a kind of bridge between the people and the Palace. This job was not so easy that everyone could take this kind of responsibility.

Therefore, a man could have selected according to the some criteria for this job.

Firstly, he had to be adult and fair, he had to have faith and information about the judicial structure; additionally, his father and mother had to be known and he had to

<sup>375</sup> Ibid. , p. 234

<sup>376</sup> R. C. Repp, *The Müfti of Istanbul*, (London: Ithaca Press, 1986), p. 28

<sup>377</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian Publication, 2002), p. 232

<sup>378</sup> Ibid. , p. 233

be objective. The last point is that the qadi had to be a man; women could not be the qadis.<sup>379</sup>

In addition, the qadis could be dismissed according to the similar criteria; for example, if he had lost his mind or he became deaf, blind or mute, he had lost his faith or he had said that he did not have enough knowledge about his job, he could have been dismissed. Also, the corruption was another important cause for him to be kicked by the sultan.<sup>380</sup>

However, all these criteria were not enough to be a qadi in the Ottoman lands. Also, the education and the hierarchical process were the inevitable parts of being qadi in the Ottoman Empire.

“From the 16<sup>th</sup> century on, to qualify for a position as *kadı*, the candidate had to have completed a precisely defined career path, both as a teacher and as a judge. The highest position required teaching experience, normally a past at the high schools of the Süleymaniye. By this point, the number of qualified candidates greatly exceeded the number of open slots; short terms of office therefore alternated with long periods of joblessness. Also, family connections and the support of the sultan were often crucial, especially for the highest positions of military judge (*kadı-asker*) and the top legal authority (*şeyhülislam*).”<sup>381</sup>

The ‘*ilmiye*’ class was divided into three main categories such as the ‘*müdürris*’ who was responsible for giving lectures, the ‘*müftis*’ who was responsible for giving *fatwa*, and the ‘*qadis*’ who was responsible for the judgement.<sup>382</sup>

The Ottoman qadis had to be well-educated, certainly in this hierarchical process.

“On the council, they had particular responsibility for judicial business. This is clear from the notes which the clerks have appended to the drafts of sultanic decrees contained in the volumes which survive from the mid-sixteenth century onwards.

<sup>379</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Hukuk ve İdare Adamı Olarak Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kadı*, (Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 1994), p. 9

<sup>380</sup> Ibid. , p. 10

<sup>381</sup> Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire A Short History Translated by Shelley Frisch*, (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2009), p.72

<sup>382</sup> Ibid. , p.12

These show that the military judges were, in the first place, responsible for submitting to the Imperial Council letters and petitions for redress that they received from office holders and members of the public.”<sup>383</sup>

“In addition to their responsibility for judicial matters in the Imperial Council, it was the military judges who were responsible for appointing –again in the sultan’s name- professors and judges from among the candidates for office who were ‘in attendance’ on them in the capital. The system of nominating candidates which Ebu’s-su’ud introduced shortly after 1537 seems to have lasted into the seventeenth century.”<sup>384</sup>

To conclude, the Ottoman judicial system was based on the Hanafi Schools which was the sect of Sunni Islam and three main figures such as the ‘*muftis*’, the ‘*qadis*’ and the military judges had provided this process to be worked. This system was valid for the conflicts among the Muslims or the conflicts between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. On the other hand, the non-Muslim subjects in the empire had gone to their own courts. However, if there had been a conflict among the two non-Muslim men who were the members of the two different millets like the Greeks and Armenians, they could have applied for the *qadis* to solve their problems. The Ottoman judicial system had been well-organized and its hierarchical structure had facilitated to control over the officers and the provinces. Therefore, it can be said that this system was one of the corner of the rectangle of administration.

### The Mughal Judicial Institutions in the Reign of Akbar Shah

“In the early Islamic period there are some cases of legislation in matters of police, taxation and criminal justice for the sake of *siyasat*, even though, in general, such legislations were often rejected as *siyasiya*, as distinct from *shari’iya*, and hence did not have the same sanctity or authority. Some consideration was also given to usage and custom (‘*urf* and ‘*adat*). But here again the *shari’a* of the jurists allowed such custom on the pretext of *qiyas* and *maslaha*-which meant reasoning by analogy, and expediency, exigency; or, in other words, justification through texts or their implications from the Qur’an and its traditions. *Qiyas* and *maslaha* did not involve an independent moral opinion. For all this, categories like *qiyas*, *maslaha*, ‘*urf*, and ‘*adat* did introduce and reinforce resilience and a degree of ambiguity in *shari’a*, which in turn proved a factor in facilitating the acceptability of these *akhlaq* texts.”<sup>385</sup>

<sup>383</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian Publication, 2002), pp. 238-239

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240

<sup>385</sup> Muzaffar Alam, *The Languages of Political Islam India 1200-1800*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1988), p. 60-61

The akhlaq texts such as the Tusi's or Rumi's, or the well-known one '*Akhlaq-i Humayun*' were the favored readings of the Mughal ruling elites. Also, the '*Ain-i Akbari*' can be evaluated as these kinds of the texts. If it is necessary to define what the Akhlaq text is simply, it can be said that it was the source of the written rules in order to administrate fair.

“A whole body of literature, known as *Akhlaq*, etiquette, grew up in medieval Iran and India. Its prototype was *Akhlaq-i Nasiri of Nasir al-Din Tusi*, an Iranian works of the first half of the thirteenth century, although this is one of several works on the subject. This text was among the ones read out to Akbar every day.”<sup>386</sup>

“The *Akhlaq-i Nasiri* goes into very great detail about every aspect of regulating (*siyasat*, both governance and punishment) the mode of eating, sleeping, talking, etc., that children should be socialized into.”<sup>387</sup>

“Beyond the literary arena, the institutionalization of administrative mechanisms for providing justice enabled the productive classes of society to press their interpretations of justice and their demands for redress. Peasants and townspeople used petitions and *mazalim* courts to request reassessment of taxes and punishment of corrupt and tyrannous official; they understood quite well the procedures by which the Circle of Justice could be invoked. *The Thousand and One Nights* reflected this understanding in numerous stories telling how the petitions of common people, especially the poorest and most helpless of them, called unjust princes to rectitude. Although the Turkish and Mongol invaders of the next two centuries brought both the Abbasid and the Fatimid caliphates to an end, they themselves developed a concept of state that incorporated Turco-Mongol values into the Perso-Arabic synthesis that upheld the shariah and was in harmony with the Circle of Justice.”<sup>388</sup>

The concepts of the Circle of Justice had originated with the historic Near Eastern state by the eleventh century. However, they had been very well integrated into Islamic political thinking and they were in harmony with Qur'anic pronouncements and Islamic precedents.<sup>389</sup>

<sup>386</sup> Harbans Mukhai, *The Mughals of India*, (Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p.75

<sup>387</sup> Ibid. , p. 75

<sup>388</sup> Linda T. Darling, *A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 82

<sup>389</sup> Ibid. , p. 81.

These texts contained the rules which were necessary to regulate the daily life and they made up of the basics of the judicial rules, actually.

The administration of justice can be classified into three major categories such as 'siyasat', 'mazalim' and 'qada'. The 'siyasat' was related to the public servants and the 'qada' was responsible for the criminal and civil suits. All of them had been organized differently.<sup>390</sup>

Also, it is necessary to explain the crimes. Generally, the crimes had been divided into three categories under Muslim law. First one is the crime against God (religious crimes; e. g., swearing to God), crime against the state (fraud, default, etc.), and the last one is the crime against private citizens (murder, theft, etc.). There could not be mercy for the first crime but the second one could be punished according to the pleasure of the emperor. For example, a man who was guilty of such this crime could pay blood money.<sup>391</sup> "In the crimes against individuals action could be taken only if complaints were made, as there was no public prosecutor in the Mughal judicial system."<sup>392</sup>

First of all, the 'diwan-u'l-qada' was the institution of relating to the ordinary crimes of individuals.

"The 'diwan-u'l-qada' has a long history. In the lifetime of the Prophet, he dispensed justice in person. This tradition continued in the early days of the Caliphate and even later, at least in theory, the caliph remained the chief guarantor of justice in the realm. The Sultans of Dehli, as the representatives of the caliph, held the same position through the theory of delegation. The Mughuls, as has been mentioned earlier, believed in their own caliphate."<sup>393</sup>

<sup>390</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p.173

<sup>391</sup> Abraham Eraly, *The Mughal World: India's Tainted Paradise*, (London: Phoenix, 2008), p. 259-260

<sup>392</sup> Ibid. , p. 260

<sup>393</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p.182

It was a significant institution of the Sultanate of Dehli and its structure applied to the pattern evolved in the Muslim world, particularly in the Abbasid caliphate, in general and it was inherited by the Mughals.<sup>394</sup>

Another important officer of the judicial institution was the '*qadi*'. At the beginning of the time, he was just responsible for the civil and criminal justice but later on he had gained more responsibilities than before. Firstly, his occupational field was enlarged. "He was entrusted with the guardianship of certain beneficent activities of the Muslim society. For instance he supervised the management of the property of insane, the insolvent, orphans and idiots."<sup>395</sup>

There were some basic necessities to become a '*qadi*'. Firstly, he had to be healthy both mentally and physically. For example, the insane, blind and mute people could not be chosen for this job. Also, he could be chosen among the free adult Muslim males. In addition, he had to be capable of independent *ijtihad*<sup>396</sup> and he had to be objective and well-educated.

The organization of the judicial system of the Mughal Empire was based on the Hanafi school of Sunna Islam and they had taken this system from the sultans of Delhi in Northern India. For a long time, this system had been continued in the continent.

"The jurisprudence that the Mughal emperors generally followed was that of the Hanafi schools too, to gain flexibility in policy and action."<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>394</sup> Ibid. , p. 183

<sup>395</sup> Ibid. , p. 188

<sup>396</sup> Ibid. , p. 188

<sup>397</sup> Abraham Eraly, *The Mughal World: India's Tainted Paradise*, (London: Phoenix, 2008), p. 259

Nevertheless, the Mughal Empire had been consisted of a huge amount of non-Muslims. Therefore, the Muslim shar'i law could be applied to the non-Muslims; nevertheless, with the certain limits defined well.

“The Hindus had their own personal law and the provisions of the shar' regarding marriage, divorce and inheritance did not apply to them. The principles of the shar' were applied in so far as it was feasible without injustice, to disputes arising between Muslims and non-Muslims. Cases between non-Muslims, if they belonged to a group with common customs were decided in the light of those customs, 'adah' (customary law). Those cases where neither the principles of shar' nor 'adah' could be applied were decided on the basis of equity. A large number of cases were decided by the panchayats and were never brought to the court of the qadi.”<sup>398</sup>

“The king has a right to appoint a separate qazi for the army (qazi-i-'askar), but his jurisdiction is limited to the area defined for him. In a case in which one party resides in the jurisdiction of the qazi-i-'askar and the other in that of the qazi of the city, and the latter insists on having the case tried in the city court, the qazi of the army cannot try it unless he has been specially empowered to try all such cases in which one party belongs to his area of jurisdiction. On the other hand, if both parties belong to the 'askar and they want to take their case to the city court, they can do so, and the qazi of the city has power to entertain it (zi ra ke vilayat u 'am ast).”<sup>399</sup>

The *qazi* had to hold the court in a common place like the mosques because of that the poor people could access him easily to mention about their problems.

He had to have the *katibs* (scribes) with him to record the evidences at the courts and they could help him for the foreign languages.

All the parties that came to the court had been equal in front of the law and the qazi had sit with them on the same place when he listened to them. This situation is different from the Ottoman application. There was not equality between the 'zımmis' and the Muslims and there was not equality between the males and females. This situation was also seen in not only the Ottoman Empire but also the Muslim Empires. Also, there was a hierarchy to act as witness in court. There were two types of witnessing which were the personal witnessing and case witnessing.

<sup>398</sup> Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. 190

<sup>399</sup> Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire translated by E. Denison Ross*, (Karaçi: The Civil and Military Gazette, 1967), p.312

“Only an adult Muslim male could perform the office of case witness. This restricted eligibility had the result of rendering the court taxonomy’s “default” identity coterminous with the formal constitution of the legal system. Persons labeled as “other” [non-Muslims, slaves, freed persons, nomads, children and sometimes villagers were called as “others”] could not serve case witnesses. They might act as personal witnesses, but only so long as they themselves enjoyed full legal personhood: thus slaves and minors were limited to speaking only on their own behalf at court. Personal witnessing by adult women and non-Muslims was generally confined to instances when theirs was the only reliable testimony to be had.”<sup>400</sup>

The shari’a was highly important in the Ottoman Empire that all the people, either Muslim or non-Muslim, were ruled according to the shar’i rules. Also, the Ottoman Empire obeyed the shar’i rules much more than the Mughal Empire. For example, the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire could not talk at the court in contrast to the Mughal court where the non-Muslims could be the witness.

The scribes had recorded the statement and then the *qazi* would have addressed the defendant as he said such that what did you say about this event; that is, would you accept it or deny it. It called as ‘*iqrar*’ (accepting) or ‘*inkar*’ (denying). Then, he would record this answer. However, if the defendant denied the charge, the *qazi* would record the statement with his defense.

“When a witness comes to give evidence the qazi will not direct him anyway. When the proceedings is thus over, he will pass judgement in accordance with Sharia’.

If the case is decided against the defendant, he will order him to make recompense, but not send him to jail for non-payment unless so requested by the plaintiff, and none will be put under arrest for non-payment unless two witnesses give evidence of his capacity to pay (gavahi na dihand bar ghina-i-u).”<sup>401</sup>

“The existence of a mufti does not appear to be compulsory. If the qazis is capable and qualified to give fatvah, he can decide the case himself; otherwise he will refer the case to the mufti and ask fatvah for him.”<sup>402</sup>

The other main figure in the Mughal judicial system was the muhtesib who was responsible for the Islamic morality and behavior. In other words, he was a kind of the controller who controlled the Muslim society.

<sup>400</sup> Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales Law and Gender In The Ottoman Court of Aintab*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and California: University of California Press, 2003), p. 146-147

<sup>401</sup> Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire translated by E. Denison Ross*, (Karaçi: The Civil and Military Gazette, 1967), p. 314

<sup>402</sup> Ibid., p. 314

It cannot be said that there was not the chief muhtasib. “The appointment and supervision of the local muhtasibs was the duty of the *sadr-u’s-sudur* and the provincial subahdars.”<sup>403</sup>

Here, it is necessary to explain what ‘*sadr*’ means and the ‘*sadr-u’s-sudur*’ is.

“The kings, at times, summoned a body of ulama as well, whom they consulted on important matters. The ulama thus summoned for advice and consultation were called sudur, and the one permanently attached was called *sadr* (the chief). Thus *sadr* becomes synonymous with sheikh-ul-Islam, and technically he can be regarded as the chief or the representative of the ulama in the state and in the councils of the king. From this point of view the term *sadr-ul-sudur* (the chief of the sudur) used by the Mughals was very accurate.”<sup>404</sup>

“The *Sadr-us-sudur* or Chief *Sadr*:-This officer was the Chief Civil Judge and Supervisor of the Endowments of land made by the Emperor or Princes, for the support of pious men, scholars and monks. It was his duty to see that such grants were applied to the right purpose and also to scrutinise applications for fresh grants... The *Sadr* was also the Emperor’s almoner and had the spending of the vast sums which Emperors set apart for charity in the month of Ramazan and other holy occasions,-amounting to 1½ lakhs of rupees in the reign of Aurangzeb, and at Court ceremonies. Like the Chief Qazi, he also made the appointments of the local *Sadr*. For this post, men of the best Arabic scholarship and sanctity of life were selected.”<sup>405</sup>

The first major duty of the *sadr* was to control over the ulama of the states in terms of their conditions, capacities and the teaching abilities as the teachers or instructors also he had to encourage the best teachers and students.

Secondly, the *sadr* was also responsible for the appointment of the *qadis* and *muftis* in the state.

The last one is that he was a kind of a bridge between the sultan and the people.

“At the beginning of Akbar’s reign the *sadrs* occupied an important position, but as far as the history of the period and its administrative side is concerned, their position appears to have been limited to the use of their power to award stipends and jagirs to the ulama and needy people.”<sup>406</sup>

The *sadr-u’s-sudur* consisted of the Department of Religious Affairs. The offices such as the *qadi-u’l-qudat*, the chief judge of the empire, and of the *sadr-u’s-sudur* were

<sup>403</sup> Ibid. , p. 204

<sup>404</sup> Ibid. , p. 256

<sup>405</sup> S. R. Sharma, *Mughal Empire In India 1526-1761-Part I*, (Bombay: Karnatak Printing Press, 1934), p. 303-304

<sup>406</sup> Ibn Hasan, *The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire translated by E. Denison Ross, (Karaçi: The Civil and Military Gazette, 1967)*, p. 258

combined. “This Qazi of the Imperial Camp, as he was also designated, made all the appointments of local qazies in various parts of the Empire.”<sup>407</sup> The *sadr-u’s-sudur* was responsible for the judicial administration and the religious affairs and the *qadi-u’l-qudat* was responsible for holding the court as the chief judge.<sup>408</sup> Also, it is necessary to say that both of the two officers, *sadr-us-sudur* and *qadi-ul-qudat*, were the members of the central governments.

In conclusion, the Mughal judicial system had mainly been taken from the earlier Muslim empires in the continent as an inheritance and they adopted such these institutions into themselves and they had been mostly improved at the reign of Akbar Shah. Moreover, this system was in progress until the British colonial era.

The Mughal judicial system was also based on the Hanafi school of Sunna Islam like the Ottoman Empire and there are some basic similarities especially among the judicial institutions like the ‘*mufti*’, ‘*qadi*’ or ‘*qadi-t-askar*’, etc. The most important reason of these similarities was that nearly all the concepts had been taken from the global heritage of Islam via the Iranians; therefore, the names of the institutions are generally Persian in both empires, for example. Also, the applications were also nearly the same in these two empires because of that the basics of both of them were the same legal school of Islam. Furthermore, there were the hierarchical structure in them and this situation had facilitated to control over the people, officers and the provinces.

As a result, this judicial structure was the key point of turning into the empires from the government.

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<sup>407</sup>S. R. Sharma, *Mughal Empire in India 1526-1761-Part I*, (Bombay: Karnatak Printing Press, 1934), p. 303

<sup>408</sup>Ishtaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*, (Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1990), p. 207

## CONCLUSION

Fortunately, the numbers of comparative studies have been increased day by day. Furthermore, the comparative studies on history have gained importance and it has been turned into a professional field at the universities. Hopefully, many examples on this field will have been introduced in the following years and one of the major aims of this thesis is to be an applicable example of this field.

The Ottomans and Mughals had never been the neighbors of each other; therefore, their relations had been so limited. However, this situation had been a little bit changed at the reign of Shah Jahangir and the relations had been started to be set up at the reign of Shah Jahan. For example Shah Jahangir tells the Ankara Battle and its results; then, he says that “From that time until now, notwithstanding such favors, no one had come on the part of the emperors, nor has any ambassador been sent: how, then, can it now be believed that this person from Mawara’-a-n-nahr should have been sent by the emperor? I could in no way understand the affair, and no one could bear witness to the accuracy of his claim: I therefore told him to go wherever he might wish.”<sup>409</sup>

Nevertheless to say that both of these two empires were the contemporaneous of each other and they shared the common time, similar culture, tradition, and social structure and political one.

Despite of their limited relations, there are many similarities between the two empires of the sixteenth century world.

First of all, both of them were the Muslim empires and the administrative rules were based on the Sunni sect of Islam although the shari’a had been ignored from time to time in the Mughal Empire and it can be reminded that it was not important in the

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<sup>409</sup> Shah Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i Jahangiri or Memoirs of Jahangir Translated by Alexander Rogers*, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1909), p.145

Mughal Empire as much as in the Ottoman Empire that was certainly based on the shari'a. Also, both of them were the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious empires.

On the other hand, both of these two empires had been mixed with the Central Asian and Persian tradition within the Islamic context. Therefore, the backgrounds of these similarities among them are clear.

One of the main similarities can be seen on their institutions [administrational, fiscal, military and judicial ones] and their methods of institutionalizations.

Another important similarity is their political institutions and the administrative methods like the Palace officers and the governmental officers in the provinces. Also, the hierarchies of these officers are similar; on the one hand. Additionally, the methods of controlling the empires of these two emperors, Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and Akbar Shah were similar in both provinces and centre. Here, it is necessary to add that their well-known officers' destinies, Bairam Khan of Akbar Shah and İbrahim Pasha of Kanuni Sultan Suleiman, were also similar ones [Both of them were killed with the commands of their leaders although they had been the most significant figures at the beginnings of their reigns.]

The other basic similarity is to govern the provinces and military powers and economic sources. For instance, both of them used the similar structure based on the land owning, known as the '*mansabdari system*' in the Mughal Empire and the '*timar system*' in the Ottoman Empire. In addition, both of these two systems were similar to the Late Byzantine Empire's '*Pronoia*' system. They provided their military and economical necessities easily and effectively via this way.

The last major important common point in two worlds is the '*culture engineering*'.

Both of them were the outsiders. The Eastern Roman Empire in Istanbul had been survived until the conquest in 1453 although she was invaded in different times at the period of the Ottoman Empire. When the Istanbul, had been fallen, Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror had become officially '*Sultan-ı Rum*' because the natives of Istanbul [and Anatolia and the eastern side of the Black Sea] were the Greeks. Also, there were Armenians who lived in different parts of Anatolia and there were many other people who had the different backgrounds in the places that were conquered by the Ottoman Empire.

The Mughals were not the Indians. When Babur Shah came to the Indian peninsula, the numbers of the Turks and Muslims were lower than the native Indians. For example, the Hindus were higher than the Muslims at that time. In addition, the Afghans, Hazaras, Perisans, and Turanis had been composed of the population in India. On the one hand, there were also some different religions without Islam at that time.

Through the period of the Mughal Empire, the Muslim population had been increased day by day with the migrations from the outside of the country to the empire.

Until the reign of Akbar Shah, the Mughal Empire had not been stabilized. Akbar Shah had succeeded in not only the military aspects but also in the political ones.

It can be said that Akbar Shah had reshaped the empire and political and social rules. In other words, his reign was a kind of an example of the culture engineering like in the Ottoman Empire. For example, he provided the Hindus to become the officers or the landowners as the mansabdars. Although the Mughal administrative system had

mainly been consisted of the Persian and Islam impact, the Hindus had become the parst of the administration. Moreover, Akbar Shah had adopted some Hindu applications such as to give a speech on the balcony into his own administration policy and he provided them to celebrate their ritual days.

On the other hand, he had never forced to people to turn into Islam; furthermore, he invited the religious leaders of Christians or Jewish to come to his Palace in order to learn their religions.

Akbar Shah's religious policy, '*Din-i Ilahi*', was another possible example of this kind of engineering.

It can be said that he had succeeded to unite the different parts of society under his authority.

On the other hand, the sixteenth century was the age of transformation and the diplomacy and bureaucracy which was related to the improvement of diplomacy had started to gain more importance. Then, the empires had started to strength their administration bureaus; thus, they set up the political institutionalizations.

It can be said that these institutionalization politics had contributed the empires to survive much more times because of that these institutions had mainly facilitated the political authorities to be strengthened and they contribute the empires to become stronger.

In conclusion, these two parts of the world had followed the similar ways in general and the comparative history facilitates to understand the societies, civilizations, and their periods more easily.

This thesis aims to fill in the gaps because of that the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire had been limited to Iran in the classical period and then it was also limited to Russia nearly since the eighteenth century. This work tries to show the east side of Iran to learn what happened there and what kind of changings had taken a place in the Mughal and Ottoman empires as the Islamic state in the sixteenth century.

Hopefully, these kinds of comparative studies are gained more importance and the scholars and historians will probably be more interested in this subject.



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