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GERMAN-TURKISH WOMEN'S TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES AND BELONGING AT INTERSECTING SOCIAL DIVISIONS

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German Turkish Women's Transnational Practices and Belonging at Intersecting social Divisions

Alman-Türk Kadınların Toplumsal Bölmelerindeki Çok Uluslu İşleri ve Aidiyet

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ABSTRACT

This thesis asks how German-Turkish women who were raised in Germany produce a transnational space and experience belonging at intersecting social divisions. To answer the research question, the author of this work conducted episodic fieldwork in 2013 and in 2017, mainly in Turkey and partially in Germany. The fieldwork included participant observation among four main informants and semi-structured interviews with a total number of 32 women. While 14 women were consulted in 2013 and in 2017, 18 women were only interviewed in 2017. Most interlocutors rationalized their migration to Turkey as self-made decisions.

Belonging and transnationalism – the main concepts and themes of this thesis – are bound together by the framework of intersectionality. Intersectionality situates agents in an asymmetric continuum of social locations which are defined by intersecting social divisions, i.e. categories, such as citizenship status, gender, socio-economic and educational background, ethnicity, migrant status, age, race, and religion. Not only do social locations constrain and enable migration and settlement. As far as belonging is concerned, social locations also impact the intersectional language of exclusion and citizenship women migrants and postmigrants experience and their tactical responses.

The results show that migration and settlement are ultimately circular processes if citizenship rights allow for it. Over time, a migration to Turkey is often followed by a migration back to Germany or to another country. Related decisions depend on external political, social and economic transformations. Moreover, migration and settlement decisions are embedded with transformations in German-Turkish women's cycle of life and their corresponding social locations. The results show that German-Turkish women's decisions to engage in transnational circular migration are tactical choices of balancing intersectional inequality they experience in their place of origin with intersectional equality in the destination of migration. They move away from structural disadvantages they face in the form of gendered constraints, intersectional discrimination, unemployment, economic deprivation, social exclusion and curtailed individual liberties. By way of migrating, they seek to alter their social locations by claiming fundamental rights such as the right to be near family members and friends, the right to accommodation, livelihood, work and education, the right to gender equality, social inclusion, and the right to freedom of expression and self-realization. As far as belonging is concerned, German-Turkish women experience intersectional categorizations of

difference based on race, ethnicity, culture, religion and gender in both countries. Contrary to these categorizations and even contrary to hybrid, binational or hyphenated cultural identities, the consulted women situate their senses of belonging and self-identification with groups on the social micro-level of their past and present everyday life. Meaningful social networks, groups and localities include family and friends, the workplace and university, neighborhoods in Germany and in Istanbul as well as Istanbul's urban public sphere. It can be concluded that German-Turkish women's fundamental rights, needs and resources and their social, economic and political spheres of participation and belonging are distributed across the transnational space Germany-Turkey. Their migration motives constitute claims for participation, for fundamental rights and for intersectional justice in the polities of two sovereign states.

Since the protagonists of this thesis evade structural inequalities and alter their disadvantaged social locations in both states as they migrate, a right to dual citizenship is a necessary step to enhance intersectional justice and to reconcile them with the structural inequalities they face in each polity.

Keywords: Intersectionality, German-Turkish women, Belonging, Transnationalism, Migration

ÖZET

Bu tez Almanya'da büyümüş Alman-Türk kadınlarının nasıl bir ulusaşırı alan oluşturduğu ve aidiyeti kesişimsel sosyal alanlarda nasıl tecrübe ettiklerini sorgulamaktadır. Araştırma sorusunu cevaplamak için yazar, çoğunlukla Türkiye'de ve kısmen Almanya'da olmak üzere, 2013 ve 2017 yıllarında aralıklı saha çalışması yürütmüştür. Bu saha çalışması, 4 kaynak için katılımcı gözlem içermekte ve toplam 32 kadın için yarı sistemli mülakatları içermektedir. 2013 ve 2017 senelerinde aynı 14 kadına danışılırken, 18 kadınla sadece 2017'de görüşülmüştür. Görüşülen kadınların çoğu, Türkiye'ye göçlerini, kendi verdikleri bir karar olarak rasyonalize etmektedir.

Tezin ana konusu ve konsepti olan aidiyet ve ulusaşırılık, kesişimsellik çerçevesinde birbirine bağlanmaktadır. Kesişimsellik kişileri; kesişen sosyal alanlar tarafından tanımlanan ve vatandaşlık, cinsiyet, sosyo-ekonomik ve eğitimsel arkaplan, etnisite, göçmenlik statüsü, yaş, ırk ve din olarak kategorilendirilebilecek, asimetrik olarak sürekli sosyal konumlara yerleştiriyor. Göç ve yerleşmeyi sadece sosyal konum kısıtları belirlemiyor. Aidiyet göz önüne alındığında, sosyal konumlar kadın göçmen ve post-göçmenlerin tecrübe ettiği kesişimsel dışlanma söylemini ve vatandaşlık durumunu da, taktiksel tepkilerini de etkiliyor.

Sonuçlar, vatandaşlık hakları izin verdiği sürece, göç ve yerleşmenin neticede döngüsel bir süreç olduğunu gösteriyor. Zaman içerisinde, Türkiye'ye olan göçü sıklıkla Almanya'ya geri dönüş veya başka bir ülkeye göç takip ediyor. Bununla ilgili kararlar dışsal politik, sosyal ve ekonomik dönüşümlere bağlı oluyor. Ayrıca, göç ve yerleşme kararları Alman-Türk kadınlarının hayat döngüsü ve denk gelen sosyal konumları ile içsel. Sonuçlar Alman-Türk kadınların ulusaşırı döngüsel göçle ilgilenme kararlarının orijin noktasında tecrübe ettikleri kesişimsel eşitsizlikler ile varış noktasındaki kesişimsel eşitliği dengelemek için verilen taktiksel kararlar olduğunu gösteriyor. Cinsiyet kısıtları, kesişimsel ayrımcılık, işsizlik, ekonomik yoksunluk, sosyal dışlanma ve kısıtlanmış kişisel özgürlükler biçiminde karşılaştıkları sistemsel dezavantajlardan uzaklaşıyorlar.

Göç ederek, aile ve arkadaşların yanında olma hakkı, barınma hakkı, geçim, iş ve eğitim, cinsiyet eşitliği hakkı, sosyal kabul, ifade özgürlüğü ve kendini gerçekleştirme gibi temel haklarını talep edip sosyal konumlarını değiştirmeyi amaçlıyorlar. Aidiyeti göz önünde bulundurduğumuzda da, Alman-Türk kadınları her iki ülkede de ırk, etnisite, kültür, din ve cinsiyete bağlı kesişimsel kategorizasyon ayrımı yaşıyorlar. Kategorileştirme ve hatta hibrit, iki uluslu, çoklu kültürel kimliklemeye rağmen danışılan kadınların aidiyet hissi

ve kendini tanımlamayı sosyo-mikro seviyedeki ve lokalitedeki gruplarda konumluyor. Anlamlı sosyal ağlar, gruplar ve lokaliteler; aile ve arkadaşları, iş yeri ve üniversiteyi, Almanya'da ve İstanbul'daki mahalleleri ve ayrıca İstanbul'un kentsel alanını içeriyor. Alman-Türk kadınların temel haklar, ihtiyaçlar, kaynaklar ve sosyal, ekonomik ve politik alandaki katılım ve aidiyetinin Almanya-Türkiye ulusaşırı alanına yayılmış olduğu sonucu çıkarılabiliyor. Göç motivasyonları iki bağımsız ülkenin yönetiminde; katılım, temel haklar ve kesişimsel adalet için talep oluşturuyor.

Bu tezin protaganisti biçimsel eşitsizliklerden sakındığı ve göç sırasında iki ülkede de oluşan dezavantajlı sosyal konumların değişmesinden yana olduğu için, çift vatandaşlığa hakkın kesişimsel adalet ve iki yönetimde de karşılaşılan biçimsel eşitsizliği uzlaştırmak adına gerekli bir adım olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kesişimsellik, Alman-Türk Kadınları, Aidiyet, Çok Ulusluluk, Göç

INTRODUCTION

Two anecdotes from the field entangled with my own experience illustrate how migrants sustain links between countries in their everyday lives. During my fieldwork in Istanbul in 2017, I visited my interlocutor Damla at her apartment to conduct an interview. She offered me sparkling water. Sparkling water can be found anywhere in Turkey. It is served in 0,2-liter glass bottles that can be purchased in six-packs. To my surprise, Damla handed me a Turkish brand of sparkling water served in a large 0.7-liter glass container, a bottle size that I had never come across before in Istanbul. Sparkling water in 0.7-liter plastic bottles was something I would occasionally buy in a rather special supermarket but not in glass bottles. I was fascinated, and Damla showed me a stock of glass bottles she had purchased from her local grocery store around the corner in exchange for the delivery of the bottles to her house. On another interview occasion at Mine's house, she kept offering me sparkling water, bottle after bottle and I did not decline. The fact that I like to drink sparkling water often and in large amounts was always met with bewilderment by my Turkey-born friends in Istanbul. They preferred to occasionally drink one small bottle, for example after a meal. In the fieldwork context however, several of my interlocutors shared similar preferences: based on our biographic experiences and our culinary preferences we brought from Germany to Turkey, we favored the consumption of sparkling water in larger amounts than the native locals.

These examples illustrate some of the topics this thesis aims to explore: The different kinds of border-crossing connections, people who migrate or who have migrated maintain to their places of origin, not only by means of traveling, but also in their post-migration everyday life practices. In the example, a sensory perception – the sense of taste – helped to keep a past experience alive. The perception, however, can also trigger mental images of imagining the future and bears along with its function to sustain memories, the potential to translate into migration at a later point in time.

After shedding light on the research question of this thesis, a short illustration of the local and global context will help the reader to contextualize this episodic research in the light of larger social, political, and economic transformations. The state of the art gives an overview of the main concepts and scholars this work refers to, followed by the rationale of research. The following sections will explore the methods of participant

observation, interviews, self-reflexivity and content analysis as tools of data collection and evaluation followed by an overview on the scope of this thesis and its limitations.

1.1. RESEARCH QUESTION

The main research question that will be answered in this dissertation is as follows: How do German-Turkish women experience belonging and produce a transnational space and in their everyday lives across intersecting social divisions such as gender, citizenship, socio-economic background, migrant status and educational positionality? This thesis will take a closer look at how German-Turkish women who grew up in Germany and subsequently decided to live in Turkey at different points in their lives negotiate belonging and mobility in the transnational space Germany-Turkey. Applying the concept of social locations, I understand the places that shape German-Turkish women's capacity for taking action as dependent on a continuum of privileges and disadvantages defined by intersecting social divisions such as gender, age, migrant and citizenship status, ethnicity, attribution of difference, socio economic, professional and educational background.

First, I ask for the context of opportunities and constraints in which the women decide for and imagine border-crossing mobility and how they produce a transnational space. How do their transnational ties differ across varying social locations? Do mobile and non-mobile women produce different transnational ties, and if so, how? How for instance do transnational ties, relations and connections of women who can no longer travel to Germany because they lost their right of residence differ from the ones who can? Second, the study will explore how German-Turkish women negotiate ethnic, racializing and culturalizing prejudices and how such prejudices relate to their belonging and their senses of belonging in relationship to their respective social locations. Last, how do transnational everyday life practices and self-perceptions of belonging relate to one another? That is, are self-perceptions of belonging affected by the latter and vice versa? Juxtaposing different social locations becomes crucial for showing different realms of opportunities and constraints in the making of transnational spaces and belonging. How do transnational practices and experiences belonging of women in less privileged social locations differ from women in more privileged social locations?

1.2. LOCAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT

In the year 2006, the number of people moving from Germany to Turkey exceeded the number of people moving in the opposite direction for the first time in nearly two decades. German mainstream media labelled this trend as a mass phenomenon. Speculating about the educational level of those migrants, some claimed a 'brain drain' emigration of highly skilled second and third generation Turkey-origin academics. Contrary to these assumptions this migration trend reversed in 2015 when net-migration from Turkey to Germany turned positive. The very limited statistical information on this theme indicates that it is not a mass phenomenon: For example, only 3,000 to 4,000 Turkish citizenship holders who moved to Turkey annually between 2007 and 2012 were of the second and third generation (Alscher, Baraulina and Müller, 2014, pp. 121-122).

The discussion shows that in public discourse it is still assumed that people migrate in one direction only. In the case of German-Turkish people leaving Germany for Turkey, a migration decision must not be irrevocable. Even if so, people still maintain different kinds of relations to their places of origin in Germany. Concepts of transnationalism help to contextualize migration trends as circular and multi directional processes that are open-ended. The increasing interconnectedness due to the rapid expansion and development of communication, information and transportation technology – a condition of the age of globalization – facilitates the maintenance of dense connections and relations to more than one location.

In this theoretical reading of migration, German-Turkish migrant women become agents who engage in different kinds of border-crossing ties and identify with more than one locality. Due to rapid technological development, migration decisions can be made quickly, while the maintenance of social and economic ties not only presents a resource that facilitates migration but also an opportunity to stay in touch easily in comparison to the 1960s when maintaining border-crossing ties and moving between countries was a costly and time-consuming undertaking.

To explore causes of such larger migration trends, it is therefore helpful to assess second and third generation German-Turkish people's migration to Turkey beyond economically motivated pull factors from one country to another. A qualitative perspective helps to examine how such global trends manifest locally. German-Turkish women are situated actors whose migration decisions and trajectories need to be

embedded with their life circumstances, networks, local activities and in the light of broader political and economic transformations that occur in Turkey and Germany.

During the period of increased net migration from Germany to Turkey (2006 – 2015), broader changes occurred in Germany, including unfavorable outcomes of social welfare reforms, increased unemployment rates among immigrants and postmigrants, as well as a heightened lack of educational opportunities and discrimination in the housing and labor markets.

Turkey, by contrast, had become an attractive destination for migrants due to its economic growth and the democratic reforms spurred by the EU accession process. In fact, Istanbul was an important hub for companies with economic and financial ties to Germany (see section 3.8.).

The positive net-migration to Turkey lasted eight years until it reversed in 2015 and the latest figures of the migration report indicate that the trend of positive net migration to Germany continues. The causes of this reversal can be found in political and economic transformations in Turkey. A series of events account for decreasing political stability. Anti-democratic tendencies of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, *Adalet ve Kalınma Partisi*) government increased before and around the time the migration trend reversed. Political scientists argue that Turkey underwent an authoritarian shift from a "tutelary democracy" to a "competitive authoritarian regime" (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Özbudun, 2015; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, 2018). These developments are accompanied by a decline of economic growth and a sharp increase of the inflation rate (see section 3.8.).

The fieldwork data that provide the basis for this thesis fall exactly into these two periods of different migration trends. I conducted the first fieldwork during and after the Gezi protests in 2013, and returned to the field in the year 2017, around the time of the constitutional referendum in Turkey that resulted in a presidential system. The fact that 14 women were consulted twice can illustrate how their migration and settlement trajectories have been influenced by this broader political context, as circular migration occurs in the period of reversing migration trends and in the context of broader political transformations. Five of the 14 interlocutors I met in 2013, resettled in Germany between 2015 and 2017. In total, I know that eight women of the whole sample (32 women) left Turkey between 2015 and 2019.

While German-Turkish women's migration and settlement decisions and purposes have to be contextualized with these developments, it also needs to be stressed that migration between Germany and Turkey was never unidirectional and static. Turkish labor migration was organized according to a circular principle and coupled with return migration. On retirement, first generation immigrants from Turkey who settled in Germany also started moving between the countries in a circular fashion. And the same applies for second and third generation German-Turkish people. It can be argued that regardless of these macro factors, second and third generation women's migration is an ongoing circular phenomenon in itself – if citizenship rights allow for it – which is additionally influenced by these broader transformations. This research will illustrate the transnational migration dynamics because the two fieldwork occasions allow for shedding light on the process of migration and settlement over time.

It is not only the global context that changes processes of transnational migration. German-Turkish women's individual life circumstances have changed during the four years of my absence as a researcher. While macro factors may have influenced their lives, it is also important to localize migration and settlement trajectories and narratives of different women with their social locations, and dependent on that, with their capacities of becoming shaping agents of their lives.

1.3. STATE OF THE ART

The length of this thesis can be explained with its scope: I try to bridge concepts from different disciplines and I aim to contextualize two country-specific contexts on two different research occasions. The main theoretical strands of this thesis, transnational migration and belonging offer approaches on intersectionality and gender. Embedding the empirical results with concepts of intersectionality made it also necessary to extend these concepts with literature on citizenship. Concepts of citizenship and belonging help to explain German-Turkish women's migration trajectories as entangled with constraining citizenship regimes, migration policies and citizenship discourses in Germany and in Turkey on the one hand, and with German-Turkish women's claims to rights and membership on the other hand.

For the contextualization of German-Turkish women's transnational migration trajectories and belonging, a review on the literature covering the migration history between Germany and Turkey, migration policies and membership discourses in Germany was a prerequisite. Ultimately, the two research occasions in 2013 and in

2017, showed how transnational migration works as an open-ended process. Explaining social and individual transformations in this process – the country of settlement and ideas and plans of the future country of settlement had changed for many women in the sample – called for a historical and country-specific contextualization of migration and settlement decisions and for a contextualization of the two fieldwork occasions.

The analysis of the empirical material for this thesis is based on three theoretical discussions: Firstly, the debate on cultural representation, secondly concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging and thirdly, migration theory concerned with transnationalism and transnational migration.

A theoretical fundament for the analysis of the ethnographic material is the *debate on cultural representation* that has unsettled the disciplines of cultural studies and cultural/social anthropology as it deconstructed the dialectic relationship between representing *ethnographic Self* and *represented Other* as a relationship of power over meaning and the representation of culture as construct (section 2.1.1.-2.1.3.). Edward Said's renowned book, *Orientalism* (1978), is one of the most influential works on the deconstruction of cultural representation along Self-Other lines. He defines Orientalism as a power-embedded discourse that helps to rule over, to administer and to produce knowledge about the 'Orient'. Said uncovered that the relationship between 'Orient' and 'Occident' is and was a relationship of power over meaning. Moreover, Said showed that the relationship between *Western designators* and *designated Orient* was an unequal relationship in which the designated people did not agree with the meaning of designations. This process of designating 'the Orient' as different and backward, constituted a strategy of producing the Western Self as rational and developed. Said's method of deconstructing discourses about cultural difference is crucial because he opened up a discussion about the *designating Self* that constructs a *designated Other* as an interdependent relationship between identity and alterity.

The debate on cultural representation helps to deconstruct Othering discourses German-Turkish women face in their everyday lives as discourses that primarily reveal information about the positionality of designators, rather than providing information about German-Turkish women. The discussion provides the analytical language necessary to deconstruct hegemonic discourses about "Turkish women" as victims of patriarchal oppression (see section 3.6. and Chapter 5). Related discourses often operate with a *homogenizing notion of culture and identity*, similar to the notion of culture used

by classic ethnographers (see section 2.1.1.). The debate on cultural representation furthermore sheds light on the heterogeneity of positionalities within a designated group (Clifford and Marcus, 1986).

Today *space* and *culture* are conceived as an *outcome of social practice* and not as an a priori existent substance. On the one hand, *practice theory* embeds agents with *constraining structures* they reproduce, confirm and comply with (Wicker, 1997; Ortner, 2006). On the other hand, practice theory highlights *agency* as people also *contest structural constraints* and thereby transform a given status quo. Concepts about the *production of space* (de Certeau, 1984; Soja, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991) conceive space as an outcome of social practice, perception and people's imagination. Those concepts help to describe and analyze German-Turkish women's border-crossing everyday life experiences and symbolic practices of belonging in the light of structural constraints and agency. Concepts of space as socially produced help do describe how they merge two physically separated worlds into one perceived space that is locally situated.

Another fundament for the empirical analysis are theoretical debates about *belonging* and *mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion at the social level and at the subject level*. At the social level, concepts of belonging deconstruct collective mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. In his famous article *Ethnicity without Groups*, Brubaker (2004) makes a plea for disconnecting notions of cultural identity, culture and ethnicity from groups. An underlying assumption of ethnicity and culture is that individuals are implicitly assumed to be members of groups, that collectively identify as nation, ethnicity or race (section 2.2.1.). He suggests letting go of the connection between group and culture, nation, race and ethnicity *as priori* analytical category. Group membership based on such categories may turn out as an *a posteriori* result of analysis. Different scholars have suggested that to deconstruct the positionality of people who designate others based on ethnicity, culture or religion. As a *strategy* "organized by the postulation of power" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 38) the politics of belonging include a struggle over meaning, including *citizenship discourses* (section 2.2.3.). Similar as in the discourse of Orientalism citizenship discourses employ *strategies of Othering* such as, *ethnicization, culturalization and racialization*, which serve the construction of an *ideal citizen subject* as member of a given polity (section 2.2.2.). Attributions of belonging along such lines can result in collective struggles for recognition, citizenship practices and group formation as counter-hegemonic practice (Tschernokoshewa, 1999; Brubaker, 2004; Anthias, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006). To further define *postmigrant and transmigrant*

citizenship practices vis-à-vis *discourses of citizenship* in Germany (section 3.6.), concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging at the collective level are useful. Ong (1996) has proposed to define citizenship as a "dual process of self-making and being made". Isin's (2002, pp. 35–36) definition of *citizenship as a dialectic relationship between Self and Other* – in which the ideal citizen is defined while drawing boundaries from those defined as Others, "strangers, outsiders, and aliens" – is helpful to understand the citizenship discourse in Germany (section 2.2.3.). To interpret citizenship and belonging from a practice-related and participatory angle which does not necessarily relate to the state, citizenship concepts proposed by Kron and Noack (2008, p. 12), Turner (1993, p. 2) and Erel (2009) are helpful.

Anthias, Yuval-Davis (1983) and Morokvašić (1987) were the first authors in the European migration context who inspired by black feminists from the U.S. (Crenshaw, 1989; Hill Collins, 2002) highlighted that *strategies of ethnicization* also operate in an *intersectional* manner. With the notions of intersectionality, social locations and social divisions they provided the analytical tools to analyze belonging at the society and at the subject level. *Social divisions* bridge the social and the subject level. As fluid socially stratifying categories, such as race, gender, class, age, religion, kinship group or citizenship status, social divisions assign a positionality in a hierarchy of power. A person may identify with a social division. The subjective meaning a designated person ascribes to a social division however differs from the social meaning of a social division. While white speakers of the majority in Germany are inclined to assume the headscarf to be a symbol of oppression and force, a woman who identifies as Muslim sees it as a private and religious symbol. Social divisions produce inequality and discrimination (section 2.2.4.). *Social Locations* define a continuum of privileged or disadvantaged positionalities people can be situated in. A social location is defined by the *intersection of social divisions*. A person's capacity and opportunity to act is constrained by his*her social location. *Intersectionality* describes overlapping categories of discrimination based on social divisions like race, gender, class, age religion, nationality etc. *Intersectional discrimination* occurs where social divisions overlap and results in distinct experiences of discrimination.

The last important element of concepts of belonging is *a subjective sense of belonging* which depends on social locations (section 2.2.4.). People identify with a lot of spheres other than cultural groups. The analytical openness of concepts of belonging leaves room for a sense of belonging that goes beyond ethnic group membership. A sense of

belonging may not overlap with an ascribed ethnicity. Self-perceptions of membership and belonging may in include practices of attachment to objects people and places. As a consequence, it makes sense to analyze related practices that – a posteriori – may reveal that individuals prioritize membership and have socialized identities in family and friendship networks or in occupational, political and neighborhood networks. People's self-perception and a sense of belonging can constitute a *tactical response* "determined by the absence of power" vis-à-vis attributions of belonging (de Certeau, 1984, p. 38).

A third theoretical fundament to describe German-Turkish women's migration trajectories and their border-crossing practices are concepts dealing with *transnational migration and transnationalism* (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992). On the one hand these concepts stress that migrants sustain different border-crossing relationships merging their country of settlement and their country of descent into one social field. On the other hand, the notion of transnationalism underlines that mobility between two or more countries can be open-ended and circular processes.

To embed transnational practices into a local context, I argue with Guarnizo and Smith's notion of the *trans-locality*. Both authors stressed the importance of contextualizing transnational migration and practices with historical context, the role of the state and people's local embeddedness (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). Border-crossing practices do not necessarily connect two countries, they can also connect two localities. The adjective *translocal* describes border-crossing ties between places. German-Turkish women's experiences of growing up in different rural, regional, or urban contexts in Germany and their experiences of living in different neighborhoods in Istanbul shape their border-crossing practices, mobility and narratives of cultural belonging (section 2.2.2.).

The importance of *networks* in transnational space as stressed by Faist (2000) and Vertovec (2009). The analytical language of network analysis provides an important tool to scrutinize how German-Turkish women establish and maintain ties, and how they are embedded into an established web of *social and symbolic ties* which constitute an *asset* that can trigger migration and settlement decisions and transnational migration circuits (section 2.2.3).

Pessar's and Mahler's concept of *gendered geographies of power* (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006) has been an important inspiration for contextualizing

transnational migration and transnational practices with *gender and intersectionality*. The capacity to migrate is constrained by social locations: Migration decisions, purposes and the imagination of migration are enabled or constrained by gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, age and so on (section 2.2.4).

Appadurai's (2008) notion of the *imagination* includes the experiences and agency of people who cannot migrate because their mobility is constrained by their social location. Appadurai describes the imagination as a form of practice, an experience of modernity and globalization. The rapid development of media and transportation technology has extended the boundaries of migrants' perception of the present and the future to a more global level. Plans, ideas and wishes about settlement and migration are integrated into mediated communication. Images affect the perception of what is possible. In the light of globalization, Appadurai argued that ethnography needs to consider also the *deterritorialized world* as a crucial component of human experience. His notion of deterritorialization, i.e. the experience of the world as detached from place does not assume subjects to be mobile, he rather defines it as an experience of postmodernity. To consider the role of the imagination for German-Turkish women means that plans and ideas about the future as far as migration and settlement are concerned, may be realized at a later stage or impact their present lives.

To contextualize and structure German-Turkish women's causes and motives for mobility and settlement in the German-Turkish transnational space, it is helpful to define their de facto *citizenship rights*. Marshall (1950, pp. 28–29) defines citizenship is a legal status of those who are "full members of a community" and have access to civil, social and political rights (1950, pp. 10-11). The notion of community can be adopted for the radius of German-Turkish women's transnational practices, i.e., the transnational space that combines Germany Turkey into one sphere of action. Access to civil and social rights can in part explain why they become mobile (see sections 4.1., 4.2.).

To define the citizenship status of German-Turkish women who grew up in Germany and hold a German residence title and Turkish nationality, Hammar's (2016) notion of *denizenship* can define their access to rights in Germany. Based on Marshall's notion of citizenship, Hammar underlined that immigrants with a permanent residence permit in Europe were gradually endowed with social and civil rights but have no political rights in their country of settlement which is only grated by full or dual citizenship (section

3.4.). The chapter on the German-Turkish migration nexus mainly refers to the works of Abadan Unat (1976, 2011), Kaya (2009) and Martin (1992, 2006) who have all made significant contributions on the topic (see Chapter 3).

1.4. RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH IN A LOCAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT

This thesis examines migration and settlement decisions of German-Turkish women coming from different socio-economic and educational backgrounds within the wider context of social and political developments in Germany and Turkey. Early last decade, highly skilled German-Turkish post-migrants were a topic in German media. Journalists feared that 'integrated' (used synonymously for "educated") individuals with Turkish roots would leave the country. The tenor of the debate mainly revolved around an irrevocable emigration decision (see section 3.7.). The existing qualitative research on transnational migration of second and third generation German-Turkish people is limited in number and scope. While research on migration purposes is inclined to look at push-factors in Germany, research about actual migration to Turkey is inclined to emphasize pull-factors in Turkey. The empirical data for this thesis were collected during different migration trends between Turkey and Germany (see section 1.5.2.). On the first research occasion in 2013, net migration to Turkey was positive. This trend reversed in 2015, before the second research occasion in 2017. The existing research is mainly concerned with highly skilled German-Turkish people who moved to Turkey during the first trend. I hope to contribute to the existing research by analyzing how the changed social, economic and political context mainly in Turkey has played into German-Turkish women's ideas, purposes and decisions about migration and settlement.

Most existing research deals with male and female migrants, whereas few contributions address women. The latter consider either highly skilled women only or women who moved who moved to Turkey in the course of a family return or an arranged marriage. I attempt to contribute to existing discussions by providing an intersectional perspective on women with differing socio-economic and educational backgrounds to show how transnational practices, migration and settlement purposes and decisions differ along more privileged and less privileged social locations as far as their citizenship status, income, family status, religion and age are concerned.

Migration trends may change. What is important to consider is that the people, who move within these trends and beyond, move between countries in a circular fashion. Pessar and Mahler (2003, p. 832) have pointed out that that longitudinal transnational studies are rare and constitute a gap in the existing literature. This work can contribute to the general literature on transnational migration because it addresses transnational processes of circular migration and the open-ended character of transnational migration. Even if German-Turkish women do not plan to move in a circular fashion between Germany, Turkey and beyond, the contexts of their lives change and result in circular migration where citizenship rights allow for it.

The two research occasions in 2013 and in 2017 help to show how migration and settlement is connected to the social locations of different women which differ across time. German-Turkish women's life circumstances and individual choices are simultaneously embedded with larger social and political transformations in Germany and Turkey. So far, few scholars have argued that self-made emigration decisions may be reversed at any time (see section 3.9.). As the proponents of transnational concepts have highlighted, migration may be circular and migration and settlement are open ended processes.

I hope to contribute to the existing research by shedding light on decision-making concerning migration and settlement as a multi-directional process. If citizenship rights allow for it, German-Turkish women's decisions on settlement issues may change over time, as they aim to improve their circumstances tansnationally, weighing advantages and disadvantages they may have in each country (see Chapter 4). The voices of the women show that the 2013 imagination of the future may become reality in 2017. I will contextualize German-Turkish women's narratives of actual migration decisions and their rationalization of migration purposes and ideas with gender-related social, political and economic contexts. Mobility is only one aspect of transnationalism. I also hope to contribute to the discussion by addressing non-mobile German-Turkish women's transnational practices including symbolic transnational ties such as practices of belonging and attachment in which they symbolically connect two localities into one space.

As far as German-Turkish women's senses of belonging are concerned: How do they perceive their membership in the German and Turkish polity? How do they position themselves and their membership in the light of a public discourse in Germany that often

represents them as victims of patriarchal oppression?[1] These are questions that relate to belonging and will be answered in the course of this thesis to explore how different German-Turkish women in transnational space tactically position themselves and define their allegiances in the light of discourses about citizenship and membership in Germany and in Turkey (see section 3.6.).

The reference to immigrants and postmigrants in Germany is often negative and underlines their alleged cultural difference. Several politicians, journalists, and even some scholars describe the German-Turkish community as an immigrant group that is struggling or unwilling to integrate, often blaming German-Turkish people's allegedly clashing different cultural beliefs, traditions and religious practices. Instead of representing postmigrants along problem-oriented keywords, their commonalities with members of the dominant group of white citizens is hardly a topic of discussion, unless postmigrants themselves make claims for belonging and recognition (see section 3.6.). By shedding light on the statements and interests of German-Turkish women, and as a member of the white majority without migration background, I claim that it is first, time for the majority to first contribute to a critical self-reflection on the citizenship discourse in Germany, and second, to redefine membership in the German polity.

In line with concepts of belonging and citizenship (see section 2.2.) it is questionable whether this alleged difference of German-Turkish people is not rather a self-reference – an empty signifier – that works like the discourse of Orientalism. The citizenship discourse in Germany is more about how the majority wants to define ideal citizens as white, modern, integrated and progressive while demeaning an alleged Other. Although the *de jure* citizenship law has changed from *jus sanguinis* (blood right) to *jus soli* (birth right), the discourse in Germany *de facto* still seems to refer to the principle of blood right according to which membership in the polity is defined by ethno-cultural descent. In this discourse, immigrants' and postmigrants' claims to membership are hardly discussed by speakers who are members of the majority group as postmigrants' identification with life in Germany is not recognized: the fact that German language is their mother tongue and that they were born, raised, and probably will die in Germany.

By describing four exemplary cases in Chapter 5, I analyze German-Turkish women's citizenship practices vis-à-vis this citizenship discourse. Moreover, I intend to illustrate

[1] See for example Yıldız, 2009

their multiple allegiances in different social spheres of belonging that the empirical analysis revealed as meaningful. A goal is to illustrate German-Turkish women's multiple allegiances and socialized identities. Those allegiances can be observed on the micro level in social and local spheres of belonging that connect German-Turkish women as much to Turkey as to Germany, for example in the family, among friends, in the neighborhood and urban public sphere or at work and university.

1.5. METHODS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

In this research I employ a constructivist epistemological stance from the disciplines of cultural and social anthropology. Traditional ethnographers thought they were objective and considered themselves as a "neutral vessel of cultural experience" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 14 – 15). They believed they did not influence or alter the research setting. However, as Hammersley and Atkinson correctly point out, "all data involve presuppositions", and "social researchers are part of the social world they study" (2007, p. 15). This epistemological shift from an objectivist to a constructivist stance which occurred during the debate of cultural representation (see sections 2.1.1.-2.2.3.) has affected the understanding of the role of researchers and their relation to the people and topics they study. Today it is acknowledged that a written text is a construct that is always influenced by the writer's positionality and by social interactions in the research site. Researchers' orientations are influenced by their "socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 15)

As the researcher is believed to constitute an inevitable variable in the research process, qualitative research designs in cultural anthropology also address the subjectivity of researchers vis-à-vis their research subject(s). To control the effects of researchers' presence on the data, self-reflections on subjectivity in qualitative research also aim at uncovering power asymmetries between researcher and the subject of study and the interactions with the people ethnographers learn about (see also sections 2.1.1., 2.1.3.). Accordingly, a critical self-reflexive stance becomes a necessary requirement of doing research and affects the whole research process. A quality feature of research is that researchers reflect on their perceptions, their social locations in the site of research and their influence and interactions with the groups they enter (von Unger, 2014, p. 23).

1.5.1. Sampling and Sample

The research for this thesis was mainly conducted in Istanbul, Turkey. Istanbul is the largest city in Europe, and an innovative hub for global networks, businesses and universities that also connect Germany and Turkey. As a global hub, Istanbul is an attractive destination for German-Turkish migrants. I met several German-Turkish women in Istanbul at network events. After moving to Istanbul for my first fieldwork in 2013 (April-August), I started out with initial contacts from my own social network. I visited the monthly meetings of the Regulars' Table of Returnees (*Rückkehrerstammtisch*)[2] where I met some of my first interlocutors. After getting to know my first interlocutors in preliminary meetings and conducting the first interviews, I used the snowball sampling technique to find additional women. During the Gezi Protests in May and June 2013, I ran out of contacts as I had difficulties in reaching the people I already knew. I started to use the online platform *Xing*[3] – a career-network. I wrote to members in the Xing group of the Regulars' Table of Returnees with 1,600 registered members in April 2020. Because the platform is a career network, its members' qualification levels are visible. After I realized that most of my interlocutors were university graduates, I specifically addressed women without academic degrees.

During the second fieldwork in Istanbul in 2017 (March-September), I started searching for the women I had consulted in 2013. I had become friends with some interlocutors and stayed in touch with others. To find the other women, I had talked to in 2013, I had to do thorough research on the internet including various social media platforms. As in 2013, I used my own social network in Istanbul and snowball sampling. After I ran out of possible interlocutors, I used the platform *Xing* again. Unlike in 2013, *Xing* was no longer a popular career platform. *LinkedIn*, another online career platform, did not provide the kind of information I was looking for, so I started posting requests for interlocutors in *Facebook* groups of German-Turkish people in Turkey which proved to be a successful strategy.

A prerequisite for conducting qualitative research is the informed consent of interlocutors (Spradley, 1980, p. 49; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 200). By obtaining informed consent, ethnographers disclose the motives, content and goals of their research and guarantee the safeguarding of privacy, rights, interests and

[2] https://www.facebook.com/groups/ruckkehrerstammtisch
[3] https://www.xing.com/

sensitivities of interlocutors (Beer, 2008, p. 27; Association, 2012). In view of the debate on cultural representation (see section 2.1.1.-2.1.3.), an ethical research paradigm is to keep in mind that the relationship between ethnographers and interlocutors, is characterized by access to social relations, to knowledge and mobility, and by financial and social status (Hauser-Schäublin, 2008, p. 56). Since collecting data serves the fulfillment of personal goals, here a PhD degree, it requires a permission for research and according to Beer and Hauser-Schäublin, a service in return. If a conflict of interests arises, the people among whom the research is conducted are always of primary concern. Interlocutors have to stay anonymous and the contents and results of the research should be made accessible to them (Beer, 2008, p. 26; Hauser-Schäublin, 2008, pp. 56–57).

In 2013, I obtained an oral research permission from my interlocutors to conduct interviews and to write fieldnotes during the preliminary meetings. In 2017, I asked for permission to record fieldnotes on preliminary meetings. Before the interviews in 2017, I obtained informed consent with an information sheet. Interlocutors have my contact details and can withdraw their participation and access the interview transcripts any time. For this thesis, I used data obtained from a total of 46 interviews with 32 different German-Turkish women, in addition to fieldwork material. I interviewed 14 out of 32 women twice, first in the year 2013[4] and again in 2017[5]. 18 women were only consulted once. Apart from one woman who was living in Germany at the time of the interview in 2013, seven of the 14 interlocutors interviewed in 2013 and in 2017 have changed countries after I first met them in 2013. They moved to Germany or another country between 2015 and 2019. Of the whole sample nine women have left Turkey between 2017 and 2019. The research setting literally became multi-sited (Marcus, 1995) as I met five women in their place of residence in Germany during the second fieldwork.

The women who will be mainly represented in this thesis are the women I met in 2013 and in 2017. Their cases vividly exemplify how migration and settlement concerns and decisions and a sense of belonging can transform over time and in relation to the life cycle and the broader historical and global context. 19 women moved to Turkey between 2010 and 2015 which matches the time span when net migration from Germany to

[4] 2-I2013-14-I2013, x (interlocutors 1 to 14, interview conducted in 2013, section x [exception: Interview 1 is a pilot interview included into the analysis and was conducted in 2012]

[5] 1-I2017-13-I2017, x (interlocutors 1 to 13, interview conducted in 2017, section x [exception: Interview 14 was conducted in 2018])

Turkey was positive. Nine women moved to Turkey between 2000 and 2009. Three women moved to Turkey in the 1990s and one women in the 1980s.

I mainly chose interlocutors who say that they decided of their own accord to move to Turkey. In order to have a broader scope of social locations in the sample, I also consulted four women, who moved to Turkey in the course of a family return or before they were of full age. The women were born between 1965 and 1993. They have different cultural and socio-economic backgrounds. Some state that they are non-religious, while others identify with the Sunni-Islamic faith. One woman affiliates with the Kurdish, and another with the Zaza Alevi. The majority of the 32 women have completed an education. 17 women hold an academic degree, while nine have completed vocational training. One woman dropped out of school and did not complete an education. The remaining five women have completed school education until 10th grade or obtained *Abitur*, a school leaving certificate which qualifies for studying at a university.

The parents and grandparents of most interlocutors moved to Germany in the course of the labor recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey between the early 1960s and its cancellation in 1973 (see section 3.2.). That is, the majority of my interlocutors' parents or grandparents were labor migrants who grew up in rural areas in Turkey. Many worked in factories or became self-employed with small businesses, mostly in the food and gastronomy sector in Germany. Some interlocutors emphasize their parents' and grandparents' worldliness and literacy which they ascribe to their parents' and grandparents' levels of education and upbringing in the cities of Istanbul and Ankara.

19 interlocutors are of the second generation and children of the first-generation Turkey-origin labor migrants. Six women are of the third generation while seven women have parents from the first and the second generation of Turkey-origin immigrants. The interlocutors originate from different places in Germany. While the majority was born in Germany, some were born in Turkey and came to Germany as infants or small children in the course of family reunion. Six women grew up in cities and towns in North Rhine-Westphalia. Four interlocutors grew up in villages or small towns in Bavaria, Hesse and Baden-Wuerttemberg ranging roughly between 2,500 and 17,000 inhabitants. Eleven women grew up in cities. Four of them are from Cologne; others grew up in Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hannover, Munich and Nuremberg. Two women grew up in cities close to Frankfurt. Five women are from towns located in Baden-

Wuertemberg, often near the city of Stuttgart, ranging from 20,000 to 45,000 inhabitants. Three women grew up in Bavarian towns ranging between 30,000 and 90,000 inhabitants. One woman is from a town in Lower Saxony. Those women who grew up in cities, mostly lived in working-class and middle-class neighborhoods whose residents they describe as international, or as mainly populated by Turkey- or Germany-origin people. Others grew up in rural areas or villages mostly inhabited by Germans without migration background.

#	Pseudonym	Birth	MigrationTR-GER	Family Status	Citizenship Status	Generation	Education
1	Zilan	1990	2012	Single	Dual	2	Abitur
2	Yağmur	1971	2000	Single	TR/no res. title	2	Voc. Training
3	Kübra	1984	2004	Married, 3 sons	TR/no res. title	2, 3	10th grade
4	Mihrimah	1988	2012-2016	Married, daughter	TR/res. title	2, 3	Voc. Training
5	Ela	1979	1997	Partnership	TR/no res. title	2	University
6	Lara	1987	2010-2019	Married, daughter	GER/Blue Card	2, 3	University
7	Emma	1976	2010-2017	Single mother, daughter	Dual	3	University
8	Asena	1970	1993-1994 1997-2000 2007-2010	Divorced, 2 daughters	Dual	2	University
9	Lena	1982	2013-2015	Single	Dual	2	University
10	Ayla	1979	2010-2019	Married	TR/no res. title	2, 3	Voc. Training
11	Zeynep	1982	2003	Married, son	TR/no res. title	2	University
12	Melisa	1965	1984	Remarried, daughter	TR/no res. title	2	-
13	Nojan	1985	2007-2013 2014-2017 2017	Divorced, single	GER/Blue Card	2	Abitur
14	Bahar	1984	2011-2015	Married, 2 sons, daughter	GER/Blue Card	3	Voc. Training
15	Farah	1990	2011	Married	GER	3	University
16	Leyla	1991	2014-2017	Partnership	GER/Blue Card	3	University
17	Julia	1979	2012	Married	GER	2	Voc. Training
18	Sofia	1984	1999-2002 2012	Married, son	Dual	3	University
19	Damla	1981	2013-2014 2017-2019	Single	TR	2	University
20	Beyza	1992	2014	Single	GER	3	Abitur
21	Berivan	1990	2013-2014 2015	Single	GER	3	University
22	Munsur	1971	1992	Married	Dual	2	Voc. Training
23	Cennetkuşu	1974	2006	Married	GER	2	10th grade
24	Jasmin	1988	2011	Single	GER	2	University
25	Tiran	1974	1996	divorced, son, daughter	TR	2, 3	University
26	Mine	1970	2011	Single	GER	2	University
27	Ada	1985	2012	Married	TR/res. title	2	University
28	Esma	1993	2008	Single	Dual	2, 3	Abitur
29	Arzu	1978	2012	Married, son	GER	3	Voc. Training
30	Sühan	1993	2009	Married	GER	3	University
31	Asya	1974	2006	Single	GER	2	Voc. Training
32	Şirin	1969	2012	Single	GER	2	Voc. Training

Figure 1: Sample and Demographic Information

1.5.2. Episodic Fieldwork

The ethnographic data for this thesis were collected during two fieldwork occasions in 2013 and in 2017 within differing political and economic contexts. To learn about how German-Turkish women produce a transnational space and experience belonging in their everyday lives across intersecting social divisions, I used the 'classic' methods of ethnography, participant observation and ethnographic interviews.

There is a distinction between a longitudinal research design and collecting longitudinal data. In a longitudinal research design, such as in a panel study, the occasions people will be contacted on are previously determined in the research design. Elliot, Holland and Thomson state that it "is not necessary […], to use a longitudinal research design in order to collect longitudinal data […]. "Indeed the one-off retrospective collection of longitudinal data is very common in both qualitative and quantitative research" (2008, p. 229). Since research is conducted on two or more different occasions, longitudinal data collection allows for highlighting change and continuity over time. Changes in people's lives, perspectives and worldviews, the meaning of life events, strategies of reworking the past or adaptation to transformations can retrospectively be highlighted by comparing two or more occasions in time (Elliott, Holland and Thomson, 2008, pp. 229–241). Pessar and Mahler (2003, p. 832) have called for more longitudinal studies in the research of transnational migration and gender because longitudinal data collection is "more appropriate to comprehending transnational processes".

Although hardly reflected in research methods, short but sequential stays in the field that last several weeks or months have become a common undertaking for many PhD students in the disciplines of European ethnology, empirical cultural studies and cultural anthropology (Welz, 2013, p. 44). Whyte defines fieldwork among the same people on more than one occasion *episodic fieldwork* (2013, p. 110). According to Whyte, episodic fieldwork stresses the importance of absence and return for fieldwork relationships. A crucial element of fieldwork on different occasions is the communicative act of "updating" between researcher and interlocutors. Updating gives access to specific knowledge and "involves reinterpretation of past understandings and of one's understanding of past" (2013, p. 114). Accounts about returning to the field have been discussed in the literature as events in which the rapport between researcher and interlocutor evokes shared memories, past biographic events and include moments in which identities are mutually reassured (Welz, 2013, p. 48). The process of updating not

only involves obvious changes in the researcher's and interlocutor's positionality and their relationships to other people. It may also involve access to local perceptions of a changed broader context, for example political changes or retrospective interpretations of "the world and the direction that it is taking" (Whyte, 2013, p. 117). Welz (2013, p. 48) quotes the sociologist Burawoy to underline that repetitive encounters in the field over a longer period can disclose effects of larger processes. Burawoy (2003) has conducted episodic ethnographic research on transformation and globalization processes. He underlines that ethnographic "revisits" are characterized by changes in the relation between observer and participant and changes concerning the theory the ethnographer brings to the field. In addition, internal transformations occur in the field and the latter is transformed by external forces. Changes, variations and differences is what we come to understand when we revisit the field over time. Subjects or discourses we study can no longer be situated in "a continuous everyday life that facilitates uninterrupted immersion". Today, our research questions tend to address "processes and relationalities" that are spatially dispersed, for example migrant networks (Welz, 2013, p. 51-52).

Changes of the broader social, economic and political context in Turkey and Germany (see section 3.8.) have not only affected the lives and migration decisions of my interlocutors but also large-scale migration patterns between Germany and Turkey: As outlined above 2015 was the year when the number of people migrating from Turkey to Germany outnumbered the number of people moving from Germany to Turkey for the first time after nearly a decade (see section 3.7.). I conducted the first ethnographic fieldwork between April and August 2013 and significant external political events that erupted in Turkey during May and June that year were the Gezi protests.

The second fieldwork which lasted from March until September 2017 took place around the time of the constitutional referendum in 2017 that gave way to a presidential system of government in Turkey. Political scientists started to argue that Turkey was undergoing an authoritarian shift from a "tutelary democracy" to a "competitive authoritarian regime" (Özbudun, 2015; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016). Meanwhile, in Germany the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD, *Alternative für Deutschland*) emerged and managed to alter mainstream discussions about immigration and refugees.

As I also consulted 14 women, I first met in 2013 also four years later, my research site was defined by their place of residence in 2017. The return of five of the 14 interlocutors from 2013 to Germany between 2015 and 2017 and the fact that eight of the 14 women have changed countries between 2015 and 2019 occurs during the transformation of positive to negative net migration from Germany to Turkey on the one hand and in the context of these broader political transformations on the other hand. However, as this research is concerned with transnational migration and transnational ties, it is also a logical consequence that the location of research may change over time. Thus, it can be argued that the research site became more strongly defined by the research topic over time, as the process oriented episodic fieldwork reflects how transnational migration of German-Turkish women works as an open-ended process. Due to the dynamics of transnational migration and networks, Istanbul as the initially chosen location of research became a temporary starting point and an ephemeral site of research.

Beyond the broader national and transnational context, interlocutors' life situations had changed during the four years of my ethnographic absence. Apart from migration paths, to name a few aspects, family situations had changed as children were born, had grown, interlocutors had gotten married and been divorced. Careers had been pursued; crises had been experienced and overcome. Likewise, my positionality had changed as well: From the role of doctorate student in Turkey, to doctorate candidate and from foreigner in Turkey to native in Germany.

Participant Observation

Participant observation and ethnographic interview mutually enrich each other, and interviews are usually embedded into the method of participant observation (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 102). By means of participant observation ethnographers traditionally try to understand a group's lifeworld from that group's point of view while simultaneously remaining external observers. In order to gain access to cultural knowledge about a group or setting, ethnographers participate people's everyday life for a defined period of time and listen to people, document events and interactions and ask questions in informal or formal interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 200). Although contemporary research is less concerned with 'the culture' of a 'community' or 'group', access to inside views remains a crucial methodological demand of social and cultural anthropology. Today, inside views are

addressed as subjectivities, perspectives, practices, and discourses of social actors (Bischoff and Oehme-Jüngling, 2014, p. 25).

The method of participant observation gave me the opportunity to actually observe transnational practices of German-Turkish women beyond the narrative context of an interview. I could also observe the making of belonging in an everyday life setting from another, less formalized and less directed perspective. Participant observation served as the method to access knowledge in social settings on events and in more private face-to-face and family settings.

Instead of considering the gathered data in an isolated manner comparing interviews and fieldnotes, the process of analysis allows for confronting the subjectivities of the researcher with interlocutors' statements and therefore becomes an instrument of mutual control and complementation (Bischoff, 2014, p. 25). Since the ethnographer's influence on the setting and the distortion of data are seen as inevitable in the process of doing fieldwork, reflexivity on the ethnographer's presence in the field presents an opportunity to understand how data have been altered. Thus, the ethnographer can use her*himself as a research instrument to monitor and analyze the effects of his*her influence on the data (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 14–15). Instead of becoming a source of disturbance that must be controlled or eliminated, the researcher's reflexivity on his*her perception, conduct and interactions in the field constitute a significant component of knowledge production (Flick, von Kardoff and Steinke, 2004, p. 23). Like this, reactions to her*his presence the field become a source of information as different reactions, behaviors across different contexts and the ethnographer as "research instrument par excellence" become central to the analysis (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 16–17).

Since participant observation results in the ethnographer's entanglement with the perspectives, practices and the manifold ways people interpret their actions, one limitation of the method is that ethnographers can lose the distance vis-à-vis their interlocutors. The challenge for researchers is to locate themselves between participation and observation where they remain capable of keeping distance between their own subjectivity and the subjectivities of the people they learn about. The process of losing the distance necessary for observation and doing research without detachment has been discussed as 'going native'. When ethnographers 'go native' they become too involved with the group they study, and run the risk of becoming biased and adopting

perceptions and perspectives observed in the field in an uncritical manner (Flick, 2007, pp. 210–213; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 87; Hauser-Schäublin, 2008, p. 42).

The going native discussion is important, but it also runs the risk of distinguishing between research that is more acknowledged because the subjects of study are different from the researcher and research in one's own social setting, society or native group that is often accused of lacking professional distance and of being partial. As outlined in sections 2.1.1.-2.1.3., cultural difference between researcher and his*her subject does not automatically yield objective distance. Rather the contrary: tacit assumptions about objectivity have concealed power-relations. Researchers construct their subjects based on their own positionalities and subjectivities in the field. Abu-Lughod argues that it is the positionality of researchers that can become an instrument of producing knowledge. She argues that the researcher self is never positioned outside the setting s*he studies, s*he relates to the Other at the intersection of "systems of difference" (2014, pp. 386–388).

I want to argue that researchers may be native and go native in their research setting as long as they reflect this process (see below). What keeps researchers from becoming uncritical and too involved with their subjects is the analytical steps they undertake after conducting fieldwork. The shifting perspective between the interior view of a studied group or setting and the outside view on the latter becomes relevant in the process of ethnographic writing. This process is also discussed as emic and etic perspective. The emic perspective refers to the ethnographer's participation in the world s*he studies while conducting participant observation and concerns the culture-specific perspective and knowledge s*he accesses. The emic perspective is concerned with inside views and categories people use to explain their perceptions, behaviors and actions. The etic perspective on the other hand refers to the analytical process after conducting fieldwork, when the researcher employs a rather analytical outside perspective and explains the perspectives and behavior s*he observed with theoretical categories (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 194–195; Nelson, 2017, pp. 4–5).

During my 2017 fieldwork, I met with several interlocutors on a regular basis. Three women I met in 2013 were my main interlocutors. They had different world views and socio-economic backgrounds. I recorded fieldnotes[6] to document and memorize events,

[6] 1-14FN2013/1-13FN2017, x (interlocutors 1 to 14, fieldnotes, 2013, section x or 2017 [exception: 14-FN2018], section x) and 15-32FN, x (interlocutors 15 to 32, fieldnotes, section x)

conversations and observations in the field according to the recommendations in Emerson, Fretz and Shaw's book *Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes*. The authors highlight that ethnographers start constructing their subjects in the field. Ethnographic writing starts in the process of taking notes when author's decide on the order of jotting and what to leave out (2011, p. 213). Deliberate choices, like writing fieldnotes in the third or first person, describing a scene from a particular or from varying vantage points or jotting conversations as direct or indirect speech show different degrees of "awareness" of representation and audience. Fieldnotes in which ethnographers can be seen and heard can document and preserve the formative processes of ethnographic texts. This not only helps researchers to remember the context, it also informs readers about the specific occasions a quoted text was written in (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011, pp. 52–60, 74–77, 212–215).

After asking for permission, I usually took notes right away to accustom my interlocutors to this practice. On some occasions, I followed my intuition and took notes after I left the field. In the field, I recorded notes as keywords and quotes that served as reminders for subsequent detailed fieldnotes at the desk. After an encounter, I complemented the field jottings as soon as possible, for instance on my way back home (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011, pp. 19–22). In cases in which I did not take notes in the field I followed the recommendations and reconstructed observations and memories of conversations immediately after the encounter, or latest the following morning (Girtler, 2001, p. 142; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2011). I wrote all fieldwork entries in the first person and started each written record with describing the context and how I felt that day. During the preliminary meetings[7] in 2013 and 2017, in which I shared the purpose of my research and asked the participant to sign a statement of informed consent, I jotted down any other discussion topic that came up during the conversation.

In addition to these face-to-face settings, I participated in the monthly network meetings of German-Turkish people at the event of the *Rückkehrerstammtisch* (Regulars' Table of Returnees). I visited those meetings twice in 2013 when they took place in different locations. In 2017, the organizer Çiğdem Akkaya mostly chose the Café of the Turkish-German Bookstore (*Türk Alman Kitabevi*) located on the İstiklal Street in the center of

[7] 1-14PM2013-generation-citizenship/1-13PM2017-generation-citizenship, x (interlocutors 1 to 13, preliminary meeting, 2013, section x or 2017, section x) and 15-32PM-generation-citizenship, x (interlocutors 15 to 32, preliminary meeting, section x)

Istanbul. I visited those meetings six times in 2017. The events provide a platform for informal exchange and professional networking and are mainly visited by German-Turkish academics of the second generation.

Semi-Structured Issue-Focused Interviews

While participant observation is the more explorative method, semi-structured issue-focused interviews served to answer my research question in a more problem-focused manner (Hopf, 1991; Flick, 2007, pp. 127–138; Schmidt-Lauber, 2007). The interviews are half-structured because the questionnaire can be applied flexibly and adapted or modified as needed during the course of an interview. In comparison to standardized interviews, interlocutors can articulate ideas and experiences freely. Thus, when the researcher finds it contextually meaningful the guideline can be complemented with follow-up questions and certain aspects can be discussed more deeply (Hopf, 1991, p. 178).

Qualitative interviews are not conceived as representation of a given reality, nor are they seen as sources for real behavior in everyday life. Statements of interlocutors can be interpreted within the social context in which they are made (Girtler, 2001, pp. 35, 57). The narrative content of qualitative interviews can give access to information on how people would like to be seen, how they see themselves and which meanings they assign to narrated events. Interviews are often embedded into participant observation to shed light onto the context and practice of everyday life (Schmidt-Lauber, 2007, pp. 170, 172).

After conducting the interviews, I took notes (post scripts)[8] to record my perception of the interview setting and atmosphere and my interaction with the interlocutor (Flick, 2005, pp. 137–138). On several occasions an encounter continued after the interview and those postscripts additionally served as fieldnotes to record additional informal conversations and observations. Interviews and fieldnotes were transcribed, anonymized and coded with the Qualitative Data Analysis software *f5* and *f4analysis* (see section 1.5.4.). Additionally, I interviewed five men, but due to timely constraint these interviews will not be part of this thesis.

[8] 1-14PS2013-generation-citizenship/1-13PS2017-generation-citizenship, x (interlocutors 1 to 14, post script, 2013, section x or 2017, section x) and 15-32PS-generation-citizenship, x (interlocutors 15 to 32, post script, section x)

2013 Questionnaire

The interview guide I used in 2013 included a list of questions concerning three categories: first, migration decisions and adaptation processes to life in Turkey, second, transnational connections, and third self-identifications of cultural belonging and experiences of social exclusion in Germany and in Turkey. The first questions addressed interlocutors' motives and their assessments of migration decisions, the social environment's reactions to those decisions in Germany and alternative destinations of migration. Additionally, the interview guide explored whether the women could consider living in the location their parents and grandparents originate from. The questions furthermore inquired the process of adaptation in Turkey, experiences of cultural difference, and the women's perception of their life in Turkey.

Additional questions targeted border-crossing ties, attachments and relations to people, places and objects and aimed to explore the ways interlocutors maintained social relationships in Germany and whether they interacted socially with people of native and postmigrant Germany-origin in Turkey and whether they could imagine moving back to Germany.

The last part of the interview guide aimed at exploring German-Turkish women's citizenship status and their self-identifications of cultural belonging. Additional questions aimed at exploring experiences of exclusion and discrimination in Germany and Turkey based on their cultural background. The final questions were concerned with learning about experiences and meanings the interviewed women assigned to the ascription *Almancı*. After asking for their identification with a religious community, I closed the interview by asking for demographic information. After the Gezi protests started, I also asked how the women perceived the protests.

2017 Questionnaire

The 2017 interview guide consisted of five sections that aimed at exploring aspects of German-Turkish women's

- Life histories in Germany
- Migration decisions and assessment of their life in Turkey
- Experiences with exclusion and attributions of difference
- Transnational connections
- Self-identifications and experiences of belonging

The first section of questions attempted to collect basic background data and biographical events that the interlocutors thought were meaningful. Subsequently, I asked for their parents and grandparents' migration history, their family constellation, the neighborhoods they grew up in and their educational paths.

Similar to the 2013 questionnaire, the second section was meant to elicit detail from the German-Turkish women relating to their migration to Turkey. This section included questions about the duration of their residence in Turkey, their migration motives and their perception and assessment of their decisions and lives in Turkey. Additional questions addressed their social environment's reactions in Germany to their migration decisions and targeted at uncovering processes of adaptation, integration and work life in Turkey, and whether the women engaged in increased contact to their ancestors from Turkey after their migration to Turkey.

The goal of the third segment of questions was to explore experiences relating to exclusion and attributions of difference in Germany and Turkey. An additional aim was to explore interlocutors' opinions and feelings vis-à-vis designations like *Almancı*, *Gurbetçi*, *Deutschländer* (retranslation of *Almancı* to German), *Ausländer* (foreigner), and *Türke* (Turk).

Section four addressed transnational connections. The questions explored the women's border-crossing ties, attachments, and connections to people, places and objects. Subsequent questions were concerned with the maintenance of relationships, and whether the women interacted in social circles with ties to Germany. Last, I asked again about their ideas of returning to or living in Germany in the future. The main goal of section five was to learn about self-identifications of cultural belonging, experiences of belonging, identification with religion and perceptions of gender roles in both countries.

Due to the change of the political context in Turkey and Germany since the first interview occasion in 2013, the last set of questions aimed at collecting information on how the respondents felt about the AKP government in Turkey and the rise of right-wing populism in Germany since 2013. The final questions dealt with citizenship or residence and level of education. After turning off the recording device, I asked for demographic information. After turning off the recording device I asked for demographic information. For the women who had changed the country of settlement to Germany I adapted some of the questions to the country context.

1.5.3. Self-Reflections and Limitations

This constructivist epistemological stance and ethnographic research practice follow an exploratory openness to phenomena including the collection of empirical data and concepts (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007; Bischoff, 2014). The principle of openness vis-à-vis the research subject accompanies the whole research process. Accordingly, research designs following a methodical alignment of cultural and social anthropology are not fully determined in the beginning of a research. Self-reflective research practice includes transparency in the process of selecting and discarding concepts, and reflexivity on the interdependence of empirical data, concepts, and analysis and interpretation. Bischoff states:

> "This means that open exploration and a self-reflective, ethnographic view of one's own research practice are important skills that cultural anthropologists should apply in every research they undertake. They do not work with previously sharply contoured, well-defined and precisely operationalized terms, but with open concepts that sensitize researchers to perceive social meanings in concrete actions." (2014, p. 26)

Research questions, theory, empirical data and their analysis and interpretation are not linear steps but constitute an interdependent process of exchange between all components. Schmidt-Lauber states that

> "This always means that new questions and changes of perspective arise during the research and [it means] that planning, data collection, evaluation and analysis are only ideal-typical consecutive steps, whereas in reality they are parallel components of one process." (2007, p. 172)

Knowing that research questions, concepts, empirical data and analysis constitute interdependent processes that are only reconstructed in a linear text, I attempt to reconstruct some paradigms of this interdependence in my own research process, an undertaking that can only be partial and fragmented.

Developing a *research question* is a task which accompanies the research process. Formulated in a vague manner in the beginning of a research, research questions are adjusted in the process of conceptualizing a research design and in the process of data gathering, evaluation and analysis (Bischoff and Oehme-Jüngling, 2014, p. 35). It is even "expected that initial questions that motivated the research will be refined and perhaps even transformed over the course of the research" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p. 3; Hauser-Schäublin, 2008, p. 49). Hammersley and Atkinson state that by defining the research question

> "the inquiry will become progressively more clearly focused on a specific set of research questions, and this will then allow the strategic collection of data to pursue answers to those questions more effectively, and to test these against evidence." (2007, pp. 3–4)

Due to external circumstances, I later divided the process of data collection into a rather explorative and into a more problem-oriented stage. In the explorative stage, the researcher adapts to a new local setting, approaches first contacts and collects the first data (Beer, 2008, pp. 22–24)**.** Hammersley and Atkinson refer to the ethnographer's inductive and exploratory research orientation as *foreshadowed problems* (2007, p. 3). The initial foreshadowed problems, I started my 2013 fieldwork in Istanbul with were concerned with German-Turkish transmigrant women's self-perceptions of belonging and their strategies of dealing with attributions of belonging and difference and whether such attributions affect their construction of social belongings. Furthermore, I was interested in whether ascribed gender roles by the social environment in Germany and Turkey differed and how the women respond to ascribed gender roles. Although I wasn't familiar with the intersectionality theory, my first preliminary interviews in 2012 guided my interest in showing how discrimination works intersectionally along lines of gender and attributions of difference. In my initial research proposal, I wrote:

> "Women often are subject to multiple discrimination. The women my thesis will be about, make experiences in Germany and in Turkey which they perceive as discriminating. In one of my preliminary talks, I carried out last September one woman told me that she would always be Turkish for her social environment [in Germany] although she saw herself as a German. She said she would never expect to be accepted as a German in Germany. In Turkey she would now in many situations in which she felt discriminated [against] be named *Almancı*. She told me about the phrase '*Ordada yabancı, burada Almancı*' which means as much as 'foreigner over there, a person from Germany here'. I found out that other gender roles were allotted to my interlocutor as *Almancı* compared to women from Turkey."

An additional goal was to learn about the decisive reasons that triggered migration decisions to Turkey and whether experiences of exclusion and attributions of difference in Germany constituted a reason for migrating to Turkey. Furthermore, I wanted to find out about the social ties German-Turkish women pursue in both countries. Here I was especially interested in how social ties to Germany are maintained and how meaningful these are for the women. I also wanted to learn, whether contact to their parents' and grandparents' relatives had facilitated migration decisions.

During my first fieldwork in 2013 (see below), I was new in Istanbul and did not speak Turkish. Through academic writing and reading during my PhD studies in Istanbul and the analysis of the 2013 fieldwork material (October 2013 – March 2017), I became familiar with concepts of cultural identity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988; Hall, 1992, 1996; Bhabha, 1994; Grossberg, 1996), notions of space as socially produced (de Certeau, 1984; Soja, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991) and additional concepts on transnational migration (Faist, 2000; Pessar and Mahler, 2003). Based on these concepts, I delineated the 2013 consulted German-Turkish women's self-perceptions of cultural identities in three respects: First, as located in-between and as combining both cultural backgrounds, second, as unfixed and changing over time and third, as relating to attributions of difference by mainstream society, influencing the women's self-perception of belonging (because some women positioned themselves vis-á-vis experienced attributions of difference (Turk/foreigner/*Almancı*) or complied with such attributions by underlining their cultural difference). The concepts helped to explain subjectivities of cultural identity as hybrid, rhizomatic, syncretic and as associated with difference. As a result, I became more interested in shedding light on the different dimensions of cultural identity in relation to fragmentation, difference hybridity and power relations. Concepts about the social production of space helped to show that German-Turkish women engage in transnational ties of symbolic and imaginary quality. The perception of space presented supplemental ways of producing a transnational space and supported the access to memories and biographic experiences in Germany.

The second more problem-oriented fieldwork (Beer, 2008, pp. 22–24) as well as the analysis and interpretation of the ethnographic data was strongly influenced by concepts of intersectionality and gender. The main authors who influenced this process are Crenshaw (1989), Pessar and Mahler (2003) and Anthias (2006) who have underlined the intersectionality of social divisions such as race, class and gender. Not only did those contributions support a more explicit gender perspective. The concept of social locations

defined by these intersecting social divisions presented a powerful tool of analysis because it helped to level German-Turkish women's transnational migration practices and decisions in the light of hierarchies of privilege and structural disadvantage.

Concepts of intersectionality also helped to explain the connection between social locations and experiences of discrimination. A veiled woman of lower-class background for example, is more likely to experience structural inequality and exclusion by mainstream society in Germany in comparison to an affluent white man who is a member of the majority. Concepts of intersectionality and belonging supported a perspective in which cultural identity no longer is assumed as an a priori concept but rather seen as one possible result of analysis. Instead of using concepts of cultural identity which run danger of assuming ethnic group membership before any related self-identification has taken place, the notion of belonging turned out as more promising because of its analytic openness for a sense of belonging that relates to other social spheres, for example, the family or the occupational group. In this context, cultural identity only remains meaningful in social processes of categorization, such as the ascription of cultural difference. Social mechanisms and strategies of ethnicization, culturalization and racialization, for instance, entail assumptions about cultural difference. Such mechanisms are intersectional and translate into the everyday life of German-Turkish women in Germany and in Turkey as attributions of difference through labels such as Turk, foreigner, and *Almancı*.

What other techniques of reflexivity may be applied other than reflecting the research process itself? Ethnographers will include references to themselves either in separate chapter or throughout the text as a whole. They may use the pronoun "I", or words like "the researcher" and "the author". Or, they may also be omniscient narrators and use a passive voice (Massmünster, 2014, pp. 524–525). Massmünster (2014, p. 529) suggests differentiating between multiple ethnographic "Is" depending on the researcher's situation and social setting. Accordingly, the researcher discloses his*her positionality in the different stages of the research, including data collection, the selection of concepts and the interpretation of data.

My positionality during this research has changed multiple times. When I conducted the first fieldwork, I was new in Istanbul and Turkey. I had little knowledge about everyday life in Turkey and about the city of Istanbul. In 2017 when I left Istanbul after the second fieldwork, I could look back at a four-and-a-half-year lasting experience of living in the

city. Both positionalities in the field have clearly shaped interactions between me and my interlocutors and their families' and friends' reactions towards me. While the 2013 fieldwork was rather dominated by my researcher persona, I had much more in common with my interlocutors in 2017 because of our shared history in Germany and our lasting everyday life experiences in Istanbul. My researcher persona seemed to be more in the background and one component of many roles I found myself in: PhD student, woman, city-dweller, foreigner. These experiences made it easier for me to relate to and communicate with interlocutors in an authentic way, also because the research interest lost some of its dominance.

Awareness of power-relations in the field has become one form of reflexivity after different voices in the *debate about cultural representation* underlined and criticized that such relationships had concealed ethnographers' entanglement with colonialism and the ways they constructed 'culture' (see sections 2.1.1.-2.1.3.). The reflection on power relations in the field is also linked to the use of language and designations used to represent the people among whom research is conducted. Amborn suggests to aim for a dialogue oriented and "active partnership" in order to prevent that people feel treated as "passive research objects" (1993). Accordingly, designations like *informant* or *respondent* clearly mark an asymmetric relationship in which the ethnographer is the sole specialist entitled to ask questions that are to be answered. Contrary to that, *interlocutors* are considered as partners in a symmetric relationship in which they also ask questions. Here the researcher aims to develop an active partnership by developing a *rapport* and friendship with the individuals s*he is learning about. Mutual trust guarantees honest exchange of information (Alasuutari, 1995, pp. 51–52; Kaya, 2001, pp. 23–26). I chose the designation interlocutor to underline that I asses German-Turkish women not as passive research objects but as agents. Other than the one interlocutor who identifies as Kurdish and another woman who identifies as Zaza-Alevi, I did not have the chance to meet many women who consider themselves as members of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey. Since the majority of the consulted women perceive their cultural belonging as hyphenated or hybrid and oppose singular categories as insufficient, I use the broader designation German-Turkish. For second and third generation Germany-born people who live in Germany I find the designation postmigrant most useful because they were born in Germany and have no migration history. To avoid generalization and cultural essentialism, I use the self-designations of the two women in the sample who identify as Kurdish and Zaza-Alevi.

1.5.4. Transcription and Content Analysis

I transcribed the 46 interviews with the transcription software f5. My transcripts are based on the rules Dresing and Pehl suggest for basic transcripts focusing on the content of narratives (2012). Accordingly, speech is transcribed literally, i.e. not phonetically. Dialects are translated into standard German. Incomplete words and notions are completed and transcribed into written German. For example, “She ain’t here” is changed into “She is not here”. Or “We gotta go” becomes “We have to go”. Word and sentence breaks and stuttering are smoothed out or omitted. Word doublings were only recorded if interlocutors used them as a stylistic device for emphasis as in “This is very, very important to me”. Half sentences with complete meaning were transcribed and marked with a slash (/). Punctuation was smoothed out in favor of legibility. That is, if the voice was lowered briefly or an emphasis ambiguous, I rather used a dot than a comma to finish a sentence. Breaks were marked by dots in brackets: (.) for one second, (..) for two seconds, (...) for three seconds, numbers for more than three seconds (4). I did not transcribe my signals of understanding, such as “mhm, aha, yes, exactly, um” etc. except when an answer consisted of “mhm” without any further explanation or when I continued with a subsequent question. This was recorded as “mhm” (affirmative) or (negative). Emphasized words or utterances were transcribed in CAPITAL LETTERS. Each speaker’s contribution was transcribed in a separate paragraph, including short interjections. Time stamps were inserted at the end of every paragraph. Emotional non-verbal expressions of the interlocutors and me supporting or clarifying statements (such as laughter or sighs) were added in brackets. Incomprehensible words were substituted with the German abbreviation for incomprehensible (unv.). Longer incomprehensible passages were marked with the cause (unv., mobile phone noise). If I suspected a word, I was not sure about, I put the suggested word or phrase in brackets with a question mark. I marked myself as interviewing person with an “I” and the interviewed person with a “B” (Dresing and Pehl, 2012, pp. 26–31).

In a next step, I coded the interviews and fieldnotes with the Qualitative Content Analysis software *f4-analysis*. I chose the method of qualitative content analysis following the suggestions of Kuckartz’ (2014). In her analytical review concerned with research on qualitative content analysis Schreier identifies the following approach as established research practice:

> “[Q]ualitative content analysis is understood […] as a method for describing selected textual meanings. This description is done by

> explicating relevant meanings as categories of a content-analytical category system and then assigning text passages to the categories of this category system." (Schreier, 2014).

Among the three main ways of doing qualitative content analysis, thematic text analysis, evaluative text analysis and type-building text analysis, I chose the first method in order to identify important and reappearing topics relating to transnational practices on the one hand and to belonging on the other hand.

Kuckartz (2014, p. 62) exemplifies studies like those conducted by Mayring and Gläser-Zikuda (2005) and Gläser and Laudel (2010), as underlining the rule-guided approach of qualitative content analysis in which deductive and inductive methods are combined in order to construct categories. Kuckartz (2014, p. 70) suggests to adopt the following analytical steps for a thematic content analysis:

> 1) Initial work with the text by highlighting important passages, composing memos and bullet point case summaries,
>
> 2) Elaborating main topical categories,
>
> 3) The first coding process by assigning text passages to main categories,
>
> 4) The determination of sub-categories,
>
> 5) The final coding of all data.

Step 1, the *initial work with the text*, is an interpretative step. The goal is to understand the text on the basis of the research questions by reading it and if necessary, by listening to the original audio recording. While thoroughly reading the text, the researcher records memos (Kuckartz, 2014, p. 52). Such memos may contain thoughts, ideas, assumptions, or hypotheses occurring during the analytical process of reading, for example: theoretical insights, ideas for categories, interpretations, important facts or important text passages and arguments. Subsequent case summaries help to summarize case descriptions in the light of research questions. Case summaries are "fact oriented and based on what is said, not a hermeneutical […] interpretation of the story". After summarizing the cases in bullet points, the selection of a title or "motto" for each interview helps to relate the particularities of the person's narrative to the research questions (Kuckartz, 2014, pp. 51–53).

With research questions and my 2017 interview guide in mind, I closely read the 26 interviews conducted with my 14 main interlocutors of 2013 and 2017. When I identified sections in the text relating to the research questions and the guideline, I used

the in-text memo function of the *f4 analysis* software to take notes and to underline relevant passages of the text. In addition, I used the memo function of the program to record demographic information and distinctive statements that caught my attention. In a next step, I wrote case summaries for each woman as suggested above.

The next steps of determining categories involved deductive and inductive strategies. In *step two*, the *main categories or codes* are usually inferred from the research questions and guideline and applied to 10 to 20 percent of the material. Since "new, unexpected topics" are discovered, writing memos as in step one becomes a necessary undertaking (Kuckartz, 2014, pp. 71–72). Accordingly, I *developed the main topical categories* deductively, based on my research question, the interview guideline and the memos.

In *phase three*, I did the *first coding and assigned text passages to the main categories* developed in step two. Since a text passage may include multiple topics, it can be assigned to multiple categories (Kuckartz, 2014, pp. 72–75). I coded the whole material including fieldnotes by reading all texts twice and simultaneously assigned relevant sections to these main categories. When the assigned main codes were not accurate enough, I made a memo for the relevant passage, for possible sub-codes.

In phase four, the *determination of sub-categories*, I developed the final category system. Here the inductive approach became a crucial strategy of categorizing the material in a differentiated manner. Reading the material summarized under the assigned codes, the codes at hand were differentiated into sub-categories on the basis of the assigned text material (therefore inductive strategy) and on the basis of the additional memos (Kuckartz, 2014, pp. 76–77).

In the last step, *the final coding of all data* I used the established category system to code the whole material (Kuckartz, 2014, pp. 79–80). Subsequently, I anonymized the transcripts changing the names of interlocutors with pseudonyms of their own choosing, anonymized the names of smaller cities, villages and neighborhoods as well as the names of my interlocutors' friends and relatives, of educational institutions, professions and workplaces. The pseudonyms the women already hint their multiple cultural and local sense of belonging, since some of them selected German names.

1.6. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2 provides the *theoretical framework* of this thesis. It includes some insights from the debate on cultural representation, introduces concepts of belonging and closes

with transnational migration theory. *Section 2.1.* addresses the debate on cultural representation that started in the 1980's in the disciplines of cultural studies and cultural and social anthropology which contributed to a deconstruction of ethnographers' positionality. The debate on cultural representation has resulted in a more self-reflective representation of cultural phenomena beyond cultural essentialism and in new methods and concepts for describing cultural phenomena. The volume *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* edited by James Clifford and George E. Marcus (1986) has received much attention as the authors in this book unveiled how classic ethnographic accounts represented indigenous cultures as static and as homogeneous groups that are bound to a particular place. Ethnographers concealed that their relationship to the people they studied was one of power. In their response to *Writing Culture*, feminist anthropologists called attention to the fact that women were excluded from the volume. Despite recommendations for a more reflexive and experimental ethnographic accounts, women ethnographers and anthropologists who have engaged in such styles of writing were not acknowledged (Behar and Gordon, 1995). The contributions of the volume *Women Writing Culture* stem from intersectional "critiques of white middle-class feminism by lesbians and women of color" (Behar, 1995, p. 3).

The mainly white and male Western ethnographers covered up their positionality and entanglement with colonial contexts of oppression. Fundamental for this discussion was Edward Said's (1978) contribution *Orientalism* which resulted in a thorough reflection about *designating Self* and *designated Other* as a dialectic relationship. Reflections and criticism addressing the Self-Other distinctions and relationship in cultural and social anthropology and in the context of migration were for instance provided in the works of Gupta and Ferguson (1997a, 1997b), Abu-Lughod (2014), and Malkki (1992) and in the volume Women Writing Culture (1995). Those scholars deconstructed the relations between representing *ethnographer Self* and *represented Other* as unequal by uncovering a socio-economic cleavage and a physical distance between metropolitan urban center and remote periphery. In this relationship, the ethnographic Self, picks and constructs his*her*its Other along the greatest possible cultural difference and geographic distance. Meanwhile, knowledge production in one's own socio-economic and cultural setting by women ethnographers and people with hyphenated or Non-Western histories was hardly acknowledged. In this representation of the Other, cultural difference was the main research paradigm. Much can be learned from this discussion

to analyze the discourse German-Turkish women are addressed with, mainly in Germany, but also in Turkey.

More recent ideas about describing culture contextualize culture with globalization and migration. Concepts revolve around more open notions such as *scapes*, *sites* and *frames* to underline the importance of *interaction*, *connections*, *ties* and *networks* for cultural practices (Marcus, 1995; Appadurai, 2008; Hannerz, 2012). Practice theory (Ortner, 1996, 2006, 2014; Wicker, 1997) and notions of *space as cognitively and socially constructed* (de Certeau, 1984; Soja, 1989; Lefebvre, 1991) address space and culture as outcome of social practice, including the perception and the imagination. These concepts help to analyze translocal or transnational attachment and belonging of German-Turkish women.

Section 2.2. presents a continuation of the debate of on cultural representation in the migration context including deliberations about discourses of inclusion and exclusion *at the collective level* and *at the subject level*. Regarding the collective level in society, concepts of belonging deconstruct notions of cultural identity (see section 2.2.1.) and cultural difference as meaningful concepts and analytical categories for collectives (Brubaker, 2004). Different scholars argue to instead scrutinize who forges the notion of cultural difference and why it is constructed in the first place (Tschernokoshewa, 1999; Brubaker, 2004). Attributions and labels along cultural, ethnic or religious difference are can accordingly be deconstructed as *strategies* defined by "the postulation of power" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 38). Accordingly, it is possible to deconstruct attributions of difference as a construction that is uttered from a majority position. Attributions of difference from speakers of a majority group can therefore also be called strategies of ethnicization, racialization and culturalization that often fix difference, while neglecting the designated groups commonalities with the majority group (section 2.2.2.). One could take this argument further and say that belonging at a collective level constitutes a dialectic relationship between *Self- and We-image in the image of Others*; a relationship between identity and alterity that can become a strategic political concern. To construct the ideal citizen subject, it is necessary to construct some Other that is not included (section 2.2.3.). This Other can be the designated migrant or stranger, the non-citizen or another nation. Different scholars have theorized how collective and individual claims to the state and for membership vis-à-vis excluding discourses can be analyzed (Rosaldo, 1994; Ong, 1996b; Isin, 2002; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Lazar, 2013). Citizenship practices as claims to membership, political participation and rights are also

made in the family, the neighborhood and so on. Therefore, it is crucial to highlight citizenship practices beyond the state level as different scholars have pointed out (see for example Jelin, 1990; Turner, 1993; Kron and Noack, 2008; Erel, 2009).

The concepts of belonging concerned with the subject level of section 2.2.4. will be used for the analysis of German-Turkish women's practices of belonging and attachment. The notions of social location, social divisions and intersectionality have been briefly discussed in the State-of-the-Art section above. As outlined above, social locations are defined by social divisions like race, gender, class, age, nationality, religion and so on (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Morokvašić, 1987; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Anthias, 2001, 2006).

Section 2.3. summarizes concepts of *transnational migration* theory that help to analyze German-Turkish women's mobility between Germany and Turkey and their border-crossing everyday life practices. Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992, pp. 1–2) first introduced the notion of transnationalism to stress that migrants are not just immigrants or emigrants and subject to experiences of up-rootedness. Based on the empirical results of their ethnographic research they stressed that *migrants sustain different kinds of border crossing ties* – social, economic, religious, political and kinship related – in their country of settlement and in their country of descent that simultaneously connect them to two societies. They introduced the term transmigrant to underline that people, who migrate or have migrated are connected with two societies and maintain multi-directional ties.

After shedding light on how and transnationalism emerged as a new theoretical perspective in migration studies (section 2.3.1.), I continue with dividing concepts of *transnationalism* along three *main paradigms*: First, concepts that stress local situatedness of transnational actors and groups (section 2.3.2.), second, concepts that underline ties, connections and networks (section 2.3.3.), and third, concepts that introduce gender into the analysis and bridge both perspectives by connecting situatedness in the form of social locations to social practice, to individual agency and the capacity to take action (section 2.3.4.).

Concepts outlined in section 2.3.2. mainly underline context and structural constraints. In this theoretical perspective, transnationalism is embedded with historical, social and political context, with the locality and with structural inequalities based on class, gender and race. Furthermore, the role of the state as sovereign that constrains and enables

migration is addressed. Notions like *trans-locality* or *pluri-local frames of reference* accentuate that migrant transnationalism is neither legally nor politically isolated from citizenship regimes or from local, historical and political contexts (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998; Pries, 2001).

Concepts that prioritize a network perspective underline the importance of ties and connections. These concepts mainly focus different kinds of transnational practices that connect people and institutions (section 2.3.3.). A last perspective proposed by Pessar and Mahler integrates gender into the analysis of transnationalism (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006) and somewhat bridges structural constraints with practice and agency by shedding light on how mobility is constrained by social locations on the one hand and on the other hand by stressing that individual resourcefulness and the imagination can play an enabling role even in constrained positionalities. Transnational mobility and practices are embedded into a continuum of privilege and disadvantage at depending on a person's social location.

Chapter 3 gives an overview of the *migration nexus between Germany and Turkey* to contextualize German-Turkish women's family histories. German-Turkish relations go back to historical ties before the consolidation of the German nation state and the foundation of the Turkish Republic (section 3.1.). Turkish labor migration to Germany officially started with the recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany which lasted from 1961 until 1973. Labor recruitment was organized according to the principle of rotation and return and resulted in circular migration between Turkey and Germany (section 3.3.). While the 1970s and 1980s were mainly characterized by settlement and family reunion by return migration to Turkey, a lot of people left Turkey to Germany amidst the political turmoil of the coup in 1980 and during the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces in the mid- and late 1980s. These political refugees were often left-wing intellectuals (section 3.3.). In the 1990s the German state complicated family reunion was complicated while the process of obtaining German nationality was facilitated. Germany's reunification reinforced an Othering discourse towards migrants (sections 3.4., 3.6.). A long due amendment of citizenship law was implemented in the year 2000: The *jus sanguinis* principle (blood right) was abolished and substituted by the *jus soli* principle (birth right) automatically providing German nationality to postmigrants born on German soil until the age of 23 (see section 3.5.). The law was amended 13 years later guaranteeing dual citizenship to people born in Germany but who are nationals of another non-EU country by descent. The 2000s are

characterized by the rise of Islamophobia in the public discourse and the rise of right-wing populist parties. In section 3.6. I address the ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship in Germany, by shedding light on how German-Turkish people and women have been represented in the public discourse.

In section 3.7. I summarize some statistical data on migration between Germany and Turkey. I mainly address the period of positive net migration to Turkey and the time between 2006 and 2015 and after 2015 when this trend reversed. Section 3.8. is about the political, economic context and larger transformations in Turkey and Germany mainly between the first fieldwork occasion in 2013 and the second fieldwork occasion in 2017 that may have influenced net migration trends and played into German-Turkish women's individual migration decisions. In section 3.9., I review the existing quantitative and qualitative research on second and third generation German-Turkish people's transnational migration.

The *ethnographic research findings* about *transnational migration trajectories of* the consulted *German-Turkish women* will be analyzed in Chapter 4, while German-Turkish women's practices of *belonging* are mainly analyzed in Chapter 5**.** The results of the analysis show that causes which structure German-Turkish women's transnational and circular migration paths are inherently connected to belonging. The consulted women express a sense of belonging and recognition in the same social groups, localities and spheres in which they situate their causes for migration and settlement (sections 4.1.1., 4.1.2., 4.3.2., 4.3.3., 4.4.2.-4.4.4., 5.1.3., 5.1.5.-5.1.8., 5.2.6., 5.3.5., 5.3.6., 5.4.5., 5.4.6.). Namely, their belongingness and associated roles in the family as daughters, siblings or as mothers who engage in passing on their own cultural knowledge and transnational opportunities of action to their children. Moreover, their senses of belonging as much as their motives for mobility and settlement are connected to friendship circles, to the workplace and to university and related social networks. Their local attachment to their place or neighborhood of birth and migration likewise constitutes a sphere of belonging and therefore a sphere of migration. German-Turkish women migrate to evade being exposed to the grand ethno-cultural narratives resonating in the politics of belonging in Germany and Turkey which manifest in the public and private sphere in their everyday lives. By way of migrating they not only leave behind lacking economic participation and financial deprivation (sections 4.1.2., 4.2.2., 4.3.1.). They also abandon gendered constraints and experiences of intersectional exclusion and discrimination they face at the social divisions of ethnicity, religion, class, culture and

gender in Germany and Turkey (sections 4.2.1., 4.3.1., 4.3.2., 4.3.3., 4.3.4., 5.1.1., 5.2.2., 5.3.3., 5.4.2.). The consulted women experience intersectional exclusion and a lacking sense of belonging and gender inequality in same social groups, networks and locations in which they also situate a sense of belonging, i.e. in the labor market, in the family, in the neighborhood and in friendship circles. In other words, sites in which they situate a sense of belonging are simultaneously sites of struggles and delineation.

Migration trajectories of German-Turkish women that are addressed in Chapter 4 can be read as tactics of claiming and making use of different kinds of fundamental rights. An extended notion of Marshall's (1950) definition of citizenship and Hammar's (2016) definition of *denizenship* help to embed individual migration incentives and motives as a quest for and as claims of social and civil rights in Germany and Turkey. There are many causes that trigger migration and incentives and decisions are manifold. They never stand alone and are merely separated here for the analytical purposes of showing the importance of transnational ties and networks as well as empirically rich narratives – I also define them as them tropes – concerned with migration and settlement. By way of migrating, many women claim rights in the respective countries. Social rights the women take advantage of, include a university education in Istanbul that provides access to transnational institutionalized academic networks which date back to Prussian and Ottoman times. Other women will return to Germany in order to exercise their right to education in Germany as means of giving their children access to the same educational training and language skills, they identify with based on their socialization in Germany. In the event of economic deprivation due to changed external circumstances some women who are mothers will move to Germany to make use of their right to access healthcare, welfare benefits and family support in order to provide for their families. In combination with an attachment to their place and family of origin, access to healthcare in the event of giving birth constitutes a reason to move back to Germany. The right to access to health becomes a relevant concern that based – on the experiences of parents – might result in circular migration back to Germany in the future (section 4.1.).

Civil aspects of citizenship, such as constrained freedom of speech and opinion due to reforms of the judiciary after the attempted coup in 2016 and the introduction of the presidential system in Turkey and in addition to increased political polarization have caused several women to change countries to guarantee their freedom of opinion (section 4.2.1.). The right to property of Turkey-origin people in Turkey and resulting property assets of the first generations facilitate a migration decision to Turkey while

prosperity and status in Turkey provide a reason to continue settlement in the light of a lacking income alternatives in Germany (section 4.2.2.).

Section 4.3. constitutes an extended understanding of Marshall's perspective of citizenship and includes intersectionality into the analysis of migration-related claims for citizenship rights (Yuval-Davis, 1997; Pessar and Mahler, 2003). By means of migrating, German-Turkish women tactically try to avoid the structural inequality they experience based on gender, migrant status and religion. They seek to avoid disadvantages in the German labor market and make use of their competitive advantage on the Turkish labor market based on their language skills (section 4.3.1.). Some leave a setting in Germany in which they experienced racialized discrimination in favor of a social setting in Turkey where they encounter social recognition (section 4.2.3.). Others pursue a search for the self and leave gendered constraints they experienced in segregated neighborhoods or small towns in Germany. They realize their individual liberties in the anonymous environment of Istanbul and go after their fascination with the city of Istanbul and urban ways of life (section 4.3.3.). The erosion of women's rights in Turkey under the late AKP governments constitutes an additional migration motive and concern (section 4.3.4.). In line with the concepts that stress the importance of embeddedness and networks as an asset, kinship ties within the immediate and broader family network provide support for women in the immediate aftermath of changing countries (section 4.4.1.). For many women in the sample, attachment and support provided by the nuclear family network is a migration motive. In combination with other motives several women are inclined to follow their parents to Turkey. Their parents follow them from Germany to Turkey and some women return because their nuclear families live in Germany (sections 4.4.2., 4.4.3.). The family network constitutes a resource that can trigger transnational migration into different directions and results in intergenerational migration circuits. In section 4.5., I address German-Turkish women's claims for dual citizenship for people born before 2000 and shed light on the negative implications a lack thereof constitutes for German-Turkish women's fundamental rights and the understanding of democracy in Germany.

In Chapter 5, I analyze four exemplary cases, to show how interlocutors who differ in terms of their social locations negotiate belonging vis-à-vis the excluding citizenship discourses they were addressed with in Germany and in Turkey. The four cases exemplify that the women do not meet racialized and ethnicized strategical attributions with collective claims of belonging along ethno-cultural lines. The social and local

contextualization from which they express hyphenated senses of belonging, discloses that the latter are not in any way related to national or ethnic categories. The empirical evidence suggests that their senses of belonging are rather an outcome of their membership in social groups and of the spaces of their past and their day-to-day practices. Their senses of belonging namely relate to the micro-level, that is to their biographies, to their interactions and roles in the transnational family network as children, partners, mothers, and siblings. Moreover, their senses of belonging relate to their transnational workplace and university environment and to their interactions in transnational friends' circles. Spatially and socially, the consulted women's senses of belonging also relate to their neighborhoods of origin and migration, to the urban public sphere and ultimately, to their translocal practices of connecting places of the past with places of the present by means of speaking two languages and by engaging in culinary practices that connect present experiences in Turkey with biographic memories from Germany. The four cases are descriptions of individual women and do not represent types. However, the described women who differ in terms of their social locations, also represent exemplary experiences that were empirically rich tropes in the material. In other words, the cases are individual stories that becomes exemplary where the evaluation of the empirical material suggests so.

Ayla's social location is defined by the social divisions of religion, age, migrant status and family history (section 5.1.). Her citizenship practices show how she strategically uses all of these social divisions as a resource for claiming political justice for herself and marginalized groups on the streets. Lara tactically uses her upper-class family background to contest culturalization which she has experienced through a strategy I call reversed labelling. Majority society members have addressed her with the sentence, "but you are different" in Germany and in Turkey reinforcing classicist and racialized stereotypes about the label 'Turkish'. Based on her family history and on her upward mobility and career she delineates herself from intersectional attributions of Turkishness and *Almancı* (section 5.2.). Emma makes the gendered constraints and racialized differential treatment she experiences in different neighborhoods and social groups her strength in all of these spheres. She claims membership but simultaneously emancipates herself from constrains by referring to her intersectional otherness including her gender identity, her working class family history and her German and Turkish migration background. By employing a confrontation tactic, she speaks up against racialized discrimination and claims membership in Germany (section 5.3.). Kübra's social

location is one of the most constrained ones as far as citizenship rights, educational background, and family responsibilities are concerned. By designating herself *Inländerin* (native) which she contrasts with the notion *Ausländer* (foreigner), Kübra articulates as claim to cultural citizenship (Rosaldo, 1994, p. 57) . As long as she is acknowledged as Germany-born *Inländerin*, she can also be an *Ausländer* due to her culturally different family history (see section 5.4.).

1.7. LIMITATIONS

Due to financial constraints and limited time, my sample is based on a sample of women living in Istanbul as the research was mainly carried out there. It would have been interesting, for instance, to broaden the scope of interlocutors to women living in other cities in Turkey. With the exception of one woman who identified with the Kurdish and another woman identified with the Zaza-Alevi minority, the research did not include women who said they belonged to an ethnic or religious minority. An additional limitation of the sample is its heteronormative outline. It would have broadened the perspective to include people who identify as non-binary, an area for further suggested research. As far as I know, all of the consulted women identify as cis women, that is, they identify with the sex assigned to them at birth. Moreover, I initially planned to make a comparison with the perspectives of five men whom I also interviewed in 2017. Due to my timely resources, I concentrated on women only. Including the voices of German-Turkish non-binary or queer people and men would surely have broadened the gender perspective of this work.

My knowledge on contributions regarding the topic of belonging is mainly based on the deconstruction of grand narratives of membership and exclusion along ethno-cultural lines. In line with the results, it would have been useful to work with concepts which explore the negotiation of belonging and gender from a micro-level perspective. Contrary to a hyphenated plural sense of belonging along cultural lines, ‘German-Turkish’ women’s narratives of individual and collective senses of belonging can be located in the social and local spheres of the family, among friends, in the neighborhood, the urban public sphere, at work or at university. Micro-level concepts of belonging would have supported an analysis of citizenship practices in the social and local spheres of the everyday life which empirically turned out as meaningful for the consulted women.

The epistemological shift on cultural representation and the notion of culture that occurred in the ongoing debate on cultural representation has some implications for the representation of German-Turkish women in this thesis (see sections 2.1.1.-2.1.3.). I do not claim to represent truth or reality. The analysis of the fieldwork material is based on my own reading and interpretation of the theoretical concepts I assessed to be meaningful tools of analysis. My interpretation is based on the mutual exchange between theory and data which is intermingled with my own biographic experience of living and learning in Istanbul and drafting most parts of the thesis after I returned to Germany.

This text can at best provide a fragmentary glimpse of the transnational lifestyles, citizenship practices and belonging of German-Turkish women I have had the honor to meet. The fieldwork material limited to a certain period in history which I try to contextualize. Culture is made and as such is the produced text which is an outcome of my making and interpretation. I try to face the intersections of race, culture and gender. However, as a white member of mainstream German society, I cannot escape my privileged positionality. I try to reflect on it and try to concentrate on not essentializing the interlocutors.

2. INTERSECTIONAL INTERVENTIONS: REPRESENTATION, BELONGING AND TRANSNATIONAL SPACE

This chapter provides an overview conceptual foundation for analyzing German-Turkish women's transnational mobility and belonging with a focus on positionality and intersectionality theory. Section 2.1. incudes theoretical discussions of the Self-Other relationship that has unsettled disciplines of 'culture' and contemporary cultural analysis. Section 2.2. gives an overview on relevant concepts of belonging that help to deconstruct dominant citizenship discourses at intersecting social divisions. Section 2.3. summarizes the relevant concepts of transnationalism.

2.1. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: REPRESENTATION BEYOND ETHNICIZATION AND CULTURALIZATION

To which extent can ethnographers represent reality and portray other cultures and what defines culture? The following sections deal with the self-critique in cultural and social anthropology and in cultural studies, that overthrew the classic methods and theories formerly used in those disciplines. Known as writing culture debate or crisis of cultural representation related discussions were initiated by literary studies and can be situated between the ending 1970s and the mid-1990s. Some of the implications provide insights of this thesis' methodology and the theoretical basis for the main concepts of belonging and transnationalism I use in this thesis.

Section 2.1.1. summarizes the main postulations of the writing culture debate followed by some examples on how the proponents of the debate deconstructed classic ethnographic accounts. Indigenous groups and cultures were represented out of historical (colonial) context, homogenized, and reduced to a single locality, excluding everyday life experiences and practices transcending one single place and group. The discussions on cultural representation caused a paradigm shift in ethnographic research from an objectivist to a constructivist perspective which triggered new ways of thinking and writing about culture.

Power hierarchies between ethnographer Self and ethnographers' representation of the 'exotic' Other were initiated by Edward Said with his concept of *Orientalism*. He was one of the first scholars who shed light on the dimension of power in the representation of culture (section 2.1.2.). His work had several implications for the production of ethnographic knowledge: On the one hand it resulted in reflections about the construction of difference in defining 'culture' and selecting research topics. And on the

other hand, Said's work contributed to a discussion of white male Western ethnographers' privileged positionalities in comparison to positionalities of women ethnographers with and without hyphenated identities (section 2.1.3.).

In addition, assumptions about space as geographic location that overlaps with culture resulted in depictions of cultures as homogeneous and locally bound entities in which members of such a culture were assumed as sharing certain group attributes. At the same time, ethnographers represented themselves as metropolitan travelers while concealing colonial entanglements. A result of this research practice was that natives' mobility and relations of exchange were not addressed in most classic ethnographies or depicted as deviating from the norm. Contrary to that, a new research agenda called for a representation of actors simultaneous experience of stasis and travelling (section 2.1.3.).

German-Turkish women have often been reduced to gendered and homogenizing categories of difference not only in the public discourse in Germany but also in academia. The debate on cultural representation helps to identify such representations as hegemonic and orientalist construct. Reflections on the positionality of ethnographers and others speaking about 'Turkish culture' help to illustrate that these often-victimizing representations of German-Turkish women rather shed light on the positionality of those designators, than informing about the designated, i.e. German-Turkish women. The following sections also help to deconstruct related representations as hegemonic citizenship discourse which reveals continuities of an ethnonational self-understanding (see section 3.6.) of citizenship and culture in Germany. This citizenship discourse employs a holistic notion of culture similar to notions of culture in classic ethnographies. The debate on cultural representation warns us from representing those designated as research subjects as *Others* and calls for self-reflections of ethnographers' positionality and embedded with power relations. A lesson from the debate of cultural representation is to acknowledge that the consulted German-Turkish women are by no means a homogeneous group. On the contrary, diversity within the group of selected interlocutors can be shown in terms of their different positionalities and senses of belonging.

Sections 2.1.4. and 2.1.5. address more recent notions of culture that emerged after and during discussions on cultural representation. The criticism raised towards deterministic concepts of culture as homogenous static entities which define human practices merely in the light of systems and structures of norms and values led to revisions on the notion

of culture. Culture was contextualized with processes of globalization and migration. Hannerz (2012) and Appadurai (2008) underlined the crucial role of transnational connections, ties, networks and practices of creolization within different kinds of global flows and sites. New ways of experiencing the world as no longer tied to a specific locality were explored theoretically. Globalization and mobility across borders have deterritorialized our capacity of imagination, which today is more than ever detached from a single locality (section 2.1.4.).

Section 2.1.5. sheds light on a new perspective of culture according to which culture and space were no longer seen as priori existent substance but as an outcome of different kinds of social practices and relations. Practice theory highlights the dialectic relationship between the constraining role of structure and the enabling role of practice as reaffirmation and reproduction of a status quo or as practice of contestation against the latter. The *spatial turn* resulted in concepts of space as a result of social practice. This had implications for the definition of the field as research site. The field as no longer defined in terms of locality, but as multi-sited or as a field of relations yields to the methodological implication that interlocutors and their ties, objects and stories have to be traced across places and borders. A changed notion of space as produced by social practice described below is also helpful for capturing German-Turkish migrant women's experiences of space as bridging more than one locality. They produce a transnational space in terms by means of migrating between Germany and Turkey, but also as far as their translocal or transnational practices and perceptions of spaces are concerned.

2.1.1. Examples of Deconstruction of Classic Ethnographic Accounts

The *Writing Culture Debate* marked a 'literary turn' in ethnography foregrounding the textual dependency of cultural representation. The academic discussion on writing about culture was concerned with a critical analysis of theory, ethnographic description and interpretation addressing the portrayal of (non-Western) societies. The deconstruction of classic ethnographic texts resulted in the analysis of literary techniques ethnographers used in order to establish credibility as neutral observers. Ethnographers saw themselves as capable of describing 'cultures' the way 'they really are'. Ethnographers were assumed to be objective and invisible observers who did not influence the way things happened (Crapanzano, 1986, pp. 52–53; Pratt, 1986, p. 33). The ideal of objectivism during the classic period assumed that "social life was fixed and constraining". As a result, indigenous groups were regarded as integral, consistent, and hardly subject to

change or internal divisions. Whenever observed social phenomena did not fit into categories of patterns or systems they were excluded from analysis or regarded as "exceptions, ambiguities, or irregularities" (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 31). Proponents of the debate pointed out that value neutral language is impossible ,as the act of writing always entails cultural and political commitments (Bachmann-Medick, 1996, pp. 30–31; Rosaldo, 1989, p. 29).

An increased reflexivity in doing and writing ethnography resulted in a growing awareness of the fact that neither the experience of participant observation nor the testimonials of members of a described society could ever be fully represented. Hence, the epistemological assumptions in cultural anthropology and the ethnographic method underwent a radical change. The former ideal of objective realism and its underlying assumption of the possibility to represent a complete picture of reality was discarded in favor of a constructivist methodology. Fiction was no longer contrasted with reality because reality itself was seen as non-given construct (Bachmann-Medick, 1996, p. 32,36; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, pp. 10–13)

Ethnographers were no longer seen as neutral experts at the center of knowledge production because the people they represented as *Others* raised their voices against the ways they were represented. As a consequence, ethnographers' capacity to represent "culture" was highly doubted and criticized (Clifford, 1986a, pp. 8–13). The deconstruction of power relations between ethnographers and the studied "culture" or "community" revealed the discipline's political and historical entanglement with colonialism and contextualized anthropologists' privileged positionality in the production of knowledge along lines of gender, class, ethnicity and space.

Groundbreaking for this discussion was the volume *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* edited by James Clifford and George E. Marcus (1986). James Clifford is a historian, who has been called the ethnographer of ethnographers because of his observations of ethnographic practice in social and cultural anthropology from an outside perspective (Rabinow, 1986, p. 243). He and others criticized how authors of ethnographies established a position of dominant authority.

Clifford identified two modes by which ethnographers establish authority and represent foreign cultures as a homogeneous unit: Firstly, in the manifold ways ethnographers narrated their immediate experience of having been to the field. And secondly, in the act of constructing the ethnographic text in the writing process. In classic accounts,

anthropologists isolated their personal expertise, facts and events from historical and local contexts and integrated them into a more general reality, which they constructed after fieldwork (1988, p. 34). Clifford opposed objective realism, the guiding methodological principle of traditional anthropologists. He pointed out that the "literariness" of ethnographic writing, that is metaphor, figuration and narrative make a text fictional and affect readers' perceptions of the latter. Since literary techniques have a manipulative quality, ethnography can never represent things as they are. Clifford recommended to abolish a notion of culture, entailing the ideal to represent the Other completely arguing that ethnographers can at best tell "morally charged" stories (1986a, p. 14; 1986b, p. 100).

As a result, culture was no longer only described but conceived as "produced" and constructed through (ethnographic) texts. Clifford argued for shedding light on the circumstances under which ethnographic texts emerge with respect to speaker, author, time, place, reading audience and "institutional and historical constraints". Unlike representing 'a culture', ethnography was now seen as capable of at best presenting a few voices in a particular context. He maintained that ethnographies could only contain "partial truths" that are temporary, particular and a result of a process of selection and exclusion linked to the ethnographer's research interests (1986b, pp. 6–8).

An analysis of rhetoric in ethnographic texts can show how ethnography produces its subject. In opposition to defining culture as essential or "coherent differential identity", culture is conceived as constructed by whoever defines and produces it in ethnographic writing (Clifford, 1986a, p. 6; Crapanzano, 1986). The following sections give some insights about how culture has been produced in ethnographies of the classic period.

Mary Louise Pratt describes the ideal of traditional ethnographic writing as "neutral, tropeless discourse" that aims to represent "other realities 'exactly as they are', not filtered through our own values and interpretative schema". She points out how expectations of academic conformity led to a separation of personal narratives and impersonal cultural description in classic ethnographies (1986). Since professional texts had to conform to the norms of objective description, personal accounts of field experiences were either pushed off into sub-genres or placed in the first chapter as introduction to subsequent 'objective' ethnographic description. Pratt reveals how anthropologists used certain *tropes* borrowed from traveling literature in order to establish credibility. "Symbolically and ideologically rich" and vivid opening narratives

would usually depict a "subjective, sensuous experience" and become the most memorable part of an ethnography conveying the audience that the author had really 'been there'. Such chapters included the writer's "royal arrival" in the field, his initial rejection by the locals and the weary process of learning the language and overcoming such rejection (Pratt, 1991, pp. 31–32). Pratt recognizes the *image of the innocent castaway/prisoner* as another frequently used trope. She unmasks how Bronislaw Malinowski, for instance, developed his authority by portraying himself as innocent castaway/prisoner. This trope served him to depict a "sense of dependency, lack of control, the vulnerability to being either isolated completely or never left alone" during his fieldwork experience (Pratt, 1986, p. 38).

Those personal accounts reveal important information about the ethnographer who disappears in the rest of the ethnographic text. Characterized by the "pretense or fantasy of a first encounter", the authors of the classic ethnographies aspired to describe cultures as they were before Western invasion, not yet corrupted by the colonial encounter. As a result, these texts conceal the colonial context by means of the authors' self-victimization. By belittling and individualizing the lack of welcome they experienced, ethnographers not only represented their presence as innocent and accidental, they also deliberately concealed historical context by personalizing natives' lack of cooperation and resentment against the ethnographer's presence (Pratt, 1986).

Rosaldo makes similar observations in the ethnography *Montalillou*, written by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie (1979) and in Evans-Pritchard's ethnography on the Nuer (1940). Both authors employ a rhetoric that depicts them as "innocent" concealing that data were collected within a colonial context of domination and oppression. Evans-Pritchard established his credibility of having been to the field, by representing himself as "modest" observer who questions his results and as calm-minded, despite the most exhausting and stressful physical and mental circumstances in the field (Rosaldo, 1993, pp. 79, 88–93). In a similar vein, Crapanzano (1986, p. 69) analyzes how Clifford Geertz' (1973) depicts himself as "naif (…) awkward simpleton, not all sure of his identity (…) in a betwixt and between world" in the entry tale to his ethnography *Deep Play: Notes of a Balinese Cockfight*.

Crapanzano (1986, p. 53) exemplifies how the ethnographer's proof to readers of having witnessed events and their accentuation of detached and neutral observation also characterizes more contemporary ethnographic texts. Based on Geertz' ethnographic

text, Crapanzano shows the unequal relationship between Geertz (1973) and 'his' natives as an hierarchical I-they relationship, contrary to an I-you relationship. He describes how the Self of the ethnographer in the first chapter completely disappears from the rest of the text clearing the way for general descriptions of "the Balinese man" and "the Balinese cockfight", disregarding the particularity of a rather specific event. Crapanzano criticizes Geertz's claim to understand "from the native's point of view' through 'reading over the native's shoulders'" as presence of an anthropologist who is "behind and above the native" (1986, pp. 72–74). Crapanzano shows how Geertz represents himself and his wife as individuals, while the Balinese are repeatedly generalized and homogenized throughout the whole ethnography. The 'foreign' is represented without rupture, and a dialogue with real people is not demonstrated (1986, pp. 70–71). Prioritizing the relationship between author and readers, the Balinese are excluded by means of employing metaphors, images and terminology that is only familiar to Western readers (Ibid). Rosaldo uncovers a rhetorical technique in classic ethnographies in which authors generalize conduct and traits of the respective group members by referring to the group as a whole with "the group noun" or the "masculine pronoun" (Rosaldo, 1986, p. 94). Generalizing descriptive narratives were usually made in the 'ethnographic present', leading to a depiction of societies as timeless unchanging isles, while blurring the colonial and historic context of the ethnographic encounter.

2.1.2. The Discourse of Orientalism

Edward Said's book *Orientalism* (1978) has become a canonical text of the postcolonial discourse in the disciplines of literature and cultural studies (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015a)[9]. As "systematic discipline" of the West in producing knowledge about and governing the "Orient" (Said, 1978, pp. 3, 95), *Orientalism* is a discourse that connects knowledge and power. Said states,

> "Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient— dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient." (Said, 1978, p. 3)

[9] Castro Varela and Dhawan's (2015) introduction to Said's main academic contributions, supports this overview about Said's main hypotheses which were relevant for the reflections of ethnographic Self and Other.

Said criticized self-proclaimed Western experts' essentialist knowledge production on Islam and Muslim people as coherent unity, often stereotyping people from Arabic speaking countries (Said, 1978, 1981). Said discloses the role of Western knowledge production and systems of representation in the political subjection and subjectivization of the non-Western world by deconstructing the dualism between 'Orient' and 'Occident' (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015, p. 101). Employing concepts of power by Gramsci and Foucault[10], Said demonstrates the relationship between 'Orient' and 'Occident' as a relationship of power, domination and hegemony. That is, the "Orient was Orientalized […] because it could be– that is, submitted to being–made Oriental." (1978, pp. 5–6).

Orientalism as a power-knowledge connection between the European production of knowledge and European imperialism manifests itself in Orientalism as the "Western approach to the Orient" and as an academic "discipline by which the orient was (and is) approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice" (Said, 1978, p. 73). To show how knowledge production and accumulation by experts of the Orient served to facilitate colonial administration, Said analyzed different kinds of works by scholars and authors from the 18th century to the present (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015, pp. 98–99). His analysis includes scholarly works, literature, political writings, travel reports, journalistic articles, fiction and religious writings (Said, 1978, p. 23). The texts constituting the orientalist discourse at the time Said wrote the book, were not written for an Eastern audience. Instead, scholars, readers and consumers as well as the disciplines related to the 'Orient' were situated in Western metropoles (Said, 1978, pp. 323–326). The discourse of Orientalism constitutes a knowledge pool that helps to consolidate cultural, economic and military domination over the 'Orient'. Accordingly, Western systems and institutions of cultural description and representation of the 'Orient' have been penetrated by and connected to European imperialist strategies of domination in (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015, p. 99). Orientalism as a discourse

[10] According to Castro Varela and Dhawan, Said refers to a notion of state theory and power Gramsci designated common sense (2009, p. 261). According to this concept, hegemony is not only based on constraint, but also on the political will and opinion which is shared by the majority. Said also employs Foucault's notion of discourse and the subject produced by discourse (Foucault, 1972, 1994). Discourses are produced in the symbiosis of knowledge and power, that is, knowledge and power are interrelated and interdependent: While knowledge is produced by power, no relation to power exists without knowledge (Foucault, 1994, pp. 39–40).

> "with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, […] colonial bureaucracies and […] styles […] is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident.' Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, 'mind', destiny, and so on." (Said, 1978, pp. 2–3)

The division between Orient and Occident is the result of an "imaginative geography" (Said, 1978, p. 54) in a discourse of domination revolving around linguistic assignments and distinctions made by designators and the ones they designate as Others. Such assignments do not require that designated people acknowledge the distinction made by designators. That is, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these boundaries in our own minds; 'they' become 'they' accordingly, and both their territory and their mentality are designated as different from 'ours'." (Ibid.) The binary opposition between the Western self (the Occident) and the Eastern Other (the Orient) is characterized along stereotypes that reveal more about the cultural self-perception and -representation of Western experts than about what is as designated "oriental". While the West is described as masculine, rational, developed, mature and active, the 'Orient' is depicted as feminine, sensual, backward, irrational, child-like and ahistorical (Said, 1978, pp. 41, 47, 186–188, 205–206).

As a nationalist and racist discourse, Orientalism appropriates authority in talking about cultural difference, history and languages. With the adjective 'oriental' it is possible to homogenize a wide range of diverse knowledge (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015, pp. 98–99). Said's aim is to deconstruct the dualism of the discourse on Orientalism. He criticized the representation of the 'Orient' as an ahistorical monolithic block, an "essentialist standpoint" that ignores "a heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex human reality" (1978, p. 334).

With his work, Said has shown that constructed paradigms of cultural difference between 'Orient' and 'Occident' is not a neutral undertaking. On the contrary, explaining differences between groups with culture is directly related to hierarchy, devaluation and dominance. His analysis leads to questioning the notion of culture as a concept that bears the danger of disregarding socio-economic and historical analysis:

> "How does one represent other cultures? What is another culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful

> one, or does it always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one's own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the Other)?" (Said, 1978, p. 325)

Despite his stated aim of uncovering the construction of a dualism, Said has been criticized for generalizing and homogenizing complex phenomena. His emphasis on the 'Orient-Occident' dualism was criticized for resulting in the stabilization of the latter and for re-essentializing the very essentialism he aimed to criticize. His critics blame him for overlooking geographic and historical differences as well as discontinuities and antagonisms in the Western production of knowledge and colonialism. Said overlooked, so his critics, the dimension of change and process within hegemonic systems and the discursive nature of power (Castro Varela and Dhawan, 2015, pp. 107–111). The generalizations required for analyzing Orientalism as a discourse can only be made by sacrificing and repressing ambivalences, ruptures and contradictions within orientalist discourse. Furthermore, Said's concept of Orientalism was criticized as too rigid to regard the agency of the subaltern, in terms of practices of social and political resistance (Ibid.).

Despite this criticism Said's contribution was an important trigger for the debate on cultural representation as his concept of Orientalism has deconstructed aesthetic cultural depictions in ethnographic texts and uncovered ethnographers' entanglement with colonial regimes and imperial domination (Bachmann-Medick, 1996, pp. 37–40). By revealing the asymmetric power relationship between experts writing about culture and the subjects of such writings, Said shed light on the privileged positionalities of dominant Western culture in the production of knowledge about the 'Orient' as non-Western Other. His understanding of *designating Self* and *designated Other* has led to academic expectations to reflect on ethnographers' and their subjects' positionality. By scrutinizing the construction of cultural demarcation as a strategy of colonial domination along stereotypical images and dichotomies of *Self* and *Other*, his analysis revealed the positionality of authors who wrote about the 'Orient' (Bachmann-Medick, 1996, p. 38). His concept of Orientalism is an important pillar for the concepts of belonging (see section 2.2.) as it helps to understand ideas about membership to Germany and associated citizenship discourses. Said's concept of Orientalism helps to deconstruct attributions of difference as hegemonic strategies of dominance by those endowed with the power of designation (see section 3.6.).

2.1.3. Traveling Ethnographers' Constructions of Exotic and Localized other

In the following sections I will illustrate the methodological deliberations on ethnographers' positionality. Afterwards I will address deliberations on space and locality in ethnography that also contributed to the questioning of representing 'cultures' as static and isolated wholes.

Ethnographers' positionality

Abu-Lughod problematizes that the main paradigm defining the discipline of cultural anthropology and the notion of culture is built on the "historically constructed divide between the West and the non-West, a relationship that has been shaped by Western domination (2014, p. 387). Referring to Said's concept of *Orientalism*, Abu-Lughod argues that culture has become a notion used by Orientalist scholarship for distinguishing the West in character, development, and government from its respective other that has nearly become innate. The research subject's cultural difference *from* the ethnographer is a requirement for ethnographic analysis and representation as the notion of culture has been pivotal for constructing the Self-Other distinction. She states that anthropology as "a professional discourse that elaborates on the meaning of culture" still freezes difference despite its "anti-essentialist intent". Thus, anthropology takes part in constructing, producing and maintaining difference (Abu-Lughod, 2014, p. 390).

In a similar vein, Gupta and Ferguson have argued that the field as research site has been constructed around a juxtaposition of an anthropological Self and the object of knowledge the Others. Despite women's, minorities', and Third World researchers' participation in the discipline, the ethnographer Self is still constructed around a predominant "Euro-American, white, middle-class male", while field sites are constructed around degrees of *Otherness*, privileging non-European or non-American and non-middle-class sites of research (1997c, pp. 16–18).

Reflections on ethnographers' positionality and the field as a research site have become a mode of revealing power asymmetries between ethnographic Self and described Other (see also section 1.5.3.). Abu-Lughod notes that reflective accounts on personal links to the research topic constitute one mode of writing against an essentializing notion of culture. Self-reflective accounts on power relations in the course of research reveal ethnographers' historical and contemporary positionality that connects with the phenomena they study. This means that ethnographers reflect on the historical processes

that initiated their studies and on the global conditions of inequality that enable them to conduct fieldwork in a particular place (2014, pp. 392–393).

Rosaldo suggests to detect the power-knowledge relationship by means of differentiating three positionalities related to authorship: The writer, the narrator and the textualized persona of the field investigator (Rosaldo, 1986b, p. 86). As "positioned subject" the ethnographer occupies "a position or structural location" which shapes a particular optic and perspective. Gender, age, "being an outsider, and association with a neocolonial regime, influence for example what the ethnographer learns". Rosaldo exemplifies how the sudden death of his wife and colleague helped him to gain some insights:

> "The notion of position also refers to how life experiences both enable and inhibit particular kinds of insight. In the case at hand, nothing in my own experience equipped me even to imagine the anger possible in bereavement until after Michelle Rosaldo's death in 1981. Only then was I in a position to grasp the force of what Ilongots had repeatedly told me about grief, rage, and headhunting." (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 19)

Revealing the intersection of one's own positionality along social divisions, as in my case, being an unmarried cis woman, white ethnic German, academic etc. underlines the possibility "for uniting an analytical with an ethical project and render obsolete the view of the utterly detached observer who looks down from on high" and is "connected to a community" (Rosaldo, 1993, p. 194). Moreover, representing dialogs with interlocutors bear the potential of a literary form that explains discursive processes in ethnographic texts, since knowledge is negotiated in a process of communication (Clifford 1986: 6-7; 13-14). In fact, the 'omniscient' narrator has been replaced by direct quotations of the people that are being studied in ethnographies (Alasuutari, 1995, pp. 55–57).

Despite the debate on Writing Culture and subsequent attempts to give voice to the Other, the discipline implicitly continues a tradition of objectivism and exoticization even when research is conducted in one's own society. Since research is inclined to address "ethnic communities and the powerless", practices of establishing credibility for conducting research in the United States or Europe continue to ensure that groups research is conducted about "seem 'other'" (Abu-Lughod, 2014, p. 387). The issues related to this ongoing distinction between Self and Other is the "tacit" understanding that objectivity regarding "one's own society" is impossible and that research conducted in non-Western communities continues to receive more approval in the academic community. As a consequence, native researchers, minorities or *halfies* (people who

relate to Western and non-Western societies) are either accused of lacking professional distance, of being too easily ready to become subjective and partial or they are expected to essentialize the Non-Western part of their hyphenated identity (Abu-Lughod, 2014, pp. 387–388). In a similar vein, the contributors of *Women Writing Culture* (Behar and Gordon, 1995) who from their positionality as women of color blur the boundaries of the Self-Other distinction by bringing together feminist and anthropological insights and by underlining their own identities' complex entanglement at the intersections of gender, class, race as women writers.

Abu-Lughod argues that feminists and halfie anthropologists' knowledge on the intersectionality of gendered and cultural identities and categories of difference provide the prerequisite for deconstructing an essentialist notion of culture along a Self-Other dichotomy. Anthropology can benefit from feminist theory in acknowledging that the Self is constructed and that the production of the Self by means of creating an opposition to some Other always entails "the violence of repressing or ignoring other forms of difference" (2014, pp. 386–388). For the feminist and the halfie, the Self is not a coherent unity; on the contrary, the Self is divided "caught at the intersection of systems of difference". A consequence of this insight is that the anthropological Self is never positioned outside the Other. Instead, the ethnographer is always positioned "within a larger political-historical complex" that interrelates along a power continuum (Abu-Lughod, 2014, p. 388).

In a similar vein, Gupta and Ferguson stress the importance of anthropologists' reflections on the idea of the field in foregrounding their historical connections to the research site and acknowledge that "in an interconnected world, we are never really 'out of the field'" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, p. 35, 38).

> "Practicing decolonized anthropology in a deterritorialized world means as a step doing away with the distancing and exoticization of the conventional anthropological 'field', and foregrounding the ways in which we anthropologists are historically and socially […] linked with the areas we study." (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, p. 38)

Ethnographers' recurrent use of tropes of entry to and exit from the field (see section 2.1.1.), has contributed to a tradition of constructing anthropological research sites as separated and opposed to home. Accordingly, the authors argue that field sites have been produced along a "hierarchy of purity" organized around "degrees of Otherness".

The most desirable degrees of "Otherness" from the ethnographer's home is preferably located in an isolated area as far away as possible from Western urbanity. Gupta and Ferguson stress that the central issue at work is not related to the location where fieldwork is conducted, whether that is abroad or at home. At the heart of the problem lies the assumption that there is a radical separation between home and field, between Self and Other (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, pp. 13–15).

Localized Other and Traveling Ethnographic Self

Additional reflections on cultural representation continued in the 1990s as Gupta and Ferguson, Olwig and Hastrup and Malkki addressed assumptions about space, according to which geographical territory was assumed to be filled with different 'cultures' (Malkki, 1992; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997a; Olwig and Hastrup, 1997). Nations and cultures were seen as bound to specific localities, "naturally" dividing geographical territories into national societies, of which each country was assumed to embody "its own distinctive culture and society" (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997a, pp. 34–36). Since cultures, nations and groups were imagined as closed entities with clear cut boundaries, academic research wa inclined to disregard relations of exchange (Olwig and Hastrup, 1997, p. 4). Olwig and Hastrup argue that ethnographers' pitfall was their own ethnocentrism. They contextualize ethnographers' assumptions of cultural holism to their objects of study with scholars' embeddedness with nationalist discourses. The authors argue that the essentialist notion of cultures as wholes actually stems from the "romanticist" idea of the nation as characterized by a fixed "set of beliefs and customs" and language shared by people who are rooted in a particular place. They argue that nationalist discourses in Western countries and the associated strong bias in research along such lines resulted in a place-focused concept of culture (1997, p. 4).

In a similar vein, Malkki underlines that identity and territory were not only linked in nationalist discourses but also in "scholarly studies of nations, nationalism and refugees". Tacit assumptions linking territory to nations, cultures and societies would naturalize an understanding of the latter as "rooted" in a soil, place or territory that is often compared to the metaphor of a tree (1992, pp. 3, 27–28). In line with territory-based notions of culture, the field as research site was also understood as part of culturally different locations defined by common features, such as ethnicity, religion, language, race or nation (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, pp. 9–10). Gupta and Ferguson argue that the definition of the field and fieldwork practice as encounter with the other

‘culture’ is therefore an inherently spatial question that many ethnographers have not reflected on. Referring to the field as research site, the authors argue

> “This mysterious space–not the ‘what’ of anthropology but the ‘where’–has been left to common sense, beyond and below the threshold of reflexivity.” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, p. 2)

The main goal of fieldwork practice was to study “primitive humanity in its natural state” in a remote and isolated area. Apart from the above discussed concealment of conquest and colonialism, fieldwork as the constitutive method of cultural anthropology was expected to meet the ideal of observing people in their “natural” surroundings and “natural state” uncontaminated by the colonial encounter and contact to white people (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, pp. 6–7).

This idealized expectation for the discipline’s defining method in the early days of cultural anthropology involved anthropologists’ initiation rite to become a member of the discipline: travelling to the field. The journey to the field became a necessary undertaking in order to encounter difference and to study “those natives who stay put in the particular area” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, p. 8; Olwig and Hastrup, 1997, p. 5). Clifford situates the “spatial practices of anthropology” within the Western history of travelling. Although conducting fieldwork is connected to a “specific style, quality and duration of dwelling”, anthropologists represented themselves as travelers. This self-representation was opposed to their representation of “natives” as bound to a location concealing relations and practices of exchange (1997, pp. 19–22, 53, 68). Contrary to immobile and locally bound natives, “distant from the metropolitan West”, explorers, missionaries, administrators were “regarded as quintessentially mobile; they are the movers, the seers, the knowers” (Appadurai, 1988, p. 37). Due to these privileged forms of Western mobility, the notion of traveling is characterized by a certain “historical taintedness” along social boundaries of class, gender, race and “literariness” that is associated with “genuine” travelers. While traveling accounts have mostly been written by bourgeois travelers, other travelers like “servants, helpers, companions, guides, and bearers” have been excluded from the written accounts of travelling (Clifford, 1997, pp. 33–39). A consequence of this research paradigm was that people, who were not living in their place of origin because they had moved to cities or farms for work, were often not considered as “suitable anthropological objects” because they lived outside of what had been constructed as research site (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, pp. 6–7). The territorialized representation of societies additionally concealed the mobility of natives,

cultural transformation and relations that extended the research site, such as different forms of interaction including trade and marriage networks and language exchange. In addition, histories of conquest and "hybrid cultures of post coloniality" as well as transformations in the context of (imperial) historical connections were mostly excluded from ethnographic accounts. Likewise, experiences of mobile people including nomads, migrants, refugees or professional elites were either disregarded or devalued as "uprooted" or "displaced" and diversity within groups was ignored or categorized as "abnormal" (Appadurai 1988, p. 39; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997a, p. 34-35; Olwig and Hastrup, 1997, p. 2; Malkki, 1992, pp. 27-28).

Gupta and Ferguson note that assumptions of the field as bound to a place remained a problem in the 1990s. It was replaced by the notion of locality which was used as self-evident category. The authors warned that employing locality as category without definition and reflections would run the risk of drifting back to assumptions of specific localities as field sites where valuable knowledge is produced based on face-to-face relations among members of small-scale communities. Like Abu-Lughod (2014), Gupta and Ferguson state that topics related to difference and locality are still prioritized over less localized "translocal phenomena". Translocal phenomena would include spatially non isolated or localized people, research sites and topics: For instance topics related to mass media, transnational corporations, (inter)national politics and finance or sites "at home" in the cities (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997c, pp. 15–16, 39). Clifford suggests to find a middle ground between de-localization and localization. While in traditional assumptions of culture "roots always precede routes" and dwelling is seen as the basis of collective life with traveling as a supplement, anthropology should recognize that people, things, and ideas are mobile: humanity is and has been determined "as much by displacement as by stasis", "everyone's on the move and has been for centuries" (1997, pp. 2–3). According to Clifford (1997, p. 36), Culture should rather be conceived as encounter and exchange between mobile people and people who stay at home, shedding light on "every day practices of dwelling and traveling: traveling-in-dwelling, dwelling-in-traveling". He argues that

> "once the representational challenge is seen to be the portrayal of local/global historical encounters (…) one needs to focus on the hybrid, cosmopolitan experiences as much as on rooted, native ones. In my current problematic, the goal is not to replace the figure of the 'native' with the intercultural figure 'traveler' Rather, the task is to focus on concrete mediations of the two" (Clifford, 1997, p. 24).

However, locality remains an important contextual category. To counter generalization, Abu-Lughod suggests to write “ethnographies of the particular”. An emphasis on particular individuals’ lives however does not imply to privilege micro processes over macro processes or to disregard non-local dynamics. Global effects outside of the local realm as well as long-term processes are manifested locally in individuals’ particular lives and everyday life practices “in time and place”, while generalization conversely erases time and conflict (2014, pp. 394–395).

In this section I outlined how proponents of the debate on cultural representation have reflected on the positionality of ethnographers and their representation of the Other. A criticism raised towards deterministic concepts of culture as homogenous static systems of difference that define human characteristics and actions led to a revised understanding of culture. The concepts I describe in the next section address the impacts of globalization has on notion of culture, emphasizing global interconnectedness and flows, and interactions and exchange between actors and networks. Unlike assumptions of culture and space as a priori existent, culture is today seen as an outcome of different kinds of social practices. Cultural phenomena are no longer seen as bound to a place or territory. The above-described deliberations on locality and the field as a research site, already reflect a notion of space as socially constructed that will be described in section 2.1.5. Together with the deliberations on cultural representation those concepts had several methodological implications for the field as a research site: By no longer assuming space as autonomous fixed entity, that exists independent from social interaction, the identity of a place or community is conceived as constructed by means of social interaction. This understanding paves the way for an examination of historical context and power hierarchies within constructed spaces and research sites.

2.1.4. Globalization and Deterritorialization

Ulf Hannerz' essay collection *Transnational Connections* (2012) is an important contribution to the understanding of culture in the age of globalization. Hannerz aims to explain the wider cultural interconnectedness and organization of modern life by means of analyzing “the coherence of the world in terms of interactions, relationships, and networks” (Hannerz, 2012, p. 7). He emphasizes the “making” of cultures, as “shaped and carried by people in varying social constellations, pursuing different aims”. In order to analyze the complexity of global cultural processes, Hannerz defines four frames that organize the latter. The interplay of these frames can explain the production of culture

within contexts of *creolization* (2012, p. 69). Everyday life takes place in *the form of life frame*. Here the "circulation of meaning" is constructed in the context of "households, workplaces, neighborhoods" etc. In this frame, networks include intimate relationships and relationships to acquaintances or strangers. The circulation of meaning in the form of life frame is "symmetrically organized" and tends to be "routinized" and repetitive (Hannerz, 2012, p. 69). The *state* as another frame connotes the asymmetric circulation of meaning between state apparatus and citizens involving institutions such as "media, schools, museums and civic ritual". The *market frame* includes an asymmetrically organized "commoditized culture" circulating between buyer and seller. Lastly, cultural process is organized around the *frame of movement*, including "a rather decentered handling of meaning, a matter of persuasion and proselytizing" (Hannerz, 2012, pp. 69–70).

Opposing the assumption that globalization leads to increasing cultural homogenization, Hannerz operates with the notion of *creolization* as a process-related notion of culture. He argues that the increased global interconnectedness contributes to new ways of organizing cultural diversity and "also results in some cultural gain". Creolization defined as "a combination of diversity, interconnectedness, and innovation, in the context of global center–periphery relationships" is constrained by power relations and hierarchies (2012, pp. 66–67). Creolization involves a coalescence of different traditions. Unlike self-contained cultural entities that were constructed as homogeneous, "bounded" and "pure", the cultural diversity of creole cultures originates from "historical roots in different continents". Cultural diversity is not isolated but constitutes an uncompleted process of historical interconnectedness. Hannerz states:

> "The interconnectedness typically takes the shape of a relatively continuous spectrum of interacting meanings and meaningful forms, along which the various contributing historical sources of the culture are differentially visible and active." (2012, p. 67)

Hannerz analyzes how creolization processes occur along a global and national center-periphery continuum. It is mainly the form of life frame in which mixing and combining of cultures takes place: It is in "ordinary practices and interactions that much of the everyday life of the periphery is creolized". Most of his reflections are dedicated to explaining how state and market organize the continuous creolization of the periphery. Mostly seen as the homogenization force per se, Hannerz argues that the market also creates cultural innovation by processes of creolization: Local entrepreneurs of the periphery find their own niche, developing a product that fits the needs of local

consumers in the realms of music, art, literature, fashion, cuisine and religion. Considering global urban centers in the US and Western Europe, with cities like London, Paris and New York, the "periphery is now speaking back" with migrant culture and popular culture (2012, pp. 70–78).

Another contribution to the globalization processes in relation to culture has been made by Appadurai who stresses the flowing and unbound character of contemporary cultural formations. Evocative of Hannerz' frames (or vice versa), Appadurai identifies five global "flows" or "streams" that initiate global cultural processes and constitute the basis of "imagined worlds". In his renown essay collection *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions about Globalization*, Appadurai designates these flows *scapes* derived from the term landscape. He identifies five *scapes*: *ethnoscapes*, *mediascapes*, *technoscapes*, *financescapes*, and *ideoscapes*. Appadurai's scapes reflect "fundamental disjunctures" between the realms of "economy, culture and politics". Furthermore, scapes are the pillars of "imagined worlds" that characterize the lifeworlds of people and groups and their fragmented experiences of a globalized world. Appadurai defines these scapes as "deeply perspectival constructs" depending on the "historical, linguistic, and political situatedness" of different kinds of actors ranging from nation-states, subnational groups and "movements" to face-to-face groups and individuals (2008, p. 33). By *ethnoscape* he understands the "landscapes" of groups and persons on the move or people who have "fantasies of wanting to move", for instance, exiles, immigrants, refugees, tourists and migrant workers (Appadurai, 2008, p. 33). Since people are more mobile than ever, group identities also change. The homeland can mainly become an imagined place. The places people live in today do not necessarily overlap with the places they identify with in their imagination (Appadurai, 2008, p. 48). *Technoscapes* constitute transnational fields of evolving technology, that enablie and accelerate transportation to areas that were difficult to access before. According to Appadurai, the present distribution of technology is less driven by political control or "market rationality" but rather by multifaceted ties of "money flows, political possibilities, and the availability of […] skilled and unskilled labor". *Financescapes* define the global configurations of capital and include currency, stock markets and "commodity speculations". *Mediascapes* and *Ideoscapes* are interconnected landscapes associated with images. Mediascapes address the increased accessibility and distribution of information and images in print media, television, movie industries (and today on the internet and social media). Mediascapes empower audiences to access complex sets of

"images, narratives and ethnoscapes" combining worlds of politics, commodities and news. The images and narratives of mediascapes provide components for constructing "imagined lives" of Self and Others in different locations (Appadurai, 2008, p. 35). *Ideoscapes* are transmitted by media images or communicated in oral and written ways across borders consisting of a "chain of ideas, terms, and images", such as freedom, welfare, rights and democracy (Appadurai, 2008, p. 36). Unlike mediascapes, ideoscapes provide the basis to act in unknown ways and reduce the distance to alternative ways of life, for instance when gender norms and traditional values are contested (2008, pp. 38–39).

Appadurai argues that the notion of culture assumes a "substance" or "some kind of object" which seems to bring back culture into the "discursive space of race". Instead of adhering to "primordialist images of cultural form and substance", Appadurai suggests conceiving the "configuration of cultural forms in today's world as fundamentally fractal, that is, as possessing no Euclidian boundaries, structures or regularities." Such fractal cultural forms are dynamic and overlap (Appadurai, 2008, pp. 12, 13, 46). He introduces the notion of *deterritorialization* as the dissolution of ties between a territory and cultural formations stating:

> "As groups migrate, regroup in new locations, reconstruct their histories, and reconfigure their ethnic "projects," the *ethno* in ethnography takes a slippery, nonlocalized quality, to which the descriptive practices of anthropology will have to respond. The landscapes of group identity–the ethnoscapes–around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically self-conscious, or culturally homogeneous." (Appadurai, 2008, p. 48)

What characterizes today's world is not only the widespread definition of globalization as "interactive system" defined by increased technological, economic, financial and social interconnectedness. Appadurai claims that the increased global interconnectedness has altered the ways people experience the world today in terms of imagination (2008, pp. 27–31). His *scapes* constitute the basis of such "imagined worlds". Asking what would constitute "the nature of locality, as a lived experience, in a globalized, deterritorialized world?", Appadurai argues that ethnography needs to consider the changing role of identities as groups migrate. No longer connected to localities people construct and reconstruct their histories in the process of migration. Rather than focusing on localities, ethnography should foreground the imagination to capture such deterritorialized experiences (Appadurai, 2008, pp. 52, 63).

While the imagination used to be part of a "special expressive space of art, myth, and ritual" and a faculty limited to "endowed individuals", today it has become a pivotal aspect ordinary people's everyday life. Appadurai analyzes how the interplay of media and migration has expanded the boundaries of what people can perceive or imagine as possible in the future. The imagination has become a "constitutive feature of modern subjectivity" (2008, pp. 3–5). For Appadurai, migration and media have a significant impact "on the work of imagination". Not only have the number of people who can imagine living and working outside their native countries and who actually migrated increased. Mass media have deeply changed migrant experience transgressing state borders:

> "Those who wish to move, those who have moved, those who wish to return, and those who choose to stay rarely formulate their plans outside the sphere of radio and television, cassettes and videos, newsprint and telephone. For migrants, both the politics of adaptation to new environments and the stimulus to move or return are deeply affected by a mass-mediated imaginary that frequently transcends national space." (Appadurai, 2008, p. 6)

Social life used to be "inertial" and fantasy and imagination were mostly "residual practices" attached to special realms, moments, persons or places. Transformations resulting from technological progress and the rise of mass media have changed the "role of the imagination in social life". Today people all over the world perceive their lives connected to the possibilities "offered by mass media". Contrary to traditional cultural frames of reference that limited what could be thought and done, such limits are subverted to varying degrees in the contemporary world. In today's "global cultural processes" the imagination and fantasy have become a "social practice" and the imagination is "now central to all forms of agency" (Appadurai, 2008, p. 31). The new role of the imagination does not necessarily imply more choices or mobility, it merely means that "the harshest inequalities are now open to the play of the imagination". According to Appadurai, ethnography can no longer focus on locality and particularity alone. If ethnography "wishes to retain a special voice in a transnational, deterritorialized world", larger-scale perspectives of "partly imagined lives" need to be taken into account (Appadurai, 2008, pp. 54–55). Elsewhere Appadurai states:

> "Rather, ethnography must redefine itself as that practice of representation that illuminates the power of large-scale, imagined life possibilities over specific life trajectories. This is thickness with a difference, and the difference lies in a new alertness to the fact that ordinary lives today are more often powered not by the givenness of

> things but by the possibilities that the media […] suggest are available." (1988, p. 55)

For collectives, the "imagination" unleashed by mass media can promote "communities of sentiment" or create group "solidarities". It is the collective imagination that can provide the ground for organization and action (Appadurai, 2008, pp. 7–8).

2.1.5. Practice Theory: The Production of Space and Cultural Formations

Abu-Lughod suggests three modes of "writing against culture" as essentialist notion that fixes difference. Focusing on a Foucauldian notion of discourse would for instance dissolve the distinction between ideas and practices on the one hand and "text and world" on the other hand. Additionally, a focus on practice instead of culture would prioritize "strategies, interests, and improvisations over the more static and homogenizing cultural tropes of rules, models and texts" (Abu-Lughod, 2014, p. 392). In a similar vein, Rosaldo argues that instead of revolving around systems of order, norms and rules, cultural observation and analysis should include "the less explored realm of 'nonorder'" that is, people's actions which are characterized by disarray, spontaneity, improvisation, coincidences and rule violation (1989, pp. 102–103).

Among others, Ortner (1984, 1996, 2006) and Wicker (1997) have theorized a practice related approach to culture. According to Ortner (2006, pp. 1–2), cultural formations are the result of a dialectical interplay of human practice and systems of structure. Wicker situates "the ability to act culturally" as practice centered "fields of negotiation" that are limited by structure (1997, pp. 38–39).

Ortner argues that the common feature of classic theories of culture is that they are *theories of constraint*. These theories emerged during the 1960s and 1970s from the schools of functionalism, symbolic anthropology, cultural ecology, (post) structuralism, structural Marxism and political economy (1984, p. 146). Those schools assessed social practice as determined by "external social and cultural forces and formations: by culture, by mental structures, by capitalism". Ortner assesses constraint as an important element of culture. But reducing theory of culture only to constraint only, without acknowledging social practice, namely agency and processes "that produce and reproduce those constraints" results in cultural determinism (2006, pp. 1–2).

Ortner situates practice theory within the academic turns of the 1970s and the early 1980s in social sciences, namely the "power shift", the "historic turn" and the Writing Culture Debate (Ortner, 2006, pp. 3–4). The 1980s were characterized by a growing

interest in "practice, praxis, action, interaction, activity, experience and performance" and an increasing interest in actors, referred to as "agent, actor, person, self, individual, subject" (Ortner, 2006, p. 146). The first practice related framework emerged in the late 1970s and the early 1980s and were put forward by Bourdieu (1977), Giddens (1979) and Sahlins (1981). In suggesting a dialectical relationship between a social unit's structural constraints and its members' social practices, Ortner sees the common ground of these works in "restoring the actor to the social process without losing sight of the larger structures that constrain (but also enable) social action" (2006, pp. 2–3). She states:

> "The modern versions of practice theory, on the other hand, appear unique in accepting all three sides […]: that society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through human action and interaction." (Ortner, 1984, p. 159)

While theories of constraint examined how culture determines behavior and what culture enables individuals to "see, feel and to do", Ortner asks how culture constrains people from "seeing, feeling, and doing" (1984, p. 152). A theory of social practice bears the potential to provide "a dialectical synthesis" of the structure-agency division. In opposition to theories of constraint, a cultural theory of practice would include the capacity of human agency, implying that the world is "made" and can hence be "unmade" and "remade" by humans (Ortner, 2006, pp. 16–17).

In practice theory, people's actions serve as a reference point for elaborating reproduction processes or transformation of structure-related phenomena. Despite the flexibility that comes with practice, the latter is not operating independent from structure, but within and in relation to structure (Ortner, 1984, p. 150). Accordingly, Ortner argues that actors' motivations are not triggered by independent individuals or rational and utility maximizing decision-makers. Motivations for action require an "analysis of the system itself" by means of scrutinizing the "forces in play upon actors". A system imposes burdens and restrictions on actors by shaping their motives and the projects "they construct for dealing with their situation". In opposition to theory of interest, that stresses actors' pursuit of gains, practice theory includes emotional motives for taking action and sheds light on a more "systematic exploration of the social forces shaping motives" (1984, p. 151).

The ways practice can shape systems can be observed from acts of systemic reproduction and change. Following Bourdieu, she notes that system related features

such as norms, values and conceptual schemes are reproduced in everyday life practice in the

> "little routines people enact, again and again, in working, eating, sleeping, and relaxing, as well as the little scenarios of etiquette they play out again and again in social interaction." (Ortner, 1984, p. 154)

By enacting routines, people's behavior and actions are shaped by organizational principles and reproduce those principles (Ibid.). In her introduction to the essay collection *Making Gender* Ortner (1996) develops a theory of practice that combines approaches to social practice (Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1979; Sahlins, 1981) with theory of power (Scott, 1975; Williams, 1977; Foucault, 1978). By means of developing a "feminist, minority, subaltern […] theory of practice" she examines how domination is characterized by ambiguities, gaps and contradictions and includes practices of contestation into the analysis of gender. In her theory of practice, she combines ideas of the three theoretical turns she situates in the late 1970s, the "power shift", the "historic turn" and the writing culture debate.

In her theoretical deliberations on the power shift Ortner mainly refers to Bourdieu (1977) and Foucault (1978) as thinkers who stress "cultural domination" since they conceive culture as systems which constrain human practice and become part of the Self by "shaping actors' dispositions". Constraint may take the form of shaping peoples' "definitions of the world", "conceptual tools" and "emotional repertories" (Ortner, 1984, p. 153). She underlines that Bourdieu and Foucault do not assume "cultural domination" as fully implemented because "hegemony is always more fragile than it appears" (Ortner, 1984, pp. 153–154). While assessing domination and power relations as meaningful tools of social analysis Ortner also concludes that the emphasis on the asymmetrical character of social relations conceals the other side of social existence: "patterns of cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity" (Ortner, 1984, p. 157).

Historicizing practice theory is a consequence of growing awareness in anthropology that "cultures" are not timeless, but subject to internal and external processes of change. A historicized theory of practice considers that cultural concepts or categories according to which people explain their actions can be subject to reappraisal. Even those (most frequent) practices that constitute an "existing framework of meaning" and reproduce the latter may undergo a semantic change. Historicizing practices can also highlight duration of patterns or situate an analysis in a particular historical moment (Ortner, 2006, pp. 9–11).

In examining change in systems, Ortner follows the arguments of Sahlins (1981), who argues that radical change can be an outcome of changes in meaning of a status quo. That is, change in existing social relations does not necessarily involve the "coming to power of groups with alternative worldviews". Ortner contrasts her understanding of practice-related change of systems to a Marxist perspective of change as class struggle (1984, p. 155). While practices of contestation against given dispositions of practices and a status quo of relationships remain a possibility, change mainly occurs when actors apply and act in line with traditional worldviews and such practices of reproduction fail to work. Thus, change comes about in the form of revaluation and transformation of traditional interpretations. Change therefore does not have the disruptive quality of revolution but is rather process-related and a "largely an unintended consequence of action" (Ortner, 1984, pp. 155–156).

Ortner cites Sahlins' (1981, p. 52) ethnographic research as an example for such a change of meanings. Sahlins showed that differing worldviews do not need to result in conflict of interest or struggle. A change in meanings of existing relations occurs when traditional patterns of handling for instance gender relations or asymmetric relations to "chiefs" are applied to new phenomena and when those new phenomena do "not respond to those practices in traditional ways". For instance in colonial encounters with unknown cultural practices and new relations of exchange. Sahlins describes how the complexity of relations between Hawaiians and Europeans "brought the former into uncharacteristic connections of internal conflict and contradiction" resulting in a "structural transformation" because their internal relationships were ascribed with new content. In the case of cultural contact and encounter, the reproduction of traditional activities fails to function in practice when unprecedented dynamics unfold and "relationships defeat[…] both intention and convention" (Sahlins, 1981, pp. 50, 52).

Lastly, Ortner argues for a practice-related notion of culture that discards a connection between culture and groups of people by not only regarding "narratives of power and inequality" but also agency. Ortner defines such a notion as the "new-old" concept of culture because she argues for a continuity in defining culture as

> "enabling (allowing people to see, feel, imagine, understand some things), and constraining (disabling people from seeing, feeling, imagining, and understanding other things)" (2006, p. 14).

Based on examples of her own work, she contextualizes culture within specific historic regimes of power as constraining the perception and subjectivity. The enabling quality

of culture unfolds itself by means of "hidden transcripts" or "cultural resources that enable the very idea of resistance". The enabling component of culture, furthermore entails the capacity to define culture as a concept that produces specific "subjectivities" and agency "as both, a kind of empowerment and as a basis of pursuing 'projects'" in the light of power and inequality (Ortner, 2006, pp. 14–16).

In comparison to Ortner who attaches greater significance to how systems of structure can affect practice, Wicker focuses on structural aspects of culture, for example norms as resulting from the negotiation of compromise. Wicker relates culture to practice by connecting cultural process to dynamics of intersubjective interaction and practices of negotiation. He regards social practice and negotiation as embedded within contexts of a person's "inert social fields of origin" which he defines as constraining processes of negotiation. In opposition to the "unilinear cultural determinism" of earlier schools that saw the human mind as passive, Wicker (1997, pp. 38–39) underlines the importance of the subjective character of culture. He contrasts the notion of *enculturation* as a process of cultural construction to culture as an entity "in itself". According to Wicker, enculturation is "active, context-orientated appropriation of knowledge and significations within the framework of guided participation" (Wicker, 1997, p. 39). In other words, people actively appropriate norms, values, languages and classifications and produce meaning when they interact. Wicker grounds agency as constituted by dialectical "processes of interaction" between "subjective thinking" and "objective structure" (Ibid.). Culture is therefore subject to practices of negotiation that can be "active and reactive processes of resistance and accommodation". Being subject to negotiation, the "ability to act culturally" bears the opportunity for change. Similar to Ortner who stresses changes in meaning, Wicker addresses change as a process of creolization (Wicker, 1997, pp. 38–39).

Culture is also constraining. "[S]tructural facts" constrain the agency of actors in a social field. That is, the extent to which culture can be negotiated is limited in terms of choices of "alternatives of thinking, perception and action". "Social facts" generate "durable dispositions and field-specific strategies of habit or interaction". Dynamic and complex fields of negotiation are also endowed with different "degrees of defining power" (Wicker, 1997, pp. 39–41). Negotiability is limited by structural facts of a social field which limits individuals' abilities to act, perceive and think. Referring to Bourdieu (1977), Wicker defines constraints on the negotiability of culture, as "inert durable dispositions of social fields of origin", such as educational qualification, social strata,

rural-urban origin, migrant status and ethnicity. These *durable dispositions* form habits, world views and strategies of interaction which change rather slowly (Wicker, 1997, pp. 40–41). Durable dispositions enable participation, integration and creolization, but slow down dynamics of adaptation, since the transition from one social field to another, "from lower to higher social stratum, from country to city, from one country to another" is a slow "inert" process. Wicker explains these theoretical considerations with the case of migration from Turkey to Switzerland. Not Turkish culture determines the ways integration of people from Turkey in Switzerland works, but it is

> "the migrants' social field of origin (rural, urban, social class, degree of literacy, etc.) which generates and naturalises durable dispositions in the form of action strategies and world-views, and […] the social fields in the country of admission […] whose residents, obviously, have equally naturalised habits. […] It is not cultural persistence, therefore, that is responsible for the typical formation of field-related or field-ethnic enclaves – particularly among first-generation immigrants – but the dialectic of existing barriers of integration and the staying power of habits." (Wicker, 1997, p. 41)

Although Wicker does not include gender, his social fields of origin are somewhat evocative of concepts of intersecting social divisions (class, gender, migrant status, age, etc.) discussed in sections 2.2.4. and 2.3.4. Concepts of intersectionality complement Wicker's social fields of origin with a structural analysis of social practice by highlighting how social fields of origin are essentialized by more powerful majoritarian segments of society resulting in strategies of gendered ethnicization and racialization of minorities.

The Social Production of Space and Research Sites

Debates in which power hierarchies between ethnographer Self and exotic Other and spatial assumptions of culture as overlapping with geographic locations were deconstructed (see section 2.1.3.) also need to be contextualized with a new conceptual perspective of space that had methodological consequences for the field as research site. During the second half of the 20th century a new concept of space emerged in the academic disciplines of cultural studies and social sciences. Firstly, social space was no longer seen as separate from the geographical space and secondly, space itself was seen as socially constructed by individual and social practices (Dünne, 2006, p. 289). Soja designated this conceptual shift away from "an overdeveloped historical contextualization of social life and social theory" to an increasing focus on space in social life *spatial turn* (Soja, 1989, p. 16). He situates the spatial turn in social sciences

in the 1960s when Western Marxist theory moved away from historicism and critical social theory and started paying more attention to space. In particular Lefebvre's work (1991) was seen as groundbreaking for the spatialization of postmodern human geography and influenced deliberations on space in the works of Foucault, Giddens and Harvey (Soja, 1989, pp. 41–42).

Prior to the spatial turn, a Newtonian understanding of space as absolute container prevailed in social science. A notion of space as container assumed a dualism between space and the objects it encloses. As preexistent entity the container space was conceived as empty vessel, a physical space devoid of interaction with its content. Accordingly, people and the space they inhabit were conceived as separate bodies (Läpple, 1991, p. 163). Today, this absolutist notion of space has been replaced with a relational and process-oriented concept of space. Space is regarded as connected to social and cognitive practice, including perception, memory, imagination or processes of communication (Löw, Steets and Stoetzer, 2008, pp. 9, 64). While a separation of space and action assumed space to be a static "plane" on which action takes place, a relational notion of space is constituted by practice, social processes and "spatial structures" (Löw, 2016, p. 43). Löw describes the spatiality of social life as constituted by social structure and process-oriented practice. As a consequence, space becomes a "relational arrangement of bodies" constantly in motion and subject to change. She states:

> "That means that space is also constituted in time. Accordingly, space cannot be the rigid container existing independently of social and material conditions, but rather space and the world of material bodies are interwoven with each other. The term "arrangement" ([An]Ordnung) emphasizes that both a dimension of order (Ordnung) referring to social structures and also a dimension of action, that is, the process of putting in place (Anordnen), are immanent to spaces." (Löw, 2016, p. 106)

Lefebvre (1991) and de Certeau (1984) are two important thinkers who have theorized spatial and social practice. De Certeau delineates space from place. While he defines place as a constellation of fix points which in their coexistence cannot inhabit the same location and are therefore stable, space "is a practiced place", constituted by activities and movement. The act of walking produces the space and through the stories of its appropriators its inhabitants render mute places to spaces attributed with meanings (1984, p. 117). De Certeau understands everyday life in terms of power relations between a dominating social order and the common people. He considers individuals not as passive recipients of a commercial, political, cultural or economic ruling order,

but as actors who playfully reinterpret the latter. Accordingly, dominant political narratives in a society can for example be seen as a discursive formation employed and imposed by a given social order. Common people reinterpret and appropriate such dominating narratives by means of their everyday life practices which have their own logic and function in line with interests and sets of rules eluding the system (1984, pp. xii–xvii, xxii, 20). Popular everyday life practices can be analyzed by differentiating "strategies" from "tactics". While a strategy is "organized by the postulation of power", a tactic is "determined by the absence of power" (de Certeau, 1984, pp. 37–38). By means of strategies, institutions and subjects (like companies, the military, a municipality or an academic institution) are positioned in places of ideological representation "with will and power"(de Certeau, 1984, p. 36). A tactic is "a calculated action" without a "locus". It comes about in the "space of the other". Without a locus, a tactic is more flexible and mobile: it "takes advantage of opportunities" accepting "the chance offerings of the moment, and seize on the wing the possibilities that offer themselves at any given moment" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 37). De Certeau's differentiation between tactic and strategy is very useful because his conceptual language allows us to conceive social practice as strategy when employed by more powerful actors and as tactic, when exerted by less powerful social actors.

According to Lefebvre, social space consists of three components: Firstly, *spatial practice*, that is, the ways people "perceive" and "produce" space. The second component are *representations* of space by which Lefebvre understands the "conceived" space which is conceptualized by experts, like urban planners or academics. The last component of social space are *representational spaces*, spaces that are filled with life "through its associated images and symbols" (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 31–33, 38). Based on Lefebvre's triad of *spatial practice* (perceived space), *representations of space* (conceived space), and *representational spaces* (appropriated/lived space), Soja interprets perceived space as material "real" space (*Firstspace*) and conceived space as "imagined space" (*Secondspace*). He defines representational space (*Thirdspace*) as:

> "another mode of thinking about space that draws upon the material and mental spaces of the traditional dualism but extends well beyond them in scope, substance and meaning. Simultaneously real and imagined and more (both and also …), the exploration of Thirdspace can be described and inscribed in journeys to 'real-and-imagined' (or perhaps 'realandimangined') places." (Soja, 1996, p. 11)

Soja develops this notion of *Thirdspace* as real-and-imagined by applying a dialectical synthesis that he names "critical thirding-as-Othering". Thirding-as-Othering creates an alternative to dichotomies of either/or choices in which "no mixture or combination is permitted". By thirding-as-Othering the binary choice is not renounced but complemented with another perspective in which it is "subjected to a creative process of restructuring that draws selectively and strategically from the two opposing categories to open new alternatives" (1996, p. 5).

As the previous sections underline it can be argued with Olwig and Hastrup (1997, p. 7), that ethnography underwent a methodological redirection from place that has lost its prominence as a "metaphor for culture" to mobility and processes of deterritorialization. Rather than structure, contemporary ethnographies tend to highlight people's social practices and change as "condition of culture". As a consequence, the field as a research site can no longer be localized. Based on de Certeau's (1984, p. 117) notion of space as a "practiced place", Olwig und Hastrup capture the field as a site that is constituted by social practices that "blur" boundaries of distinct places. Since histories and territories overlap, interrelations take place along hierarchies of power. A consequence of following practices is that the analysis of cultural phenomena prioritizes change over structure. Spaces relevant for conducting fieldwork "will often cut across boundaries; in practice East and West, North and South may be one" (1997, p. 7). Hastrup and Olwig suggest to define the field not in terms of a locality, but rather as "the field of relations and the ways which are of significance to the people involved in the study". As a consequence, both, local and non-local relations will be disclosed. Focusing on the relations and networks of the subjects of an ethnographic study implies a shifting perspective on the meaning of the research site and the meaning of culture: The classic ethnographic monograph documenting unified cultures must yield to a "new genre" that takes a network perspective as vantage point. Here, "nodal points" of networks of local and global relations or "fields of interrelationships" that shape the lifeworlds of many people today, serve as a starting point for research; a site where identity is constructed mutually through cultural contact (Olwig and Hastrup, 1997, pp. 4–12). The authors suggest defining the field as a research site that is a field of interactions characterized by unequal power relations in line with Pratt's concept of the contact zone. Pratt defines contact zones as

> "social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as

> colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today. Eventually I will use the term to reconsider the models of community that many of us rely on in teaching and theorizing and that are under challenge today" (1991, p. 37)

With his approach of *multi-sited ethnography*, George Marcus makes additional suggestions on how the field as research site can be delocalized. He maintains that participant observation in conventionally single-sited locations needed to be replaced with ethnography in multiple sites (1995, p. 99). By means of reviewing ethnographies, Marcus shows the potential of multi-sited research. He identifies different techniques ethnographers have used to trace their objects of study: following the people, following the thing and following the metaphor (1995, pp. 105–110). In addition, ethnographers have traced plots, stories, allegories, lives or biographies and conflicts. The most obvious form of conducting multi-sited ethnography, has been the technique of following people, most commonly employed in migration research. Ethnographers have followed the thing by tracing the circulation of objects through different contexts, for example "commodities, gifts, money, works of art, and intellectual property" (Marcus, 1995, p. 107). Ethnographies following the metaphor have moved within "the realm of discourse and modes of thought" and traced the circulation of signs, symbols and metaphors that can be sited in the use of language, in print and visual and (social) media (Marcus, 1995, pp. 108–109). An example for tracing the plot, story or allegory in traditional anthropology has been the myth analysis conducted by Levi-Strauss. Tracing lives or biographies is a particular mode of following the plot. Ultimately, a strategy of following the conflict has been employed by the anthropology of law in small scale societies. In contemporary ethnographies following a conflict typically involves sites such as everyday life, media and legal institutions (Marcus, 1995, p. 110).

The theoretical discussion of this chapter is the fundament for the main concepts of this thesis and the interpretation of data. Concepts of belonging benefit from the debate on cultural representation and practice theory by detaching the notion of culture and ethnicity from groups, underlining inner heterogeneity, subjectivities, identities and the imagination and practices of positioned subjects. Some cultural and social anthropologists have argued that the act of writing and interpreting always entails an act of oppression and thought about discarding ethnographic writing altogether (Fabian, 1990). In my perspective, notions of belonging I outline in the next chapter constitute an extension of the Self-Other relation that has been discussed above. As the Self-Other relationship is discussed on a subject and a social level those concepts help to

deconstruct difference as a social attribution and align attributions of difference with the perspective and agency of those who are designated as Others. While I do not claim to represent the group of interlocutors, I will try to write against power in the form of hegemonic constructs of ideal citizenship. I attempt to and to interpret German-Turkish women's manifold tactics of situating their senses of belonging vis-à-vis attributions of difference in Turkey and Germany.

Different spheres of belonging are produced by means of social practice. Practice theory provides the theoretical language for representing German-Turkish women as agents who develop tactics to counter homogenizing categories of difference they experience in their everyday lives. Since a cultural or ethnic sense of belonging with a collective, may but must not be an outcome, myths that culture and territory overlap or that culture is constituted by primordial ethnic groups are debunked. As the debate on cultural representation, concepts of belonging address the importance of positionality within power relations at the intersection of gender, ethnicity, class etc. Beyond the subject of investigation, this changed theoretical focus also applies to the positionality of ethnographers and to the field as site of research. Understanding culture and space as a result of social practice has influenced the theoretical outline of this thesis: Concepts of transnationalism and belonging both underline the constructive character of (border-crossing) social and symbolic ties. Transnational space and belonging are both produced my means of social practice. Concepts of transnational migration theory rely on a terminology that is also crucial for contemporary contributions on the notion of culture highlighting change and historical context, global interconnectedness, activities of exchange, different types of relations and networks. Detaching cultural phenomena from single sites and localities and space as "practiced place" (de Certeau, 1984, 117) provides the fundament for German-Turkish women's transnational spaces that are not only produced by mobility and settlement. As much as by migration, German-Turkish women produce a transnational space with their social practices, their perceptions and their imagination. As the focus of cultural description has shifted to the agent it can be concluded that a meaningful description of German-Turkish women's transnational spatial practices and practices of belonging needs to consider more than one single site. Their experiences include settlement and mobility, local and translocal practices and relations.

2.2. CONCEPTS OF BELONGING: SOCIAL PRACTICE AND INTERSECTING SOCIAL DIVISIONS

I define belonging along the *level of society* and along the *subject level*. Both relate to practice theory, as defined by dialectics of structure and agency (see section 2.1.5). The first component concerns belonging at the level of society and addresses power asymmetries in discourses of collective membership via mechanisms of strategic exclusion. The second component concerns power relations at the subject level, in which the subject's social location reflects social structure. Moreover, the subject level of belonging includes a sense of belonging and addresses the individual as capable and experiencing agent. While social practice defines belonging, it delineates belonging from concepts of cultural identity. Other than in concepts operating with notions of cultural, ethnic or national identity, belonging is disconnected from the assumption of group membership along such lines because people's membership in and senses of belonging relating to groups is addressed as a result of empirical analysis. Moreover, belonging to ethnic groups is conceived as one possible form of group membership among many others. While the analysis of social practice and power relations bridge the social and the subject level, both levels are separated here for analytical reasons.

At the level of society, concepts of belonging – also called the politics of belonging – help to deconstruct collective mechanisms and discourses of membership and exclusion including ideas of citizenship. Strategic exclusion from membership is defined by the power of definition a given majority is endowed with and occurs in terms of essentializing attributions of belonging vis-á-vis the Other. As a practice related framework, belonging addresses attributions as a strategy and subversive counter strategies of the persons affected by such attributions. Collective and individual responses to exclusion from citizenship or attributions of belonging affect the sense of belonging and can result in tactical responses in the form of counter hegemonic citizenship practices and struggles for recognition.

At the subject level, processes of social differentiation constitute another defining component of the concept of belonging. Related theoretical perspectives stress intersectionality, that is differing subjectivities at intersecting social divisions, such as gender, class, age, migrant status and resulting attributions of belonging which locate individuals in a hierarchy along axes of privilege and disadvantage. Although those concepts address where individuals are located at and how the latter develop tactics of dealing with intersectional exclusion mechanisms, related experiences with

intersectional exclusion circle back into the subject level. Social locations in power hierarchies along intersectional privilege and disadvantage can be analyzed by taking the individual as vantage point to analyze subjective narratives as cumulative experiences. As experiences of intersectional exclusion and inclusion constitute a shared experience, such experiences reflect the social level and related strategical and there for structural mechanisms of defining membership via exclusion. Moreover, the practice related approach yields a perspective where subjects become agents who develop a sense of belonging and a sense of attachment to objects, people and places and meet social exclusion and attributions of difference with tactical responses in terms of relating self-attributions.

These defining aspects of belonging – the politics of belonging at the social level on the one hand and the subject level as social location and individual agency on the other hand – are highly interrelated. The social level which includes collective processes of inclusion and exclusion is intertwined with the social location and a sense of belonging concerning the subject and the individual, especially in cases of essentializing attributions of group membership and interrelated self-positioning. In the following sections I will summarize theoretical paradigms that can be grouped under these three aspects. De Certeau's (1984) differentiation between *strategies* and *tactics* can be of help to understand the relevance of practice theory for concepts of belonging. De Certeau differentiates "strategies" from as "organized by the postulation of power" from tactics as "determined by the absence of power" (de Certeau, 1984, pp. 37–38).

At the social level, people are subject to *strategic discourses* regarding citizenship discourses and the politics of belonging that are defined "by the postulation of power". Such strategic discourses manifest at the subject level in a person's social location as s*he is subject to categorizations based on intersecting social divisions. Lastly, people seek to alter their social locations and encounter strategic discourses with *tactical responses*, defined "by the absence of power".

2.2.1. Discarding Notions of Cultural Identity and Cultural Difference

As outlined in the previous sections, an understanding of culture as static homogeneous entity was discarded on the behalf of concepts of culture that stress historical and global processes, social interaction and networks. The increased theoretical focus on practice and power was accompanied by an understanding of culture and space as socially produced. These theoretical developments also paved the way for a more individualized

understanding of culture: Different notions on cultural identity were mainly discussed and theorized in the 1980s and the 1990s. Cultural identity was described as fluid, changing and multi-dimensional process mainly in relation to the subject.

While the conceptional incorporation of social practice defines the theoretical language of belonging, practice theory also delineates the latter from notions of cultural identity. In the following, I will heuristically juxtapose some ideas about cultural identity with concepts of belonging. Grossberg (1996, pp. 90–92) has analytically separated concepts of cultural identity as mainly revolving around the notions *hybridity/border*, *fragmentation*, *différance* and *diaspora*. The first three notions of cultural identity are also relevant in the theoretical discussion about belonging, however from a different angle.

Echoing Bhabha (1994) who made important contributions to post-colonial theory and introduced the notion of *hybridity*, Grossberg categorizes notions of hybridity and border as defining "images of boarder existences" in the postcolonial context, situating identities of the subaltern "between two competing identities". Such aspects of identity are also described as liminal or "situated on the border". In this context, the role of imagination has also been given importance (Bhabha, 1994; Grossberg, 1996, pp. 91–92; Soja, 1996, pp. 1–6). Particularly in the light of migration experiences, cultural identity is described as situated in the realm of the "imaginary […] as well as the symbolic" and as "partly constructed in fantasy" (Hall, 1996, p. 4). In his essay collection *Imaginary Homelands*, Salman Rushdie addresses the crucial role of the imagination and memories in the construction of cultural identity for people who have migrated. Describing his present as "foreign" while "the past is home" this particular past is not shaped by how it has actually occurred but as nostalgic and fictional fantasy, an "imaginary homeland". The "partial" and fragmented nature of these memories makes them subjectively meaningful (1991, pp. 9–12). He describes the ambiguity of people who were born in India and live in England as a hybrid constitution of identity which is plural and partial at the same time; as sometimes embracing two cultures and as falling "between the stools" at other times (Rushdie, 1991, p. 15).

Belonging incorporates ideas about *hybridity* in terms of cultural self-identification that may refer to more than one cultural setting. However, migrants' and their descendants' (multiple) cultural belonging is not conceived as given but rather as one possible outcome of many other group affiliations. The essentializing tendency of naturalizing

membership in ethnic groups to the notion of identity accounts for a demarcation of belonging as a "socially meaningful concept" that not only includes cultural identity but also a "sense of belonging in terms of preconditions for quality of life"(Anthias, 2006, p. 20). Anthias delineates belonging from cultural identity as a concept that abandons the "tendency to focus too much on the cultural predisposition of newcomers or 'others'" by focusing on societal mechanisms as crucial elements in the narratives of 'identity' and belonging" (Ibid.). Anthias' deliberations are probably inspired by Rogers Brubaker's (2004) suggestion to detach the notion of culture and ethnicity from groups that will be discussed in the following section. Opposing a notion of identity that is characterized by 'culture' and ethnicity, the concept of belonging stresses the importance of sameness and commonalities by highlighting membership in other social groups and by underlining processes of social inclusion and participation. Presupposing membership in ethnic groups results in an overemphasis of cultural difference and homogenization concealing transethnic commonalities. An actor-centered perspective as vantage point allows for analyzing practices and negotiations of belonging locating the self in a broader spectrum of group membership including for instance affiliations with peer groups, kinship networks, political networks or occupational groups (Riegel and Geisen, 2009, p. 7). Bogner and Rosenthal underline the importance of including membership in the family into the analysis: "Family history in its interdependence with collective and societal history for individual life stories" is significant as it transforms and shapes "we-images" and images of others. Their research shows that an ethnic sense of belonging is linked to the position of individuals as family member and not merely to individual decision making (2009, pp. 12–13).

While identity concepts that highlight "diaspora, hybridity, transculturalism and cosmopolitianism" link cultural identity theory to migration, Anthias argues that these concepts fall short of addressing "the intersectionalities of social position and positioning" (2006, p. 24). Power hierarchies are excluded from the analysis and the focus on ethnic groups excludes other social divisions such as "gender, class and generation within diasporic groups" from the analysis (Anthias, 2006, pp. 25–26). Anthias criticizes that concepts of hybridity and diaspora tend to emphasize transnational ties "within the community of origin" while falling short of describing transethnic ties with other groups within the same local context (2006, pp. 20, 25).

Fragmentation as another crucial concept of identity theory stresses the partiality, simultaneity and "multiplicity of identities and of positions within any apparent

identity". Theories of fragmentation refer to identity from the perspective of the individual and to collective social categories of difference individuals are placed in (Grossberg, 1996, p. 91). Hall argues that structural transformations in modern society during the late 20th century have fragmented landscapes of class, gender, ethnicity, race and nationality which in turn have caused a shift in our personal identities. The *sense of self* today is a reconceptualization of the subject as rather dislocated and de-centered and identifications are conceived as discursive construction which constitute an unstable "process never completed – always in 'process'" (1992, pp. 274–275, 1996, p. 2). According to Hall (1996, p. 3), a shift away from associating identity as stable and static

> "accepts that identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions" (Hall, 1996, p. 4).

Frameworks concerned with social locations, such as Anthias' concept of translocal positionality that will be discussed in section 2.2.4., analyze intersecting social divisions like race, class, gender, migrant status, etc. and allow for the analysis of positionality along lines of structural advantage and disadvantage. Here the concept of belonging seizes the idea of *fragmented identities*. But other than the concept of fragmentation, belonging also highlights fragmented identities as power-embedded social practice and structural constraints. On the other hand belonging also also takes peoples' agency into considerations. Social processes intersect with the lifeworld of capable social actors who alter circumstances and are not merely subject to a fixed positionality. Belonging is social practice, it is enacted, made and unmade. Accordingly, Albiez et al. (2011, p. 13) argue for a fluid concept of belonging, that defines individuals' belonging as different kinds of social, sensual or material attachments, that are constantly subject to change. Such attachments are experienced in the everyday life and can be observed in individual narratives (Ibid.). As a cumulative analysis of individual attachments, the analysis of individual networks transcends the level of the individual. Referring to de Certeau's (1984) practice theory and theory of space, the authors argue that "belonging is enacted by everyone" by means of

> "using individual strategies and tactics, poetics and rhetoric, feints and ruses to position themselves into the social and material environment and thus, make *belonging* happen, it can be shown how people invent and produce *belonging* with the resources at hand." (Albiez *et al.*, 2011, p. 15)

Stuart Hall (1996, p. 4) theorizes *difference* as including processes of *Othering* as a crucial component of cultural identity. Rather than constituted by a stable self, identifications are made by "the marking of difference and exclusion". *Différance* describes identification as a process that "operates across difference" and "requires what is left outside, its constitutive outside, to consolidate the process" (Hall, 1996, p. 3). According to Grossberg representatives of identity theory have used difference to describe a relation in which the "subordinate term" that is "the subaltern, the marginalized or the other" is a necessary condition for the "dominant term" resulting in "defining the subaltern as pure différance" (1996, p. 90). In comparison to the period of renaissance and enlightenment when identity was conceived as circulating around the self, in late modernity, identity relates the subject to the *Other*. Grossberg states:

> "Identities are always relational and incomplete, in process. Any identity depends upon its difference from, its negation of, some other term, even as the identity of the latter term depends upon its difference from, its negation of, the former." (Grossberg, 1996, p. 89)

Difference or negation from some Other is an asymmetric relation in which the Self has the power of definition (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 89–90). Despite framing identity in terms of difference, Grossberg takes a critical stance on the notion of difference, arguing that the focus on the notion of identity in cultural studies has placed too much theoretical emphasis on identity in terms of difference. For Grossberg difference is relational, not external to identity. He delineates theories of cultural identity operating with a "very strong notion of difference" from those embracing "weak" notions of difference. Theories applying a strong notion of difference ought to be dismissed in favor of *theories of otherness*. In opposition to theories of difference, theories of otherness would embrace the productive character of power in the making of difference by assuming "that difference is itself an historically produced economy, imposed in modern structures of power". Together with identity, difference is a result of power (Grossberg, 1996, pp. 93–94). Beginning "to construct a theory of otherness that is not essentialist" would not only imply that the Other is not fundamentally different from the self, it would also be "a theory of positivity" that permits commonalities among variations of the Other based "on notions of […] belonging" (Grossberg, 1996, p. 97).

By introducing a perspective that neither overemphasizes difference nor sameness, Gingrich interprets Grossberg's perspective of the Other as a notion that also admits the *Other's sameness*. Agreeing with Grossberg, Gingrich argues that cultural identities have primarily been discussed by placing too much attention to difference representing

identity "only in terms of difference". He argues that such a point of view not only essentializes difference but also isolates difference as something that is 'external' to identity (Gingrich, 2006, pp. 4–6). By underlining the relational character between difference and identity Grossberg's argument supports a theory of identity that underlines the mutually constitutive relationship between "sameness and differing, belonging and *othering*, identity/alterity" (Gingrich, 2006, p. 6). Gingrich suggests defining identities at the individual and the collective level

> "as simultaneously including sameness and differing. These identities will be multidimensional and contradictory, and they include power-related, dialogical ascriptions by selves and by others which are processually configurated, enacted and transformed by cognition, language, imagination, emotion, body and […] agency." (2006, p. 6)

With the concept of sameness, the demarcations of (a broadened) notion of identity and the framework of belonging become more and more fluid. Baumann and Gingrich define identity in terms of sameness and belonging while they associate alterity with difference (2006, p. X).

Grossberg's and Gingrich's criticism of concepts of cultural identity as essentializing difference has also been addressed by proponents of belonging. The argument for discarding concepts of cultural identity is that even relational notions of identity and difference that include sameness and participation still assume the a-priori existence of some Other – before any social interaction has taken place. The notion of identity is discarded because identity continues to be imagined and automatically associated with static properties and groups (Brubaker, 2004; Anthias, 2006; Albiez *et al.*, 2011). Anthias argues that regardless of opposing intentions even concepts of multiple and fragmented identities which criticize the unitary notion of identity still carry "elements of essentialization" as the notion of identity is generally assumed as "a possessive property of individuals rather than a process" (2006, pp. 20, 25).

It is mainly the understanding of power relations what delineates belonging from notions of cultural identity. Power relations are conceived as productive, i.e., as social practice: We can argue with de Certeau (1984, pp. 37–38) that *difference* merely becomes a strategy that is "organized by the postulation of power". Here, the notion of difference is incorporated but it is mainly addressed as social construction that is an outcome of productive capacity of power relations and social inequality. The notion of difference is then merely associated with attributions and ascriptions of identity categories. Contrary to presupposing (cultural) difference as concepts of cultural identity do, difference

solely becomes a notion that is deconstructed as strategy employed by powerful social actors who produce stereotyping attributions in selective and intertwined processes of exclusion and inclusion. Assumptions of cultural difference for instance attributions of assumed (ethnic) group membership are not taken as given facts. Like in Said's concept of *Orientalism* (see section 2.1.2.), cultural difference is deconstructed as power embedded social processes of exclusion that draws boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. A collective Self is constructed the very same moment as adscriptions of belonging to some Other, demean and essentialize the latter along lines of difference, as for example in processes of ethnicization and racialization. Below I will discuss with more detail how assumptions of group membership are deconstructed as power embedded practice and discourses that unveil the role of speakers who depend on some Other for purposes of defining the opposing a collective in-group of the Self. Collective practices of contestation, for instance in the form of struggles for recognition also highlight the role of people as agents (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983, pp. 197–200; Anthias, 2006, pp. 26–28; Riegel and Geisen, 2009, p. 7).

2.2.2. Deconstructing Ethnicization and Racialization as Strategies

In his famous essay *Ethnicity without Groups* Brubaker suggests to drop the concept of group as meaningful category of analysis. Brubaker argues that the concept is rarely analyzed since it is often implicitly taken for granted. As a consequence, we not only presume the notion of the group as given but also take the phenomena to which the notion refers to as given (2004, p. 7). Brubaker uses the term '*Groupism*' to describe the

> "tendency to treat ethnic groups, nations, and races as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. I mean the tendency to reify such groups […] as if they were internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes. I mean the tendency to represent the social and cultural world as a multichrome mosaic of monochrome ethnic, racial, or cultural blocs." (2004, p. 8).

He argues that contrary to the concept of social class that is hardly ever used without quotation marks, ethnic groups are still understood as entities and collective actors. Research is still concerned with "struggles 'of' ethnic groups, races and nations" (Brubaker, 2004, pp. 8–9). Instead of using such groups as analytical category, Brubaker suggests to treat such membership as an a posteriori result of analysis. Accordingly, he claims that the inclination to divide the social world into primordial groups "is a key part of what we want to explain, not what we want to explain with; it belongs to our

empirical data, not to our analytical toolkit" (2004). Ethnic, national and racial conflicts should rather be described as ethnicized or ethnically interpreted conflicts and not as conflicts between ethnic groups. Even if such conflicts are represented in such *groupist* terms by participants or people affected, research should refrain from reproducing and reinforcing the same ethnopolitical categories and terminology in an uncritical manner as categories for social analysis (Brubaker, 2004, pp. 9–10). Instead of understanding ethnicity, race and nation as "substantial groups", the former should be conceived in relation to practice as "situated actions, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and contingent events" (Brubaker, 2004, p. 11).

In line with Brubaker's thoughts about ethnicity and groups, Anthias argues for detaching different forms of exclusion and violence from groups. Presuming the existence of ethnic groups leads to essentializing "population categories" along racial or ethnic characteristics (2006, p. 18; see also 2016, p. 174). Anthias (2006, pp. 18–19) shows how such "population categories" that rely on ethnic, racial and national groups also apply for categories of religion and untangles the intersectionality at work in processes of categorization. The racialization of the category 'Muslim' as in the case of anti-Muslim racism shows for instance, that violence and hatred against particular groups of populations or against "the enemy within" operates intersectionally. That is, anti-Muslim racism is not only based on the category Muslim but also on other social categorizations like race, culture, religion and ethnic descent.

Similar to the criticism that addresses the notion of culture as involving hidden assumptions of homogeneous groups, Anthias argues that assuming the existence of groups may result in a determinism constructing persons as uniform in relation to different social categories of inclusion. Accordingly, the talk of ethnic groups results in an overemphasis of the category migrant and conceals the importance of other social divisions and aspects of belonging that are shared interethnically along lines of class, gender and so on (2006, p. 26). Anthias states that

> "the very act of already presupposing the groups per se as useful classificatory instruments as opposed to groups who are positioned in a particular relation to the state (e.g. focusing on Albanians rather than working class or poor migrants who are located in Greek society in a particular way) risks placing too much emphasis on the origin of the migrant and not enough on a shared terrain of disadvantage across country-of-origin-based lines (or those of religion and so on)." (2006, p. 26)

Instead of assuming group membership based on "population categories", Anthias suggests investigating different forms of exclusion that are for instance used by government institutions and actors based on such categories (Anthias, 2006, p. 18).

Similar to Anthias, Tschernokoshewa (1999, pp. 112–116) suggests analyzing ethnicization as attributions that are intertwined with power relations in which the actors who assign membership to groups – based on race or ethnicity – are located in a more powerful position than the people to whom they assign group membership. Because the notions of ethnicity, nation, race and culture underline assumptions of inner homogeneity and purity, Tschernokoshewa assesses them as dangerous constructions.

Tschernokoshewa and Anthias both criticize notions such as ethnicity, race, nation and culture on the grounds of essentializing cultural difference and for falling short of including other dimensions of group membership that constitute belonging and are socially meaningful. But as long as attributions of ethnic difference carry marginalized people's experiences of discrimination, ethnicity remains important as a socially constructed concept, because such experiences would be excluded if the notion were discarded. Moreover those notions still carry "ethnic semantics" of minorities', subcultures' and other marginalized groups' struggle for recognition and equal opportunities (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, pp. 112–116; Anthias, 2006, p. 20). For this reason, Tschernokoshewa (Ibid.) suggests addressing ethnicity not as a given reality, but from a constructivist and actor-centered perspective. By foregrounding an actor-centered perspective, ethnicity can be conceptualized as practice. Accordingly, the paradigm of research will shift the focus from the question of "What is ethnicity?" to the question of "Who does what with ethnicity and why?" Such a perspective would carve out actors' contribution and place the actor at the center of theory-building opening up the possibility "to think the relationship between cognition, communication, social system, institutions and media together from a theoretical perspective." The act of deconstructing ethnicity as made and unmade sheds light on power relations as it unveils the relationship "between macro level and micro level, i.e. between the level of the system, the lifeworld and the actors" (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, p. 116).

Tschernokoshewa observes a paradox concerning attributions of ethnicity in post-modern society in Europe: Today's society in Europe is categorized as functionally differentiated into subsystems (i.e., education, occupation, family, administration, consumption etc.) and individuality is characterized by a mixture of such subsystems

manifested and bundled in a person. Understanding late modernity as a mixture of such roles and subsystems it is a paradox that ethnicity remains unambiguous in the German speaking discourse. Conceiving ethnicity as practice manifested in discourse, she asks:

> "Why is it so difficult to imagine that someone can bundle two or three ethnic identifications in his/her world? Why does the idea dominate that people either have one ethnic affiliation or none? Why is ethnicity defended as the last bastion of uniqueness? Who is interested in this?" (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, p. 118)

Based on her fieldwork with Sorbian-Germans, she concludes that the construction of a static, consistent and substantial Sorbian ethnicity has two implications. Firstly, it serves Sorbians to imagine the past as safe and consistent place that guarantees security in times that are perceived as unsecure due to unemployment, social insecurity and lacking access to education. Secondly, do such rigid conceptions of ethnicity serve the ends of a struggle for power over resources and spheres of influence by those who have the power to define what is or isn't Sorbian (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, pp. 118–119). The construction of Sorbian ethnicity is furthermore intertwined with expectations and attributions of the outside of what produces Sorbian authenticity. By means of constructing a "pure" homogeneous German national culture, ethnic minorities are constructed in an asymmetric power relation as minorities. That is minorities always have to correspond to and interrelate with a majority. While the German majority appropriates a self-image of progress and modernity, ethnicization takes place by means of attributing folkloristic elements not only to the German-Sorbian minority but more generally speaking also to immigrants. The paradox is that these groups who have most actively and autonomously appropriated identities – descendants from minorities and immigrants who balance two cultural fields – are most strongly affected by unidimensional attributions of belonging. Innate ethnicity is no longer part of those people's lifeworlds as they have appropriated identities that represent the pluralization and mixture of lifeworlds that are so typical for late modernity as outlined above. The biographic choices of migrating and living elsewhere and experiencing categorizations of cultural difference instead of choosing roots and safety in their country of origin shows that immigrants and migrants have abandoned notions of innate ethnicity and appropriated a new kind of ethnicity. Institutions and citizens of majority society in the country of migration often do not locate these people in line with their biographies, that is, with respect to what has been acquired or what constitutes part of "the lived". On the contrary, immigrants are exclusively ethnicized. That is, they categorized with

attributions of belonging that allegedly carry innate characteristics. Such attributions take place along premodern or early modern standards, a perspective that Tschernokoshewa designates "feudal" and assesses to be a "symptom of domination" (1999, pp. 120–122). She states:

> "The person who came to Germany from Turkey is only made a 'Turk' here (just as s/he is now regarded as 'the German' in Turkey) and remains a 'Turk' years after his/her departure from Turkey, even in the second and third generations." (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, p. 122)

Despite migrants' and everybody else's wish in late modernity to exercise a right to difference and to belong at the same time, migrants are again and again confronted with the either-or dilemma of belonging (Tschernokoshewa, 1999, p. 123).

Attributions of Belonging as Strategies of Selfing and Othering

Concepts associated with the notion of belonging also deconstruct the speaker's power of definition as strategy that employs stereotypical attributions and ascriptions of belonging. Baumann provides a theoretical framework that helps to deconstruct attributions of belonging along lines of race, ethnicity or religion by shedding light on strategies of making groups by way of producing difference. Identity is intrinsically linked to alterity, that is, self-definitions always depend on defining and being defined by some Other and vice versa. In his theoretical model "grammars of identity/alterity", Baumann diversifies the notions of identity and difference at the collective level, by identifying three strategies of producing identity by means of social inclusion and exclusion as *processes of selfing and othering* (2006, p. 19).

The first grammar, the *grammar of orientalization or reversed mirror imaging* (Baumann, 2006, pp. 19–21) is based on Said's concept of *Orientalism* (Said, 1978). Bauman interprets Orientalism as a strategy of constructing 'us' and 'them' as 'a binary opposition' employed by a Self that invents the Other as contrasting mirror image (see also section 2.1.2.). Said's theory of Orientalism presents a strategy of exclusion that devalues the so-called 'Orient' with alleged negative attributes (such as backwardness, irrationality, and superstition) and thereby constructs an opposing self-associated with positive and opposing attributes (such as secularism, democracy and reason). According to Baumann, Said's concept of Orientalism not only aims at underlining the construction of a self-image as a simple dichotomy between 'us' as 'good' and 'them' as 'evil'. Said's theory also embodies a practice of reversed mirror-imaging, that entails a "self-critique" in the act of representing the 'Orient'. By inventing "positive" attributions to the Other,

which the Self lacks, "in a sense of loss, as in 'we' are 'no longer' so spontaneous, luxuriant or mystical", speakers implicitly express a self-critique of the 'Occident' as calculating, sober and materialistic. The power of definition, however, always remains with the Self and the collective it belongs to.

Bauman (2006, pp. 21–24) designates his second grammar of identity/alterity the *segmentary grammar of contextual fission and fusion*. Based on the model of the lineage system in Evans-Pritchard's ethnography of the Nuer (1940), Baumann suggests a model of alliance and segmentation that theorizes performances of *selfings* and *otherings* among groups "conceived as formally equal" as changing with different contexts that correspond to different classificatory levels of segmentation.

> "The Other may be may foe in a context placed at a lower level of segmentation, but may simultaneously be my ally in a context placed at a higher level of segmentation". (Baumann, 2006, p. 23)

Differences between in-group and out-group that are meaningful at a lower level of segmentation are no longer made at a higher level of segmentation and eliminated because of contextual alliances against a third new out-group. The defines the *grammar of encompassment by hierarchical subsumption* (Baumann, 2006, pp. 25–27; Baumann and Gingrich, 2006, p. X–XI) as "a formal operation" of "selfing by appropriating […] selected kinds of otherness". That is, a particular segment of an outside group is included into the group of the more powerful insiders provided that the included ones assimilate themselves to the in-group. That is, the in-group "tends to minimize the otherness of those it includes". A prerequisite for this grammar of encompassment is that some of the others remain excluded, that is it depends on a third group of outsiders. The grammar of encompassment entails two levels: "The lower level of cognition recognizes difference; the higher level subsumes that which is different under that which is universal". Other than in the second grammar of segmentation, difference is not contextual or situational, but rather a "fiction caused by your own horizon".

With de Certeau, it can be argued that Brubaker, Anthias and Tschernokoshewa and Baumann argue for deconstructing attributions of belonging as strategic practices of ethnicization and racialization "organized by the postulation of power". Against this backdrop, the notions of ethnicity, culture or nation becomes a power-embedded strategical construction that tells us more about those who construct it. Ethnicity relates to social practice as a political and economic strategy employed by more powerful actors to produce an in group via marginalized some Other that is constructed as different.

Ethnicity as social practice becomes an attribution of difference to people who may not identify with such attributions and are met with countering tactics by the addressed people. Tschernokoshewa's question of who does what with ethnicity can be partially answered by deconstructing citizenship discourses. The construction of an ethnonational Self and Other reveals how the ideal citizen is often a racialized construction.

2.2.3. Social Inclusion and Exclusion: Politics of Belonging and Citizenship

As far as the construction of difference is concerned belonging can be analyzed with respect to "processes of inclusion and exclusion in order to distinguish between in-groups and out-groups". As a *concern* belonging becomes an imagined a self-attribution, a sense of belonging or self-definition by claiming membership in a collective. As a *claim*, however belonging is an attribution by others that presumes membership to a collective along ethnic, cultural and national lines. An understanding of belonging as attribution by others and as self-attribution also entails social categorizations such as ethnicity or citizenship either as assigned membership or as "expressions of collective *belongings*" (Albiez *et al.*, 2011, p. 13). Bogner and Rosenthal (2009, p. 14) stress how self-assigned group membership and attributions of group membership by others are highly interdependent processes that stem from the interplay of self-perception and perception by others: "The we-image and the image of the others as well as the social processes of self-attribution and attribution of the others are forever intertwined with one another". The authors underline the perspective of "self-images" and "we-images" concerning ethnic groups or other collectives as interrelated with their images of Others.

Yuval-Davis (2006, pp. 204–207) introduces the *politics of belonging* as processes of boundary making between constructions of *us* and *them* by means of stereotyping attributions and counter reactions by the group designated as 'them'. She differentiates between belonging and the politics of belonging. While the former "is about emotional attachment, about feeling 'at home'", the politics of belonging "comprise of specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging to particular collectivity/ies." (Yuval-Davis, 2016, pp. 269-271). *The politics of belonging* include political projects that produce belonging in order to construct particular collectives. Such boundary drawing is a constructive "act of active and situated imagination" involving decisions about inclusion and exclusion by an in-group, for example, the nation. As mutually constitutive processes in the making of belonging, social inclusion and exclusion occur

within structures of power. As a collective concern, belonging constitutes the making of a collective self that is meaningless without alterity. A collective self depends on some Other or different. In other words, the making of a collective self by means of producing difference represents a power struggle over meaning. Accordingly, nations depend on the construction of some Other e.g., other nations, migrants or refugees that are represented as others for the purpose of self-definition. In this reading of citizenship, membership in a nation-state, that is, nationality becomes only one aspect of citizenship. Unlike assimilationist theories that ignore differences, alternative political theories of citizenship recognize differences between citizens and scrutinize how the state attends to the varying needs of different groups of citizens. The politics of belonging also include participatory citizenship practices including marginalized and excluded groups' struggles for recognition and community activism. Furthermore, do the politics of belonging include practices that contest political boundary making as political agents challenge hegemonic projects that define membership and belonging to a group or nation (Yuval-Davis, 2006, pp. 204–207; 2016, pp. 269-273).

Self-attributions of citizens with a background of migration present a struggle over meaning. Located in a more disadvantaged position, immigrants and their postmigrants' collective narratives of belonging relate to attributions of belonging by majority society and to its nationalist citizenship discourses. I describe some paradigms of citizenship discourses in Germany in section 3.6. Social discourses about exclusion from membership to a state and Yuval-Davis' (2006, 2016) notion of the politics of belonging partially overlap with citizenship concepts. A state's legal and discursive immigration policies and the public discourse vis-à-vis migrants are crucial elements of notions of citizenship which also reveal how states strategically make citizens.

Encounters between people and the state constitute the spaces where the boundaries of citizenship are most contested. With regard to migration those boundaries are drawn between those who are legally and discursively entitled as citizens and those who are not, i.e., denizens, second-class citizens, or non-citizens. Those defined as Others raise questions about definitions of who is included into and excluded from political communities delineating the boundaries of a political community. Membership has been one of the most important aspects in discussions about citizenship concepts (Lazar, 2013, p. 8). Isin's definition of citizenship analytically describes the dialectic nature of political boundary drawing in the construction of Self and Other. According to Isin, citizenship is an identity that can only exist together with alterity. Certain agents define

ideal citizens while differentiating this identity from that of "strangers, outsiders, and aliens" which they strategically refer to as their alterity (2002, pp. 35–36).

Arguing with de Certeau's differentiation between strategies and tactics (see above), the public discourse vis-a-vis migrants can be read as strategy of constructing the migrant as Other by more privileged segments of society endowed with the power to define the normative citizen subject and member of the political community. But political language of exclusion and inclusion is not sufficient for explaining who is defined as citizen and who isn't. In my work I want to understand citizenship not only as top-to-down process that involves a state that reduces immigrants merely to subjects who experience exclusion. With Lazar, I argue that citizenship is not only a "top-to-down process" of subject formation but also a "bottom-up process" of self-making. Migrants respond to strategic narratives of exclusion and make claims to membership and political participation. Concepts highlighting citizenship as practice help to analyze migrants' responses to exclusion and their claims to membership as citizenship practices. Immigrants' claims to membership and struggles of contestation are bottom-up process (Lazar, 2013, pp. 3, 10). That is, German-Turkish women's experiences with being categorized and labelled along lines of ethnicity, religion, class, race and gender that ethnicize and racialize them can be interpreted in the language of citizenship. Citizenship becomes a *strategy* to define the ideal German citizen subject by means of categorization. Such a citizenship discourse is not only a top-to-down process German-Turkish women are merely subjected to. They respond and develop *tactics* and responses to deal with the language of political exclusion. Those dynamics can also be understood with Ong's definition of citizenship as a top-to down and bottom-up processes of *cultural citizenship*. By cultural citizenship she means

> "cultural practices and beliefs produced out of negotiating the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms that establish the criteria of belonging within a national population and territory. Cultural citizenship is a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society." (Ong, 1996a, p. 738)

Citizenship is not only the possession of rights and obligations; an understanding of citizenship as practice with an analytical focus on the process of self-making means to include "the agency of citizens or those who are claiming citizenship or claiming better citizenship" (Lazar, 2013, p. 11). In a similar vein, politics of belonging can be divided into formal and substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship is constituted by the

possession of formal rights, as "based on principles of incorporation in the nation-state" while substantive citizenship is "the substantive distribution of the rights, meanings, institutions, and practices that membership entails to those deemed citizens". Substantive citizenship is the actual ability of citizens to lay claim to these rights (Holston, 2009, p. 7).

Rosaldo's notion of cultural citizenship differs from Ong's proposition insofar as he mainly focuses on bottom-up processes, i.e., the claims minorities make vis-à-vis dominant citizenship discourses (1994, p. 57). He defines cultural citizenship by claims on the right to belong and to be culturally different at the same time. These claims address the dominant group. Rosaldo's notion of cultural difference is not an *a priori* assumption, it is an empirically based conclusion resulting from the analysis of his ethnographic research (Ibid.).

Among others, Yuval-Davis (1997), Stasilus and Bakan (1997) and Goldring (2001) were the first authors who have highlighted the important role of gender in citizenship practices that relate to the state and argued for embedding gender and intersectionality into the analysis of citizenship. If we consider citizenship practices in the light of social divisions, of which gender is one, it is important to expand the notion of transnational citizenship practices to social spheres beyond the state-level. While acknowledging that the nation state is still the central institution that not only protects and guarantees citizens' rights but also serves as the central reference point for those who see themselves as partially or completely excluded from formal citizenship Kron and Noack (2008, p. 7) ague that a practice related notion of citizenship also considers citizenship practices that reach beyond the state-level into other social realms in which rights are negotiated. This also means to dissolve the gendered division of the public and the private sphere. Rights are also negotiated in social formations beyond the state level, for instance in family and kinship, community and neighborhood networks (see also Jelin, 1990; Erel, 2009).

2.2.4. Subjectivities of Belonging and Intersectionality Theory

Concepts of belonging at the subject level address people as agents on the one hand and as embedded with social contexts of inequality on the other hand. Riegel and Geisen argue that belonging is constituted by a *subjective* and biographic component of *affinity and attachment*, that is located in a social and spatial context, in which individuals exert agency by locating and positioning themselves. The other *component* of belonging is

constituted by *social structure* and locates the individual in a social space from where s*he may or may not take action along conditions of social inequality and constraints manifested in intersecting mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (2009, pp. 7, 12). In a similar vein, Bogner and Rosenthal theorize belonging as historically embedded process constituted by individual practice on the one hand and by social boundaries on the other hand while a sense of belonging is constantly subject to change (2009, p. 15).

The subjective or individual dimension of belonging can be observed where people exert agency. This includes a sense of belonging and practices and narratives of belonging and attachment. The social dimension of belonging relating to the subject can be addressed with concepts of social locations along social divisions, locating actors in power hierarchies. The subjective dimension of belonging is affective and experienced or perceived with the senses. Here "attachments of individuals to other individuals, groups and objects, including locations, artifacts and other kinds of media" are portrayed as means of (re)producing *a sense of belonging*. Accordingly, belonging is understood as a result of events, daily life practices and experiences (Albiez *et al.*, 2011, p. 13). Anthias (2016, p. 177, 183) underlines the relevance of the "place-making element of belonging", locates belonging not only socially (see section 2.2.4.) but also spatially. As experience, belonging constitutes the "affective dimension of relating to social bonds and ties". Anthias relates (im)migrants' experiences of belonging to processes of exclusion and inclusion by delineating a sense of identification with a collective from a feeling of belonging to the country of residence as affective dimensions of belonging that do not necessarily overlap:

> "You may identify but not feel that you 'belong' in the sense of being accepted or being a full member. Alternatively, you may feel that you are accepted and 'belong' but may not fully identify, or your allegiances may be split." (Anthias, 2006, pp. 19–20)

The affective quality of belonging is strongly shaped by feelings of not belonging, relating to experiences of exclusion since "belonging becomes activated most strongly when there is a sense of exclusion." That is, the relational nature of belonging" to experiences of exclusion is crucial (Anthias, 2006, p. 21). Practices and experiences of social inclusion present another component of the notion of belonging at the subject-level. Practices and experiences of social inclusion encompass feelings of being acknowledged as a member of a community: To "feel safe within it and to have a stake in the future of such a community of membership" and to "share values, networks and practices." (Ibid.)

The social dimension of belonging that relates to the subject, addresses manifold and overlapping social divisions. Here, the concept of *intersectionality* is crucial because it supports a perspective of belonging that does not fix "categories of difference and belonging" in advance. This has an important implication for empirical research since categories of belonging that may become relevant and dominant in shaping people's practice, are not predetermined beforehand (Bogner and Rosenthal, 2009, p. 15; see also section 2.2.3.). Concepts of belonging that operate with intersectionality have their roots in the theoretical deliberations of black feminists from the U.S. (Crenshaw, 1989; Hill Collins, 2002). In the European context, Anthias and Yuval Davis (1983) and Morokvašić (1987) were the first authors who stressed the importance of *social divisions* along hierarchies of power by contextualizing gender and the articulation of gender with class, race or migrant status. Addressing the positionality within axes of power, social locations include categorizations of people as belonging to a particular group, along divisions of gender, class, race, migrant status, age-group, kinship group, etc. (see also section 2.3.4.). Accordingly, being a

> "man or a woman, black or white, working-class or middle-class, a member of a European or an African nation: these are not just different categories of social location, but categories that also have a certain positionality along an axis of power, higher or lower than other such categories. Such positionalities, however, tend to be different in different historical contexts and are often fluid and contested." (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 199)

While people may only identify with one category of identity, their social location is constituted by "multiple axes of difference". Such "social divisions" intersect, they cannot be reduced to the meaning of one inherent and separable category (Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 200).

As a practice and experience-related notion, Anthias argues for relating the notion of belonging to membership by means of conforming with gender norms of various groups, instead of reducing belonging merely to "ethnic terms". Accordingly, belonging can be related to the "locations and contexts from which belongings are imagined and narrated", i.e. from social positions and divisions, such as gender, class or stage in the life cycle (2006, pp. 21–22). Conceptualizing belonging as a process, Anthias (2006, pp. 27–28) relates belonging to "practices and arrangements" that bring about different social actors' different positionalities that are defined by the interplay of structure and agency. Accordingly, positionality arises out of reading a social position on the one hand and as "a set of practices, actions and meanings: as process" on the other hand. The

concept of *translocational positionality* highlights the complexity of people's positionalities at intersecting social boundaries/divisions, such as social class, gender, ethnicity, culture, and religion as categories of discrimination. By locating lives and identities situationally and at the intersection of social divisions, individuals' social locations are firstly defined by hierarchies and secondly by the boundaries social divisions produce. Positionalities in social locations are characterized by the intersection of such social boundaries or divisions and hierarchies within these boundaries. Location denotes the context in which people express claims and attributions situated in "complex and sifting locales" (Anthias, 2001, pp. 634–635, 2006, p. 27). Elsewhere Anthias broadens the notion of belonging by relating it "to a place in the social and in the geographical sense". Translocational positionality locates the transmigrant not only socially but also spatially in the "translocation" as individuals who migrate engage in "translocal links" between different spaces (2016, pp. 177-178, 183, 186).

While Anthias agrees with black feminists and advocates of identity politics in defining intersectionality as overlapping categories of discrimination that lead to exclusion based on race, gender and so on, she warns from constructing people as members of "fixed and permanent groups which then all enter […] into determining their lives". In order to renounce the assumption of group membership as analytical instrument (see section 2.2.1.) she delineates the concept of translocational positionality from those discussions in feminist theory and identity-politics which link identity theory to intersectionality. Translocational positionality conceptualizes difference and inequality as "a set of processes and not as possessive characteristics of individuals". The concept of belonging detaches the analysis of migration and settlement from notions of culture and identity, foregrounding "social inequality and transformation in relation to intersecting social divisions". As a result, group formation rather comes about by means of "organizing around particular kinds of political struggles than around particular kinds of static identities (Anthias, 2006, p. 28).

Despite the analytical separation of subject-level (i.e., translocational positionality and agency in terms of a sense of belonging and practices of attachment) and society-related aspects of belonging (social divisions, citizenship discourses and related strategies of ethnicization and racialization), it is important to note that belonging at the subject level is interrelated with intersecting social divisions. A sense of belonging is uttered in different social and cultural contexts, from local, regional and national points of reference, in relation to family origin, institutions, peer-groups, religious institutions or

political groups. Such contexts of inclusion are never static but subject to negotiation over criteria of belonging and symbolic membership and exclusion from such contexts (Riegel and Geisen, 2009, pp. 7–8).

This can be illustrated by highlighting different perspectives on ethnicity. Contrary to assumptions of ethnicity, an ethnic sense of belonging remains a possibility as a result of analysis and not as a predetermined assumption: Identifying subjectively as Turkish or German must not but can constitute a strategy of contestation and a struggle for recognition or a (strategic) response vis-à-vis attributions of cultural difference. At the level of society, ethnicization constitutes a hegemonic social practice of exclusion for the sake of self-definition of the majority that holds the power of definition. The relationship to the constructed Other is an unequal one because the latter's minority positions results in the lack of power of definition. At the subject-level, ethnicity can be treated as one social division if we take attributions of ethnicity as one of many social divisions. Ethnicity becomes a process constituted by individual and social practice, an 'ongoing' and 'situated accomplishment', in other words, a result of one of many "interactional process of constructing and maintaining social categories of differentiation or social boundaries" (Bogner and Rosenthal, 2009, p. 15).

2.3. TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION THEORY

This section will firstly carve out the main postulations of transnational migration theory in the light of established migration frameworks' shortcomings. In a further step, concepts of transnationalism will be divided into two theoretical currents: Concepts on transnational migration which underline the local situatedness and the structural constraints of actors or groups. And concepts which focus on different kinds of transnational ties and are mainly concerned with social and spatial practice. In a third step, I will address a theoretical lens that benefits from both perspectives as it bridges contextual and gendered positionalities with individual agency. This perspective is eligible for highlighting different levels of transnationalism along lines of privilege and disadvantage, shedding light on transnational practices beyond border-crossing mobility. Lastly, this section will discuss how the analysis of German-Turkish women's border-crossing mobility and their border-crossing practices can benefit from these concepts.

2.3.1. Emergence and Main Postulations

Transnationalism emerged as a theoretical framework because the analytical language and models explaining international migration mainly regarded one society, namely the country of migration. Accordingly, such frameworks mainly addressed the integration or assimilation of migrants (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, p. 4). Glick Schiller et al. observed that their empirical findings of different research projects on international migration could not be captured with established migration theories which explained migration, for example, push-pull models or micro and macro-economic models. In addition to those models, analytical terms such as immigration or immigrant also reflected a focus on migrants' adaptation to the places of settlement and were not sufficient for explaining the observations Glick Schiller and her colleagues had made in the field. Those models and their conceptual language did not consider connections between the country of migration and the country of origin. Migration was conceived as consequence of 'unrelated forces' in two separate societies (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992, p. 9).

The 'push-pull model' underlines individual migration decisions as the result of a cost-benefit calculation weighing up negative factors (push factors) in the country of origin with positive factors (pull factors)[11] in the country of destination (Lee, 1966, pp. 49–52). The push-pull-model and micro-economic models explaining migration were based on the utilitarian axiom of neoclassical economics. Migrants were represented as individual and rational actors, who maximized their utility by migrating from poor 'underdeveloped' regions to 'civilized' and developed cities or countries (Zelinsky, 1971; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). Macro-economic models of migration assumed labor migrants' mobility as based on the factor-price differentials: Accordingly, countries with labor markets providing more occupational opportunities and higher wages attract migrants from countries with labor markets providing of less occupational opportunities. After wage rate differentials reach an equilibrium of labor supply and demand, labor migration ends (Massey *et al.*, 1998, p. 19).

By following the premise of modernization theory, these frameworks are based on a thesis of modernization assuming a gradual development from a continuum of

[11] Negative factors may consist of political oppression, poverty and lacking economic opportunities while positive factors may consist of opportunities for education, employment or higher living standards and political freedom (O'Reilly, 2015, p. 26).

‘underdeveloped’ societies towards an ideal of Western industrial societies. Migrants are represented as progressive individuals who impact the development in their ‘traditional’ countries of origin. Kearney criticizes that the implicit assumptions of the push-pull model assume a dualism between modernity and tradition, development and underdevelopment, city and countryside. Within this perspective, relations between migrants and receiving countries are conceived as one-sided and linear progress of development in which the city develops the countryside and modernity develops tradition (Kearney, 1986, pp. 336–338). Moreover, these models neglected personal, family-related and socio-cultural factors of migration and they lacked an analysis of colonial histories, economic power disparities and obstacles to international migration (King, 2012, p. 14).

The advocates of transnationalism also found approaches of world systems theory which addressed topics of global social inequality as insufficient for explaining their empirical observations on migration because individual motives and cultural aspects shaping migration could not be captured (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, pp. 11–13). Migration theories stemming from world systems theory and dependency theory were based on a Marxist analysis of the capitalist global economy and colonialism. Corresponding approaches explaining international migration mainly stressed a macro perspective on labor explaining the disparities of global economic development as an outcome of global inequality (Kearney, 1986; Armbruster, 2009).

World systems theory (Wallerstein, 1976) explains unequal power relations between economically developed countries of the center and underdeveloped countries of the periphery as a result of colonial exploitation. Related models on international migration analyze migratory movements as triggered by a demand driven global labor market. Migrants are hired in countries or cities of the center, often working in low-income jobs in the service sector while natives work in more privileged jobs. Due to a variety of structural disadvantages migrants who come from economically less developed countries have no bargaining power (Piore, 1981; Sassen, 1991).

Neoclassical models and models stemming from world systems theory were both criticized for excluding motivations and actions of migrants and group dynamics (Castles and Miller, 2009, p. 26). On the contrary to these grand narratives and rather unidirectional theoretical perspectives on migration, Nina Glick Schiller and associates concluded from their analysis of ethnographic observations that migrants from Haiti,

the Philippines and the Eastern Caribbean region living in New York maintained multidirectional types of relations not only in New York but also in their countries of origin: The authors observed that the establishment of home town associations in New York City served the organization and funding of projects in migrants' home countries (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992, p. 2). With the purpose of sustaining thei livelihood, families from Grenada and St. Vincent in New York maintained kinship networks by connecting households in two different countries (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1995, p. 54). While the authors acknowledged that the demand for migration is tied to the capitalist world economy, they maintained that theories of migration derived from the world systems theory, mainly reduced migrants and causes of migration to labor, falling short of considering migrants as social and political actors whose ethnic and national identities shape their perception and social practice (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, pp. 11–13).

The concept of transnationalism sought to contribute with a new theoretical perspective by means of including the country of origin and the country of residence into the analysis of migration. Rouse (1991) had already applied the notion of "transnational migrant circuit" to explain how residents of the town of Aguililla in Michoacán and Mexican residents in Redwood City, California were connected to one community:

> "Through the continuous circulation of people, money, goods and information, the various settlements have become so closely woven together that, in an important sense they have come to constitute a single community spread across a variety of sites." (Rouse, 1991, p. 15)

Their senses of belonging and organization patterns illustrated that migrants build and sustain "multi stranded social relations" in two societies simultaneously and neither strive for complete assimilation in the country of settlement nor for social and cultural isolation and demarcation. Their social practices demonstrate that they participate in social, economic, and political relations which extend national borders and combine the country of migration and origin into one social field which transcends geographical, cultural and political boundaries (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, pp. 3–8; 23). Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992, pp. 1–2) define transnationalism

> "as the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated 'transmigrants.' Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations - familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span

> borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously."

A bias in migration research towards assimilation, integration and incorporation into the country of settlement not only ignored migrants' sustained home ties. A consequence of the earlier models' focus on assimilation was the representation of migrant lives and identities as 'uprooted' and exposed to rupture, resulting in the victimization of migrants as "standing between cultures" (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). Glick Schiller and her colleagues underlined that migrant identity just like different kinds of transnational ties are multi-directional and border-crossing, because migrants identify with their place of residence and with their place of origin:

> "While some migrants identify more with one society than the other, the majority seem to maintain several identities that link them simultaneously to more than one nation." (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992, p. 11)

Contrary to victimizing migrants as uprooted, the concept of transnationalism aimed at foregrounding migrants' agency by considering their everyday life social practices (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992, pp. 9–17, 1995, p. 52).

Wolbert, who conducted participant observation in the late 1980s among female Turkey-origin labor migrants who returned to Turkey was one of the first researchers who criticized the one-sided lens of migration research in Germany. She noted that the representation of Turkey-origin return migrants tended to underline ruptures in biographies and associated return migration with problems of reintegration to Turkish society (1995, pp. 16–20). Similar to the advocates of transnationalism, Wolbert criticized that research about return migration tended to address economic impacts on the country of origin, and consequently defined successful return in terms of successful business formation in Turkey or integration into the labor market. Individual motives were isolated or reduced to labor related causes such as job satisfaction or job insecurity. Although actual return decisions were traced back to clusters of different motives, the transformative process of remigration including contrasting and overlapping motives of structural and personal nature was not considered (1995, pp. 16–21). Contrary to these rather unidirectional approaches to migration which interpreted processes of adaptation and readaptation as cultural conflict, Wolbert concluded that her interlocutors lived a life in which they permanently crossed national borders as long as they had access to

rights of residence in Germany. They "have formed affiliations which make the nation-state seem obsolete" (1995, p. 177). Long before concepts of transnationalism gained popularity academia in Germany, Wolbert underlined the border-crossing interconnectedness of migrant women, concluding that their return migration could not be described appropriately with established analytical tools. Analyzing migration with categories of ethnicity and territoriality, mostly regarded one society only. She concluded from her results that

> "[T]he practice of commuting thus shows that the problem of remigration does not arise from the cultural difference between returnees and their compatriots in Turkey and cannot be grasped with the formula of 'returning to a foreign land'. The return is not characterized by being different or being in an unknown place, but by changes that cannot be comprehended with the categories of ethnicity and territoriality. Instead of starting from the question of ethnicity and cultural identity of migrants, the investigation of migration processes opens up an access to the cultural practice of migrants." (Wolbert, 1995, p. 178)

Transnational theory also placed importance on state actors. In order to define states' practices of incorporating their expatriate citizens, Basch and her colleagues introduced the notion of the *deterritorialization* (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994). By deterritorialization they aimed at describing politicians' vested interest in engaging with diaspora communities. Quoting Haiti's former president Aristide's statements as an example. Aristide referred to Haitians abroad as the tenth department of Haiti. Another example was the impact, Haitian migrants in New York City had on general election results in Haiti (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, pp. 2, 178). Another early example for *deterritorialized* state practices was given by Mahler (1998) who showed that the El Salvadorian state provided free legal assistance to political refugees who aimed to settle in the United States although these refugees had fled that very regime. The government's rationale behind this was its interest in remittances refugees sent back to El Salvador.

Beyond the incorporation of expatriate citizens living abroad by governments, the authors relate the notion of *deterritorialization* to migrants' imagined collective identifications with their country of origin: "a people may be anywhere in the world and still not live outside the state" (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, p. 293). Consequently, people may imagine themselves as nation outside of their homeland's territory. Before that, Anderson (1991) had underlined the constructive nature of nations as imagined communities. The notion of deterritorialization goes back to Appadurai

(1990, 2008) who used it to describe the dissolution of ties between a territory and a cultural community in the course of globalization while he stressed the role of the imagination as crucial for observing experiences of people who are no longer connected to localities because they migrate or imagine to do so (see chapter 2.3.4.).

Pries (2001, p. 18) holds that Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc's (1994) analytical language of "deterritorialized space" or "perceived deterritorialized nation states" implies a notion of transnational space as tied to the nation state. Therefore, he interprets their proposition as not having completely abandoned a notion of space as "national container society" according to which geographic spaces overlap with homogeneous "essentialized collectives". As I see it, Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc's (1994) follow a conceptual understanding of space that includes cognitive processes such as perception and imagination into the making of space. That is, a reference to a container notion of space entailing the nation may be the result of people's imagination. The authors do not imply that a container notion of space exists before people imagine it. For Glick Schiller and colleagues, social formations across space do not need to be locally situated (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1992). Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc's (1994) transnational social fields are built under reference to two societies and result in a space that is not independent from a place but simultaneously exceeds mere territoriality because migrant networks, everyday life practices, migrant ties, concerns, imagination and perception can take multi directional and border crossing (e.g. transnational) forms. Migrants act in a space in which they address multiple local directions and in doing so they construct a space their own in comparison to people without migration experiences. Accordingly, community, social formations or networks are a result of different kinds of border-crossing practices and cognitive processes such as perception and imagination.

Because the analytical language of the "deterritorialized nation state" would evoke an image of a state without borders, Glick Schiller and Fouron replaced it with the notion of "transborder state" to refer to the ways, nation sates acknowledge their citizens' settlement abroad and simultaneously act transnationally by including them into the national community by relating to them as members of the nation. While nationalism binds people to a specific territory, Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001, pp. 18–23) defined *long-distance nationalism* as a way of binding transmigrants, their descendants and those who stay in their home countries together as "transborder citizenry". By long-distance nationalism, the authors' understand the political claims people make for

membership in a political community which crosses national borders and the political-institutional landscape that allows migrants to maintain links with their home countries.

Applying this language to Turkey-origin labor migrants and postmigrants, politicians and the Turkish state have in fact maintained political links with expatriate citizens and addressed them with ‘transborder’ or ‘deterritorialized’ policies. Since Germany is the home of the highest number of Turkey-origin immigrants in Europe, such policies have mainly maintained informal and formal political ties with German-Turkish people. Although such political links are not new, the Turkish government under the AKP has intensified links with Turkish citizens in several respects: Politicians of the AKP have firstly sought to intensify links with Sunni Turkey-origin immigrants. Secondly, they have intensified institutional ties with Turkey-origin expatriates and their descendants and thirdly addressed them as potential voters (see section 3.6.).

Some proponents of transnationalism argue that concepts of transnationalism are a result of globalization and processes caused by advancements in transport and communication technology and therefore provide a new analytic lens for a new phenomenon and experience. Accordingly, Glick Schiller and her colleagues argue that contemporary transnational ties “differ in their intensity and significance from the home ties maintained by past migrants”. Transnational ties are not a result of technological progress, but their maintenance and density is facilitated and reinforced by technological progress in communication and transportation technology. The simultaneous involvement in two or more countries is understood as an unprecedented new technological possibility (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton, 1995, p. 52). Other scholars argue that transnationalism provides a new perspective on the multi-directional forms migration trajectories and lifestyles can take. Vertovec argues that this perspective on migration was a blind spot in previous migration theory but that transnational practices have existed long before the concept was introduced. Transnationalism understood in the terms of long-distance networks, he states, even “preceded 'the nation'”. In the age of more efficient and new information and transportation technology, the novelty is, that transnational social formations are more intensive and work in “real time” worldwide (2009, p. 3). Since previous research on international migration mostly focused on the ways migrants adapted to their destination countries, the “transnational turn” also contributed to a new historical analysis in the history of international migration (Vertovec, 2009, p. 13).

One of the criticism addressing migration in general and concepts of transnationalism in particular raised by feminist migration scholars is that gender has been "regularly sidelined" (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 812). Most research of the 20th century until the early 1970s marginalized women and children as passive 'companions' or followers of men (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 814). Distinctions between 'autonomous' migration and family migration supported the assumption that female migration trajectories are comparable to those of male migrants or that women are "not real protagonists". Micro- and macro-economic models of migration based on rational choice theory, assumed the typical migrant to be a rational *homo economicus*. Such a 'young economically motivated male' represented all migrants. Likewise, gender was excluded from the world systems approach. Feminist migration scholars were the first ones questioning the stereotypical representation of women as dependents and the gender blindness of migration research (Morokvašić, 2015, pp. 356–358). Hondagneu-Sotelo was the first feminist scholar who employed gender as a theoretical concept in the study of migration asking how gender affects migration and settlement experiences and decisions (1994). Nevertheless, gender was marginalized during the early years transnational perspectives on migration gained foothold. Meanwhile other "socially stratifying" categories such as race, ethnicity, and nation were addressed more prominently (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006). Only later when research embedded individual migrants within social and kinship networks and migrant organizations, "social context and social forces along with the economic ones" were taken into account. Scholarship became "more sensitive to causes underlying women as agents of migrations, as well as to all those that neither corresponded to the male *homo economicus* profile nor fitted the heterosexual normative frame" (Morokvašić, 2015, pp. 358–359). A further criticism is that concepts of transnationalism may become an "empty vessel" because units of analysis are not defined with caution. For instance, in the interchangeable use of the question *how* transnational ties emerge – for instance by means of a "transnational circuit" or a "transnational social network" – with forms of social organization like "transnational communities" or "binational societies" that emerge from transnational practices (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, pp. 25–27).

Faist (2000) approaches transnational migration from both of these angles by discussing an actor centered theoretical perspective of a "the transnational space" on the one hand and a concept "transnational social capital" in which he puts forward the importance of different kinds of transnational ties and networks on the other hand. I would argue that

concepts of transnationalism and migration can be divided into two main currents: Into concepts that tend to emphasize local situatedness, structure and conditionality and are mainly concerned with different kinds of *actors or groups*, such as individuals, economic actors, kinship networks, communities, states, government institutions or international organizations. And into concepts that tend to emphasize social and spatial practice while prioritizing different kinds of transnational *ties* of which group formation can but must not be a result. While the first perspective is more concerned with structure the second one is more inclined to stress agency. In the following passages, some theoretical insights of both perspectives will be summarized and a third theoretical lens will be introduced, which not only reconciles structural constrains and agency but also theorizes gender and intersecting social divisions in transnational space.

2.3.2. Contextualizing Migration: From Actors to Localities of Transnationalism

By introducing the notion of the *trans-locality*, Guarnizo and Smith argue that it is essential to locally ground research on transnationalism within nations. Receiving states exercise coercive power within their borders that presents a "material force" which should be included into the analysis of migration. A trans-locality would constitute a transnational social space built by collectives for example "local households, kin networks, elite fractions, and other emergent local formations" who "actively pursue transnational migration." The authors oppose such collectives' "transnationalism from below" to "transnationalism from above" defined by multilateral institutions. Guarnizo and Smith argue for a double grounding concerning transnational networks, policies and practices of "territorially-based sending and receiving local and national states and communities" (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, p. 10).

Guarnizo and Smith criticize that cultural studies and social sciences overemphasize "subversive popular 'resistance from below'" when operating with concepts of transnationalism while falling short of analyzing social power asymmetries and local contexts (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, pp. 4–5). Foregrounding agency by highlighting imagination and practices of deterritorialization would ignore the locality, and depict migrants as "boundless" and transnationalism as "liberatory process" (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, p. 11). As a consequence, the conditions of migrants' transnational practices in the light of opportunities and constraints would be disregarded. Ignoring the coercive force states exercise over migrants, as far as local policies are concerned, opportunities and constraints, the notion of deterritorialization, would detach migrants

from local contexts as “free floating people” and not account for the fact that boundaries exist and limit people’s mobility. Furthermore, such a mode of using concepts of transnationalism would detach transnational practices as abstractly located between national territories (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, p. 11).

Contextualization on the contrary means to ground transnational migration “trans-locally” by shedding light on the dialectics of migrants’ structural constraints on the one hand and their agency on the other hand, that is, the “dialectic of domination and resistance”. The locality becomes essential for a contextualization of migrant transnationalism within structural hierarchies of race, class and gender. As a consequence, the authors argue that transnational practices need to be embedded into asymmetries and inequalities, based on forms of domination and oppression, such as “racism, sexism, class conflict, uneven development” that the authors assess to be neglected in research on transnationalism (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, p. 14). Moreover, a contextualization would also entail a historicization of biographies, networks and ties in the light of adaptation to changing structural circumstances, for instance in the labor market or with regard to state policies (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, pp. 15, 24). In a similar vein, Mahler argues for a contextualization that exceeds background information on the group studied. Contextualizing individual cases with culturally constructed key characteristics such as gender, class, age/generation, regional origin, mobility, race and ethnicity and related identities sheds light on differing circumstances and varying levels of access to opportunity in the country of origin and settlement resulting in different transnational practices (Mahler, 1998, pp. 82–87).

Vertovec suggests to borrow the concept of “embeddedness” from social network terminology. An analysis of actors’ embeddedness into different kinds of networks and their actions’ “social situatedness” would zoom out from the level of individual motives and also foreground the conditionality of practices against the backdrop of unequal access to different spheres of networks “from household to international arena” (2009, pp. 37–38).

Like Guarnizo and Smith (1998), Pries (2001, p. 18) pays attention to not detaching transnational social spaces from local situatedness, territoriality and the geographic space. Pries argues for a notion of transnational social space that is connected to the geographic space, understanding transnational social spaces as connecting geographic spaces. A territorial reality is not given but perceived in terms of “geographically

coherent and sovereign politico-cultural entities" (Pries, 2001, p. 3). The emphasis on territoriality leads to an understanding of transnational social spaces primarily as locally grounded. According to Pries, transnational social spaces are "pluri-local social entities" consisting of "social practices, artifacts and symbols" which encompass different geographic spaces in at least two nation-states without constituting a new 'deterritorialized' nation-state or being the prolongation of nation-states (Pries, 2001, pp. 18, 29). Transnational social spaces are:

> "pluri-local frames of reference which structure everyday practices, social positions, biographical employment projects, and human identities, and simultaneously exist above and beyond the social contexts of national societies." (Pries, 2001, p. 23)

Such "pluri-local" spaces must be composed of "relatively dense and durable configurations of social practices, systems of symbols and artifacts" (Pries, 2001, p. 5). In comparison to other social spaces, transnational social spaces are attributed with a relatively high density and stability (Pries, 2001, p. 24). Likewise, Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt argue that a precondition to study transnational phenomena should be that observed practices are stable and long term based and not "fleeting or exceptional". Another precondition for studying transnational migration should revolve around a significant number of people including "migrants and their home country counterparts" (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, 1999, pp. 218–219).

2.3.3. Migrant Practice: Sustaining Social and Symbolic Ties

Other theoretical perspectives of transnationalism employ a network perspective by stressing the importance of different kinds of ties, connections, transactions and networks that span borders. Al-Ali and Koser (2002, pp. 5–6) underline the importance of transnational practices. Based on their empirical findings the authors suggest a distinction between motivations for migration on the one hand and driving forces or incentives for transnational practices on the other hand. Migration motives are concrete mobility drivers and may include individual "strategies of survival in the context of war, conflict or natural disasters, political motivations, economic factors, or opportunities in terms of education and work". Transnational practices include activities of sustaining ties to the country of origin. They can be connected to a variety of factors and motivations and yet lead to the same outcome: For instance, ties to the homeland can be sustained because of "national sentiments, political motivations and in search of prestige and increased status". The authors argue that transnational practices, by no means can

only be reduced to empowerment and liberation, because “transnational activities and engagements are more a result of social pressure, unwelcome family responsibilities or even feelings of guilt” (Al-Ali and Koser, 2002, pp. 5–6).

Vertovec (2009, p. 1) broadly defines transnationalism as “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation states”. The notion of “transnational social formations” is broad enough to divide the different perspectives of transnationalism into a “social morphology”, “a type of consciousness”, “a mode of cultural reproduction, an avenue of capital, as a site of political engagement, and as a reconstruction of ‘place’ or locality” (Ibid). Migrant transnationalism becomes a subcategory within these formations “referring to a range of practices and institutions linking migrants, people and organizations in their homelands or elsewhere in a diaspora.” (Vertovec, 2009, p. 13). Vertovec stresses the importance of border-crossing practices and interactions necessary to maintain different kinds of transnational ties. Accordingly, he argues that the study of transnational migration can benefit from a “cross-fertilization” in borrowing terms and concepts from network analysis. Networks provide “opportunities and constraints” for taking action (2009, pp. 30–36). Transcending a micro-level analysis of individual cases, a network related terminology supports a more abstract level of analysis by paying attention to patterns and regularities of social relationships and network structures. Networks can be described according to their size and density, their intersection with other networks, or with respect to their clusters. Relational ties within networks can be described according to strength, durability, reachability/compactness and frequency of contact. The content of network ties may include “economic exchange or assistance, kinship obligation, religious cooperation, friendship and gossip.” (Vertovec, 2009, p. 34) Network analysis terminology supports the steps of data collection, description and analysis. While a network terminology may prevent the assumption of communities where no such communities exist, the complete application of network analysis with procedures of mathematical analysis would conceal the qualitative nature of relationships and individual agency of actors (Vertovec, 2009, pp. 35–36).

One of the most comprehensive theoretical contributions on migrant transnationalism also employs a network terminology. Faist’s (2000, pp. 96–142) theoretical elaboration of the transnational social space and transnational social capital bridges the division between concepts that prioritize local contextualization and practice-related approaches: He merges migrants’ process-related structural constraints with a practice-oriented

network perspective that stresses different types of transnational ties and practices. By *social capital*, Faist understands network ties that vary according to strength, content, and density. Social capital influences the selection of potential migrants, their diffusion throughout migrant networks and triggers chain migration. Moreover, social capital connects networks, groups and organizations within migrant systems and influences processes of adaptation and readaptation in countries of origin and countries of migration (Faist, 2000, pp. 121–122).

Faist differentiates between *social* and *symbolic* network ties. The strength of *social ties* depends on the intensity of interactions and transactions between members of a network, for instance an interest group, a communal organization, households, kinship groups or communal organizations. While strong social ties involve social obligations and expectations, weak social ties are rather indirect and more superficial (Faist, 2000, p. 120). *Symbolic ties* belong to the realm of perception and imagination and address groups or collectives. Faist (2000, p. 102) associates the meaning of symbolic ties with Benedict Anderson's definition of nations. Anderson (1991) highlighted the constructive character of nations as imagined communities because their members share an image of "communion" although they are not familiar with one another (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). In a similar manner, Faist conceives symbolic ties as based on "perceived bonds" among members of a religion, a language group, an ethnic group or a national group, to which "participants attach shared meanings, memories, future expectations, and representations" (2000, p. 102).

Social capital *as social and symbolic ties* presents a collective resource that enables cooperation between groups and integration processes. Social and symbolic ties are maintained or operated by means of three mechanisms: *Obligations*, *reciprocity* and *solidarity*. Primarily a local resource occurring in specific locations and in a defined time frame, social and symbolic ties are a result of continued and close interaction between specific members of the place of origin that are based on reciprocity and solidarity directed at family members and kinship groups (Faist, 2000, pp. 105–107). While solidarity among family members or within kinship groups can result in the migration of a pioneer migrant's family, it is not sufficient for causing a high number of people to emigrate or for triggering chain migration patterns (Faist, 2000, p. 110).

So, how does social capital become transnational? According to Faist, *transnational social spaces* develop in two stages that are strongly related to the transnationalization

of social capital. Transnational social spaces are an outcome of different forms of south-north migration and initially planned to be limited to the first generation of migrants. Social capital becomes only transnational by "macro-structural" triggers that initiate migration flows. Triggers for different kinds of transnational migratory movements are wars or "pre-migration linkages" between the sending and the receiving country, such as labor recruitment agreements, military agreements, post-colonial ties, trade, foreign investment or other institutional, political and cultural ties (Faist, 2000, p. 69).

After social capital is set into motion by such triggers, larger groups of people start migrating because social and symbolic ties to a pioneer migrant are spread throughout a community. Pioneer migrants, brokers and agents play an important role in initiating the formation of migration networks and processes of perpetual mobility (Faist, 2000, pp. 120–124). Castles and Miller also underline the important role of intermediaries like travel and housing agents, labor recruiters, brokers, interpreters, lawyers and human smugglers who are powerful enough to override states migration policies (2009, pp. 28, 114).

After migrants or refugees have become pioneer migrants and have established networks with their home countries, which transcend family networks, social capital becomes transnational. At that stage, return migration to the county of origin occurs and chain migration has been initiated (Faist, 2000, p. 201). In a second stage, after chain migration has taken place, transnational social spaces transcend the circular migration trajectories of the first generation and "develop a life of their own". Members of the second and third generation continue transnational ties and develop new forms of border-crossing links (Faist, 2000, pp. 201–202). Given that ties to pioneer migrants exceed the family-level and have spread throughout the community, the transformation of social capital from a local asset into a *transnational transmission belt* is set into motion. Once social capital has become transnational, it becomes a crucial determinant for further chain and mass migration (Faist, 2000, pp. 120–124).

Faist defines different kinds of *transnational networ*ks that emerge and shape transnational spaces after the transnationalization of social capital: *Transnational kinship groups*, *transnational circuits* and *transnational communities*. These networks are organized by the principles of obligation, reciprocity and solidarity, the same principles that organize social capital (pp. 202–211). *Transnational kinship groups* are distributed across two households in two different states. Close relatives are connected

through social ties between stayers and first-generation migrants and refugees. Organized by the principle of reciprocity, remittances flow back to relatives in the home country, where the latter manage domestic affairs (Faist, 2000, pp. 202–206).

Faist defines *transnational circuits* as economic transnational social space organized by the principle of exchange or "institutional reciprocity". Transnational circuits are characterized by the circulation of goods, people and information spanning national borders. Involving mutual obligations and expectations of involved actors those economic networks require beneficial conditions for the investment of capital. Although transnational entrepreneurs may initially benefit from social and symbolic ties with friends and their kin, the flourishing of economic activities in transnational circuits does not depend on these ties (Faist, 2000, pp. 206–207, 213). *Transnational communities* are characterized by "strong social and symbolic ties over time and space", that is by a high degree of social cohesion which connects members of networks and circuits in two countries. In the form of village communities or diaspora communities located in the home country and the country of settlement, transnational communities transcend "narrow kinship systems" (Faist, 2000, pp. 208–209).

Based on his fieldwork, Jurgens (2001) argues, that assuming frequent physical border crossing mobility for all groups of migrants is problematic. In opposition to migrants in the US and Mexico who have been mobile and flexible, the Turkish-German migration experience is a different one since Turkey-origin people living in Germany

> "generally do not and have not moved, in pendulum-like fashion, back and forth between work opportunities in multiple countries, as has been the case for some of their Mexican counterparts. Although 'return' trips to Turkey in various forms do occur, the everyday lives of most migrants are, by now, firmly established in Germany." (Jurgens, 2001, p. 94)

Jurgens argues that conceptualizations of transnational space which depend on frequent border-crossing movements and simultaneous local embedment in at least two societies fall short of capturing how non mobile immigrants experience transnationalism. Most Turkish migrants living in Germany are not simultaneously integrated members of both societies. In comparison to Mexican migrants' mobility trajectories between the USA and Mexico, such flexible mobility between Germany and Turkey was constrained by "highly regulated work relations and restrictive visa regulations" (Jurgens, 2001, p. 98).

To uncover the transnational experience of second and third generation German-Turkish people who stay put, Jurgens suggests to differentiate between *concrete* and *imagined transnational ties*. Concrete ties are tangible or particularistic transnational ties

connecting different kinds of multi-local relationships of economic, political, social, marriage, kinship and friendship-related nature (Jurgens, 2001, p. 99). Imagined ties are "diffuse", relating to "a sense of multi-local belonging and identification" and are established through media consumption and art (Jurgens, 2001, pp. 94, 107). Despite the fact, that concrete multi-local relationships are still maintained, the imagination of a Turkish-German social space has gradually gained more significance than concrete transnational ties. Especially in the case of second and third generation Turkish-German people, relations to localities in Turkey and to the Turkish nation-state are rather imagined than concrete. For the second and third generation, Turkey "remains a multi-stranded, practical and imaginary point of reference". The author carefully doubts if these mainly "imagined ties and identifications" are durable and will continue for future generations (Jurgens, 2001, pp. 99–100).

It can be concluded that an analysis of transnational ties smooths the way for interconnecting actors at both ends of a transnational relation without determining membership in a group or network beforehand. Accordingly, a person's involvement in different kinds of networks, groups or communities is a result of analyzing transnational ties, not a prerequisite. Moreover, the consideration of transnational ties allows for a more practice related approach, as the manifold actions transmigrants undertake to maintain those ties can be underlined. Finally, the emphasis on transnational ties also includes how individuals who are not mobile maintain "symbolic" or "imagined" border crossing ties and develop and a multilocal sense of belonging by means of engaging in different kinds of everyday life practices such as media consumption, arts or by imagining and thinking of the present past and future.

2.3.4. Levelling Context and Practice at Intersecting Social Divisions

For highlighting different forms of German-Turkish women's transnational mobility and ties in transnational space, it is necessary to level transnational mobility and transnational practices along opportunities and constraints in transnational space. Approaches combining transnationalism with the intersectionalities of gender, race, class, age, migrant status etc. help to point out different levels of transnational mobility, practices and ties in the light of social structural constraints and individual agency.

Pessar and Mahler (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006) extend the theoretical discussion on transnationalism with an intersectional perspective on gender. The authors conceptualize gender as practice related process on the one hand and as

embedded in institutions on the other hand. As practice-related process, that is "as one of the several ways humans create and perpetuate social differences" gender theory can deconstruct assumptions that naturalize gendered distinctions:

> "People do 'gender work'; through gendered practices and discourses they reproduce and/or contest hierarchies of power and privilege. Conceptualizing gender as process yields a more praxis-oriented perspective wherein gender identities, relations and ideologies are fluid, not fixed."(Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 813)

In addition, the authors situate gender as embedded with institutional structures. Here, gender is conceptualized as a structure of social relationships on various levels, include family, education, economy and state, that manage power beyond the level of the individual by means of constructing categories of gender (Ibid.). Pessar and Mahler introduce a conceptual framework on how gender can be examined in transnational spaces. Designated as *Gendered Geographies of Power* their framework consists of three features: *geographic scales*, *social locations* and *power geometries* (2003, pp. 812–813).

Gender operates transnationally on *geographic scales*, namely multiple spatial and social scales, such as body, family or state. Gender relations and ideologies are "reaffirmed and reconfigured" within and among spatial and social scales (Pessar and Mahler, 813-815). Referring to the state as geographic scale, Pessar and Mahler ask whether migration and transnational activities tend to reinforce prevailing gender ideologies, gender norms and gender relations. Or whether migration results in the transformation of gender ideology in which hegemonic notions of gender are questioned by competing understandings of gendered lives that lead to new ideas of gender across transnational spaces. As the empirical evidence suggests, gains for women or men may be uneven and contradictory. Since the state has been prioritized in studies on transnational migration and gender has been sidelined, the Pessar and Mahler suggest combining state and gender as units of analysis to close gaps in transnational migration research.

The authors present a review on research concerned with the role of the state across "multiple geographic scales", for instance by showing how constrained access to power and social capital in the country of origin and access to political rights and entitlements within institutions in the country of migration has consequences on men's and women's preferences about long-term settlement and return migration. Empirical evidence also indicates that victims of abuse by state actors of the home country become empowered

by “alternative, globalized gender ideology” promoted by international organizations. Transnationalism as a theoretical framework can explore how state policies in line with or against “international human rights and feminist discourses and organizations” shape migrants’ experiences across geographic scales (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, pp. 819–821).

The second component of the model, *social locations*, positions people within power hierarchies in the light of “socially stratifying factors” and “multiple dimensions of identity” such as spatial, political, economic, historical and kinship-based factors. Such power hierarchies exist independent from the people who can be located within them. People’s differing social locations are grouped along an axis of advantages and disadvantages. That is, intersections of gender, class, race, sexuality, ethnicity and nationality have an impact on social locations of groups or individuals. The authors state:

> “We imagine a social location continuum from most disadvantaged to most privileged and locate people in different sites along it, roughly identifying the places and predicaments from which they may take action” (Pessar and Mahler 2003, 816).

People do not enjoy the same legal status or opportunities to migrate, that is

> “people’s ability to physically migrate is constrained by their social location. In other words, gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, sexuality and so on shape and discipline people’s ability to move and how they think about and act toward migration.” (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, p. 823)

Pessar and Mahler build their framework upon concepts of intersectionality that underline how gender overlaps with other axes of difference which produce inequality and discrimination, such as race, class, generation, sexual orientation etc. The black feminists Patricia Hill Collins (2002) and Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) were the first to theorize such intersectionalities. Hill Collins (pp. 276–277) explored the relations between overlapping identities such as being black and a woman and the parallel existence of power hierarchies and inequalities reflected in systems of domination, based on the categories black and woman, namely racism and patriarchy.[12] Crenshaw

[12] According to Collins, overlapping identities and systems of domination form a “matrix of oppression” which operates along interrelated domains of power. While the structural domain of power organizes oppression, the disciplinary domain manages oppression. The hegemonic domain justifies oppression and the interpersonal domain influences individual everyday life consciousness and experience. Black women’s experiences not only “illustrate how these four domains of power shape domination” but also practices of empowerment and resistance against these forms of oppression (Hill Collins, 2002, pp. 276–277).

(1989) contributed to the discussion with the notion of intersectionality. Intersectionality sheds light on the multidimensionality of black women's discrimination experiences, interrelating gender-based discrimination, i.e., sexism and racialized discrimination. Crenshaw debunked the homogeneous category of women along white bias by showing how black women are more likely to be subject to discrimination and by showing how they experience oppression differently from white women.

Other than the early scholarship on transnational migration, that mainly focused on border-crossing mobility as main characteristic of the transnational framework, Pessar and Mahler also ask for how stayers likewise live in transnational social fields. A gender analysis can generate knowledge on how gender determines "who stays and who moves" by controlling access to opportunities and whether or not gender has an impact on peoples' "post-migration" experience. Pessar and Mahler identify four themes in the existing literature on gender and migration that have mapped people's social locations: border-crossing communication mostly between spouses, the organization of work tasks in the country of origin after labor migration, the negotiation of permanent settlement in the host country against the option of returning to the home country, and finally, the post migration experience after migrants returned to their country of origin (2003, p. 823). In the case of non-migrant wives who stay behind while their spouses migrated, the women's disadvantaged social location in comparison to their husbands' male privilege manifests itself in the communication between spouses. Even in such disadvantaged positions, acts of "situational feminism" arise as opportunity. With respect to labor, evidence indicates that rules concerning the traditional division of labor can change after migration, for example when women take over tasks of sons and spouses who migrated. At the same time, "traditional gendered work norms" in the domestic realm are also perpetuated by women even spouses question such norms or upheld when families migrate together. Regarding negotiations of permanent settlement or return, evidence suggests a tendency of women to develop strategies in line with permanent settlement, while men maintain transnational networks that link them more closely to their home countries. The authors conclude that research findings reflect a tendency in which women's social status improves after migration, while the opposite happens for men. Literature addressing social locations and men's and women's experiences of gender after return migration, accounts for a "reimposition" of patriarchy (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, pp. 824–828).

The third component of the *Gendered Geography of Power* framework, *power geometries*, defines "the types and degrees of agency people exert given their social locations". That is, agency depends on "extra-personal factors" (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, pp. 815–817). Pessar and Mahler borrow the concept of power geometries from Doreen Massey (1994). For Massey the "time-space compression" of modernity locates people in different positions concerning degrees of movement and communication on the one hand, and in different degrees of control and access to global financial flows and mobility on the other hand. "[T]hose who are both doing the moving and the communicating and who are in some way in a position of control in relation to it" are located at the advantaged end of power geometries while groups "who are […] doing a lot of physical moving" like refugees have less control. Others, who are not mobile are situated on the "receiving end of time-space compression", contribute to it or are constrained by it (Massey, 1994, p. 149). Pessar and Mahler interpret Massey's framework not only as addressing the impact people's social locations have on "access to resources and mobility across transnational spaces" but also their "agency as initiators, refiners and transformers of these locations" in terms of controlling financial flows. For instance, concerning the people in charge of sending remittances and those at the receiving end. In addition to social locations, Pessar and Mahler define agency as composed of three more components: an individual's initiative, "cognitive processes", and lastly, as dependent on people's social locations. "[I]ndividual characteristics, such as initiative" provide opportunities for a person who due to her*his "own resourcefulness" may influence and change his*her circumstances in comparison to a person in a similar social location who does not take action. Cognitive processes include the "imagination" and "substantive agency". Since transnational research has mainly prioritized social relations and institutions, the role of the imagination and the "mind work" has hardly received attention (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, pp. 816–817). Appadurai (2008) has coined the term imagination as a source for individual agency (see section 2.1.4.). People's imagination, their plans and strategies can become practice at a later stage. As empirical research shows, the imagination of equal gender roles or of "gendered lives of peers" who have migrated may for instance translate into acts or goals of migration or conversely, lead to gendered ideas of the future that can impact practices in the present (Pessar and Mahler, 2003, pp. 828–829).

Among the various theories of international migration, approaches on transnationalism are most suitable for capturing different levels of border-crossing mobility and ties of

second and third generation German-Turkish women. Concepts of transnationalism not only help to explain German-Turkish women's migration trajectories and decisions as an open-ended process that may take multiple directions, resulting in a return to Germany after a longer stay in Turkey or a migration to a third country. The framework of the transnational social space allows for highlighting migration decisions not as irrevocable but rather as flexible and alterable decisions, which present a tactic for improving the interviewed women's living conditions. Furthermore, those concepts also provide us with a terminology that sheds light on border-crossing practices beyond movement that belong to the realm of imagination, for instance narratives of the past and future.

2.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASE OF GERMAN-TURKISH TRANSMIGRANT WOMEN

The "crisis on cultural representation" and a resulting changed notion of culture which transcends the determinism of homogenous groups helps to deconstruct the citizenship discourse in Germany that has victimized German-Turkish women. Most of the interviewed women narrate their migration to Turkey as self-made decisions. Their transnational everyday life practices and practices of belonging will be addressed by representing them as agents with different opportunities for taking action ådepending on their social locations. The German-Turkish women consulted for this thesis spent their childhood, youth and early adulthood in Germany. They have lived in Turkey and some have moved back to Germany again. In considering migration as a process that points in two or more directions, Glick Schiller et al.'s (1992) definition of transnationalism underlines their mobility between both countries as an open-ended and potentially circular process that includes a long-term settlement in Turkey but also a resettlement in Germany after a several year-lasting stay in Turkey. Moreover, concepts of transnationalism allow for describing German-Turkish women's transnational practices beyond mobility and migration. Pivotal are also border-crossing everyday life practices, activities that can also disclose different kinds of economic, family-related, social, political, religious or symbolic ties which link Turkey and Germany or even a third country. Concepts outlined in section 2.3.2. either highlight the role of actors, the locality or territoriality and emphasize the importance contextualizing transnational practices with local and state-related constraints. Trans-locality or pluri-local frames of reference accentuate that migrant transnationalism is neither legally nor politically isolated from citizenship regimes or local historical and political contexts. The two

fieldwork occasions bear the potential to contextualize transnational practices and mobility in the light of changing living conditions and political contexts. German-Turkish women's transnational mobility and their transnational practices need to be contextualized with legal constraints they experience in the sovereign territories of two nation-states and governments in the form of legal citizenship rights and obligations. It is furthermore important to contextualize migration motives and transnational practices in the light of citizenship discourses of cultural homogeneity and everyday life experiences of exclusion in Germany and Turkey (see sections 2.2.3, 3.6.).

The vantage point of an actor-centered analysis for this work is the embeddedness of German-Turkish women's mobility and transnational everyday life practices with biographic, local, political transformations and citizenship rights regimes that constrain mobility. Narratives of family history and local circumstances, such as growing up in different rural, regional, or urban contexts and interlocutors' present lives in different neighborhoods in Istanbul and in Germany shape their transnational mobility, their transnational practices and their narratives of belonging. A contextualizing perspective can also integrate German-Turkish women's migration and settlement narratives over time. On the other hand, locally bound concepts of space may assume membership in a community and lose sight of one of the main aims of transnational research: the emphasis of individual agency in daily life practices as well as imagined and symbolic aspects of everyday life that refer to more than one locality. One problem arising from studying transnational communities is that the latter are often juxtaposed with transnational social spaces implying that the only form of a transnational space is connected to a community (Faist, 2000, p. 190). The focus on collective actors like migrant groups, communities or kinship groups that produce transnational social spaces may drift back to an essentialist and concept of culture, one of the pitfalls in anthropological research (see sections 2.1.1., 2.1.3.). Instead of assuming German-Turkish women's ethnic group membership in Germany – a fallacy that often results in paradigms of difference (see section 2.2.1.) – a perspective on networks and symbolic and social network ties does not a priori assume membership in a group, providing the analytical tools for analyzing social spheres of belonging. Such a perspective prevents the construction of ethnic boundaries that may not exist. Concepts of belonging stress that membership in an ethnic community such as "the Turkish community" may not part of German-Turkish women's experience (see section 2.2.2.).

The analysis of transnational ties and networks provides an analytic openness to German-Turkish women's membership in collectives. That is, membership in a network is not determined prior to analysis but may be a result of analysis and reveal ties that are important for the actors, for example, political, friendship, family, occupational or interethnic social ties and related group membership. A theoretical lens that analyzes transnational social space in terms of ties and relations as outlined in section 2.3.3. yields to a more practice related perspective and helps to stress German-Turkish women's agency. An analytical perspective in which social and symbolic ties are scrutinized considers individual agency of women as far as their migration and settlement motives are concerned. The analytical perspective on transnational ties allows for the analysis of non-mobile women's symbolic border-crossing connections. Transnational experiences, and social ties of German-Turkish women who are no longer mobile because they have lost their residence rights in Germany or lack timely or financial resources for transnational mobility are included into the analysis. Women in disadvantaged social locations, who are no longer mobile between Germany and Turkey, still have concerns about the future, remember the past and perceive in ways that connect them to more than one locality. Concepts of space as socially produced help to describe such perceptions and experiences (see section 2.1.5.). As part of the everyday experience of migrant transnationalism, the imagination is as an important aspect in the social production of real-and-imagined transnational spaces that connects the experiential realm of perception to physical locations into a *Thirdspace* (Soja, 1996). A network perspective also helps to carve out the different kinds of transnational everyday life activities German-Turkish women engage in to sustain social and symbolic ties in Germany, Turkey and beyond. It moreover transcends the analysis of individual cases. Taking a step back from individual motivations means to look at network ties different women share and contributes to patterns, regularities or dynamics in different kinds of networks. Faist's concept of transnational social space (2000) calls attention to the fact that the German-Turkish women do not produce a transnational social space out of the void. German-Turkish women produce a transnational social space based on social ties, networks and organizations, their first and second-generation ancestors have already established (see Chapter 3 and section 2.3.3.).

A network perspective that stresses social and symbolic ties in transnational space can combine concepts of belonging and transnationalism. Contrary to Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999, pp. 218–219) who maintain that activities studied should be stable and

durable and not “fleeting or exceptional”, I agree with Jurgens that “diffuse” and imaginary ties are just as important to capture (see section 2.3.3.; Jurgens, 2001). Jurgens (2001) has shown that the imagination becomes an important aspect when long-term settlement becomes a fact. In such cases, including the imagination into the analysis is crucial to underline that transnational ties persist. In this reading, mobility is only one aspect of migrant transnationalism. Where concrete social, political and economic ties fade, people still feel connected to their country of origin or their former country of residence. Imaginary or symbolic ties and practices can help to grasp this transnational experience, especially in the cases in which women whose residence rights in German have expired or who lack financial and timely resources for transnational mobility. Symbolic and imaginary ties can be analyzed with the analytical language of belonging: As experiencing agents, German-Turkish women develop senses and feelings of belonging and allegiances, attachments to groups, objects and places that can be translocal and transnational. Their subjective narratives of attachment and senses of belonging will be contextualized with respect to their social locations. The analytical openness of concepts of belonging leaves room for identification with groups and a sense of belonging beyond ethnic group membership.

Narratives of attachment, identification and social practices can also include allegiances and belonging to mainstream society in Turkey and Germany. The concept of intersectionality helps to situate the cases of consulted German-Turkish women in privileged and disadvantaged positionalities in transnational space. Concepts of social divisions and social locations combine an analysis of structural constrains as outlined in section 2.3.2. with a practice related perspective that also underlines agency including the role of the imagination and the capacity to become mobile even in a very constrained position (see section 2.3.4.). As outlined in sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.4., social divisions are defined by gender, race and ethnicity, socio-economic status, educational status, age, religion, migrant and citizenship status etc. and position people in a power hierarchy of privilege and disadvantage (Mahler and Pessar, 2006; Pessar and Mahler, 2003). Depending on her structural circumstances, each woman has different opportunities to take action. Opportunities to become mobile or to access networks vary from woman to woman depending on her social location. As a consequence, approaches combining transnationalism along varying social locations at intersecting social divisions help to carve out different levels of transnational mobility, practices and ties as far as opportunities and structural constraints are concerned.

Accordingly, a woman with children and a working-class background who holds Turkish nationality but no residence title in Germany, will have less access to mobility, resources, and networks than a woman with dual citizenship and a higher education who grew up in a city and works in a well-paid job in Istanbul. The first woman with Turkish citizenship may want to visit Germany or resettle there, but her expired residence rights and lower income may not allow for it. In comparison, the woman with dual citizenship has an enhanced access to financial, educational resources and to citizenship rights. Therefore, she has more agency and is more privileged than the first woman.

With concepts of belonging citizenship discourses and policies can be addressed as social *strategies* (see section 2.2.). Social locations defined as overlapping social divisions along the intersections of gender, migrant status, ethnicity, religion also include attributions of belonging, for example when German-Turkish women are labelled as "foreigner" in Germany or "*Almancı*" in Turkey (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Anthias, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006). In the analysis of belonging regarding German-Turkish women, social divisions can be addressed as social strategies "organized by the postulation of power" in de Certeau's (1988, p. 38) sense of the word. As strategic constructions by members of majority groups, culturalized, ethnicized and religionized attributions of belonging produce intersectional paradigms of difference and mainly reveal information about the designators' power of definition and designators' self-images and ideas about ideal citizen subjects (see section 2.2.). Meanwhile, when addressed with attributions of belonging, German-Turkish women may have ideas, senses of belonging and allegiances that contrast and contest the discourse they are addressed with. The concept of social locations bridges the *discursive level of society* with the *subject level* and therefore provides a powerful tool for analyzing social processes that produce intersectional discrimination and inequality. An analysis of different women's social locations along levels of privilege and disadvantage sheds light on the heterogeneity the interviewed women and can deconstruct Othering attributions and assumptions about cultural homogeneity, cultural holism and ethnic group membership (see section 2.1.).

Moreover, the analysis of social locations can go hand in hand with a practice related approach that explores German-Turkish women's subjectivities on matters of belonging. Accordingly, the women will be addressed agents who experience exclusion and develop *tactics* "determined by the absence of power" (de Certeau, 1984, p. 38). Here subjective perceptions and (counter)narratives of the consulted women can shed

light on their tactics of dealing with intersectional discrimination and exclusion. To contextualize German-Turkish women's transnational migration paths and their practices of belonging with German-Turkish migration history and the existing research on German-Turkish transnational migration, the next chapter will provide an overview on the main paradigms of migration between Turkey and Germany mainly after the labor recruitment agreement in 1961 until today. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 apply the implications of the concepts outlined in Chapter 2 firstly, to the empirical analysis of German-Turkish women's migration and settlement trajectories and, secondly, to intersectional aspects of belonging.

3. MIGRATION TRAJECTORIES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GERMANY: MAIN PARADIGMS

Today, there are 2,824,000 million people of Turkey-origin living in Germany. 1,472,390 million Turkey-origin residents hold the Turkish nationality (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019a, 2019b). In the following sections, I will provide some background information on the history of migration trends between Turkey and Germany to contextualize German-Turkish women's family histories and their migration narratives.

After shortly highlighting some aspects of migration between the Ottoman and German Empire/Prussia and Turkey and Germany including historical ties prior to the labor recruitment agreement, the succeeding sections illustrate a chronology of the different types and stages of migration between Germany and Turkey. Starting with a phase of semi-official labor migration in the late 1950s, the main sections address migration between Turkey and Germany after the ratification of labor recruitment agreement in 1961 until today. In the 1960s, labor migration was organized as circular migration of rotation and return. The 1970s were characterized by settlement in Germany, that was paralleled by further immigration due to family reunion. In the 1980s a high number of people fled Turkey due to violence and political persecution in the aftermath of the military coup and the armed conflict between the military and the PKK. The 1980s were also characterized by the continuation of return migration to Turkey. During 1980s and 1990s the political discourse in Germany was characterized by a denial that Germany had become a country of immigration. This political climate was accompanied by racist attacks against migrants. A new law on "foreigners" adopted in the 1990s facilitated the application process for German citizenship while laws concerning family reunion were restricted. The 2000s are characterized by decreasing family reunion and asylum applications. From the onset of the new millennium until today, migration policies in Germany have encouraged the immigration of highly skilled individuals. The reform of the citizenship law from the *jus sanguinis* (blood law) to the *jus soli principle* (birth right) has contributed to a more inclusive understanding of citizenship. Since the law's amendment in 2014, descendants of immigrants born after 2000 can automatically obtain dual citizenship. At the same time, the German state has complicated the visa application process for family reunification. The years after 2000 are shaped by the rise of Islamophobia which culminated in the foundation of populist parties and initiatives. All sections provide information on the German state's migration policies and the public

discourse in Germany vis-à-vis immigrants and Germany-born postmigrants. Followed by a section on the politics of belonging and citizenship in Germany that until today follow an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship, the last sections, address migration trends between Turkey and Germany. Statistics account for positive net migration to Turkey between 2006 and 2014. This trend reversed in 2015 when net migration to Germany became positive. The qualitative data for this thesis fall into the period of positive net migration to Turkey and positive net migration to Germany as the data were collected in 2013 and in 2017. The subsequent section contextualizes migration trends with economic, civil and political factors that may influence participation in society in Germany and Turkey and the corresponding migration trends. I close with a review on the literature exploring the transnational migration of German-Turkish individuals of the second and third generation.

3.1. MIGRATION PRIOR TO LABOR MIGRATION

The political and economic links between the German and the Turkish state reach far into history, starting out with state and military personnel and civilians of varying educational background who migrated between the two countries. As a consequence, it can be argued that the migration of Turkish workers did not occur in a historical and political void but presents a continuation of ongoing relations between both states.

Migration between the Ottoman and German empire was initiated with a military cooperation aiming at the modernization of the Ottoman Janissary troops in the 19th century. In the *Moltke Mission*, Prussian officers were sent to the Ottoman Empire in 1836 and later during the era of the *Tanzimat* reforms.[13] During the reign of Abdulhamid II both states initiated a close economic, military and political cooperation.[14] A military mission under the command of General von der Goltz aimed to train the Ottoman military elite. Meanwhile, the German weapon industry gained foothold in the Ottoman Empire. Other economic beneficiaries were financial institutions like the German Bank and numerous companies that participated in the construction project of the Baghdad railway (Wallach, 1976, pp. 17–20, 34, 73, 104–107; Demm, 2005, p. 692). Many

[13] The *Tanzimat* reforms aimed to modernize the Ottoman Empire, to assure its territorial integrity, and to halt separatist aspirations of Ottoman Christian groups (Zürcher, 2004, pp. 50–51).
[14] While the other great European powers especially Great Britain and France were assessed as Imperialist threat the German Empire under Kaiser Wilhelm II politically seemed to be less of a threat, among other reasons because it had not colonized Muslim areas. Germany on the other hand was interested in gaining economic and military influence in the Ottoman Empire (Zürcher, 2004, p. 82).

German-speaking workers were hired for the construction of the railway settled in the Ottoman Empire (Fuhrmann, 2014, p. 31). Ordinary people of the Ottoman populace migrated to Prussia and worked in factories or to pursue an education. This group includes Turkish officers who received military training in Germany, who later entered the higher ranks in Ottoman politics and the Ottoman army. Apart from military personnel, envoys and diplomats, writers, businesspeople and craftspeople settled in Germany for a longer period of time. (Gültekin, 1997, pp. 18, 48; Demm, 2005, p. 693).

The Ottoman Empire and Germany became allies during the First World War and the German military was put in charge to reform the Ottoman army under the general Liman von Sanders. According to Wallach's and Demm's sources, the number of German officers that were active in the Ottoman army grew to 700–800 during World War I. (Wallach, 1976, pp. 108–109, 126–135, 246; Demm, 2005, p. 693). Meanwhile, tobacco factories in Berlin which mainly imported tobacco from the Ottoman Empire hired many Ottoman workers. Due to the German-Ottoman alliance during the First World War, young Turkish leaders of the Committee for Union and Progress escaped to Berlin in the aftermath of the war to not be held accountable for the Armenian Genocide (Gültekin, 1997, pp. 20–28, 36; Zürcher, 2004, p. 134).

Since German-speaking migrants moved to the Ottoman empire on several occasions and in varying functions, a German speaking colony was established in Constantinople by 1850, including immigrants from the Habsburg empire, the German Empire and present-day Switzerland. The group included diplomats, dispatched military personnel, sales agents, craftsmen and merchants. This colony[15] grew during the military alliance of World War I. After the end of the First World War, diplomatic relations between both states came to an end. It is estimated that by 1918, 3000–4000 Germans were living in Constantinople. The Armistice of Mudros stipulated terms according to which not only diplomatic relations between the former allies had to be cancelled. Moreover, Austrians and Germans were expelled from the Ottoman Empire. Nearly all German civilians and soldiers left and lost their existential basis in the course of this expulsion in 1919. After political relations between the 1923 founded Turkish Republic, Germany and Austria normalized, many of them returned to Constantinople (Fuhrmann, 2014, pp. 32–36;

[15] Further information on German institutions and German-speaking immigrants in Istanbul have been provided by Dietrich (1998) and Radt (2001). For additional information on the everyday life of German-speaking craftspeople, artists, engineers and business people between 1850 until the end of the 19th century see (Pauw, Böhme and Münch, 2014).

Pauw, Böhme and Münch, 2014, p. 5). Kaiser calls the descendants of these German-speaking immigrants who live in Istanbul today *Bosphorus-Germans* (Kaiser, 2012, pp. 105, 108).

After Hitler's seizure of power in Germany in 1933, university professors and German academics, mainly Jewish-Germans, fled the Nazi regime and started settling in Turkey. Widmann shows, how unique historical circumstances in Germany and Turkey resulted in the emigration of German academics to Turkey: it was the simultaneity of Hitler's and the National Socialists' seizure of power in Germany that was paralleled by the implementation Kemalist reforms in Turkey which resulted in the emigration of German scholars to Turkey. Against the backdrop of the Kemalist one-party state's consolidation of power, reforms concerning the system of higher education[16] enabled German professors and academics to find refuge and work in Turkey (1973, pp. 42–50, 176–178). The German professors were offered permanent positions at Turkish universities for five years. In total, 200 academics were appointed, among them 63 professors. In the 1940s, half of the chairs of the University of Istanbul were managed by emigrants teaching in the departments of medicine, sciences, law, economics and at the faculty of arts (Hillebrecht, 2000, pp. 11, 100–111). Other exiled academics worked in executive positions, as advisors, assistants, technicians, research assistants, reformers, architects, urban planners, musicians and actors. This group also included women and children, traders and artisans. It is estimated that the total number of German-speaking emigrants at that time revolved around 1000 people (Hillebrecht, 2000, pp. 11–13; Erichsen, 2008, p. 41). This German speaking community in Istanbul was not only composed of these exiles. Dietrich places a special focus on the *Nazifizierung* (Nazification) of the existing German-speaking community in Istanbul that hardly offered any resistance to the Nazi regime. Only after emigrants escaped the Nazi regime and settled in Istanbul an opposition emerged (Dietrich, 1998, pp. 175–176). The German immigrants who sympathized with the Nazi ideology were designated Colony A, while the persecuted German refugees that found exile in Turkey called themselves Colony B (Hillebrecht, 2000, p. 100).

[16] Reforming the *Darülfünün* an institution that preceded the University of Istanbul was one of the main items on the agenda of Kemalism. In addition YZE (*Yüksek Ziraat Enstitüsüdür*) was founded, an institutional precursor that later became the University of Ankara) (Widmann, 1973, p. 42). On the Kemalist reforms see also Çağaptay, 2006, pp. 41–64.

It can be concluded that there is a history of diplomatic exchange between Turkey and Germany characterized by state, civilian, military, economic and academic relations. These historical ties and fact that "no belligerent action took place between the two countries until the end of the Second World War" contributed to a political climate in which new forms of bilateral collaboration were considered which eventually culminated in the labor recruitment agreement in 1961 (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 6).

3.2. CIRCUITS OF LABOR MIGRATION UNTIL 1973

The following sections will deal with the different stages of labor migration from Turkey to Germany after the Second World War. Already in 1976, Abadan-Unat (1976, pp. 12–19) periodized Turkish labor migration to Germany into different stages. Accordingly, labor migration to Germany started with experimental semi-official form during mid-1950s. The second stage of labor migration was mediated by the German and Turkish state and adjusted to demands of the German industry. The third phase constituted a stage of consolidation and was characterized by a redefinition of goals in the employment of foreign workers and first attempts of integration policies. Labor migration officially ended with Germany's withdrawal from the labor recruitment agreements with non-EC countries in 1973.[17]

Semi-Official Labor Migration as Individual Enterprises

The first phase of migration of Turkish workers to Germany commenced a couple of years before both states officially initiated labor migration. This early stage took the form of an "unofficial recruitment". Unlike migrants from other Mediterranean countries, labor migrants from Turkey initially entered Germany with the objective of improving professional skills. In 1956, the *Institute for World Economy* of the University of Kiel aimed at facilitating German capital investment in Turkey. The institute proposed a vocational training program for trainees from Turkey that was later accepted by the *Turkish Association of Technical Vocations*. This initiative did not prove to be successful as the Turkish trainees quickly found work at the docks in the cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. Additional workers were recruited by "private 'Translation Bureaus' in Turkey and similar organizations in Federal Germany'"

[17] Eight years later, Castles, Booth and Wallace (Castles, Booth and Wallace, 1984) made a periodization of migration from Turkey to Western Europe that starts with labor migration, continues with family reunification and ends with immigration and settlement, accompanied by the formation of minorities in the countries of migration.

(Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 13). The later founded *Institute for Research in Turkish-German Economic Affairs* organized the recruitment of skilled labor for the shipyards in Hamburg and Bremen. This institution charged German companies a fee for every recruited worker from Turkey while the employers paid the hired workers' travel expenses (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 13, 2011, p. 13). This exchange of 'trainees' was in reality a temporary unofficial recruitment of industrial labor and it was stopped after a legal dispute between Turkish and German public authorities and after the *German Trade-Union Federation* (DGB) advocated for its stop (Abadan-Unat and Ünsal, 1976, pp. 13, 46).

Temporary and Circular Migration

The 1961 ratified bilateral labor recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey initiated state-controlled migration from Turkey to West-Germany. The Turkish state signed other agreements with Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), and the Netherlands (1964), France (1965), Sweden (1967) and Australia (1967). Due to an explosive population growth, Turkey's domestic labor market had too many people in the search of work: 700,000 people entered the labor market every year, while only 400,000 found employment. Due to high unemployment rates in Turkey, emigration of some segments of the labor force seemed to provide a solution for this problem. By the end of 1973, almost one million people had registered for labor recruitment abroad (Abadan-Unat, 1976, pp. 5, 7). In comparison to the previous phase, characterized by the migration of individuals or small groups of workers, state-directed labor migration caused a significant rise in numbers with 27,500 people moving from Turkey to Germany in 1963 (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 12).

Turkey's first five-year plan encouraged Turkish state agencies to control population growth and to "export" labor. Apart from hoping that labor migration would support Turkey's economy by relieving pressure on the Turkish labor market, the Turkish state showed an interest in the potential economic impact of remittances on the Turkish economy. It was expected that Turkish workers abroad would generate foreign exchange and send back hard currency to Turkey (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 6, 2011, p. 29). Turkish state planners also hoped that formerly unskilled workers would return to Turkey with new skills they could provide for the industrial sector and thus contribute to the industrialization and modernization of Turkey's economy (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 23).

Martin sheds light on a similar but paternalistic political perspective on labor migration in Germany, stating:

> "Many Germans believed that the 3 R's of recruitment, remittances, and returns were a form of 'foreign aid' to labor emigration countries. Unemployed workers would be recruited, reducing joblessness in southern Europe, their remittances could supply some of the capital needed for economic development, and returned workers with training and experience gained in Germany would be productive factory workers in their countries of origin" (Martin, 2002, p. 8).

In addition, post-war Germany was motivated by the rapid economic growth of the 1960s *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) that resulted in a high demand for labor. There were more job vacancies than registered unemployed people. Companies argued in favor of labor migration and the German state hoped for an acceleration of economic growth. In particular "factories producing cars, machine tools, coal and steel, and consumer durables for booming export and domestic markets" were in need of workers (Martin, 1991, p. 63). Between the end of the Second World War until the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, the labor force was mainly provided by the millions of east-west migrants of German ethnic origin who returned to the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany signed the first recruitment agreement with Italy in 1955 (Martin, 1991, p. 63, 2002, p. 7).

Between 1955 and 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany ratified recruitment agreements with seven countries which at that time were not members of the European Community (EC): Greece, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Turkey's status as an important NATO-partner as well as the existing political and economic ties mentioned above were some reasons that led to the ratification of the recruitment agreement. After the agreement with Turkey was set into motion in 1961, Germany became the principle destination country for labor migrants from Turkey (Martin, 2002, pp. 7, 34). One reason for Germany's preference for workers from Turkey may have been that Turkey – in comparison to other countries – was willing to send the highest percentage of skilled workers abroad (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 35–36).

Labor migrants from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia were placed upon requirements that didn't apply for people from Italy and Spain: Work and residence permits of Turkish employees were restricted to two years only to prevent permanent employment and immigration. In contrast to Germany's agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, that contained the opportunity of family reunification, such a paragraph was

missing in the agreements with Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. After Turkey refused to accept the regulations and German employers raised objections, an amended version of the Turkish-German recruitment agreement came into force in 1964. The restriction of only two years of residence in Germany was dropped (Jamin, 1999, pp. 148–150).

Labor migration from Turkey followed the principle of rotation (*Rotationsprinzip*) and can be classified as temporary circular migration in which both states organized the workers dispatch, settlement, return and replacement by new recruits after one or two years of employment. Workers were selected by German government facilities and sent to Germany to mainly work in the industrial sector. The *German Federal Labor Office* (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) set up offices in the different countries from which workers were recruited. Companies in Germany in search of employees requested local Employment Service offices abroad to refer workers in Germany to fill vacant jobs. After local employment offices had conducted a "pro forma search for local workers", those requests were sent to the employment service office in Istanbul where people in search for work were registered. After conducting a screening on police and political records, an assessment of skills and medical checkups, the German Federal Labor Office issued residence permits. Shortly afterwards labor migrants worked on constructions sites or in assembly lines in Germany. Hiring only one of ten people searching for work, German employers were quite selective (Martin, 1991, 2002, p. 9). Between the ratification of the labor recruitment agreement and its halt in 1973, a total number of 14 million people migrated from abroad to Germany in the course of this rotation system while 11 million people returned to their home countries (Kaya, 2009, p. 42).

The fact that rotation and return was a myth for many immigrants which never became reality, not only resulted in immigrants' narrative of return plans, also called the "myth of return". It also prevented the German state from implementing settlement and integration policies (Martin, 2002, p. 9; Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 12). The idea that the workers would not settle but instead return to their homes after one or two years of work is reflected in the meaning of the designation *Gastarbeiter* (guest-worker) for labor migrants. *Gastarbeiter* characterizes "the invited and temporary nature of the imported manpower which is dependent on the needs and goodwill of the host" (Wilpert, 1984, p. 306).

Between 20 and 30 percent of the workers from Turkey who entered Germany between the late 1960s and the early 1970s came with a tourist visa after their attempts to migrate

by official means failed. Many were in touch with brokers who organized the journey and paid excessive fees for job placements. They later managed to legalize their residence status. Before that however, they had "no access to social rights, union rights, or health insurance" and were severely exploited by their employers (van Velzen and Pennix, 1976; Martin, 2002; Abadan-Unat, 2011).

In the early stages of labor migration, migrants were not permitted to bring their families. Accommodated in dormitories outside of the cities, they were spatially separated from the social life in Federal Republic of Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 62). Abadan-Unat (1964) conducted an empirical survey for the Turkish State Planning Organization DPT (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*) in 1963, where she pointed out that 85 percent of workers were living in such shared dormitories "set out as part of the conditions of their contract" of which 53 percent shared a room with four to five people (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 55).

An economic crisis between 1966 and 1967 caused 70,000 workers from Turkey to lose their jobs. The majority was reemployed in 1967. This experience however caused an unionization since the membership in a trade union guaranteed the continuous payment of social insurance in the case of unemployment (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 11). Labor recruitment peaked between 1968 and 1973 when the number of employed migrant workers rose from 1 million in 1968 to 2.6 million in 1973. On some days in the early 1970s, over 1,000 migrants arrived, and they became increasingly visible in the German public sphere (Martin, 2002, pp. 9–10). By 1973, the number of citizens from Turkey involved in this temporary and circular migration had reached 2 million people (Kaya and Adaman, 2011b, p. 39). While between 1960 and 1999, 70 percent of the 30 million migrants registered as foreigners in Germany returned to their home countries, 30 percent settled in Germany (Beauftragte für Ausländerfragen, 2001, p. 5; Martin, 2002, pp. 9–10).

Demographic background

Altogether, the majority of labor migrants who left Turkey to Europe during the peak of labor migration between 1968 and 1973 when most immigrants came to Germany were unskilled workers who mainly came mostly from rural areas (Gökdere, 1978; Martin, 1991, pp. 25–30). However, approximately 30 percent of the total amount of Turkish emigrants were skilled workers. They belong to the segments of immigrants who came to Germany in the early stages of labor migration and mainly emigrated from cities or

belonged to the upper higher ranks of the peasantry and were more educated and skilled than the average working population in Turkey (Martin, 1991, pp. 25, 30; Paine, 1974, p. 19; van Velzen and Pennix, 1976, pp. 173–175). Martin states that by 1970, “40 percent of Turkey's carpenters and stonemasons were employed in Germany, often as assembly line or unskilled workers” (2002, p. 9). Many of those workers had given up prestigious professions such as “teaching, accounting and, sales to accept worker status” prior to their migration (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 53). This skilled labor force of the first stages presented a problem for the Turkish state because it lost 17 percent of skilled workers between 1961 and 1972. As a result, Turkey’s second five-year plan documented shortages of skilled workers between 1970 and 1975. As main host country of Turkish workers, Germany benefited from the skilled segments of Turkish labor migrants who were the most qualified labor migrants after Yugoslavia (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 11, 2011, pp. 35–36). The State Planning Office, the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce, Turkish employers and the Ministry of Industry criticized this policy. Due to a high unemployment rate and the Turkish state’s interest in remittances, emigration was only restricted in the region of *Zonguldak* to prevent the emigration of miners (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 11).

In the early stages of labor migration from Turkey to Germany, exclusively young male adults migrated while women mostly stayed in Turkey. Women from Turkey started migrating to Germany later. Many of them were lower skilled and had a rural background or came from poor neighborhoods of big cities. Despite such difficult conditions due to their lacking work experience, they were able to successfully adapt to jobs mainly in the textile and electronic industry or in the domains of tailoring and food packaging (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 87–90, 105). In some cases, female spouses migrated before their husbands. Here the traditional division of labor within the family changed as these women became the breadwinners while male spouses were in charge of bringing up the children. Decision-making processes that were usually undertaken by men in traditional families were now made by women who worked in full time employment. The women then started making use of their rights by selecting the family members, they wanted to reunite with, also acting contrary to their husbands’ interests (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 95–96). Abadan-Unat nevertheless concludes that the labor migration of Turkish women from structurally disadvantaged regions in Turkey to industrialized countries did not necessarily culminate in their emancipation from gendered constraints. In some cases, women of traditional background from rural

environments were socially isolated in their work environment. This isolation rather resulted in "strengthening of their traditional values and judgements" (2011, pp. 104–105). Meanwhile, other women immigrants became more open towards German family structures as far as value judgements regarding the education of children and pedagogic measures were concerned. Abadan-Unat concludes that women adapted more easily to the new environment than male immigrants from Turkey. Migration had some severe effects on family structures as single and married women in search for work left behind their families (2011, pp. 94–95). Moreover, women migrants' emigration contributed to "widespread breakdown of the extended family structure and a marked increase in nuclear family living" not only in Germany but also in the event of circular return migration (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 104).

Circular Migration's Social and Economic Impact on Turkey

Until today, remittances constitute an element in Turkey's economy. Remittances of the labor migrants' savings had a significant impact on Turkey's economy during the 1960s when the Turkish state used the workers' currency transfers to finance the trade deficit. Beyond that, remittances were used to cover Turkey's energy shortages and resulted in the import of consumer products (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 31). The share of remittances in the GDP fluctuated at around 2 percent in 1964 and reached 4.37 percent in 1973. Kaya and Adaman state that Turkey's balance of payments shows that "up until the 2000s, remittances constituted a large part of current transfer items, counter-balancing the deficit in goods, services and income" (2011a, pp. 45–46). The generated earnings labor migrants sent back to Turkey not only had an impact on the Turkish state's balance of payments. In addition, local economies in Turkey were indirectly affected as the purchasing power of the labor migrants and their family members in Turkey rose significantly. Savings mostly flew back to people in the regions the labor migrants originated from but these regions did not benefit from the savings because foreign currencies were mostly transferred to bigger cities (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 30). During 2000s the flow of remittances sharply decreased. This is explained with recession between 1999–2000 and the weaker ties of postmigrants to their parents' and grandparents' home country. In addition, the Turkish Central Bank no longer counts labor migrants' accounts and spending during visits to Turkey as remittances (Kaya and Adaman, 2011a, p. 46; Adaman and Kaya, 2012, p. 11).

Contrary to state's expectation that labor migration would provide a skilled workforce for the industrial sector in Turkey, returnees hardly had an impact on Turkey's industrialization. The majority of returnees invested their savings in property or retail businesses and did not search employment in the industrial sector (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 22–23).

A research team instructed by Nermin Abadan-Unat (Abadan-Unat *et al.*, 1976) evaluated the economic and social impact of labor migration in the district of *Boğazlıyan* located in the province of *Yozgat* in Central Anatolia. Despite the fact that labor migrants invested into land, tractors, vehicles, and housing, Abadan-Unat concludes that labor migration and the economic activities of migrants did not result in "any significant development in the flow of goods or revenue into the Boğazlıyan district". The lack of workers in the district rather resulted in a decline in agricultural production. Capital goods were mainly purchased outside of the district (2011, pp. 81–82).

Labor migration had a major impact on family structures in that district. While prior to migration households were shared with the extended family members, emigrated family members who had saved sufficient money to afford a house on their return tended to live with the nuclear family. In addition, the researchers found that women in the Boğazlıyan district benefited from changes in gendered family structures. Firstly, as far as the division of labor between spouses and decision-making in the household was concerned. While decisions concerning crops and livestock, spending of cash and payments for weddings were traditionally made by husbands, women started managing the money their husbands sent back home and got in touch with state institutions. They managed the land and gained authority over how to bring up their children (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 101–102). On the other hand Abadan-Unat concludes that most women on their return to Turkey did not benefit from skills they had acquired in Germany because the district of Boğazlıyan did not have many industries at that time. Women who had accompanied their husbands abroad complained that they felt restricted in the village after their return. On the one hand, emigration had a negative psychological impact on those children who were left behind with their grandparents and children who accompanied their parents had problems in adapting to the education system in the country of immigration (2011, p. 93). The consumer behavior of returning families changed. Beyond the purchase of useful household appliances or aliments, conspicuous consumption became a symbol for representing upward mobility and the success of

labor migration, manifesting itself in the construction of spacious houses and in the purchase of electronic equipment (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 104).

3.3. THE 1970S AND 1980S: FAMILY REUNION, RETURN MIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Like other European governments, the German government ended the recruitment of workers outside of the European Community in November of 1973. An economic crisis incited by the oil embargo caused a rise in unemployment. Labor migrants were encouraged to return to their countries of origin. While in 1973, 103,753 labor migrants traveled to the Federal Republic of Germany, the German government only issued 640 work permits in 1975 (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 14–15).

Despite the German government's intention to stop immigration, the ban of the recruitment agreement 1973 did not end migration from Turkey to Germany. After 1973, the dominant form of migration occurred in the course of family reunification. Spouses and children joined their working relatives in Germany. The reunited families started to rent apartments often in socially deprived neighborhoods. With migration due to family reunion, the total number of people migrating to the European Community even increased between 1974 and 1977. Some people from Turkey entered Germany with a tourist visa and later applied for a residence status, while others travelled by train to eastern Europe and entered West Germany by subway from East Berlin (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 15).

The settlement of workers occurred contrary to the expectations of the states that planned the labor recruitment. Racist slogans like "Foreigners out" by the far right were coupled with an attitude by most ethnic Germans who disapproved of labor migrants' and their families' settlement in Germany. Since settlement became a fact, it resulted in negotiations and agreements concerning migrants' social rights as far as health care, unemployment and pension rights, social security and state assistance concerning childcare and birth were concerned (Martin, 2002, p. 10; Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 13). Some of the legal requirements for family reunification were that spouses in West Germany had to be in a permanent employment and could provide accommodation for the immigrating family members (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 95). Contrary to the intentions of recruiting workers in rotation and only temporarily, German migration policies simultaneously strengthened the right of settlement. Family reunification policies were implemented on the request of employers and trade associations. A cancellation of the

two-year rotation system saved companies from losing their qualified workers and the additional costs of recruiting and training new unskilled workers. Employers welcomed family reunification because spouses provided additional labor (Martin, 2002, p. 10).

Meanwhile, many immigrants also realized that a longer settlement than initially planned was in their interest. Living expenses in Germany turned out higher than expected and many were not able to fulfill their goals of saving the desired amount of money. Plans of returning home were not only postponed for economic reasons. The 1970s in Turkey were characterized by unemployment, political instability and violence. As a result, many postponed their return plans to retirement and meanwhile concentrated on reuniting their families (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 16). A policy change in 1975, according to which child subsidies for children living in West Germany were increased in comparison to formerly equal subsidies for children living in Turkey indirectly reinforced family reunification (Abadan-Unat, 1976, p. 35).

While the number of employed migrants in Germany fell from 2.6 million in 1973 to around 1.8 million in the late 1970s, the total number of migrants settling in Germany remained 4 million. Migrants who were unemployed feared that they could not return to Germany once they left the country. In addition, family reunification continued which led to 4.5 million immigrants living in Germany by 1980. Due to the fact that relatives who joined their spouses were not permitted to work, the ratio of non-working migrants in Germany continued to grow (Martin, 2002, p. 11).

In comparison to the 1960s and 1970s which were characterized by labor migration and family reunification, the profile of emigrants leaving Turkey changed in the 1980s. Due to political polarization between the extreme left and the extreme right political repressions by the Turkish state in the aftermath of the September 12-military coup in 1980, people fled the military regime in Turkey seeking asylum in Germany. These new immigrants were mainly left-wing political refugees who were intellectuals and members of the Kurdish, Assyrian and Alevi minorities (Kaya, 2019, p. 124). Some were also members of the extreme right and fundamentalist Islamists (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 190). The number of people who applied for asylum increased again during the second half of the 1980s. Many escaped the political violence resulting from the armed conflict between the PKK, an insurgent Kurdish separatist organization and the Turkish army in Southeast Anatolia, a region that is mostly inhabited by the Kurdish minority (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 181; Sirkeci, Cohen and Yazgan, 2012, pp. 34–38). Immigrant

organizations that were established in Germany grew in number and diversity regarding different political interests. These organizations also helped refugees and other migrants to apply for asylum and prevented deportations of people whose asylum applications were rejected (Aydın, 2013).

The German government's migration policies of the 1980s oscillated between promoting the social and economic integration and residence status of immigrants on the one hand and encouraging return migration and impeding immigration from non-EU states on the other hand. The Social Democratic Party (SPD, *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) started implementing restrictive 'policies on foreigners' (*Ausländerpolitik*) to decrease the number of Turkey-origin immigrants in Germany (Martin, 2002, p. 12; Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 21–22). In 1981, a law restricting family reunification was adopted according to which only children below the age of sixteen were permitted to join their parents in Germany. The reunification with spouses was also restricted. Only people who had been living in Germany legally at least eight years could reunite with their spouses after three years of waiting time.

The center-right coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, *Chistlich Demokratische Union*) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP, *Freie Demokratische Partei*) under Helmut Kohl won the elections in 1983 based on an election campaign that promised to restrict further immigration and to encourage return migration. The government started offering financial incentives to migrants who gave up their residence and work permits and returned to their countries of origin (Martin, 2002, p. 11). In 1983, a corresponding law called the return act (*Rückkehrförderungsgesetz*) was passed. The return act encouraged the return of labor migrants and their families with a financial bonus of up to 10,500 German Marks in addition to 1,500 German Marks for children and a refund of returnees' deposited social security contributions (Pagenstecher, 1994, p. 60). Hönekopp (1990) estimates that 300,000 migrants of different nationalities left Germany between 1984 and 1985. This number declined again to roughly 35,000 annually by the end of the 1980s. It can be concluded that this policy did not prove as effective, since the numbers indicate that it is likely that these returnees would have left Germany anyways (Martin, 2002, p. 11).

The 1980s were also characterized by problems concerning the school education of the second-generation children, resulting in a segregation from larger society which also encouraged these youngsters' withdrawal to Turkish communities. While only a few

children successfully graduated from *Hauptschule* – a lower secondary school that qualifies for vocational training – a high proportion of these children did not complete a school education. It is the lack of integration policies, and not the unwillingness of immigrants as so often assumed in public discourse that resulted in insufficient language skills of the second generation and their social marginalization (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 19–20).

During the 1980s, former labor migrants became self-employed and started establishing wholesale and retail businesses mainly in the trade sector and gastronomy. Such businesses included restaurants, food retail, bakeries, coffee shops, audio- and videotape retail, export and import businesses, tailors and shoemaker businesses, travel agencies, bookstores and car repair shops. These businesses mainly served the demand of the Turkey-origin immigrants. By 1985, roughly 22,000 people from Turkey owned small and middle size businesses. Based on the empirical data of a survey Erichsen and Şen conducted among 315 Turkish businesses that in average generated 3,5 jobs, the authors hypothesize that 22,000 self-employed Turkish entrepreneurs in Germany created around 77,000 jobs for Turkish workers (1987, pp. 40, 42, 44, 63). Contrary to the public perception of workers from Turkey as the least skilled workers, most people from Turkey were working in semi-skilled jobs in manufacturing companies during the late 1980s (Martin, 1991, p. 72).

In the course of political debates around election campaigns of the 1980s, the public discourse in Germany was dominated by slogans and catchwords like “abuse of asylum”, “Germany is not a country of immigration” and that ‘guest-workers’ should return home (Sökefeld, 2004; Abadan-Unat, 2011). Moreover, racist attitudes were widely spread in public opinion of mainstream society in Germany and openly displayed in the public sphere. Slogans such as *Türken raus* (Turks out), *Ausländer raus* (foreigners out) were painted on walls in the urban public. Anti-Semitic jokes from the Nazi era were revived and adapted to Turkey-origin people (Tsiakalos, 1983, p. 24; Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 26). According to an opinion poll from 1981 by the Ifas-Institute, 49 percent of the German population were hostile towards foreigners (*ausländerfeindlich*), 29 percent friendly towards foreigners (*ausländerfreundlich*) and 22 percent ambivalent (Tsiakalos, 1983, p. 23). Räthzel quotes another opinion poll from 1982, according to which more than 62 percent of West-Germans agreed that there were too many foreigners in Germany while 50 percent believed that foreigners should return to their countries of origin (1991, p. 38). In addition, right-wing parties and

skinhead gangs emerged. Right-wing prejudices were reinforced by the growing number of international refugees seeking asylum in Germany (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 26). Racist and radical right-wing parties and organizations distributed leaflets, sent letters to mass media and politicians and organized civil initiatives against 'foreigners' (Tsiakalos, 1983, pp. 22–23). This racist climate was accompanied by a rising number of assaults against immigrants and homicides (Tsiakalos, 1983, pp. 12–16). In 1985, Memet Kaynakçı and Ramayan Avcı were murdered by skinheads. In 1988, skinheads committed the first deadly arson attack on a house in Schwandorf Bavaria, leaving four people dead (Sökefeld, 2004).

3.4. THE 1990S: STRUGGLES FOR CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, REUNIFICATION AND RACISM

The 1990s were characterized by Turkish labor migrants' struggle for legal citizenship rights. In 1992, the Foreigner's Act (*AuslG-Ausländergesetz*) was adopted. On the one hand, it facilitated the process of becoming a German citizen. On the other hand, the residence rights of long-term unemployed people was restricted. To apply for German citizenship people between the age of sixteen and twenty-three had to renounce their Turkish citizenship, certify at least six years of school attendance and prove eight years of residence in Germany. People who were older than 23 had to document 15 years of residence to obtain German nationality. According to article 46, Foreigners Act, people who personally or in the name of a family member made use of welfare payments for more than three years could be deported by local authorities. Contrary to that, the right of residence prevented deportation. But the criteria for obtaining a residence permit were also strict: Applicants had to prove an eight-year lasting residence in Germany, that they had no criminal record, possess a sustainable source of income and "have paid at least sixty months of compulsory social insurance". In addition, the Foreigner' Act further restricted family reunion (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 23–24).

The law also contained an important passage for adolescents and young adults between 15 and 21 who left Germany against their will in the course of a family return. After the return act was passed in 1983, several adolescents who were forced by their parents to move to Turkey tried to reenter Germany without papers (Sieveking, 1991, p. 150). According to the right of return (*Recht auf Wiederkehr*), adolescents had the right to return to Germany. For making use of this right, these youngsters had to prove eight years of residence in Germany and at least six years of school attendance, and guarantee,

that they or another person could provide for their living costs (Sieveking, 1991, p. 153). Abadan-Unat (2011, p. 24) notes that despite 30 years of immigration:

> "German law makers had decided to maintain firm lines between foreigner and native. In this case they had Germany's welfare system in mind: they made it clear that they were interested only in keeping those foreigners who were good prospects in terms of integration and would not be a burden to the state."

The legal status of those defined as foreigners in Germany seems to communicate an understanding of them as non-citizens. If we go with the famous definition of citizenship suggested by Marshall, "as a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community" and who based on this status "are equal with respect to the rights and duties" (1950, pp. 28–29) including civil, social and political rights (Ibid. 10-11), Turkey-origin immigrants and their children and grandchildren were definitely not members of the German community. Following this definition, those legally defined as foreigners appear as 'the Other' of those defined as citizens and natives. Since those Turkey-origin people with a residence status in Germany struggled for their social rights in the course of their settlement in Germany, and were gradually endowed with certain rights, their citizenship status still differs from people without residence rights. To further define the citizenship status of Turkish immigrants and their descendants who have been settling in Germany for decades or were born there but did not acquire German citizenship, Hammar (2016) suggests the notion of *denizenship*. Denizenship defines the legal status of immigrants with a permanent residence permit who were gradually endowed social and civil rights and "who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status" in their countries of settlement. In many European states which hosted migrants in the course of labor migration recruitment agreements and postcolonial migration, residence rights were extended after those migrants became long-term residents. Hammar argues that the *denizen* status of the growing number of immigrants was characterized by a gradual endowment with social and civil rights while political rights were mainly seen as reserved for those individuals with formal nationality of their country of their residence. Lacking political rights of Turkey-origin immigrants and postmigrants who are Turkish citizens also explains the marginalization of some segments of this very diverse population. Some became organized

> "politically along collective ethic and religious lines. As a response to the German insistence on the segregationist 'Ausländerstatus', Turkish migrant communities have tended to develop strong ethnic structures and maintain ethnic boundaries. Lack of political participation and

> representation in the receiving country made them direct their political activity towards their country of origin." (Kaya, 2009, p. 47)

This argument is supported by Castles' and Miller's comparative analysis of migration policies of the German and the Australian state. They conclude that temporary labor recruitment is very likely to cause permanent settlement and that the state's policies in the early stages of migration are decisive for the formation of ethnic groups. Policies denying the reality of immigration lead to marginalization and minority formation like in some neighborhoods in Germany. In comparison, state authorities in Australia responded to permanent settlement, by legitimizing chain migration and family reunion at an early state. Immigrants were granted full citizenship rights which in turn provided conditions for successful settlement, participation and integration into society (Castles and Miller, 2009, pp. 216–219; 254).

The deficiency of acknowledgement of immigration in Germany translates into the public opinion of the 1990s in Germany which were characterized by resentments against immigrants. Such sentiments were supported by the Germany's reunification process. According to an opinion poll, only 34 percent of the respondents considered a person born and raised in Germany with Turkish roots as German. Despite the urgent domestic political issue of reunification of the Western Federal Republic and the Eastern German Democratic Republic and the Gulf war, public opinion in Germany was mainly concerned with stopping asylum seekers from entering the country. The reunification of Germany triggered debates on defining the German nation along lines of ethnicity and was coupled with asymmetric and discriminatory tensions between West- and East-Germans. The 1990s were also characterized by a rising number of right-wing extremist attacks with more than 6,336 incidents in 1992 (Abadan-Unat, 2011, pp. 26–27).

The names of places became synonyms for right-wing terrorism in Germany: *Hoyerswerda*, *Rostock-Lichtenhagen*, *Mölln* and *Solingen*. Hoyerswerda marked the beginning of these attacks in September 1991, when after several days of rioting, asylum seekers and contract workers in Hoyerswerda in Saxony, were casted out from their shelters. The aggressors threw incendiary bottles and stones at them while the surrounding crowd was applauding. Up to 500 people were involved in those attacks and groups of neo-Nazis declared Hoyerswerda "Germany's first foreigner-free city" since 1945. In 1992, a right-wing mob attacked an apartment block, mostly inhabited by asylum seekers in the neighborhood of Lichtenhagen in Rostock with stones and petrol bombs. The same year, right-wing extremists carried out an arson attack on the

houses of Turkish families in Mölln killing two women and one child. In 1993, five women and a girl were killed in a right-wing extremist arson attack in Solingen (Polenz, 2019).

Meanwhile, people from Turkey became more visible in the public. Although, people from Turkey were never constituted more than one third of the people in Germany with a history of migration, they were more visible because they were Muslims and because "they were the last of the guest workers to arrive in large numbers" (Martin, 2002, p. 12; Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 25). Under reference to Islam, many Germans othered Turks as "problem foreigners" emphasizing obstacles to integration such as political divisions in the Turkish community and the different treatment of women and men. The assumption that social problems can be explained with cultural difference is also connected to the citizenship discourse after Germany's reunification. In this discourse Turkey-origin people and postmigrants were othered to construct a country unified by a common ethnic descent (see section 3.6.). Moreover, political thinking at that time revolved around the concept of multiculturalism. Political debates were characterized by assumptions about the existence of different ethnic and religious communities and integration was identified with "equal rights for different cultures". The dominant multicultural rhetoric contributed to the Othering of immigrants that along with lacking citizenship rights and caused the latter to reemphasize cultural difference. German-Turks started to "represent themselves with their own ethno-cultural and religious identities in the public sphere" (Kaya, 2009; Abadan-Unat, 2011). Racialized exclusion caused chain reactions in Turkish communities in Germany. "National ties" were strengthened and many withdrew to their own communities which in turn caused an increased focus on cultural difference in German mainstream society (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 28).

Simultaneously, youngsters with migration background who searched for training vacancies were structurally disadvantaged, a problem in Germany that has not been solved until today. Martin underlines that during 1990s most foreign children completed secondary school which qualified them to apply for training vacancies. Since they had to compete with Germans who held the *Abitur* certificate from the *Gymnasium*, a preparatory upper secondary school for college or university, they were crowded out by Germans as far as training spots in banking or IT were concerned. According to Martin, "almost one-fourth of foreign youth in the vocational training system in the late 1990s were learning to be barbers or hairdressers, and another 20 percent were learning to be

mechanics or painters." (Martin, 2002, p. 14). Moreover, statistical data by the German Higher Education Information System Institute (HIS) indicated that German-Turkish youth are less likely to enter a university or college than German youth (Kristen, Reimer and Kogan, 2008). In addition, empirical data of Heitmeyer et al. (Heitmeyer, Müller and Schröder, 1997) substantiate discrimination experiences of adolescents with relatives of Turkish origin in public offices, schools, at the workplace and the housing market in Germany during the mid-1990s.

From 1950s onwards until 2000, all German governments declared that "Germany is not a country of immigration". It can be concluded that this stance blocked reforms of immigration policies. 'Foreigners' policies' (*Ausländerpolitik*) between the 1970s and the 1990s were mainly concerned with constraining further immigration. Concrete measures aiming at an improvement of social and political participation of immigrants and their descendants were undertaken quite late. Not only has the German state failed to employ integration policies by delegating it to welfare organizations. It has also ignored the voices of those who have advocated for a facilitation of naturalization and integration. Only in the beginning of the new millennium, after more than 40 years of immigration, the political attitude slowly started to change (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p. 7; Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 13).

3.5. 2000S: NEW CITIZENSHIP LAW AND HIGHLY SKILLED IMMIGRATION

By the end of the 1990s, it was no longer denied that Germany had become a country of immigration. An indicator of this changed trend was the reform of German citizenship law on January 1, 2000, almost 40 years after the ratification of the labor recruitment agreement with Turkey. Until 1999, the German citizenship law was based on the *jus sanguinis principle* (blood law) according to which citizenship was defined by ethnic descent (Article 116, German Constitutional Law) excluding non-ethnic Germans from the idea of citizenship. In order to naturalize, non-EU residents had to repudiate their other citizenship. In addition, second and third generation German-Turkish individuals did not receive German citizenship automatically despite being born and raised in Germany. While 'foreigners' from non-EU countries had to be residents in Germany for 15 years in order to naturalize, people defined as *volksdeutsch*, mostly Poles and Russians with German ancestors had the right to naturalize. Additionally, membership in an ethnic organization was an obstacle to naturalization since it was required for applicants "to identify with the German cultural environment" (*Bekenntnis zum*

deutschen Kulturkreis) (Kaya, 2009, pp. 46–47). On January 1st in 2000 the *jus sanguinis principle* of citizenship was replaced with a new law. Descendants of migrants obtained the right to German citizenship according to the *jus soli principle* (right of the territory) based on the place of birth. Germany-born children of legally foreign residents were automatically dual citizens until the age of 23, if they had at least one parent holding an unlimited resident permit and had been living in Germany for at least eight years. Instead of the initially planned right to dual citizenship, the *Optionspflicht* (option obligation) was implemented. Postmigrants with a non-EU citizenship had to decide, whether to renounce the German or the other citizenship until the age of 23 (§ 4, paragraph 3 Nationality Act (*StAG*)). Applicants for German citizenship needed to prove six years of schooling in Germany and submit a language certificate or prove their German skills in an interview with the naturalization authority.

Despite its limitations, the new citizenship law indicates an opening and a shift away from an understanding of citizenship based on ethnic descent towards "the construction of hyphenated civic identities such as 'German-Turkish'". These legal changes constitute a "discursive shift in the perception of Germany as an immigration country" away "from a segregationist into an integrationist country" which is also indicated by usage of such hyphenated identities in the public discourse (Kaya, 2009, pp. 30, 51).

In 2014, the above mentioned *Optionspflicht* was dropped and paved the way for dual citizenship. People who were born after the year 2000 and grew up in Germany no longer have to choose one of the two nationalities when they turn 23. Only children who did not grow up in Germany still have to decide for one citizenship. People are legally defined as having grown up in Germany if they have lived at least eight years in Germany and visited a school for six years, or if they have a school-leaving qualification or completed vocational training (BMI, 2014a; Worbs, 2017). This change of attitude may be explained with the high-tech boom by the end of the 1990s that caused German employers of the IT service sector to proclaim a lack of qualified employees. The debate now focused on skilled immigration after chancellor Schröder announced that the German government would issue Green Cards to hire highly skilled migrants on the computer trade fair *CEBIT* in March 2000. In a report of an *Immigration Commission*[18] published in 2001, the commission recommended the immigration of 50,000

[18] The commission included members of major political parties, representatives of trade unions, employers and churches.

professionals from abroad and declared that "Germany is and should be a country of immigration". Between 2000 and 2004, immigration of foreign IT professionals was facilitated after Germany opened the borders for 18,000 people who mainly came from Eastern Europe and India (Martin, 2002, p. 4; Currle, 2016; Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017).

Additional reforms promoting the immigration of highly qualified professionals followed in January in 2009 when the law on the regulation of labor migration (*Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz*) came into force. The minimum income highly skilled immigrants had to earn in order to obtain a permanent right of residence was reduced from 86,400 euros to 63,600 Euros annually (§ 19, paragraph 2, No. 3).

In 2001, the *Independent Commission on Migration to Germany* prepared a report that contributed to a debate on migration and immigration which resulted in the passing of the Immigration Law[19] in 2005. Core piece of this law is the Residence Act (*AufenthG*). For the first time, the integration of immigrants and their descendants was promoted as a political goal. While highly skilled immigration was facilitated – highly skilled migrants can apply for a temporary residence permit, in cases of "outstanding" qualifications an unlimited residence permit can be issued right away – the immigration of low-skilled individuals was restricted. The Immigration Law of 2005 was reformed in 2007 to implement EU guidelines. Newly arriving non-EU immigrants who don't know German have to visit mandatory 'integration courses' which include language courses and a course on history, culture and Germany's political system (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 11). The new Residence Act also complicated family reunion for non-EU citizens. Requirements for family reunification with a spouse abroad are that the 'foreigner' with residency in Germany is employed and provides sufficient income and living space. Furthermore, do the partners abroad have to verify that they have passed an A1 German language test (§ 27, paragraph 2, Residence Act).

In 2012, the Residence Act in Germany was amended, to attract highly skilled experts from non-EU countries. This reform was an implementation of the EU-Guideline to encourage highly skilled immigration by providing EU Blue Cards to facilitate the process of issuing work and residence permits in the EU (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 11). To receive a Blue Card, immigrants who can fill the shortage of labor supply

[19] Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern

with their skills in the areas of science, mathematics, engineering, IT and medicine must at least earn 3,302 Euro every month while people in other skilled professions must at least earn 4,234 Euro a month (Verein für soziales Leben e.V., 2020).

Migration policies in 2015 were mainly concerned with registration, accommodation and livelihood for refugees. Public authorities at the municipal, federal and national level were not prepared and struggled with the high number of asylum applications. The number of asylum applications only decreased after the EU-Turkey refugee convention became effective (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 14).

In August 2016, the Integration Act was ratified. Like the integration policies since 2000, the Integration Act follows the tenet of "support and encourage" (*Fördern und Fordern*). Accordingly, immigrants are indebted to learn German, and to accept the "values that are important in Germany". The receiving society in Germany on the other hand is obliged

> "to guarantee immigrants access to all important areas of society, business and politics, characterized by equal opportunities and equal treatment, by recognizing and breaking down existing barriers". (BMI, 2014b, p. 51)

The law is mostly concerned with regulating asylum applicants' residence, the acquirement of language skills and labor market participation (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 14). An additional law to encourage skilled labor migration from third countries is the *Fachkräfteeinwanderungsgesetz*, passed in August 2019. The law implements EU regulations concerning immigration and residence of non-EU migrants. Like the amended Residence Act, the law addresses Germany's skill shortage in jobs in the areas of mathematics, information technology, sciences, engineering and in the trade sector (BMI, 2020).

Securitization of Islam: The Integration Summit and the German Islam Conference

The annual *Summit on Integration* and the *German Islam Conference* were both established in 2006. Both meetings were a signal by German politicians that immigrants should participate in a dialogue. The annual Summit on integration later resulted in the *National Integration Plan* and in the *National Action Plan for Integration*. The Islam Conference[20] supported the introduction Islamic religious instruction at schools and the

[20] Members of the conference are representatives of the federal government, of the federal states (*Länder*) and representatives of local councils as well as representatives of the Muslim communities and independent Muslim personalities (Kaya, 2009, p. 171).

foundation of Centers of Islamic Theology for the education of school teachers, theologians and imams (Musch, 2012; Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017).

Muslim organizations have criticized the Islam Conference for an overemphasis of security-policy aspects addressing Islam. This legitimate criticism also addresses the fact that the Islam Conference is part of the ministry of interior which answers to domestic security in Germany (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 13). This governmental strategy is also reflected by the topics discussed at the Islam Conference, i.e., religious extremism or the role of women in Islam. Instead of developing an authentic dialogue with immigrants and postmigrants, addressing them individually, the Christian Democrat government has addressed them with a cultural and religious discourse (Kaya, 2009, p. 170).

After 9/11, the train bombings in Madrid on (11 March 2007) and the suicide bombings in London (7 July 2005), Muslims have become "a shared 'security' concern for Western governments" and been made the object of securitization policies (Humphrey, 2009, pp. 136, 138). Responses to these and other attacks have "focused on immigration issues" although the perpetrators of the bombings were by no means strangers; most of them were postmigrants and citizens of the very societies they attacked (Kaya, 2009, pp. 7–8). Although the perpetrators' ideology by no means represents the vast majority of Muslim people in Europe nor the heterogeneity of Islam in Europe, Europe's Muslims' "citizenship has become increasingly conditional on their 'performance' as citizens by active efforts to integrate on the one hand and their rejection of radical Islam on the other" (Humphrey, 2009, p. 136). Kaya underlines that:

> "The security discourse conceals the fact that ethnic/religious/identity claims of migrants and their reluctance to integrate actually result from existing structural problems of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, xenophobia, heterophobia, nationalism and racism. To put it differently, the public perception of migration as the principal source of present disorder masks the actual causes of the globalized social-political discontent." (2009, p. 8)

Moreover, the German state has prevented the organization of Islam in Germany by authorizing the diaspora institution *DİTİB* (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs) to organize Turkish-Muslim communities in Germany. DİTİB is associated with the Turkish state's Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Işleri Türk-Islam Birliği*) which centrally manages religious affairs in Turkey and reports to the prime ministry. *Diyanet* provides clerics, weekly sermons, religious education and is in charge

of the construction of mosques in Turkey. While Diyanet was institutionalized aiming at the secular Turkish state's control of Islam in Turkey, DİTİB's role is to do the same for the Turkish Sunni Muslim community in Germany. Since DİTİB only represents Sunni Islam and since Diyanet is a Turkish state institution for Sunni-Islam in Turkey, a representative bottom-up Islam in Germany representing Sunni Muslims could not assert itself. By choosing DİTİB as a representative organ for Islam in Germany[21], the German state has neglected other Muslim communities and minorities and Muslim people from other countries (Humphrey, 2009, pp. 140–141; Kaya, 2009, pp. 169–170).

Immigration from Turkey

The 2000s marked a decrease in immigration from Turkey to Germany which lasted until 2015. I have outlined that for three decades of the last century migration from Turkey mainly occurred in the course of family reunification. This type of migration only decreased between 2002 and 2013 (see figure 1) probably because of the new Residence Act that complicated family reunion (see above). The sharp increase in visa applications for family reunification can be explained with the refugee crisis in 2015/2016 since the number of applications decreases again after 2017.

[21] These institutional practices of organizing Islam in Germany also derive from the German state's recognition of religions. While officially recognized religions also receive state funding in the form of the church tax (*Kirchensteuer*), Muslim congregations do not benefit from this tax. German state authorities collect and redistribute a church tax constituting the primary budget of recognized churches including Catholic and Protestant churches as well as Jewish congregations (Robbers, 1996; Heimann, 2016).



Figure 2: Family Reunification Visa Issued in Turkey

The decline in migration from Turkey to Germany can also be explained with decreasing numbers of asylum applications. While in 2002, 9,575 people from Turkey applied for asylum in Germany, this number dropped to 1,408 people in 2008. Between 2010 and 2015 asylum applications did not exceed 1,578 people and remained stable (BMI – BAMF, 2020, p. 275). This decline in the 2000s is also explained with more restricted regulations concerning asylum applications (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 8). The human rights situation in Turkey changed during the first terms of the AKP as the Turkish-Kurdish conflict somewhat deescalated due to peace talks. Additionally, Germany became a less attractive country of immigration, among other reasons due to curtailments of the German welfare state. Since 2016, asylum applications of Turkish citizens are on the rise again (from 1,578 applications in 2015 to 10,160 applications in 2018 (10,784 applications in 2019)), a development that can be explained with the authoritarian shift in Turkey (BMI – BAMF, 2020, p. 275, 281; see also section 3.8.).

In the course of state efforts to restrict lower-skilled immigration while facilitating highly skilled immigration, the number of Turkey-origin immigrants visiting a university in Germany has been rising. In 2000, 825 people migrated from Turkey to Germany to pursue an academic education. This number rose to 3,517 people in 2017 (BMI – BAMF, 2019, p. 264). After 2012 immigration to Germany has increased as many people from EU countries have entered the country due to the financial crisis, among them many university graduates (Hanewinkel and Oltmer, 2017, p. 4).

Upward Mobility of German-Turkish People

The first generations from Turkey and their descendants have experienced significant upward mobility. In comparison to the 1980s when Turkish immigrants' self-employed wholesale and retail businesses were mainly located in the trade sector and gastronomy – still an important sector today – there is a growing number of businesses in the service sector, construction management and craft businesses. While these businesses have professionalized and grown in number and hired employees, German-Turkish businesses can also be found in the sectors of computer engineering, business consultancy, architecture and law (Zentrum für Türkeistudien, 2006, p. 5; Werner, 2009).

Despite structural discrimination and disadvantages in the light of the state's longstanding absence in shaping immigration, German-Turkish people have become public figures in Germany including artists, professional sportspeople and representatives of political parties.[22]

From Sarrazin to the rise of the AfD

In 2010, Sarrazin's contested book *Germany Does away with Itself* was published and became a bestseller. Employing extremely racist arguments evocative of national-socialist eugenics, he claims that the German population is thinning out and decreasingly intelligent in average because intelligent German women do not give birth and because of immigration from Muslim countries. According to Sarrazin, the "genes" of Turkish immigrants are responsible for their alleged 'failure' in the German school system. Sarrazin was a former board member of the Bundesbank, a Finance Senator for Berlin and a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD).[23]

Although Sarrazin's arguments are based on conventional racist rhetoric and have been broadly objected by public figures, the problem is that his statements have gained "wide

[22] For example, Sevim Dağdelen (Die LINKE) for the left-wing party, Berivan Aymaz and Cem Özdemir for the Green Party (Die Grünen), Aydan Özoğuz and Lale Akgün for the Social Democrats (SPD) and Serap Güler for the Christian Democrats (CDU)

[23] The party's attempts to expel him from the SPD, have been dismissed by arbitration committees (Böl/dpa/dapd, 2011). In 2020, ten years later, a final decision in the party expulsion proceedings against Thilo Sarrazin is ongoing. A third lawsuit concerning his expulsion from the SPD was initiated in 2018 after Sarrazin's book "Hostile Takeover: How Islam hinders progress and threatens society" was published containing again highly racist statements. In January 2020, the Berlin state arbitration commission decided that Sarrazin can be expelled from the party. The decision is still not final as Sarrazin's lawyers declared that Sarrazin would go all the way to the SPD Federal Arbitration Court which has a last say in the matter (Tagesschau, 2020).

publicity" and "popular support" since his book became a bestseller. Habermas states: "The poison that Mr. Sarrazin had released by reinforcing cultural hostility to immigrants with genetic arguments seemed to have taken root in popular prejudices." (Habermas, 2010)

Prepared by securitization policies regarding Islam and the public discourse on Islam (see also section 3.6.), an Islamophobic political discourse further gained momentum with the rise of local populist parties in Germany and the rise of the *Alternative for Germany* (AfD, *Alternative für Deutschland*) in 2013, the first established right-wing party in Germany after World War II. The motive of the party foundation was how the crisis of the EU monetary union was handled by EU-Institutions and member states. Initially, the party represented itself as connecting a liberal market-economy perspective with socially conservative positions, concentrating on the Euro currency. After the party's success in three elections of eastern federal states in Germany, the party drifted to the far right-wing in 2014. Under chairwoman Frauke Petry, the party's success continued despite inner conflicts. Due to the immigration of refugees in 2015, the party achieved a record-high in federal state elections of 2016. In 2017, the party gained 12.6 percent of the votes in the general elections of the *Bundestag* and moved into the Bundestag as the third strongest party. With slogans like "Islam does not belong to Germany" and notions like *superalienation* (*Überfremdung*) in the basic program of the AfD in 2016, the party feeds on an anti-Muslim discourse and constructs Muslims as threat.[24] Similar to many public statements, politicians in Germany have made (see section 3.6.), a Muslim non-German Other is constructed as opposite of 'Germanness', regardless of language skills, being born/raised in Germany or identifying as German. What is new about the AfD language, is the representation and construction of Muslims as invaders and threat. The rise of the AfD was paralleled with the foundation of *PEGIDA* (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident), a right-wing populist and anti-Muslim organization. PEGIDA successfully organized street demonstrations with up to 17,000-25,000 demonstrators (Berger, Poppe and Schuh, 2016). The organization employs an orientalist discourse stereotyping Muslims as the

[24] In the party program for the general elections of 2017, it says: "In the spread of Islam and the presence of over five million Muslims, whose number is constantly growing, the AfD sees a great danger for our state, our society and our values." (AfD, 2017)

Others of Europe and criticizes Merkel's government and European immigration and asylum policies.

The post 9/11 public discourse on Islam that has been exploited by right-wing populists has paved the ground for general anti-Muslim attitudes in the broader society of Germany. The survey *Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2018* found that the proportion of people agreeing with the statement "Muslims' immigration to Germany should be prohibited" increased from 35,5 percent in 2014, to 44,1 in 2018. The percentage of people agreeing with the statement "Because of the many Muslims here I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country" in the general population in Germany rose from 43 percent in 2014 to 55.8 percent in 2018. In East Germany, there is a stronger increase from 33.9 percent to 54.8 percent (Decker *et al.*, 2018, p. 102). Even though anti-Muslim attitudes have decreased in 2020 in Germany, they are still widely spread. The authors argue that the higher anti-Muslim attitudes in East-Germany can be interpreted in the light of surveys which indicate that lacking contact is a cause for resentment (Decker *et al.*, 2020, pp. 64–65). The survey shows that Muslims in Germany are perceived as not belonging to the general citizenry.

Right-Wing Terror Exemplified in the National Socialist Underground

Between 2000 and 2007 the right-wing terrorist organization *National Socialist Underground* (NSU, *National Sozialistischer Untergrund*) assassinated ten people in different cities in Germany. Eight people of Turkey-origin, one person of Greek origin and a police officer.[25] The NSU was discovered only in 2011 due to its self-exposure. The terrorists Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos, who together with Beate Zschäpe formed the core of the group, robbed a bank. When the police approached the getaway vehicle, Uwe Mundlos shot Uwe Böhnhard and committed suicide. Beate Zschäpe set fire to the apartment, all three of them shared and surrendered herself to the police. Beate Zschäpe and four supporters of the NSU were put on trial at the Munich Higher Regional Court. The trial lasted 438 days between 2013 and 2018, including more than 600 witnesses and about 90 joint plaintiffs (Ramelsberger, 2019). The supporter network of the NSU includes an estimated number 120-200 people, among them confidential

[25] The names of the victms are: Enver Şimşek, Abdurrahim Özüdoğru, Süleyman Taşköprü, Habil Kılıç, Mehmet Turgut, İsmail Yaşar, Theodoros Boulgarides, Mehmet Kubaşık, Halit Yozgat and Michèle Kiesewetter.

informants of the Federal Intelligence Service and functionaries of right-wing extremist parties (Bundestag, 2013; Landeszentrale and Bildung, 2013).

Beyond the terrifying deeds of the NSU, it was also scandalous how German state authorities criminalized the victims when they attempted to solve the murders. Neither the police nor the German Intelligence suspected an extreme right-wing motive. Hundreds of officers investigated for years into the wrong direction, criminalizing victims and their families. In 2013, the NSU investigative committee criticized that even when it became apparent that it remained fruitless to suspect "organized crime" as motive, investigators held on to this alleged motive instead of following racist motives for the murders (Radke, 2013). The NSU investigative committee concluded that the few characteristics the murder victims had in common "could not bring them into conflict with any known criminal organization" while the racist motivation of the perpetrators for the crime connected all the victims. Instead of protecting the victims from additional harm, investigative authorities reinforced their suffering,[26] for instance by means of "wrongly and knowingly accusing the murder victims" and tapping the phones of some victims' families (Bundestag, 2013, p. 843). There is no transparency and clarification concerning the files of the NSU court case, since court files are not accessible for the public. The files of the case are closed for at least 30 years including the closure right-wing extremists' files to the local police forces. The state seems to have no interest in making the court files public due to its own involvement concerning confidential informants of the Federal Intelligence Service (Change.org, 2020; epd/mig, 2020).

Germany has a history of right-wing terrorism which is still not acknowledged sufficiently by public authorities and in the public perception. After the NSU terror, right wing-terror in Germany has continued with the planned attack on a Synagogue in Halle in 2019, the attack on the CDU politician Walter Lübcke in the same year, an attack in Munich's Olympia shopping center in 2016 and the terror attack in Hanau in 2020. Public authorities have represented racially motivated offenders as single perpetrators with psychological issues and neglected that they have maintained relations to radicalized social circles (Puls, 2021).

[26] A linguistic analysis of the court case found that actors in the process and journalists continued to maintain a we/them dichotomy that criminalized and excluded the victims not only during the lawsuit but also prior to the NSU's self-exposure in 2011 (Virchow, Thomas and Grittmann, 2015, p. 11; Gür-Şeker *et al.*, 2017, p. 119).

3.6. PARADIGMS OF DIFFERENCE: CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICS OF BELONGING

For understanding attributions of difference vis-à-vis migrants in Germany, some historical paradigms concerning legal and discursive aspects of citizenship provide insights on the social and political context in which those culturalized and religionized attributions of difference are generated.[27]

The legal tradition of citizenship in Germany which connects membership to genealogical descent, stems from the period of romanticism. Although formal citizenship was transformed to membership by birth (*jus soli*) in beginning of the millennium, the contemporary public discourse on immigrants and their descendants can still be situated in this tradition.

Brubaker illuminates the idea of citizenship in Germany by comparing the development of "nationhood" in Germany and France. While the French model of citizenship is "universalist, rationalist assimilationist and state-centered" the German model is "particularist, organic, differentialist and *Volk*-centered". As the French idea of the nation was born politically through the French revolution and "Republican definitions of nationhood and citizenship", it is based on political unity and conceived in terms of state institutions and territory. In comparison, the German national self-identification precedes the nation state. Brubaker argues:

> "Because national feeling developed before the nation-state, the German idea of the nation was not, originally, a political one, nor was it linked with the abstract idea of citizenship. This pre-political German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community – as an irreducibly *Volksgemeinschaft*. On this understanding, nationhood is constituted by ethnocultural unity and expressed in political unity." (Brubaker, 1990, p. 386)

This "ethno-cultural" understanding of nationhood developed before the consolidation of a German nation-state. The German understanding of citizenship developed during the cultural historical era of romanticism between the end of the 18th and throughout the 19th century. In the light of the strong English and French nation states and Napoleon's rule over German states in the beginning of the 19th century, the German bourgeoisie

[27] Due to limitations of space and expertise citizenship discourses concerning "national minorities" or displaced German speakers after World War II are not included here. For the same reason this section does not include the hegemonic citizenship discourses concerning East Germans in West Germany or internal migration trajectories from East to West Germany after Germany's reunification.

established a form of cultural nationalism (*Kulturnationalismus*) that was triggered by discontent with the French occupation. German language became popular, as poets and publicists of the 1770s, who saw themselves as national educators, established 'German' journals and formed language associations. These figures popularized the concept of the *Volk* and attached speakers of German language to an inescapable community bound by language and culture with a common "national character". In doing so, they formulated the basis of an imagined national identity. Germanic peoples were constructed as a homogeneous community of descent and served as a founding myth an imagined continuity of the German *Volk*. Echternkamp locates the beginning of "organized civic nationalism" in the establishment of politicized gymnastics associations where youngsters received pre-military training (1998, pp. 306–307, 337, 483–487). One of the initiators of this movement, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn argues with a *Volksgefühl* (spirit of the folk/nation/ethnic group). According to Jahn, the Volk is bound by the "spirit of nationhood (*Volksthum*)" which is nothing else but "Germanness" (*Deutschheit*). In his opinion, this German nation (*Volk*) was in need of a state just as the state was in need of the *Volksgefühl* (Jahn 1813 quoted in Kaschuba, 2012, p. 27). During the second half of the 19th century the invention of an "ethnic paradigm" – according to which peoples and societies are bound together by ethnicity and therefore by genetic descent – transforms into the idea of eugenic arguments within a nationalist ideology.

The Nazi's invention of a superior master Aryan race (*Herrenrasse*) presented the ideological ground for the devaluation of Jews and anyone else who did not fit into it. In the light of the atrocities of the holocaust and the Third Reich's extermination policy, it is probably puzzling, if not shocking for the international observer that a genealogical understanding of membership in the nation-state as literally based on blood, i. e. race has outlived the holocaust.

The *jus sanguinis* law presented the principle of citizenship in the German constitutional Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*). Outlined in Article 116a of the constitutional Basic Law, the *jus sanguinis* connected citizenship with the ethnicized notion of *Volkszugehörigkeit* (belonging to the folk/ethnic group). Accordingly, *Volkszugehörigkeit* was the fundament of the definition of German citizenship until the beginning of the new millennium. Contemporary social practice and migrants' tactics against the exclusionary treatment of minorities show that Germany's historical legacy of citizenship continues with assumptions of a static, authentic pure essence of German identity as based on the *Volksgemeinschaft* (folk/ethnic community).

Until today, public debates about citizenship carry an understanding of citizenship as defined by genealogical descent. This self-understanding of nationhood results in the exclusion of all those who are not defined within these parameters. In fact, throughout Germany's history of immigration the construction of the 'Other' in the form of migrant groups has served to keep this understanding of citizenship discursively in its ethno-cultural place. This understanding fits into Isin's definition of citizenship as

> "that kind of identity within a city or state that certain agents constitute as virtuous, good, righteous, and superior, and differentiate it from strangers, outsiders, and aliens who they constitute as their alterity via various solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies and technologies. Citizenship exists through its alterity and strategies." (2002, pp. 35–36)

The ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship in Germany as based on nationhood and the resulting othering designations for immigrants who do not fit into this category defined by blood also explains politicians' rejection of the fact that Germany is a country of immigration until the late 1990s (see section 3.4.). More than thirty years after the labor migration recruitment agreement, the emphasis on migrants' difference and Otherness continued to resonate in the 1990s. In fact, the politics of coming to terms with the holocaust have been used to reinforce this understanding of nationhood. While Germany has managed to acknowledge Anti-Semitism as racism, continuities of racism in German society were denied. Only recently the discourse is starting to change as the new generations' claims to belong are slowly being heard and answered.

Räthzel underlines that despite the fact that 15 percent of the Federal Republic's workforce were migrants during 1990s, the denial of this reality led to primarily directing attention to "'integrating' migrants to keep in place the homogeneity of the Kulturnation". Racism did "not exist, only *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* – hostility to foreigners" (1991, p. 45). The racism and racist violence of the 1990s is also explained with continuities of a racialized and ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood in the course of Germany's reunification using the strategy of racializing the Other for the reassurance of German nationhood. According to Räthzel, the reunification was based on an "unquestioned commonsense of the vast majority of West Germans" according to which the West-German nation was created as "blanc sheet" that had overcome its fascist heritage after the Second World War. Germanness was attached to the alleged biological heritage and cultural homogeneity of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. As this "restricted notion of Germanness" was connected to biological descent and to the West German state and economic system, the

constructed and opposing Others were those who "did not have a birthright to a West German passport". These Others were racialized as

> "dark haired, from the poor South, underdeveloped, not speaking the language properly, doing the dirty jobs, of the Muslim region. In short, the Other was Turkish, and all other migrants could be constructed as more or less Turkish, that is more or less under-developed, more or less assimilated." (Räthzel, 1991, pp. 45–46)

Mandel skillfully shows how the treatment of Germany's Others continues to serve a definition of the German citizen-self which includes only those who can claim genealogical German ancestry. She points out how the differential constitutional treatment of Russian German 'settlers' (*Siedler/Aussiedler*), in comparison to other immigrant minorities evokes and carries a concept of German citizenship as based not only on a genealogical descent but also on a racialized understanding of purity. Fundamental for claims to authentic Germanness and an ideal of "belonging to a common people bound by language, history, and tradition" (Mandel, 2008, p. 202). In fact, the criteria according to which *Aussiedler* are included "ultimately exclude those who are deemed non-ethnic Germans. In other words, one does not become German by speaking the language" or by being born in Germany; "rather one is *born* a German" (Mandel, 2008, p. 215). Comparing the constitutional treatment of Russian German settlers (not foreigners) born abroad with the denizenship status of Germany born German-Turkish people, Mandel shows how settlers are entitled to more rights and can make more claims for being accepted as Germans. In the 1990s, newly arriving *Aussiedler* were entitled to two years of state support, enjoying social benefits in the form of "housing, monthly stipends, language classes, free health care, [and] employment assistance". However, *Aussiedler* who do not perform their identities in an institutional context proving their Germanness are conceived as exploiting the benefits the German government provided to them. Mandel identifies a language of 'purity' politicians have used to address immigrants and postmigrants with in the 1990s. Moreover, her fieldwork findings illustrate how this discourse translates into the everyday life of 'Turkey-origin peoples' experiences with "perceived racialized difference". According to the law on the persecution of exiled Germans, those claiming citizenship had to have experienced suffering as based on their German "ethnicity" and revive such experiences in interviews with German state authorities which – depending on their performance – qualified them for citizenship. Accordingly, these new citizen

subjects "in some sense […] were seen as the representation of the nation having suffered for its sins" (Mandel, 2008, pp. 206–214).

Strategic Othering of Immigrants and Lacking Political Rights

In the words of Sökefeld: Germany's immigrants with migration background from Turkey in particular have been addressed discursively within a "paradigm of difference" (Sökefeld, 2004) in the public discourse and in research.[28] Two points concerning the representation along paradigms of difference several authors stress: Firstly, immigrants are continuously represented together with problems. Secondly, immigrants are represented with a language that underlines 'their' alleged difference from the ethnic German majority.

Problem-focused descriptions and keywords have revolved around conflicted identities, identity-crises, in-betweenness, degeneration, delinquency and integration and orientation problems (Wolbert, 1995; Sökefeld, 2004; Kaschuba, 2007; Kaya, 2007, 2009; Mandel, 2008; Riegel and Geisen, 2009; Tošić and Streissler, 2009). Kaya underlines that despite having experienced significant upward mobilization,

> "German-Turks have been continually misrepresented both in Germany and Turkey. The labels attached to them include derogatory terms such as 'in-between', 'foreigner', 'German-like' (*Almancı*), 'degenerated', 'conservative', 'radical', 'nationalist', and/or 'lost generations'. All these problem-oriented representations have acquired wide popularity in both countries. It seems that the popularity of these labels spring from a holistic notion of culture, which has wide usage in both countries." (Kaya, 2009, p. 44)

Academic publications in Germany have represented "Turkish culture" often – under reference to Islam – as homogeneous, traditional and as tied to rigid 'values' such as 'honor' and "patriarchal authoritarian structures" between women and men and

[28] Wolbert deconstructs a study by Hansen (1989) as a representative example for a deterministic assumption of culture concerning German-Turkish peoples' identities in the 1980s. Asking for identity constructions of second-generation German-Turkish adolescents who moved to Turkey in the course of a family decision, the author assumes that these adolescents are conflicted 'between' two cultures. According to Wolbert, Hansen represents these youngsters' cultural identities as if they could be situated at a fixpoint of a scale along the poles German and Turkish while their parents' return decision is interpreted as rupture with their biographic experiences in Germany and conceived as second emigration. Wolbert criticizes that research on return migration does not conceive return as a process but instead as a static before and after situation. Problems continue with reintegration problems in Turkey which are described as identity conflict between two cultures. As a consequence, attempts of reintegration were interpreted as opposing the personal identity of returnees. Wolbert underlines that the hidden assumption of such research was a perception of culture as closed static entity not leaving any space for individual practices, creativity and strategies of reintegration. Moreover, migrants' perspectives of and motives for a return were often excluded in this research (Wolbert, 1995, pp. 16–20).

generations (Sökefeld, 2004, p. 18). The representation of immigrants and their descendants as conflicted between the homogeneous culture of the first generation's country of origin and the homogeneous culture of the country of settlement explains why immigrants are represented as torn between two cultures. If 'a culture' is a set of norms and values, migration necessarily has to become a problem as those static cultural entities have *different* norms and values, that in this reading become irreconcilable and eventually have to clash. This 'clash' of cultures leads to a culture conflict between two groups or the inner worlds of cultural subjects standing "between the cultures" (Sökefeld, 2001, 2004; Tošić and Streissler, 2009).

A language that addresses the cultural difference of migrants either highlighting ethnicity, religion or both as markers of their otherness shows that a normative discourse of German nationhood as based on genealogical descent endures in the public discourse in Germany. Concerning the language of difference, Thränhardt underlines that designations for immigrants in Germany always carried an excluding connotation and that this terminology's "history of exclusion" draws on Germany's tradition of national self-definition as based on "biological elements from the tradition of romanticism" (1984, p. 116). The notion *Gastarbeiter* (guest-worker) carries contradictory implications since "guests are actually not allowed to work, especially not only in bad jobs" (Thränhardt, 1984, p. 115). *Gastarbeiter* was chosen to replace terms like *Fremdarbeiter* (foreign worker) and *Zwangsarbeiter* (forced laborer) that the German Reich and the Nazi regime used to label forced laborers from Poland and Italy. Since the term *Fremdarbeiter* was associated with Hitler fascism's policy of annihilation and suppression the euphemism *Gastarbeiter* did not have such connotations (Thränhardt, 1984, p. 115; Wilpert, 1984, p. 306). The designation guest-worker was substituted by the term *ausländische Arbeitnehmer* (foreign employees) in the beginning of the 1970s. In the 1980s *Ausländische Mitbürger* (foreign fellow citizens) was replaced by the designation Ausländer (foreigner).

Since an ethnic sense of belonging is often uttered in a context of racism and exclusion, immigrants can respond with a stronger emphasis of difference which results in further marginalization and exclusion from majority society. Kaya (2001, 2009, pp. 30–31, 47) has underlined that the reemphasis by Turkey-origin immigrants' cultural difference is connected to their legal rights. The legal citizenship status of permanent residence has endowed them with civil rights and social rights but not with political rights, a status of non-naturalized EU immigrants which Hammar has described as *denizenship* (2016).

Based on Marshall's definition of citizenship (1950) as political, social and civil rights, Hammar (2016) has used the notion of *denizenship* to refer to those immigrants and their descendants who do not have the nationality in their countries of settlement and birth. Those immigrants are entitled with social and civil rights but have no political rights (see also section 3.4.).

Since those non-naturalized Turkey-origin immigrants had no political rights and political participation in Germany was impossible, they have built organizational structures along political, ethnic and religious lines as some directed their political attention to Turkey where they have political rights. This was also welcomed by political actors and institutions in Germany (see sections 3.4., 3.5.). Spivak has underlined that re-emphasis of cultural difference by oppressed groups can also be read as a political tactic of minority groups. Accordingly, minority groups can use the categories of gender, ethnicity or culture used against them to politically organize and to achieve equal rights despite differing diversified identities within such groups (Spivak, Landry and MacLean, 1996, p. 204).

The transformation of German citizenship law which became effective on January 1st in 2000, was preceded by the initiative of immigrants who publicly demanded the right to *jus soli* and to dual citizenship. The campaign was launched in 1993 and signed by one million people (Koşan, 1993). Germany's citizenship policies became legally more inclusionary when the citizenship law was reformed from the *jus sanguinis* to the *jus soli* principle (see section 3.5.).

Although politicians for the most part acknowledge that immigration exists in Germany, the terminology used continues with the strategic denial of fact that Germany has become a home for many immigrants and their families. Sökefeld points out that old positions are maintained by constantly employing the notion *Zuwanderung* (in-migration) instead of immigration. In 2004, he states: "The use of a new word tries to maintain the impression that it is still about something other than the immigration that took place long ago." (2004, p. 14). There is also the term *Abwanderung* for emigration. While *zu* means to/towards/at/on and not in, *ab* means from/off/away/ex but not out. Considering the above-mentioned terms designating immigrants, etymologically speaking the term stands in a history of excluding designations that have denied immigration. In 2008, Mandel notes:

> "The prefixitive neutral rendering of migrant minus the intention to permanently settle, dominates the discourse. Notionally, if Turks are not

> permitted to be immigrants – then presumably they will return to Turkey at some point and are not in need of integration via language." (Mandel, 2008, p. 217)

Unfortunately, *Zuwanderung* and *Abwanderung* are used so widely today, that they have become substitutes for immigration and emigration also for academics who are immigrants.

Culturalization of Islam

Despite the transformation of German citizenship law, the public discourse still underlines immigrants' and their descendants' difference to mainstream society. A shifted more inclusive understanding of immigration and integration in Germany after 2000 has been paralleled with a new othering discourse that continues with the heritage of a *Volk*-based understanding of membership. The static notion of the foreigner's different culture which impeded his*her integration is now replaced (or combined) with essentialized stereotypes towards Islam and the ones designated as Muslims. After the attacks of 9/11, Huntington's civilizational and orientalist discourse and his thesis of the *Clash of Civilizations* (1993) has been reproduced over and over. Accordingly, "the major obstacle behind the problem of integration was the distinctiveness of Islam, which is somehow essentialized by the German government as a religion with certain codes and customs preventing migrants from integrating into German society" (Kaya, 2009, pp. 171–172).

The migration policies of the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats' coalition government between 2005 and 2009 marked the securitization of Islam in Germany. The establishment of the *Conference of Islam* under the ministry of interior which answers to domestic security in Germany shows how Islam started to be perceived as security threat. Moreover, it reflects the government's assumptions about Turkey-origin immigrants and their descendants who are now often represented within essentialized stereotypes about Islam (see section 3.5.). Likewise, the Christian Democrats' notion of German guiding culture (*Leitkultur*) has to be situated into a broader discursive racialization of the category Muslim after 9/11. Firstly, used in 1998, the Christian Democrats promoted the concept three more times. According to a Christian Democrat Union document for the immigration commission in 2000, German *Leitkultur* was defined by German language, "values of the Christian Occident" and a liberal-democratic basic order (Sökefeld, 2004, p. 10). Friedrich Merz, the former leader of the Christian Democrat Union/Christian-Social Union (CDU-*Christliche Demokratische*

Union/CSU-*Christlich Soziale Union*) brought up the notion in 1999. It was broadly discussed in German talk shows and other mainstream media outlets. While proponents advocated a notion of an exclusive hegemonic German *Hochkultur* (high culture) discussing notions of Germanness and tradition, it evoked a discussion about foreigners in Germany and opponents argued that the term was an "euphemism for 'xenophobia'" (Mandel, 2008, p. 219).

The *Leitkultur* debate reemerged in 2004, after the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered. Markus Söder, head of the Bavarian Christian-Social Union (CSU), a sister party of the Christian Democrats (CDU), evoked a "clash of civilizations" when they referred to the murder warning that something similar could occur in Germany as well. The events in the Netherlands served Söder as proof to the need of *Leitkutur* in Germany as he stated:

> "When we look at the recent events in the Netherlands, we see a clash of civilizations in full, and we must prevent anything similar from evolving here […]. We need a change in our integration policy which ought to be based strictly on the values and notion of a modern Christian Society."

Meanwhile, Merkel declared that the multicultural society had "failed" at a party congress of the Christian Social Union in 2004 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2004). Following this reasoning of German culture, an immigrant from Turkey may perfectly speak German and identify with the German constitution. Based on this civilizational interpretation, labelled as Muslim, s*he will never belong to German society defined as Christian.

These discussions about Islam and Muslim people as security issue and the Other of the German nation explain the wide popularity of Sarrazin's 2010 published book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* which entailed racist and Islamophobic arguments that can be traced back to the Nazis' eugenic arguments of race (see section 3.5.). The same year, Angela Merkel held a speech in front of the youth organizations of the Christian Democrats and the Bavarian Christion Social Union and declared again that Multiculturalism has "absolutely failed". In the same speech she mentioned that immigrants should be "supported and encouraged" (*fördern und fordern*). According to Merkel, demands and challenges towards immigrants (*Zuwanderer*) had not sufficiently been stipulated in the past. In the same speech, she demanded that immigrants should not only abide German law but also be proficient in German language. This emphasis not only implied that immigrants have problems with abiding the law (AFP/dpa/str,

2010; YouTube, 2010). Her speech additionally implied that Germany-born descendants of immigrants are incapable of speaking German. Othering immigrants with the gendered stereotypes of difference, she constructed a homogenizing picture of Muslim culture as coercive towards women and girls when she continued her speech, stating that Muslim girls should participate in school trips as much as in swimming lessons. Excluding all immigrants and Germany-born Muslim people from the German national community, she additionally underlined the importance of "German traditions" as shaped by the Jewish-Christian heritage in the same breath attempting to alleviate her statement by stressing that Islam belongs to Germany (Ibid.).

A couple of days later, Horst Seehofer, the party leader of the CSU reused the concept of guiding culture again declaring: "We as Union [the alliance of CDU and CSU] stand up for the German *Leitkultur* and against multiculturalism (*Multi-Kulti*). Multiculturalism is dead." (K., 2010) Reiterating the slogan that "Germany is not a country of immigration", ten years after German governments finally declared the opposite, Seehofer added that even highly skilled immigration should not cumulate in "uncontrolled" immigration. He went on in stating:

> "Integration does not mean living side by side but living together on the common foundation of our constitution's values and our German guiding culture, which is characterized by its Christian-Jewish roots and by Christianity, humanism and enlightenment." (Dapd/Reuters/grc/jab, 2010)

In the light of the holocaust, the sheer ignorance of Seehofer's statements is stunning. Habermas argues that the discourse on *Leitkultur* is no longer defined by "German culture" but by religion. Members of the German nation are defined by religion:

> "With an arrogant appropriation of Judaism –and an incredible disregard for the fate the Jews suffered in Germany– the apologists of the *Leitkultur* now appeal to the 'Judeo-Christian tradition', which distinguishes 'us' from foreigners." (Habermas, 2010)

By constructing a continuity with Jewish and Christian tradition, the latter is instrumentalized for a concept of citizenship that culturalizes religion with the concept of *Leitkultur*, as Seehofer refers to Jewish traditions in order to exclude Muslims. Despite the principle of *jus soli*, this rhetoric shows again that inclusion and recognition are not a matter of fact as a person who has taken up permanent residence in Germany for decades, was born, raised and educated there and speaks mother tongue German is not seen as a member when s*he is Muslim.

The construction of a civilizational clash of cultures between the Muslim world and the Christian West has affected the representation of German-Turkish people in Germany. The label Muslim has replaced the designation guest worker, foreigner or Turks as Others. All these labels distract from interethnic commonalities and shared social divisions, such as class, gender or other group memberships. Riegel and Geisen identify an orientalist upgrading of the 'western' Self after the 9/11 attacks, along progress and civilization that goes together with a devaluation of alleged Others along ethnicized and gendered ascriptions of difference (2009, p. 15).

Brubaker underlines that populisms in Northern and Western Europe feed on this very civilizational discourse. Self and Other are no longer constructed on a national basis, but in civilizational notions based on a "civilizational threat from Islam" (2017, p. 1). In Europe,

> "anti-Muslimism […] has an identitarian and civilizational dimension […]. It draws on the historical trope of "antemurale Christianitatis" – the idea, central to nationalist historiography and myth throughout the region, of ECE [East Central European] nations as 'bulwarks of Christianity' against Islam." (Brubaker, 2017, p. 19)

The rise of populism in North and West European countries has been constructed around a binary opposition of Self and Other in a civilizational discourse that constructs Islam as threat. Brubaker observes a "partial shift from nationalism to 'civilizationism'" that "has been driven by the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam". An outcome of this civilizational discourse is "an identitarian 'Christianism', a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech."(2017, p. 1). The analysis of migration policies in Germany and corresponding conceptions of citizenship vis-a-vis immigrants and their descendants benefits from the conceptual language of belonging (see section 2.2.). Concepts of belonging help to deconstruct labels attached to German-Turkish people as strategic attributions of difference which construct immigrants as the Other of the German citizen and nation. Assumptions of cultural difference (attributions of belonging) create social boundaries at the intersections of the social divisions of migrant, gender, religion and ethnicity (see section 2.3.4.). The crucial role of gender in combination with religion and ethnicity in labelling immigrants and postmigrants has also been highlighted by various authors. The orientalist devaluation of Middle Eastern countries and Islam as done in public representations of Muslim people serves the construction of a national Self as civilized and progressive and can be interpreted as the continuation of a tradition-

modernity paradigm of the 1980s and 1990s (Riegel and Geisen, 2009, p. 13). Riegel and Geisen comment the dynamics of gender[29] in the public debate along this binary opposition:

> "The focus of this debate is, for example, on male youths with an (alleged) Islamic religious affiliation from Turkey or the Middle East. They are often perceived as a threat and placed at the focus of attention. Exclusion works by the mere assumption or suspicion of 'Islamic fundamentalism' and 'terrorism'." (Ibid.)

Based on their empirical research the authors illuminate the intersectional character of othering ascriptions. Gender roles are culturalized and placed in ethnicized contexts: While male adolescents are criminalized and serve as an example for failed integration, female adolescents are represented as oppressed victims of patriarchal family relations (Riegel and Geisen, 2009, pp. 15–16). In a similar vein, Riegel applies the concepts of belonging to the empirical data she collected in a socio-biographic inquiry.[30] She shows that especially young women with a background of migration from Turkey are confronted with questions and expectations that culturalize or ethnicize their role as a women and girls in situations that confront them with racist, nationalist and sexist ideologies supporting rigid patterns of social inclusion and exclusion (2003, pp. 59–60). Riegel shows how assumptions of contradicting cultures in public discourse construct an orientalist opposition between countries as in the case of Germany and Turkey. While one country is associated with equal gender relations and is categorized as modern and democratic, opposing countries are characterized by gender inequality and constructed as traditional and backward. Gendered oppression is perceived as a cultural characteristic of a society that is categorized as "different". That is, the speakers in such discourses as representatives of majority society, interpret the position of women only culturally along contradicting poles of emancipation and patriarchal dominance (2003, p. 71). Similar arguments have been made by Erel (2002, 2009). The victimization of women with migration background from Turkey as powerless subjects of oppression and abuse has not only disguised the internal differentiation and agency within the group

[29] On the construction of "masculinities" of Turkish immigrants as "patriarchal" along the categories of migrant, ethnicity and gender see Scheibelhofer (Scheibelhofer, 2014)

[30] She interviewed female adolescents between the age of sixteen and nineteen on the transition from school to employment. She contextualizes these young women as agents confronted with attributions of difference based on overlapping categories of gender and ethnicity. Addressing an agency and practice-related perspective, Riegel asks how these young women position themselves and deal with ascriptions. On the other hand, Riegel foregrounds the intersectionality of gender, ethnicity and age in these processes of ascription.

assigned as Turkish women. Ethnicized and gendered ascriptions primarily seem to serve the construction of Germanness. Erel shows how the image of the objectified Turkish or Muslim woman as the "Other of German society" serves to represent the 'German woman' as "modern, emancipated Western women who enjoys gender equality" and constructed a "dichotomy of 'modern German' versus 'traditional Turkish' gender and family relations" (2002, 127, 132).

These examples illustrate that the strategic discourse of citizenship in Germany has shifted from an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship and nationhood to an ethno-religious discourse. Throughout German post World War history immigrants and their descendants have been othered. Although, the perception and language of citizenship after the legal transformation to the *jus soli* principle became more inclusive in the beginning of 2000s, this development has been coupled by new othering discourse on the basis of religion. Right-wing populism in Germany which gained momentum with the establishment of the AfD and during the refugee crisis in 2015/2016 has successfully appropriated an Islamophobic discourse that resonated after 9/11 (see section 3.5.).

Contrary to the representation of Muslims in Germany as homogeneous mass, people who identify as Muslim present highly differentiated groups of international immigrants and postmigrants. people in Germany. Moreover, Muslim people of Turkey-origin alone constitute a very diversified population along lines of ethnicity, socio-economic background and in terms of their religious belonging with different congregations, such as Sunni, Alevi and Shiite (Haug, Müssig and Stichs, 2009; Kaya, 2009).

Connecting immigration merely to religion not only overemphasizes the role Islam may play in the everyday life of immigrants. What is lacking, is an informed discussion about Islam as a religion which people practice in their day-to-day lives and a discussion which actually involves the people designated as Muslim without reducing them to stereotypical assumptions. A discussion with self-identified Muslim women for example, could bear the potential to deconstruct an essentialized image of Islam along security issues and patriarchal oppression of women.

Moreover, the focus on Islam conceals that first, second and third generation German-Turkish people may not identify with Islam. The ethnicization of Turkey-origin migrants and all the other labels that have concentrated on immigrants' and postmigrants' alleged otherness from majority society in Germany construct a contrast between 'us' and the 'them' that does not allow for their self-identification as

‘Germans’. The repetitive representation of immigrants along paradigms of difference distracts from commonalities with the majority based on allegiances beyond ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. People approached with paradigms of difference talk back and long have become members participating and identifying with society in Germany. Their membership and political participation in fact has transformed a narrow sense of citizenship as far as legal amendments are concerned and in a broader sense as far as debates about the idea of citizenship are concerned. Their practices show that their senses of belonging transcend unambiguous notions of ethnicity and that they have developed a range of tactics to respond to the labels attached to them. In the case of second and third generation German-Turkish women, their narratives and everyday life practices show that citizenship practices as much as their sense of belonging and loyalties are translocal and hyphenated.

Immigrants and Germany born postmigrants make claims to legal citizenship and they respond to attributions of difference and everyday racism with struggles for recognition. Such struggles also concern their multiple cultural allegiances. The #MeTwo debate of 2018 is an example for recent political struggles for recognition and claims for membership to the citizenry in Germany. Inspired by the initiative of women who publicly uncovered experiences with sexualized violence under the Twitter hashtag #MeToo, the activist Ali Can the initiated a political discussion about experiences of everyday racism under the hashtag #MetTwo in July 2018. The debate erupted in social media and received a broad echo in mainstream media after Mesut Özil resigned from the German national football team. Due to a political controversy, that erupted after Özil posed on a photo with the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he was subject to racialized attacks and hate speech. Stating that identification with Germany and the parents’ homeland must not be a contradiction Ali Can quoted Özil who had stated “I have two hearts, one German and Turkish.” (BBC NEWS, 2018). Under the hashtag #MeTwo Germany-born postmigrants talked about their everyday experiences with racism. Their accounts illustrate that they are still not perceived as full citizens and members of mainstream society, despite their upbringing in Germany. By criticizing and shedding light on their experiences, they stood up against the culturalist political discourse claiming recognition for their identification with Germany and their simultaneous attachment to their parents’ ‘culture’.

The #MeTwo debate received a broad echo and to some extend transformed the representation of immigrants in German mainstream media. Different voices made

themselves heard, representing the diversity of Germany born people with migration background. Simultaneously, different voices addressed the intersectional nature of attributions of belonging along lines of gender, ethnicity and socio-economic background by stressing educational and professional success. Women highlighted that not all female descendants of migrants are uneducated and socio-economically disadvantaged. It can be argued that their claims for recognition as upwardly mobile bi-cultural citizen subjects and their public condemnation of everyday experiences with racism in Germany result from a primordial understanding of citizenship continues and has been transforming citizenship. During and after the BlackLivesMatter protests, black Germans and other minorities made their voices heard and are finally receiving the attention of the dominant group of citizens, they deserve. Postmigrants transform citizenship with spokespeople like Ali Can, Alice Hasters, Kübra Gümüşay, Tupoka Ogette, Ferda Ataman, Hasnain Kazim and many others who show that a public debate about racism is many years overdue. Even though some members of the dominant group of citizens are listening, this debate is coupled with a right-wing backlash in Germany and many other societies all around Europe.

Contemporary Nominal and Discursive Citizenship Practice in Turkey

Prior to the amendment of citizenship law from the *jus sanguinis* to the *jus soli* principle in 2000, immigrants who applied for legal citizenship in Germany had to renounce their original citizenship. With the *jus soli* Principle, Germany born children with immigrant parents were endowed with dual citizenship until the age of 23 when they had to renounce one nationality (*Optionspflicht* – option obligation; see section 3.5.). Only in 2014, this law was amended to finally recognize dual citizenship of Germany born children who were born after 2000 and hold an additional nationality (BGBl. - Federal Law Journal I, p. 1714, BMI, 2014; Worbs, 2017).

European states of immigration slowly have started to acknowledge dual citizenship. Apart from France (1973), Switzerland (1992) and Sweden (2001), more recently Belgium (2008) and Denmark (2015) allow dual citizenship. Like other countries with significant proportions of emigrants, Turkey accepts dual citizenship. In fact, many Turkey-origin people residing in other countries hold dual citizenship. During the 1980s and 1990s, a common practice of some Turkish citizens was to officially abandon their Turkish citizenship, to naturalize as German citizens and to reapply for Turkish citizenship at a local Turkish embassy. The Turkish state *de facto* allowed dual

citizenship as it retained Turkish citizenship for those people who would naturalize in Germany, despite the German state's position against dual citizenship. Like other countries of emigration, the Turkish state has a vested interest in keeping its expatriates as citizens. The lobbying activities of expatriate citizens who maintain political, economic and religious ties also guarantees the flow of remittances, the Turkish economy depended on (Çağlar, 2004, pp. 277–280; see section 3.2.). It is worth noting that the flow of remittances has sharply decreased in the 2000s, probably because of weaker transnational ties and a changed method of collecting corresponding data (Kaya and Adaman, 2011a, p. 46).

It is also likely that many German-Turkish people were not informed about this practice. The low proportion of naturalizations of Turkey-origin immigrants and their descendants is explained with the fact that they had to give up their Turkish nationality. Until 1996, Turkish citizens who would naturalize in their countries of settlement lost their property rights in Turkey. During the transition from the *jus sanguinis* to the *jus soli* principle in 2000, reapplying for Turkish nationality, was no longer possible. Thousands of German-Turks not only lost their German citizenship, but also their permanent residence status, for which they had to re-apply (Kaya, 2012a, p. 165).

One way out of this dilemma for Turkey-origin immigrants was to apply for the *Pink Card* (*Pembe Kart*), today known as *Blue Card* (*Mavi Kart*). In response to the pressure of the German government to end the de facto practice of dual citizenship, the Turkish government started to assign more importance to an alternative citizenship it had already introduced in 1995. The Pink Card was a citizenship status in Turkey for people holding the nationality of their countries of migration who had repudiated their Turkish citizenship. Çağlar designated this citizenship status citizenship light (2004). The Pink Card endows former Turkish citizens and their descendants with a nationality of a country that does not acknowledge dual citizenship with a status that resembles what Hammar (2016) has called denizenship status, with the exception that they are legally treated as residents but in most cases no long-term residents in Turkey. The Pink, was renamed Blue Card in 2004, entitles their holders and even their children with the right of residence, the right to acquire property and to receive inheritance, the right to conduct businesses and to invest, and the right to work and attend public schools and universities in Turkey. Blue Card holders cannot vote or be elected (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dişleri Bakanlığı, 2021). The Blue Card is issued by the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities (YTB, *Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı*), a Turkish

state agency that is connected to the vice presidency that was founded in 2010 to bundle policies attending to Turkish expatriates. In addition to the difficult accessibility, the Pink Card and the Blue Card were not very known in the German-Turkish population in Germany (Mandel, 2008, pp. 223–225).

Since Germany is the home of the highest number of Turkey-origin immigrants in Europe, Turkish policies have always maintained informal and formal political ties with German-Turkish people throughout the history of emigration. However, Turkish politicians have sought to intensify links with 'expatriate' Turkey-origin immigrants as *transborder citizenry* with a discourse that perfectly corresponds to what Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001, p. 4) have designated *long distance nationalism*. The AKP has reached out to Turkey-origin emigrants and postmigrants by evoking their nationalist sentiments and allegiances. In different speeches, politicians have addressed Turkey-origin migrants in Germany as members of the Turkish nation, employing a "strong home country discourse" and a narrative of protecting its citizens abroad (Mencutek and Baser, 2017, p. 12). The ideological construction of the Turkish nation is clearly connected to pragmatic political goals. Links with the Sunni Muslim Turkish citizens in Germany are maintained because they are potential voters. In 2019, there were 1,472,390 million residents holding the Turkish nationality among a total number of 2,824,000 million Turkey-origin in residents in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019a, 2019b). Potential voters abroad present five percent of the electorate in Turkey. And they were addressed in the AKP's electoral campaign in favor of a constitutional referendum for a presidential system in 2017 (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017, pp. 308, 315). Another example for such a long-distance nationalism and for a governmental interest in maintaining political and identity related ties is the civil society organization UID (Union of International Democrats), formerly known as UETD (Union of European Turkish Democrats). The UID is a migrant association in Germany with close ties to the AKP. While formally denying the political connection to the AKP, the UETD has integrated German-Turkish people into the Turkish political system by hosting several events in which the Turkish president Erdoğan (2015) himself addressed Germany's Turkey-origin migrants to preserve their national identity, culture, religion and language (Kaya, 2019, p. 99). Becker-Bertau shows how political homeland activism of Turkey-origin AKP voters in Germany has been used by UID to represent an image of a "homogeneous migrant group, quasi-naturally attached to their country of origin and its ruling party" (2020, p. 142).

In addition, the AKP government has established institutions to mobilize expatriates' allegiances as members of a Turkish national community. In 2007, the Yunus Emre Cultural Centers (YEKM, *Yunus Emre Kültür Merkezleri*) were founded to disseminate Turkish language abroad. The above mentioned YTB which also issues the Blue Card promotes and ethnic understanding of nationhood and citizenship. It sees itself responsible to enhance social, cultural and economic links with Turkey-origin people and their descendants with and without the nominal Turkish citizenship and with "co-ethnic" communities and Turkish students abroad (Mencutek and Baser, 2017, p. 10)

From a transnational perspective, it can be concluded, that the excluding citizenship discourse in Germany perfectly merges with the Turkish state's inclusive citizenship discourse addressing expatriate citizenry: While in Germany immigrants and postmigrants have been othered for decades to construct an ethno-cultural nation, the Turkish state discourse addresses Sunni-Turkey-origin immigrants and postmigrants as members of Turkish nation.

3.7. CHANGING MIGRATION TRENDS

As a more recent phenomenon, the voluntary migration of second and third generation German-Turkish people to Turkey received intensified attention by the media and by academics in the last decade, especially regarding the emigration of highly skilled individuals with academic degrees. This attention was inspired by a reversal in the migration balance from Germany to Turkey which turned negative in 2006, when the number of people leaving Germany to Turkey outnumbered the number of people moving from Turkey to Germany for the first time since 1986 (see figure 3). In addition to that, the number of emigrating German citizens increased for the first time after decades (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2020). Meanwhile, the ongoing demographic trend to a society with few young people and the discussion revolving around a shortage of skilled labor caused a change in migration policies to attract highly skilled immigrants from non-EU countries (see section 3.5.). Policies addressing the immigration of highly skilled individuals and the changed migration trends initiated a debate about the possible qualification level of emigrants. Under the catchword 'brain drain', the debate revolved around the fear that highly skilled people would leave the country and cause a loss of 'human capital' for Germany (Alscher and Kreienbrink, 2014, p. 14). In the case of German-Turkish emigrants, the debate was in part initiated by an online survey about Germany born academics and students with Turkish ancestors. The survey found that

respondents expressed a lacking sense of home in Germany and that roughly 36 percent had positive attitudes about emigration, that is, they could imagine moving to Turkey (Sezer and Dağlar, 2009b, pp. 16–18).

Subsequently, many articles covered the emigration of highly qualified German-Turkish people, in some cases designating it “exodus” and “brain drain” (Goeßmann, 2008; Jacobsen, 2009; Wierth, 2009; Holzmüller, 2010; Kálnoky, 2010; Thurman, 2010; Akyol, 2011; Gobels, 2011; Wetzel, 2013). The debate focused on the emigration of highly skilled second and third generation German-Turkish individuals who “due to their school education and professional education are perceived as examples of successful integration” in Germany (Obergfell, 2014a, p. 15). As outlined below actual numbers show a different not to say a contrary picture.

Between 1986 and 2005 the number of people migrating from Turkey to Germany exceeded the number of people migrating from Germany to Turkey. The figures compiled by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) show that this migration trend reversed in 2006, when for the first time after nearly two decades, the number of people moving from Germany to Turkey exceeded the number of people moving in the other direction: In 2005, 36,341 people moved from Turkey to Germany and 34,595 people moved from Germany to Turkey. One year later, 31,449 people moved from Turkey to Germany and 33,229 people from Germany to Turkey. Contrary to the speculations of the above-mentioned debate on brain drain, this migration trend only lasted until 2014 and reversed again in 2015, when net-migration to Germany turned positive (BMI – BAMF, 2020, pp. 234, 238; Bundesamt, 2021a). The number of people moving from Germany to Turkey slowly started decreasing in 2013, dropping from 33,644 to 27,049 people in 2017. There is a significant increase concerning the number of people migrating from Turkey to Germany between 2013 and 2019. In 2013, 26,390 people left Turkey to Germany, whereas in 2017, 47,750 and in 2019, 51,610 persons did so.

The figure shows that the proportion of non-German citizens moving to Turkey composes the great majority of people moving to Turkey while the number of German citizens emigrating to Turkey and returning to Germany is comparatively small. Migrants listed in the diffuse category “non-German” are most likely Turkish citizenship holders (BMI – BAMF, 2020, pp. 234, 238; Bundesamt, 2021b). It can be

inferred that the majority of people listed as non-Germans in the statistics of the BMI – BAMF in this dataset are Turkish citizens.



Figure 3: Migration Between Turkey and Germany (2009-2019)

The number of German citizens moving from Germany to Turkey constantly rises from 1,339 in 2000 to 6,750 in 2015 (see figure 2). Since statistics in Germany do not differentiate between German citizens of Germany or Turkey-origin, it can only be guessed that Turkey-origin immigrants and their descendants constitute a large proportion of this group. The amendment of citizenship law in Germany in 2000 with the subsequent rise in naturalizations also indicates this (see section 3.6.).

The brain drain discussion in the media and the academic focus on highly skilled German-Turkish individuals is astonishing in the light of very limited demographic data by the Federal Office of Statistics on German-Turkish individuals leaving Germany. There are no large datasets concerning the generations or the educational and professional background of the people leaving Germany. An exception is the inquiry by Alscher, Baraulina and Müller who analyzed statistical data from different sources.[31] The authors showed that the proportion of emigrating Germany born people of Turkey-

[31] The authors analyzed official border-crossing emigration and immigration data by the Federal Statistical Office (*Bundesamt für Statistik*) that are based on the registration authority's data of registration and deregistration of domicile. In addition, the authors analyzed the data of Central Registry of Foreign Nationals (*Ausländerzentralregister*), an office that registers only people with foreign citizenship settling in Germany on the long run (Alscher, Baraulina and Müller, 2014, pp. 89–90).

origin is in fact quite low. In the light of three million residents with Turkey-origin in Germany, mobile second and third generation Turkish citizens constitute a minority (2014, pp. 112–126). The authors conclude that only 20 percent of the Turkish citizenship holders emigrating from Germany to Turkey are of the second and third generations. Only 3,000-4,000 Turkish citizenship holders who moved to Turkey annually between 2007 and 2012 were of the second and third generation (Alscher, Baraulina and Müller, 2014, pp. 121–122).

The authors also find that the proportion of emigrating retirees has in fact declined, while this group's circular migration patterns have increased. Another large proportion of the group of Turkey-origin migrants moving to Turkey are short or long-term stayers like students and professionals who return to Turkey at later point of time (Ibid. 112-126). While the public debate focused on highly skilled emigration of German-Turkish people of the second and third generation as a mass phenomenon, the existing research has argued that the majority of people moving from Germany to Turkey are former labor migrants returning to Turkey after retirement. Qualitative research on return patterns and circular migration of (retired) labor migrants of the first generation has been conducted by Jankowitsch, Klein and Weick (2000), Fabian *et al.* (1990), Krumme (2004) and Wolbert (1995).

Pusch und Splitt (2013, p. 156) estimate that 5000 people of the 30,000 Turkish and 4000 German citizens who in average moved to Turkey in the years before 2013 are highly skilled. This means in turn that the number of German-Turkish people without academic education is much higher. As the data for Turkey-origin immigrants on retirement and my own data indicate, it is also very likely that a high proportion of German-Turkish people who move to Turkey also move back to Germany at a later point of time. In other words, transnational migration of Germany born German-Turkish people is most likely a circular and not a unidirectional phenomenon. To my current state of knowledge, there is no statistical information on the demographic background of people moving from Turkey to Germany. Germany's policy change enhancing the immigration of highly skilled people from non-EU countries and rising numbers of academics who escaped or left Turkey after the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, may indicate that the proportion of academics of this group is higher.

I prefer to classify migration of women of the second and third generations to Turkey as transnational migration. As discussed in section 2.3. concepts of transnational

migration illustrate that migration to Turkey is a dynamic and open-ended process, that may result in a later return to Germany or take the form of a pendulum-like movement between both countries. In the following passages, I will apply a transnatioal perspective to review research addressing the migration of second and third generation German-Turkish people between Turkey and Germany. In the following sections, I will contextualize these migration trends with economic, political and state-related factors in both countries. After that, I will turn to research about migration purposes of German-Turkish individuals living in Germany and address the literature dealing with the motives of second and third generation German-Turkish individuals and I will also provide an overview on additional topics this research addresses, i. e. transnational lifeworlds, uprbringing and education in Germany, social networks in Turkey, integration and experiences of exclusion in Turkey and a cultural sense of belonging.

3.8. MIGRATION TENDS AND POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXTS

The following sections address possible macro determinants of migration, such as economic, political and civil aspects in Germany and Turkey that account for changed migration trends. Such a macro perspective can contribute to an explanation of larger causes behind the above mentioned changed migration trends between Germany and Turkey. Such a perspective includes the increasing global and bilateral interconnectedness between Germany and Turkey and takes socio-economic and political context of both countries into consideration.

Factors accounting for increased migration to Turkey

A reason explaining the positive change in the migration balance to Turkey in 2006 may relate to the German state's welfare policies which underwent significant changes in the early 2000s and after the financial crisis in 2008. These policies addressed and overlapped with high unemployment rates in Germany and included measures of cutting social benefits and dismantling the welfare state. An outcome of these reforms concerning the 'flexibilization' and precarization of the labor market was a low wage sector. People working in the low wage sector are more vulnerable for unemployment. Germany has the largest low wage sector in Europe – hiring a high proportion of people with migration background (Obinger, 2012; Manow and Schwander, 2013; Grabka and Göbler, 2020).

As a country of immigration, the German state is responsible for the integration of immigrants. The public discourse on integration in Germany however mostly expects accomplishments from migrants, failing to acknowledge that descendants of immigrants have long become members of society and integrated before any political integration goal was implemented. It is striking that despite the policy shift after the 2000s migrants and their descendants still are far from equal opportunities of participation in central areas of society. Postmigrants' claims in public debates and surveys demonstrate unequal treatment in labor and housing markets and in the educational sector. This is the case especially for people with a Turkish name and Muslim people (Janßen and Polat, 2005; El-Menouar, 2015; Kaas and Manger, 2012; Schneider, Yemane and Weinmann, 2014; Weichselbaumer, 2016). A field experiment found that in comparison to a German applicants, discrimination significantly increases for female applicants with a Turkish name, even more so if they wear a headscarf (Weichselbaumer, 2016).

Between 2012 and 2013, the unemployment rate of people born abroad was nearly twice as high as for Germany born people. The likelihood of unemployment of people born abroad rises among women and people with higher education (OECD, 2015, pp. 92–95). The data of the micro-census by the German Federal Office of Statistics of 2012 indicate that a similar trend affects postmigrants born in Germany. In 2012, the unemployment rate of people with migration background[32] and without migration experience was nearly twice as high (8.89 percent) as among people without migration background (4.65 percent). In 2012, the unemployment rate of people with a Turkey-related migration experience was even higher (11.27 percent) while the next generations without experience of migration were even more strongly affected by unemployment (14.28 percent) (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013, pp. 279, 281, 285). Although unemployment rates decreased, the gap between the general unemployment rate and the unemployment rate of people with a Turkey related migration history is an ongoing trend. In 2018, the unemployment rate of people without a migration background[33] was around 2.6 percent while the unemployment rate of people with migration background was more than twice as high (5.94 percent). The unemployment rate of people with

[32] The Federal Office of Statistics defines People with migration background in 2012 as "all immigrants to the present territory of the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949, as well as all foreigners born in Germany and all those born in Germany as Germans with at least one immigrant or foreign parent" (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013, p. 6)

[33] In 2018, the Federal Office of Statistics defines a person with background of migration as someone who does not hold German citizenship by birth or has at least one relative without German citizenship (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019c, p. 4)

migration experience in Turkey is still even higher with 6.54 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019c, pp. 50, 399).

Statistical data of 2018 continue to show that people with and without a background of migration still do not have equal opportunities of participation in the realm of education and in the labor and housing market. According to the 2018 micro-census, people with a migration background are more likely to have no school-leaving qualifications than people without migration background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019). People with a migration background between the age of 25 and 65 are almost four times less likely to have completed vocational training than people without a migration background (37.8 percent). In comparison, the number of university graduates was slightly higher among the population with than without migration background (14.8 percent vs. 13.1 percent) (IntMK, 2019, p. 74). In the light of a considerable shortage of training positions in companies during the 2000s, the transition phase between school and vocational training in particular has become a challenging stage of life for many adolescents, even more so if with a migration background (Beicht and Granato, 2009, p. 4).

People with a history of immigration are more frequently at risk of poverty. The at-risk-of-poverty rate was 27.2 percent in 2018, more than twice as high than for the population without a migration background (11.4 percent). The at-risk-of-poverty rate among children of Turkey born immigrants was even 30.1 percent (Engels *et al.*, 2011, p. 86; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019c, p. 327). Sievers, Griese and Schulte (2010, p. 92) analyzed factors that determined the educational success of German-Turkish academics who became transnational migrants**.** They found that their interlocutors had to take detours in the educational system to enter a university. Many visited different types of schools or adult schools in order to graduate. Sievers at al. found that these individuals often quote an incident or a "significant other" who has contributed to their educational success, for example a neighbor, a family member or a teacher. The authors also found that many of their interlocutors attended upper secondary schools, contrary to their teachers' advice for a lower education. Successful German-Turkish individuals who worked their way up in the educational system had to undergo certain struggles.

While these factors account for structural inequality and an increased likelihood of deprivation for German-Turkish postmigrants in Germany, Turkey on the other hand became an attractive destination of migration during the first decades of the millennium. In 2010, when the number of people entering the country was almost as high as the

number of people who left Turkey (Kaya, 2012b, p. 86). Several authors explain that Turkey's economic development and the EU accession process made Turkey an increasingly attractive destination for migrants (Kaiser, 2012, pp. 104–105; Kaya, 2012c, pp. 85–87; Aydın, 2013, pp. 36–41). Turkey's economic integration into the world market and a subsequent sustainable economic growth in the 2000s accounts for this trend. Turkey's economy "grew an average of 6.0% per year from 2002 through 2007 – one of the highest sustained rates of growth in the world". In addition to that, Turkey's GDP quickly recovered from the financial crisis of 2008 (Adaman and Kaya, 2012, p. 4; Hanewinkel, 2012).

The ongoing economic relations between Germany and Turkey and the economic growth in Turkey also affected different industries providing professional opportunities for skilled and highly skilled workers (Obergfell, 2014a, pp. 199–200). Regardless of their educational background second and third generation German-Turkish people who moved to Turkey between 2006 and 2013 mostly settled in the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, Antalya and Izmir. With their professional skills, they could and can fulfill the demands of the Turkish labor market in sectors like arts and culture, telecommunications, engineering and banking (Aydın, 2010, p. 9, 2013, p. 67; Kaya and Adaman, 2011b, pp. 37–42). In 2012, Kaiser stated that "German investments rank at the top among foreign investors in Turkey; today, more than 1,700 firms with German financial participation operate in Turkey" (Kaiser, 2012, p. 105). By 2017, 6,846 companies from Germany had a branch in Turkey (von Kessel, 2017). In addition, companies from Germany sent managerial staff together with their relatives to Turkey for defined periods of time and German-Turkish immigrants became interesting for these companies because of their language skills and their cultural knowledge (Kaiser, 2012, p. 105; Obergfell, 2014a, p. 200).

The accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union initiated democratizing reforms. In 2001, the restrictive constitution of 1982 was amended. After the AKP came to power in 2002, several reform packages between 2003 and 2005 were passed to fulfill the requirements necessary to initiate the of EU-accession talks. The civil code was adapted to European civil code, resulting in legal improvements for women (see also section 4.3.4.). Additional reform packages included the legalization Kurdish language in the educational sector and media. The death penalty was abolished and freedom of expression extended as laws supporting the punishment of "propaganda" against the unity of the Turkish state were reformed (Cizre, 2009, p. 320). The de-

escalation of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict furthermore resulted in a decline of asylum applications to Germany (BMI – BAMF, 2011, p. 247). Numerous reforms[34] curtailed the autonomy and power of the Turkish Armed Forces leading to the civilian control over the military. The military in Turkey intervened into civilian politics and brought down elected governments in 1960, in 1971, in 1980 and 1997. In its mission as the "guardian of the Turkish Republic", it has interpretied "internal 'political' conflicts" as "internal security threats" (Cizre, 2009, p. 301). With the reforms, the AKP government managed to become more independent from the tutelary control of the Turkish military.

Factors accounting for Increased Migration from Turkey to Germany after in 2015

The positive net-migration to Turkey continued until 2014 and reversed in favor of Germany in 2015 (see figure 2). As illustrated section 3.7., the migration report 2019 shows that in 2015 more people started moving from Turkey to Germany than in the other direction (BMI – BAMF, 2020, pp. 234, 238). The reasons for this change can be explained with significant changes in society, politics and the economy in Turkey. A series of events accounts for decreasing political stability as anti-democratic tendencies of the AKP government intensified. These developments are accompanied by a decline of economic growth and a sharp increase of the inflation rate (Öniş, 2016, p. 149). Moreover, EU accession talks were stopped in 2016. These developments may have affected the perception of Turkey as an attractive country of immigration and as migration trends show.

Already before 2012 and in the AKP's third and fourth term the freedom of expression and opinion was increasingly violated as arrests of journalists accumulated (European Commission 2012). Civil society organizations were increasingly monopolized (Doyle, 2018) and the AKP was involved in corruption scandals (Özbudun, 2014). The

[34] Different institutions of the Turkish Armed Forces such as the *National Security Council*, *the General Secretary of the National Security Council* were reformed. The National Security Council, established in 1962 in the aftermath of the military coup in 1960 – an institution that was planned to be a government advisory body concerning internal and external security – became "a powerful watchdog" gradually extending its influence over civilian policies (Zürcher, 2004, p. 245). With the reforms, military representatives in the National Security Council, in the General Secretary of the National Security Council and in the *Council of Higher Education* and the *Supreme Board of Radio and Television* were replaced with civilians and transformed into advisory bodies. The civilian control of the national defense budget was increased and national security courts were abolished. As a remnant of the 1980s coup, these courts brought crimes against the state to trial. In addition, military courts were no longer authorized to try civilians criticizing the state (Cizre, 2009, p. 322).

government's reaction to *Gezi Park Protests*[35] of 2013 represent the accentuation of an ongoing process towards increasingly authoritarian political measures as the protests were met with large scale police operations against protestors, many arrests and seven casualties (Örs, 2014, pp. 491–495). The Gezi Protests started with a small group of environmentalists who occupied the Gezi Park in Istanbul and protested against the construction of a replica of Ottoman artillery barracks and with a shopping mall. These initially small protests spread into country wide protests with numerous participants criticizing the AKP's authoritarian and polarizing tendencies and the police violence against protestors. According to Özbudun, the Gezi Park Protests indicated the AKP's shift towards conservatism and authoritarianism as it reflected "majoritarian drift" in the AKP's understanding of democracy. Accordingly, the ballot box becomes the only instrument for democratic accountability and the segments of society in Turkey that do not sympathize with AKP are no longer addressed. In polarizing speeches and statements Erdoğan justified political measures as he repeatedly emphasized that he was backed by 50 percent of the voters (2014, pp. 157–158).

Based on the definition of Levitsky and Way (2002), Esen and Gümüşçü (2016, 2018), Somer (2016) and Özbudun (2015) argue that the AKP government has transformed the Turkish state from a "consolidating" or "tutelary democracy" to a "competitive authoritarian regime". Events accounting for such a shift are the termination of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process in 2015 and rising political violence (Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016, pp. 471–473). In 2015 and in 2016, Turkey witnessed several deadly terrorist attacks (Sayarı, 2016, pp. 269–271). On July 15th in 2016, the country was erupted by a failed military coup. The attempted coup served Erdoğan and the AKP as an excuse to justify a bulk of authoritarian measures in its aftermath to consolidate its power. A state of emergency which lasted two years until July 19 in 2018, was extended every three months. The emergency rule served as an instrument to arrest thousands of people, to further curtail freedom of speech and assembly and to rule and pass reforms per decree (Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016, p. 472; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017, pp. 269–271). With a constitutional referendum in April 2017, the parliamentary system was replaced with an executive presidency, enhancing the president with executive powers

[35] The protest started with a small group of environmentalists who occupied the Gezi Park in Istanbul and protested against the construction of a replica of Ottoman artillery barracks including a shopping mall. These initially small protests spread into country wide protests with numerous participants criticizing the AKP's authoritarian and polarizing tendencies and the later the police violence against protestors.

that were formerly executed by the parliament (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017). Meanwhile, the number of Turkish applications for asylum in Germany has been rising again after it had dropped between 2002 and 2015 from 9,575 to 1,578 applications. In 2016, the year of the coup attempt, 5,383 people from Turkey applied for asylum in Germany while there were 10,784 applications in 2019 (BMI – BAMF, 2020, p. 275). As I have shown, the political and economic instability after the coup attempt was also a factor in my interlocutors' return considerations and actual return decisions (Weißenberg 2020). What may have contributed to a positive migration balance in Germany are the declining unemployment rates of 2018 in comparison to 2012 (see above).

3.9. GERMAN-TURKISH TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION: STATE OF THE ART

For a survey concerned with the emigration of people with Turkey-origin launched by the BAMF (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees in Germany), Kreienbrink and Obergfell (2014, pp. 14–29) give an overview on quantitative and qualitative research published until 2013 which addresses the purposes and migration motives of potential and actual German-Turkish migrants of the second and third generations. Corresponding research mainly focuses on highly skilled individuals with academic degrees who migrated to Turkey during the period of economic growth and political reforms in Turkey (see capter 3.8.). Obergfell (2014) make a useful distinction by delineating surveys addressing migration purposes of potential migrants from research that adresses causes of German-Turkish people's actual migration to Turkey. Among the existing quantitative research, the survey on migration purposes on Germany-based academics and students of the second and third generation conducted by Sezer and Dağlar received increased attention and inspired additional surveys and qualitative studies. The authors found that around 36 percent of their respondents could imagine to emigrate in the future (2009, p. 30).

Migration Purposes

Surveys concerned with migration purposes are mainly quantitative and based on data acquired (online) via questionaire. Corresponding research mainly deals with push factors in Germany (Obergfell, 2014, pp. 197–198). In a nutshell, quantitative surveys on migration purposes of potential German-Turkish postmigrants in Germany find that migration motives correlate with the structural disadvantages German-Turkish people experience in comparison to ethnic Germans. Migration purposes are mostly explained

with a lacking sense of home or identification in Germany, a lack of recognition and belonging, difficult access to vocational training and the German labor market, discrimination experiences and economic deprivation (Sezer and Dağlar, 2009b; INFO GmbH Markt- und Meinungsforschung/ Liljeberg ResearchI International, 2012, pp. 15, 17; Sauer, 2017, pp. 30–32). These quantitative findings are supported by a qualitative study realized by Sarı and Alkan (2016) who carried out eight problem-centered interviews with German-Turkish academics. The authors underline that their interlocutors stressed career-related reasons, discrimination experiences and a lacking sense of home as motives triggering their migration purposes. Sarı (2017) conducted an additional qualitative study on the migration purposes of 14 highly skilled individuals and found that his research confirms the results of the mentioned quantitative studies. "Unfavorable career prospects" and discrimination experiences in Germany were main motives as the "majority of interviewees have already experienced discrimination in everyday life and in the daily working life. Individuals with a Turkish sounding name are already discriminated in the first application phase" (Sarı, 2017, p. 463).

Migration Decisions

Research on migration motives of second and third generation German-Turkish transmigrants who actually migrated to Turkey tends to be qualitative and is inclined to underline pull factors, in the country of migration (Kreienbrink and Obergfell, 2014, pp. 16–17). Qualitative research mainly addresses highly skilled German-Turkish people. In the literature reviewed here, this group is usually defined by an academic education. Since the literature focuses on the highly skilled, there is no unanimous term addressing people who underwent vocational training or graduated from different schools in Germany.

The scholars who have conducted qualitative research on migration motives agree that actual migration decisions are based on a combination of intersecting reasons (Sievers, Griese and Schulte, 2010, p. 63; Hanewinkel, 2012; Aydın, 2013, pp. 86, 103; Neitzert, 2014, p. 256; Obergfell, 2014, p. 205). Most authors identify economic motives like *career or job opportunities* among the motives which caused migration decisions (Sievers, Griese and Schulte, 2010; Alkan, 2011; Ehrsam, 2011; Pusch and Aydın, 2011; Aydın, 2013; Gümüş, 2013; Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin, 2014; Neitzert, 2014; Warrach and Reuter, 2016; Aver and Gümüş, 2017). While some of those authors find that structural discrimination in the labor market in Germany was not a migration motive,

others make contrary observations. Aydın for instance identifies *better career opportunities* and the hope for professional development as dominant motives for the majority of the 22 highly skilled German-Turkish people he interviewed. He underlines that career opportunities in Turkey do not go hand in hand with lacking occupational perspectives in Germany. Meanwhile, "Unfavorable occupational perspectives in Germany" were only occasionally narrated migration motives (2013, p. 70). While experiences of discrimination or disadvantaged professional perspectives were not rationalized as significant in the decision-making process – although they doubted that their career paths could have taken the same direction in Germany – Aydın's interlocutors still expressed that they felt disadvantaged as far as their careers and their opportunities of participation in society in Germany were concerned (2013, pp. 70–72). Likewise, in Pusch and Aydın's (2011) research, highly skilled interlocutors maintained that they had good occupational perspectives in Germany while some even underlined that they did not feel disadvantaged in comparison to their colleagues without migration background. Most of the authors' interlocutors also underlined that they had not experienced discrimination at school or at work in Germany. These statements were accompanied by an emphasis that their parents had encouraged their educational progress in order for them to achieve upward mobility. The authors carefully conclude that these results may indicate that "successful" children with a migration background may be less likely to experience discrimination

Year	Author(s)	Number of Interviews	Generation	Age	Gender	Education (completed)	(In)voluntary
2009	Werner	12 (5 in Istanbul; 7 in Germany	1, 2	19-67	mixed	Vocational training, university, university students	Family return, Indiv. decision
2010	Hanewinkel	12	2	N/A	female	University	Indiv. decision
2010	Sievers et al.	10	2	30-46	mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2011	Pusch und Aydın	12	N/A	27-43	mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2011	Ehrsam	10	2, 3	20-47	mixed	University, Abitur certificate, secondary school	Family return, Indiv. decision
2011	Alkan	11 (+320 quantitative Online Survey)	2, 3	N/A	mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2012	Splitt	3	2, 3	21-42	mixed	University, vocational training, secondary school	Involuntary (escape), indiv. decision
2013	Aydın	22		N/A	mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2013	Gümüş	6	2, 3	30-32	mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2013	Rittersberger-Tılıç, Çelik and Özen	*22 12 1st gen. 10 2nd and 3rd gen.*	1, 2, 3	N/A	mixed	Second gen.: university, university students, secondary school	Family return
2014	Bürgin and Ezene-Bürgin	15 structured phone interviews (+86 Online Survey)	N/A, 2, 3 likely	N/A	mixed	Higher*, middle** and lower*** secondary school	Family return, indiv. decision
2014	Neitzert	29	2	N/A	mixed	University, without university degree (N/A)	Involuntary (8, family return, deportation), indiv. decision (22)
2014	Kılınç	35	2	N/A	female	N/A	Family return, indiv. decision
2016	Warrach and Reuter	8	2	N/A	female	University	Indiv. decision
2017	Aver and Gümüş	4	2		mixed	University	Indiv. decision
2017	Kılınç and King	30	2	N/A	mixed	Secondary school (N/S), university	Indiv. decision
2020	Warrach	8	2	32-40	mixed	University	Indiv. decision

* Gymnasium; ** Realschule; *** Hauptschule

Figure 4: Overview Research on German-Turkish Transnational Migration

Hanewinkel (2012) who interviewed highly skilled women found that occupational perspectives and economic reasons were a cause for migration but not a decisive one since many of her interlocutors stated that they were well integrated into the labor market before leaving Germany. Hanewinkel states that her interlocutors did not mention any disadvantages that would have influenced their migration decision. Several authors find that the highly skilled German-Turkish individuals in particular note that they did not experience racialized hostility in Germany or that their interlocutors downplayed related experiences (Sievers, Griese and Schulte, 2010, pp. 65–68; Aydın, 2013, pp. 70–71; Neitzert, 2014, pp. 253–254). Although higher levels of education indicate a somewhat privileged position in a hierarchy of social divisions and may account for a decreasing likelihood of experiencing racism and discrimination in comparison to German-Turkish people without academic education, narratives of not having experienced discrimination may have additional implications. Experiences with racism and exclusion are a sensitive topic and people may have developed different coping strategies. Narratives of not having experienced discrimination may constitute a strategy of avoiding self-victimization and representing oneself not as victim but agent.

Contrary to these findings, the empirical results of other authors support the above mentioned results of quantitative studies on migration purposes as based on experiences with structural discrimination on the labor market. The migration motive of better occupational perspectives is closely linked to experiences of discrimination in professional life on the German labor market. Sievers, Griese and Schulte (2010, p. 63) show that several of their interview partners quoted better occupational perspectives and opportunities for promotion in Turkey in comparison to difficulties of "gaining foothold" in a profession in Germany and "uncertain" career perspectives. Likewise, Warrach and Reuter find that no invitation for job interviews and problems to find a job in Germany were reasons why interlocutors moved to Turkey after a successful job application (2016, pp. 115–116).

These findings are confirmed by those authors who found that better occupational opportunities in Turkey or a job offer triggered migration decisions. These findings are explained by contextualizing decisions as directed at opportunities in Turkey with simultaneous experiences of disadvantaged treatment in the labor market in Germany (Ehrsam, 2011, pp. 57–60; Gümüş, 2013, pp. 331, 333; Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin, 2014, p. 175; Neitzert, 2014, p. 254). Neitzert finds that lacking career opportunities in Germany were contrasted with occupational perspectives in Istanbul's expanding

economy. These results also include people without academic education who reported to have a competitive advantage in Turkey because of their German language skills (2014, pp. 253–256). Likewise, Bürgin and Ezene Bürgin find that career perspectives in Turkey went hand in hand with a dissatisfaction with occupational perspectives in Germany: 14 out of 86 respondents of their online survey chose "attractive professional perspectives in Turkey" and 14 individuals chose the answer "dissatisfied with occupational perspectives" in Germany as migration motives (multiple responses were possible). 59 percent of 58 respondents with work experience mentioned to have experienced discrimination at work (2014, pp. 174–175).

Contrary to the above quoted findings by Pusch and Aydın (2011) and Aydın (2013) according to which discrimination experiences were no decisive motive, additional qualitative research findings indicate the contrary. In Aver and Gümüş's sample, *experiences of discrimination and exclusion* were cited twice as main motives for leaving Germany (2017, p. 542). Kılınç and King (2017, p. 1508) as well as Splitt (2012, p. 257) make similar observations. Rittersberger-Tiliç, Çelik and Özen (2013, p. 138) find that experiences of discrimination in Germany combined with tertiary educational opportunities in Turkey led to a migration to Turkey of several second generation interlocutors.

Several authors identify narratives of feeling different or not recognized as a member of society in Germany as motives. Sievers, Griese and Schulte (2010, pp. 65–68) mention that some of their interlocutors contrasted experiences *of lacking recognition in Germany* and being labelled as "different" with experiences of recognition in Turkey. Lacking recognition was experienced socially and mentioned with respect to professional skills. In addition, a lacking feeling of belonging to society in Germany was quoted together with referring to "roots" in Turkey. Aver and Gümüş find that a *feeling of being different* or exotic in Germany was replaced by a feeling of belonging and of being one of many in Turkey (2017, p. 529). Neitzert (2014, p. 254) finds that her interlocutors often complained that they repeatedly had to justify for or were reduced to their Turkey-origin, even though they did not necessarily identify themselves with it. She states:

> "Even in the absence of concrete direct discrimination, many *Deutschländer* in Germany often felt that they were different and did not belong. The desire to no longer live as foreigners was for some people an important decisive factor for migration to Turkey." (Ibid.)

Interlocutors of Neitzert who also stressed that they did not experience discrimination often felt "different" or expressed a lacking sense of belonging (2014, p. 254). Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin (2014, pp. 174–175) also find that 28 percent of their 86 respondents agreed with their questionnaire's statement of "not having felt at home in Germany" as migration motive.

Tertiary education is identified as another migration motive in the existing literature (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 57; Rittersberger-Tiliç, Çelik and Özen, 2013, p. 140; Warrach and Reuter, 2016, p. 113). Other migration motives relate to *cultural origins, roots, identity and religion* (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 61.69; Hanewinkel, 2012; Aydın, 2013, pp. 75–78; Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin, 2014, pp. 175–176; Kılınç, 2014, pp. 24, 30). In addition, the *metropole of Istanbul* is often mentioned as an attractive destination of migration (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 58; Hanewinkel, 2012; Gümüş, 2013, p. 328; Neitzert, 2014, pp. 254, 256). Closely related is the motive of *self-realization*, also expressed as wish or longing for experiencing personal change or to try out something new (Hanewinkel, 2012; Aydın, 2013, pp. 80–81; Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin, 2014, pp. 175–176; Kılınç and King, 2017, p. 1510). Ehrsam points out the gendered implications of the motive of *self-realization,* as some of her interview partners expressed their migration to Turkey as motivated by self-liberation from traditional gender roles, religious and gendered constraints on the one hand and by self-determination and independence from their families of origin on the other hand (2011, pp. 60–61). The motive of self-liberation also presents itself as *exit strategy* in cases in which problems with families or ex-partners induced migration decisions (Neitzert, 2014, p. 253). Kılınç and King (2017, p. 1509) find that some of their interlocutors even escaped the family context in Germany.

The *family network* and family-related motives present another cluster of motives that induce migration decisions. Hanewinkel (2012) and Warrach and Reuter (2016, p. 113) who interviewed women find that two generations mutually influenced their migration decisions, with daughters following their parents and vice versa. Hanewinkel (Ibid), Warrach and Reuter (2016, p. 117) and Kılınç (2014, p. 3) identify *return narratives* as a parameter that influenced migration decisions. Decisions of moving to Turkey are often influenced by parents in cases in which women are

> "fulfilling the expectations of parents who could not (yet) return but want their children to build their lives in the homeland. This is a highly gendered situation; whereas daughters are expected to obey their parents' decision, sons can determine their future decisions more independently." (Kılınç, 2014, p. 3)

Another motivation to start a life in Turkey mentioned by a lot of authors is *partnership and marriage* (Sievers, Griese and Schulte, 2010, p. 68; Ehrsam, 2011, pp. 58–59; Hanewinkel, 2012; Aydın, 2013, p. 38; Rittersberger-Tiliç, Çelik and Özen, 2013, p. 140; Neitzert, 2014, p. 253; Warrach and Reuter, 2016, p. 116).

There has not been much evidence on the process-related quality of transnational mobility between Germany and Turkey. At a later point of time settlement decisions may change and result in a return to Germany or in recurrent migration between both countries. Bürgin and Ezene Bürgin (2014, p. 181) find that 13 percent of 86 respondents living in Turkey concretely plan a *return to Germany*. Another 20 percent can imagine returning to Germany although they have no concrete return plans. Five percent want to commute between both countries or can imagine to live in a third country in the future. Return migration motives to Germany include job opportunities, emotional attachment to Germany, educational opportunities for children, the "better" health system in Germany and political developments in Turkey. The authors find that the willingness of returning to Germany increases with higher levels of education (Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin, 2014, pp. 180–182). Since German-Turkish people have experienced upward mobility in the second and third generations and members of the second and third generation spent their childhood, adolescence and young adulthood in Germany, it may be hypothesized that the willingness to return to Germany or to commute between the countries is higher for individuals of the second and third generation. Alkan who conducted eleven interviews with German-Turkish university graduates in Ankara, Istanbul and Antalya notes that most of his interlocutors can imagine living in Germany again. He also found that *promising job opportunities* are the main reason why his interlocutors imagine a resettlement in Germany (2011, pp. 24–25). Aydın underlines that many of his interlocutors make sense of their migration as an uncompleted process. This does not imply that life in Turkey is perceived as transitory. A possible return to Germany is often considered as a fall-back option, in case something goes wrong (2013, pp. 92, 105–109).

Aver and Gümüş (2017, pp. 507–550) have conducted interviews with German-Turkish individuals who returned to Germany after a longer stay in Turkey. In their exploratory study, they present four case studies of highly skilled German-Turkish people and one German person. The authors carve out personal, professional, social and political experiences made in Turkey and are the first ones who explicitly highlight decision-making processes for migration as transnational by addressing advantages and

disadvantages in both countries. With respect to career, *return motivations revolve around lacking career opportunities in Turkey and a job opportunity in Germany. No social welfare benefits and a stronger identification with Germany* present other motives for return decisions (Aver and Gümüş, 2017, pp. 546–548).

In my own work (Weißenberg, 2020), I found that German-Turkish women's narratives on decisions and ideas about leaving Turkey and returning to Germany present a *strategy of avoiding structural disadvantages and intersectional discrimination* they experience as women in Germany and in Turkey. Several women mentioned in 2017 that they felt pressured to take a political stance or to conform to conservative gender role expectations. Some consulted women narrated economic insecurities and fear after the coup attempt and deadly suicide bombings in 2015 and 2016 as migration triggers and as migration purposes. Those motives overlapped with gendered motives in the context of maternity and redistributive state policies in Germany (see also chapter 4).

German-Turkish Allegiances in Transnational Space

Qualitative research indicates that the German-Turkish experience of migrating to Turkey is specific as far as experiences of integration and a sense of belonging are concerned. Aver and Gümüş (2017, p. 324) point out that the existing research on highly skilled transmigrants in Turkey has not considered "German-Turk's problems of (re)integration into the country of their parents and grandparents". Many aspects of the everyday life in Turkey are unfamiliar and processes of adaptation to life in Istanbul are accompanied by tensions and stress resulting in a revision of a romanticized imagination of Turkey prior to migration. An experienced "disillusionment" after a longer stay in Istanbul regarding cultural aspects of everyday life in Turkey are perceived as different and contradictive to own practices which Gümüş's interlocutors identify as "German". Gümüş concludes that such cultural "frictions" can revise a glorified image of Turkey and even result in a return to Germany (2013, pp. 325, 334–336).

Kılınç's (2014) research contributes to the existing research with a gender perspective on second generation German-Turkish individuals' voluntary and involuntary "return 'home'". She finds that home and belonging are perceived differently by men and women. Notions of home are based on gender norms of "Turkish culture". Additionally, post-return experiences of women who had to "return" to Turkey in the course of a family decision, showed that they "struggled to renegotiate their gendered identity; they had to adapt to new rules of gender roles". Furthermore, Kılınç found that women who

returned in the course of marriage "struggled in their new family lives mostly because of the more rigid views of their husbands, and the mother-wife role that was given to them by the Turkish society" (2014, p. 30).

Ehrsam sheds light on her interlocutors' initial difficulties of integrating and adapting to an everyday life that was unfamiliar to them in the beginning of their settlement. Turkish language skills or the lack thereof not only had an impact on her interlocutors' integration into society in Germany and Turkey. Interlocutors interpreted that Turkish language skills which were perceived as "not perfect" or lacking technical terminology revealed that they came from abroad and resulted in being treated as "different". After a period of adaptation and being marked as different, related attributions no longer appeared to be a problem (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 51). Neitzert's (2014) analysis reveals that the German-Turkish people she interviewed in Istanbul, form groups with German-Turkish peers. Most of her 29 interlocutors of different educational backgrounds work for a German company or for a subsidiary of a German group and underline that speaking German and sustaining links to Germany at work is meaningful to them. The minority of the people she interviewed worked for a Turkish company. Beyond work, her German-Turkish interlocutors were also inclined to interact socially among peers. Accordingly, friendship groups were mainly maintained with other German-Turkish individuals who migrated from Germany to Turkey. Making friends with people in Turkey without migration experience was rationalized as challenging in comparison to socializing among peer groups in which a sense of commonality was experienced through a shared history of being brought up in Germany (Neitzert 2014, pp. 253–259).

Aydın analyzes narratives on cultural belonging and migration and notes that interlocutors often criticized the idea of being "in-between" cultures. His interlocutors rather described a double or mixed identity or refused to localize their identities and home in one place (2013, pp. 92, 105–109). Ehrsam (2011, pp. 63–68) finds that some of her German-Turkish interlocutors developed a sense of home and belonging to Germany or a sense of home that was tied to more than one locality. Other interlocutors were reluctant about "selecting one identity marker" (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 64) or expressed a sense "of not belonging anywhere truly". Ehrsam discusses her interlocutors' transnational identities by underlining the constant switching between two cultural systems and the renegotiation of identity in line with changing social contexts (Ehrsam, 2011, p. 69). Bürgin and Ezene Bürgin (2014, pp. 181–183) conclude from their online-survey data that the majority of the German-Turkish participants living in Turkey

identify as bi-national. Only roughly 21 percent identified as Turkish only while none of the survey's participants identified as German. The authors categorize and contextualize their data in line with participants' secondary school education level. The rates of self-identification as "only Turkish" or as "more Turkish than German" decreases with a higher secondary-school qualification. The tendency to identify less with the country of immigration and more with the homeland (of ancestors) indicates that part of the respondents are from the first generations who were not only born and raised in Turkey but who also tend to have lower levels of education.[36] These data can be read as indicating that the segments of Turkey-origin immigrants who have lower educational background are less likely to identify with Germany because of the structural disadvantages they experience in the labor market and/or because they experience exclusion and (structural) discrimination in accessing resources (see section 3.8.).

Neitzert (2014, pp. 261–262) points out that the German-Turkish transmigrants she interviewed develop a new identity composed of two cultures and languages. This identity is pridefully represented when interlocutors argue that they not only benefit from belonging to two cultures (*Bikulturalität*) and bilingualism individually, but that their bicultural and bilingual skills also constitute an asset for the companies they work for. This argument was often made by highly skilled German-Turkish people visiting the Regulars' Table of Returnees (*Rückkehrerstammtisch*), a monthly German-Turkish network meeting in Istanbul that is mainly visited by individuals with academic education who work in high positions. Nevertheless, interlocutors who made other choices concerning their education use similar arguments when defining their own group as bilingual and as capable of handling two cultures. Neitzert and others observed that her interlocutors drew boundaries to ethnic Germans and Turks who were born and raised in Turkey. Most interestingly, they also delineated themselves from German-Turkish people in Germany (Gümüş, 2013, p. 327; Neitzert, 2014, p. 262; Warrach and Reuter, 2016, p. 114).

Splitt's (2012, pp. 253–257) work contextualizes how transnational biographies of second and third generation German-Turkish people are entangled with their occupation as call center agents for German companies that have outsourced their call center services to Turkey in order to save labor costs. Splitt scrutinizes how these offshoring

[36] The authors do not inform the reader of the respondents' generations.

practices in Istanbul become entangled with German-Turkish call agents' biographies of migration. Lower-skilled German-Turkish individuals can use their "cultural capital", that is German language skills professionally. In phone conversations, call center agents who have to work with German pseudonyms express that they "leave" Turkey and symbolically travel back to Germany, the country where they spent their childhood and youth. Many of these call-center agents cannot return to Germany because they no longer have a German residence permit.

4. GENDERED ACCESS AND CONSTRAINTS IN GERMAN-TURKISH TRANSNATIONAL SPACE

In this chapter I explore the migration and settlement paths of German-Turkish women. Analytically it makes sense to conceive Germany and Turkey as one transnational space. Depending on their social location, German-Turkish women's capacity to become mobile is determined by both, structural constraints and agency. This chapter will explore concrete structural incentives, motives and plans for migration and settlement. Moreover, the imagination and purposes for mobility and settlement in the future that are less concrete will be included into the analysis to explore positionalities that are constrained by social locations and residence status. By also exploring some motives for settlement, I aim to, as Clifford has put so nicely, include rooted experiences of "dwelling" as much as experiences of migration, "dwelling and traveling": traveling-in-dwelling, dwelling-in-traveling" (1997, p. 36).

The voices of consulted women which are bundled in the coded empirical ethnographic data provide the fundament for my arguments. Because the data were collected on two occasions in 2013 and in 2017 in the course of episodic fieldwork (see section 1.5.2.), it is possible to historicize and scrutinize processes-related aspects of migration and settlement. The two fieldwork occasions provide the opportunity to contextualize migration and settlement with changes in the women's life cycle and with broader social and economic transformations in the German-Turkish transnational space. Not only has the social, economic and political context in Germany and Turkey changed between 2013 and 2017 and influenced migration patterns, decisions, but also purposes. This context overlaps with different life events and changing life situations that also shape ideas, purposes, and plans about moving and staying.

Decision-making itself is as a transnational process, that is, the women always assess their opportunities and constraints multi-directionally and consider the consequences migration decisions have and may have for them. Since the fieldwork material includes two occasions, the women's narratives reveal how some actually realized their imaginary narratives of 2013 in 2017.

I attempt to explain German-Turkish women's migration trajectories with concepts of transnational migration outlined in section 2.3. and to contribute to the discussions on transnational migration theory with an intersectional analysis along axes of privilege

and disadvantage that shape decision-making processes about mobility and settlement in different ways (sections 2.3.4., 2.2.4.). The concepts of transnationalism and practice theory provide the tools to analyze social practice and motives behind practice not as isolated individual utility maximizing behavior. Women migrants and potential migrants are not only embedded into different socio-economic and political contexts, they are also situated within social locations that determine their capacity to act. Decision-making is based on their respective social locations which constrain or broaden their latitudes to take action as far as social divisions such as formal citizenship status, age, gender, socio economic, educational, and cultural and religious background are concerned.

On the other hand, the women are not only subject to external constraints and the circumstances of their respective social locations. Imaginations of the future, purposes and decisions concerning mobility and settlement also present tactical choices for improving different realms of their everyday lives. Thus, a single woman's purposes of migration can be read and explained as individual resourcefulness for taking action to improve her situation. Even in a very constrained positionality, the imagination may provide a tactic from where a woman still finds ways to act upon in the future.

The content analysis of the sample resulted in repetitive statements about migration and settlement from macro-level perspective on German-Turkish women's migration paths. The sum of cases can carve out social, structural and network related factors that facilitate or constrain mobility and reach beyond individual decision-making. The theoretical lens of intersectionality theory provides a tool for analyzing and situating individual voices in transformed social and political contexts.

Migration Narratives as Citizenship Practices in Transnational Space

The results presented in the following sections show that German-Turkish women's migration and settlement practices in transnational space can be structured as transnational citizenship practices. I outline below how migration narratives simultaneously are claims to social rights, civil rights, social inclusion, intersectional justice and citizenship rights. Concepts of citizenship at intersections of political theory and social/cultural anthropology can help to frame citizenship as political belonging and political membership in a given community. While ideas about citizenship from political theory are rather normative and inclined to prioritize the state and the relationship between individual and state, concepts of social/cultural anthropology underline actual

citizenship practices and political participation, while including the state and other realms of society.

Since the first ethnographic part explores migration trajectories, representing the women's state-related narratives about migration and settlement, it benefits from a Marshallian (Marshall, 1950) understanding of citizenship. Marshall has defined citizenship "as a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community". He states, "All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (Marshall, 1950, pp. 28–29). In addition, Marshall defines citizenship as including civil, social and political rights (Ibid. 10-11). Those rights include social, political and civil rights. Hammar (2016) suggests the notion of *denizenship* to define the legal status of immigrants in industrial countries of North and Western Europe. Immigrants "who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status" in these countries were gradually endowed with social and civil rights after that those migrants became long-term residents. Hammar argues that political rights were mainly seen as reserved for those individuals with formal nationality of the country of their residence.

As Yuval-Davis pointed out, Marshall's definition links citizenship to membership in a community and therefore allows to discuss citizenship beyond the level of the nation-state "as a multi-tier construct, which applies to people's membership in a variety of collectivities – local, ethnic, national and trans-national" (1997, p. 5). Since this definition allows for conceiving citizenship as membership in a community, it is meaningful here because German-Turkish women's claims for citizenship rights exceed the nation-state level and need to be extended to their realm of action, that is, to transnational space.

The differentiation between social, civil and political rights in transnational space helps to structure German-Turkish women's migration and settlement narratives. Since the material force of the Turkish and the German state manifests itself empirically in the women's narratives, in particular, when it comes to social and civil aspects of citizenship, Hammar's idea of *denizenship* that is based on Marshall's definition is useful to represent the empirical data. The consulted women with Turkish nationality who can make use of their denizenship status to access social and civil rights, while others make use of their German nationality. The following sections will explore German-Turkish women's transnational mobility between Germany and Turkey as

citizenship practices involving flexible struggles for social rights and civil rights in a border-crossing manner combining the jurisdictional realms of the German and the Turkish state where the citizenship rights allows for it.

Feminists have acknowledged and simultaneously criticized Marshall's liberal notion of citizenship for its universal perspective. By defining all citizens as equal in status, rights and duties, structural inequalities based on different social boundaries are excluded from the status of being a citizen. Marshall has included a discussion of class-based differences into his definition of citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 8). Such inequalities result from social divisions such as gender, ethnicity, age and formal citizenship status.

As German-Turkish transmigrant women tactically avoid exclusion based on intersectional inequalities and aspire to improve their circumstances in different social spheres by means of migrating or continuing settlement, it is helpful to expand Marshall's notion of citizenship. To explain citizenship related aspects of migration practices, it is helpful to consider concepts which define the citizenship from a practice related and participatory angle in which the state may but does not have to become a relevant factor. Related theoretical interventions can also highlight aspects of citizenship beyond the state-level and explain the impact of inequalities based on gender, difference, age, formal citizenship status etc. on migration and settlement decisions.

The sociologist Bryan Turner has defined citizenship as "a set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups". According to Turner, highlighting practices avoids a mainly state-related and juridical definition of citizenship. He continues, stating, "The word 'practices' should help us to understand the dynamic social construction of citizenship which changes historically as a consequence of political struggles" (Turner, 1993, p. 2). According to Turner, citizenship is firstly "a condition of social integration by providing normative institutionalized means of social membership, which are based upon legal and other forms of entitlement" and secondly as "a set of conditions that promotes social conflict and social struggle where the social entitlements are not fulfilled" (1993, pp. 11–12). Quoting an approach to citizenship and gender by Jelin (1990a, 1990b, 1997) who assesses citizenship as constructed in the process of recognizing oneself as political

subject with rights and obligations and as member of a political community that is not necessarily the nation state, Kron and Noack underline that practice related concepts of citizenship are also useful to analyze gender. Framing citizenship as a process of self-recognition as political subject with rights and obligations in a polity, allows for studying political practices of participation and different spaces such as household, family, community and neighborhood and to discard the gendered division between public and private sphere in which only the public sphere is recognized as political (Kron and Noack, 2008, p. 12).

Erel (2009) contextualizes citizenship as participatory process that involves agency by means of highlighting citizenship practices in which migrants challenge their marginalized positions in different spheres of everyday life. Based on her own empirical research involving the life stories of German-Turkish and German-British women, she shows how migrant women engage in everyday life practices which question ethnicized and orientalist assumptions of educational practices that victimize Muslim migrant women. By taking into consideration everyday life practices of citizenship at work and in mothering practices, Erel (2009 p. 184) considers migrant women's "capacity for becoming political subjects" by claiming their rights in their political, cultural and caring practices in everyday life.

These definitions enable a discussion of German-Turkish women's transnational migration narratives as modes of negotiating participation in Turkish and German society. Purposes and decisions to migrate relate to social divisions and social locations, that is, in the case of female German-Turkish interlocutors, they challenge the lack of normative entitlement to social membership in the German polity and they challenge their marginalized positionalities as far as unequal treatment by dominant groups of citizens in both countries are concerned. Related inequalities have triggered migration decisions and include overlapping experiences with racism, economic deprivation, unemployment and gendered constraints occurring in different spheres including family, neighborhood, and work life.

While related experiences of marginalization are rationalized as having triggered migration decisions, German-Turkish women's migration paths constitute a tactic of negotiating intersectional exclusion and participation in the social spheres in their everyday lives. As citizenship practices, their migration and settlement narratives simultaneously constitute practices of empowerment, claims for equal participation, for

intersectional justice and recognition in different social spheres of the German-Turkish transnational space. Their migration and settlement practices challenge marginalized positions and normative ethno-cultural understandings of citizenship. Related practices claims and struggles for participation empowerment from gendered constraints, aspirations of improving social and economic status, a quest for social belonging and translocal practices of self-realization.

4.1. SOCIAL RIGHTS

The fieldwork material indicates that the state is an important structural factor in German-Turkish women's transnational migration trajectories as far as social rights are concerned. Their rationalization of mobility and settlement practices illustrate that migration practices relate to their entitlement to and their exercise of citizenship rights. In the following sections, I contextualize significant tropes the women addressed when they rationalized actual settlement and migration decisions and purposes and ideas to migrate in the future. Since the fieldwork material was collected in 2013 and in 2017, the data fall into the period of changed migration trends when positive net migration from Germany to Turkey reversed. Moreover, the material also shows how imagination can materialize in the future as some women's future concerns about leaving Turkey to Germany were rationalized in 2017 as reasons for their return decisions.

Social aspects of citizenship become relevant when it comes to settlement and migration decisions which revolve around claims of exercising rights to welfare, health care, pension funds and the right to education (Marshall, 1950, pp. 10–11). As suggested by Mahler and Pessar (Pessar and Mahler, 2003; Mahler and Pessar, 2006) with respect to transnational migration and by Anthias and Yuval-Davis (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1983; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Anthias, 2006) with respect to citizenship and belonging, I will illustrate German-Turkish women's claims for social rights and related migration motives along intersecting axes of social divisions (see sections 2.2.4., 2.3.4.).

4.1.1. University and School Education

Some women in the sample who have children or plan to have children are concerned with moving back to Germany or have moved back to Germany to provide for their children's education. Others decided to move to Turkey in order to pursue a tertiary education.



Figure 1: Growth of Turkey's Tertiary Education Sector 2003-2020

Seven women in the sample explain their migration to Istanbul with a tertiary education. Some of these women also spent a semester in Istanbul prior to their decision to study there. Turkey has become an attractive destination for international university students in the last two decades as Turkey's sector of tertiary education has witnessed significant growth. While Turkey had 53 publicly funded universities in 2003 and 24 universities were funded by private foundations, the total number of universities has almost tripled in 2020 (129 public/74 foundation universities).[37] Turkey has become a global center of tertiary education since English is the common language of instruction in most foundation run universities and also at state universities. This has made the country an attractive migration destination for international students and academics (Kaya, 2012, pp. 89–90).

Before deciding for a longer stay in Istanbul, several interlocutors have acquired international experience in Turkey and other countries during a semester abroad. While two women spent a semester in Cambridge and in San Diego before deciding to study in Turkey, others decided to move to Turkey after spending a semester at a university in Istanbul.[38] On this occasion, four women chose *Boğaziçi* University, one of Istanbul's most prestigious universities with international academic staff and instruction in English language.[39] Since *Boğaziçi* University is not part of the German-Turkish ERASMUS network, they had to put a significant effort into organizing their registration and

[37] For 2003-2015 see Özoğlu, Gür and Gümüs, (2016, p. 23), for 2017 and 2020 see Yükseköğretim Bilgi Yönetim Sistemi (2020).
[38] 7-I1-2017, 49; 8-I2013, 7; 16-I2017, 7; 18-I2017, 49; 21-I2017, 46
[39] 8-I2013, 7; 16-I2017, 7; 18-I2017, 49; 21-I2017, 46

enrollment. Berivan specifically mentions that she felt attracted by the international environment this university provided, stating:

> "Everyone was doing a semester abroad and then I was like, 'Hey, cool, why don't you do one too.' Then I wanted to go to America. But it just didn't work out with an available spot, in America. (...) And so I got a scholarship. And then I only got it for Turkey." (Berivan, 1990 - 18.06.2017)

Berivan[40] adds that she wanted to study abroad in English language. Although she states that getting to know Turkey was an additional motive because of her Kurdish family origin, it was primarily her interest to improve her English language skills and the opportunity to gain professional experience in an international environment that triggered her decision to spend a semester in Istanbul. She notes that she simultaneously arranged an opportunity to gain professional experience in Istanbul's globalized labor market as she worked part time for two multinational companies during her studies. In some other cases, it was the experience abroad which triggered a decision to settle in Istanbul for a longer period of time. For the women who like Berivan spent a semester in Istanbul, it was the international university environment in particular which arouse their interest to study in Turkey.

Apart from the internationalization of Turkey's tertiary sector, existing German-Turkish academic ties also had an impact on migration decisions. Academic exchange between Germany and Turkey precedes the labor recruitment agreement of 1961. Academic relations[41] between both states reach back into the 18th century (Fuhrmann, 2014, pp. 34–36) and culminated in the foundation of the Turkish German University (TAU – *Türk Alman Üniversitesi*) which started its teaching activities in 2013. The TAU represents itself as the academic and scientific institutionalized extension of historical German-Turkish ties in the realms of civil society, politics and economic cooperation. As an academic institution, the TAU is a hub of transnational German-Turkish ties in several respects including financial circuits, as it is jointly funded by the Turkish and the German state. While the Turkish state is responsible for funding the site, the buildings and the infrastructure, funding institutions of the German state like the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF, *Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung*) and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD, *Deutscher*

[40] 21-I2017, 50-56
[41] On the history of Turkish-German academic relations until today see Özil (2016).

Akademischer Austauschdienst) are responsible for administering instruction and German language courses.

Each faculty is supervised and coordinated by a university in Germany and each TAU master program has a German partner university. Apart from double degree programs, the university promotes academic exchange programs in Germany. Related scholarships are funded by the DAAD and the Turkish University Council (YÖK, *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*). Many of the Bachelor and Master programs in the realms of economics and political relations have an international focus.[42] In the beginning of 2020, 45 lecturers were from Germany. 30 percent of the instruction is conducted by lecturers from Germany who travel back and forth between the two countries. Lecturers from Turkey have opportunities for academic qualification and research at partner universities in Germany (Hecker, 2019; DAAD, 2020a, 2020b).

Among the ten women who have completed an academic career in Turkey, four were enrolled in a master's program of the TAU in 2017. It can be argued that the familiarity with the city of Istanbul and pre-established social ties provided the ground for their decisions to study there. While one interlocutor had been living in Istanbul for several years prior to enrolling in the master's program, three women gathered previous international experience during a semester at *Boğaziçi* University. They state that the geographical location of Istanbul or Turkey was not relevant in their decision-making process. Instead, the women argue that it was the academic program, the international outline of the syllabus and the prospect of studying in a German partner university what triggered their decision to enroll at the TAU and to start a life in Istanbul.[43] Damla,[44] who lives in Germany today who worked in international relations for a civil society organization in 2017 reasons as follows: She found the program she got enrolled in by coincidence and the contents perfectly matched her professional profile. It was not the location of Istanbul that interested her during her studies or during her professional experience in 2017. She even states that she never wanted to live in Istanbul and that she was glad to return to Germany after completing a year at the TDU. In 2017, she retrospectively expresses this concern as follows:

[42] Examples are study programs such as Business Administration, Economics, Political Science and International Relations, International Finance, Cultural and Communication Sciences, Intercultural Management, International and European Affairs, German as a Foreign Language.
[43] 16-I2017, 9; 19-I2017, 66, 68; 21-I2017, 50-56
[44] 19-I2017, 66-68

> "So, this is the second time I've been to Turkey for an extended period of time. And both times [it] was actually not my goal to come to Turkey, but the external circumstances [university and employment] were; the location was Turkey. I just chose this program and it was just in Turkey for one year." (Damla, 1981 - 24.05.2017)

It is worth mentioning that four other women completed an academic degree in Turkey in disciplines related to German language, including translation studies and German philology and literature. Among them are three of the four interlocutors who moved to Turkey in the course of a family decision or when they were still minors. The university of Istanbul was the first university which established thorough academic ties to Germany. As of the 18th century German professors were instructors at the predecessor of Istanbul University, the *Darülfünun* (Widmann, 1973, p. 42; Fuhrmann, 2014, pp. 34–36). Historical academic ties between Turkey and Germany continued after Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. Jewish-German academics who fled Germany, were later appointed as instructors at Istanbul University in the course of Kemalist reforms of Turkey's educational system. Among them were 63 professors who held chairs in various disciplines at the University of Istanbul, including German philology (see section 3.1. and Hillebrecht, 2000, pp. 11, 100–111; Özil, 2016, pp. 245–246).

The consulted women who studied a discipline related to German language entered this network of established academic ties between Germany and Turkey. In the course of the return act (*Rückkehrförderungsgesetz*) of 1983 which resulted in the return of numerous labor migrants and their family members to Turkey (see section 3.3.). Many of these return migrants' children who studied at Turkish universities chose to study German language and literature or to become German teachers (Özil, 2016, p. 250). Özil notes that the popularity of these programs decreased by the end of the 1990s. Every third or fourth instructor in German philology or in the disciplines of teaching German and translation studies at Turkish universities today comes from a family with a Germany-related migration experience (Ibid., p. 256).

The fact that some of the consulted women selected one of these programs reflects their attachment and identification with German language and their wish to speak German in their everyday life. They also rationalize their decisions to pursue a related education because they were integrated into a group of peers who shared a history in Germany.[45] Ela who returned in the course of family reunion in 1997 when she was 18 years old,

[45] 5PM2013, 3; 5-I2017, 37; 11-I1-2013, 80; 28-I2017, 49 – 55; 30-I2017, 75

symbolically always had her "suitcase ready" to go back to Germany, a decision she postponed on several occasions. She reasons that it was the time after she moved out from the family home located in another city in Turkey to study German in Istanbul, when she arranged herself with a longer stay in Turkey. She states:

> "And then I started [studying]. And when I had many around me, like me, who returned, who spoke German. Who had classes in German, you felt more/ I felt more comfortable also because Istanbul is cosmopolitan and not many people interfere [with your life]. I liked being in Istanbul and to study German. [...] I always had this ulterior motive: 'When I finish the first class, I'll go back to Germany.' Okay [...] 'First, I will finish my studies and then do the internship. Then I can still do it.' Then it always got delayed. […] And all of a sudden: this year is our 20th year." (Ela, 1979 - 31.05.2013)

Although she could find a way to arrange herself with life in Turkey when she started studying and had the opportunity to practice German language and make friends with German-Turkish peers, she still imagined returning to Germany in the future. It seems like she appropriated this return narrative from her parents. In fact, Ela mentions that she remembers that her parents who were first generation labor migrants in Germany always talked about returning to Turkey in the future at the time she and her family were still living in Germany.[46]

Zeynep who graduated in teaching German language moved to Ankara in 2003 when she was 20 years old. Due to her hasty decision and her young age, she struggled to adapt to her new life. She rationalizes her decision with the gendered discrimination she experienced in her family of origin and by her ex-fiancée (see section 4.4.4.) and with experiences of exclusion. Her following statement exemplifies how several women found a way to adapt to their new lives in Turkey by in the transnational German-Turkish university environment:

> "But when I then moved to Turkey, well, I suddenly had this longing for Germany. Then I thought, 'No, I don't belong here at all. I just want to be on vacation here.' […] So, during the first two years I would have done anything to be able to go back. Everything. As I said, it was very hard for me. The adaptation was very hard. After that, when I got my life under control, I went back to university. [After that] I formed my circle of friends. Most of them are like me, come from Germany." (Zeynep, 1982 - 09.07.2013)

[46] 5PM2013, 3; 5-I2017, 37

A couple of sentences later she states that her longing of returning to Germany only started to fade, when she started studying German.[47] For Ela, Zeynep and the two other women it was the network of peers that supported them psychologically to start a life and settle in Turkey, a place some of them formerly rejected because it was new to them and because of their longing for their places of origin in Germany. A university environment with friendship networks and teachers with a German-Turkish background, protected them from having to justify their upbringing in Germany and related stereotypes (see section 5.1.3., 5.3.5.). The German-Turkish transnational university environment they found in Istanbul provided them with the opportunity to jointly evoke memories and to connect to their histories in Germany and to use their shared cultural repertoire, for example by speaking German. They found a piece of home in a particular German-Turkish transnational space of their own where they could connect with other students who possibly also experienced problems with adapting to a new life in Turkey. Today, Zeynep is content with her life in Turkey. She is successful in her profession and feels socially included in comparison to the lacking recognition she experienced in her own age group without migration background in Germany (section 4.3.1., 4.3.2.).

The shared experience of the individual cases shows how German-Turkish women's migration paths are embedded into networks of transnational social ties of different content and quality that have were established between Turkey and Germany before and after the labor migration recruitment agreement. Beyond international academic ties in a prestigious university in Istanbul, historical academic ties between Germany and Turkey produce a transnational social space with a particular history. Border-crossing institutional ties between state funded educational institutions and universities from Germany and Turkey render this space attractive for German-Turkish women, precisely because of this transnationalized production of knowledge as for example provided by "flying faculties".[48] In this space German-Turkish women can deepen their experiences of growing up in two contexts by rendering it professional intercultural knowledge. Meanwhile, a social environment with German-Turkish peers that is bound together by language, migration experiences and shared memories constitutes a support network and a place of belonging. This transnational academic space provides a connection point for newcomers who fill it with new life for those who will come after them.

[47] 11-I1-2013, 92
[48] 19-I2017, 68

Maternity and Education in Germany

An important trope in the empirical material is maternity or plans to start a family in combination with access to education. Related narratives constitute a gendered concern that determines actual migration paths and purposes which can translate from a concern into actual migration decisions at a later point of time. Moreover, concerns about moving back to Germany are closely linked to the family household's economic situation and the school systems in Germany and Turkey. The majority of consulted women who plan to have children or have children in pre-school age, are concerned with advantages and disadvantages of their children's school education in Turkey or Germany. Many of the interviewed women state that they either would not live in Turkey if they had children[49] or state that that they plan leaving Turkey to Germany or to another country in the event of having children.[50]

In the light of a transnational repertoire of comparison, these women evaluate their personal knowledge and based on their experiences with the school system in Germany and the advantages they associate with it. Based on this comparison their assessment of the school system in Turkey is rather negative and translates into vague ideas or into concrete purposes of moving to Germany, depending on their mobility as far as their citizenship rights are concerned. The negative assessment of the school system in Turkey revolves around modes of instruction and discontent with reforms of the school system and curriculum (see also section 4.2.1.).

Ela and Zeynep who are German-Teachers at public and private schools derive their statements from their professional everyday life experience in Turkey and their biographic experiences with the school system in Germany. On the one hand, they criticize that the school system in Turkey creates a performance pressure on students. As youngsters would have to compete at a young age for the best test results and the highest grade point averages, the system would teach them that competitiveness is a desirable value. Ela states:

> "children are in - well, of course, I see that now from the perspective of my job, but that's important. So, the children are important. In particular because they are our future. But they are then taken from one course to another like racers. Among them, then there's also the talk of 'How many points did you get in this subject, how many points did you get in that

[49] 2-FN2017-2-T, 16; 32-I2017, 80
[50] 5-I2013, 112, 17-I2017, 213; 21-I2017, 189

> subject, in that other subject?' And the parents just talk about that too. But the time, the beautiful time and the things the child then also has to learn, to be independent, [to] trust, that doesn't come along during the school time." (Ela, 1979 - 15.07.2017)

Zeynep in particular criticizes the ÖSS (*Ögrenci Seçme Sınavı*) exam which is organized by the Turkish Foundation for University Admissions (*Öğrenci Seçme Yerleştirme Merkezi*) which is a department of the Turkish University Council (YÖK, *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*). YÖK is a state body that centralizes control over universities in Turkey. Zeynep can imagine to join her son in Germany if he decides to study there. She states:

> "[T]he children in Turkey, they are under pressure because of this educational system. They are not allowed/ they do not have the possibility to study what they want or what they are interested in. They do not have this possibility. They have to study what they have enough points for. And that scares me. I do not want that. I don't want to turn my son into a freak. […] I do not want my son to be good or successful everywhere. No. My son can also have bad grades. [..] That is not important. I just want my son to be happy, to be a happy person. And to do what he is interested in and wants to do. But he doesn't have that [opportunity] in Turkey because of the education system. [...] That's why I [personally] don't really want to live in Germany, but I want him to study in Germany." (Zeynep, 1982 - 14.08.2017)

While Ela reasons that this performance pressure for children in the Turkish school system is a reason for her to migrate to Germany in the event of becoming a mother, Zeynep would join her son, when necessary, in order to support his academic future.

Meanwhile several women contrast the German education system with the Turkish one, some women associate the German system with a creative style of teaching that would prioritize a profound understanding instead of memorization. They associate the school system in Germany as more inclined to train students' individual interests, their creativity and independent thinking capacities.[51] Ela for instance explains that her colleagues always ask her to do the creative work and derives her creative capacities and her fine-motor skills from her school education.[52]

In several cases, migration motives and plans related to education overlap with financial concerns over school education in Turkey and the women's personal connection to German language. Many interlocutors want to pass their bi-cultural experience and skills on to their children. Language skills are a crucial asset for their children's capacity

[51] 5PM2013, 12, 184; 5-I2017, 61; 11-I2017, 62; see also Interlocutors: 6PM2013, 12; 17-I2017, 95
[52] 5-I2017, 63

to move in transnational space in the future. For nearly all of the interviewed women who have children or plan to have children, it is self-evident that their children will learn German at school. Against this backdrop Arzu – who stresses her identification with German and Turkish language throughout her narrative – frames a return to Germany as possible undertaking in the future to guarantee her son's linguistic education:

> "I definitely want him to grow up multilingual as well. Because I had the advantage and the luck to have grown up that way and I really had advantages in life. […] If I have that opportunity, I would like to offer him that as well. As I said, if back [to Germany], then only for him." (Arzu, 1978 - 07.08.2017)

Since the public education system in Turkey does not meet this demand, private schools provide the main alternative for a German language education at school. Private schools involve tuition fees which are too expensive, even for middle-class households. Moreover, some complain that private schools do not meet educational standards the women situate in the German school system.[53] Based on the women's statements, tuition fees cost between 20,000 and 45,000 Turkish liras annualy.[54] According to the exchange rate in August 2017, tuition fees ranged 3,200 and 10,900 Euros yearly. Cennetkuşu who has no children states that she considered the following options when she was planning to become a mother:

> "[I]f you want to do or become anything here, you have to go to a *Kolej*, a private school. And they are really expensive. It's damn expensive. And I don't see why I should pay for a private school, for the child to go somewhere and me paying ridiculous amounts here. So, with 2000 Lira monthly, you're in the game if you want to have a good *Kolej*. But in Germany this is not the case. There you can also go to a state school. Then you can, if the child is smart enough, […] he or she will do *Abi* [university entrance certificate] and I don't know what else. But that simply works without money. You don't have to invest 2000 […] euros each month for the child, right? Plus, first of all, the child would master German language." (Cennetkuşu, 1974 - 14.07.2017)

As the majority of the interviewed women don't consider state schools in Turkey as an option, private schools are the only alternative. Depending on a household's financial situation, schools in Germany present an alternative to provide German language education. In that case, a return to Germany is the only option. Cennetkuşu[55] also argues

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[53] 5PS2017, 16; 7-I1-2017, 85; 7PS2-2017, 15; 8-I2013, 38; 14-I2018, 125; 16-I2017, 25; 17PM2017, 7; 23-I2017, 239
[54] 7-I1-2017, 85; 17PM2017, 7; 23-I2017, 239
[55] 23-I2017, 239

that school education in Germany improves children's future academic opportunities since secondary school diplomas are globally more acknowledged in comparison to a degree from a public school in Turkey. Based on these narratives, it is not astonishing that several women have decided to move back to Germany for these reasons.

These women explain their migration back to Germany with their children's school enrollment and their wish to provide German language education for their children.[56] It is important to note that related decisions in several cases also intersect with socio-economic burdens that cannot only be explained with the high tuition fees in Turkey. Emma is single mother, and Bahar and Mihrimah are de facto single mothers[57]. In all three cases, the ex-partner and husbands do not provide any financial support to the family income. In 2017, all three women live in their place of origin in Germany. Before she had her children in 2013, Bahar already anticipated in Istanbul that high tuition fees in Turkey and a school education for her children in Germany might be a reason for her to move back to Germany in the future. And in fact, she returned to Germany in 2015.[58] Against this backdrop, Emma rationalizes her concrete return plans stating:

> "[T]here is the fact that Klara's school enrollment is just around the corner. I have to take care of it and I see that my repayments don't get less in time. That means that even in one year, I will not be able to send her to a good school. Right? Everything is so expensive, you can't imagine. A normal school where they teach a bit of German. With shuttle, with food, everything, it will cost you between 20 and 25,000 Lira per year and that is the good from the bad [...]. And the father does not support me. Nothing at all. Nothing. Zero for one year. So, I see myself only in a dead end right now." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

In 2013, Emma[59] already anticipated that she might go back to Germany if she "has to" because of her daughter's school education, a situation that occurred with her daughter's school enrollment. While she was still hoping that her daughter's father would support her financially in 2013, she has to carry the economic burden of raising a child and paying of a real estate credit and a business credit by herself. In addition, her return to Germany was also motivated by avoiding and protecting her daughter and herself from her daughter's fathers verbal abuse. Her family of origin in Germany, in particular her twin sister provide an additional tenet of security.

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[56] 7-I1-2017, 84 – 89; 8-I2013; 14-I2018, 94, 125
[57] 4-I2017, 52; 4PS2017, 10; 7-I2013, 90; 7-I1-2017, 55, 75, 77, 84-90; 14-I2018, 77-79; 92 - 94, 125
[58] 14-I2013, 77-79
[59] 7-I2013, 30, 90; 7-I1-2017, 84 – 89, 97

Emma, Bahar, and Mihrimah had financial problems with covering their everyday life expenses in Turkey, a situation in which they were nowhere near providing the desired linguistic education in German language for their children. Emma's example exemplifies how overlapping causes such as single motherhood, socio-economic positionality and gendered discrimination cause a situation in which she and other women move back to Germany to make use of their social rights for enhancing their children's educational opportunities (see also section 4.1.1.).

4.1.2. Maternity, Economic Deprivation and Welfare

For several women, transformations of the political and economic context in Turkey become determinants of migration purposes and ideas of returning to Germany. Those transformations overlap with economic deprivation, motherhood or plans to start a family. Julia[60], a middle-aged woman plans to have children. Julia's desire to have a child combines with precarious employment conditions. Her education as a doctor's assistant is not acknowledged in Turkey and she works for a doctor's office without work contract. She states that she worries about not finding a job in the event of possible unemployment and struggles with feelings of existential insecurity. These concerns overlap with her fear of suicide attacks in 2017 and her own and her husband's insecure financial situation which are connected to the wider political context in Turkey. The high number of suicide attacks in 2016 together with the attempted coup on July 15 in 2016 and the resulting economic crisis have significantly deteriorated the couple's income that she provided for in 2017 (see also sections 3.8., 4.2.1.). Julia's working hours in the private doctor's office have been reduced resulting in a lower salary. Julia explains this with a decreased demand for private medical care in Turkey because of the economic crisis. Her husband who is a musician does, according to her narrative, not contribute to the family income because he can no longer play music, as fear of suicide attacks kept bars from hosting concerts due to lack of customers.

Her German citizenship presents a solution to prevent economic deprivation. A logical consequence of these overlapping factors is that security concerns have become Julia's main purposes for returning to Germany. A return to Germany would provide her with support by siblings and parents who live there. A potential employment opportunity in her old job and better employment conditions provide an opportunity for financial

[60] 17-I, 65 – 69, 79-81, 95, 211 – 213, 251; 17PS2017, 8; 17PM2017, 15-16

security. In the light of possible unemployment in Turkey, she makes the following statement:

> "Okay, if I'm unemployed now, 'Can you find a job here now?' Because in the end our state doesn't help us here, like in Germany. And that's why you just start thinking about it. And then maybe you want to go back again (laughs)."[61] (Julia, 1979 - 02.05.2017)

Her purpose of returning to Germany is entangled with her social location, a positionality that in that particular historical context is defined by her age, gender, her German citizenship and the threat of socio-economic deprivation. In her narrative about security, her German citizenship presents a solution to access social rights in Germany. A return migration to Germany provides her with the right to welfare benefits, a fundament for security in the event of unemployment.

As far as her legal citizenship status is concerned, Mihrimah's[62] positionality is more disadvantaged than Julia's. Mihrimah's migration back to Germany was caused by macro-economic changes due to transformations in political context in Turkey (see also section 4.2.1.). Related financial insecurity due to a lack of income on the one hand, and transformations in her life cycle on the other hand caused her to return to Germany. In 2013, Mihrimah got married and gave birth to a daughter the following year. In 2013, she was deputy manager of a restaurant and concerned with saving money to guarantee her financial security in Istanbul. At that time, she underlined that she wanted to stay financially independent from her then future husband. After she gave birth to her daughter, the family household's economic situation drastically deteriorated after the attempted coup of 2016 and the numerous suicide attacks in the city of Istanbul (see sections 3.8., 4.2.1.). Similar to Julia, her husband's business in the tourist sector no longer generated sufficient income to provide for the family and to afford the rent, as tourists no longer travelled to Istanbul. In 2016, Mihrimah returned to Cologne, her place of birth, together with her two-year-old daughter. In 2017, economic insecurity was overshadowed by an illness that prevented her from working. Her entitlement to social rights and her claims to social welfare in Germany presented a solution for her to ensure the family household's economic survival and access to medical treatment. Mihrimah points out:

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[61] Okay, wenn ich jetzt arbeitslos bin: "Findest du jetzt hier einen Job?" Weil letztendlich unser Staat hilft uns ja auch nicht hier, so wie in Deutschland. Und deswegen machst du dir schon halt deine Gedanken so. Und dann willst du halt doch vielleicht wieder zurück (lacht).

[62] 4PS2017, 10; 4-I2017, 47, 52, 63, 66

> "And when you have a child, you think much better about what it is good for [the child]. [...] I'm still unemployed at the moment, but at the end of the month I'll start working again. After the surgery and so on. And here you have the guarantee. Your rent will be paid, you are insured and you will also get/ okay, it's not much, but you will get by each month, right? You have the guarantee here." (Mihrimah, 1988 - 12.09.2017)

Since her husband can no longer contribute to the household income, economically speaking Mihrimah is de facto a single mother. She became solely responsible for providing an income and for child-care related work. Mihrimah receives the minimum *Hartz IV* welfare benefits which enables her to provide for herself and her daughter. She explains her return decision with the fact that a life in Germany granted her more security for covering livelihood and access to health care in comparison to the financial insecurity she experienced in Istanbul. The reform of the German Residence Act in 2007 which has restricted the immigration of lower skilled individuals causes additional problems in Mihrimah's life since family reunification of non-EU citizens has been complicated. A requirement for family reunification is that the person with a residence status in Germany and a non-EU nationality has to be employed or provide sufficient income and living space (§ 27, Paragraph 2 Residence Act). For Mihrimah, this means that she cannot reunite with her husband because family reunion is not possible for denizens who make use of their rights to social welfare (§ 5 Paragraph 1 No. 1 in combination with § 2 Paragraph 3 Residence Act). Other than that, she states that her husband prefers to stay in Istanbul instead of joining her and his daughter. To facilitate her own situation and to guarantee the German nationality for her daughter, Mihrimah plans to adopt German citizenship. Mihrimah's positionality is more constrained than the positionality of other women. In addition to her denizenship status and her illness, financial problems and her situation as single mother together with the associated responsibilities situate her in a disadvantaged social location.

As return migration in cases of severe financial insecurity is determined by external circumstances and by their positionality, it not astonishing that two women do not identify their decision to move back to Germany as matching with their personal interests (see sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2., 4.3.4.). The following statement made by the single-mother Emma who has concrete plans of moving back to Germany (see above) gets to the heart of this constrained positionality:

> "If it was just about Emma, I would still be here. If it was just about me, I'd still stay here. Why? I have no idea. It's still interesting the whole thing. Plus, I have a job here, I work [... as a German teacher] and I have

> my courses, I am recognized. I told you that as well. I am respected by the students, I like that. If I go back to Germany now, I know EXACTLY that it will take on the same structure as it did back then. Which I never liked. But now, I definitely need consistency for my daughter. And I somehow have the feeling that I can earn more money in Germany now too. The situation is completely different because they also need German teachers." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

In a similar vein, Bahar states:

> "Well Istanbul is something for me alone, I think. So maybe I can't really explain it the right way now. Well, that was a project for me. And with the children it just stopped or something like that." (Bahar, 1984 - 21.05.2018)

These statements guide the way to migration decisions directed at Turkey which are based on motives of social recognition, empowerment and self-realization and will be explored in the following sections.

4.1.3. Age and Maternity: Access to Pension Funds and Health Care

Yağmur[63] explains her concerns of leaving Turkey with her age and worries about her future in the light of her financial insecurity. Born in 1971, she is concerned about her economic security as an older woman in the future and does not want to age in Turkey for various reasons that relate to economic deprivation triggered by broader political events. Her idea of living in another country is connected to her age and her pension funds which in the light of her situation in 2017 is "no longer guaranteed". After Yağmur's sales agency went bankrupt in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 2016, she is heavily indebted in 2017 (see section 4.2.1.). At the time I met her in 2017, she had given up her apartment and was living with relatives (Weißenberg, 2020, p. 174).

Due to the German-Turkish migration history, a bilateral social security agreement renders it possible to add the contributions made in Turkey or Germany to the pension insurance of the respective country of residence (Rentenversicherung, 2020). Knowing that she can access the Turkish pension payments recognized in the German pension system or the other way around, provides Yağmur with a solution for guaranteeing her financial security in the future. As far as her residence rights are concerned, Yağmur is situated in a more disadvantaged end than other interlocutors. According to the German Residence Act (§ 51 Residence Act, Paragraph 2), the residence title in Germany expires after six months of absence. She lost her right of residence in Germany, because her ex-

[63] 2-I2017-2-T, 63, 69, 71, 222

husband – whom she left with her migration to Turkey in 2000 – informed the local migration authority in Germany about her residence in Turkey. Imagining that she will live in Germany or in another country in the future provides her with a resourcefulness in a situation with very constrained opportunities for action.

Two more interlocutors express worries about their financial security as elderly women and their pension while considering a life in Germany in the future. In comparison to 2013, Ela[64] explains a reluctance towards life in the city in 2017. In the light of her middle age, she is concerned about her financial situation as elderly woman. Ela has been working for more than ten years in short term contracts for the same private school without future perspectives. Due to her low salary she cannot save money for her retirement. Against this backdrop, Ela states that she seriously considers leaving Istanbul for a place in Germany or to Vienna stating:

> "Yes, when I think about my future and want to ensure that I live humanely. To live safely. […] Now I can still overcome that, but when I am in retirement age, I really want to have security. Be it health-wise, be it socially, financially. And I'm not able to provide this security on my own. I cannot establish it by myself." (Ela, 1979 - 15.07.2017)

In addition to her worries about financial insecurity as elderly woman, Ela also relates her purposes of leaving Turkey to a changed atmosphere in society. Apart from feeling pressured into identifying herself along polarized political lines, she also experiences an increased pressure to conform with traditional gender role expectations as far as motherhood is concerned (see sections 4.3.4., 4.2.1.). Although she imagines leaving Turkey, like Yağmur, Ela is no longer endowed with legal rights of residence, that is, to travel to Germany, her country of birth, without a visa. While her employment situation has not changed, her life circumstances have changed because of her age and her wish to have children (see section 4.4.1.). Ela works on obtaining a C2 German certificate for the opportunity to leave Turkey and to teach German abroad.

Other women explain deliberations of living in Germany with their preference to access health care in Germany. Before shedding light on related narratives, a short digression on the health system helps to explain related narratives. Over the years, Turkey has implemented extensive health-care reforms. With the *Health Transformation Program* (SDP, *Sağlıkta Dönüşüm Programı*) of 2003, primary health coverage was implemented providing health insurance for the majority of the population with a social security

[64] 5-I2013, 36, 104, 136; 5PS2017, 3, 5

scheme. Health services are now financed by the *General Health Insurance* (GSK, *Genel Sağlık Sigortası*) and are provided by hospitals of the public and private sector. In addition to the expansion of access to primary health care, in particular in the domain of maternal and child health, formerly high levels of out-of-pocket expenditures have dropped (Tatar *et al.*, 2011). In comparison to the German health system, health governance is highly centralized and corporate actors which help to strengthen patients' rights in Germany (doctors associations and insurance funds) hardly have a say in health policies in Turkey (Wendt, Agartan and Kaminska, 2013). Apart from granting more equitable access to health services, the Health Transformation Plan has also promoted privatization of health care in Turkey. Although the state is still the main actor, a commodification and marketization of healthcare is likely to strengthen private actors' leverage in the future. This in turn may lead to a weakening of patients' rights as those become customer rights (Yılmaz, 2017, pp. 249, 256). Although the *Health Transformation Program* made health care services more accessible in the broader population, out-of-pocket payments may have hindered the impact of equitable access to health (Yılmaz, 2017, p. 93). The state has also transferred the financial burden to patients who use their public health insurance in private clinics, instead of pressuring private healthcare providers to accept the prices by the *Social Security Institution* (SGK; *Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu*) (Yılmaz, 2017, pp. 255, 256). Yılmaz notes that this may have resulted in an increased purchase of private health insurance plans and supplementary private health insurances (2017, p. 89). Despite the better accessibility of health care in Turkey, health treatment presents an option in the transnational space, available to those women who have German nationality or a *denizenship* status (Hammar, 2016) and corresponding access to rights in Germany. In comparison to Turkey, privatized health care does not provide general services to patients with a public insurance.

Concerned with their health as elderly women, ideas about migrating in the future relate to medical treatment in Germany which some women mention to prefer in comparison to medical treatment in Turkey. Others identify health care in Germany as more secure and accessible while they assess health care in Turkey as less transparent, more expensive and dependent on their income.[65] These plans of making use of health treatment in Germany on retirement may also be based on their first generation parents' experiences of comparing health systems and their recurrent migration between

[65] 5-I2017, 135; 17-I2017, 85; 20PM2017, 12; 20-I2017, 253

Germany and Turkey on retirement. Several interlocutors mention that their retired parents – many of whom initially planned to return to Turkey for good – started to commute between both countries after their health deteriorated and they started making use of their rights to medical treatment in Germany.[66] My interlocutor Zilan explains that her parents who initially had planned to resettle in Turkey in the long run at the time of our interview in 2017, planned to live in Germany again because of their discontent with how they were treated by medical personnel and because of long waiting hours.[67]

As Krumme shows, one central motive of first-generation retirees' migration paths from Turkey to Germany is their familiarity with the health care system in Germany and accessibility to medical treatment which they assess it as less complicated and time-consuming in comparison to the health system in Turkey. Her interlocutors reported to have experienced overcrowded hospitals and complained about long waiting hours, limited services by the state system and high prices for treatment in the private system (2004, p. 148). Experiences with high expenses in private clinics in Turkey, familiarity with and trust into public health care in Germany is the reason why five women[68] mention that they gave birth in Germany. Several of them moved between Turkey and Germany in a circular fashion before their pregnancy and after they gave birth. An important motive for their high mobility during and after their pregnancy is the accessibility of health care in Germany. Before getting married and starting a family, Mihrimah already anticipated that she would give birth in Germany. In 2013 in Istanbul, she explained her related future concerns as follows:

> "Yes, not here. (.) Because I feel safer there. Because I think, here they have more/ over there [in Germany] they have more alternatives if something happens to me or if something happens to the baby. […] In the beginning, when I had to be examined because of work, I was in a private hospital. I had to pay 350 euros to have them examine me. (.) Things I would actually get done in five minutes by my own family doctor in Germany." (Mihrimah, 1988 - 09.06.2013)

High out of pocket expenses in Turkey explain while Mihrimah found it safer to give birth to her daughter in Germany in 2014.[69] Additionally she explained this decision with her emotional attachment to her birth-place Cologne. Furthermore, Mihrimah and two other women explain longer stays in Germany in the event of giving birth and

[66] 3-I2017, 32; 11-I1-2013, 204; 13-I2017, 7; 1-I2017, 75 - 81
[67] 1PM2017, 10; 1-I2017, 75 - 81
[68] 3-I2017, 5, 54; 4-I2017, 44-45; 7PM2013, 3; 7PM2017, 18; 8-I2013, 15; 14-I2018, 73
[69] 4-I2017, 45

thereafter with security that is provided by the family of origin and a stay in their place of origin in Germany[70]. In fact, the parents of most interlocutors who gave birth in Germany also lived there or had a place of residence in both countries.

It can be concluded from this section that historical academic ties between Turkey and Germany have resulted in a transnational academic network in Istanbul. This network offers academic and educational opportunities for German-Turkish women triggering their migration to Istanbul. Moreover, this transnational academic network facilitates settlement decisions for others who struggle to adapt to life in Turkey as the German-Turkish academic network provides support and social space. Here, German-Turkish women can practice German language and interact with peers who share a history in Germany. Circular migration paths back to Germany on the other hand are an outcome of complex interrelations of social locations and the broader political and economic context in Turkey.

Migration paths back to Germany were imagined and realized by women who are mothers or plan to have children and who struggle with financial insecurity. A return migration to Germany and access social rights in the form of German language education for their children and the possibility of accessing welfare present a solution for granting economic security, an essential fundament for starting a family or to provide security for a family household. Related decisions overlap with the political and economic context in Turkey. Purposes, plans and actual decisions to move from Turkey back to Germany are prevalent in cases in which a changed economic and political context in Turkey aggravated class-related socio-economic disadvantages in comparison to interviewed women who continue their lives in Istanbul. Returning to Germany presents a tactic of eluding external factors such as financial and psychological insecurity. In the sum of cases, gendered inequality is also very significant. It is striking that many women who are mothers or plan to start a family and simultaneously plan to or have returned to their places of origin in Germany were solely responsible for providing for the household's income. The evaluation of fieldnotes and interview material shows that in the cases of Julia, Emma, Mihirmah and Bahar,[71] migration purposes and actual migration decisions to claim social rights in Germany became relevant, when they could not shoulder economic deprivation by themselves. Single

[70] 4-I2017, 45; 8-I2013, 13; 4FN2018, 6; 14-I2018, 121
[71] For similar narratives see also interlocutors 5-I2017, 135; 8-I2013, 83; 29-I2017, 165

mothers or not, the women who actually returned to Germany experienced gendered inequality as far as an unequal division of labor regarding income provision and care work were concerned, since their husbands did or could not contribute to the family income. They were in charge of covering living costs and bringing up the children. This situation is also indirectly supported by the German state's migration policies which constrain the immigration of lower skilled individuals from third countries or prevents family reunion if a denizen receives social welfare. In this particular situation of overlapping factors, German-Turkish women tactically plan to or in fact claim their social rights in Germany including access to education, welfare, health, and pension funds to find a solution. The family network and family support in Germany constitutes an additional important resource.

4.2. CIVIL ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP

Civil rights also constitute motives for mobility or stasis in the German-Turkish transnational space. Defined by Marshall as another aspect of citizenship, civil rights include freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and the right to conclude contracts (Marshall, 1950, pp. 10–11). The 2017 fieldwork material shows – other than the material of 2013 – that some of the interviewed German-Turkish women voice migration concerns, plans and decisions with constraints of their freedom of opinion and thought. Self-censorship in the public sphere for instance results from experiences with arbitrary repressive political measures against them. In addition, some women note that they increasingly experience social pressure to position themselves along polarized and politicized identity categories in their everyday lives express worries about their children's access to education as far as an impartial and secular school syllabus is concerned. In the following sections, related statements will be contextualized with political transformations that occurred in Turkey in particular after the attempted coup on July 15, 2016. In section 4.2.2., I outline how civil rights as far as rights to property are concerned can constitute a migration and settlement motive. Access to family property assets can facilitate a migration to Istanbul and rule out other migration destinations. Self-acquired property, family property, social status and upward mobility constitute motives that promote continuous settlement but also vary in the light of different women's social locations.

4.2.1. Restricted Freedom of Expression

The migration back to Germany of some German-Turkish women I met in Turkey in 2013 can partially be interpreted in the light of various political transformations under the AKP government which account for a rising authoritarianism of Turkey's political system. Several authors (Özbudun, 2015; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, 2018; Somer, 2016) have categorized the political transformations in Turkey between 2011 and 2016 as a transition of the political regime from a "tutelary democracy" or a "consolidating democracy" into a "competitive authoritarian regime" (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Contrary to the first two terms of the AKP between 2002 and 2011, the late AKP era after 2011 has been assessed as a period of de-Europeanization as far as the rule of law is concerned. Coupled with the decreasing motivation regarding the EU accession process, mechanisms of checks and balances including the independence of the judiciary, the media and freedom of expression in civil society have been weakened if not abolished (Saatçioğlu, 2016).

Corresponding concerns mainly become apparent in the ethnographic material collected during the second fieldwork in 2017. Five of 14 women I also met in 2013 had returned to Germany between 2015 and 2017; other women concretely planned to move back to Germany or to leave Turkey. Among other reasons, those who had moved back to Germany in 2017 explained their motives with observations of increased restrictions on civil rights as far as individual liberties and freedom of speech are concerned. Women who imagined or planned to leave Turkey in the near future, rationalized their concerns in a similar vein. The fact, that six women I interviewed in 2017 avoided answering or did not answer the question about how they assess the political situation hints to a problem with freedom of speech in Turkey.

Esen and Gümüşçü find three of Levitsky and Way's four defining criteria for a competitive authoritarian regime fulfilled in Turkey: Unfair elections, the violation of civil liberties and unevenly distributed political rights (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, p. 1587). The following transformations concern restrictions on civil rights which have occurred between the two fieldwork occasions in 2013 and in 2017 and continue. The ongoing pressure on media has increased during AKP's third term, while the party strengthened the establishment of government friendly media and financially pressured various critical media outlets were pressured financially. In addition, opposition parties were provided with limited space to access public and private television channels.

Journalists were publicly targeted and detained. Apart from that, social media have been restricted or banned and websites have been blocked. Lawsuits against individuals who have criticized the government have significantly increased after 2013. These developments have been coupled with an increasing intolerance towards the opposition. Incidents of police violence in public assemblies and protests increased together with detentions and lawsuits against protestors (Esen and Gümüşçü, 2016, pp. 1590–1594). In the aftermath of the attempted military coup on July 15, 2016 the state of emergency was extended numerous times until July 2018. The AKP government closed several critical newspapers and massive waves of arrests took place. Journalists and pro-Kurdish scholars and politicians were increasingly targeted. The curtailment of civil liberties can also be observed in the increasing pressure on critical knowledge production at universities. During the state of emergency thousands of academics were dismissed (Öktem, 2016; Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016, pp. 472–473). In addition, the protection of civil liberties is no longer guaranteed by the judiciary. The executive has been strengthened after the presidential referendum and many civil servants, among them also staff of the judiciary, for example judges and public persecutors were dismissed by decree during the rule of emergency after the attempted coup, according to the AKP's narrative to sack Gülen-affiliated[72] staff (Öktem and Akkoyunlu, 2016, p. 472; Esen and Gümüşçü, 2017, p. 304).

Some women relate their decisions of leaving Turkey to these political transformations and express related concerns together with worries about the future and their children's prospective school education or with decreasing liberties in their everyday lives, quoting experiences with self-censorship, curtailed freedom of expression in the public sphere and a perception of an increased pressure to position themselves on two poles of mutually exclusive values.[73] The women's concerns and experiences about what can and cannot be said in the public and worries about being reported to the police or held in the country can also be contextualized with the erosion of the rule of law since the protection of individual liberties is more difficult to protect for the judiciary.

Lena's circumstances illuminate how this political context has affected her decision of resettling in Germany. After completing a one-year lasting master's program in

[72] The Gülen movement has infiltrated the Turkish state on various levels including the judiciary and used to be an ally of the AKP during its first term. Due to limitations of time, space, and knowledge on this matter I will not enter this discussion.
[73] 2-I2017, 59; 5-I2013, 184; 5-I2017, 101, 113; 6-I2017, 89; 8-I2017, 39, 41; 9-I2017, 44, 116

England, she decided to move back to Germany in 2016 instead of going after her initial plans to resettle in Istanbul. Among other reasons, she rationalizes her decision with the increasing curtailment of civil liberties after the attempted coup in combination with an ending relationship:

> "My original plan was [as follows]: shortly before I went to England, I started a relationship with a man. And he also gave me a little bit of a hint that we would move in together sometime after [my studies in England]. And among other things, I also had the vision in my head that I would then return to Istanbul with my newly acquired skills. [...] But then there was a coup and all sorts of things, and as an academic, as a musician, as an artist, a bit left-wing oriented, it didn't feel right. The relationship had also ended in the meantime." (Lena, 1982 - 21.09.2017)

When I interviewed her in Germany in 2017, she responded to the question whether she can imagine living in Germany in the future by stating that such a decision would depend on whether she can or cannot express her own opinion in Turkey without the risk of being arrested.[74] In the light of the above-mentioned detentions of after the attempted coup, she clearly saw herself in danger as a left-wing oriented artist. Lena, who holds the German and the Turkish citizenship was held in Turkey for over two months after a New Year's Eve visit in the beginning of 2018 without knowing what was held against her. The fact that the file of indictment was sealed to state officials of lower ranks and not accessible to her lawyer, reflected that the accusations held against her were serious and delicate. Only after her case was brought to the higher ranks of German politicians thanks to her personal contacts she could return to Germany. She later found out that the allegations against her were an arbitrary confusion by the Turkish state. Lena's case illustrates how the competitive authoritarian regime becomes a co-determinant that influences transnational mobility and migration paths: Holding the Turkish nationality, she is subject to the Turkish state's sovereignty. The coercive force of the Turkish state's strengthened executive, the lack of transparency and the weakening of civil liberties, and lacking protection thereof as the influence of the judiciary has been weakened. Her fate depended on her nationalities. Without her Turkish nationality it would have been more difficult for the Turkish state to ban her from returning to Germany. Without her personal network connections and her formal German nationality, her unforeseen long stay in Turkey could have lasted much longer as the German state's sovereignty was also at play due to the intervention of German government representatives.

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[74] 9-I2017, 116

The attempted coup in 2016 and the mass arrests in its aftermath have had severe impacts on Yağmur's life. Her main business ties were with companies whose management was arrested. Since all of the company's assets were confiscated by the Turkish government, she could not pay her supplier and her company faced bankruptcy. As described in section 4.1.3., she considers leaving the country because of her financial insecurity and her social rights to German pension funds (see also Weißenberg, 2020, p. 174). Yağmur additionally explains her worries about the future and her concerns about leaving Turkey with the restricted freedom of expression. In addition to economic deprivation, she also worries about falsely being identified with the Gülen movement, a former ally of the AKP government that is accused of having plotted the coup. She describes her situation as "laying low". She and other women are concerned with what to say or not to say in the public sphere. Yağmur and Asena make similar statements about critical political statements in the public. Both women explain their related worries quoting experiences of people they know who discussed politics or publicly criticized the Turkish president and were attacked or reported to the police afterwards.[75] Asena's mobility between Germany and Turkey is also affected by restricted freedom of expression as she refrained from posting and sharing information about Turkey on social media prior to a trip to Turkey in May 2017. As she positions herself very critical towards the AKP government's policies, she notes that her trip was overshadowed by a discomfort of possibly not being able to leave the country again because of her social media history.[76]

An additional concern for several women who consider leaving Turkey to Germany or have left Turkey can be traced to their perceptions of and their experiences with social pressure to conform with polarized identity categories. The 2017 fieldwork fell into a period of increased political polarization in society in Turkey as I met different women during the period of the election campaigns on the constitutional referendum for or against an executive presidency and during political debates on election fraud thereafter. For that period, different scholars have shown that the high frequency of elections in Turkey, Erdoğan's populist 'us'-'them' rhetoric, the erosion of mainstream media in favor of government sympathizing media outlets and the algorithms in social media have resulted in an increased tendency for people to stay in their "echo chambers",

[75] 2-I2017, 59; 8-I2017, 39
[76] 8-I2017, 41

namely to mainly socialize with people who share their political views (Erdoğan, 2016; Aydın-Düzgit and Balta, 2017; Erdoğan and Uyan Semerci, 2018; Erçetin and Erdoğan, 2021). I have shown that increased political polarization in Turkey has also resulted in a rising pressure on the women to conform along polarized positions and that actual migration decisions present a way out of this pressure. Migration plans or the imagination thereof in cases in which women have lost their residence rights in Germany can be interpreted as a tactic of dealing with political polarization (Weißenberg, 2020, pp. 166–170). Categories German-Turkish women faced in their everyday lives and did not identify with, were mutually exclusive and identified by the women along lines of modern/traditional, secular/religious, Turkish/*Almancı*, AKP/CHP (*Chumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – The Republican People's Party) or conservative/liberal. Such binary oppositions neither represent the complex realities at play in Turkish society nor do they correspond to the senses of belonging of several of the consulted German-Turkish women. Pressure to identify with such opposing categories translate into a curtailment of self-expression, as people pay more attention to not sharing a different opinion in fear of being judged or attacked. Three women consider leaving Turkey due to these experiences that are coupled with additional motives (Ibid.).

Ela's statements illustrate how political polarization can impact individual freedom of expression in the everyday life. In 2013, Ela responded that she had made peace with her life in Turkey and imagined living in Germany as a choice that was always available to her when I asked her if she could imagine living in Germany in the future. Her perspective changed in 2017 when I quoted her 2013 answer and asked whether her perspective on where to live in the future had changed. Already bothered by political polarization in 2013, Ela explained in 2017 that she imagines a future abroad. She explains her answer with more frequent experiences with discrimination based on the grounds that she neither delineates herself from polarized positions nor identifies herself politically or along secular-religious poles.

> "Now with the development of Turkey that it doesn't get better. The political aspect and all those developments (..) one feels/ I still do not understand that one must be on a side in Turkey. So, you are either from this party or from that party or from that thought. I experience that in my school too. Well, you just can't quote someone's behavior. Then they say: 'You are not like that.' Actually/ everyone is a human being and you have the good and the bad sides, but you can't express yourself freely, that's the way it is. […] it's like you have to position yourself here somehow. Be it the party, be it faith, religion. Somewhere people are in a group and do not respect the other. (10) Yes. And as soon as I (4) felt that it was not

> (..)/ that the boundaries or how should I express [it]? That the discriminations have increased, I no longer feel comfortable. I have to/ the compulsion to belong somewhere/ yes, left/. On the left side or on the right side, I really don't care. I do not belong to any political party (*parteilos*)." (Ela, 1979 - 15.07.2017)

Ela works as a German teacher at a school in Istanbul. Her statements illustrate how the polarized atmosphere in Turkey in 2017 affects her. Similar to the experiences of other women I talked to, she perceives and experiences a less tolerant social climate which translates into her everyday life at work as social pressure to identify with a political party or along ideological or religious/secular lines. In Ela's case, this experience is coupled with rising intolerance towards her wish to refrain from identifying along mutually exclusive lines. Like for other women, her multilocal experiences of socialization and a sese of belonging overlap with Ela's gender identity and the gender role expectations she does not want to comply with, add up to these mutually excluding categories that resonate in polarized debates (see section 4.3.4.). The rising pressure on her to conform along polarized positions overlaps with other motives that cause her to consider emigrating from Turkey. She wants to start a family and worries about her financial stability in the future as she works under short-term work contracts (see also section 4.1.2.). The desire to have children was already a concern of her in 2013 when she expressed, that freedom of opinion was one motive for her to leave Turkey in the event of giving birth. Back then she stated: "Everyone must, should be able to say what they want to and do that, but unfortunately that's not the case. (...) That's why I don't want my child to grow up here. My child will get confused."[77]

Another criticism that materializes in some women's rationalization of leaving Turkey to Germany or to another country relates to the rising Islamization in Turkey under the AKP government regarding reforms of the educational system.[78] Related concerns also affect the freedom of expression, opinion and ideas. A school syllabus presents the foundation for educating future citizens. Reforms of the syllabus influence the access to information and can result in less informed citizens when it comes to suppressing significant scientific knowledge. Related modifications some interlocutors have criticized was the reopening and expansion of *Imam Hatip* secondary schools[79] in 2012 and the removal of evolution theory from the high-school syllabus. *Imam Hatip* schools

[77] 5-I2013, 184
[78] 6FN2017_1, 7; 6-I2017, 89; 8PM2013, 23; 8-I2013, 22, 24; 8-I2017, 123; 17PM2017, 7
[79] Schools that train prayer leaders and preachers

promote religious education and the separation of girls and boys at school. A related draft from January 2017, was passed under the emergency rule after the attempted coup in 2016 which facilitated the quick enactment of new laws. This draft included the expulsion of evolution theory from the compulsory high-school curriculum (Arat, 2016, pp. 131–133; Kandiyoti and Emanet, 2017, pp. 870, 874). Kandiyoti and Emanet argue that the realm of education under the AKP government became a site of hegemonic struggle in which the social engineering of "pliant citizen/subjects" is envisioned as the ultimate goal for a "totalizing vision of 'New Turkey'". Rule per decree after the attempted coup served as an excuse for the closure of numerous schools, the expulsion of teachers, and the destruction of textbooks. A new draft curriculum for schools basically introduces a new historiography in which the attempted coup serves as starting myth, as the "15 July victory of democracy" and "values education" in line with "national values and Islamic morality" are integrated into the syllabus (2017, pp. 869, 876–874).

Lara, who makes sense of the world from a scientific perspective and graduated in a natural science discipline is worried about these reforms when it comes to the education of her daughter. Not a mother in 2013, she anticipated that she could imagine moving to another country if education for a future child in Turkey would not work out for her. In 2017, she is mother a one-year-old toddler. She expresses her future concerns of moving to a third country within a changed political context in Turkey in relation to her mother role as follows:

> "And then, for example, the fact that the theory of evolution has been abolished, that was such a no-go for me. Yes, and those are the reasons. So educationally, I think: 'Okay, when my daughter grows up here, in what kind of environment will she study here?'" (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

When I met Lara in 2017, she was discussing the option to move to Cyprus with her husband. Lara moved to the Netherlands with her husband and daughter in 2019.

4.2.2. Property and Prosperity

Many Turkey-origin people who used to be labor migrants own property in Turkey or transferred it to the next generations. This is also factor in some of the consulted women's migration decisions and their post-migration experience, in particular during the first months after their arrival in Istanbul.

Nine women[80] in the sample mention that they stayed in their family's apartments or houses upon their arrival. While some stayed with their parents who had previously moved to Turkey or commute between the countries (see section 4.4.1.-4.4.3.), others lived in their parents' house mainly by themselves. In comparison to other migration destinations, the opportunity for access to accommodation in the onset of their stay made Istanbul a more pragmatic migration destination for several reasons: In the event of starting a new life, easy access to accommodation facilitated their arrival in Turkey providing the security of not worrying about a place to stay and reduced the financial burden. Moreover, the familiarity with their new place of residence based on previous family holidays they had spent there mitigated the unknowns of starting a new life in Istanbul. For the women who stayed with their grandparents or parents, social bonds and their attachment to close relatives also provided emotional support upon their arrival (see section 4.4.1.).

Those women benefit from family networks and assets which have been established by their relatives (Faist, 2000, pp. 120–124). Some of the German-Turkish transmigrant women make use of their parent's and grandparent's family networks in Turkey, the latter maintained by visiting relatives and sending remittances back to relatives in Turkey and by investing into the Turkish housing market. Owning an apartment or summer house presents an asset in several respects: as a financial provision for retirement, as location for summer holidays or longer stays or as a source of income provided by rent or sale. Some of the German-Turkish women benefit from the transnational social and economic ties their relatives have established and maintained, here in the form of access to accommodation (see section 2.3.3. and 4.4.1.).

Thirteen women mention that their parents or grandparents own a house, an apartment or a summer house in Turkey. Information on German-Turkish people's real estate property in Turkey has been provided by a quantitative survey on the role of *Euro-Turks* (German-Turkish and French-Turkish people) during Turkey's EU accession process conducted by Kaya and Kentel (2005) between 2003 and 2004. Based on a sample of 1065 interviewed Euro-Turks, the authors found that 84.5 percent of the German-Turkish sample live in rented accommodation in Germany while 65.7 percent own

[80] 1-I2017, 107; 6FN2017 _4, 7; 7-I2013, 13; 8-I2013, 20; 10-I2013, 11; 10-I2017, 82; 13-I2017, 5; 16-I2017, 15; 19PS2017, 8; 26-I2017, 31; 28-I2017, 11; 29-I2017, 31; 32-I2017, 86

property in Turkey. Since the survey dates back 16 years and since the proportion of Turkey-born people among the German-Turkish sample in the survey is 73 percent (Kaya and Kentel, 2005, pp. 5, 83), it can be concluded that the majority of participants who owned property in Turkey at that time belong to the first and second generations. With the Blue Card, Turkey-origin people with German nationality are entitled to inherit property. Property presents an option for German-Turkish people to spend longer periods of time in Turkey in the form of circular migration on retirement or during holidays and to maintain ties with family members. While the proportion of retired emigrants has decreased, levels of circular migration between Turkey and Germany of retired German-Turkish people have increased since 2009 (Alscher, Baraulina and Müller, 2014, p. 142).

Zilan's decision to migrate to Istanbul was triggered by various factors: Answering the question what brought her to Turkey she states:

> "We had an apartment here. Istanbul is really great. I like that it has so many different cultural influences. [...] why do I want to go to Istanbul? I don't know, no idea. I always tell myself because of the rent, because I didn't have to pay anything here. But I just really wanted to come to this city. Because when it comes down to it, I could also have gone to Barcelona or somewhere else." (Zilan, 1990 - 13.07.2017)

It seems like Zilan was mainly attracted by the city of Istanbul (see section 4.3.3.). The fact that her parents own an apartment and her experiences of spending holidays in this apartment provided the basis for her familiarity with Istanbul and her perception of the city as an attractive destination of migration. In comparison to a stay abroad in Barcelona, she states above that she prefers the opportunity to stay in her parents' apartment because she doesn't have to pay rent. Her migration decision to her parent's home country and into her parents' apartment (Zilan is of the second generation) also can be interpreted as a tactic to leave the parental home in Germany, and to obtain the permission to do so (see section 4.3.3.). She can combine her emancipation from the family, escape the village atmosphere in her place of origin in Germany and go after her thirst for adventure in the world of opportunities Istanbul offers to her. In a similar vein as Zilan, Nojan also moved into the apartment her grandparents handed down to her parents when she first came to Istanbul.[81]

[81] 1-I2017, 107; 13-I2013, 77 - 79

Some of the consulted women of the second and third generation have acquired property and pay off property loans. Either they have bought a house or an apartment in Turkey by themselves or with their husbands or they entered a family owning property when they got married. Some women state that their enhanced socio-economic status results from owning property. The women's narratives relating to property involve financial prosperity and entail a comparison of their post-migration experience to their socio-economic situation in Germany. For some, an enhanced socio-economic status in Turkey rules out the option to live in Germany or another country in the near future, even if their individual motives don't concur.

The narratives of Kübra and Lara illustrate different aspects concerning property and prosperity that depend on their different positionalities in terms of educational background, socio-economic standing and citizenship rights. Kübra[82] explains her continuous settlement with the financial stability and the prosperity, she and her family have in Istanbul. The family income is generated by her husband's property and his businesses. He owns several restaurants and a hotel in Istanbul's historical center. Although the family had to get by with less income due to a decline in tourist travel after the numerous deadly suicide attacks in 2015 and 2016, the family income is sufficient to maintain their high standard of living. Kübra and her husband follow a traditional division of labor. While her husband is responsible for the family income, she takes care of their three sons. They live in a luxurious apartment in one of Istanbul's gated communities. Kübra married her husband whom she met at a wedding in Turkey when she was 19 years old. During the first six years of their relationship when her first two sons were still young, she commuted between her place of origin, Cologne, and Istanbul. After she gave birth to her third son and her oldest son got enrolled at school, the circumstances forced her into mainly locating her life to Istanbul. If the decision on where to settle was up to her only, without her responsibilities as mother, she would live in Cologne (see sections 4.4.3., 5.4.4.). She explains that it was only her son's school enrollment that made her decide to mainly choose Istanbul as her place of residence to Istanbul:

> "That's when I said, 'Now you have to decide. The child will enter first grade now. Either there or here.' Mahmut [oldest son] was also in kindergarten in Germany for a while. And then we were back in Turkey and then here again. And then/ in Turkey we/ then I talked to my husband.

[82] 3PM2013, 16; 3-I2013, 6 - 18, 112 – 115, 139, 168-171, 309; 3-I2017, 24, 30-32, 56-60; 82

> Of course, he wanted to/ he works here. That's why he didn't want to leave Turkey. I didn't want to leave Germany. He didn't want to leave Turkey. But then, of course, we decided and lived in Turkey. Because financially we are much better [off] here. That's why we started living in Turkey then." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Kübra's computing practice and her style of speaking in this quote reveals that her decision for long-term settlement in Turkey was not an easy one and that she negotiated it with her husband for a long time. In 2013, she also felt insecure about the status of her residence title because she didn't have the chance to visit Germany every six months to renew it. When I asked her in 2017 about her settlement decision, she complained about the disadvantages of city life that disturbed her. But she rationalized her decision to stay in Istanbul as a household decision which is based on the socio-economic standing of her family in Turkey:

> "But still, you have a luxury life here. If you compare that, right? With Germany. Even if you were rich in Cologne. You still couldn't live like that. Something [a life] like that doesn't exist there. Maybe they don't need it. […] But if you were to compare it, I would also be able to live in Germany. I would also live in Turkey. You know? You see? I could live in both countries. I live here now. But if Hasan said, 'Yes let's live in Germany', I could live in Germany. Although my circumstances here are much better/ if you would think like that, much much better. But still, I would go back." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Kübra feels strongly attached to her place of origin in Germany and longs for spending more time there. But following her reasoning of comparing her life in Istanbul with a life in Germany, what could a family life in Germany actually look like? The circumstances she and her family would encounter in the event of moving to Germany do not present a feasible alternative. Not only would they have a lower income. Without holding the German nationality, Kübra does not have the right to live in Germany together with her husband. Kübra has a Turkish passport and had a permanent residence title (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*) in Germany. Although she was born in Germany, this denizenship status (Hammar, 2016) is nothing she can take for granted anymore (see also section 4.5.). According to § 51 paragraph 1 of the Residence Act, permanent residence expires if the 'foreigner' leaves the country for a reason that is not temporary in nature (§ 51, paragraph 1, no. 6) or if the 'foreigner' leaves the country and does not reenter within six months or a longer period determined by the migration office (§ 51 paragraph 1, no. 7). When I met Kübra in 2013, she was worried because her residence title in Germany had expired since she had not entered the country for more than two years.

The German Residence Act, which was ratified in 2005 (AutenthG), has further restricted the immigration of lower skilled people, an ongoing trend in German immigration law (see section 3.5.). Together with her and her lower husband's educational background, her citizenship status constrains the family's access to residence in Germany. Even if she entered Germany again, Kübra would have to go without her husband and with three young children. Taking care of the children and finding a job with sufficient income to sustain the family will be nearly impossible because Kübra has not learned a profession. Since Kübra does not have a German passport, she would also have to provide for her husband's income for family reunion as a non-EU citizen with residency in Germany has to be employed and needs to provide sufficient income and living space for family reunion (§ 27, paragraph 2, Residence Act). In the light of such a comparison, starting a life in Germany as a family seems impossible which is the most likely reason why Kübra realistically imagines – in 2013 as much as in 2017 – to commute between both countries in the future after her sons have grown up.

Like Kübra, Lara's[83] assessment of her migration decision is also connected to the luxurious life she leads in Istanbul thanks to a high income and the property she owns. But unlike Kübra, her latitude of choosing a country of settlement is much more flexible for several reasons. Her lifestyle and her mobility between Turkey, Germany and beyond, is connected to a more privileged social location than that of Kübra: While Kübra's grandparents were labor migrants and her parents also have a working-class background, Lara's mother was a businesswoman who grew up in an affluent and influential family in Istanbul. Lara's German passport, her parents' property and educational history, her social status, the apartment she owns, and her professional skills account for her privileged positionality in the sample (see sections 4.4.3. and 5.2.). In terms of her social location Lara is one of more privileged interlocutors in the sample. In 2013, Lara cannot imagine living anywhere else. She states that migrating to Istanbul was the "best decision she made". She was "content" and "glad" that she made that decision also because of the good career opportunity for her in her profession. Another reason why she is happy with her decision and wants to continue living in Istanbul is because of the high social status and upward mobility she has experienced. She has interacts in a respective social environment. Accordingly, she states:

[83] 6-I2013, 9, 23, 80, 82; 6FN2017_1, 5; 6FN2017_4, 7; 6-I2017, 9, 47, 49

> "Also, because I lived in a very nice neighborhood, with my parents [when I first moved here]. And now also. So, my environment is also very, very nice and the people I hang out with are rather/ so different than in Germany. So, I am happy. It was actually like a leap for me [...] From the social class a bit. More like/ well that sounds so snobby somehow. You know sort of, well like the elite (laughter in voice). Well, it's like, I don't know, living in Frankfurt in *Lerchesberg*, where all the posh people [*Schicki-Mickis*] are and so on (laughter in voice). Now the environment, I don't know. It's a very young environment that I'm in. The new friends that I've made. Mostly also from/ I don't know, from established families." (laughs)." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Although, she is the sole breadwinner of the family, her salary is high enough to afford a housekeeper and nanny for her daughter. She owns a luxury duplex apartment complex located in one of Istanbul's upper-class-neighborhoods (see sections 4.2.1., 5.2.). Like in the cases above, her decision-making and arrival process in Istanbul was also facilitated by the fact that her mother and her stepfather own property. She could live in their "lovely house with a garden" in the beginning of her stay.[84] Since Lara is content with her job, her relationship and her prosperous lifestyle in 2013, she would need a "VERY good reason" to leave Istanbul. Such a reason may be the future school education of a child. Here Lara anticipated what happened in 2017 when she was concerned with leaving the country based on these grounds (see section 4.2.1.). Since she already knows Germany and because nothing would really appeal to her about living there, she stated in 2013 and in 2017 that she would prefer to migrate to another country instead.[85]

It can be concluded that property assets in the family facilitate a migration to Istanbul ruling out other countries that several women also consider as migration destinations, while self-acquired property and family property and social status and upward mobility promote continuous settlement.

4.3. NEGOTIATING EXCLUSION, EQUAL PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

The following sections explore different narratives concerned with inequalities based on different social locations and with a quest for equal participation in different spheres of the everyday life. The migration practices of German-Turkish women indicate that their migration paths also constitute a tactic of bypassing intersectional inequality, they

[84] 6-I2013, 19
[85] 6-I2017, 23, 29, 37; 6-I2013, 9, 40, 49, 202 - 203

face in Germany and in Turkey. Social divisions that turned out as structuring their migration paths include their migration background, gender, religion, age, and their socio-economic positionality.

Related motives include: *Firstly*, structural discrimination in the labor market in Germany, unemployment and stigmatization of social welfare receivers and *secondly* closely connected with this motive a lacking sense of belonging and recognition and experiences with ethnicization and racialization in Germany. *Thirdly*, some women who grew up in segregated neighborhoods in towns or urban villages in Germany mention gendered constraints and boredom with town life as migration motives. *Fourthly*, changes in gender policies and the discourse on gender in the late AKP terms, which construct ideal women citizens as mainly serving family ends, translate into an increasing pressure on women and people with gender-identities which do not correspond to this ideology. Some interlocutors have voiced their migration decisions and concerns with increasing gendered oppression against them to conform with these expectations in the public sphere but also in their social environment and family by people who sympathize with this concept of gender.

Migration and settlement decisions and concerns also constitute tactical choices of leaving behind these forms of intersectional inequality. By way of migrating the women emancipate themselves from structural disadvantages and challenge their marginalized positionality in Germany. Therefore, migration decisions and narratives can also be read as citizenship practices for the enhancement of intersectional equality.

Migration decisions translate into claims for equal participation, including access to work, economic resources, membership in different social spheres, and gender equality and individual rights. *Firstly*, irrespective of their educational background German-Turkish women find employment in Turkey while several women also among the lower-skilled ones achieved to pursue a career and become upwardly mobile. *Secondly*, they find spheres of belonging and recognition in Turkey among friends, family and colleagues, which are motives that play into long term settlement decisions. *Thirdly*, by choosing Istanbul as migration destination, they go after a search for the self. While emancipating themselves from their neighborhoods and families of origin, they go after their individual interests and follow their fascination of urbanity and the city of Istanbul while enhancing their agency and autonomy as women. *Fourthly*, by way of moving back to Germany or imagining to do so, several women want to enhance their right to

gender equality and liberate themselves from increasing gendered constraints, they experience in the public sphere, in the neighborhood but also in the family.

4.3.1. Constraints and Access to Labor Markets

The empirical material for this research indicates that transnational economic factors in Germany and Turkey present an important element in the analysis of migration determinants and German-Turkish women's motives for transnational migration. The majority of the consulted women work or have worked in a company or institution with economic, bureaucratic or cultural ties to Germany.[86] As illustrated in sections 3.7. and 3.8. Turkey became an attractive destination of migration between the mid-2000s and 2015. This is explained with the reforms in the course of EU accession talks for Turkey and Turkey's sustainable economic growth at that time. The growth of different industries in particular, in western cities of Turkey and Ankara, has increased the demand for skills German-Turkish transnational migrants can provide. Moreover, the proliferation of economic relations between Germany and Turkey is also a result from the labor recruitment agreement between both countries which resulted in the circulation of knowhow of German-Turkish entrepreneurs who easily move between the two country contexts. In 2012, Kaiser stated that "German investments rank at the top among foreign investors in Turkey; today, more than 1,700 companies with German financial participation operate in Turkey" (2012, p. 105). In 2017, von Kessel estimates that 6,846 German companies have established branches in Turkey (2017). In addition to German companies sending managerial staff and their relatives to Turkey for defined periods of time, German-Turkish immigrants became interesting for these companies due to their language skills and their cultural knowledge (Kaiser, 2012, p. 105; Obergfell, 2014, p. 200). Istanbul's multinational companies are in need of bilingual employees and brokers who can provide this knowledge and corresponding skills; skills German-Turkish women provide.

As far as migration motives are concerned, structural disadvantage in the German labor markets can trigger a migration from Germany. Meanwhile, German-Turkish women's

[86] 1-I2012, 7, 9; 1PM2017, 8; 1-I2017, 53; 2-I2013, 43, 72, 118, 130; 5-I2013, 36; 6FN2017_1, 6; 7PM2013, 3; 8-I2013, 9, 13, 45; 9-I2017, 38; 10PM2013, 4; 10-I2017, 82, 84; 11-I1-2013, 106; 11-I2017, 46; 12-I2013, 102; 12-I2017, 63; 13PM2013, 3; 13-I2013, 21, 115; 14-I2013, 61; 16PM2017, 4; 16-I2017, 17; 17-I2017, 83; 18PM2017, 5; 18-I2017, 51; 19-I2017, 72; 21PM2017, 10; 22-I2017, 125, 135; 23-I2017, 127; 25-I2017, 29, 38, 46; 26-I2017, 67; 27-I2017, 83; 29-I2017, 36, 72; 30-I2017, 65; 31PM2017, 2; 32-I2017, 58

skills are needed in Turkey, regardless of their educational background. Because of their German and English language skills, German-Turkish transnational migrants have a competitive advantage in Turkey. In fact, in nearly all positions the consulted women work or have worked in jobs in which their German language skills were a decisive reason for being hired.

Industries the consulted women found jobs in, include the telecommunication sector, the IT industry, the car industry, the trade and tourism industry and the education sector. Many women I met have worked or work in call centers. Numerous German companies have outsourced their telecommunication services to benefit from the wage gaps between Turkey and Germany and from the Turkish employment law. Istanbul is a hub for hundreds of call-centers operated by German companies which have relocated their telecommunication services to minimize wage costs. Those call centers almost exclusively hire German-Turkish people as call center agents (Splitt, 2012). The majority of women who have worked in a call center for a longer period of time have no academic education. While some interlocutors only worked in a call center for several months until they found another job, some women have worked in call centers for years. These call centers serve the customer market in German speaking countries. Many call centers use questionable strategies of hiring treating their employees and acquiring customers. Disguising the location their agents call from and requiring them to work with a German pseudonym exemplify some of these practices. While some women have worked in call centers that are specialized on outbound calls which include product sale and telemarketing, others have worked in call centers specialized on inbound calls, which include the administration of product or service customer support.[87]

German (and English) language skills are also crucial for interlocutors who work in multinational German companies as technology or IT specialists in business and customer support and consultancy. Moreover, many consulted women work in language education and training. While some work as German teachers, mainly for private schools, others work in administrative positions at language schools or tutor adults in

[87] 1-I2012, 7, 192 – 194; 1-I2017, 43; 2-I2013, 118 – 120; 2-I2013, 120 – 130; 3PM2013, 14 – 16; 3PS2017, 8 – 9; 5PM2013, 4 – 5; 10-I2017, 2 – 4, 82, 84 – 86; 132 – 133; 12-I2017, 85, 133 – 136, 142 – 143; 13-I2013, 19, 17, 20 – 21; 114 – 117; 13-I2013, 117, 188; 13-I2017, 5; 14-I2018, 125 – 128; 17-I2017, 14 – 17, 34 – 35; 23-I2017, 126 – 127; 26-I2017, 65 – 74, 80 – 82; 27-I2017, 83; 28-I2017, 76; 31-I2017, 2, 5, 7, 11

German and English language. Several women have also worked as employed or self-employed translators. Three women work or have worked for hotels, airlines and travel companies. Occupations in the trade industry are concerned with import and export of German and Turkish commodities. In the trade industry, women work administrative positions, in quality control or are self-employed. Oher relevant employers are German foundations, German media outlets and German state institutions. Self-employment in the service industry includes sectors like gastronomy and cosmetics, partially addressing the German speaking community in Istanbul.

Lacking Recognition of Skills and Unemployment in Germany

Independent of their educational background, several women report that they have experienced problems with unemployment, or struggled to find a job, a vocational training position or an internship in Germany. The majority of women who made such experiences also make sense of their migration decision quoting racialized prejudice and classicist stereotypes as causes for their difficulties to find employment in Germany.[88]

The qualitative data of the fieldwork material substantiate results of surveys mentioned in section 3.8. indicating that specifically people with a Turkish migration background are exposed to structural disadvantages in the German labor market. In comparison to Germans without migration background and other immigrant groups, German-Turkish women are more likely to suffer from unemployment. Moreover, opportunities to start vocational training are smaller than for Germans without migration background and the proportion of people who complete vocational training is much lower among people with migration background. People with a Turkish name and Muslims are more disadvantaged than other minorities (see section 3.8.). Several German-Turkish women in the sample of different educational backgrounds explain their migration decision with experiences of constrained access to employment in Germany. Constrained access to work in Germany becomes a decisive trigger for transnational migration as it not only induces migration to Turkey but also constrains migration back to Germany.

Before shedding light on related narratives of the women I consulted, the following research is helpful to contextualize their statements with gendered discrimination: A field experiment conducted by Weichselbaumer shows that access to employment

[88] 2-I2013, 284; 3-I2013, 199 - 204; 4PM2013, 6; 4-I1-2013, 15; 4-I2-2013, 159; 7PM2013, 3; 7-I2013, 9; 21-I2017, 189; 25-I2017, 88; 31-I2017, 5

decreases for women with a Turkish name, even more so if they wear a headscarf. Weichselbaumer shows that three identical CVs got different responses depending on the name and photograph. While the likelihood for Sandra Bauer to be invited for a job interview was 18.8 percent, Meryem Öztürk's chance for an invitation was only 13.5 percent. The difference however became even more striking when Meryem Öztürk was shown as wearing a headscarf: In that case only 4.2 percent responded positively. To be invited, Meryem Öztürk had to apply 4.5 times more often than Sandra Bauer to receive the same number of invitations for an interview. As the level of qualifications rose, disadvantaged selection increased. While Öztürk had to apply 3.5 times more often than the applicant with a German name for a job as a secretary, the fictive applicant wearing a headscarf had to apply 7.6 times more often for the profession as chief accountant (Weichselbaumer, 2016, pp. 12–13). OECD data show that the likelihood of unemployment of people born abroad rises among women and people with high levels of education (OECD, 2015, pp. 92–95). Emma's case somewhat exemplifies that structural discrimination in the labor market in Germany operates at the intersections of gender, class and ethnicity an shows how structural disadvantages increase with the level of qualification of German-Turkish women.

In Emma's case, all of these factors seem to be relevant. After she graduated from university, she aspired to break out from the precarious and low paid short-term work contracts and student jobs but she could not find a job with an appropriate salary in line with her qualifications. Her struggles of finding a job went together with related struggles for upward mobility. Emma interprets her migration decision not only as exit from lacking career prospects in Germany but also as a struggle of breaking out from a class role. She states:

> "And I realized relatively quickly after my studies that I couldn't get rid of my student status. […] And I didn't find a job. I continued to do my student jobs and I definitely wanted to break out of the system. […] I thought to myself 'If I stay here now, I will wait tables. I'm going to do my *Intikurse* [integration courses] and I'm going to continue to work for the television channel x.' And everything is half-way and nothing proper. […] Well, I always had the feeling that they only want to see you, where you are anyways. Because the priority is that nothing changes. They had gotten so used to feeling sorry for me that they somehow didn't want me to break OUT of it. This was even the case when I said, 'I want to leave'. 'NO, you have to stay here, it's safe here and everything.'" (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Apart from the fact that Emma could not find employment, she also interprets her social environment's expectations of her career paths as predetermined by her parents' working-class background. She rationalizes her migration to Turkey as a struggle for upward mobility that becomes even more important for her as single parent:

> "So, I'm fighting for the fact that I can definitely live one layer higher in the future than I did before. And to be able to offer my child something, too. So first the thought was more or less for me. But now of course I'm thinking for two people. She should not only have a similar life as I do, in the sense of education. She should have it even better." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

While Emma mainly refers to her family and friends without migration background who assign her a working class-role, Zeynep makes a similar comment but mainly refers to the group of German-Turkish friends of working-class background among whom the regular thing to do was to start vocational training after school:

> "Then, of course it was like I said/ then these self-evident things added up, such as not studying, but vocational training instead. To find a job as quickly as possible and to make money. And then I realized that this is also not a thing for me, becoming a tax clerk. And on vacation [Turkey] I realized, 'You know what? I will simply live here.'" (Zeynep, 1982 - 14.08.2017)

Elsewhere Zeynep states that she doubts that she would have studied in Germany saying: "I don't think I thought about whether I want to study […] no I didn't." Also, neither her German-Turkish friends nor her parents considered a higher education as an option for themselves. As pursuing vocational training was the "normal" thing to do in her social environment, she wrote applications for vocational training positions in professions such as office clerk, tax clerk or doctor's assistant.[89] Zeynep contrasts her the socio-economic background of her school environment at higher-secondary school with the environment of her friends outside of school with migration background and interprets her migration to Turkey as breaking out from the pre-determined path of pursuing an education. Although Zeynep obtained a school leaving certificate that entitles her to study at a university, her statement evokes an implicit comparison to families often with an academic education and higher income who send their children higher-secondary schools for pursuing academic careers. As financial pressures are higher among Turkish immigrant households due to their history of labor migration and the lower incomes working class jobs generate, low-income families also create an

[89] 11-I2017, 68 - 70

economic pressure on the next generations to contribute to the family income as quickly as possible. Other than university students, youngsters in vocational training already generate a small income and complete an education more quickly than university students.

However, it is not only the increased economic burdens a blue-collar family has to carry in comparison to academic households with a higher income. The experiences of Emma and Zeynep and other women are accompanied by feelings of lacking recognition as full members of society in Germany and a lacking acknowledgement of their professional background and skills.[90] Some women who could not find a job, attempted to avoid the risk of receiving *Hartz IV* unemployment benefits. The implementation of *Hartz* reforms in 2005 is portrayed as a structural as well as a moral break in the history of welfare policies in Germany because of the social and psychological consequences for those receive *Hartz IV*. In the course of the reforms, unemployment benefits and social welfare were merged and the tenet of *support and encourage* was anchored in the Social Security Code (SGB, Sozial Gesetzbuch), increasing the bureaucratic pressure and control over job seekers (Bitzregeio, 2019). The tenet *support and encourage* was also a component of migration policies and the Integration Act of 2015 (see section 3.5.) and indicates the implementation of neoliberal policies which have curtailed social welfare for market competitiveness. Core elements of the *Hartz* reforms were measures of flexibilization, deregulation and privatization in the labor markets. The working population is seen to serve the needs of the labor market by planting employment impulses and "activating" measures. Ironically, the reforms were passed by the Green party-SPD coalition government. This has caused the SPD to lose credibility as a party of social justice and welfare state advocate. The flexibilization of the labor market has strengthened the low wage sector. Today, Germany has the largest low-wage sector in Europe. During the debate about the reforms, unemployed people were often represented along stereotypes and prejudices in speeches and public statements (Bitzregeio, 2019; Grabka and Göbler, 2020). In comparison to unemployment benefit (*Arbeitslosengeld I*) which is paid out of an employee's contributions to unemployment insurance and based on the salary of a former employment (at least one year), temporary employees working in the low wage sector are more likely to receive *Hartz IV* unemployment benefits.

[90] 4-I1-2013, 7; 4-I2-2013, 157; 7-I2013, 9, 78, 161; 168 - 172; 11-I2017, 88

In addition to an instable financial situation and an unsuccessful search for an employment that met her skills, Emma rationalizes her migration as preventing employment in the lower wage sector, an alternative she rules out by stating:

> "I had never been able to afford a car. I had a bicycle. It was just too LAME for me. And honestly, if you study literature in Germany, what do you want to do with it? (..) And all these temporary employment agencies are totally in right now. But what do you get from them? Right? Well, really. There was no perspective for me." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Living in Germany as unemployed welfare receiver was no alternative for Emma. Receiving *Hartz IV* benefits is a bureaucratic undertaking Emma rejects, quoting endless paperwork and numerous visits of government facilities.[91]

Two interlocutors, Cennetkuşu and Asya perceived receiving *Hartz IV* welfare benefits as an unbearable situation they solved with a migration to Istanbul.[92] They also quoted the danger of falling into a "One-Euro job measure". In line with the *support and encourage* tenet, people receiving *Hartz IV* are pushed into measures of "integration". One-Euro jobs were publicly funded for recipients of *Hartz IV* who cannot otherwise be "integrated" into the labor market. According to § 16d, paragraph 6, Social Security Statute Book II (*Sozialgesetzbuch- SGB II*), state authorities can assign people to One-Euro jobs for 24 months. Asya summarizes her experience with *Hartz IV* as follows:

> "I had completed the training in the company X. […] And I successfully completed it, was looking for work, but [I] found nothing. I was on [social] welfare because I hadn't worked enough, for unemployment benefit [*Arbeitslosengeld*]. And then I somehow slipped into *Hartz IV*. […] I had to apply [for jobs], what I was already doing anyways. But I had to prove [to the authorities] that I was applying [for jobs], which hurt my honor tremendously. I had to do this every month and I couldn't find a job. The year was completed. And then the clerk said that he now had to activate me for all industries. That was very bad, because then I could have worked in a painting company, gardening for one euro per hour, as it is quoted everywhere. That was a horrible idea." (Asya, 1974 - 26.07.2017)

It is not only the economic threat that *Hartz IV* causes and the psychological burdens of wanting to work and not finding work. Asya's quote shows that the 'activating' measures of 'integration' are perceived as stigmatizing and humiliating. It can also be argued that her and other women's difficulties of finding a job are a result of structural

[91] 7PM2013, 3
[92] 23-I2017, 93 – 95; 31-I2017, 5

intersectional discrimination that has racialized, gendered and classicist dimensions. Migration presents a tactic out of economic deprivation and receiving stigmatized social welfare benefits. The women whose statements I quoted here, quickly found employment in Turkey.

Employment, Recognition of Skills and Career in Turkey

As the results of some authors who have conducted qualitative research among German-Turkish transnational migrants indicate, negative experiences in the job market in Germany are contrasted with job offers or occupational opportunities in Turkey (see section 3.9.; Sievers, Griese and Schulte, 2010). Regardless of their educational background, several women in the sample make sense of their migration to Turkey, because they found work in Istanbul. Some refer to a "better life" in Turkey, which they explain with a higher salary, and a sense of recognition and belonging.[93]

Finding employment is also connected with the recognition of their professional skills that goes beyond a solely professional experience. Recognition of professional skills also entails social recognition and inclusion which some women contrast with their negative experiences of lacking recognition in Germany. Emma for example states:

> "And the beautiful thing that happened when I first came here. I was someone who came from Germany. Someone who had a degree. I was seen as a whole person. As a real person. And that was good for me. It was so good for me. I wasn't just a student anymore. I was no longer little Emma." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

For this reason, Emma's return to Germany in 2017 is rather a result of intersecting constraints – she is a single mother – and not in her personal interest (see section 4.3.4., 5.3.). In 2017 shortly before she moves back to Germany for her daughter's German school education (see section 4.1.1.), she explains why she would prefer to continue her life in Istanbul:

> "Plus, I have a job here, I work at X and I have my courses, I am recognized. I told you that too. I am respected by the students, I like that. If I go back to Germany now, I know EXACTLY that it will take on the same structure as back then." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

[93] 4PM2013, 6-9, 15 - 17; 7-I1-2017, 91; 11-I1-2013, 84; 11-I2017, 37, 144; 13-I2013, 125; 13-I2017, 41; 23-I2017, 95, 113; 31-I2017, 5, 91, 97

In the light of experiences with racialized discrimination at school and structural discrimination in the labor market, Zeynep and Yağmur note that they cannot imagine a life in Germany in the future (see section 4.3.2.).[94] Zeynep also contrasts her experiences of exclusion in Germany with the professional and social recognition she feels in Turkey. After her migration to Turkey in 2003, she completed a university degree in German language in Turkey.[95] In comparison to Emma, she is economically more privileged. Since she and her husband are both public servants, they have a stable income and share the economic household responsibilities. In addition to her marriage, a financially stable situation and close family members near her, the recognition she experiences in her social and professional environment in Turkey constitute a significant motives for Zeynep to continue her settlement in Turkey. She rationalizes the social recognition she experiences in Turkey and the contrasting experiences she made in Germany (see section 4.3.2.) as motive that rules out living in Germany in the future:

> "Here I am accepted. [...] For example, if I/ doesn't matter where you are. Already in the bank, if you want to take out a loan, for example. When they see a German teacher, they treat you very differently. [...] Or from my students or among colleagues or even in my circle of friends and so on and so forth. There are people from different professions. And it doesn't matter what you are, you know? We laugh and we share and we go on vacation together. You know, I feel like that. It doesn't make me feel any different. I feel the same way." (Zeynep, 1982 - 14.08.2017)

Including Asya and Cenetkuşu, some of the women who underwent vocational training but in particular for those women who have no education, establishing a career is a secondary motive[96] as the prior motive for their migration to Turkey was an employment and escaping unemployment and the struggles of finding a good job in Germany. Others were able to develop their skills and to pursue a career in Turkey. Since the expertise they have acquired in Turkey is not recognized in Germany, the likelihood of living in Germany in the future decreases.

Nojan's recurrent migration paths between Turkey and Germany are facilitated by the fact that she holds the German citizenship. Her migration trajectories over the years illuminate how balancing work- and career-related advantages and disadvantages in both countries influence circular migration and have become a crucial reason for her orientation towards a life in Turkey. At that time, Nojan planned to move back her

[94] 2-I2013, 284; 2-I2017, 71 - 75
[95] 11FN-2013_1, 6
[96] 4-I1-2013, 72; 13-I2013, 21; 23-I2017, 113; 31-I2017, 5

hometown in Germany for several months to be near her family and to re-evaluate her migration decision. However, she was sceptic about re-establishing a life in Germany explaining her reasoning as follows:

> "N: Because here in Turkey there are more job opportunities, better opportunities for promotion, and earning money is definitely easier here in Turkey than in Germany.
>
> I: In what way? What do you mean by that?
>
> N: [...] I don't have any education. I've been a merchandizer in X for six years. Which is already totally blatant. Just because I speak German and English. Okay, now of course I have the experience. I have six years of work experience. But before that. You would NEVER be accepted as an assistant in Germany. You would have to have done some kind of training first. Or at least have had some experience. Therefore easier. Let's see. Will be exciting from October." (Nojan, 1985 - 01.08.2013)

In 2013, Nojan assessed her professional skills as possible resource that could enable her to find a job in Germany. But after a stay in Germany in 2013, she returned to Turkey where she changed the company she worked for twice and continued to work her way up to get a better salary.[97] In 2017, when I met her in Germany, she was the brink of re-establishing a life in Istanbul for the second time after she had moved back to Germany to take care of her sick parents (see section 4.4.3.). She had concrete plans to return to Istanbul a couple of months later for the same reasons she had anticipated in 2013, when she was sceptic about returning to Germany for longer. She states:

> "And then I registered here at the job center. [...] And then I also looked for jobs. I have already written 120 applications, you know? But (...) it is/ since professionally it is/ *tatmin etmiyor beni burası* (it doesn't satisfy me here). Because I have simply achieved a lot there, right? I am really in demand in our *Piyasa* [market] there. That means I have no problems finding a job. And I earn for Turkish circumstances/ I earn 6000 TL. And here [in Germany] I am not getting there. Because I have no academic degree and no vocational training. There, it does not count at all. I speak two languages that I am comfortable with in the industry. German and English, and I have ten years of work experience. That's all people want." (Nojan, 1985 - 01.09.2017)

She rejected a job offer in her hometown because of the low salary. She states that the salary would not nearly have enabled her to approximate the lifestyle, she had been able to afford in Istanbul. Her identification with the city of Istanbul (see section 4.3.3.) goes together with the independent life she has achieved in Istanbul, including her

[97] 13-I2017, 5

emancipation from family expectations and obligations, financial independence and renting an apartment of her own (see section 4.4.3.). As her statement from 2013 shows, language skills present an important resource and decisive reason for several women who did not pursue an education. In Melisa's case, the fact that she did not complete an education and her age also constrain her jobs opportunities. She notes that she wouldn't find a job without her German language skills:

> "When I think about it now. (5) Mhm mhm (negating). I even have advantages because of the German language. Just imagine. If I could not speak German now. I will be 48 this month. I wouldn't be able to find a job because I didn't go to university, for example." (Melisa, 1965 - 15.07.2013)

While it is more crucial for many women without an academic education to find work and prevent unemployment, women with a higher education in the sample are more inclined to establish a career in Turkey or to enhance career opportunities in Germany. Several women mention that an employment in Turkey presents an opportunity for quicker upward mobility in comparison to Germany and maintain that they could not have pursued a similar career in Germany. Among other factors, Lara's work-related post migration experience of upward mobility also explains her overall satisfaction with her life in Istanbul in 2013. She anticipates that only her prospective child's education would change her settlement decision (see section 4.1.1.). With respect to her upward mobility, she states:

> "This is a job/ if I were in Germany, I would have to work at least five or six years to get the job I have here. So, this is a job, for which you would have to have at least a master's degree. And you would also need experience. That's why it's not so bad to make the [career] jump after two years. With a company car and everything." (Lara, 1987 – 12.06.2013)

Some interlocutors with a higher education identify a job offer in Turkey as the primary, some even as the sole reason for their migration to Turkey. For those women, quick upward mobility or their access to a management position constitute part of their experience in Turkey. Like Lara, these women underline that they would not have had a comparable job opportunity in in Germany.[98]

For Damla, it was only an interesting job offer, that convinced her to live in Istanbul. She describes how torn she was in the decision-making process:

[98] 16-I2017, 15; 19-I2017, 68 - 72; 25-I2017, 29, 68

> "'But that [job] is in Istanbul, you did not want to go to Istanbul. But this is your employer. You really want to work there.' And then I thought to myself: 'It doesn't really matter where I work, the important thing is that I do what I want to do. And here you have the opportunity to do exactly what you want to do, in terms of content.'" (Damla, 1981 - 24.05.2017)

Damla is about to graduate from the Turkish-German University. Her job presents an opportunity for her to gain professional experience she can benefit from in the labor market in Germany. In 2017, Damla stated that she can imagine to resettle in Germany very well and she returned to Germany in 2019. In comparison to other interlocutors, Damla is highly mobile between Germany and Turkey. Her work trips allow her to spend time in Germany and to sustain friendship and family ties. In fact, she states, "I would still say that the center of my life [*Lebensmittelpunkt*], even though I live here now, is still in Germany", because her close family members and friends live in Germany.[99] Her return decision, can additionally be contextualized with difficulties in establishing friendship ties and with increasing political polarization in Turkey (see section 4.2.1.) and the proliferation of a traditional gender role ideology in Turkey during the last AKP terms (Weißenberg, 2020, pp. 168–170; see also section 4.3.4.).

Damla and two other women are on the brink of completing or have recently completed their university education in one in of the double master programs of the Turkish German University in Istanbul and by a partner university in Germany. They identify a job opportunity in Turkey as springboard for entering professional life. These women narrate their motives for living in Istanbul as rather temporary because they assess the professional experience and skills, they acquire in their first jobs as springboard for their professional careers which some of them plan to continue in Germany. Leyla[100] easily found her first job in Istanbul in a management position. Shortly after she graduated, she started to work in a corporate group with a branch in Istanbul that has its headquarters in Germany. Her decision to stay in Istanbul was reinforced because her partner was also living in Turkey at that time. In 2017, after two years of work experience, Leyla returned to Germany after we met. She rationalizes her plans with a job offer in Germany. Her decision to return to Germany overlaps with many other motives such as the changed political context in Turkey (see sections 3.8., 4.2.1.).

[99] 19-I2017, 82
[100] 16-I2017, 9, 11-15, 130

Attachment to her close family members and boyfriend's migration to Germany also explain her decision.

Berivan explains her stay in Turkey mainly with her plans of gaining professional experience and to return to Germany with her newly acquired skills. She states:

> "I want to stay here for another two years at most. To gain my professional experience to develop myself further. To strive for a higher position. And to find a job in Germany more easily. Because (...) in Germany it is not so easy to find a good job." (Berivan, 1990 - 18.06.2017)

Berivan's comment and the above summarized results exemplify that working in Turkey in order to start a professional career also presents a tactical decision to evade structural disadvantages in the German job market, even if the women do not explicitly mention it. In their cases, establishing a career is a primary motive for living in Istanbul, as these women can imagine living in Germany again after having pursued this goal. As Leyla's and Damla's cases exemplify, they gained professional experience in Turkey and returned to Germany with their newly acquired skills.

The empirical evidence from the beginning of this section and the results of surveys shows that German-Turkish women are likely to experience structural discrimination in the German labor market. At the intersections of social divisions including ascriptions of class, religion, gender and ethnicity, women with a Turkish name and even more so, women with a higher education, who like Damla identify as Muslims are subject to unemployment or precarious employment (see section 3.8.). Leyla and Berivan both mentioned that it was difficult to find a job in Germany. Not explicitly mentioning discrimination against them in the job market can also constitute a tactical choice of handling experiences with a disadvantaged positionality. It is not unlikely that they aim to enhance their competitiveness through international work experience and thereby tactically avoid structural discrimination in the German labor market, they may have as job starters. My own privileged positionality in the field as white German woman without migration background and member of the majority citizens in Germany and my fieldnotes of a preliminary meeting account for this interpretation as I wrote about one woman: "She explicitly and cautiously remarks - because I am German - that it is also difficult to move up [the career ladder] in Germany because of discrimination".[101]

[101] 17PM2017, 9

Interlocutors from different educational backgrounds expressed that their German and English language skills significantly influenced their access to the labor market in Turkey. They mention that they were hired or preferred in comparison to other applicants and that language skills expanded the scope of jobs to choose from. For women who pursued an education or graduated from university, language skills supported their access in higher positions.[102] Like Emma, others state that an education completed in Germany also privileged them as far as access to work and salary were concerned in comparison to applicants who pursued an education in Turkey. Jasmin[103] for instance states that in Germany she would just be another person with a migration background while in Turkey her foreign language skills and her university degree would be acknowledged. The next section will illustrate migration narratives to Turkey that overlap with those of lacking recognition and structural disadvantage in Germany. Several interlocutors have explained their migration decisions with experiences of exclusion and racialized discrimination against them. Contrary to that, some mention to have found social spheres of belonging in Turkey.

4.3.2. Racialized Exclusion and Membership

Nine women[104] connect their migration to and continuous settlement decisions in Turkey to racism in general, that is some women address racism and Islamophobia as general issues in the public discourse in Germany as having triggered their decisions to move to Turkey or their decision to not resettle in Germany in the future. Others refer to specific experiences in their everyday lives which evoked feelings of discomfort and exclusion. Migration decisions, as much as ideas about future places of settlement can be interpreted as tactical choice or self-protection from racialized discrimination and Islamophobia in Germany.

Asena's related statements exemplify different layers of how the interviewed women explain migration decisions and concerns. She mentions the public discourse about immigrants in Germany in the 1990s, and a concrete experience of being discriminated against. In addition, she mentions experiences of lacking recognition and exclusion by

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[102] 6PM2013, 9; 25-I2017, 29
[103] 1-I2012, 211; 3PM2013, 15; 4-I1-2013, 75; 6PM2013, 9; 6-I2013, 17; 10-I2013, 29; 11-I1-2013, 11; 12-I2013, 279; 12-I2017, 63, 65; 13-I2013, 67; 13-I2017, 43; 16-I2017, 47; 16-I2017, 47; 24PS2017, 10; 25-I2017, 29; 29-I2017, 44; 31-I2017, 97
[104] 2-I2017, 71; 8-I2013, 7 – 9; 8-I2017, 19, 13, 151; 9-I2013, 13, 175 - 177; 9-I2017, 44 – 48; 10-I2017, 55; 11-I2017, 75 – 88; 15-I2017, 34 – 36; 26-I2017, 120, 146; 27-I2017, 189; 29-I2017, 42

friends which can be interpreted as the affective dimension of belonging which Anthias (2006) describes as crucial in situations when one feels like one doesn't belong (see section 2.2.4.). After illustrating Asena's rationalization of her migration to Istanbul, I will touch upon these aspects.

Asena's first migration to Turkey in 1993 was motivated by leaving a social climate in Germany she perceived as hostile against migrants. She quotes right-wing extremism and racist attitudes in Germany in the beginning of the 1990s as main causes for her decision to move to Turkey in 1993. Asena states:

> "And I took a year's leave of absence from the university, in '93, '94. And this was exactly the period when this *Solingen*, *Mölln* phase began. It all fell into this phase and I said, 'I have to get away from here.' And when I was gone/ Solingen even happened after I left. That's when it really escalated again. […] So, my motivation was, 'I have to leave this racist country. I am not welcome here. And I don't feel like I've arrived here either. And [I do] not really [feel] at home. So, I will take a look now: Back to the roots; what is Turkey actually like?'" (Asena, 1970 - 29.06.2013)

Asena refers to the arson attacks in *Mölln* in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein in 1992 and in *Solingen* in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1993. Right wing extremists attacked the houses of Turkey-origin families with arson murdering women and children (see section 3.4.). She remembers that her parents warned her from going to the city center because of "clash between skinheads and Turks" and Asena saw slogans like "foreigners out" on the city walls in the 1980s. She also rationalizes the exclusion she experienced at school as racialized discrimination against her.[105] Although Asena grew up in Germany, she explains that she could not feel at home in Germany because of right wing terrorist attacks against German-Turkish people. But this is not the only reason. Those events are coupled with the lacking empathy of her friends without migration background who did not only do not acknowledge that she experienced racialized discrimination. She explains that her friends even denied that she was exposed to racialized discrimination, stating:

> "And I also had a lot of arguments here with my German friends. They couldn't understand at all: 'What do you actually want? You've totally arrived here. Nothing will happen to you. Who is racist towards you?' I say: 'Yes, nothing really happened to me specifically, except for being picked on in the tram at some point. But it's just what resonates, right?

[105] 8-I2017, 19

> The political signals, the social signals. You just feel it." (Asena, 1970 - 29.06.2013)

Asena's statements show that she has in fact had experienced racialized discrimination in the public sphere. The fact that her friends, members of the majority without migration background, deny her perception of racist attitudes in society in Germany and her experiences of discrimination adds up to her perception of the political atmosphere of the early 1990s and explains her lacking feeling of belonging.

Her statements present a retrospective historical account the atmosphere of the early 1990s which were marked by a high number right-wing extremist and racially motivated assaults against people with a migration background. "Political signals" against immigrants and asylum seekers were a fact coupled with Germany's reunification process (see section 3.4.). An ethno-cultural construction of German nationhood served as glue to integrate East-Germany into the West-German political and economic system while concealing power disparities and inequalities in the reunification process. In a citizenship discourse and policies that constructed an ethno-cultural community of descent as the German nation, Turkey-origin immigrants and their descendants were ethnicized and racialized as the Others of the imagined German nation, stressing their difference to mainstream society. In the light of these debates, it is hardly astonishing that this political climate was also coupled with racist attitudes in the broader society (see sections 3.4., 3.6.).

Asena is not alone with a sensation of racialized prejudice against her. Her statement that racialized discrimination is something 'one just feels', has been voiced by many interlocutors.[106] The subtlety of racialized discrimination is perceived as individual sensation which in its singularity cannot be easily specified or explained as racist. Like Asena, many women have underlined that they cannot specifically describe what is happening, that experiencing racialized discrimination is rather vague, indirect and more of a sensation. Many state "you just feel it", "you feel it's because of you" or in Sofia's words it is "a buzz in the background".[107]

After I asked them whether they can imagine living in Germany in the future, four women answered in the negative stating that they could rather imagine living in a third

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[106][106] 1-I2012, 217, 231; 4PS2017, 7; 4-I2017, 56; 5-I2013, 152; 8-I2017, 56, 58; 8-I2013, 9, 104; 9-I2017, 12 – 18; 11-I1-2013, 230, 277 – 280; 11-I2017, 104 – 108; 18-I2017, 125; 18-I2017, 134 – 137; 28-I2017, 117 – 120; 29-I2017, 87 - 88

[107] 18-I2017, 136

country. These four women rationalized their ideas about a possible future in a third country with concerns about rising hostility against Muslim people in Germany and with the rise of right-wing populism.[108] Not only continuous settlement in Turkey is explained with racism and Islamophobia in Germany. Other women explain their migration to Turkey with similar motives.[109] The women who voice these concerns left Germany between 2000 and 2013. They moved to Turkey after the citizenship law in Germany became more inclusive. While the German state promoted and facilitated highly skilled immigration a discursive shift on immigrants occurred after the attacks of September 11 when an Islamophobic language started resonating and the categorization 'foreigner' was replaced by the category Muslim. Muslim people became the projected Other of German nationhood while first attempts of "integration" policies directed at Muslims revolved around security concerns. Coupled with the wide resonance of Sarrazin's book which entailed eugenic racist arguments against immigrants from Muslim countries, German-Turkish people were categorized and targeted with gendered attributions of difference often under reference to Islam (see sections 3.4., 3.6., 5.1.2.). The women's cautious attitude about a future settlement in Germany needs to be contextualized with the reinforcement of anti-Muslim attitudes in Germany and an Islamophobic political discourse that further gained momentum during the humanitarian refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016. Since these women did not live in Germany when people from Syria sought refuge in Germany and right-wing populism started becoming an issue, they could only observe it from afar. Founded in 2013, the *Alternative for Germany* (AfD) gained increasing support after the refugee crisis and moved as the third strongest political party into the German parliament in 2017. During and after that, the anti-Muslim network *Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident* (*PEGIDA*) started organizing street demonstrations against the immigration of Muslim refugees. The AfD and PEGIDA employ an anti-Muslim discourse in which Muslims are constructed as invaders and threat to the purity of Germany (see section 3.5.). These developments are coupled with increased anti-Muslim attitudes in broad segments of society in Germany (Decker *et al.*, 2018, p. 102, 2020, pp. 64–65).

[108] 2-I2017, 71, 75; 10-I2017, 55; 18-I2017, 235 – 236; 26-I2017, 120, 146; 27-I2017, 189
[109] 8-I2017, 19; 9-I2013, 13, 175-177; 11-I2017, 75 – 88; 15-I2017, 34 – 36; 26-I2017, 119-120; 29-I2017, 42

Mine's statements exemplify some of the related worries interlocutors have expressed in 2017 about returning and living in Germany in the future:

> "[W]hat if this center moves to the right? And that will then also/ so it is one of my concerns why I do not return immediately. For them it doesn't matter if I look the way I look, people can't place me, where I come from. […] [F]or them I am perhaps an asylum seeker […]. [T]his image of the enemy, if the press continues like this and that's/ yes, Muslims are the worst of all. I find it dangerous and unpleasant. That's why I say, 'Okay, maybe I should go to Canada.' […] So, the moderate news / well, it is always so well expressed in the undertone that you don't really notice it, but if you pay close attention to it, it is always emphasized that it is a Muslim, that it is a foreigner. So, you drop these terms again and again, until it gains foothold somewhere. It is always the Muslims who use these (...)."(Mine, 1970 - 03.08.2017)

Mine refers to the criminalization of people who are read as Muslims and foreigners in mass media in Germany. Although she does not mention it, but she probably refers to the homogenization of Muslim people as Islamists. And in fact there is research that indicates that in the early 2000s more than one-third of the media coverage about migration and migrants in Germany focused on the terrorism debate while often mentioning Moroccan and Turkish people (Ruhrmann, Sommer and Uhlemann, 2006, p. 46).

Some women explain their migration to Turkey with exclusion by or lacking recognition in their age group.[110] Membership in peer groups seems to be an important factor during youth and young adulthood in comparison to other peers which makes youngsters and young adults also more vulnerable to exclusion from peers. Zeynep, who has explained her migration to Turkey with a bundle of motives related to gendered oppression (see section 4.4.4.) became a friend of mine throughout my stay in Turkey. We know each other from our youth and after I learned that she migrated to Turkey, I contacted her on my arrival in 2013. Her statements show that it was our rapport in 2017 that had created an atmosphere in which she told me that racialized discrimination by her age group and her struggles to make friends constituted one of her primary motives to decide to migrate to Turkey. In comparison to 2013, her narrative of 2017 revealed that a lacking feeling of belonging had additionally triggered her migration. Since this was new information to me, I note in our conversation that this motive probably added up to her other motives. Contrary to my assumption, Zeynep rationalizes a lacking feeling of belonging and

[110] 8-I2013, 19, 151; 11-I2017, 75 – 88; 15-I2017, 34 – 36

exclusion by peers as her main migration motive. She responds to my following statement as follows:

> "I: So that added up to it [the other motives].
>
> Z: So that was actually/ (...) No, that was actually the main reason. Because it is so/
>
> I: That was actually the main reason?
>
> Z: That was the main reason because I can always remember, maybe you can too. I used to count the days back to summer vacation. […] Because I wanted to come here. Because I felt comfortable here. Because I could just express myself. […] That was actually the main reason. I thought about it a lot. Also, after you [and me talked in 2013] and before you, and so on. How this came about and so on. And why I don't stay in touch with my friends at all.
>
> I: Yeah, because you didn't mention that at all last time. You know? That's why it's very interesting that you're telling me that now.
>
> Z: It's like that. Somehow, we got closer you and me. And it's like this, I didn't want to admit it, that I've always been the Other one. Actually. That's hard to admit. I wasn't the outsider, but I was the Other one. And that's very hard to admit. Because people always say, 'Sure, I had a lot of friends.' But it wasn't like that at all. (Zeynep, 1982 - 14.08.2017)

Elsewhere[111] she states that male German classmates racially discriminated against her and that she was the only German-Turkish girl in her class at upper secondary school (for a similar experience see sections 5.2.2., 5.3.2.). As her repeated attempts to make friends at school failed, Zeynep started to mainly socialize with German-Turkish peers from working class families (see section 4.3.1.). Against this backdrop, Zeynep's statements show the internal struggles connected to admitting experiences of racialized exclusion individually and socially. Her statements illustrate that avoiding cognitive awareness of experiences of racialized discrimination presents a tactic of preventing feeling of humiliation. During her youth, Zeynep's imagination of a possible life in Turkey, which she connects to her summer holiday experience presents a possible way out of exclusion and a quest for social membership and recognition which she realized at a later point of time with a migration to Turkey. Socio-economically, she explains her professional career in Germany with the normative practice of her German-Turkish peers and family in which vocational training was a pre-determined career path while an academic education was not considered. Contrary to these experiences of exclusion,

[111] 11-I2017, 88

upward mobility, social and professional recognition in her occupation but also in the family network and friendship circles present a reason for Zeynep's continuous settlement in Turkey (see section 4.3.1.). Like Asena and Zeynep, other women also state that feelings of lacking recognition and acknowledgment in their closer social environment among peers at school and among friends, but also in public social events evoked feelings of "not being welcome", "not feeling at home", "not belonging" or these women make sense of these feelings as having triggered their decisions to move to Turkey.[112]

Lena's statements show how people she becomes acquainted with other her by labelling her along ethnicized and racialized identity categories (see also sections 5.2.2., 5.3.3., 5.4.1.). Frequent confrontations with attributions of difference in her everyday life evoked a sensation of feeling "incomplete" which she explains as having triggered her decision to move to Turkey. Not "treated German" because of her last name, she "didn't feel German either". Researchers have provided empirical evidence for discrimination against German-Turkish people based on their last name (Janßen and Polat, 2005; Kaas and Manger, 2012; Schneider, Yemane and Weinmann, 2014; El-Menouar, 2015). Lena's sense of belonging in 2012 was also deeply intertwined with her family identity. Together with categorizations of difference she frequently experienced in Germany, Lena's migration to Turkey also is a quest for family identity and roots, as becoming acquainted with her Turkish father and his family was a significant migration motive for her in 2013 (see section 4.4.2.). The recurrent experience with members of white mainstream society in Germany unsettled her, as she experienced that her belonging and biographic experience of being born and socialized in Germany were questioned. She rationalizes this experience with her Turkish last name and quotes narratives people approached her with as deeply unsettling because she never thought about family-identity or her cultural identity. Typical sentences she was approached with in Germany's public sphere include questions like "Where are you from?" She rationalizes her settlement in Turkey as follows:

> "I want to define myself, that's why I'm here. I need that apparently. (4) So (...) you/. Also, external influences quite a lot. That's sayings like 'But you're not very German.' or something like that, stuff that comes from the outside in Germany. […] 'That's not typically German.' Which, of course, makes you think." (Lena, 1982 - 04.07.2013)

[112] 9-I2013, 13; 11-I2017, 75 – 88; 15-I2017, 34 – 36; 26-I2017, 120

Lena's more than two-year lasting settlement in Istanbul has provided her with the answers she was looking for. After she moved back to Cologne in 2015. In 2017 she states:

> "[I]f people ask me now where I come from and I say: 'Here, from Pforzheim'. Then they say, 'No, where are you really from?', then I say, 'Yes, from Pforzheim. What do you want to know? Where my parents come from? Where my hair and whatever colors come from?' You know? [...] Some people don't understand that at all, that they uproot with that question. [...] Since childhood, I've been asked where I really come from. That implies that I'm lying or that I just don't know any better. That something is wrong. And that's not true. When people ask where I'm from, I'm from the village where I was born. Done." (Lena, 1982 - 21.09.2017)

Her circular migration experience emancipated her from feeling incomplete as she felt more rooted concerning her Turkey-origin family identity (see section 4.4.2.). In 2017, she no longer felt unsettled by excluding questions strangers address her with. Not only has she learned to unmask such questions as racializing; she also stresses her membership as based on her birth-right citizenship. The fact that Lena perceives the question "Where are you from?" as uprooting also sheds light on a prevailing citizenship discourse in Germany that translates into the everyday experiences of exclusion of many interlocutors (see sections 5.2.2., 5.3.2-5.3.3.). Lena's statements illustrate that the representation of immigrants and their descendants as uprooted would not concern her and others with family migration history if they wouldn't repeatedly be confronted with othering stereotypes and expected to answer comments without becoming inconvenient. In Tschernokoshewa's words, the language of ethnicization entails a paradox. As people who have most actively appropriated plural identities and balance two cultural and social fields, are most often addressed with categorizations of innate ethnicity (1999, pp. 120–122). There is a problem with the citizenship discourse in Germany if immigrants and postmigrants are repeatedly addressed with discourses of culturalization, ethnicization and racialization that stress their difference. In line with the long lasting ethno-cultural political and public discourse on citizenship in Germany (see section 3.6.) members of majority society without any transnational experience feel entitled to represent people with hyphenated senses of belonging as having problems with their identity. What they are actually doing is constructing an image of their own in which membership in the German polity is based on a community of German descent. In this reading, questions like "Where are you from?" reveal that speakers imagine membership as based on blood and primordial ancestry. Cultural difference of the

people addressed as Others in their everyday life is hardly relevant here. What is relevant is that attributions of difference constitute a social strategy and practice by more privileged segments of the majority to define themselves as ideal citizens. It is not astonishing that this can cause feelings of uprootedness among Germany born-postmigrants since in this discourse, membership in their country of birth is not acknowledged.

Experiences with exclusion in Germany can also lead to a stronger identification with Turkey and Istanbul in particular as in Ada's case. She rationalizes her migration to Turkey as primarily based on experiences of being discriminated against. While not going into details what has happened to her, she underlines her agency of breaking out of these circumstances by referring to her past Self in Germany that imagined her life there as temporary, stating:

> "But it was just like I was like you, for example. You came here for a certain period of time. You know you have a certain period of time. And then you will also go back to your own home. That's how I felt. To me it was like, 'Okay, I was born and raised here, but at a point I'm going to go back. There is this particular day. And on that day I will be in a place where I will be happy, too." (Ada, 1985 - 02.08.2017)

Not only does her imagination of Turkey provide a tactic to leave behind experiences of discrimination against her. Ada[113] realized her migration to Istanbul mainly because of such experiences while simultaneously emancipating herself from her parental home. In addition, her parents return narrative that may also have played into her decision (see section 4.4.2.). Her local attachment and identification with the city of Istanbul present additional decisive factors for her migration decision. As other interlocutors, she bonded with the city of Istanbul during the summer holidays with her family which contrasted the negative experiences she made in Berlin (see also section 4.3.3.). She describes her post migration experience as content happy life and contrasts this experience with feelings of alienation when she visits Berlin to extend her residence permit and to visit her family.

The ethnographic results indicate that migration motives related to experiences of racialized discrimination are frequent in comparison to the samples of other researchers. How can this be explained? The samples of other researchers were mainly included highly skilled male and female interlocutors. The fact, that I only spoke with women of

[113] 26-I2017, 29, 39, 120, 146

different educational backgrounds, provides additional evidence for intersectional discrimination (see section 2.2.4. and 2.3.4.). The voices quoted above illustrate that German-Turkish women experience racialized discrimination based on the social divisions of gender, Turkish, migrant status, age, religion and working-class background. In comparison to German-Turkish men or white German women without migration background, their chances of being discriminated against along these overlapping minorizing categories increase.

While every single woman I met mentioned some form of discrimination against herself in Germany, related ideas about migration and migration motives also appear quite often in the sample in comparison to the results of other researchers. My findings contrast the results of Pusch and Aydın (2011) and Aydın (2013) who found that discrimination experiences were not decisive reasons for undertaking an actual migration decision to Turkey. The statements of the women are more in line with the findings of Splitt (2012) Rittersberger-Tiliç, Çelik and Özen (2013), Aver and Gümüş (2017), Kılınç and King, (2017), Sievers, Griese and Schulte (2010), Bürgin and Erzene-Bürgin (2014) and Neitzert (2014) who found that experiences with racialized exclusion or a lacking feeling of belonging presented a decisive motives to leave Germany.

On the individual level, belonging also constitutes an attachment to places or a sense of place. The next section sheds light on how the women perceive the city of Istanbul as place and as urban sphere that enhances individual projects of self-realization and emancipation from places of origin in Germany.

4.3.3. Self-Realization: Urban Translocal Perspectives

> "But it's also really cool to learn about Germany, because my friends at the TDU (Turkish-German University), that one [girl], Luzi, comes from a village in Bavaria. And what she has told [us]… So, she has told things, that one-to-one would happen in a Turkish village as well. And I actually became aware through these people that […] cultures are very similar. So, a Bavarian village idiot is the same as an Anatolian village idiot. For me, it's one-to-one the same thing. I mean, for example, they live in a village and want to build a house in another village five kilometers away. Together with her boyfriend. [...] And the boy's mother cries and says – the boy is already 40, by the way – 'But Peter comes from this village, he can't live in the other village.' I'm like, 'Guys, what kind of stories are these?' The stuff she talked about. For example, she [stepmother] said to Luzi,'Well, when my friends come, you never show yourself. They already ask me whether I have problems with my daughter-in-law.' So that would happen one-to-one in a Turkish family." (Farah, 1990 - 14.04.2017)

Several interlocutors have explained their migration to Turkey link to a wish to become familiar with Turkish culture and thereby mainly referred to aspects they connect with the city of Istanbul.[114] Farah's words illustrate that we often confuse culture with different social and spatial entities. The women protagonists of this thesis are children and grandchildren of labor migrants who mainly came from villages in Turkey and in part have created similar structures in Germany. Farah's translocal comparison refers to universal social structures that can occur in villages or socially segregated neighborhoods defined by all over the world. Instead of making cross-cultural comparisons, the women in this section rationalize their migration decisions from a translocal perspective.

To understand some of the dynamics of gender in German-Turkish women's migration trajectories, their translocal comparison between city and small towns explain some social and spatial implications of their migration trajectories beyond cultural essentialism. While many refer to their migration to Turkey as a form of self-realization and search for the self, urbanity in Istanbul supports this search in various respects as explored in this section. Several women rationalize their self-realization as a simultaneous emancipation from their village like hometown neighborhoods in Germany, anonymity in the city constitutes a contrasting experience that guarantees them the freedoms necessary for their individual projects of looking after themselves. Meanwhile, characteristics assigned to the perception of urbanity make the city of Istanbul an attractive destination of migration. Several women quote the diversity of urban lifestyles, and the vivid dynamics of city life which some perceive as a contrast to a routinized everyday life in Germany some associate with boredom. General aspects of urbanity overlap with an Istanbul-specific sense of place and attachment to the city. In many cases, a sense of place results from connections to the city which have been established during (family) holidays prior to their migration decision. Here, several women refer to their previous selves in Germany imagining the realization of a migration decision as future dream or refer to their previous perceptions of the city during a holiday. While life in the city of Istanbul in terms of self-realization evokes a translocal delineation from places in Germany, at another point of time the draining aspects of city life may evoke another translocal comparison to areas and places in

[114] Others mentioned wish of learning Turkish and improving languages skills, to their faith (4-I1-2013, 9; 9-I2013, 17) or to their family roots (see section 4.4.2.).

Germany which some women associate with peace, tranquility and nature. Such a comparison may eventually play into decisions of leaving Istanbul.

Gendered Translocal Contrasts between Urbanity and Hometown Neighborhoods

Many women rationalize their migration and continuous settlement to Turkey as individual self-realization. The motive of self-realization is strongly connected to a search for the self. Some express this quest as "taking care of" oneself, "spending time with" oneself, "finding" oneself, "developing" oneself or simply as "being alone". Self-realization is also expressed as "building/having built one's own life" and a search for and realization of "autonomy" (*Eigenständigkeit*) or "self-reliance" (*Selbstständigkeit*).[115] For instance, Ayla's assessment of her migration decision in 2013:

> "I have not regretted it once so far. Quite the opposite. I think it's a good thing. Because you had to build a) a completely new thing. [...] somehow, well you have a bit more time [to] focus on yourself. And (..) just to find out: 'What do I actually want and what don't I want?' and yes, I could really just look inside myself while in Germany, I was actually always doing stuff for all the other people all the time somehow, or always been there for other people, somehow. And here I could just start to look after myself. And yes, that did me a lot of good. Yes, I now have a somewhat straighter line. It's not as zigzag as it was in Germany, where you're just distracted all the time." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

This language of self-realization is an individual one and the consulted women have also concrete explanations for the different ways their migration decision and long-term settlement plans has helped them in this quest. A repeating trope that explains how the pursuit of *Eigenständigkeit* or *Selbstständigkeit* translates into everyday life, is by engaging in an occupation and by maintaining financial independence. Another aspect several women mention is to have a living space of their own that guarantees them privacy and going after their individual interests and hobbies. Take Nojan's answer after I ask her where she feels at home and what home actually means for her:

> "Istanbul. Istanbul. Where I feel at ease. And I just feel at home there. Right? No matter what I've experienced. What I have experienced makes me who I am now. And that's why it's good the way it is. I am a strong woman, independent, right? I live my own life. And can take

[115] See 2-I2017, 173; 10PM2013, 5; 10-I2013, 29, 82-86; 10-I2017, 122; 13-I2017, 47; 13-I2017, 57; 13-I2017, 93; 14-I2013, 11; 14-I2013, 25 - 27; 14-I2018, 88; 16-I2017, 23, 29; 21-I2017, 46, 82; 218 - 211; 24-I2017, 37; 26-I2017, 29

> responsibility and earn money. Right? And do what I want to do." (Nojan, 1985 - 01.09.2017)

Ayla's quote already somewhat hints to the fact that narratives of self-realization imply independence from a gendered positionality and everyday life experience in Germany of which self-realization was not a component due to responsibilities for others.

For Nojan, it is the independence from her parents which additionally explain her attachment to Istanbul as the place where she pursued her self-realization: For her, Istanbul represents her own autonomous and financially independent life she has established away from family responsibilities. When I interviewed Nojan in Germany in 2017, she was on the verge of returning to Istanbul. Before that she departed Istanbul in order to take care of her sick mother in Germany (see section 4.4.3.). Both Nojan's and Ayla's narrative are gendered. *Eigenständigkeit*, *Selbstständigkeit,* "building one's life" also means personal autonomy and breaking free from the family of origin and from gender role norms the women contest and negotiate. By migrating to their parents or grandparents' homeland, some women claim a right to a gender identity that differs from normative gender role expectations. The gender norms Nojan strives to exit – include care taking roles and associated responsibilities for her parents. Ayla on the other hand is concerned with gender equality and criticizes the first generation's rigid understanding of gender norms and the unequal treatment of boys and girls she experienced in her neighborhood. She rationalizes this unequal treatment as an outcome of a generational divide (see section 5.1.1.).

The fact that many interlocutors are more inclined to mention their independence and less so gendered constraints in the family accounts for their genuine interest to experience themselves as individuals outside the family context and to experience a change of scenery through migrating. But on the other hand, the reader should bear in mind that it is rather unlikely that German-Turkish women want to discuss (although some did) gendered constraints with me as a member of the majority. The fact that their migration also meant to break away from their parental home (about half of the consulted women moved out when migrating to Turkey) was left implicit. Since the fieldwork material reveals this information but it can hardly anywhere be found as an explicit statement. While the majority left their parental home with their parents' consent some left against their parents' will. My ethnographic self's positionality –a female representative of German majority society in academia who is not an expert in gender studies – is important and accounts for the scarcity of fieldwork material on the

topic of self-emancipation from the family. It is nothing unusual but sometimes expected in Germany for children without migration background to leave the parental home as soon as they are young adults. Despite my living experience in Turkey my interlocutors probably also paid attention to not essentializing their family histories along gendered constraints. When addressing such topics, they did so carefully, situating related statements into a larger context. Since German-Turkish women are very often represented as victims of patriarchic gendered constraints imposed upon them by male family members in the public discourse in Germany this is hardly astonishing (see section 3.6.). Their migration and post migration practices account for the fact that gendered responsibilities may have been constraining but did not hinder them from claiming their right to gender equality, self-realization and to self-exploration.

Three interlocutors I met in 2013 and in 2017 refer to themselves as very involved with family responsibilities in Germany.[116] Bahar explains her migration motives as follows:

> "And I'm a family person, like that. (...) Many siblings, a lot of responsibility, the oldest. And somehow, I was lying in bed and just spontaneously decided to go to Istanbul. […] because I have two difficult brothers and I was carrying a lot of responsibility there […] so to speak and yes. Quite a good relationship with my family but always got a lot of responsibility. Because they had to work a lot and so on. And therefore, it was too much for me at some point." (Bahar, 1984 - 21.05.2013)

Bahar situates her caretaking role in the family with her parents' jobs and with her age position among her siblings. Firstly, she explains that both of her parents worked. They are shift workers in local factories. The fact that her mother was working and not taking care of the children contests stereotypes of the traditional division of labor ascribed to Turkish families according to which female spouses are in charge of the household chores and bringing up the children. Secondly, she highlights the good relationship with her family and her family belongingness describing herself as family person. As a "family person" she did could not ignore her brothers' situation which is why she complied with taking over responsibilities. While contextualizing this experience, it also constitutes her main migration motive.

In 2018, she is mother of three children and back in her family's home in a small town in southern Germany (see sections 4.1.1., 4.3.4.). We have become friends and after we get to talk about her motives which triggered her decision to move to Istanbul, she adds

[116] 4-I2017, 37; 14-I2018, 78; 13-I2017, 7

to her 2013 narrative that she did not only intend to leave behind family responsibilities. Living in an apartment in her parents' house in 2018, she is confronted with her father's attempts to control her as he asks her questions about where she is going and how long she will be away. Confronted with these questions in 2018, she adds to her migration narrative that she also wanted to liberate herself from her father's interference with her personal life. She contrasts her "own life" in Istanbul with the gendered constraints she experienced as young woman in her family remembering that her parents did not allow her to meet with boys and male youngsters, when she was growing up. These restrictions also affected her school performance as she had to hide in order to meet up with male school friends for group work. With her migration to Istanbul, she left her social role in the family behind and started "taking care" of herself and "getting to know" herself as she went after her interests including outdoor hobbies such as climbing, and hiking, sports, travelling and became more involved with her interest in music.[117] Other women share her intention of breaking free from imposed family responsibilities and caretaker roles while going after individual freedoms in Istanbul.

However, there is another dimension to the gendered control concerning Bahar's behavior in the public sphere and her interaction with the opposite gender which she shares with several women. Reducing her parents' attempts to control her behavior to the family unit only would isolate her parents' actions from a larger social and local context. The neighborhood in Germany the women grew up in plays a crucial role. Bahar and other women who rationalize their migration to Turkey as self-realization, mostly grew up in neighborhoods in small towns which they describe as mainly populated by Turkey-origin immigrants who sometimes even originate from the same village in Turkey. They contextualize and explain their parents' interference with their freedom of movement in the public sphere with the social control neighbors exerted over their parents. Bahar contextualizes her parents' patriarchal measures over her behavior as young woman as follows:

> "[B]ecause they are actually not that strict. But they allowed themselves to be manipulated to an extreme degree back then. And back then, a lot of people called at home. So, if they saw me somewhere, or something happened. And they dared to call my parents. [...] And they [my parents] probably also accepted that. [...] it was always people they didn't really know that much. And twice my mother tried to oppose it, but that put more pressure on her – so I had the feeling at that time that she was

[117] 14-I2018, 11, 25, 80, 217 – 222

> somehow unhappy with what she had done. So, she used to let herself be influenced. By my grandma, by everyone actually. So, by her own mother, she was also kind of quite conservative [*ein bisschen sehr konservativ*].” (Bahar, 1984 - 21.05.2018)

It is important to bear in mind that Bahar’s parents were also very young at that time. In Bahar’s and in other cases, the family unit becomes a public site of negotiating and reproducing gender norms diachronically throughout family generations and synchronically with the overlapping social sphere of the neighborhood. It is interesting how Bahar’s narrative shifts from both of her parents to her mother. She describes her mother of the second generation as giving in to the first generations’ patriarchal norms of social behavior. After several attempts to contest those norms, her mother reproduces the patriarchal social pressure she experienced herself as young adult. As Bahar’s mother was subject to even stricter patriarchal norms by her own parents, those experiences add up to the social pressure of neighbors. In fact, the neighbors expand the family unit into a public sphere of social control over young girls’ bodies and their behavior.

Other women who are mainly concerned with their independence and self-realization in Istanbul also explain their migration decisions with getting away from the gendered constraints in their neighborhoods that are mainly populated by German-Turkish residents. Some women also make sense of their neighbors’ interference as having forced their parents into constraining their freedom of movement during their youth. They assign their parents a positionality in which they were expected to control their daughters’ behavior. Emma explains this social pressure on her body and her movement in the public sphere as follows:

> “Because I come from this background: a migrant kid. And we also lived in ghettos, so to speak, where we lived together with the Turks. And that accompanied me my whole childhood or rather my youth. That you always heard from home […]: ‘Hey, watch out, will you? Not that they see this or that they say something. I don't want to hear from the neighbors “Your daughter and here and there.”’ And that's so/ it’s rigid. So, you don't want to be seen anymore. ‘I don't want that he says, “I saw your daughter there and there and she was wearing this and that.’”(Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Berivan makes similar remarks about Turkish families in her hometown:

> “And then it was gossiped around. They even called my dad once. I was 20 at that time, and an acquaintance called and said, ‘Your daughter is also sitting there with two boys.’ And my father said, ‘So what? I know what my daughter is doing.’” (Berivan, 1990 - 18.06.2017)

It appears that in such village-like settings or in segregated German-Turkish neighborhoods in Germany, young girl's bodies in the public sphere become the locus of negotiating gender identities and norms. While some women's parents complied with such gendered constraints others did not. The fact however that neighbors complain about Bahar's, Emma's and Berivan's behavior shows that they have struggled against these constraints and broke the circle by moving to a city where they can remain anonymous.

Anonymity and Individual Liberty

Scholarly deliberations about urbanity have in fact contrasted anonymity as a crucial component of urbanity, in comparison to increased social control in a small community. In his 1903 published article, Simmel (1957, p. 236) observed that the large numbers of strangers and different people one encounters in the city would result in a distant behavior (*Reserviertheit*) towards strangers in comparison to life in a small town. A positive outcome of this distant social behavior would result in enhanced individual freedom. Robert Ezra Park, one of founding fathers of the Chicago school of sociology, argued that primary face-to-face relationships would be weakened in the city. Technological progress and increased mobility would render social relations in the city more transitory and less stable resulting in more superficial social relations. This different quality of social relations in the city would provide people with the opportunity to find a social environment where they can have the freedom to live out and develop their individuality (Park, 1915). Louis Wirth also believed that social encounters in the city tend to be of secondary nature, that is transitory and are characterized by superficiality and anonymity. The "individual gains […] a certain degree of emancipation or freedom from the personal and emotional controls of intimate groups" (1938, pp. 12–13).

Although the contrast between city and village or "folk society" has been criticized for excluding the mutual entanglement and influence of both systems (Hannerz, 1980, pp. 63–67), the city-village contrast is still used for explaining different of social relations, also in more contemporary contributions on urban anthropology in Germany. Dürr for example, argues that anonymity and heterogeneity still constitute defining moments of urbanity in contrast to personal acquaintances, manageability and greater social control in the village (2004, p. 139). Urban sociologists and anthropologists have also found

communities dominated by face-to-face relationships in the city which relates more to some of the women's neighborhoods of origin in Germany.[118]

What has changed today is that the transitory and superficial quality of social relations and anonymity in the city are seen as characteristics of the public sphere and public urban spaces. Anonymity and the freedom that comes with it occur in the public spheres and spaces. Although existent in the city one may intimate social face-to-face relationships in a specific urban neighborhood, those relations do not not define the city. It is rather the constantly existing public sphere and the strict separation of public and private sphere that defines urbanity in comparison to rural areas in which the public sphere is rather of temporary nature. This permanently existing public space results from the fact that people who do not know each other constantly meet in typical urban spaces including traffic sites, streets, public squares, supermarkets and shopping centers. Since people in these spheres and spaces are unfamiliar with one another typical urban norms of behavior – for example not communicating – make social relations as what Simmel, Park and Wirth have called transitory, superficial and anonymous (Kokot, Hengartner and Wildner, 2000, pp. 287–294; Antweiler, 2004, pp. 287–294).

The women who most vehemently discuss their migration decision as self-realization and criticize the gendered social pressure they and their parents were subject to in their neighborhoods in Germany also connect their self-realization to life in the city. They contrast life in Istanbul to their life in the small hometowns or home villages in Germany they identify as control over their bodies and individual liberties. Like Simmel and Park and Dürr argue, the different kinds of social relations urbanity offers with its permanent public sphere, they perceive life in the metropolis of Istanbul as liberating because they can be anonymous. In the light of their above raised criticism against their parents' and neighbors controlling behavior in Germany, Bahar and Emma both rationalize their post migration experiences and their related motives of moving to Istanbul as follows:

> "[And I was] Alone here in this city. And I just liked it pretty much. Yes. And because I also know the language very well. Istanbul is / And I also like the anonymity here. I come from a rural area in Germany. And everyone knows each other. Everybody knows everybody. And Turkish people know each other anyway, and yes, it was always a bit difficult for me to fight my way through. With us. (.) Because my sister and I were

[118] On ethnographies of "urban villages" i.e., neighborhoods that accommodate occupational groups, immigrant or ethnic groups and the poor see for example: Gans, 1982; Wirth, 1983; Anderson, 2014

> just a bit different from the other Turkish women in the city or village, so to speak." (Bahar, 1984 - 21.05.2013)
>
> "[F]or me it was DEFINITELY obvious that I wanted to go to a metropolis. So, it had to be bigger than Cologne and Düsseldorf. And that's why. So, my thought was England, America, but not just England, America. Only London or New York would have come into consideration. Or Istanbul, for that matter. So not a small town. I just need/I like a lot of people around me. I also like the anonymity a big city offers. Right? It's a bit of a retreat for me. When you are where there are lots of people, but you can still be by yourself. That's important to me. I don't want people to be able to observe me living my life. So that was important to me, too." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Bahar and Emma both state that they were different from other girls with Turkish family migration history. What is it that that they perceive different about themselves? What makes them possibly feel different from their peers is that they contest against normative gender roles imposed on them more openly. Emma's practices of meeting up with the opposite gender in her town's public sphere became a topic of debate in her neighborhood. In fact, Emma's and Bahar's migration to Istanbul presents a tactic of contestation against gendered constraints reproduced in their neighborhoods and their families. Emma's and Bahar's statements clearly show this. Istanbul's metropolitanism, it's accessibility due to German-Turkish women's language skills and the anonymity of an urban environment made Istanbul their destination of migration. An urban setting where they can also make claims to gender equality. In addition, Emma's narrative reveals that another city in Germany cannot compete with the opportunities Istanbul as a metropole offers.

To close the circle back to the statements about self-realization and time for the self: By moving to the city, the women have created a space of their own where they can enjoy their privacy and are free from social interference of family member and neighbors precisely because nobody knows them. A consequence of transitory, superficial and anonymous relations in the city is a certain freedom that Emma, Bahar, Nojan, Ayla and Berivan[119] mention as constitutive of their post migration experience. However, their perception of freedom is uttered from a translocal gendered positionality that only becomes meaningful in its connection with their experiences of a constraining atmosphere they faced as young women in neighborhoods they grew up in. Take for instance Bahar's statement about Istanbul after she returned to Germany: "So, there I

[119] 7-I2013, 192; 13-I2013, 43; 10-I2013, 29; 21-I2017, 46, 64

was just, because people didn't know me, freer."[120] As far as Nojan's, Emma's, Bahar's, Ayla's and Berivan's experiences and perceptions are concerned, both Park's and Simmel's, contrast between town and city have not lost any relevance. Contextualized within gendered social locations which include age and family migration history, the individual freedom of the city dweller only makes sense in the light of the contrasting experience with a lack of freedom and constraints a person living in a small town or community still faces today from her respective positionality.

Urban Heterogeneity and Density and Translocal Contrasts

After spending five years in Istanbul, in 2017, Zilan is still fascinated with the city of Istanbul. She states, "Istanbul is really awesome. I like that it has such culturally different impressions. You just see the differences between people. No matter where you go. It's just a huge city."[121] In a similar vein, Ayla quotes the variety of different cultures and impressions and the manifold possibilities to organize everyday life after work that attracted her in comparison to the few leisure opportunities the city close to her hometown in Germany offered. These migration narratives relating to the city refer to perceptions of urbanity that are rather general. Such characteristics include what Zilan, Ayla and others mention: the variety of different lifestyles and leisure opportunities, the city's liveliness and its vivid dynamics. [122]

Luis Wirth, one of the fathers of the Chicago school of urban studies has raised theoretical arguments about the city as a distinctive way of life and particular form of social organization. The women's motives of migration and settlement in Istanbul are evocative of some of his arguments. He defines the city "as a relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals" (Wirth, 1938, p. 8). As defining characteristic of a city, the high population density leads to a differentiation and specialization of residents and of their activities, resulting in more complex social structure. A city's high population density also results in close physical contact between residents and their confrontation with different lifestyles. Since city dwellers do not know each other, contacts in the city are characterized by social distance. A city's *heterogeneity* is constituted by the spectrum of different groups that exist in a city. City residents have the opportunity to choose between these groups depending on their

[120] 14-I2018, 212
[121] 1-I2017, 59
[122] 1-I2017, 59; 6-I2013, 76; 10-I2013, 29; 10-I2017, 39, 39; 30-I2017, 45

individual interests and they can be members of several groups at the same time. The increased mobility of city dwellers thanks to urban infrastructure allows individuals to move easily between different groups, each of which serves a different part of the personality (Wirth, 1938, pp. 14–18). Considering contemporary theoretical debates about power and more specifically concepts of intersectionality, the density and diversity of different lifestyles in a city is not equally accessible to all city dwellers. Wirth has been criticized for examining the city as isolated social entity and it has been stressed that small communities can also have high degrees of heterogeneity (Hannerz, 1980, pp. 69, 98). Although size, density and heterogeneity as defining criteria of the city have been criticized as reductionist and as neglecting local and social contexts, his definition is quoted in numerous publications which aim to conceptualize urbanity and social experience of city life. Antweiler extends Wirth's criteria with a fourth component, the artificial or constructed environment and the public realm (2004, pp. 293–295). Other scholars of urban anthropology in Germany assess Wirth's criteria as no longer sufficient for defining the city. Nevertheless, these criteria are still seen as applicable as far as the city is seen as distinctive spatial unity which is defined by its residents' perception of urbanity (Kokot, Hengartner and Wildner, 2000, p. 7).

If we consider the different ways the women rationalize the city of Istanbul as an interesting place to live in, based on their perception of Istanbul as a magnet for different cultural lifestyles and as a space that bundles the coexistence of different types of people, their statements in fact reflect the characteristics, proponents of urban studies have used to describe urbanity. Ayla's and Zilan's fascination with Istanbul's heterogeneous lifestyles and many influences can also be explained with the contrasting experiences they have made living in comparatively small towns in Germany they originate from. In comparison to Istanbul's estimated number of 15.5 million inhabitants, those towns have less than 60,000 inhabitants. In his cultural and philosophical reflections about the modern individual in large cities, the sociologist Simmel contrasted the experience of city as "sensual foundations of the soul's life" with life in a small town or on the countryside. Composed of the "rapid pressuring concentration of changing images, the abrupt distance within what one encompasses with a single glance, the unexpectedness of impressions that force themselves upon one" the experience of city life constitutes a contrast to life in rural areas or villages "with the slower, more familiar, more evenly flowing rhythm of its sensual-spiritual image of life" (Simmel, 1957, pp. 228, 236).

It may be argued that Ayla's and Zilan's perception of a slower rhythm in their hometowns constitutes a contrasting experience in comparison to life in the metropole of Istanbul. In fact, Ayla and other women contrast a quest for a new experience with routine, boredom and dullness they associate with everyday life at work, in the family or in their places of origin in Germany. For some of these women a short holiday trip to Germany has reinforced such perceptions. Emma explicitly compares her experience of Istanbul with her hometown in Germany (around 63,000 inhabitants) which she describes as "boring".[123]

Another migration motive that is indirectly connected to the city is expressed as longing for adventure, a need for change or the desire to experience something new.[124] While some women connect this motive with life in the city of Istanbul as they mention different implications city life has for them shortly before they start talking about their desire to experience something new. Ayla's statements exemplify this migration motive in which the perception of routine and dullness in Germany contrasts her experience of city life. She explains:

> "I just wanted a little change of scenery. And a bit of a culture change. Although Germany is already a blatant melting pot of cultures [*Kulturkessel*], it was still a bit boring. Because everybody kind of, I don't know like/ there's already a […] mentality there and I just wanted to try something new. And as long as I/ I didn't have big responsibilities in Germany – hence no family, no husband, no children. And I thought to myself: 'Now is the right time. I'm in the right age. I'm independent' and at that time I also had the courage to simply do something new and then I just decided." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

Another aspect mentioned by Ayla above reveals that age is an important aspect. This motive is also shared by others who in a more general fashion note that they are still "young" and "free" or "independent" to pursue such a migration decision as they have not started a family yet or finished their education.[125] Another statement of Ayla exemplifies the statements of some other women and explains, how age relates to experiencing life in the metropole:

> "As I said, Istanbul is something for now, so for these years, where I am cheerful and curious, Istanbul certainly is the right city. However, I would not spend my retirement years here. Because that would be too stressful for me. Traffic, people. It's too much. You can't walk down a

[123] 7PS2-2017, 11
[124] 9-I2017, 62; 10-I2013, 7, 11; 14-I2013, 13; 24PS2017, 11; 31-I2017, 73
[125] 5-I2017, 37; 16-I2017, 15; 19-I2017, 251 - 253; 22-I2017, 234

> street without fifty people running into you. At some point, it will definitely be too much for me. And then I will possibly move down the Aegean area. Somehow to Izmir or well it depends. So, I haven't decided yet or/" (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

And in fact, age may be one factor that may have induced Ayla's decision to move back to Germany in 2019. Several women mention that living in the city is exciting as long as they are still young. Like Ayla, they imagine living somewhere else in Turkey or returning to Germany when they enter a middle-age or retire. Some argue that age goes with a need for calmness and that life in Istanbul will be more stressful and tiring.[126] Asena for example who lived in Turkey and in Sweden and migrated back and forth between these three countries for several years between 1993 and 2010, later also with her family, explains her decision to continue her settlement in Cologne with getting older and a need for tranquility and a fatigue she feels because of her recurrent movement between different countries. Despite her experiences with racialized exclusion in Germany and her related strong criticism of society in Germany (see section 4.3.2.), she has wanted to "root" herself in a place and chose her hometown Cologne in 2017.[127]

Sense of Place

Several women live in their parents' or grandparents' houses, often in the beginning of their stay in Istanbul (section 4.2.2., 4.4.1.). The familiarity with a specific neighborhood and with the city from family holidays during their childhood or young adulthood[128] turns out as a crucial experience for some women. Holiday experiences have shaped their imagination of living in the city of Istanbul in the future. Consider the following statements made by Nojan and Ada:

> "N: ISTANBUL was my dream. I really wanted to go to Istanbul, nowhere else. I definitely wanted to go to our neighborhood, to our *Mahalle* [neighborhood], right? Because that was just what I knew.
>
> I: The place, where your parents have a house.
>
> N: Exactly. [Where they] [h]ave a house. It belongs to my grandpa, my mom inherited it and the house was just empty. And I've been coming to Istanbul to the same place every year since I was six. And really six

[126] 5-I2017, 37; 16-I2017, 15; 19-I2017, 251-253; 22-I2017, 234
[127] 8-I2017, 43
[128] 1-I2012, 7; 6-I2013, 9; 10-I2013, 17; 13-I2013, 79; 13-I2017, 3; 14-I2013, 11; 17-I2017, 123; 26-I2017, 39; 30-I2017, 3, 43; 32-I2017, 72

> weeks and sometimes in the fall and the winter holidays, you know?" (Nojan, 1985 - 01.08.2013)

Ada states:

> "Istanbul was like the first great love for me. I was always so happy when I came here. And it really upset me when I always had to go back. It was like torture for me. So that was already/ Istanbul and I, that was like a/ really, like the first great love. That's why it was my dream to move back here one day. And to live here. And I kind of swore to myself, 'I'm going to make this dream, no matter what, I'm going to make it happen. I'm going to do it. This is going to be my reward to myself, so to speak.'" (Ada, 1985 - 02.08.2017)

Nojan's and Ada's holiday experiences[129] in Istanbul are crucial for their later migration decision as they became familiar with and attached to a specific neighborhood and developed an interest in the city. In fact, they reconstruct their attachment to the city before their migration and their perception of their desire to live in Istanbul in the future as "dream" or describe Istanbul as "great love" and "inaccessible" place. According to this narrative, they have developed a sense of place based on their holiday experiences which back in their everyday life in Germany has shaped their imagination as "dream" of living in Istanbul in the future. In Ada's narrative, the imagination of 'returning' to Turkey and going after her dream of living in Istanbul can be interpreted in Appadurai's (2008, pp. 31, 38) words as a form of agency and tactic in Germany to cognitively come to terms with experiences of exclusion in Germany (see also section 4.3.2.), an idea that becomes so strong that she realizes it at a later point of time despite her constrained gendered positionality in the family. Like other women Ada and Nojan emancipated themselves from their families as they migrated to Istanbul. In realizing her migration, Nojan struggled to persuade her parents and left Germany against their will, while Ada continuously talked her parents into letting her have her way. The women share an emotional attachment to the city that is visible throughout their whole narrative. Content with their migration decisions, they want to continue with their lives in Istanbul in the long run and cannot imagine to living in Germany in the near future.

What is it that makes the city of Istanbul so attractive for many interlocutors? Is it the quality of urban life in itself discussed above or is also the inherent logic (*Eigenlogik*) (Löw, 2008, 2012), that is, these specific characteristics attached to of the city of Istanbul? In some narratives specific characteristics of Istanbul merge with general

[129] See also Zilan in section 4.3.2 or 1-I2012, 38, 10-I2013, 50 and 30-I2017, 45

characteristics of urbanity which both have attracted interlocutors. Some women sate that they could also imagine living in other cities in Tukey and other cities and countries in the world before migrating to Istanbul, but they chose Istanbul due to the uncomplicated accessibility of accommodation (see sections 4.2.2., 4.4.1.), because they already knew the language or because they found a job (section 4.3.1.), or due to specific discipline to study there (4.1.1.). Other women[130] like Ada and Nojan state that it was Istanbul in particular, that attracted them and that they didn't want to move anywhere else. The city's own dynamics seem to make it an interesting place to live in. Take Ayla's experience of strolling in the city during a holiday. She explains her fascination with the city as follows:

> "As I said, I have always come here on holiday and I have never done typical tourist things, but no idea [for example]/. [Going] To *Kadıköy* again and again and to *Beşiktaş* and [I] just absorbed the spirit a bit. I was generally walking around alone, so I was really not distracted. And then I realized. Istanbul is actually pretty cool." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

Nojan's statements about her *Mahalle* (neighborhood) and Ayla's experience of strolling in neighborhoods while perceiving their "spirit" account for characteristics the women specifically attach to the city of Istanbul and not to urbanity in general. One characteristic two women mention when they refer to their interest in Turkish culture, is Istanbul's vivid art and music scene,[131] while others mention living near the sea as an Istanbul-specific quality.[132]

Among a bunch of motives of which her mother's and stepfather's return migration to Turkey is one motive (see sections 4.4.2., 4.3.2., 4.3.4., 4.4.4.), Lara also remembers a holiday experience as decisive for her migration decision:

> "For example, after I was here and saw the Bosporus and ate fish here with my mother. I remember very clearly that the tables were still here. My mother said, 'Yes, wouldn't it be nice, if you lived here? And we would eat fish here together every weekend?' (laughter in her voice) and so on. Well and she convinced me a little bit." (Lara, 1987 – 12.06.2013)

Since we conducted the interview in that very place, it is likely that it evoked this memory. But it is not a coincidence that she chose the same restaurant for the interview setting. In our first encounter in 2013, Lara rationalizes her decision of continuing her settlement and ruling out other places with living near the sea in Istanbul. In her above

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[130] 1-I2012, 38; 6-I2013, 7, 76; 9-I2013, 65; 14-I2013, 13; 30-I2017, 45
[131] 9-I2013, 47, 65; 14-I2018, 161, 172
[132] 6-I2013, 76; 26-I2017, 188

made statement, she does not only refer to her holiday experience; she explains her growing interest and attachment to Istanbul with her senses, namely her visual perception of the Bosporus view and the taste of fish. She reasons that these components of a unique atmosphere in a restaurant where she enjoys this moment together with her mother pave the ground for her later migration decision. Lara[133] migrated to Istanbul in 2010. Living in a neighborhood near the sea in Istanbul and going for walks near the shore has become an important aspect of her everyday life (see section 5.2.6.). In her 2017 future plans and ideas of other migration destinations, she also attaches importance to living near the sea Since 2019, she has been living in the Netherlands, a country which is built on an infrastructure of managing water (see section 5.2.6.).

City Fatigue

While these statements might evoke the impression that life in Istanbul is determined by these rather positive characteristics, another trope in the material regardless of age, tells a whole different story, leading to a reverse translocal contrast. Based on their experience of living in the city of Istanbul many interlocutors have mentioned what can be called city fatigue.[134] The public sphere is perceived as stressful, draining and exhausting *chaos* that is defined by traffic, long commuting hours, the crowds of people, unfriendly manners, noise and a lack of time. Some observe that in the course of living in the city, they have changed, stating that they have become aggressive and often feel annoyed. While explaining the negative aspects of this chaos associated with city life, many interlocutors express a longing for what is not part of their experience in Istanbul. While referring to Istanbul's stressful urban qualities they express a longing for *peace and quiet* which they often situate in Germany or their places of origin in Germany. Arzu for example states:

> "When it gets too much, too stressful, too loud, too hectic, I miss a bit of the calmness in Germany. This orderly life, this, when I go to the city, not having constantly this elbow-to-elbow fight." (Arzu, 1978 - 07.08.2017)

Arzu's comparison is illustrative for many statements. An additional reference and longing city life evokes in many cases, is an identification with green areas which – based on their experience – several women situate in Germany. Many express that they

[133] 6-I2013, 76; 6-I2017, 91
[134] 1-I2017, 217; 3-I2017, 72; 4-I2-2013, 36 – 39; 4PS2017, 8; 5-I2013, 86; 5-I2017, 71; 6-I2013, 19; 12PM2017, 4; 13-I2013, 53; 14-I2013, 21 – 23; 15PS2017, 4; 16-I2017, 7; 17PM2017Julia, 11; 17-I2017, 65; 19PM2017, 4; 19-I2017, 117; 26-I2017, 154; 27-I2017, 155; 29-I2017, 135; 30-I2017, 40

miss aspects of nature, like forests, green areas, trees, lakes, landscapes and parks they situate in their places of origin.[135]

What is very interesting in these narratives is, that at one point in life urbanity may be perceived as thrilling, fascinating and adventurous experience that contrasts the perception of 'boring' town life in Germany. Yet at another point of time a 'city fatigue' constitutes an experience of lacking access to nature and calm places. As much as a sense of place makes the city of Istanbul an attractive destination of migration contrasting life in a German town, draining city life results in a contrasting translocal attachment to places and nature in Germany. Both translocal comparisons and contrasts have resulted and may result in a migration decision at a later point of time if citizenship rights allow for it. A similar argument was raised by Lara regarding her deliberations of moving to a third country in 2017. Contrary to her fascination with the city and living near the sea, I underlined above, she explains her plans to leave the city and possibly moving to Cyprus with her and her husband's yearning for tranquility as follows:

> "I think five years ago I would have answered differently [...], I still went out a lot and so on. But now, we have a child and we are at home and we just want our peace and quiet. We don't want to drive two hours to go shopping. Or just go to the movies." (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

Age is a relevant factor here. With a family, life quality in the city has dropped for Lara and her husband. This may have complemented her motives[136] of moving to the Netherlands after I interviewed her in 2017.[137]

While motives of self-realization may leave behind the impression that gendered constraints are a fact in German-Turkish women's biographies, it very important to bear in mind that I analyze narratives here that are concerned with migration which *some not all women in the sample* narrated as self-liberation from gendered constraints. It would be worth analyzing German-Turkish women's counter-narratives in which several women underline that parents had a laissez faire style of education and encouraged their freedoms when they were girls and young adults. Moreover, it would be worth contextualizing these narratives with the neighborhoods these women grew up in, as there seems to be a significant relationship to the non-segregated neighborhoods these women grew up in. Due to thematic scope and of this thesis and limitations of space I

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[135] 5-I2017, 71; 6-I2017, 97; 9-I2017, 125 – 128; 13PM2013, 5; 17PS2017, 3; 27-I2017, 151, 155; 30-I2017, 124

[136] For other motives of Lara's emigration plans see section 4.2.2. and 4.3.1.

[137] 6-I2017, 91

will not make such an analysis but it would be an interesting topic of future social inquiry. This section illuminated some aspects of gender that play into migration decisions from Germany to Turkey. The following section will illustrate how gender becomes an important aspect in migration decisions and concerns from Turkey to Germany.

4.3.4. Shifting Gender Discourses and Policies

Migration as a gendered tactic to improve one's living conditions is also an important aspect in German-Turkish women's deliberations and decisions of leaving Turkey. Other than in 2013, the fieldwork material of 2017 indicates that breaking free from increasing gendered constraints in Turkey becomes an enhanced concern. Much has happened in Turkey's political arena after the first fieldwork occasion in 2013. In comparison to their statements in 2013, some of the 14 women I talked to again in 2017 perceive a shift to more traditional gender role expectations that I have tried contextualize elsewhere (Weißenberg, 2020, pp. 170–173). More writing space and a broader scope of interpretation of the fieldwork material since I wrote the article in 2018 allows for a deeper analysis of some of the women's gendered ideas and decisions of leaving Turkey. Related narratives reveal changes in the women's individual life situations and their social locations which overlap and are influenced by external political and social changes in society in Turkey. Some of the interviewed women voice their migration concerns and their concrete decisions to leave the country with an increased pressure they experience based on their gender in their family environment, in their neighborhood or in the public sphere. Against this backdrop they quote aspects of the AKP's gender policies and a shift in society to a more conservative gender ideology that enhances gender inequality, developments that are coupled with rising violence against women.

The AKP's gender policies have been described as controversial and contradictive (Arat, 2016, pp. 133–134; Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017, p. 611). In the course of reforms undertaken for a prospective EU-accession and thanks to the women's movement in Turkey, the AKP has implemented significant legal reforms towards gender equality. Those include advances in the penal code concerning the legal persecution of violence against women and constitutional amendments to strengthen gender equality. Moreover, legal advancements included measures against sexual harassment at work. In addition, the Unemployment Insurance Law was amended,

maternity leave was extended and municipal training programs were implemented to increase women's participation in the labor market. In 2011, Turkey actively contributed to the drafting the European Council's Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, shortly Istanbul Convention because it was drafted in Istanbul. In line with the 2011 ratified Istanbul Convention, article 6284, an additional law to prevent domestic violence against women, was passed in 2012. AKP governments have collaborated with non-governmental organizations on the prevention of illiteracy of girls and for an increased attendance of girls at primary schools (Arat, 2016, pp. 131–133; Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017, pp. 613–614).

After its second term in office however, the AKP has increasingly promoted and reinforced traditional gender norms in which women are mainly seen as serving the ends of the family. The AKP's political discourse on women reflects its conservative gender ideology. The fact that politicians have repeatedly addressed married couples to have at least three children is only one of numerous examples that have penetrated the public in Turkey. Simultaneously, social policies account for a patriarchal gender ideology which is mainly visible in educational policies and family policies. After 2012, preacher training and prayer leader junior high schools were reopened and expanded. Those schools promote a traditional understanding of gender in their curriculum and separate the instruction of girls and boys. In addition, these schools are mainly visited by girls. Although compulsory education has been extended from eight to twelve years, the state has legalized home schooling in 2012 and thus "opened the way to restrict girls to the home" where girls are often condemned to do housework and care work. Additional transformations include the reform of the Ministry of Women and Family into the Ministry of Family and Social Policies against the advice of women's organizations to include 'women' and 'equality' into the name of the ministry. The promotion of family and motherhood is part of the neo-liberal outline of AKP policies. In the light of associated reforms, social welfare programs have increasingly been outsourced to the family realm and alleviated the state's involvement in the care and nursing sector to women as care-providers for children, disabled people and elderly people. Meanwhile, the promotion of flexible part time employment for women provides cheap work for the labor market and simultaneously reconciles work with family life. Related "pro-natal" policies include the protection and encouragement of motherhood with state subsidies.

The government has also promoted pro-marriage incentives including cheap credits for young recently married couples (Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017, pp. 617–622).

Women and girls in Turkey have increasingly become subject to violence, rape and sexual assaults. The platform 'We Will End Femicide" reports 300 femicides and 171 suspicious deaths of women and girls for 2020. The total number of murdered women has more than doubled after 2012 (Kadın Cinayetleri Durduracağız Plataformu, 2021). Kandiyoti maintains that this rise in gender-based violence has become naturalized with a change of ideas and practices. She observes a gap between the *de jure* existent laws promoting women's rights and the *de facto* implementation of law. Male offenders are often backed by judges and therefore receive light or reduced sentences in court (Kandiyoti, 2016, pp. 108–109). Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün argue that the effective implementation of laws preventing and persecuting violence against women is inhibited by the AKP government's attempts to maintain a conservative gender climate, in particular after the third term in office. The authors argue that the AKP's discourse and gender policies outlined above which have reduced women to maternity and family ends has resulted in a "religio-conservative gender climate" in Turkey at the "intersection of religious, nationalist and neo-liberal concerns". Following this reasoning, such a social climate is justified and legitimized by references to religion, tradition and custom. Violence against women is legitimized whenever women do not fit into expected gender stereotypes an essentialist understanding of tradition and religion requests (Güneş-Ayata and Doğangün, 2017, pp. 615–616). Countering a perspective of women as mere subjects of patriarch oppression, Kandiyoti maintains that a victim-blaming mentality is not sufficient for explaining this rising violence against women in Turkey (2016, pp. 109–110). She argues that it is not "the unquestioned subordination of women and an entrenched patriarchy that results in heightened violence, but rather a masculinity in crisis that pulls all the stops to shore up male prerogatives" (Kandiyoti, 2016, p. 109). Since women in Turkey contest patriarchy and more strongly than ever raise their voices against oppression, she sees coercion by the state as an effort to reproduce patriarchy. Kandiyoti supports this argument by underlining that violence against women tends to occur whenever women contest gendered stereotypes and by underlining the existence of a strong women's movement in Turkey which organizes resistance and can quickly mobilize for street demonstrations (Kandiyoti, 2016, p. 110). In the summer of 2020, advocates of conservative family policies have suggested to exit the Istanbul Convention along with article 6284 arguing that it would damage the institution of the

family. These suggestions were met with street protests of women and LGBTIQA+ people. On March 20th, 2021 Turkey, the first signatory of the convention, resigned from it (Resmi Gazete, 2021).

Some women refer to a shift to a more conservative gender climate in their ideas about leaving or decisions of having left Istanbul. While I have mainly situated Bahar's return narrative in the light of the discursive shift in gender ideology in Turkey (Weißenberg, 2020, pp. 170–171), I would argue today that it is the combination of changes in her life circumstance that together with the gender climate in Turkey have triggered her migration decision. Bahar[138] rationalizes her migration decision to Turkey with motives of self-realization contrasting her life in Istanbul with the gendered constraints and neighbors' interference in her neighborhood in Germany (see section 4.3.4.). Bearing her gendered motives in relation to her neighborhood in mind, it is ironic that she experiences gendered constraints in the neighborhood for a second time, only this time in Istanbul. Two years after she migrated to Istanbul in 2011, Bahar married her today ex-husband and shortly after that gave birth to three children, among them twins. In order to take care of them, she gave up her profession as a teacher. She describes her neighborhood in Istanbul as AKP affiliated and "conservative". While she maintained in 2013, that she particularly enjoyed the anonymity and the resulting freedoms in Istanbul, she also experienced pressure on her based on her gender. Already in 2013, she noted that neighbors talked about her, ignored her, observed her, and interfered with her private life. Male neighbors knocked at her door to inform her that she was is not a good example for their children. Moreover, she was offended on the streets because of her clothing style. She rationalizes the discrimination against her because she did not fit into neighbors' expectations of marriage because she was living by herself her boyfriend visited her. In 2013, she felt disturbed but also stated that she did not care about what the neighbors thought of her since they did not know her, other than in her hometown neighborhood in Germany. In 2018, on the second interview occasion, she had resettled in her town of origin in Germany. Bahar retrospectively still reasons that felt less controlled and freer in Istanbul before she gave birth.

How does she then rationalize her return to Germany in 2015? Her return decision mainly needs to be contextualized with significant changes in her social location due to transformations in her personal life. She situates her decision in the time of her

[138] 14-I2013, 129, 137; 14PM2013, 5; 14PS2013, 13, 20

pregnancy with twins when she mainly stayed at home. At that time, her perception concerning her freedom of movement in the public sphere started to change. As pregnant woman, incidents which constrained her liberty increased. She was disturbed by the pressure against her exerted by neighbors and by her then husband, a pressure she did not specify in the interview. Moreover, she felt socially isolated. At that time her husband was doing his military service and friends hardly visited her. After giving birth, her strategy of ignoring the neighborhood pressure on her as a woman stopped working out for her because she was no longer only responsible for herself. She remembers that she started feeling insecure and threatened by her neighbors' pressure to sympathize with the AKP. Because of the low family income, her and her husband's apartment search in another neighborhood was not successful.[139] Socially isolated with three children, an absent husband who neither contributed to the family income nor to the domestic work, she decided to move back to Germany. After I ask her, she rationalizes her decision to return to Germany as follows:

> "B: Yes, the children. The circumstances that I was in there. So, the housing conditions. Okay, here I don't live in *Ding* [means good circumstances here] either. Well, better than there. But there, I always had to watch out.
>
> I: Financially?
>
> B: Financially. Yes. Yes, and the political situation. So, at some point I felt like I was being watched and I didn't feel good anymore. And just in this/ so it was already/ *Eyüp* is already pretty conservative and so. And to move somewhere else, we looked for apartments for a long time and that didn't work out either. And in the areas where I wanted to go to, everything would have been much too expensive. We couldn't have afforded that and then there was the option that I actually ALWAYS had in mind. Of going back to Germany." (Bahar, 1984 - 21.05.2018)

Raising the children by herself, Bahar sates that financial instability and feelings of social isolation were coupled with a longing for her family. In comparison to her neighborhood in Istanbul, she feels that her children's security guaranteed in her town of origin in Germany. She can solve her economic problems by living in her parents' house and her family supports her in bringing up her children.

Ela[140] who is 38 years old at the time of our 2017 interview raised similar concerns as Lara. I have outlined her deliberations about migrating with a rising pressure on her to

[139] 14-I2018, 100-101, 121, 125, 212-216; 14-FN, 6-13
[140] 5-I2013, 142; PS2017, 17; 5-I2017, 135

conform with secular or political values in section 4.2.1. She also struggles with a gender ideology in which women are mainly seen to serve family ends. In 2013, she assessed her spatial and financial independence from men and the family as contrary to the norm. In 2017, she plans to start a family but her ideas about family do not correspond to a conservative gender ideology, as she sates that she wants to have children without being married. Since she feels that marriage is a precondition for having children in Turkey, she narrates plans of moving to another country. Living by herself, she is, similar to Bahar, disturbed by male intrusion into her private sphere quoting her landlord's behavior as an example:

> "For example, I had problems with my landlord. (...) He interfered everywhere and so on. And then you feel that, if we [women] were a man, he couldn't talk to you like that. I also always say, as long as women say, 'I can also have a career and have children.' 'No, in Turkey it's not like that.' When they come home, the women have to cook, the women have to take care of the children. Even though they may earn as much or more [money] than the men. That doesn't change. [...] But at some point, the social pressure is there. I know [that] very well from my brother, he helps out at home. But as soon as visitors come, all of a sudden he doesn't go to the kitchen." (Ela, 1979 - 15.07.2017)

As unmarried independent woman who lives alone and doesn't have any children, her gender-identity does not correspond to a conservative gender discourse. Ela is concerned with the unequal positionality of women and men in Turkish society which she experiences as a woman living by herself and on a broader level as far as norms concerning household chore are concerned.

Melisa's social location is one of the more disadvantaged ones in the sample as far as citizenship rights, socio-economic background and gender and family history are concerned: Because her father impeded her from travelling to Germany to extend her residence title in Germany, she no longer has a residence permit in Germany. Her residence permit for Germany was declared invalid. She regrets, that she had no knowledge about the right of return (*Recht auf Wiederkehr*). According to that law, adolescents between 15 and 21 years had the right to return to Germany after eight years of regular residence in Germany and a six year lasting school education, on the condition that they or another person could guarantee livelihood for the person in question (Sieveking, 1991, p. 153). Ela's socio-economic and educational positionality is disadvantaged and she has experienced many incidents of gendered oppression during

her youth and young adulthood in her family and during her marriage.[141] Over the course of the years, she has managed to liberate herself from these constraints. Based on her biographic experiences of gendered oppression by her parents and ex-husband she closely monitors the political developments in Turkey as far as women's rights are concerned. In comparison to our encounter in 2013, she observes in 2017, that the situation for women has changed in Istanbul. On these grounds, she also argues that she would leave Istanbul to Germany if she would still be entitled to a right of residence in Germany. After I ask her what has changed for her in comparison to 2013 and how she feels with her life in 2017, she answers that she observes a social change which she relates to the AKP government and that she perceives as a rising pressure against women. She states that for these reasons, she no longer goes out as much as she used to in 2013. She witnesses this pressure against women in her social surrounding manifesting itself in increasing assaults against women in the public sphere in some of Istanbul's neighborhoods which she identifies as religiously conservative and as sympathizing with the AKP.[142] She elaborates her thoughts on a changed social gender climate as follows:

> "The people are very different. The gazes are different. Also, you don't have rights as a woman anymore. That is the worst thing. The Imam is allowed to do wedding ceremonies now. What does a marriage ceremony by an Imam mean? If I don't have anything legal in my hands, then anyone can marry someone in any city and is just married before God. Then he takes advantage of the woman and after a month he says, 'Okay, we are divorced.' That's enough/ if you say three times, '*Boş ol, boş ol, boş ol'* [Be free, be free, be free], in Islam, it means you're divorced. That's easy. No responsibility or anything. […] [W]hen we used to get married, we once got married by the state and once by the Imam. And the Imam says if you want to divorce, you have to pay this much money [to your wife when you divorce her]. Who does that? Nobody. But, if it's laid down in law, everybody pays that." (Melisa, 1965 - 04.08.2017)

The problem Melisa refers to in her statement is not the religious marriage ceremony in itself. She talks about two legal amendments which contributed to a further erosion of the Turkish state's secular and egalitarian legal framework ensuring women's rights. In July 2017, shortly before the interview, the AKP submitted a controversial draft to the parliament that endows religious personnel with the right to perform civil marriages. The law was passed in October 2017 under the state of emergency after the attempted

[141] 12-I2017, 11 – 15, 51, 60, 64 66
[142] 12PM2017, 2; 12-I2013, 197; 12-I2017, 88, 92, 235

coup in 2016. Prior to that, in 2015, the Constitutional Court had granted the right to contract a religious marriage without legally contracting a civil marriage. Melisa refers to the abolishment of women's protection by the Civil Code according to which spouses have a right to inheritance, divorce, child custody, child support and maintenance. Those legal amendments were criticized mostly for undermining the protection of the most vulnerable group of deprived young girls. Since civil marriage is no longer a legal duty, it is possible and therefore likely that minimum-age requirements for marriage are bypassed (Arat and Pamuk, 2019, pp. 256–258).

Munsur's[143] financially and professionally more privileged position – she lives in her property in one of Istanbul's privileged neighborhoods near the Bosporus – does not protect her from discrimination she experiences based on her gender and intersectional positionality. Like Melisa, she also expresses migration concerns and rationalizes these concerns with the changed social position of women in society in Turkey concerning the erosion of gender equality and rising levels of violence against women. Based on the changed gender climate Munsur has made different experiences that have caused a discomfort severe enough for her to imagine spending her retirement in Germany. She underlines in our interview in 2017 that after having lived in Istanbul for 25 years she has experienced sexualized violence for the first time in her life. The incident she refers to took place in public transportation. Like Melisa, she states that she has started to pay more attention on how to dress in the public sphere when she leaves her upper-middle class neighborhood. She also refers to a social change concerning the position of women in society in Turkey, quoting an interaction with a stranger who commented on and criticized her for spending a holiday by herself without her family. Munsur identifies as Zaza-Alevi, a non-recognized ethnic-religious minority in Turkey. She underlines that she openly lives as Alevi. Based on the fact that she identifies as a member of the Zaza-Alevi group, she has been bullied at work by her Sunni-Muslim colleagues and by a German male colleague. When I met her in 2017, she considered to leave her job based on these experiences. She notes that her colleagues discriminate against her based on the categories Alevi and Kurdish although she is not sure on whether or not to identify as Kurdish.

Despite achievements in the cultural realm, many demands Alevi people have made to the Turkish state have been left unanswered including claims for recognition as religious

[143] 22-I2017, 96-101-107, 109-111, 147, 153-163, 206-208, 276; 22PS2017, 7-9, 12

minority[144]. Alevism is a very heterogeneous and syncretic faith. Due to its diverse beliefs and practices Alevism is not conceived as official religion. Alevism combines religious elements from Islamic mysticism and Shi'a Islam with rituals, institutions and cultural practices including music and poetry. Unlike the Sunni Muslim majority in Turkey, Alevis do not fast during the month of *Ramadan* and they do not perform the prayer (*namaz*). They have experienced discrimination and marginalization in the form of social prejudices against them as disreputable people of lacking sexual morality, and experienced persecution and assaults with numerous people dead in recent Turkish history of the 1990s. Alevi places of worship, the *cemevis* do not enjoy the status of worship places (*ibadethane*). During the Ottoman Empire Alevi people have experienced forced conversion to Sunni Islam. There is a tradition of concealing Alevism (*takiyye*) for reasons of self-protection (Massicard, 2013).

Munsur's ideas about migrating to Germany can be interpreted as resulting from the discrimination she experiences at work. But she also rationalizes a social change in terms of gender ideology which she also experiences in her own family. She observes that her husband's world view has become more traditional as far as gender role expectations towards women and her as his wife are concerned. She explains his changed behavior with his job that involves a business collaboration with an AKP municipality in Istanbul. She rationalizes her husband's changed normative expectations of her as his wife with the changed gender climate in society in general and with the fact that he is influenced by his work environment. She feels pushed into a role where she has "to fight for her rights as a woman" more often noting that her husband has started to pressure her to refrain from interacting with men in the public. Her sister-in-law normalizes and essentializes Munsur's husband's behavior by stating that he is a "Turkish man". Despite the challenges that are put in her way, she insists on going after her individual interests and hobbies. Although it was "exhausting" for her because her husband did not approve of her "dancing with other men", she insisted on her right to engage in her hobby and participated in a dancing class. She notes that she considers divorcing her husband and that her son would support her in that matter. In fact, Munsur realizes her struggle for gender equality in her upbringing practices as she has educated her son to help her with the household chore also in my presence. Standing up for

[144] The Turkish state's treatment of Alevi people has been ambivalent. During the 1960s there was an alliance between Kemalism and Alevism (Azak, 2010).

women's rights is a political concern of hers she refers to by representing herself as helping other women who face similar problems as she does. She states:

> "So, I think I really have a task here. I have a task here. […] I have [told] so many women who, for example, have problems in their relationships and so on, right? When I tell them: 'Go into yourself. Make sure you do your own stuff. Develop yourself. Make sure that you don't [become] this/.' How should I say this? Not this wife of the man. But also, as a person. I feel like I still have a task to do here. So, I'm not allowed to [go] back yet. What has also affected me a lot the other day. Kılıçdaroğlu, the woman[145] gave an interview and I was so involved in it/ they are also Alevis, right? And she said, 'I don't want to be the wife of Kılıçdaroğlu[146] […]. I am a person myself. I have an identity myself and I don't want to be the wife of/.' And that's where I saw myself. [...] Not the wife of Metin, but Munsur." (Munsur, 1971 - 12.07.2017)

She strategically refers to her Alevi identity and to her political identity as CHP affiliated while stressing her individual right to after her individual interests beyond the family realm as a cause that is worth fighting for collectively.

It can be concluded that contrary to significant advancement in the first legislation periods of the AKP, the de jure and de facto citizenship for women in Turkey have changed. Gender policies and the gender discourse of the late AKP terms constructs ideal woman citizens as nurturing mothers. As in this ideology women are supposed to mainly serve family ends, an unequal treatment of women has become apparent in the everyday life of German-Turkish women and affects their migration narratives and decisions. People who sympathize with this ideology, increasingly pressure women whose gender-identities do not correspond to related ideals. The fieldwork material indicates that in comparison to the first fieldwork occasion in 2013, two years after the Istanbul Convention was ratified, German-Turkish women experience a rising social pressure in the family realm and in their neighborhoods in Istanbul as they are more often confronted with expectations of fitting into an ideological family image. The examples of Bahar, Ela, Melisa and Munsur illustrate that in certain contexts, it becomes difficult for women to make claims to gender equality and their right of self-determination outside of the family realm. Equal citizenship for these women – de facto not given – is a right they insist on and struggle for, if necessary, in another country if citizenship rights allow for it. Therefore, it can be concluded that their ideas about

[145] Selvi Gündüz
[146] leader of the CHP (Republican People's Party) since 2010

leaving Turkey and actual emigration decisions constitute a tactic of avoiding gender inequality and of enhancing their rights as women citizens.

4.4. TRANSNATIONAL FAMILY TIES AND MIGRATION CIRCUITS

The culturalized label Muslim is often instrumentalized to represent ethnic minority families as traditional and as characterized by strong and stable family ties, family responsibilities, and by patriarchal structure and gender relations. Umut Erel has pointed out that such representations follow a modernity-tradition paradigm. "The Turkish family" that allegedly embodies tradition is contrasted with '"the modern German family"'. In such representations in Germany, German-Turkish women appear mainly as passive victims and the family unit is seen as main site of patriarch oppression (Erel, 2009, pp. 109–110). Contrary to these ethnicizing assumptions, the migration paths of German-Turkish women illustrate that their family networks and partnerships are as important as their emancipation from the family, divorce and a single status, just as much in what is assumed as a 'German' and 'modern' family. As illustrated in section 4.3.3., some of the consulted women's migration paths are *directed away from their immediate families* at a particular point in time. As external circumstances and individual life situations change, migration paths can be *directed towards the immediate family* at another point of time.

The inductive analysis of fieldwork material shows a general migration pattern that reveals itself in the sum of cases and over time: immediate and wide family ties span borders and therefore constitute a crucial element in German-Turkish women's transnational space. Concepts of transnationalism offer the flexibility to analyze migration related to kinship ties as dynamic and open-ended process that often takes circular directions. The transnational family network constitutes a driving force or incentive for migration for many of the consulted women. Since I gathered the fieldwork material in 2013 and in 2017, it is possible to illustrate how the consulted women's immediate and wider family ties structure transnational migration in a process-oriented manner. Different kinds of family relations trigger, structure, constrain or enable migration and settlement over time.

In several cases, close family members were already distributed across two countries prior to my interlocutors' migration to Turkey. For other women, this started happening in the event of their migration to Turkey. What can be concluded from the inductive analysis of the fieldwork material, is that in the majority of cases the women's

transnational migration paths are directed towards their immediate family members at a particular point in their lives. This also explains their own, their parents' and their siblings' migration circuits: in the great majority of the 32 cases, the women either explicitly mention family related motives for their migration paths or the fieldwork material indicates related motives. Five consulted women have followed their parents and/or siblings who moved to Turkey before them between 1985 and 2007.[147] It can be argued that emotional and close relationships to family members are an indicator of future migration trajectories. For the ten women of the whole sample who have returned to Germany or moved to another country by 2019 or had concrete return plans in 2017, ties to siblings and parents were crucial, as they mainly moved back to the places in Germany where close family members live, in particular after they became mothers. Many of the women who mention that they miss close family members in Germany, in fact also either imagine a resettlement in Germany in the future, have concrete plans to return to Germany or lived in Germany again after the first fieldwork occasion.[148] Longing for family members is often expressed together with feelings of social isolation and loneliness, resulting from challenging life circumstances such as pregnancy, economic deprivation and insecurity due to political events (see sections 4.1.2., 4.2.1. 4.3.4.). The women use different kinds of social media to stay in touch with their families, many of them who have the financial resources and necessary citizenship rights visit their close relatives on a regular basis in Germany or are visited by them.

On the other hand, the women also constitute a hub in their immediate family networks as eleven women note that their parents moved to Turkey after them. The fact that they had established their lives in Turkey at that time may have triggered their parents' – and in some cases siblings' – decisions to move to Turkey or to start commuting between Germany and Turkey on their retirement. To firstly carve out the different kinds of ties the women explain their migration paths with, it makes sense to include both directions, Germany and Turkey, that is to define the different kinds of ties the women narrate as relevant for their migration not as situated in two different geographic locations but rather as occurring in one transnational space. This makes sense, because the different

[147] 9-I2013, 13; 18-I2017, 73, 75; 23-I2017, 9, 59, 117; 27-I2017, 47; 32-I2017, 34
[148] 3-I2013, 139, 257 - 259; 4-I2-2013, 47; 7-I2013, 23, 94; 10-I2013, 62; 14-I2013, 75, 80-81; 14-I2018, 72; 16PM2017, 7; 16-I2017, 206; 19-I2017, 82; 21-I2017, 50, 189

family ties structuring German-Turkish women's migration paths may vary in content but their content does not change with the direction of migration.

Firstly, I will address how family ties to close and more distant relatives facilitate the transnational mobility of German-Turkish women and function as a resource. Members of the broader family network include grandparents, first- and second-degree aunts, uncles and cousins. I continue with exemplary statements of some women who have followed their parents and of others who have followed their parents' narratives and imagination or understand their migration as a quest for family belonging and family roots. To understand how the women's parents are involved into transnational migration circuits, I close with the intergenerational circular migration trajectories of three cases. Lastly, I will illustrate some aspects about migration, with partnership, and marriage and family households and contextualize those motives with motives of leaving behind contexts racialized discrimination in Germany and breaking with family ties due to gendered oppression.

The motives behind family network related migration decisions and concerns of the women vary significantly in content and depend on their particular life situations. This analysis reveals that the consulted German-Turkish women's ties to close relatives can constitute a resource on the one hand, as siblings and parents provide support on many different levels. On the other hand, kinship ties are also defined by constraints in the form assistance and obligation.

4.4.1. Immediate and Broader Family Networks Wider Kinship Ties as Resource

The definitions of chain migration and social capital help to explain the different kinds of family ties. The notion of chain migration was first introduced by MacDonald and MacDonald (1964) who shed light on the important role of networks for international migration. Once migrant networks have been established in a country of migration, these networks cause people to migrate as they constitute a resource for actual and potential migrants. The authors define chain migration:

> "as that movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by primary social relationships with previous migrants." (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964, p. 8)

Faist (2000, pp. 201–211) has underlined the crucial role of networks for migration with his notion of *social capital*. By social capital, he understands social and symbolic

network ties as a collective resource that transforms from a local into a transnational resource, once migration is set into motion by macro structural triggers. In the German-Turkish case, this macro structural trigger was the labor recruitment agreement which transformed social and symbolic ties into a transnational resource which extended the family realm. Social network ties including social ties to established immigrants and brokers who can grant access to jobs and business ties, constitute a resource that attracts further migrants (see section 2.3.3.).

Although MacDonald and MacDonald's as well as Faist's deliberations extend the realm of family networks, they address a main aspect that is relevant in German-Turkish women's narratives: With the help of close family members, they can activate resources. Close family members facilitate a start in the immediate aftermath of changing countries by providing accommodation[149] or by helping them to find a job.[150] Migration paths are also motivated by longing for close relatives and by emotional attachment. Moreover, parents and siblings provide emotional support in difficult life situations.[151] Many of the women who resettled in Germany have children and their parents and siblings of live in Germany. These women claim their siblings' and parents' support as far as accommodation is concerned but also in raising and taking care of their children when they go after leisure activities, work or study.[152]

The same support is provided by more distant relatives: The opportunity of accessing support of wider relatives in the event of unexpected difficulties, made Istanbul a migration destination for several women and ruled out other places. These women have stayed with more distant relatives during the first weeks and months after their arrival in Turkey.[153] Others report that distant relatives helped them with providing local knowledge or supported them with bureaucratic matters, helped them to find a job and to improve their language skills.[154]

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[149] In Germany see for example: 4-I2017, 72; 14FN2018, 3; 18-I2017, 63. In Turkey see for example: 2-I2013, 118; 6FN2017, 7; 25-I2017, 48; 27-I2017, 51.
[150] 7PM2017, 7; 13-I2013, 125
[151] In Germany see for example: 4-I2017, 84; 14I2018, 72; 18-I2017, 91; 19-I2017, 82. In Turkey, see for example 16-I2017, 15; 27-I2017, 83.
[152] In Germany see for example: 14-I2018, 110; 18-I2017, 65. In Turkey see for example: 7-I1-2017, 67; 11FN, 10; 18PS2017, 7.
[153] 7-I2013, 7, 13; 9-I2013, 35-36; 10-I2013, 11, 82; 10-I2017, 82; 15-I2017, 80; 16-I2017, 7; 16-I2017, 9; 16-I2017, 11; 16-I2017, 11; 26I2017, 29; 30-I2017, 19; 31-I2017, 7, 11
[154] 5-I2013, 30; 10-I2013, 11; 10-I2017, 80, 82; 25-I2017, 50; 27-I2017, 83; 28-I2017, 1; 29-I2017, 52; 31-I2017, 11

Emma's[155] statement illustrates how the wider family network can influence a migration decision concerning several of these factors. She rather wanted to move to an English-speaking country. What triggered her decision to move to Istanbul was the fact that she could access her family network. Not only did she have access to accommodation, but her relatives also promised to support her with finding a job. She states:

> "It was really because my grandparents have a house here. And I knew that I could stay with my grandma in any case […]. Relatives. And I knew that if it didn't work out with my grandmother, I could always stay with my aunt or cousin in between. I just had a lot more possibilities here. To stay overnight here. Stay there for three months, there two months. Right? Without really being a burden for the people. Before finding something for myself and before being able to rent an apartment by myself […]. It was more the thought, 'I'll come here and if I don't find anything [a job] here, then I'll have had a holiday for three four months.' (...) I really came spontaneously." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Not only the fact that she could stay in her grandparents' house was crucial for Emma. In comparison to moving to another location abroad, the social bonds with relatives present a link which grants her also the social support for setting up her life in Istanbul in a more spontaneous way. Moreover, the opportunity to stay with relatives of the wider family network is crucial for her, it alleviates her of financial burdens and it enhances her flexibility to decide for or against settlement depending on the circumstances, she will encounter, that is whether she will find a job she is interested in or not.

4.4.2. Following Parents and Tracing Family Roots

Lara's case[156] presents an example for the crucial role family ties play in migration decisions to Turkey. Her mother and her second husband's return to Turkey in 2007 unfolded a series of events that eventually led to her settlement in Istanbul. After a three-decade lasting settlement in Germany, her mother and her husband decided to return to Istanbul, their place of origin and purchased a house (see section 4.2.2.). She underlines that it was only when she became familiar with the life her mother and her stepfather led in Turkey, she started imagining to live in Istanbul herself someday. Remembering that she had a biased opinion about people in Turkey prior to her mother's and stepfather's return migration, she changed her opinion when she started to visit her parents, she developed an interest in the city of Istanbul (see also section 4.3.3.). While

[155] 7-I2013, 7, 179
[156] 6-I2013, 5-7, 9, 11, 13, 19, 49, 6FN2017_3, 5; 6-I2017, 51

she describes the fact that she got to know her husband as main migration motive, she states that she "would have come to Istanbul at some point, because my parents are here. […] The second reason was the family living here."[157] It is the combination of partnership and attachment to her family together with other motives (see sections 4.4.4., 5.2.), which resulted in her migration to Turkey. In fact, despite her partnership, Lara is indecisive about whether she would have come to Istanbul if her mother and her stepfather would not have lived there in the first place. She states,

> "[I]f I hadn't liked it here, I wouldn't have come either. Or, if my parents hadn't been here either.../ If my parents had still been in Germany, for example. Maybe I also would have moved here, but it would have been harder for me."[158] (Lara, 1987 – 12.06.2013)

Without the presence of Lara's family in Istanbul and her attachment to them, a series of events, Lara would not have unfolded. She would not have visited the city and developed an interest in it (see section 4.4.3.). She would not have had access to accommodation and emotional support in the onset of her stay in the city, and it is possible that she would not have become acquainted with her husband. As in other cases, Lara's migration to Turkey is motivated by emotional attachment but also by the family support, she could access in the onset of her stay in Istanbul.

Another migration motive that is connected to transnational family ties also relates to emotional attachment to parents, but in comparison to Lara and other women it relates less to the biographic experience. Although emotional attachment also constitutes an important aspect, other migration narratives of family attachment relate more strongly to family belonging and symbolic ties as some women do not concretely follow their parents. In Marcus' (1995) words, some women *follow* the *story* or the *plot* of their own or their parents' narratives and memories of the homeland. Here the imagination as deterritorialized experience of first-generation immigrants mobilizes the second generation of postmigrants. More concretely, some women rationalize their migration decision with their family histories and as a quest for family origin and family roots which they situate in Turkey, the homeland of their parents.

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[157] 6-I2013, 7

[158] „Oder, wenn es mir hier nicht gefallen hätte, dann wäre ich auch nicht gekommen. Oder, wenn meine Eltern auch nicht hier gewesen wären.../ Wenn meine Eltern zum Beispiel noch in Deutschland gewesen wären. Wäre ich vielleicht auch hierhergezogen, aber es wäre mir schwerer gefallen." (6-I2013, 7)

Lena's[159] case illustrates, how her family origin is strongly connected to her social location in Germany and her sense of belonging. As far as her family history is concerned her case differs from other women in the sample. She is the daughter of a German-Croatian mother and a Turkish father. When she was three years old, her parents separated and her father returned to Turkey. Her main motive of moving to Turkey in 2013, was to get to know her father and his side of the family. She states that she decided early that she wanted to learn Turkish and to get to know her father, like her brother who spent several school years in Turkey.[160] She rationalizes her migration motives as a quest to feel whole with respect to a cultural sense of belonging. Experiences with ethnicization and racialization in Germany (see section 4.3.2.) overlap with her search for her family history. She rationalizes her migration motives as follows:

> "The reasons that I feel incomplete. That I am not treated German because of my last name, and that I also don't feel German either. And […] I have a lot of family in Turkey […] I can't talk to when they only speak Turkish […]. And I really need to sort that out for myself before I start a family. […] I want to get to know the culture, I want to know the language. And I want to know how much Turkish there is in me. I don't know whether that's Turk[ish] or my Turkish family in particular. How much of *Sayarı* [last name] is in me." (Lena, 1982 - 04.07.2013)

Lena's post migration experience illuminates her 2.5-year lasting stay in Istanbul fulfilled its purpose. In 2013, she stated already that her feelings of being incomplete have given way to feeling at peace and that her "hunger is now satisfied".[161] In the interview we conducted in 2017, she notes that her stay in Turkey helped her to complete her family identity. She understands her quest for family roots in Turkey as a successful undertaking stating, "I actually felt stronger in my identity after that. More rooted. And clearer."[162] Her circular migration has equipped her with a confrontation tactic, she uses to counter stereotyping attributions of difference (see section 4.3.2.).

Asya's[163] case is an example for narratives in which some women underline the crucial role of symbolic ties that connect first-generation immigrants to their "homeland" and continue in the second generation of postmigrants. Asya narrates her migration to Turkey as the fulfillment of her 2005 deceased father's "dream" of her living in Turkey someday. Together with the motive of financial insecurity due to unemployment in

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[159] 9-I2013, 161-167, 175, 189; 9-I2017, 19, 23
[160] 9-I2013, 175
[161] 9-I2013, 113
[162] 9-I2017, 44
[163] see 31PM2017, 2; 31-I2017, 73

Germany (see section 4.3.1.), she remembers that her father's wish also influenced her migration decision as his voice resonated in her subconsciousness. She reconstructs his words as follows: "Actually, I want you to work and live in Turkey. In the homeland." On the occasion of visiting her father's grave she "coincidently" stumbled over a call center's open job offer. She accepted the job offer and shortly after moved to Istanbul in 2006. Asya's migration to Istanbul constitutes a unique combination of motives: A journey to her father's death bed turns into a migration decision in which she symbolically copes with her grief by following her father's path back to the "homeland" and roots in Turkey. Those motives combine with her precarious positionality in the German labor market and a job offer in Turkey in the light of her father's wish that she would work in Turkey.

Several interlocutors of the second-generation mention that their parents who came to Germany as labor migrants again and again voiced plans of returning to Turkey in the future. While some parents realized these plans or migrate between Turkey and Germany, in other cases, parents never realized their return narratives. In those cases, return narratives constitute a rather performative act of first-generation labor migrants to maintain symbolic ties to their place of origin. Anwar (1979) has referred to immigrants' narratives of returning to the homeland one day as "myth of return" because an actual return to the homeland is never realized. Based on her empirical findings, Wolbert (1995, pp. 25–30) analyzed the function this myth of return has for the first generation of Turkish immigrants in Germany. She found that return narratives constitute a strategy of coping with experiences of lacking security, as far as rights of residence, labor right and political rights in Germany were concerned. In the light of experiences of marginalization, narratives of returning to the homeland served to understand the stay in Germany as temporary while identifying with one's roots, native language and social relationships in the place of origin. An actual return to the homeland was also constantly postponed because immigrants from Turkey felt obliged to prove the economic success of their labor migration on return. Moreover, return narratives served as a nostalgic metaphor connected to a past which also guaranteed social cohesion and community with peers in Germany. On the other hand, return narratives were future oriented as a return to Turkey was imagined as a successful representation of migration by displaying material wealth.

Statistics reveal that 70 percent of the registered foreigners in Germany moved back to their home countries between 1960 and 1999, while the remaining 30 percent settled in

Germany (see section 3.2.). Thus, in the majority of cases a return to the country of origin has been realized. Among those women who mention to have witnessed their parents' return narratives during their childhood and youth, many parents in fact returned to Turkey or started to commute between both countries at a later point of time: While one woman[164] who refers to her parents return narratives also notes that her parents moved to Turkey before her in 1997, three other interlocutors returned to Turkey in the course of a family return in 1984, in 1997 and in 2008.[165]

Even though statistics may indicate that 30 percent of the labor migrants stayed in Germany, these examples show that it is difficult to measure circular migration trajectories and the crucial role of intergenerational ties at work here. An interesting detail that illustrates how the imagination of "returning home" and related narratives can translate into concrete circular mobility trajectories in the future, is that three interlocutors who mention their parents' return narratives during their youth and childhood vicariously realized their parents' wish to return home as they were the ones who actually migrated to Turkey. Their parents' perpetual talk of returning to Turkey sometime in the future may have influenced their migration decision. Among them, two women mention that their parents followed them later.[166] Farah for instance states:

> "And my dad said/ for ten years he has been saying: 'Yes, we want to go back to Turkey. Next year, the year after next year', and he's still there. I've been here [in Istanbul] for six years now. They wanted to come ten years ago. Well and then I thought: 'Yes, if your family is coming here anyways, you can get a foothold there. Then you already have an environment there, then you can build something up for yourself. Then you won't be in the thick of it, all of a sudden. [You won't be] [s]o torn, because you go there all of a sudden.'" (Farah, 1990 - 14.04.2017)

Farah continuous exposure to her father's recurrent narrative of returning to the homeland someday, influenced her own migration decision.

4.4.3. Intergenerational Migration Circuits

Eleven women report that their parents followed them to Turkey on retirement. Independent from their parents' return narratives and plans, it is also very likely that the women's settlement in Turkey has played into their parents' and even siblings' decision

[164] 32-I2017, 32
[165] 5-I2013, 12, 24 - 26; 12-I2013, 257, 291; 28-I2017, 11
[166] 1-I2017, 67; 26-I2017, 31

to move to Turkey or to commute between Germany and Turkey.[167] When interlocutors were followed by parents and siblings, their parents were mainly of the first generation. It is likely that family ties and symbolic ties to Turkey are stronger between the first generation of labor migrants and their children in comparison to the second and third generation of German-Turkish postmigrants. Upon retirement those first-generation Turkey-origin immigrants can also live in their property without paying rent (see also section 4.2.2.). While in some cases, parents initially planned to fully settle in Turkey for good, they started commuting due to illness and access to health care in Germany (see section 4.1.3.). The parents of other women commuted from the start.

To illustrate the complexity of how intimate and dense family ties on two generational ends mutually trigger migration and settlement trajectories, I will describe the cases of Nojan and two sisters, Mihrimah and Kübra. Their migration and settlement trajectories illustrate how some German-Turkish women's immediate family members are distributed across two states and move in a transnational space that connects Germany and Turkey into one social sphere. Moreover, their cases show how intergenerational family relations trigger circular migration dynamics and how migration paths are entangled with social locations, claims to access to social rights, the negotiation of unequal access to the labor market in Germany and a changing historical and economic context in Turkey.

Nojan's[168] motives for moving between Istanbul and Düsseldorf oscillate between self-realization and emancipation from her family on the one hand and family providing support to her family on the other hand. By migrating to Istanbul in 2007, she emancipated herself from her parental home. Nojan remembers that she tried to convince her parents for several months to agree with her migration decision and eventually left against their will recalling that her mother told her "I won't give you my blessing" before she left.[169] Her parents' property (see section 4.2.2.) facilitated her arrival in Istanbul. She strongly identifies with the city of Istanbul (see section 4.3.3) which symbolically represents the financially independent life, she has built for herself by renting place of her own and working her way up the career ladder. A comparable

[167] 1PM2017, 10; 1-I2017; 14–17, 67 - 75, 85-87; 2FN, 3; 4-I2017, 77 – 78; 5PS2017, 14; 7PM2017, 8; 11FN-2013, 7; 11-I1-2013, 204; 13PM, 3; 13-I2013, 79-81, 224; 13-I2017, 9, 36 - 41; 13-I2017, 12 – 13; 26-I2017, 31; 29-I-2017, 25 - 34; 29PS2017, 4
[168] 13-I2013, 7 - 13, 17, 61, 77 – 79, 81, 120 – 134; 13-I2017, 5, 9, 13, 47, 57, 93; 13PS2017, 4
[169] „Hakkını helal etmeyeceğim."

lifestyle in Germany is out of question because she has not completed an education and cannot enter a similar profession in Germany (see section 4.3.1). Her parents moved to Istanbul in 2011, four years after her. When I met her in 2013, she was living with her parents in their house. As illustrated in section 4.3.3., several migration decisions also constitute an emancipation from the parental home and a quest for self-realization. Against this backdrop, those interlocutors whose parents followed them assessed their parents' migration to Turkey with mixed feelings. After Nojan had been living alone in her parents' property for four years and enjoyed her liberties and independence, she was involved in assisting and taking care of her sick father after her parents' arrival. Similar as in other cases, their daughter's residence in Istanbul was probably an incentive for Nojan's parents to spend their retirement in Istanbul and to give up their lives in Germany. When I met Nojan in 2013, she had been living in Istanbul for six years and was planning to move near her siblings to test whether she could imagine to resettle in her hometown. As she anticipated, she could still not establish herself in the German job market (see section 4.3.1.) and returned to Istanbul. There she started working in the same job for another company. In 2017, I met Nojan in her hometown in Germany. Her mother who used to take care of her husband had suffered a stroke and moved to Germany for medical treatment. After that, Nojan states, she "had to cut" her own life in Istanbul to assist her parents. After taking care of her father on her own for six weeks in Istanbul, her family hired a nurse to assist him. Nojan moved back to Germany, to assist her siblings in taking care of her mother who was recovering from the stroke. Nojan reasons that she initially planned to resettle in her hometown on the long run. After she took care of her mother for several weeks and after she could not find a job in Germany that met her skills for the second time, she decided to return to Istanbul. She notes that she felt alienated from her siblings after a fight, explaining her position as follows:

> "[I]n the first conversation with my siblings they accused me of being very selfish. Because I wanted to go back after three weeks and actually had a job offer. And I'm just a very emotional person and it was so hard when they said: 'Selfish person, you only think about yourself.' I was like, 'Hey, I was alone with my father for six weeks, you were four people here.' And there were four of them here and they took care of my mom, who wasn't even as bad as my dad. Both mentally and physically. And I actually felt abandoned. But I couldn't express it because I didn't really want to be selfish [...] I had a fight with my bother and left, and then my brother-in-law came and said, 'What do you actually have? You don't have anything. You don't have a job right now, you don't have a husband, your mother is here. We're here, your whole family is here. And you only

> have a few friends there and your actual circle of friends is here. What do you want there?' Then I said, 'Well, he's actually right.'" (Nojan, 1985 - 01.09.2017)

After the dispute, she postponed her return plans and continued taking caring of her mother for several months. It seems like Nojan was convinced by the argument that her close friends and relatives are in Germany. Her statement shows however, that she was rather held back from returning to Istanbul for utilitarian reasons and less because of her sibling's emotional bonds to her. She was the one who mainly shouldered the responsibility of care work for her sick parents, not her siblings or her brother-in-law. This also explains her disappointment with her siblings and her motives to resettle in Istanbul. It seems like Nojan's brother and her brother-in-law naturalize a traditional understanding of gender roles according to which the only legitimate reason for Nojan to return to Istanbul would be the family realm, while what is important to her and lies outside the family realm, her financially and spatially independent lifestyle and the profession she likes, is not acknowledged. For the same reasons Istanbul has become "home" for her. She associates Istanbul with her self-built (financial) independence from the family and with breaking free from family responsibilities. After months of care work for her parents and unfulfilled expectations of finding a job that met her professional skills, she had concrete plans of moving back to Istanbul to re-establish her independent life there when we met in 2017 (see section 4.3.3.).

Nojan's transnational mobility and settlement decisions show how she is caught up in structural constraints as far as access to work in Germany and family responsibilities are concerned. She created an opportunity for herself by activating resources that help her to establish a life of her own, independent from the immediate family network. By using her parents' house, she saved living expenses when she started settling in Istanbul. Her German and English language skills presented a resource that enhanced her access to work. As she developed her professional skills, Nojan specialized in a particular branch and was able to make a decent living. While Nojan mainly seems to provide support to her parents and siblings and simultaneously establishes her life as independent from the family, Mihrimah's and Kübra's family ties give insights about how family relations provide informal aid and are shaped by emotional attachment.

Kübra and Mihrimah[170] have three other siblings and grew up in an apartment in a high rise building in a deprived neighborhood in Cologne (see also section 5.4.). Their parents were retired early because they suffered from health issues due to the physically demanding jobs, they used to work in. To recover from an illness, their father left Germany for a health cure in Turkey, in 2004. At the age of 19, Kübra accompanied him for three months to provide medical assistance. For this purpose, she dropped out from vocational training, one year before completing her education. As his health deteriorated, her father remained in Turkey. Kübra states that the family struggled financially after her father was gone. He kept his pension for himself and their mother de facto became a single mother. On her return to Germany, Kübra who had dropped out from vocational training could no longer contribute to the family income. She remembers that all of her siblings started a vocational training right after school to contribute to the family income. Since trainees are provided with a small income during vocational training children of low-income families seem to decide in favor a vocational training instead of a longer school career and a subsequent higher education (see section 4.3.1.). When Kübra assisted her father in Turkey, she got acquainted with her husband. After a one-year lasting long-distance relationship, they married and she moved to Istanbul. She states that during the first six years of her stay in Istanbul, she had difficulties to adapt and often commuted between both cities. At that time, her two first sons were still young and she could stay in one location for several weeks or months. When she gave birth to her first son, she resettled in Cologne for a longer period of time. She states:

> "So, in the beginning, when I gave birth to Mahmut, I didn't want to go to Turkey. Because my family lives in Germany. You know what I mean? I was alone here. I don't know anything. I really wanted to go to Germany and so I just flew back to Germany. I gave birth to Mahmut there. Until he was two, Hasan [husband] flew there, I flew there. And then I went back [to Turkey] for a year. […] And after a year I went back to Germany. So, this back and forth, back and forth all the time, right? I was here for a month, there for two months. One month there. Six years just went like that." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Some of her motives for longer stays in Germany include access to health care services as young mother. Like other interlocutors who at the time of their pregnancy felt the need to be close to their families of origin, her emotional attachment to her family also

[170] 3PM2013, 7 - 8; 3-I2013, 6 - 18, 112 – 115, 139; 168-171, 309; 3-I2017, 3, 24 – 28; 30 - 32, 54 – 60, 82; 4PM2013, 9; 4-I2-2013, 25; 4-I2017, 35, 39, 72, 77-78, 82-84

explains her circular movement between both countries. I have illustrated in section 4.3.2. that Kübra's and her husband's decision to live in Turkey is also an economic household decision that becomes a priority with her parenting responsibilities. Kübra explains her settlement with the prosperity she and her family enjoy in Istanbul thanks to the property and the businesses her husband owns and manages. While the family can afford a wealthy lifestyle in Istanbul, Cologne does not present an alternative, because Kübra and her husband do not have the educational resources necessary for the family's financial well-being in Germany (see section 4.4.2.). Accordingly, Kübra perceives her decision as one she made for her family's well-being but not for her own sake (see section 5.4.4.). What may have facilitated her adaptation process in Istanbul is that her sister Mihrimah started to settle in Istanbul in 2012. Shortly after that their mother also moved to Istanbul. In 2013, Kübra had not visited Cologne for several years and felt a strong longing to her place of origin. She imagined commuting between Istanbul and Cologne once her sons get older. In 2017, she visited Cologne and her vision of commuting in the future has not changed, only that she postpones it because she meanwhile gave birth to her third son.

Kübra's younger sister Mihrimah migrated to Turkey in 2012 for several reasons, among them her wish to emancipate herself from family responsibilities for her brother in Germany. Like other interlocutors, she also faced lacking job and career opportunities in Germany (see sections 4.1.2., 4.3.1.). Her brother-in-law, Kübra's husband, hired her as manager for a café, he owns in the historical center of Istanbul. Mihrimah's situation reflects characteristics that several authors' have referred to as chain migration. Although they mainly referred to the classic immigration countries and not to the transnational migration of second and third generation postmigrants, their deliberations fit well into the Kübra's and Mihrimah's migration trajectories (see section 4.4.1.). As stipulated by proponents of the concept, social ties must extend the family realm. But the concept also works well with family networks. The resources which support Mihrimah's and her mother as newcomers in Turkey, have been established by Kübra who moved to Istanbul without accessing any wider family ties to first- or second-generation relatives.

When I met Mihrimah in 2013 in the café she managed, she was about to get married. The fact that Kübra was already living in Istanbul not only facilitated her migration and adaptation process, as far as access to work was concerned. Her family ties helped her to find an apartment in the same building complex in which Kübra and her husband are

living in. As their mother joined them, all three women lived in the same apartment complex with their husbands. Mihrimah married her husband in 2013 and gave birth to her daughter in Cologne one year later. Apart from access to medical treatment in Germany as pregnant woman (see also section 4.1.2.) she rationalizes giving birth in Germany with a sense of attachment to her place of origin which she explains as follows:

> "I wanted us to have that same connection. Like I have a connection here, for example. Cologne means a lot to me actually. Because I'm also/ I call it that sometimes/ half a Cologne girl, right? You can't say, 'I'm a Turk and I grew up only with Turkish culture.' No. That's not true. We grow up with two cultures.' Our one half is here and our one half is here because our families are also here, ne? My brothers and sisters live here. And then I said, 'Okay, if I fly to Germany, I want my child to be able to come with me, too.'" (Mihrimah, 1988 - 12.09.2017)

Mihrimah explains her motives of giving birth in Germany with her emotional attachment to her family in Cologne and her translocal and biographical identification and her own place of birth, an experience of belonging, she symbolically wants to share and pass on to her daughter.

Kübra's and her husband's local embeddedness in Istanbul, however, fulfill the function Faist (2000, pp. 201–211) identifies as social capital. She and her husband who is of Turkey-origin constitute a hub in this small family network as Kübra's husband has established a business network in Istanbul and the couple can mobilize resources such as work and accommodation for Mihrimah and her and Kübra's mother.

After Mihrimah's and Kübra's mother initially commuted between Germany and Turkey with her main place of residence in Germany, she decided to mainly relocate her life near her daughters. She sold the family house in Cologne. Mihrimah's narrative reveals, that her mother initially planned to leave Germany for good. Due to due to her changing health situation, their mother later started to commute again for medical treatment in Germany (see also section 4.1.3.). A series of external events caused by the attempted coup in 2016, outlined in section 4.1.2., caused financial problems for Mihrimah and her husband and resulted in her return to Cologne in 2016 together with her daughter. Her mother followed her. Neither Mihrimah, nor her mother had planned to live in Cologne. Returning to Cologne seemed the only option to guarantee access to basic resources for herself and her daughter. In Cologne, she can count on her siblings help and make use her social rights in Germany that guarantees her daughters and her economic survival and medical treatment.

Once again, the family network was crucial. Mihrimah and her daughter could stay with her brother until she found an apartment. In Germany, Mihrimah can access financial resources, as she can make use of her social rights. Burdened with an illness, her access to social welfare and health services ensures medical treatment and her and her daughter's economic survival. Mihrimah's constrained access to work in Germany because of her migration and educational background on the one hand, and family ties and a job in Turkey on the other hand encouraged her to migrate to Istanbul. (see sections 4.1.1.-4.1.3.).

Kübra's and Mihrimah's migration decisions depend on their different social locations. While Kübra and her family have a good economic standing in Istanbul, a life in Germany would not provide any security for the family (see sections 4.2.2., 5.4.4.). Due to her lost right of residence and other aspects resulting from her social location as discussed in section 4.2.2. and 5.4.), her transnational mobility is constrained causes her to continue her settlement in Istanbul.

The reconstruction of these circular migration paths underline how Kübra's and Mihrimah's close family ties become a resource that together with their differing socio-economic positionalities, their symbolic ties to Cologne and a changed historical and gendered biographic situation (marriage, giving birth, parenting responsibilities) shape their circular migration and settlement decisions. The sisters' different social locations overlap with social and civil aspects of citizenship (access to welfare and medical treatment in Germany, access to property, accommodation and work in Istanbul) and with a disadvantaged access to work in Germany. Those resources are distributed across families and two countries and consequently shape Kübra's, Mihrimah's and their mother's circular transnational migration paths.

4.4.4. Starting a Family and Exit from Partnership

Contrary to assumptions of strong and continuous family ties of the nuclear Turkey-origin family, more than half of the consulted 32 women are single, do not live with their spouse or are in a relationship. Twelve women had children at the time I met them in 2017; some of them were single mothers. Others were married but solely responsible for the family income and their children's upbringing which resulted in some of these the women's circular migration back to Germany (see section 4.1.2.). While five women note that a partnership was among the decisive migration motives of moving to Turkey,

one woman moved back to Germany to reunite with her partner.[171] After a pursuing a several months or several-year lasting long-distance relationship, some women decided to get married and eventually moved to Turkey, to start a family. Several women got to know their partners during a holiday in Turkey or through family and friends. However, in constellations in which a partnership is quoted as main incentive of crossing borders, significant additional motives play into the women's decisions. Seven other women I met in 2017 had met and married in the course of their stay in Turkey.

Although several interlocutors mention that they would have preferred to live in Germany and that the choice of living in Turkey was made in favor of their husbands' preference to live in Turkey, the place of residence is a matter of continuous negotiation between spouses. Several women mention that it took years or months of negotiation with their partners until they decided to start a life in Turkey. Choosing the country of settlement is a process that does not end with the women's migration to Turkey. The women's decision to settle in Turkey after they were newly married is mainly rationalized as household decision, they and their husbands made based on evaluating the family resources and income at hand in Turkey and in Germany. Kübra's case illustrates a household-related settlement decision in Turkey which is also representative for some other women who moved to Turkey in the course of starting a family (see sections 4.2.2., 4.4.4.). That the country of settlement is open to negotiation is visible in the fact that three women who are mothers resettled in Germany without their spouses because of financial problems and for their children's language education (see sections 4.1.1., 4.1.2.). Several women[172] explained their settlement in Turkey with their husbands' lack of German skills as ruling out the option to live in Germany, whereas their own Turkish skills presented an opportunity in Turkish labor market (see also section 4.3.1.). Arzu for instance states:

> "Especially if I put all this emotional stuff aside and think logically. I have more of a chance of finding a job in Turkey than he does in Germany. And that's why it was out of question for us, this reverse version." (Arzu, 1978 - 07.08.2017)

Like Kübra, Arzu also struggled with the decision to move to Turkey. Before getting married, she even ended her current relationship because she did not want to give up her

[171] 3PM2013, 3 - 9; 6-I2013, 8, 17, 57; 11-I1-2013, 7, 16PM2017, 11; 16-I2017, 130, 190; 17-I2017, 7, 99, 103 - 107; 29-I2017, 36
[172] 11-I1-2013, 7; 17-I2017, 99; 22-I2017, 75

life in Germany. She states, “It wouldn't have worked if I had come to Turkey at that time. I think I would have been unhappy here. I simply needed these four more years of time in Germany.”[173] She adds that after she decided to marry her husband, it was clear for her that she would move to Turkey. Another interesting aspect in Arzu’s case is that partnership is by no means the only decisive motive for her. Her decision is coupled with a weariness of recurring experiences with stereotypes at the intersections of ethnicity, race and gender in Germany and a quest for belonging which she shares with other interlocutors (see sections 4.3.1., 4.3.2.). Arzu’s biographic positionality differs from those interlocutors who grew in multicultural or segregated neighborhoods. She grew up a neighborhood of a small town mainly with residents without migration background which also applies for the schools she visited. While she actively engaged in a tactic of debunking stereotypes against Turkey-origin people for years, she explains her migration decision with her weariness of justifying for her ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’. Her related statement stands for itself:

> “I thought to myself, ‘I’ve lived in Germany for 30 years now.’ I have German citizenship and questions like, ‘Why don't you wear a headscarf?’ still come. Well, we are the second, now third generation. So, the Germans should also have adapted a bit’ […]. [T]his aggression came slowly somehow. And it was simple, I just didn't want this anymore. I didn’t constantly want to have to explain myself for what I am. Accept it. I accept you as you are, so please accept me as I am. And that was actually also this saturated experience. This saturating [experience]. So, it wasn't a mission for me anymore, it was just torture for me. With every new person I met, 'Oh, I didn't think you were Turkish now.' And then the same thing started over again, ‘Yes, and how is it with you? And what’s it like? And why are you like this and others like that? And yes, why?’ I don't know why one person puts on sweatpants and the other person wears jeans. Sure, there are so many factors. There are so many factors why various Turkish families are like that and [why] we are like this. But it’s all just the circumstances of life. I think that was also this subconscious thing that actually drew me more to Turkey. Because here, here I am also different. But here I don't have to explain why I fast on Ramadan or why I don't wear a headscarf. Here I don't have to explain myself.” (Arzu, 1978 - 07.08.2017)

Arzu’s migration is a decision that presents itself as a quest for equal membership in society where she does not have to face stereotypes or justify alleged cultural difference because of her grandparents’ Turkey-origin. Attachment aside, marrying a Turkey-

[173] 29-I2017, 38

origin man also presents and exit from inequality based on intersectional exclusion in comparison to acknowledgement of membership in Turkey.

In a similar vein, Zeynep's case presents itself as a migration in the course of marriage and as a self-determined exit from gendered discrimination. Comparing her disadvantaged social location and related experiences of intersectional discrimination in Germany, she rationalizes experiences with racialized discrimination as her main motive to leave Germany. Her migration was in a way prepared by the inequalities and lacking acknowledgement, she experienced at school as German-Turkish girl and young woman (see sections 4.3.1., 4.3.2.). In addition, her migration decision is exemplary for an impulsive self-determined exit from gendered oppression. She broke with her old life in Germany without knowing what laid ahead of her in Turkey. Zeynep's case stands for some other cases in which a migration decision constitutes a self-determined tactic of exiting an oppressive relationship and/or family responsibilities and a family setting of gendered oppression and violence in which women have interrupted communication with parents and abusive ex-partners.[174] After Zeynep met her husband on a summer holiday, she wanted to exit her relationship with a German-Turkish man she was engaged to. Her parents did not accept her decision. Reciting her mother's statement, "No, we made a huge [engagement] party. What should we tell the elderly?" reveals that her mother felt herself pressured by the German-Turkish social environment to act according to normative expectations that an engagement would be followed by marriage. Several interlocutors explained their parents' gendered constraints against them with neighborhood pressure by German-Turkish peers and a generation gap (see sections 4.3.4., 5.1.1., 5.3.1.). Zeynep experienced additional pressure from her ex-partner's family who also did not accept her experience. When Zeynep did not comply, her mother kicked her out of the house. After her father brought her back, things had changed for her. Zeynep states:

> "But then that was too much. You know? I felt like there was no going back. So, I no longer felt at home. And with mom […] There was no going back with mom. (...) And then (...) I called my husband. [...] And he said, back then, ten years ago, he earned seven hundred and fifty liras. He said: 'Yes, I earn so and so much. (.) Come, marry me. Let's live here. You find a job and I have a job. It will work out. So, we can do this. We'll show that, that we can do it.' [...] In the next few days [...] I arranged everything with work […]. Broke off my relations with them. And packed my things [...]. Then I told my parents, 'Yes I'm going to work.'

[174] See also: 2PM2013, 6; 2-I2013, 9 – 11, 20 – 23, 25; 7-I1-2017, 97

> And then [I] went to the airport and then to Turkey." (Zeynep, 1982 - 09.07.2013)

In this section I have shown how German-Turkish women's immediate family networks are divided across two countries and as a logical consequence also trigger migration and settlement decisions if citizenship rights allow for it. Immediate family members often provide support in financially and emotionally challenging moments in life. The fact that close family networks are transnational does not yet imply that these networks are accessible to the women. The next section will shed light on how German-Turkish women make sense of different levels of transnational mobility in the light of legal opportunities and constraints of dual citizenship, denizenship and lacking rights of residence.

4.5. NOT EVEN A RIGHT OF RESIDENCE? NORMATIVE DEMANDS FOR DUAL CITIZENSHIP

As the last sections have shown, German-Turkish women's transnational migration practices relate to the fact that different spheres of their lives are divided across two countries. By way of migrating and settling, they struggle to alter and to improve their life circumstances for the better. However, this is only possible as far as their citizenship status allows for it. Their practices still occur within the jurisdiction of nation states. Citizenship law and laws concerned with residence rights, asylum and visa regulations constrain and facilitate the transnational mobility of German-Turkish women.

Since their citizenship status in Germany determines the possible degrees of German-Turkish women's mobility in transnational space, their citizenship status constitutes the dependent variable of mobility and access to residence, social, political and civil rights in transnational space. In my sample of 32 women, 16 women hold German citizenship, ten have the Turkish nationality and six women have both nationalities. Several women own dual citizenship can because the Turkish state *de facto* allowed for dual citizenship in the 1980s and the 1990s despite the German state's official position against it (see section 3.6.). Some of the women who are German citizens simultaneously hold the Blue Card (*Mavi Kart*) a citizenship status for Turkey-origin migrants and postmigrants with German nationality that endows them with social and civil rights in Turkey (Ibid.).

The women who hold the Turkish nationality and have a residence permit in Germany, hold a *denizenship* status. Based on Marshall's (1950) definition of citizenship as a status that endows immigrants and postmigrants with social, civil and political rights, Hammar (2016) has coined the term denizenship to describe the legal status of

permanent residence for immigrants with a foreign nationality, who have access to social and civil rights in their country of residence but no access to political rights.

There are women in the sample who hold the Turkish citizenship and have lost their residence title in Germany and with it, access to transnational mobility and the rights, a long-term residence title in Germany entails. Permanent residence in Germany is not unconditional. According to the German Resident Act (§ 51), immigrants and postmigrants lose their permanent residence title if they leave Germany for non-temporary reasons (e.g., for school education abroad, for labor, to care for a family member abroad, to marry or settle abroad). A person's permanent residence title expires if s*he leaves and does not reenter the country within six months or a longer period that is determined by the German immigration authority. If a person has legally resided in Germany for more than 15 years and can assure their livelihood after reentering the country, the residence permit does not expire after living abroad for six months (§ 51 Residence Act, paragraph 2). This legal passage means people who have lost their right of residence because they live abroad have to cover their livelihood if they want to return to Germany, i.e., they lose entitlement to some of their social rights.

In practice, this law worsens the situation of Germany-born transmigrant women who are already disadvantaged based on their social location. Economically deprived women who have not completed an education and will – based on the structural disadvantage in the German labor market discussed in section 4.3.1. – have more difficulties to find a job while being deprived of their right to social welfare. In fact, this unequal treatment leads to ethical questions concerning the migration policies of the German state which encourages immigration of highly skilled people from non-EU countries and ultimately results in ethical questions: Why should a highly skilled person from a third country who finds work in Germany but has never lived in Germany before have the right to residence in Germany while a lower skilled person who was born in Germany and is a former long-term resident with another nationality lose their right of residence after six months?

From a normative perspective the difference between citizenship statuses in the sample points to an unequal and therefore unjust treatment and access to rights. All German-Turkish women in the sample who have migrated to Turkey have in common that they spent their childhood, youth and young adulthood in Germany and most of them were born in Germany. Women holding dual citizenship can be considered to be on the most

privileged end in the sample because they can be mobile anytime and can make use of political, social and civil rights in two countries. Clearly situated on the most disadvantaged end are the women with Turkish citizenship who have lost their residence title in Germany.

Some of the meanings the consulted women assign to their citizenship status provide insights of what citizenship rights de facto mean in terms of opportunities and constraints. Their narratives clearly shed light on the arbitrariness of privileges and unjust consequences a lack of citizenship rights entails for people who engage in two localities in transnational space. Several of the women who are entitled to full citizenship rights in Germany refer to their German nationality as a source of security. German citizenship provides them with the opportunity of moving to Germany at any point in time. Others refer to their German citizenship as "door", "backdoor" as future "option" or "plan B".[175] German citizenship is seen as fallback option and resource of security or "emergency card"[176] for an unpredictable future that bears the possibility of insecurity and an emergency situation. The following quote by Zilan illustrates this:

> "But Germany is just a place of rest. If something happens, then I know that I can always return to Germany. And this already gives me a (.) certain peace that I can endure it here. Because if it doesn't work out here, then I go back again. I always have this alternative. And it is just really/ well it's just the security." (Zilan, 1990 - 06.09.2012)

Other women note that that holding the German nationality constitutes an important component of their decision-making process as it facilitated their decision to move to Turkey. Some note that without the fallback option to return to Germany anytime, they would not live in Istanbul in the first place.[177]

What kind of meanings do the consulted German-Turkish women assign to security? In fact, the empirical evidence of the last sections shows which life situations the women associate with a lack of security. Here Holston's differentiation between *formal citizenship* as "based on principles of incorporation in the nation-state" and *substantive citizenship* as the actual ability citizens have to claim rights which they possess through their nominal citizenship status is helpful. He further defines substantive citizenship as "the substantive distribution of the rights, meanings, institutions, and practices that

[175] 5-I2013, 104; 6-I2013, 23; 20-I2017, 155; 23-I2017, 95
[176] 1-I2017, 205; 13-I2013, 222; 17-I2017, 121; 20-I2017, 283
[177] 17-I2017, 275; 20-I2017, 157; 27-I2017, 193

membership entails to those deemed citizens“ (Holston, 2009, p. 7). The women’s migration narratives point to the fact that they try to handle uncertainties and unjust treatment by way of moving (if possible, in a circular fashion) between the countries. Their migration paths and the imagination of mobility also constitute struggles to access substantive citizenship rights. The previous sections have provided an analysis of de facto citizenship practices that determine the women’s migration and settlement paths. An empirical reading of mobile and non-mobile German-Turkish women’s migration therefore indicates the meaning they attribute to German nationality as “security”, “backdoor” or “option”. Uncertainty is associated with the following themes: unemployment, economic deprivation, racialized and intersectional discrimination, curtailment of individual liberties and the spatial separation from loved ones. Women who have a citizenship status in both countries strategically make use of their citizenship and denizenship rights and opportunities available to them. Security is associated with all the rights their nominal citizenship status entitles them with but also with the substantive rights they claim. Security is associated with claiming fundamental and substantive rights and needs: Access to family and friends, access to labor, a right to livelihood, a right to education, a right to freedom of expression, a right to accommodation, a right to social inclusion and membership as well as a right to self-realization. In that sense, German-Turkish transmigrant women’s migration paths encompass a transnational space in which they strategically make claims to opportunities and rights available as they struggle to compensate imbalances associated with insecurity, injustice and inequality.

While German citizenship is associated with security, it is only a logical consequence that a lack of residence rights is perceived as insecure for a variety of reasons. German-Turkish transmigrants with Turkish nationality are more vulnerable to losing their denizenship status than German-Turkish people who are residents in Germany. Six of the ten women holding Turkish nationality have lost their residence rights in Germany because they have not and could not reenter Germany within the legally demanded time span of six months. Regularly traveling to Germany is not only a question of financial resources, but also a matter logistic interference with everyday life including family responsibilities and wage labor. In 2013, Kübra who has lost her residence title, expresses her feelings of insecurity associated with lacking citizenship rights in Germany as follows:

> "But I don't know now/ [...] I haven't been there for two years. I don't know now if I can go back in now. [...] I have to […] ask how it will go. If they'll take it [residence status] away from me or if they'll let me keep it. Well, I have a friend who didn't get it. That's a total pity. She should like/ the officials in Germany said that, right? They said she should go to the consulate and then apply for a visa like a tourist. And then she would have to wait to see if she would get it. Just imagine. You are treated (laughs) like a second/ that's really/ that's not good. (.) At least that's what they should do. The Turks who were really born and raised there. No matter how long, right? Well, those who have attended school. The right should at least remain." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

As mother of two young sons in 2013, it clearly presents a challenge for Kübra to uphold her residence status in Germany. Without a completed education and in her caretaker role of three young children – she and her husband follow a traditional division of labor – finding work in Germany will be nearly impossible for her. According to the above quoted law, she would need to guarantee sufficient income for herself and her children in Germany to resettle, while her husband does not have the necessary resources (language skills, education, business network), necessary to guarantee his family a similar livelihood in Germany. In her statement, Kübra refers to her birth right. She is not the only one who makes this reference. Take Ela's statements:

> "But I would like to have the right of citizeship [*Angehörigkeitsrecht*] automatically now. I was born there, I was there. But if I want to return to Germany now, I will be treated like someone who [comes] to Germany from abroad. That's why I would [like to have] the right. At the moment I'm thinking that it really wouldn't be bad to have applied for German citizenship back then." (Ela, 1979 - 31.05.2013)

Ela can no longer travel to Germany without a visa because at the time she had to extend her residence permit, leaving Turkey would have interfered with her responsibilities as a student. While she acknowledges that she no longer has residence rights in Germany in 2013, her imagination simultaneously presents a tactic in which she cognitively creates an opening in this constrained position regarding her transnational mobility. Ela imagines living in Germany in the future as "choice". Similar to interlocutors who hold citizenship or residence rights in Germany, she imagines returning to Germany as an "option", as "door or path", in case she is discontent with her life in Turkey stating, "Then I would say, 'I'm going to run away to Germany', so no problem. I could imagine that."[178] In 2017, Ela assesses her situation differently. She is no longer content with her life in Istanbul for various reasons outlined in sections 4.1.2., 4.2.1. and 4.3.4. She

[178] 5-I2013, 104

actively engages in expanding her legal opportunities of transnational mobility, as she tries to attain a C2 German certificate to create an opportunity to teach German abroad.[179]

Kübra and Ela both claim membership in Germany based on their birth right. Since they were born and raised in Germany and spent a significant part of their youth or young adulthood there, they argue that being deprived of their right of residence in country of birth is unjust. Their statements illustrate what applies for all the women with Turkish citizenship in the sample: The new citizenship law which abolished the blood right principle of citizenship based on descent (*jus sanguinis*) with the principle of birth right citizenship (*jus soli*) does not apply for them. Amended in 2014, the new citizenship law grants dual citizenship to the descendants of immigrants born as of the year 2000 (BGBl – Federal Law Journal I, p. 1714; see section 3.5.). The reformed German citizenship law does not apply for any of the women in this sample who hold Turkish citizenship, because they were born before the year of 2000, when the law was ratified. In practice, German-Turkish people residing abroad holding Turkish citizenship and born before 2000 are still excluded from birth right citizenship in Germany.

For those women who have lost their residence status in Germany, this means that that they are deprived of the fundamental rights that guarantee the securities the women holding German citizenship cite. There is no certainty that they can sojourn or resettle in their country of birth after they have exceeded the six months deadline for extending their residence permit. With the de facto denial of birth right and the fundamental citizenship rights associated with it, the German state also communicates a lack of recognition concerning their membership and formative years of their life histories in Germany including childhood, youth and young adulthood. Several women express that losing the right of permanent residence so quickly is devaluating because it evokes perceptions of being likened to "tourists" or "newcomers"[180] in their country of birth.

Contrary to the increasing interconnectedness resulting from processes of globalization, this understanding of citizenship carries a territorial notion of legal membership for those subjects who based on their family migration history are most likely to be mobile between two countries. The expiration of their residence rights strongly contradicts

[179] 5PS2017, 5
[180] 3-I2013, 171; 4-I2017, 72; 11-I1-2013, 208; 12-I2017, 111

German-Turkish women's senses of belonging associated with their histories in Germany as the last sections have shown. Nearly all interlocutors have worked in jobs in Turkey in which they use their intercultural know-how and their German languages skills. As German teachers, many even become brokers of German language and 'culture' in Istanbul (see sections 4.1.1., 4.3.1., 5.3.5.).

Applying for a visa to visit one's birth country and being treated like a visitor in Germany, exemplifies how the women are made subjects in a top-to down process of defining formal citizenship (Lazar, 2013, pp. 3, 10). Moreover, this legal treatment also reflects the citizenship discourse, Germany cannot get rid of (see section 3.6.). For those women who hold Turkish citizenship, the *jus sanguinis* principle of citizenship is still legally binding along with the whole discursive language associated with it. The legal assurance of treating these non-resident Germany-origin transmigrant women as non-citizens still carries the connotations of the *jus sanguinis* principle of citizenship. The boundary between citizen and non-citizen is constructed along the continuing understanding of membership via ethno-cultural descent. This understanding of Germanness provides the fundament for denying the membership of postmigrants who are marked as the state bureaucracy's Others as the legal term 'foreigner' reveals. The language of the German Residence Act also assures that discursively as the designation "foreigner" is used throughout the legal text to define the legal subject without German citizenship.

Visiting family and living in one's country of birth, that is, one's country of social, not ethnic origin should be a basic human right and not differentiate between people based on their formal nationality. Melisa's statement illustrates the meaning of birth right as a normative principle of justice along with the arbitrary injustice of visa regulations:

> "People don't choose their country when they are born, right? There is not such a thing as 'I will be an American citizen'. There shouldn't be a thing such as border. We all live in this world. […] But this visa requirement/ this requirement to have a visa is such a bad thing. 'You can enter this country, you can't.'" (Melisa, 1965 - 04.08.2017)

Melisa has lost her residence right in Germany because her father prevented her from travelling to Germany in order to extend it. Melisa's normative argument raises some questions about membership that yield to a normative perspective on citizenship rights. This perspective is necessary in order to rethink membership in the polity as far as transnational subjects are concerned. Normative arguments raised by political theorists can provide the ground for more inclusive policy making as far as nominal citizenship

and the rights it entails are concerned. Political scientists have proposed ideas about citizenship reaching beyond a territorialized membership which is based on national allegiances. Some scholars have suggested approaches to citizenship from a supranational, post-national or universalist human rights perspective (Soysal, 1994; Habermas, 1998, 2001).

Rainer Bauböck has argued that international migration causes a discrepancy between a democratic government's accountability to its citizens and a state's territorial jurisdiction, stating:

> "International migration creates a tension of these two basic facts about our world because it produces citizens living outside the country whose government is supposed to be accountable to them and inside a country whose government is not accountable to them. The result is a mismatch between citizenship and the territorial scope of legitimate authority." (Bauböck, 2008, p. 2)

Bauböck has put forward a crucial normative demand: liberal democracies must extend citizenship rights and become *transnational* in a sense that citizenship of a liberal democratic state needs to exceed the boundaries of a national and territory-based idea of citizenship. Bauböck argues that globalization and immigration present challenges for the principles of liberal democracy as growing numbers of permanent residents who are non-citizens are excluded from political membership. The challenge lies in the fact that a legal status of membership is usually derived from the place of birth. If liberal democracies want to remain authentic to one of their core principles, the equal distribution of fundamental rights, those rights need be extended in a more inclusive way. As a consequence, permanent residents and other major social groups cannot be excluded from the polity. Bauböck argues that immigrants have long become members in a polity by virtue of time and as a result of their social participation in the everyday life. Therefore, immigrants should also be treated as members and be provided with substantive citizenship rights in their state of residence and with the right to nominal citizenship without renouncing their other citizenship. From this normative perspective, transnational citizenship is a necessary result of institutional transformations due to changing conceptions of membership in the polity (1994, pp. viii, 187–202, 321–237). His suggestion of a stakeholder principle of citizenship (*jus nexi*) presents a solution for the above-described inequalities German-Turkish women face when they have lost the right of residence in their birth country. The *jus nexi* presents an addition or alternative to birth right citizenship. Because they are under the subjection of a "territorial political

authority", "individuals who have a permanent interest in membership" in a state including long term residents and first-generation emigrants and their children born abroad may claim stakeholder citizenship. Bauböck's inescapable conclusion is that "if resident foreigners enjoy a claim to be admitted as new citizens and emigrants a claim to retain their citizenship of origin, then, as is increasingly the case, both receiving and sending countries ought to tolerate dual citizenship." (2008, p. 5)

In the previous sections, I have shown that German-Turkish women engage in circular migration and settlement activities to negotiate access to resources and structural and intersectional inequalities they face in the light of their social locations. I have also illustrated that their migration and settlement decisions constitute struggles for participation and for more equality. Their efforts to improve their life circumstances by virtue of migration and settlement in both countries entail claims to fundamental rights such as education, economic security, the maintenance of family relations and membership and belonging as well as a quest for empowerment and self-realization. I have argued with Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton that these women are transmigrants who engage in "networks, activities and patterns of life that encompass both their host and home societies. Their lives cut across national boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field." (1992, p. 1). German-Turkish women's transnational practices and their membership in multiple social and spatial fields that connect the two countries requires a rethinking of citizenship. Dual citizenship ought to apply to all Turkey-origin people who have lived in Germany for a significant life span and not only to those who were born after the year 2000. I want to close this chapter with Melisa's claim for dual citizenship:

> "In other words, if only I had the opportunity to go to Germany, if only I could be a dual citizen. Well, I would feel free again. At the moment, I don't feel free. That way I could whenever it comes to my mind, take my passport and take the plane. I don't have this freedom. First of all, a visa. In addition, money for the visa. Let's say, I have a thousand Turkish Lira. So, I just want to go for a short weekend to Germany, that will be very expensive. What a pity that I don't [have the] German [residence right/citizenship], well, for being able to just quickly jump on the plain." (Melisa, 1965 - 04.08.2017)

The statements of the women tell us that dual citizenship would enhance their access to fundamental rights and consequently result in a fairer treatment, in particular of those women who are situated on the most disadvantaged ends due to the overlapping constraints they face, such as economic deprivation, single parenting, no residence title

in Germany and inequalities they experience based on their gender and family migration history. Those women ought to have access to rights in their country of social origin, Germany and in their country of migration, Turkey.

5. NEGOTIATING BELONGING AT SOCIAL DIVISIONS

In this chapter, I highlight different aspects of belonging of four German-Turkish women. In line with the concept of social locations and intersectionality proposed by Anthias (2001, 2006), the selected women differ most from each other regarding intersecting social divisions and privileged and disadvantaged positionalities (see section 2.2.4.). These four cases are do not represent types but individual cases with different positionalities. However, the cases represent exemplary experiences that constitute empirically rich categories in the material. Where – based on the evaluation of the empirical material – the individual woman faces more general social experiences, the experiences of other women are included into the analysis. Based on the main categories of the deductive and inductive findings of the content analysis, each case is explored with respect to the implications belonging has for German-Turkish women as far as the politics of belonging and intersectional attributions of difference and practices of contestation and subjective senses of belonging are concerned (see also section 2.4.). In other words, I analyze the cases of Ayla, Lara, Emma and Kübra with respect to their social locations which are also defined by attributions of difference. Such attributions of difference entail social strategies of ethnicization, culturalization and racialization the women faced and are still facing in their everyday lives in Germany, and in part in Turkey (see sections 2.2.2., 2.2.3.). Here the citizenship discourse in Germany plays a crucial role (see section 3.6.). Simultaneously I show how each woman is not merely *subject to* such strategies. As agents Ayla, Lara, Emma and Kübra have developed different tactics from their marginalized positionalities in the "absence of power" (Certeau, 1988) as they retrospectively challenge ethno-cultural citizenship discourses they have experienced. Attributions of difference and tactics the women have developed against the latter also exemplify empirically rich tropes that reappeared in the ethnographic material.

Moreover, I shed light on the different modes of making claims to membership and intersectional equality. The four cases show that the women do not meet racialized and ethnicized strategical attributions of belonging with a sense of belonging along collective ethno-cultural lines. Empirically rich categories that turned out as meaningful social groups and localities in which the women situate their translocal and transnational senses of belonging are the micro level groups and places of their everyday life practice.

Their senses of belonging are connected to their biographic experience in Germany, to interactions and roles in the transnational family network, to the transnational workplace and to their friendship network in Turkey and Germany. For some, the religious communities of their past or and their neighborhoods of origin in Germany constitute social spheres of belonging. Moreover, they express a sense of attachment to places, such as the neighborhoods they chose to live in Istanbul and the urban public sphere. Their senses of belonging are also connected with their transnational and translocal practices, such as multilingualism, different realms of perception, communication and media, political participation and the celebration of holidays. Practices of belonging can be interpreted as translocal spatial practices in which the perception helps women to evoke and connect memories and places of the past in Germany to the present in Turkey. Thus, the women produce a real-and-imagined *Thirdspace* experience (Soja, 1998), for instance by means of speaking two languages or by engaging in culinary practices.

5.1. AYLA: COSMOPOLITAN BELONGING AS STRUGGLE FOR INTERSECTIONAL JUSTICE

In the following sections, I will shed light on Ayla's social location that is defined by boundaries of gender, religion, migrant status, age, economic status and family history. I will describe her political struggle along those lines and on spheres of belonging in which she has used her social location also as resource for her cosmopolitan sense of belonging, for her translocal attachment, for her self-realization and for her political claims to political justice of marginalized groups.

5.1.1. Negotiating Biography as Struggle against Gendered Constraints

In 2017, Ayla is 39 years old and has been living in Istanbul for seven years. She has the Turkish nationality and no longer a residence status in Germany (see also section 4.5.). She has completed an education as doctor's assistant. In Istanbul, she worked in a language school and in a call center for roughly two years until she started to work for an IT company. She specialized in IT consultancy[181] and later in IT customer services for the Turkish, German and international market.[182] Ayla got married with her Turkey-

[181] Because of her professional specialization and professional network, Ayla found a well-paid employment in Germany. She was able to obtain a work permit and moved back to Germany in 2019 together with her husband. Motives for potential and actual circular migration between Turkey and Germany have been covered in Chapter 4. Since the second research occasion was in 2019 and due to limitations of space this section concentrates on her experiences in in Istanbul.
[182] 10-I2017, 80, 82, 84

origin husband in 2016. Ayla and I have become close friends throughout my stay in Istanbul.

Ayla grew up in a culturally "diverse" "multiculti" working-class neighborhood in a town of less than 60,000 inhabitants in southern Germany close to Stuttgart. She grew up in a circle of neighbors and friends, she describes as international. She remembers playing on the streets as a child with many international children, stating that she liked her childhood, because life in that neighborhood was "enriched a lot by other cultures."[183] She is the oldest daughter and has three younger siblings. Her grandparents originate from a small village in North-Eastern Anatolia. Ayla's grandparents both immigrated to Germany in the course of the labor recruitment agreement and worked in factories. Her mother arrived in Germany in the course of family reunion at the age of ten. Ayla's father, whom she describes as politically identifying as "rather right", immigrated to Germany as a political refugee. He fled to Germany when he was 20 years old after the 1980's military coup in Turkey because his family had received death threats (see section 3.3.).[184] Ayla describes her father's educational measures as "a bit authoritarian" while her mother would intervene with her father's strictness and therefore extended her and her sister's freedoms. Ayla describes a very strong sense of justice as part of her personality. She opposed conservative gender role expectations and related restrictions she and other girls were subject to in their local Turkey-origin community. She underlines that she felt very disturbed by the unequal treatment of girls and boys during her childhood and youth which she observed in wider family circles and in German-Turkish families she knew. While the behavior of girls was moralized and restricted, the behavior of boys often was not restricted.[185] She states that she started to rebel against this differential treatment and when she was a youngster:

> "From a certain age on, I was a total rebel at home, [...] I did not get along with certain things. The position of women within the family in Turkish culture […]/ that a lot of cultural (...) things were often actually justified with the religion. So, it [religion] was just always adapted the way they like it. [...] when it was about something that seemed very unfair to me, I just always opened my mouth, no matter where. So, if there were somehow 50 Turkish people in a room, I mustered up the courage to say: 'No, that's not right.' I don't know, if you somehow saw that a girl was not allowed to go to the school trip or that she was not allowed to go to

[183] 10-I2013, 31-33, 108 – 110, 114; 10-I2017, 3 – 19, 61
[184] 10-I2013, 107 – 108; 10-I2017, 22 - 37
[185] 10-I2017, 3, 7, 11, 12 – 15; 10-I2017, 114

> swimming lessons. Yes, there I was always very open minded and a problem child of parents." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

What Ayla criticizes here is the culturalization of religion by men, to justify gendered oppression against young girls and youngsters. In comparison to the ethnicization of German-Turkish people in the public discourse in Germany in which they are mainly perceived as members of their ethnic group (see section 3.6.), Ayla's statements draw a contrary picture. She delineates herself from the particular Turkish community that she knows in Germany by means of criticizing a conservatism that manifests itself in a traditional gender ideology that is reproduced by the older generations. Based on her experience as a young girl and youngster, she states:

> "When you start to restrict your daughters […] that's when I say, 'That's just inacceptable. Germany is developing. You don't accept the development there either. Turkey is developing. You don't accept anything there either. You just stand still.' […]. And above all, you can't expect that of your children, who are just growing up in Germany and who will have to get along there by themselves at some point in the future." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

On the grounds of gender inequality Ayla also criticizes a rigid and outdated understanding of society in Turkey and Germany of the older generations who are not catching up with progressing ideas about gender in both societies. She contextualizes "cultural (...) things" that were often "justified with the religion" – i.e. the culturalization of religion as a hegemonic instrument for justifying gendered constraints against girls and young women – with the social origin of the first generation of immigrants. In this reading, clinging to conservative values by means of following restrictive educational measures for girls and an unequal treatment of boys and girls becomes a strategy of conserving a village culture of the 1970s in the diaspora in Germany. She states that

> "they have only experienced the culture to a certain extent and have practically taken it with them from Turkey and Turkey has developed and they have not experienced this. [...] [T]hey somehow cannot accept that there are people in Turkey, for example, who are not Islamic or/ [...] They just have their certain image and they still know Turkey [the way] it was twenty years ago. [...]. And they just haven't witnessed this whole development. [...]. And yes, as I said, I always try to enlighten them and to say: 'Hey, Turkey has also developed. There are gays and lesbians here. There are people who don't believe in God, there are people who don't like being Turkish. Because there are people here who oppose the system.' [...] Or the girls, they are really quite open [*freizügig*] here and in Germany, they always think: 'No, we have to remain Turkish and we have to maintain our culture.'" (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

Ayla argues from an urban perception. Contrary to her grandparents' village of origin in East-Anatolia, Ayla lives in a central neighborhood which bundles many different lifestyles. The fact that the German-Turkish community she describes could only maintain such conservative norms can also be interpreted in the light of the German state's decade-lasting denial that Germany had transformed into a country of immigration and in the light of immigrants' lacking political rights (see section 3.3.-3.5.). An ethnicizing citizenship discourse and lacking access to education has caused some groups of Tukey-origin immigrants of the first generations to organize mainly in their ethnic communities (Ibid and section 3.6.). Moreover, the class context here is also crucial: While the first-generation immigrants had a lower educational background and grew up in another time, namely the 1960s and 1970s often in economically deprived situations in villages in Turkey, Germany's postmigrants of the next generations underwent significant upward mobility (see section 3.5.).

Some other interlocutors[186] have raised a similar criticism towards the older generations as sticking to conservative values of the 1960s and 1970s and in particular have addressed gender role expectations. Based on their experience of living in cities in Turkey, they identify related norms and constraints against girls as outdated. Their statements also entail a criticism not only of the first generations' reluctance to adapt to the liberalization of gender norms and gender equality in Germany and in Turkey. Some of them also phrase their statements as a reproach to the older generations who expected of young girls and youngsters to comply with gendered restrictions despite the fact that they as members of the next generation were born into and raised in another cultural, social and institutional setting. Not only did they want to they also had to comply with alternate ideas about gender at school and among their peers. Even if they sympathized with the latter which for them implies no gendered segregation, this also means that they experienced a social pressure exerted by several social and institutional fields. They were caught up between the expectations of the family and/or the community of descent on the one hand and the educational infrastructure as well as their own age group on the other hand (see also section 5.3.1.).

[186] 2-I2013, 238; 13-I2013, 11; 16-I2017, 86; 13-I2013, 11; 17-I2017, 54, 289

5.1.2. Culturalization of Religion: Negotiating Intersectional Exclusion

Ayla[187] narrates an experience of racialized discrimination against her around the time of the September 11 terrorist attacks when she was racially offended by an elderly German man in the public when she was on a train. The incident she quotes needs to be contextualized with the rise of Islamophobia after 9/11. I have outlined in section 3.6. and section 3.5. that Islam became a security issue in German policies and in addition was also discursively addressed as security threat in the aftermath of 9/11. Ayla's experience of discrimination relates to her social location defined by the intersectionality of the social divisions Muslim, female and immigrant descent in Germany. In 2017, Ayla tells me about the social pressure, she experienced based on her intersectional social location as Muslim German-Turkish woman in Germany, stating:

> "But there were still certain moments where I felt as a Muslim woman, now less as a woman, but as a Muslim woman (...) you have always paid more attention to how you position yourself. [...] Because in Germany you have to embody something all the time. Because you are always being asked about certain things. Because people have certain prejudices, they come and take you as an example. And I was always busy with representing myself and my lifestyle and so on. 'No, you have seen certain things, but that is not always the case. Look at me. I'm open-minded.' Then I always talked about my family. So, there I was always a little bit more under pressure than here I must say." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

Ayla's statement needs to be situated in the citizenship discourse in Germany. After 9/11 German-Turkish people were often represented along religious and ethno-cultural lines. Political debates in mainstream media about Muslim people often connected Islam to integration problems and fundamentalism. In this ethno-cultural and orientalist citizenship discourse, people in speaker positions have constructed and still construct and ostracize Muslims as Others of the German nation. This racialization based on the ascribed category Muslim occurs regardless of whether those designated as Others grew up in Germany, were born in Germany or speak German as mother tongue language. Against this backdrop, people who inter alia identify as Muslim increasingly have become target of racialized discrimination coupled with Islamophobia (see sections 3.5., 3.6.). Muslim women who decide to wear a headscarf are often subject to the intersectionality of this discourse. In this debate, the headscarf functions as a symbol of

[187] 10-I2013, 144-146

representing a binary opposition between the western German emancipated woman and the Muslim woman who is represented as and assumed to be the oppressed victim of patriarchal dominance and conservative gender relations.[188] German-Turkish second or third generation women like Ayla who identify as Muslim (among many other realms of self-identification) have to position themselves vis-à-vis related stereotypes. Like their hybrid experiences with gender norms, their agency, and their commonalities with mainstream society are not acknowledged, while the pressure of representing an example against associated stereotypes becomes part of their everyday experience in Germany. Ayla has developed a coping strategy of self-protection for related experiences. Part of this strategy is that she does not permit herself to feel excluded. She also applies a tactic of initiating dialogue and to work against stereotypes. She states:

> "Sure, at times there was discrimination here and there. Also because of the headscarf. But I've always reacted in a pretty relaxed way. And that was actually the best response I could give. Because like that maybe people started to think about it somehow. [...]. So, I always tried to find a dialogue somehow. And yes. So, I did pretty well with it. Somehow, I didn't feel outcasted or anything like that." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

Ayla concentrates on experiences of inclusion. She does not spend much time in narrating the content of insults by the offender in the train. Instead she underlines how in that particular situation other passengers on the train stood up for her, defended her and acknowledged her strategy of dialogue:

> "And, yes, I didn't listen at all at the beginning. And then I noticed how the Germans showed civil courage. And then everyone said: 'No, calm down now'. [...] I thought that was really good and I didn't talk so much anymore. I just let him babble and so on. And then I got out of the train and then just before I got out, I wished him a nice evening or something like that [...][A]nd then people kind of clapped and one of the older women [said something] like: 'Hey cool reaction, I think it's good that you reacted like that and didn't somehow get down on his level.' It was pretty cool." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

In Ayla's experience, racialized exclusion is publicly condemned and evokes bystanders' civil courage. She rationalizes the offender's behavior not only with the 9/11 attacks but also with the Islamophobic media coverage in Germany. Other women have as well pointed out that tabloid newspapers and mainstream media have reproduced a racist and Islamophobic social climate in Germany which translate into

[188] See for example (Riegel, 2003; Yıldız, 2009; El-Menouar, 2015; Erel, 2009; Decker *et al.*, 2020).

people's reactions towards them.[189] I was bothered myself by the platform that was provided for fundamentalist Salafi preachers in mainstream political talk shows with a wide broadcasting range, while regular people who identify as Muslim or Muslim spokespeople were hardly ever invited. Ruhrmann, Sommer and Uhlemann found in 2006 that more than one-third of the news reports on migrants and migration topics in Germany focused on the terrorism debate together with mentioning Moroccans and Turks (2006, p. 46).

In comparison to other interlocutors Ayla's experiences with the attribution *Almancı* in Turkey are not noteworthy for her (see sections 5.2.3., 5.3.4., 5.3.4.). In 2013, she assesses the discrimination against her based on her self-identification as Muslim woman as more significant in Turkey than in Germany. This is so, because the categorization she experiences impacts her own social niche, spheres of her everyday life that are important to her:

> "In Germany, people actually reacted more positively to my headgear in some cases. When I somehow went to a club [...]. Then they were just pretty relaxed. [...] But here people are just not used to it. Because there is really only this parallel society here. On the one hand, there are these alternative people, these open-minded people who grew up, how shall I say, quite relaxed. And then there's just this other conservative society. [I ask for an example.] Well, that was in this reggae club [...]. There were already some strange gazes and people thought to themselves, 'Huh? What is she doing here?' [...] just from the gazes you noticed: 'Something is not right.' [...] That made me quite sad. [...]. That people in 2013 think like that. [...] Especially in a reggae club. You know? Where all the people should actually be a bit more relaxed, where the philosophy is actually quite different. Yes." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

Ayla who sees her self-identification with religion as a private matter is target of normative expectations of Muslim women in a space she assessed as safe prior to the experience she quotes. In that particular moment, her religious belonging is not priority, she wants to participate in the community people who affiliate with reggae music, a sub-culture she could be part of without making related experiences in Germany. The gazes she experiences deny her membership to this community in Istanbul based on the categorization she experiences due to her religious belonging. She rationalizes this experience with the polarization between religious segments and secular rather left-wing segments of society in Turkey (see also Weißenberg, 2020, pp. 167–168). I have

[189] 2-I2017, 73; 4-I2017, 86, 27-I2017, 171

outlined that several women perceive a social climate of political polarization that is defined by intolerance towards those who do not identify along polarized poles. In this setting Ayla who mixes elements from both "sides" experiences a pressure to position herself politically or along either or religious-secular lines (see section 4.2.1.). Ayla's disappointment results from the fact that she cannot participate in a social setting – the reggae subculture – which she has experienced as safe and space of free expression in Germany.

5.1.3. Friendships and Corresponding Translocal Attachments

Ayla's plural cultural sense of belonging mirrors a sense of belonging that is uttered by the majority of interlocutors. I have quoted her strong statement in which she locates her cultural belonging along multiple cultural lines (German, Turkish, Italian, Greek) while also referring to a local sense of belonging (Swabia), citing the region she grew up in. She contextualizes her cosmopolitan sense of belonging with the culturally diverse neighborhood, she grew up in Germany (Weißenberg, 2017, p. 127). In different parts of her narrative in 2013 and in 2017, she describes that she misses this international atmosphere in Istanbul that also shaped her childhood and youth of interacting with people from different cultures and hearing different kinds of languages in the public sphere.[190]

In 2013, Ayla's German-Turkish socialization is an important reference point for her in Istanbul that delineates her from Turkey-origin natives. She states, she can relate more to people who also grew up in Germany. For this reason, she maintains friendships with German-Turkish people. Her statements illustrate why maintaining those contacts is important to her:

> "First, you can behave freely. The mother tongue is still German. So, I can't oppose it […] my mother tongue is German. And I can just communicate more freely. And I don't have to constantly try to somehow / Yes, how should I say? So, when I make some kind of statement, they understand directly what I mean. Because we have the same background. As German-Turks. Yes, the past also binds you quite a lot. If I somehow talk about Stuttgart, then they understand that directly. So [I] just feel freer. Like/ if I had to tell a Turk from Turkey: 'Yes, but in Stuttgart it was like this and like that.' You always have to/ yes, the struggle is just a bit bigger. I have an easier time with German-Turks. The mentality is

[190] 10-I2013, 108 - 110; 10-I2017, 9, 61

> also completely different (laughs). Punctuality." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

In 2013, Ayla[191] has been living in Istanbul for roughly three years. Her history in Germany connects her to other German-Turkish people in Istanbul. The common history of having spent childhood and youth in Germany and practicing the language is the reason why Ayla searches and maintains contact with German-Turkish friends. Since she does not share this common history with Turkey-origin native people, she can experience sameness and commonality among German-Turkish friends. As she identifies with German language which she perceives other than Turkish as her mother tongue, this space allows her to freely express herself without any language barriers and to be understood by significant others who share the same cultural codes such as language, food preferences and similar interests when going out on weekends as she quotes elsewhere. She delineates herself from music preferences, she situates in Turkey. Her German-Turkish sense of beloging is however not in any way related to ethnicity but based on the social experience of commonality with others who can move and understand two cultural and social contexts.

Elsewhere, she mentions that it is not only German language, but also the freedom to mix elements of German and Turkish language and culture that connects her to other German-Turkish people. She states:

> "We have well/ we are somehow something in between. We all share that. So not really German. But not really Turkish either. And there we just have the common language that allows us to just be ourselves." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

One interlocutor has designated the practice of mixing of German and Turkish language *Deukisch* (Gerkish).[192] Ayla's self-identification with German-Turkish people in 2013, does not imply that that she socially isolates herself. In Istanbul she maintains international friendships and friendships with Turkey-origin native friends. She is married to a Turkey-origin husband in 2017.[193]

With respect to Germany, Ayla stresses her cosmopolitan sense of belonging based on the friendships she maintained with people from other cultures and religions in her immediate neighborhood and beyond. She underlines that she only had two female

[191] 10-I2013, 72; 10-I2013, 74
[192] 19-I2017, 209
[193] 10PM2013, 9; 10-I2013, 64 – 74; 10FN2017, 1, 10-I2017, 9, 10, 80

friends with Turkish ancestors who were "freedom loving" like her insofar as they also contested normative gender role expectations. She explains her disagreement with the gender role expectations of the rather conservative German-Turkish community in her hometown neighborhood is the reason why she delineates herself from that social environment and did not maintain friendships with other German-Turkish people (see above).

Ayla's statements illustrate that her sense of belonging to the German-Turkish community and her ties to Germany are meaningful in a setting in a larger social environment with a different socialization experience. Friendships with German-Turkish individuals in Istanbul allow her to act out and relate to her translocal and transnational biographic, linguistic and culinary ties. While such ties are not given in Istanbul, they are in Germany. In Istanbul, she chooses to maintain German-Turkish and other friendship relations. She has built a life of her own, independent from the parental home and German-Turkish community ties, she did not choose because she was raised in them (see section 4.3.3.). Following her narrative, it is more important for her to engage in cosmopolitan friendship ties in Germany while delineating herself from the Turkish community of her neighborhood of origin because she contests the conservative gender role ideology of that particular setting.

5.1.4. Religion and Socialized Community Membership

Ayla identifies with Sunni-Islam in her personal life. She fasts during Ramadan but apart from religious duties, she conceives her religion as moral guide as far as certain normative principles are concerned. She associates her religion with

> "[c]ertain things that have nothing to do with duty but simply with the conscience of a Muslim somehow. So not to gossip about people, do no harm to anyone. Or to be able to stand up in the face of injustice and to speak the truth or simply do the right thing. That is still important. But these are things that I have internalized and they will not go away." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

In her everyday life, Ayla lives a syncretism in which she mixes elements of her religion that are important to her with profane everyday life practices that do not always comply with official orthodox ways.

Ayla cannot relate to what she has come to know as Sunni-Islam in Turkey. She criticizes that Islam is instrumentalized as "political mouthpiece" in the weekly Friday sermons prepared by *Diyanet*. *Diyanet*, the Presidency of Religious Affairs, a state

institution that manages religious affairs in Turkey. *Diyanet* reports to the prime ministry and was institutionalized under Atatürk with the goal of secular control over Islam in Turkey. After almost 20 years of AKP rule, *Diyanet* somewhat also represents the interests of the AKP government (see section 3.5.).

While a mosque only serves the purpose of sermons and worship in Turkey, Ayla feels more connected to Islam in Germany. In Germany, she perceived a mosque as "more spiritual" but it was also a social place for her. She was part of a culturally mixed discussion group of believers. In weekly meetings, she and other group members discussed and interpreted a different sura of the Quran with the help of a spiritual leader of a hyphenated cultural background. In comparison to Turkey, being part of that spiritual community felt "much more intense and much more community-like."[194] Ayla is not alone with this stance. Other interlocutors have also mentioned that they cannot relate to Islam in Turkey and note that they feel more connected to spiritual life as they got to know it in places of worship in Germany. While religious practice is something they mainly go after in private by themselves, they describe the religious community as mainly fulfilling a social purpose of community membership. In Leyla's words: "Actually, it's about meeting people, talking and then maybe pray a round in between and then sitting down and talking some more."[195]

Since Turkey-origin immigrants did not have political rights in Germany, until they could opt for German citizenship, associational life in Germany constituted one way of channeling cultural, political and religious minority interests in Germany while maintaining ties to spokespeople in Turkey.[196] Several interlocutors who identify as Muslim describe their respective religious communities as functioning like a "cultural center", a "cultural association" or a "meeting place" where they come together as members of a minority and can casually meet friends. Simultaneously, the different congregations function as a realm of civil society in various respects. Several women note that their local congregation in Germany was a social place of belonging and membership as they participated in and organized activities such as learning and studying religion, pilgrimage traveling, leisure activities or interreligious dialogue or volunteered in youth groups, grass-roots charity activities and school tutoring activities.

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[194] 10-I2017, 41 – 45, 47 – 51
[195] 16-I2017, 192
[196] For some of the major Turkish organizations in Germany see for example (Amelina and Faist, 2008)

While these places of social interaction are perceived and also serve as decentral localities for local civil, social and religious practice, many of the mentioned congregations are part of the *DİTİB* network of mosques in Germany. Despite the experience of community life several women underline, *DİTİB* still functions as a centralized institution that although organized as civil society association in Germany still answers to *Diyanet* (see section 3.5.).[197] It must also be added that the German state left matters of Islamic education to the Islamic institutions in Germany instead of building an infrastructure of religious education in schools.

This social aspect of community life is something several of the pious women miss in Tukey. Mosques mainly serve the eds of sermons and prayer. This has been the case in Turkey ever since traditional primary schools (*mekteps*) and Islamic colleagues (*medereses*) which were attached to mosques and religious foundations (*vakfi*) were brought under central state control in the late Ottoman empire culminating in their closure under the law of unification of education in 1924, in line with other secular reforms after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The formerly decentralized Islamic education in Turkey was abolished. Broader religious education was left to the Quran schools which were brought under the supervision of *Diyanet* (Özdalga, 2018). Only under the military interregnum in the beginning of the 1980s, religion was implemented as compulsory component in primary and secondary schools. It can be argued that this public and civil aspect of Islam which was dissolved in Turkey with the secular reforms has somewhat been revived in Germany. While *DİTİB* is not exempt from the women's criticism, they perceive Islam in Turkey as too politicized in comparison to their experiences with Islam in Germany and prefer a form of secularism in which religion is more independent from the government/state or at least not controlled by it in a central way.

5.1.5. Cosmopolitan Belonging in Urban Landscapes of Heterogeneity

Ayla's[198] fascination with Istanbul and city life has brought her there. While she identifies with her cosmopolitan neighborhood from her town of origin in Germany, she also stresses that she had the urge to leave town life to get to know other places. For that reason, she spent a lot of time in the next larger city *Stuttgart*. Ayla contrasts life in

[197] 1-I2012, 95; 1-I2017, 235, 241; 19-I2017, 64 – 66, 285 – 287, 291, 295; 16-I2017 192; 15-I2017, 262 – 265; 266 – 281, 313 – 317; 15PS2017, 23; 28-I2017, 31
[198] 10-I2013, 11, 17, 29, 45 – 46, 50, 78, 80, 82 – 86; 10-I2017, 39, 41, 53, 80, 124

Germany with city life in Istanbul. She perceived life in Germany as boring because of lacking leisure opportunities and the dominance of everyday life routine. In comparison, the metropole of Istanbul had much more to offer. Simultaneously, Ayla's migration to Istanbul was also a search for the self, an act of emancipating herself form family and friends. In Germany, she was "distracted" from herself as she took over a care taking role in which she was "constantly being there for others" (see also section 4.3.3.).

Ayla became acquainted with the city of Istanbul and some of its central neighborhoods during a holiday when she strolled through streets. She was attracted by the city's heterogeneous lifestyles. She explains her fascination with the "spirit" of the city as manifesting itself in the different cultures and diverse types of people, qualities that made Istanbul a livable place for her (see also section 4.3.3.). Moreover, the city's liveliness and the manifold leisure opportunities in comparison to her hometown in Germany were something, she enjoyed during her first years of settlement in Istanbul. In 2013, she remembers that she threw herself into social life after her arrival stating:

> "[I w]as actually constantly outside (laughs). So, I've actually only now come to rest a bit and just started to live the spirit of the city properly. Sometimes you were just always running under adrenaline. And go THERE and go there and see as much as possible. And to collect as many impressions as possible. And now, there is just a little down. Now you're just a part of the city." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

In her search for the self, Istanbul became the location where she could concentrate on her interests and hobbies and realize her independence from responsibilities for others. Her sense of home and the meaning she associates with it underlines this crucial aspect of self-realization as she states:

> "Home is where your heart is at (laughs). Yes, I simply have to feel at home Melli [interviewer]. [...] You also have to work out your home a bit yourself. It's like a bird that builds its own nest. […]. If you furnish your apartment, which you share with your husband, so that you feel comfortable, then you are at home here. It's really a question of putting it together yourself. […] I somehow choose a light that I like. And that's where I feel at home. Because it's warm, because it gives me a sense of security. Because it gives me warmth, because it gives me security. Home is actually something very complicated. What is home? I don't feel at home now somehow because I belong to some nationality or because I have enjoyed a certain relationship or because I was born in Germany now, I don't feel at home in Germany or here. Somehow, at home is so relative. It doesn't really exist. I just have to feel comfortable." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

In her definition of home as an aspect of self-making, Ayla explicitly delineates membership in the German or Turkish nation from her meaning of home. The locality of home can be anywhere as long as Ayla has a safe-built space to retreat to. But Ayla's narrative about home also reveals her local attachment to the neighborhood she chose to live in. She states:

> "I actually feel a bit at home in neighborhood X, because it's/ It's like/ it has a little bit of both. Neighborhood X is actually very European. With its relaxed culture, with its many people, multi-faceted people. It must be quiet; it must be warm. In the first place, my freedom, I have to still be able to enjoy my liberties. It is also safe here. So, it's actually also everything that my apartment also offers. I have my degree of freedom here, it's safe, I don't live in *Gazi* now, where I'm constantly harassed. It has to be warm and colorful. It has to be safe and I have to be able to live my freedom in the first place, which means I have to be able to walk around outside at three in the morning. (...) And the freedom, when I feel like going out, that everything is really close." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

Ayla's concern shows how a sense of freedom is inherently connected to security. The freedom to claim the streets at night is also voiced by another woman I met. Selecting a neighborhood to start a life in where they can claim the streets at night as women presents a need for and a strategy to equal access to the public sphere like men.[199] Security for women at night in Istanbul's public spaces is not given in any neighborhood (see section 4.3.4.). But it is important to note that security in the urban public sphere is a universal concern for women all over the world.[200] Women not only have to struggle with violence but also face a victim blaming mentality where advices like staying at home at night to prevent assaults and incidents of sexualized violence are often proposed as a solution. Women's organizations and women's rights activists keep on underlining that the problem is about equal access to the public sphere. A problem that can only be solved with political measures and a rethinking on gender equality.

Ayla's statements show that home it is not only her apartment, she furnishes and chooses but also the neighborhood she has selected. There she can find what made Istanbul an attractive destination of migration for her in the first place: the heterogeneity of lifestyles she associates with city life. The cultural diversity of her neighborhood corresponds to cosmopolitan aspects of her own history in Germany and to her cultural sese of belonging. On the other hand, Ayla also expresses a 'city fatigue' (see section 4.3.3.).

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[199] 10-I2017, 124
[200] See for example the latest discussions around the death of Sarah Everard.

In 2017, Ayla is weary of the city's noisiness and crowds. She has been living in Istanbul for seven years and perceives life there as "routine". Around the time of the constitutional referendum, her cosmopolitan sense of belonging becomes difficult to negotiate as she is increasingly facing situations in which she is categorized. A crucial component of her belonging, namely opportunities for exchange between different segments of society and groups decrease in a social climate of polarized political positions and worldviews.

5.1.6. Work Life and Attachment to Social Norms in Germany

In her work life, Ayla assesses styles of handling work matters in Turkey as conflicting with her own experiences and expectations. She traces her discontent with work culture in Turkey back to her socialization in Germany. She associates such conflicting experiences of norms in day-to-day life at work with notions like *Zuverlässigkeit* (reliability) and *Selbstverständlichkeit*, a word she finds untranslatable into Turkish language. *Selbstverständlichkeit* means things given/taken for granted. As far as work life is concerned, she associates *Selbstverständlichkeit* with social norms, she situates in Germany, referring to punctuality and discipline. Her discontent overlaps with her city fatigue as she explains her concern as follows:

> "Rules, certain rules that have to be followed. I'm not the type who points fingers and maintains that all the rules have to be in place, but there are certain things that are important. Somehow, that the construction sites are not operating on Sundays or that the neighbors are just a little quieter." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

She is aware of not essentializing and generalizing work culture in Turkey as undisciplined and ignoring rules. She underlines that she merely refers to specific situations and that her upbringing in Germany has shaped her perception. She also sees herself in a position in which she has to adapt to other ways stating, "These are just things that you learn over time. Or you don't pay so much attention to punctuality anymore". She notes that she has to get "accustomed with" a different style of working and that she needs to "loosen up a bit".[201] Her statements about conflicting styles of work present also a way of delineating herself by virtue of identifying with punctuality which she assesses as a collective "routine" for people who "grew up in Germany".[202]

[201] 10-I2013, 19, 92
[202] 10-I2013, 88, 92, 94; 10-I2017, 116, 114

5.1.7. Political Belonging and Citizenship Practices

Ayla[203] is politically interested and active for her own rights and the rights of various marginalized groups. Her way of articulating her political claims is the street. When I met her in 2013, Ayla had been participating in the Gezi Protests which started in Istanbul in the end of May. Some of the concerns of the different groups that protested – also in other cities in Turkey – was the rising authoritarianism, the AKP's urban planning, restrictions of freedom of expression, thought and assembly and police violence. Ayla explained that she was sceptic about the Gezi Protests at first. She also criticizes the secular state elite in Turkey and the secular political party's[204] elitism which according to her prevented the participation of conservative segments in society in Turkey. The Gezi protests indicate a change in her political position and her perception of AKP policies. She explains this transformation as follows:

> "When I was in Germany, I noticed [...] when the CHP was in government [...] that the conservative part for example was often neglected or seen as a second-choice citizen, because the girls, all those who were covered, for example, they were not allowed to go to university. They wanted to keep down the whole lower class, which actually consists of those [who are] slightly conservative. They didn't want to see people in higher positions and so on. And that really annoyed me. Because I am still a Muslim woman. No matter how open I am. And no matter how tolerant I am. I just don't like it when a certain part of society is somehow suppressed [...]. And then I realized at some point, 'Hey, the ones up there just aren't doing their job well. [...] It's really about getting their own pockets full' [...]. And then I started to get involved at some point. [...] I also went to the demonstrations. And then I just saw the police violence there, which was not cool." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

In this narrative, Ayla highlights a class divide in Turkey. She refers to the lacking access of lower classes – often pious people – to resources like education and higher positions in society. This statement can be interpreted in the light of a cleavage in society in Turkey that has been caused by state institutions and an urban state elite which has sticked to the political culture of Kemalist nationalism. In this reading, it is the membership to the Turkish nation that is supposed to transcend particular ethnic, religious interests and class conflicts. Throughout contemporary Turkish history, the secularist establishment – the bureaucratic state elite, including members of upper-class segments and state institutions such as the Turkish military, has interpreted class-based

[203] 10-I2013, 126; 10PM, 8, 10-11; 10FN2017_1, 2, 3; 10-I2017, 47, 108, 120, 138
[204] CHP - Cumhürriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican People's Party)

politics and identity politics as reactionary threat to the unity of the Turkish nation and as violating the principle of secularism as several occasions in Turkish history show. As a consequence, political interests based on class, ethnicity and religion have been impeded and suppressed, a climate in which controversial political interests could not be articulated and discussed in the political landscape (Parla and Davison, 2004). Due to the lacking economic and political participation of different interest groups in the Turkish political landscape and due to the centralized state in Turkey, opposition was mainly interpreted as reactionism. Although, this has changed with the rise of identity politics in the 1980s and the rise of the Islamic bourgeoisie[205] in the 1990s, there still remain large segments urban poor and marginalized people living on the countryside who often also represent pious segments of society and have lacking access to economic participation in Turkey (White, 2002, 2008).

Ayla's quote above needs to be situated with her family history and class-related characteristics about German-Turkish immigrants in general. The majority of labor migrants came from rural areas of Turkey and from economically deprived households with a lower educational background (see section 3.2.). Based on Ayla's own subject position as a grandchild and child of former labor migrants and as Muslim woman, she criticizes Muslim women's exclusion from the social rights to education and solidarizes with Muslim women's collevtive claims for equal access to education in Turkey. The secular Turkish state banned the headscarf from public offices and universities which kept many Muslim women from accessing higher education unless they did not take off their headgear or wore a wig. Protests against the headscarf ban started in the late 1990s. The AKP's attempts to change the constitution and to lift the ban were not successful as the Constitutional Court ruled that the AKP was "guilty of anti-secular activities" (Arat and Pamuk, 2019, p. 104). Arat and Pamuk (2019, p. 240) explain the Turkish state authorities' political practice as follows: "The secularist state elites, including the judges in high courts, interpreted the headscarf as a symbol of opposition to the secular Republic and as attempt to organize public life according to Islamic dictates." The headscarf controversy lasted until the headscarf ban was repealed in 2013 (Arat and Pamuk, 2019, p. 253). Arat underlines that many of the women who engaged in protests against the headscarf ban "believed in basic secular rights, individual autonomy and

[205] An organization which successfully bundles interests of small and medium size businesses of Islamic business people is the organization MÜSIAD that was founded in 1990.

self-expression" and "adopted the fundamental principles of the Republic". Leyla Şahin, for example whose application to the European Court of Human Rights was not a success, had argued that the headscarf ban would undermine her freedom of religion and not violate republican values and individual rights of others (Arat, 2008, pp. 411–413). Ayla also believes in secular rights as she advocates for the separation of state and religion as outlined above. Her main motivation for joining the Gezi protests was the equal access to political participation and rights in society different opposition groups claimed. Her reasoning explains how her belief in secular principles in terms of separating state and religion overlaps with her criticism of the AKP government and her motivation to join the Gezi protests:

> "Turkey is still secular. Everyone should just do what they want, as long as they don't harm others in the process. And I am still in favor of that. I also don't want the old government which somehow misunderstood this laicism a bit. Well, I'm simply in favor of everyone getting their rights, as long as they don't harm anyone else. To live the way, they want to. And that's why I was there." (Ayla, 1979 - 05.07.2013)

On the grounds of her political activism, Ayla also started to claim membership in the political opposition during and after the Gezi protests. Ayla criticizes police violence against opposition groups and the emotional rhetoric of Erdoğan whom she assessed as using religion for political purposes of getting the support of pious citizens. In Ayla's opinion, Erdoğan "is using Islam to just kind of get most of the population on his side".[206] In Turkey, she has criticized the AKP and Erdoğan for delegitimizing different group's claims to rights to political justice and membership in the political community by means of protesting and she has experienced police violence on several of these occasions. In Germany, Ayla has participated in the large *Stuttgart 21* protests in 2010 against the controversial central station construction project and the police violence against opponents. In Istanbul she participated in the May Day protests, in protests against insecure working conditions for construction workers and in the demonstrations against election fraud after the constitutional referendum. In some of these demonstrations, she has also volunteered for medical assistance.

In 2017, she politically identified with the Democratic Party of the Peoples (HDP, *Halkların Demokratik Partisi*), which mainly represents Kurdish interests and that – as I am writing this section in Mach 2021 – will be banned after a move of Turkey's

[206] 10-I2013, 126

prosecutor who filed a case with the Constitutional Court accusing the party of links with militant groups. Ayla volunteered as election observer for the HDP's ballot box in her neighborhood during the constitutional referendum for or against a Presidential System in Turkey in 2017. After allegations of electoral fraud, she joined the protests which took place on the election day and the days that followed in front of the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK, *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*). She could confirm election fraud in her own local office as the final election results in favor of the Presidential System were officially declared before the votes of the ballot box, she was in charge for, were counted. Based on Ayla's political activism, it is not astonishing that she also quotes a political moment when I ask her in which situations, she feels like she belongs in Germany and in Turkey. She states:

> "when this referendum took place and so many people took to the streets because they didn't accept this manipulation, that was the last time I felt like I belonged again. Because I realized, 'Hey, I'm not alone.' And within an hour, a few thousand people were able to get together. That was just nice once again. A bit like Gezi. Because everyone thinks they're sitting alone at home with their problems, with their news, with which they have to cope. And there you just realized again: 'Hey, I'm not alone.'" (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

Ayla's description of social affiliations and her political identity in the politics of belonging relate to her translocal cosmopolitan experience and her self-making along those lines. Apart from her own circle of friends whose world views correspond to her own, she also feels like she belongs in situations when she sits together with

> "people who do not share your opinion, but who nevertheless remain polite and accept your opinion. That was the case in Germany, and it's the same here. And that you simply/ there are people who can deal with a different opinion, then I feel like I belong. They don't always have to share my opinion." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

It can be concluded that Ayla's political citizenship practices of protest vis-à-vis the secular state elite, the AKP-government and for political justice constitute an important element of her belonging. Her protest against second class citizenship and for equal participation of different segments in Turkish society not only correspond to cosmopolitan allegiances but to her allegiances with different marginalized groups, she identifies and solidarizes with based on gender, religion, class and ethnicity.

5.1.8. Spatial Practice and Attachment to (translocal) Spaces

Ayla's narrative reveals that her spatial practices and her perception of space connect her to places and evoke a sense of transnational belonging. When I asked her whether

there is something that specifically links her to Turkey, which she cannot find in Germany, she refers to the nature in Turkey and continues as follows:

> "Or just a lot of influences, whether that is now/ so here you can actually use all the senses that you have, like sense of smell (laughs), you can live them out a bit more. You see much more, you feel much more, you are somehow more alive. Everything is not quite so monotonous. You just notice that you're alive […]. Good or bad, that depends." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

This statement fits into her narrative of attachment to the city of Istanbul and the qualities she associates with urbanity. Ayla can access her senses more fully in the metropole of Istanbul. As I have outlined in section 4.3.3., she rationalizes the act of strolling through the streets of Istanbul as a moment when she "absorbed the spirit" of the city. In this moment, she became attached to the city and considered it as a potential location to start a life in. Above Ayla has also mentioned that she started "to live the spirit of the city" in the beginning of her settlement. Accordingly, she engaged in different kinds of leisure activities in the public sphere "to collect as many impressions as possible". De Certeau has argued that "space is a practiced place" and that the street which is "geometrically defined by urban planning is transformed into as space by walkers." (see also section 2.1.5.). A place only becomes meaningful through the experience and practices of agents in it. Ayla's experience of moving in the public sphere and her perception are what makes Istanbul a space, a place she attaches meaning to, based on her experience, her impressions of diversity and density and her sensual perceptions.

In fact, it seems like the street is a central theme in Ayla's biography and, as a practiced placej, it becomes a space that bundles various aspects of her belonging. The street appears in her narrative as the location where she played with children of different cultural backgrounds in the multicultural neighborhood she grew up in Germany. The streets she strolled in were the spaces where she became attached to Istanbul and started considering it as a potential migration destination. She selected a neighborhood where she can access the streets at night as woman. Last, the streets constitute an important aspect of her political belonging when she appropriates it with others as a member of political opposition groups on different occasions of protest.

An additional spatial practice of belonging is connected to Ayla's culinary experiences. When I asked Ayla, whether there are any practices or situations in which she feels

connected to Germany or her place of origin, she cites the act of baking cookies during the Christmas season. She continues as follows:

> "Yes. I also plan to somehow, when I have kids someday, hide Easter eggs. So certain things that you just did not notice at the time, but which were still sweet, somehow. My mother has always paid attention to it. At Christmas, she always let us put our boots out. You just miss that a little bit. These sweet things. Festivities were always important to me. Carnival just doesn't exist here." (Ayla, 1979 - 11.05.2017)

Ayla's longing and connection to her place of origin relates to her past experience of celebrating traditional festivities such as Christmas, Easter and Carnival, traditions she in part has learned from her Germany-born mother and which she plans to pass on to her children. By baking Christmas cookies in Istanbul and experiencing of smell and taste this activity connects her to her place of origin in Germany and to memories, she associates with celebrating Christmas. In Soja's (1996, pp. 5, 11) words, Ayla connects her real place of residence with an imagined space, thus creating a third space of her own, a real-and-imagined space that is translocal as her perception connects two localities. In this practiced place, a translocal space she can relate to past experiences by means of evoking sensory experiences that connect her to celebrating Christmas in Germany. Like this, she produces a space of her own in which the past becomes a moment of the present (see also section 2.1.5.).

It can be argued that Ayla's intersectional and *translocational positionality* (see section 2.2.4.) along minority positions and her cosmopolitan history have taught her to not only bridge different world views but to also feel at home in a setting of diverse opinions. In connection with her social location, she has developed a sense of justice for minority positions which include women, Muslim women, ethnic minorities, the working class and opposition groups. She has made citizenship claims for gender equality as girl and young woman in the family, she has struggled with stereotypes as a Muslim and German-Turkish woman in Germany and in Turkey and also found tactics to arrange herself by creating her own niche of belonging, on the translocal level of the neighborhood and on the streets where she articulates claims for justice for others and for herself.

5.2. LARA: GLOBALIZED UPPER-CLASS BELONGING CONTESTING CULTURALIZATION-STRATEGIES

Lara is one of the most privileged interlocutors as far as citizenship rights, socio-economic, educational background and family history are concerned. Lara's affiliation

with her family history and upper-class identity present tactic of negotiating citizenship. By referring to her family's socio-economic and educational standing, she contests ethno-cultural and classicist attributions, she was labelled with in Germany and in Turkey. While her family also constitutes an important social group, her global sense of belonging is connected to her job in a multi-national company. Language as everyday life practice and cultural experience connects her to her present life in Turkey and to her past in Germany.

5.2.1. Negotiating Biography vis-à-vis Nuclear Family Essentialism

Lara was 29 years old and had been living in Istanbul for ten years when I meet her in 2017. She has the German nationality and the Blue Card.[207] As far as socio-economic background, income and citizenship rights are concerned, Lara's social location is privileged, in comparison to the positionality of other interlocutors in the sample. She graduated from a university in Germany in a discipline of technology. Lara is upwardly mobile (see sections 4.2.2., 4.3.1.); she has worked for several multi-national companies in Istanbul. She got married in 2012 and gave birth to her daughter in 2016. During my second fieldwork in 2017, Lara and I met several times when she was still on maternity leave and after she reentered her old job as an account manager.[208]

Lara's parents got divorced when she was a toddler and she was solely raised by her mother until the age of ten. Lara's mother migrated to Frankfurt in her early twenties. According to Lara, her mother's decision was influenced by the political violence and turmoil in the streets of Istanbul after the 1980's coup in Turkey and because she broke an engagement and had a distinguished job offer in Germany (see section 3.3.). Lara has a ten-year younger half-sister from her mother's second marriage. Lara relates to her stepfather as a parent. Her biological father is of the second generation and worked as a taxi driver. Her father's parents moved from a village in Turkey to Germany in the course of the labor migration agreement. Since her grandfather worked as a carpenter before migrating to Germany, her grandparents from her father's side belong to the more skilled peasantry and probably moved to Germany in the early stages of labor migration

[207] The Blue endows Turkey-origin migrants and postmigrants with another nationality with a citizenship status in Turkey according to which they have the right to work and acquire property in Turkey. Furthermore, they are entitled to receive inheritance, engage in business and investment activities and to attend schools and universities in Turkey (see section 3.6.).
[208] Since 2019, Lara lives in the Netherlands with her daughter and husband.

(see section 3.2.). Lara's father joined his parents in Germany when he was 18 years old.[209]

Lara[210] grew up in a central neighborhood in Frankfurt. An important aspect of her childhood is that she was raised by a working single mother. Contrary to stereotypes of Turkish women as solely responsible for household chore and upbringing of children Lara's case exemplifies the situation of second-generation children with working parents: Lara describes herself as latchkey child (*Schlüsselkind*)[211], an expression that summarizes that she had to be self-responsible at an early age. Wearing a key around her neck in primary school, nobody picked her up from school, she walked back home alone and spent time by herself until her mother came home from work. Lara states that she was taken care of by others for "a long time". Since she was a four-month-old infant, she was looked after in day nursery and in day care.

Lara interprets being looked after at a young age as something that was an advantage for her "on the long run" because she learned to be independent at a young age. She simultaneously underlines several times in her narrative that this by no means implies a lack of affection and care for her by her mother. She states:

> "And my mother provided me with a very nice childhood, she was also very successful in her job. She worked at X and that's why we didn't have any financial difficulties. Not even as a single mother. I can remember, for example, that we went on a holiday together twice every year." (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

As a professionally successful young mother herself, Lara looks up to her mother's financial independence and strength to pursue a professional career while looking after a child. Lara also underlines several times that she lived a "happy" and "carefree" childhood which she also designates "Tom Sawyer childhood" because she played a lot in the nature. Lara states that her friends were mainly Germans without migration background. After her mother remarried and gave birth to Lara's ten-year younger half-sister Lara and her mother moved in with her stepfather. Lara's statements about her mother's professional life, her childhood with her mother and in her new family read like a narrative against normative ideas about family as nuclear entity. Lara emphasizes that single motherhood can be the opposite of emotional and economic deprivation.

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[209] 6-I2013, 9, 40, 47 49, 202 - 203; 6FN2017 _4; 6-I2017, 9, 21-23, 29, 37
[210] 6-I2017, 9, 11, 13
[211] 6-I2017, 15; 7-I1-2017, 7; 19-I2017, 18

5.2.2. Everyday Life Manifestations of Ethno-cultural Citizenship in Germany

Despite, or it can also be argued because of Lara's privileged positionality, she has experienced racialized stereotyping during her childhood, youth and early adulthood in Germany. She explains the Othering and racializing statements, she experienced as triggered by two factors: her Turkish name and her phenotype. She remembers that she made her first experiences with such comments during her childhood and in puberty at primary and secondary school. The schools she attended were mainly visited by children without migration background. The following statement illustrates the kind of stereotype she was confronted with:

> "I was always perceived as a role model Turk [*Mustertürkin*]. Everyone/ so in school I always had As. And there it was always 'Ahh, look. Turk, but still an A student. Turkish, but still social. So socially active. Or committed. [...] Ahh, the pretty Turkish girl. The blonde Turk.' That was the image I had. That's why I was always perceived very positively. But always this: Turk, BUT. So very positive. So, yeah, I don't know. Like it was a handicap. You know? 'Oh, she's Turkish, but she's still quite smart.' That's how I was often perceived." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Born in 1987, Lara went to school during the early 1990s. I have illustrated in section 3.6. and in section 3.4. that the 1990s in Germany were characterized by a political debate of defining the German nation as ethno-cultural unity in the course of the reunification process. Not only were Germany-born people with a migration background from Turkey not considered as members of the ethno-cultural nation. A racialized discourse of purity othered Turkey-origin immigrants and postmigrants assuring the homogeneity of this ethno-cultural nation of decent. This citizenship discourse was backed by ethnicizing policies of integrating *Aussiedler*, ethnic German immigrants who based on their ethnic German descent had the right to make and made claims to citizenship (Räthzel, 1991, pp. 45–46; Mandel, 2008, pp. 202, 206–214).

The stereotypes and corresponding attributions Lara faced at school illustrate how this citizenship discourse manifests itself in society and is experienced in the everyday life. What Lara's social environment suggests here is the unsaid and works like the discourse of Orientalism (Said 1978; see section 2.1.2.). By stereotyping her as the smart, pretty, blond and socially integrated exception, Turkey-origin people are constructed as non-citizens and generalized as Lara's opposite: uneducated, dark-skinned, socially not integrated and so on. This act of labeling simultaneously carries a class dimension that defines the German citizen as belonging to the educated and progressive segments of society in Germany and Turkey-origin people as the ideal German citizen's opposite

(see sections 2.1.2., 2.2.2.). Räthzel (1991) in fact argues that Turkey-origin immigrants were strategically used as target to construct other migrants as "more or less Turkish" and more or less backward as far as demeaning references to class and integration processes were concerned. For this reason, an inclusive citizenship discourse ought to detach ethnicity from the idea of group membership and to let go of assumptions of ethnic groups and collective identities as facts, as Brubaker (2004) has underlined.

Lara narrates that she was continuously labelled as different during her young adulthood. The following two quotes exemplify what the many women I spoke to experienced and still experience in their everyday life in Germany.[212] Strategic exclusion takes the form of seemingly innocent statements, they experience over and over, often shortly after becoming acquainted with white Germans without migration background. The following two experiences of Lara are illustrative for what many women in the sample have stated:

> "[N]ow, for example, I meet someone new after a day or two or just by name - yes it was difficult. For example, if someone asked me what my name was (...) short conversation and then they ask for the name and then it's 'Ah. Where are you from? Where are you from?' Then to say 'Yes, I am from Turkey.' I always found that a bit strange. [...] I never really said I am from Turkey. Because I found it strange at that time. Because, after all, I was born in Germany." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

> "[A]nd then always the same comment 'Oh, but you speak good German' (disguises her voice). I found that so stupid. And also so humiliating, a bit. [...] 'Oh, too bad,' right? 'Such a nice girl, but Turkish.' Like that, right? I don't know. I've felt that way more than once." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

During her young adulthood in the mid-2000s, Lara's social membership in Germany is denied although she was born in Germany. The citizenship law became more inclusive with the transformation from the *jus sanguinis* (blood right) principle to the *jus soli* (birth right) principle of citizenship in 2000. The discourse my interlocutors were addressed within their everyday lives did however not become more inclusive and still communicates an understanding of citizenship in Germany as based on ethno-cultural membership. Being born and growing up in Germany, speaking German is not only an insufficient proof for membership. The fact that German-Turkish women are addressed with private questions of where their parents are from again and again appears like a

[212] 7-I2-2017, 15; 9-I2013, 239 – 243; 9-I2017, 11; 9-I2017, 29; 9-I2017, 44 – 48; 9-I2017, 50; 16PM2017Leyla, 9; 18-I2017, 125; 21PM2017, 15; 24-I2017, 109; 27-I2017, 91; 29-I2017, 42; 31-I2017, 137; 32-I2017, 48

social strategy of reassurance: Speakers want to make sure that the designated person is not "from German soil" even if born on German soil and speaking German as mother tongue language. In Mandel's words, the problematic idea of being German as based on descent that was used effectively for the *Aussiedler* while those who are designated "as non-ethnic Germans" are excluded. "In other words, one does not become German by speaking the language; rather one is *born* a German" (Mandel, 2008, p. 215).

Being confronted with racializing attributions of difference which point to an ethno-cultural understanding of membership and citizenship in Germany is an experience, many interlocutors share and make in their everyday life since many report that they faced with statements, such as "you are an exception", "but you are different", "you are not like a Turk", "you are not like the other Turks".[213] What does it mean when people are labelled as different from the alleged mass of "other Turks"? If everyone is an exception, who actually is a member of that group? In Tschernokoshewa's (1999, p. 116) words it may be asked, "Who does what with ethnicity and why?" What kind of meaning is assigned to Turkishness by those who have addressed the women with a related discourse? I asked my interlocutors what kind of meaning people attach to the label 'Turk' in Germany. Their answers point to attributions of difference that intersect at social divisions of gender, class and race. Stereotypical meanings assigned to Turkishness include generalizations and assumptions about the first generation of labor migrants which are assigned to the second and third generations. Some of the stereotypes the women have faced include: "No German language skills", "delinquency", "ignorance", "not adapted" and "uneducated".[214]

Several scholars[215] have argued that the essentialist representation of German-Turkish women immigrants and postmigrants has merged with gendered Islamophobic attributions of difference after the 9/11. In this discourse, German-Turkish women are often reduced to being victims of patriarchal oppression (see also section 3.6.). This discourse unfortunately also affects everyday life experiences of German-Turkish women. The meaning attributions of Turkishness carry intersect with gender-specific racialized stereotypes, class-based devaluations and the culturalization of religion.

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[213] 1-I2017, 165; 2-I2013, 260, 2-I2017, 194; 9-I2017, 21; 9-I2017, 94; 15-I2017, 162; 15-I2017, 162; 22-I2017, 174; 22-I2017, 174; 31-I2017, 137
[214] 1-I2012, 213, 222; 4-I2017, 102; 27-I2017, 107; 31-I2017, 137
[215] For example Erel, 2002, 2009; Riegel, 2003; Riegel and Geisen, 2009; Yıldız, 2009

Gendered stereotypes interlocutors have witnessed or identify as assigned to Turkish ethnicity culturalize them with assumptions of "extended families", "many children",[216] "arranged marriages"[217] in which the woman does not have a say, and patriarchal "oppression".[218] The headscarf constitutes an additional inert characteristic of "Turkishness". When not wearing a headscarf, some women were asked why they do not wear a headscarf of whether their mothers wear a headscarf.[219] If they wear a headscarf, they were addressed with victimizing stereotypes because it was assumed that they were forced to do so.[220]

The fact that none of the women fit into such a constructed notion of Turkishness is also commented by those who make such judgements. Many women who like Lara, often get to hear that they do not embody those stereotypes state that people who addressed them, also felt the need to share their bewilderedness with them. It can be argued that the often-mentioned phrase "But you are not like that" interlocutors faced, presents a strategy to maintain and reinforce stereotypes of alleged Turkishness instead of reflecting about one's own value judgements. To circle back to Lara: Her experience of being treated as an exception of the group that is culturalized as Turkish not only keeps the self-image of the majority citizen in Germany in its ethno-cultural place. Such a discourse constructs the German-Turkish minority merely along paradigms of difference turning a blind eye to interethnic commonalities with majority society and postmigrants' claims to membership.

Although Lara's experiences relate to the time span of the 1990s before and after the citizenship law was amended and the time before she moved to Istanbul in 2010, today's claims of postmigrants as well as the and the ongoing structural disadvantage immigrants and postmigrants face in the labor and housing market and in the educational sector (see sections 3.8., 4.3.1., 5.3.3., 5.4.1.) shows that the de facto citizenship discourse does not resonate with the legal practice of birth right and the 2014 implemented dual citizenship rigt for postmigrants born after 2000 (BGBl. – Federal Law Journal, I, p. 1714). It can be argued that an ethno-cultural understanding of membership in Germany translates into structural discrimination and results in the

[216] 2-I2013, 298; 12-I2017, 139; 18-I2017, 125
[217] 15-I2017, 162, 29-I2017, 48
[218] 27-I2017, 95; 29-I2017, 3
[219] 8-I2017, 23, 104; 12-I2013, 247; 12-I2017, 119; 18-I2017, 18; 20-I2017, 191
[220] 20-I2017, 193; 28-I2017, 106; 29-I2017, 3, 42, 92; 32-I2017, 48

strategic exclusion postmigrants still face today. Lara's narrative illustrates that Germany desperately needs a new citizenship discourse that includes postmigrants and acknowledges hyphenated cultural affiliations.

5.2.3. 'But You are Different': Reverse Labeling and Semantic Implications *Almancı*

Lara's experience as being categorized as an exception from the norm of Turkey-origin people is an experience she has also made in Turkey. She states:

> "Yes, because the Turks call these people like me who grew up in Germany *Almancı*. And this *Almancı* profile is characteristic for a lower educational class. Rather a bit chavy. A little bit *assi* [crummy]. In other words, what the Germans call *assi* or foreigners. […] Many of my friends are also very surprised, people I meet for example when I say that I grew up in Germany. Because then they say things like, 'Yes, but you speak good Turkish' or 'Yes, but you are completely different.' Yeah, things like that. And that's funny, because when I was in Germany, people always said, 'Ahh, but you speak GOOD German' or 'Ohh, you are not at all/ you don't look like a Turk. You are not like a Turk at all.' Yes? And here it's the same. 'You are not at all like an *Almancı*.' So/ well, they rather reckon me as a Turk than as *Almancı* (laughs)." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Lara's experience in fact, resembles her experience in Germany. Following her narrative of not being labelled as *Almancı* other interlocutors make the opposite experience and are labelled *Almancı*. But before diving into the possible reasons for that, a brief digression on the attribution *Almancı* that is necessary to understand Lara's statement. Similar to the essentialist stereotypes of a homogeneous group of Turkey-origin immigrants in Germany, the attribution *Almancı* also carries a pejorative meaning. The term designates people of Turkey-origin who have lived or live in Germany. *Almancı* has been translated as Germanite, German-like or Germaner. Different scholars have indicated that the term fixates cultural difference and has a demeaning connotation (Çağlar, 1994; Mandel, 2008; Kaya, 2009). I have asked the consulted German-Turkish women what they think about the notion *Almancı*, who is labelled with it and whether they were ever labelled *Almancı*.[221] Some women underlined that the meaning of the

[221] For interlocutors 1-14 see: 1PM2012, 4; 1-I2012, 27 – 28, 101, 103 – 105, 107 – 112 - 121; 141 – 143; 175 – 179; 1PM2017, 7, 15; 1-I2017, 113 – 115, 119; 121 – 123, 170 – 177, 1PS2017, 5 – 6; 2-I2013, 311 – 334; 2-I2017, 110 – 113; 3-I2013Kübra, 269, 281 – 283; 285 – 293, 297; 3-I2017, 114 – 116; 4-I2-2013, 166 – 189; 5-I2013, 152, 154, 194, 197 – 198, 212 – 216, 7-I2013, 192 – 194, 212, 221, 225 – 227, 231, 7-I2-2017, 21, 23, 38, 117, 119, 122 – 123, 9-I2013, 299 – 300, 103 – 104, 10-I2013, 17, 157 – 160, 162, 10PS2017, 2, 11-I1-2013, 288, 11-I1-2013, 290 – 304; 11-I2017, 117 – 120; 12-I2013, 281, 283,

word is slowly changing because when designated as *Almancı*, they are also perceived as experts due to language skills, a German education and because of positive values people would ascribe to Germanness, for example reliability. Others underline that the meaning of the word changes with the context and that the people using the term not necessarily want to offend them or simply want to joke around. The majority of the women, however, maintains that the word carries a negative and derogative meaning which they perceive as a discriminatory stereotype against themselves and against German-Turkish people in Germany. The interviewed women including Lara, have different tactics of dealing with the stereotypes bundled in the notion *Almancı* (see also sections 5.3.4, 5.4.3.).

Based on the meanings the women shared with me, it can be concluded that *Almancı* roughly has two semantic levels: A culturalist semantic and a classicist semantic. People labelled *Almancı* are perceived as uprooted. The attribution is excluding because membership in Turkey is denied based on the ascribed Germanness of the designated person while membership to Germany is denied based on the ascribed person's foreignness. A reappearing slogan German-Turkish people face in Turkey is 'Foreigner in Germany, *Almancı* in Turkey.' What is problematic for them is not that *Almancı* means that they are German-like but that they are excluded from Turkishness. People designated *Almancı* are seen as lost between cultures, as lacking a real home and disoriented because they would not know where they belong.[222]

The label *Almancı* implies that the designated person is "no real Turk", "a tourist", "a visitor", "a foreigner" who comes to Turkey on holiday, behaves and thinks like Germans or thinks different than people born in Turkey. The attribution also means that those designated with it cannot adapt to local manners and codes of conduct. They are perceived as people with a German lifestyle as far as cuisine, customs and behavior are concerned.

Designators who label people *Almancı* approach the people they designate with an idea of Turkishness and membership in Turkey that corresponds to a holistic understanding of culture as homogeneous static entity (see section 2.1.1.-2.1.3.). Similar as in the

285, 287 – 289, 291, 293; 13-I2013, 159 – 164, 166, 168 – 170, 175 – 178, 179 – 182, 196, 14-I2013, 149, 154 – 161; 14PS2013, 8

[222] Interlocutors quoted slogans such as: „*orada yabancı, burada Almancı*", *„Ausländer in Deutschland, Almancı dort", „Türkiye'de Almancısın, Almanya'a yabancı", „dort Ausländer, hier Deutsche", „hier Almancı, dort Türkin"*

citizenship discourse in Germany (section 3.6.) the included citizen – contrary to those designated as *Almancı* – cannot be member of two different polities, societies and places. Membership is defined by singular national categories of belonging. The primary focus on cultural difference, disregards the possibility of multiple spheres of belonging. Therefore, the notion denies sameness and membership in Turkey based on language skills and family history. The paradox here is that the expectation of authentic or ideal membership as connected to ethnicity and nation, in fact denies those of actual Turkey-origin descent membership in the Turkish nation because they have lived in Germany. This paradox uncovers the constructive arbitrariness of ethnicity-based membership. It should be noted that contrary to these implications of the widely used attribution *Almancı*, the Turkish government approaches German-Turkish people with an inclusive ethnic citizenship discourse based on their descent (see section 3.6.).

Beyond this culturalizing meaning, the notion *Almancı* also carries a classicist derogatory meaning. First generation of labor migrants who visited their villages of origin are labelled as the "newly wealthy", who display their prosperity by buying property, presenting objects from Germany as status symbols or by bringing presents. In fact, many former labor migrants have acquired property in Turkey and some have displayed their acquired wealth in their villages in Turkey to represent their migration to Germany as meaningful undertaking and as a material success (see section 3.2., 4.2.2.). Some interlocutors note that this behavior has also caused jealousy among deprived locals. Lara's description of the ascription's meaning simultaneously illustrates its culturalizing and classicist semantic:

> "So, when a Turk says *Almancı*, he thinks of someone who comes with his Mercedes, but worked for a few years at McDonalds to be able to rent a Mercedes for a month and then shows off here. Someone who can't speak decent Turkish. Probably can't speak decent German either. […]. And someone who simply missed the train. Missed the train in Turkey." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

> "That's just a social class that is somewhere lost between (..) Turkish village, German (..) I don't know (..) German painter vocational training and American hip-hop, somehow like that." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Somewhat similar as the homogeneous notion of Turkish "culture" in Germany, the derogatory classicist meaning of *Almancı* constructs all generations of Turkey-origin people who live or have lived in Germany as homogeneous group of unintegrated lower-class people. This group allegedly differs from the majority of people in Turkey by markers of difference inscribed into their bodies as far hair style and clothing are

concerned. People labelled *Almancı* are devaluated as “uneducated”, “simple-minded”, “backward”, “ill-mannered”, “ignorant”, “stuck”, “lower class”, “uncultivated” and “rural”. The label implies that the designated are unable to speak a modern Turkish or proper Turkish without German accent. Interlocutors note that they experienced the attribution *Almancı* on occasions in which people “unmasked” them because of a German accent, when they mixed German and Turkish with German-Turkish peers or in situations in which a Turkish expression was not available to them immediately. Moreover, interlocutors were designated *Almancı* in situations in which their opposite maintained they had insufficient knowledge or the wrong opinion about the Turkish nation or when they did not agree with Turkish historiography.

It can be concluded that these semantics clearly disregard German-Turkish people’s upward mobility, their educational level, their Turkey-origin family history, their Turkish language skills and therefore in fact – as Lara underlines – follow a similar dynamic as homogenizing stereotypes about Turks in Germany. The research of Neitzert can give some additional insights. She found that the everyday lives of German-Turkish individuals in Istanbul with and without academic education hardly overlapped. While the first group, mostly worked in executive positions, less privileged individuals often worked in call centers or in the tourism industry. Neitzert observed that even interlocutors who mastered Turkish well, expressed that they were exposed as “*Deutschländer*” (German retranslation of the term *Almancı*) because of their German accent. Interestingly, she observed that those interlocutors without academic education were more inclined to experience derogatory responses by people in Turkey due to their German accent while interlocutors with academic degrees, like Lara, were more likely to experience recognition (2014, pp. 258–260).

The above-mentioned attributions of difference Lara experienced during her childhood, youth and young adulthood in Germany as being labelled the exception from ‘the norm of Turks’ – who in are labelled along classicist and racialized stereotypes – presents a contrast to her socialization in a Turkish upper-class family and the elite circles, she interacts in. Her family history explains why she wants to delineate herself from related stereotypes by pointing to her higher educational background. In line with Neitzert’s findings, her privileged family background may be a reason why she is not categorized as *Almancı*. She states that in the beginning of her residence in Turkey, people would ask her where she was from because of her German accent. Lara notes that people were rather interested in her foreign past and found her accent “cute”. In the light of this

experience, it is not astonishing that she feels more connected and identifies more with her social environment in Turkey than with her past in Germany.[223]

Lara's experience and Neitzert's results contrast with the experiences of the majority of my interlocutors who often faced the attribution *Almancı* because of their German accent, regardless of their more or less privileged socio-economic and educational backgrounds. This was in particular the case when they newly arrived in Istanbul. Several women note that they experienced the label less frequently in the course of a longer stay in Turkey throughout which they perfected their language skills.

This contrasting finding indicates that Lara's narrative of not being labelled *Almancı* also results from her social location which is one of the most privileged ones in the sample. Moreover, the contrast between Neitzer's and my own results seems to relate to our different samples. While Neitzert interviewed male and female German-Turkish transmigrants and I focused on women, it can be argued that attribution *Almancı* has additional intersectional implications. Apart from classism and culturalization, German-Turkish women also face gendered intersectional discrimination (see for example section 5.3.4.).

It is important to underline that despite the fact that Lara experiences the slogan "but you are different" in Turkey, her experience in Turkey is still one of social recognition and inclusion. Not only is she upwardly mobile in terms of income and social status (see section 4.4.2.). Contrary to her experience in Germany neither her physical appearance nor her name is a topic of discussion in Turkey. Quite the contrary, she experiences social recognition and belonging. The following quote exemplifies this contrasting experience:

> "[F]irst of all the beautiful thing is my name, which I always had difficulties with all my life in Germany. Here, when I say my name, people always react like 'Ohh, how beautiful, is that romantic, oh great name.' So, a lot of people like the name (smile in her voice). And that's such a great feeling. For years I was always afraid to say my name. And now when I say Lara 'Ohh it's BEAUTIFUL, just like you. It's a great fit.' You know? And then that's always a great compliment to hear. […] man or woman. Both say that. Both sides. And a lot of people say, for example, 'Ohh, I'd like to call my daughter that too.' And then that's like, 'Wow, nice.' But not when I live in Germany." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

[223] 6-I2013, 109; 6-I2013, 114 – 117, 158 – 159, 161

As I will outline below, Lara's identification with her family history in Istanbul, the recognition she experiences and her bonds to Turkish language explain why perceives herself mainly as member of the Turkish society. Based on her own class-background, her identification with the latter and her experiences with classicist stereotypes in Germany, she delineates herself from other German-Turkish people who are designated as *Almancı*. It can be concluded that she appropriates the narrative "you are not like them" by making it her own narrative as she uses her socio-economic background and status as a marker to emphasize that her experience and migration history differs from the stereotypical norm.

5.2.4. Family affiliation and Upward Mobility as Delineation Tactic

Lara also delineates herself from the *Almancı* stereotype by pointing to her socialization in the maternal line of the family and to her membership in circles of Istanbul's urban elite. I have outlined Lara's migration motives as embedded into circular family migration (see more in section 4.4.2.). Lara's attachment to her family constitutes an important incentive for her migration. Her mother and her second husband returned to Turkey in 2007. On her visits, Lara became familiar with the city of Istanbul. Her attachment to her family, her interest in the city (see also section 4.3.3.), her husband (see section 4.4.4.), and a job offer (4.3.1.) brought her to Istanbul. Lara's family history plays a crucial role in her narrative of belonging as it is characterized by drawing boundaries to labor migration and by underlining a higher education, professional success and a higher income. She mainly identifies with her maternal line of the family,[224] stating "[I] would [...] rather call myself someone from Istanbul, simply because the maternal side is from here."[225]

By underlining that her mother was a highly skilled person from Istanbul who left for Germany in the 1980's, Lara points to the fact that not all Turkey-origin people in Germany are immigrants who came to work in blue-collar jobs in the German industry. The labor recruitment agreement came to an end in 1973 and many Turkish immigrants who moved to Germany in the 1980s were intellectuals who fled the military regime in Turkey (section 3.3.). Lara stresses that her mother is not a typical labor migrant from Turkey. Not only did she migrate to Germany as a businesswoman, but Lara also emphasizes that she was born into an affluent family and graduated from a university in

[224] 6-I2017, 11, 13, 23, 29, 37, 66; 6-I2013, 9, 40, 49, 202 - 3
[225] 6-I2013, 49

Istanbul. The Turkish people her mother socialized with in Germany were "not labor migrant families but rather the people who came during the 1980s."[226] Lara describes a class divide in her family as follows: While her grandfather from her mother's side had a higher education, her grandfather from her father's side did not learn to read and write until he was 21. Lara's maternal grandfather belonged to the upper echelons of Turkey's urban and secular state elite. He was a high-ranking state officer with a higher education in German philology and an art interested well-read translator. His ties to Germany (he travelled to Germany in his state function) and her maternal uncle's residence in Germany may have played into her mother's decision to move to Germany.

Since Lara was raised by her mother and not by her father, her attachment to her mother and her identification with her mother's side of the family is a logical consequence. In her narrative of belonging to her mother's side, Lara also reflects a socio-economic experience of growing up under affluent material conditions. While she underlines that the material conditions were good when she was solely raised by her mother; she describes her mother's second marriage with a highly qualified Turkey-origin spouse as a transition to a higher "socio-cultural setting" as they moved from the center of Frankfurt to a bigger house with a garden to a different neighborhood in Frankfurt's suburbs.

While she identifies with her mother's side of the family by underlining the high education, the socio-economic background and status she delineates herself from her father's side of the family with a working-class labor migration history. She describes her father's side as very assimilated to life in Germany and also points to an educational divide between the two sides of the family which makes it difficult for her to find a common ground of communication, for example with her cousins. Referring to her cousins' lower educational level, she states, "I don't want to judge that, but it's just a completely different way of life."[227] Based on a similar rationalization, she also delineates herself from other German-Turkish people who live in Istanbul explaining her stance as follows:

> "Because it's just a very different migration story, I think. Completely different types of people. I know some from the company. But I don't have much contact with them. I don't have anyone with whom I am very familiar (.), who is like me. Who just moved from Germany to Turkey,

[226] 6-I2017, 19
[227] 6-I2013, 66

> like me now. So, I don't have anyone with whom I can talk about it or something. Or who is like/ I actually would like to have someone. Someone with whom you can speak German from time to time on the same wavelength. Because mostly they are people from/. Yes, working-class families or so. And with them you have a completely different interaction than/. So, they are, yes/ that sounds so stupid, right? But these are rather people or girls, with whom I would not hang out too much in Germany. (...) Sounds totally *assi* [crummy] somehow, right? (laughter in the voice). I don't mean that in a bad way. It's just the wavelength. And that's why I don't really have any contact." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Many German-Turkish people in Istanbul have completed an education, but Lara refers to a higher education and immigration from Turkey in the 1980s. Pusch and Splitt (2013, p. 156) estimate that roughly 14.7 percent of the total number of second and third generation people moving from Germany to Turkey annually are highly skilled (see section 3.6.). The likelihood for Lara to find someone in Istanbul with a similar family migration history and a higher education is probably much lower.

Lara has experienced significant upward mobility in Istanbul. [228] She interacts with friends who also work in high positions and have a similar socio-economic standing like her and her family (see section 4.4.2.). When I met Lara in 2013, she was working in a multi-national company, where she found a job in because of her language skills. Her work-environment also presents a sphere of identification with the globalized working culture which describes as follows:

> "I actually feel like an international liberal citizen. […] But that's also because I work in an international company. Because I just deal a lot with French people or with, I don't know. With different affiliations. So, I just feel very/ yes, metro, global actually." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

According to Lara, the job opportunity in Turkey constitutes a "career jump" because she would not have had access to a similar position and as a young professional in Germany. In 2017, Lara reentered her job as an account manager in another multi-national company after a year of maternity leave. She describes her work mentality and upward mobility with the following phrase: "Those who have the courage to say goodbye will be rewarded with a big welcome"[229]. In the four years of my absence between 2013 and 2017, she has pursued a career receiving a higher salary each time she changed companies. She speaks English at work and interacts with international colleagues of different nationalities from all over the world.

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[228] 6-I2013, 9, 23, 80; 6FN2017-2/3G-d_4, 7; 6-I2017, 9, 47, 49
[229] 6-I2017, 6

5.2.5. Language: Adaptation and Maintaining Ties to the Past and Friends

Lara notes that she had to improve her Turkish skills at first because she did not practice the language often in Germany. Throughout her post-migration everyday life experiences in Istanbul, she started identifying with Turkish language describing this process as follows:

> "I couldn't even write properly. And now I like to read Turkish very much. Because it's very poetic. And also, because the literature is very different. Or the music. It is very different. Well, Turkish is a language that I kind of feel like I belong to now. I didn't have that before. For me, it was just some difficult, stupid language that I always learned once a week in Turkish class/. I also went to a Turkish class in Germany [...] I'm glad that I have Turkish as a second language. Because it has a lot of expression. And with the language you also have this self-image. And I didn't have that before. I was very distant from Turkish. And now I'm rather distant from German." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Her statement illustrates that speaking and learning a language involves a process of immersion which includes the acquisition of – often implicit – cultural knowledge but also constitutes a tangible cultural experience, as she learned to devote herself to literature and music in Turkish language. As a learning process combined with everyday life experience, the process of practicing and perfecting Turkish language involves much more than speaking skills. It constitutes a process of integration and identification for Lara that simultaneously symbolizes a cultural learning and appropriation process in which she cultivates a sense of belonging that connects her to Turkey.

But Lara is also connected to German language. In 2017, she maintains symbolic connections to her past life in Germany with the different educational practices, she uses to raise her one-year-old daughter. When I ask her whether there are any practices or situations in which she feels connected to her place of origin in Germany she answers:

> "I speak German with my daughter. So, I have the feeling that this is the least I have to do in order to not forget my previous life completely. Because otherwise I can't pass that on to her at all. I was recently in Frankfurt and bought a lot of children's books in German. And I have the feeling that if I don't do that, then I would simply forget the previous life." (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

As Lara does not interact with people who have a history in Germany other than her family, speaking German with her daughter is a way of remembering her past in Germany. Due to her class based self-delineation she does not benefit from the German-Turkish networks in Istanbul. The collective opportunities many other German-Turkish interlocutors create for themselves in Istanbul by interacting with other German-Turkish

people and relating to a common past in Germany and practicing German are not available to Lara (see sections 4.1.1., 4.3.1., 5.1.3., 5.3.5.).

Lara mentions that she has named her daughter's dolls after her friends in Germany.[230] While she mainly speaks Turkish and English in Turkey, she connects herself to her biography when she speaks German and plays with her daughter. In her mother role she passes on her language skills and knowledge about her past to her daughter keeping her memory of the past and her friends alive. Lara produces a *Thirdspace* in which she connects the real physical locality in Istanbul in which she connects speaking German with her daughter to her memories of her past in Germany. Language is representative for the real practice. The act of speaking and simultaneously constitutes a symbolic translocal connection to her history in Frankfurt. As much as speaking Turkish connects her to her present life in Istanbul, German connects her to her past and to her friends in Germany.

But her attachment to and longing for her friends in Germany is also concrete: She sustains her friendship ties by staying in touch via social media and messaging apps and regular visits of her closest friends on the occasion of business trips:

> "And whenever I go to Germany, I have two girlfriends that I always visit. And they both live in different cities. That means whenever I go there, they always come and we always meet at one spot. And then we always have the whole weekend together. [...] [E]very four months or so. So not that often. And [....] then we usually meet up and stay together over the weekend. The three of us as friends. These are friends from university." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

A repetitive trope in the fieldwork material is that of "mature friendships". Lara and several other women express a longing for their friends in Germany and for lifelong and grown friendships from childhood and youth. For those who maintain lasting friendships, these friendships also constitute a bond to their past in Germany, their childhood and youth memories. Some interlocutors note that because of the duration, these friendships have a deeper level in comparison to the friendships they maintain in Istanbul and to the life lasting friendships they observe in their social environment in Turkey.[231] After remarking that she regrets that she has lost touch with some school friends, Lara expresses a related concern as follows:

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[230] 6-I2017, 109
[231] 2-I2017, 127, 139, 141; 3PS2017, 10; 15-I2017, 227; 16-I2017, 190; 16-I-2017Leyla3G-d, 190

> "And I think that's such a pity, because that's what I miss here. Because many of them have had very good friends for years. That is, for example, you have three friends from elementary school age. And that's a real pity. So, I think to myself, that would be nice if I had had that here as well. If I had studied here or spent my childhood here. I miss that a little bit. [...] [In Germany] one is rather fully befriended [*ganz befreundet*]. But then even-/. You have rather few friends in Germany, but then also very thoroughly and the years. [...] I would like to have girlfriends from my elementary school days here (laughs)." (Lara, 1987 - 12.06.2013)

Lara's emphasis on her biography and related memories in Germany are also a result of her assimilation to her life in Turkey.

5.2.6. Neighborhood and Sea

I have shed light on Lara's identification with the city of Istanbul which she rationalized as triggered by a dinner experience together with her mother at the Bosporus. Lara's narrative is saturated by statements about the sea. I remember from my fieldwork that we met at least four times at the Bosporus or the Marmara Sea. I visited Lara several times in her home near the sea. Her apartment is located in one of Istanbul's upper-class-neighborhoods. She lived in a luxury duplex apartment complex surrounded by trees, a rarity in many of Istanbul's neighborhoods. She benefits from janitorial and security services by *bekçi* staff (watchmen), who announce visitors to residents. Life quality in her neighborhood is high. She has picked a house in a neighborhood that is less densely populated than other central neighborhoods in Istanbul. Concerning the inhabitants' level of education, access to economic resources, the socio-economic level is far above average (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2020). Living in a neighborhood near the sea in Istanbul is a strong settlement motive[232] for Lara and she underlines in 2017, that a prerequisite for a potential migration destination in the future is that it is near the sea (see section 4.3.3.). When I ask her whether there is something that connects her to Turkey or to Istanbul that she cannot find elsewhere she states:

> "The sea. The first thing that came to my mind was the sea, because I live right by the water and I can often go out and see the sea, see the horizon. I think that's what's missing a bit in Frankfurt. You have the Main River, but it's not the same. I think living by the sea is a thing in itself." (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

The sea and the "Mediterranean" lifestyle can be interpreted as a red thread in Lara's migration and settlement trajectories after she moved to Istanbul in 2010. It constitutes

[232] 6-I2013, 9, 35, 76; 6PS2017-2/3-G, 2, 5; 6FN2017_2, 1

a motive that has influenced her future plans. In 2017, Lara was inclined to move to Cypris or to Switzerland because of the Mediterranean lifestyle there. In 2020, Lara lives in the Netherlands with her daughter and husband.

5.2.7. Everyday Live Media Consumption

Based on my fieldnotes, I remember an evening in 2017, I spent together with Lara in her parents' home in Istanbul. We were watching football together with her husband and stepfather. The television channel was a German one and we watched the news during the break. What I remember clearly from my own experience is that I felt very alienated when we watched German news. I wrote down that I found it "extremely strange and petty."[233] I hadn't watched German television for a long time and watching the news in that particular moment at Lara's house felt detached from my life in Istanbul. What my perception reflects is – and I remember that from my arrival in Germany a couple of months later – that I was simply no longer used to German television while for Lara it was part of her everyday experience. Experiencing this moment with her and her family opened my perception to the fact that many women I met, were more actively involved in sustaining a connection to media outlets in Germany, in particular those women who no longer had a family in Germany. When I asked Lara, what connects her to Germany that is not accessible for her in Turkey, she answered "free media". Contrary to my own lack of experience with German television in Istanbul, she continues as follows:

> "Exactly, so what I also like very much/ for example my parents, they also have German TV at home [...] in Istanbul, but they also have such an antenna with which I think they get all the German channels. And when I'm with them, I love watching TV (laughs). Because I don't do that at all anymore. So, I don't watch TV at all, and then when I'm with my parents, I just watch the culture channels. That's what I like. Documentaries and knowledge programs and stuff like that. You don't have that here at all." (Lara, 1987 - 20.04.2017)

Lara already made clear in the interview of 2013 that she missed German television and German newspapers, because of freedom of opinion, she associates with media in Germany. In 2013, she also stated that she missed German media[234] for that reason. Channels airing documentaries are also available in Turkey, but maybe not as broadly represented as in German television channels. Press freedom however is a problem in

[233] 6FN2017 _4, 6
[234] 6-I2013, 86

Turkey . In 2017, Lara was also concerned about freedom of opinion in Turkey as far as her daughter's education was concerned (see section 4.2.1.).

Lara's voice presents an upper-class family history and socialization experience. In addition to her biography and family history, her personal upward mobility and her integration into the global economy includes practices, experiences and an affiliation with global citizenship. Her class-based narrative and her citizenship practices contest an understanding of ethno-cultural citizenship and assumptions attached to it: The homogenization of Turkey-origin people and postmigrants in Germany and in Turkey.

5.3. EMMA: MULTIPLE AFFILIATIONS AS STRUGGLE FOR EMANCIPATION

As far as her citizenship rights and educational background are concerned, Emma is more privileged than other interlocutors. Her social location is constrained by gender, socio-economic positionality and her migration background both in Germany and in Turkey. Despite the barriers of structural disadvantage she experienced during her childhood and young adulthood, she has managed to become upwardly mobile. Her social location in Istanbul is defined by gender and her German migration background, but most importantly by being a single parent and associated struggles of solely providing for the family income and education of her daughter in a neighborhood that does not resonate well with her positionality. Her biographic experiences of being labelled as different – in her neighborhood of origin in Germany and in her school environment with mainly Germans without migration background – account for her multiple affiliations and her emancipation from gendered constraints. By referring to her Otherness she connects her social and cultural difference into one sphere of action. Her multiple cultural sense of belonging results from these experiences but also from her multilingualism which constitutes a professional and educational resource that grants her access to membership in German-Turkish networks in Istanbul.

5.3.1. Negotiating Biography as Intersectional Struggle of Bridging Social Divides

Emma[235] was born in 1977 in a town in North-Rhine-Westphalia. She moved to Istanbul in 2010. In Istanbul, Emma mainly worked as self-employed German teacher and managed a little Café in her neighborhood. Interrupted by the birth of her daughter in

[235] 7-I2013, 102 – 104, 112, 114; 7-I1-2017, 3, 7 – 8, 13, 15, 19, 29, 35, 51 – 58; 7PS2-2017, 8

2012 in Germany, she lived in Istanbul for seven years. She moved back to her town of origin in Germany in 2017 for her daughter's school education (see section 4.1.1.). After graduating from university in philology, she could not find a job and moved to Istanbul in 2010, among other reasons to start a career. In comparison to other demographic groups German-Turkish women in particular have a disadvantaged access to the labor market in Germany (see section 4.3.1.).

Emma's grandmother came to Germany as a labor migrant. Her father migrated to Germany at the age of 14 with his siblings to reunite with his mother. Emma's mother is of the first generation of labor migrants. She came to Germany in the course of an arranged marriage (*görücü usulu*) when she was 16 years old; Emma's father was 18 years old. Emma's grandmother prevented her daughter-in law from visiting a school in Germany. Emma has a younger sister and a younger brother. During her childhood, Emma's parents both worked in night and morning shifts. Like Lara (section 5.2.1.), Emma describes herself as a latchkey child (*Schlüsselkind*). Emma notes that her parents took care of the basics by providing breakfast and waking her and her siblings up on school day mornings, whereas she and her siblings were responsible for going to school by themselves. Based on the grounds that her parents never visited a school in Germany as youngsters and because they worked, Emma did not receive any support as far as schoolwork was concerned. The main language of communication with her parents was Turkish. Emma's narrative reads like her parents did not attend much to her and her siblings which can be explained with the little time they had due to their employment. Until the age of 14, Emma grew up in a working-class neighborhood in a high-rise building with mainly Turkey-origin residents.

Emma describes the social environment she grew up in as "two worlds" and her life until she and her family moved to a neighborhood without immigrants as a "world in between". With the "two worlds" she means her family life and her Turkish neighborhood on the one hand and the middle-class school world on the other hand. These worlds were segregated by language, income and education. She describes her "two worlds" and her sense of being different from other children and youngsters in her neighborhood as follows:

> "I have lived in two worlds. Also, the school career. [...] you still live so blatantly in in-between worlds and always make your life fit. You have no choice at all. You go to a Catholic primary-school during the day and then arrive again in your ghetto neighborhood in the afternoon, where all the Turks are. [...] and then I noticed more and more this difference

> between me and the others. Also, the way I thought, the way I dressed. Those were [different] WORLDS. [...] So when I remember the girls who went to the Protestant primary-school and later went to the lower-secondary school. Well and I went to the middle-secondary school [...]. [At] middle-secondary school were seven hundred and fifty students, about seven of them were Turks. At the whole school. [...] Whereas the lower-secondary school had 75 percent Turks and somehow five Germans and otherwise all Italians, Spaniards. [...]. The girls left the house in the morning like models, right? [...]. They had their hair teased and wore make-up and gold chains. And I came out with a torn Cypress Hill T-shirt and jeans with holes [...]. And greasy hair. I refused to wash [it]. That was my rebellion. Totally! Then we went to school together in the morning. I got along well with the girls. And we then - the schools were also right next to each other - and then we said goodbye. Then I was in my world, they were in their world, and then after school we went home together again." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

When Emma was living the high-rise building in a mainly Turkish neighborhood, she struggled against her parents' concerns with Turkish neighbors' expectations. Living in these socially divided worlds based on her positionality as girl and young woman on the one hand and her family's migration history on the other hand, Emma had no other choice but to experience difference. Emma was different in her neighborhood because she contested gender role expectations and because she adapted to a school life that differed from that of her friends. She was forced into living in two worlds due her mother's decision to enroll her in schools that were not visited by her neighborhood friends. Emma also experienced Othering at school because she was in a minority position as the only Turkey-origin child from a working-class neighborhood. Surrounded by middle-class children without migration background, she experienced racialized discrimination by fellow students and teachers (see below).

I have outlined in section 5.1.2. that those women who mentioned gendered constraints against them as young girls and women not only describe a generational divide between the first generation mainly of rural Turkey-origin and the generations born after that in Germany. They also explain their struggles with gender role expectations not with their immediate parental environment, but mainly with the social pressure by neighbors on their parents. In comparison to other women who didn't raise such concerns, these women actually lived in neighborhoods in Germany which are mainly populated by Turkey-origin people who sometimes even originate from the same village in Turkey (see section 4.3.3.). Like Emma, some of these women contrast their self-made decisions of living in the metropole of Istanbul with the social environment of their

hometown neighborhoods. Emma states that in this local environment of her neighborhood in Germany, everything she did as a youngster was a problem:

> "Going out, clothes, friends, sex. Boyfriend. Sleepovers, yes or no. Party, alcohol, drugs. Haircut, hair color. Everything was properly addressed at least once in my life. At least once. And usually not just by family members, but by your extended family or the place where you live, right? You'll yeah, if you don't belong, you'll just get punished." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Despite the social pressure Emma underwent as girl and youngster, she developed a tactic to come to terms with the experience of differences in her two worlds. She rebelled against her family and against gender role expectations from her neighborhood while still maintaining friendships with her girlfriends from her neighborhood. While she rebelled against her parents, her friends also supported her when she started to emancipate herself from social pressure in the neighborhood and claimed rights to the liberties, she defines in her above statement. Since Emma experienced difference anyways as the two segregated environments she describes entailed contrasting lifestyles, she decided to adapt to the social school environment. In order to do so, Emma emancipated herself from expectations of extended family and neighbors.

Most federal states in Germany have three types of secondary schools children enter in fifth grade: The lower-secondary school (*Hauptschule*), the middle-secondary school (*Realschule*) and the higher-secondary school (*Gymnasium*). Students who graduate from a higher-secondary school can obtain the school leaving certificated which qualifies them to visit a college (*Fachhochschulreife*) or a university (*Abitur*). Students who graduate from a middle-secondary school can transfer to a higher-secondary school where they can get the *Abitur* or continue with vocational training. A school leaving certificate from a lower-secondary school qualifies for starting a vocational training or to enroll in a vocational school.

The quotes above show that Emma she appropriated a lifestyle that differed from that in her neighborhood. After she refused to put effort into her school performance at middle-secondary school – initially she hoped that she would be transferred to lower-secondary school where her friends were – her grades started to improve. She later obtained a school leaving certificate that qualified her to enter higher-secondary school. Before transferring to higher-secondary school, again a school that was mainly visited by children without migration background, she prepared her parents that "things will change"; she would "have to integrate" and that telling her friends "I am not allowed to

join" would not be an option and she went to the parties of her friends without migration background.[236]

After moving to another neighborhood, she underlines that her situation improved as neighbors were no longer observing her activities. At the higher-secondary school, Emma tactically used her disadvantaged positionality by making strength out of the difference others assigned to her. She states, "I stood up for the fact that I come from a working-class family".[237] She maintained contact to her old neighborhood friends and bridged these two environments by merging friends circles stating:

> "[O]ur old friends from the high-rise building, we also had contact with them. At higher-secondary-school, I had more contact with my German [friends], but I integrated all my Turkish best friends into the plans. For example, they lied to their parents and said, 'We're going to Emma's to watch videos tonight.' And we all went to a higher-secondary school party together, a private party. So, my friends also knew my Turkish friends, like that." (7-I1-2017, 43)

Emma contested the gender role expectations from her extended family in Germany during her youth by appropriating the social surrounding's label "black sheep" as her own role for claiming for her individual liberties. Since she was treated as different at school but also in her German-Turkish environment, she emancipated herself form expectations of conformity. In line with her practice of merging social circles of friends, Emma combined her biographic experiences of bridging two different social and cultural worlds into one plural sense of belonging. She states:

> "I feel I belong to both sides, but I have to say I always take credit from both sides. [...] I'm very German in a lot of things. That is, in terms of punctuality. Correctness. Of course, one always fibs in one's life. But correctness towards people, also [...] paperwork, tax office and lalala [...] But also as far as Germany [is concerned], right? I think it has been a real privilege [...] that I am German or was born in Germany. [...] I also always say that you can't become a good person or a free person if you were never allowed to read Hermann Hesse or Thomas Mann. [...]. And, yes, then there are other things where I definitely refuse to be German (9). When it comes to soccer, I feel very Turkish. World championships and things like that. Or if someone says something against the Turks, then I automatically feel Turkish right away. But if someone says something against the Germans, I automatically feel directly German. That's a bit like defiant behavior. Right? I'm the only one who is allowed to talk bad about both sides. Because I'm entitled to do that, because I'm both. [...] So I always try to take good things from both sides and then define myself

[236] 7-I1-2017, 25
[237] 7-I1-2017, 29

> like this: I am me. I am a person who is both. I am somehow the bridge. I am the Bosporus bridge between Germany and Turkey (laughs). [...] I am somehow a cosmopolitan. I just think many people who grew up in a country other than their nationality are world people [*Weltmenschen*]. We don't have any other choice either." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Her statement stands in contrast to the singular and excluding categorizations many German-Turkish women experience in their everyday life mainly in Germany, but also in Turkey. Emma's multiple cultural affiliation results from her practices in different social circles and are representative for the majority of statements German-Turkish women made in this respect. Approached with homogeneous, ethnic notions and discourses of culture by members of the majority, they are pushed into singular categories that do not apply to their transnational and translocal biographies and everyday life allegiances which are connected to two or more countries and localities. Emma's narrative of her cultural belonging shows that affiliations are made and unmade in social processes of exclusion and that national citizenship discourses and underlying notions of culture, race and ethnicity are a construct. The multiple cultural affiliations of German-Turkish women underline that ideas of membership based on communities of descent is a construct they unmake with their translocal and transnational practices (see also sections 2.1., 2.2., 3.6.).

5.3.2. Childhood and Youth Experiences with Institutional Discrimination

Before illustrating structural issues in Germany regarding institutional discrimination and resulting unequal access to educational resources for German-Turkish postmigrants, it is worth noting that many women contrast experiences of discrimination with positive encounters with significant others – also in teaching functions – who supported them and their families. They have mentioned teachers and school principals who recognized them, promoted their school performance and helped some of them, to improve language skills. They mention teachers who not only intervened, when they witnessed incidents of racialized discrimination, but who also took serious measures to prevent such incidents from happening again by creating an awareness among students on the meaning of racialized discrimination. They mention care workers who helped their parents with visits to authorities and neighbors who took care of them, when their parents were at work.[238] In Emma's case, such a significant other was the principal of

[238] 1-I2017-2-GT, 31; 2-FN2017-2-T, 17; 4-I2!2013Mihrimah2/3G-t, 163; 5-I2017Ela2G-t, 79 – 81; 5-I2017Ela2G-t, 81; 12-I2017Melisa2g-t, 5; 12-I2017Melisa2g-t, 11; 19-I2017Damla2G-t, 179 – 189; 20-I2017Beyza3G-d, 205, 229; 32-I2017Sirin2G-d, 10; 29-I-2017Arzu3G-d, 19; 29-I-2017Arzu3G-d, 97

her primary school, who took care of her when she was alone in recess and supported her parents. He also helped to arrange for her to enter middle-secondary school.[239]

Emma remembers that she was excluded by other children in kindergarten. Instead of blaming the children or the preschool teachers for this experience, she rationalizes being excluded with her family's emphasis on cultural difference compared to the German majority. This, she reasons, explained her different behavior in comparison to the behavior of other children in her kindergarten:

> "Because that is also taught to us a bit in the family. 'You are Turkish, you are not/' you have to be careful not to eat pork. Then you are always supposed to ask the teachers if there is pork or not [...] and sometimes you recognize [...] sometimes you don't recognize food. Certain things you didn't know in kindergarten. What do I know; now I can't think of anything. Broccoli maybe, now as a silly example. You don't know it and then you're not sure 'Is it meat or what is it now?' You ask anyway [to reassure yourself], so you make yourself a bit of an outsider." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

The education Emma's mother did not receive herself, she struggled to attain it for her daughter by registering her to a primary and secondary school, that in comparison to two other schools of the neighborhood were mainly visited by Germans without migration background. Despite visiting a kindergarten, Emma describes that she was lacking German language skills when she entered school because she was mainly socialized in a Turkish speaking environment. Emma acknowledges that her parents wanted to improve their siblings' position by sending them to a primary school with mainly German children. But she made mainly negative experiences at primary-school. She states, "I lived in two worlds. Also, the school career. I was the first in a Catholic primary-school. The first Turkish girl, the only Turkish girl. For one YEAR."[240] Being the only Turkish girl at school without any peers until her siblings joined her was not the only problem. Classmates insulted her based on her Turkish migration background. In addition to the exclusion, she experienced at this school, she was also separated from her neighborhood friends who visited the other primary school. The two primary schools were located in adjacent buildings. She remembers that she tried to communicate with her German-Turkish friends:

> "And there was a glass door between the two primary-schools. And during the break, I always stood at this glass door and communicated

[239] 7-I1-2017, 7
[240] 7-I2013, 33

> with my friends from the high-rise building who lived there with me. Like this right? 'Hey, what are you doing?' From door to door, from window to window. So, I spent a lot of time during recess looking at each other: 'And what are you doing?'" (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Emma made similar experiences at middle-secondary school. She wanted to visit the lower-secondary school, her German-Turkish friends from the neighborhood visited, to avoid for this experience to repeat itself. Although her primary-school teacher recommended for her to go to a lower-secondary school, her mother arranged for her to visit a middle-secondary school. There she experienced subtle racialized discrimination by her class teacher, remembering:

> "I always felt like she was a little bit/. She wanted-/ maybe she couldn't encourage my education, I don't know. But I had the feeling that she also excluded me a little bit. Well, at least not enough to integrate me. I often felt, well, attacked or discriminated against at school." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Two aspects of this statement constitute noteworthy general categories in the empirical material. In the sum of cases, the unequal treatment Emma experiences constitutes a form of institutional discrimination. Many interlocutors note that they experienced racialized discrimination at school at a very young school age and only later as adults understood that the unequal treatment they experienced as children was related to their Turkish descent.[241] Many interlocutors have mentioned that they were discriminated against by teachers and by fellow students when they visited primary and secondary school. Some mention that they were bullied by fellow students and classmates, excluded, not accepted, made fun of or subject to racist slogans and jokes. Related experiences were made by different age groups and during between mid-1970s and the 2000s as the consulted women were born between 1965 and 1993. As far as experiences with racialized discrimination by teachers are concerned, many like Emma state, that they experienced unequal treatment by teachers. The teachers they mention questioned and underestimated their German skills, assessed them as ignorant, did not encourage or support them as much as other students or gave them lower grades despite the same

[241] There are also numerous coded text passages for interlocutors 15 to 32. Those passages only include the coded material from interlocutors 1 until 14: 1-I2012, 213, 217-219, 223 – 224, 229; 1-I2017, 30 - 31; 2-I2013, 248; 2FN2017, 17; 2-I2017, 18 – 19; 3-I2013, 180 – 183, 207 – 213; 3-I2017, 94 – 96; 103 – 106; 4-I2-2013, 163; 5-I2013, 157 – 166; 5-I2017, 7, 11, 15 – 19; 87 – 88; 5PS2017, 11 – 12; 6-I2013, 153 – 157; 8-I2017, 19; 9-I2017, 15 – 18; 11-I1-2013, 231 – 234, 277 – 286; 11-I2017, 14 – 19, 31 – 33, 88 – 92, 94 – 100, 104 – 108; 12-I2013, 223 – 235; 12-I2013, 237; 12-I2013, 239; 240 – 245, 255; 12-I2017, 11, 146; 13-I2013, 150

performance. Three women even mention that they were bullied and humiliated in front of class by their class teachers on a regular basis.

If that were not enough, the unequal treatment many women experienced also constrained their access to opportunities of education. In Germany, primary-school teachers can speak out a recommendation for the kind of secondary-school, children are supposed to visit. A peculiarity of the data that caught my attention is that nine women mentioned that the schools, their primary-school teachers recommended them to visit, had lower ranks and did not meet their actual qualifications. Although they brought the necessary preconditions for entering a higher or middle-secondary school as far as grade requirements were concerned, a recommendation for a respective school was refused.

Youngsters with a Turkish migration background are overrepresented in lower-secondary schools and in special schools (schools for children with learning disabilities) and underrepresented in middle-secondary schools, even more so in higher-secondary schools (Erben Keçici, 2012, p. 14). Sociologists have discussed for decades that the German educational system reproduces social inequality, like no other European country. Upward mobility of children of low-income families and lower educational backgrounds is highly unlikely (Geißler and Weber-Menges, 2010). The three-part structure of the school system goes back to the times of Bismarck. Against this backdrop, it is not astonishing that the unequal access to educational opportunities increases for people who have a migration history in their family. Instead of blaming immigrants' lack of integration for lower grades and school degrees – based on the experiences of German-Turkish women – it is worth examining the institutionalized discrimination mechanisms at work, especially in primary-schools. The secondary school students attend has the highest influence on future educational opportunities.

As far as school recommendations are concerned, research of the late 1990s and the 2000s that provides evidence for the fact that primary-school teachers base their secondary school recommendations on discriminatory strategies. They tend to assess children with migration background to perform lower than their fellow students without migration background. Lacking German language skills are often interpreted as lacking expertise in other areas while – in line with my own evidence – sufficient language skills are not acknowledged (Allemann-Ghionda, Auernheimer and Grabbe, 2006; Gomolla and Radtke, 2009, pp. 125–147; Erben Keçici, 2012, pp. 121–122). Based on her review on institutional discrimination and related disadvantages for children and youngsters

with a Turkish migration background in Germany, Erben Keçici (2012, pp. 114–115) finds other scholars, who observed that primary-school teachers give biased secondary-school recommendations, hold that teachers do not discriminate against students. Sympathizing with the teachers' biased school recommendations Keçici explains that those scholars maintain that teachers make such recommendations because they are concerned that children with migration background would not be capable of meeting the challenges at a higher-secondary school. Their family's social and cultural background would result in a lacking capability to support children at home. These scholars as well as the teachers that speak out such school recommendations are members of the majority in Germany. In line with theories of citizenship, it can be argued that teachers and researchers reproduce inequality and racialized discrimination by directing the blame to the ones that are discriminated against based on their class and migration background. Contrary to that, Gomolla and Radtke (2009) concluded from similar results that biased school recommendations constitute a form of institutional discrimination in which teachers reject allegations of discriminatory practices. The authors found that primary-school teachers in fact discriminated against and rejected children along expectations of "normality" in terms of school and language ability, corresponding to their own group's family history: German-speaking, "in the broadest sense Christian-socialized middle-class children" (Gomolla, 2009, p. 10). It is not the lack of students' capacities based on their cultural or class background which results in the often quoted "integration problems". By making biased judgements, concerning German-Turkish children's capacities, many primary-school teachers actually produce ethnic difference and contribute to segregation in the education system. Their recommendations contribute to the overcrowding of lower-secondary schools and special schools with postmigrant students, while students in the other schools interact mainly among students without migration background, a situation which makes it more likely that due to the lack of interaction, stereotypes about the alleged Other are reproduced in the younger generations from young age onwards.

A school recommendation shapes the entire school career of children with migration background. Once they enter a special school or a lower-secondary school, an educational and academic career becomes less accessible. Moreover, the low proportions of children with migration background on higher-secondary schools often result in negative experiences for those German-Turkish children who visit these schools. Like in Emma's case, there are not many other students with migration

background in middle- and higher-secondary schools and it is more likely that these students will experience racialized discrimination. Emma successfully managed to blend in but in other cases German-Turkish youngsters are not included and after numerous attempts and incidents of exclusion they concentrate mainly on membership in their own German-Turkish peer groups (see sections 4.3.2., 5.4.1.). Although such a "recommendation" is legally not binding and parents have the right to not follow it, many of my interlocutors' parents followed the recommendation because they believed in it or because they were not informed about the consequences and the complexity of the German school system.

5.3.3. Confrontation Tactics against Structural Discrimination and Racism

Emma's experiences with institutional discrimination at school during her childhood is exemplary for the experience of many other women in the sample. But it is not only the educational sector that locates German-Turkish people on a disadvantaged end in comparison to Germans without migration background. Structural discrimination is also an issue in the German labor market and in the housing market (see sections 3.8., 4.3.1.). Emma has a disadvantaged access to the housing market which she traces back to her Turkish name. To my question whether she ever felt discriminated against in Germany, she gives the following answer:

> "(8) Yes. And that was when I was looking for an apartment. And I had to say my name on the phone. Telephone conversations ended relatively quickly with a rejection. That's when I kept realizing that I didn't belong. And I once got involved in a conversation with a woman where I said, 'Why don't you first get to know me? Before you turn me away." 'No, I'm not.' I'm like, 'Yes, you are.' (...) I said my name and immediately like, 'Oh, you're of Turkish descent.' 'Yes.' 'Aha. Yes, I'm sorry.' Right? [She] Still kept everything very friendly. 'I'm sorry' and bla, bla, bla 'But there are already so many interested parties. Suddenly so many interested parties.' And THEN you/ So on the phone you notice more where you come from. When they just hear your name." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Several other women in the sample have made the same experience and rationalize this experience with their Turkish names.[242] The qualitative research by Janßen and Polat (2005, pp. 81–103) provides information on disadvantaged access German-Turkish immigrants and postmigrants have to the German housing market. Based on 19 interviews with gatekeepers in the housing market, the authors conclude that "ethnic

[242] 4-I2017, 82; 8-I2017, 58; 9-I2013, 21 – 23; 9-I2017, 29; 14-I2018, 128, 131; 18-I2017, 125, 127; 22-I2017, 167

origin" plays a decisive role in renting apartments, as real estate agencies apply a quota of immigrant household tenants. Another form of discrimination were practices of reserving high-quality apartments for German tenants and to extend these quotas to whole neighborhoods (Janßen und Polat, 2004, 83, 101). The quantitative findings of the dissertation by Schmid (2015) provide additional and more recent evidence for this structural problem in Germany.

In addition to structural ethnic discrimination at school and at the housing market, Emma has experienced ethnicization and racialized discrimination in her everyday life on various occasions and developed different tactics to cope with it. She notes that her name was not only a problem on the housing market but that she was also often categorized as different in her everyday life because of her name (see also sections 4.3.2., 5.2.2.). Emma has adopted different tactics to avoid ethnicization and related attributions of difference in her everyday life. To avoid Othering and to increase her chances of finding an apartment she considers to change her Turkish name into an "international" sounding name.[243] An experience of Emma with racialized discrimination in the public sphere exemplifies what many women I met for this research, experienced in Germany before they moved to Istanbul. As her statement above and her following experience however show, Emma is not merely subject to such experiences. She is also a resourceful agent, as she has developed a tactic of confrontation: In the very moment she experiences racialized discrimination, she ready-wittedly points out the stereotyping, excluding and racist connotations to those who label her. Her account of her reaction to an old man who commented how well she was "assimilated" and later racially discriminated against her, shows her confrontation tactic. She words her response to his assimilation comment as follows:

> "'What is your problem? I grew up here, I was born here. Why do you have to make it a topic that I have integrated myself and assimilated well here?' And the old man, at first, he thought he was saying something really great, but back then I was at such a level that I said to myself, 'This integration and assimilation thing, it bothers me.' Right? The people, they are all assimilated and integrated in their own ways. [...] Then I said: 'I think it's outrageous of you to say something like that to me. That's none of your business' and he said, 'Go back to your country.' He was very angry with me. [...] With a hand gesture, like that, a 70-year-old. The bad thing is that they always think they're giving you something nice, a compliment." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

[243] 7-I2-2017, 2, 9 – 13; PS2-2017, 4

Like many other women, Emma was addressed along lines of ethnicized stereotypes in which her German language skills and her biography in Germany are commented as exception from the assumed norm of Turkey-origin people whose opposite they are supposed to represent. Emma mentions that she also has been addressed with the phrase "But you are different from the other Turks". As I have tried to indicate with Lara's case in section 5.2.2., the emphasis of difference or exception from the alleged 'norm' of Turkish people, is a reverse labelling strategy that keeps stereotypes about an assumed homogeneous group of "Turks" and "Germans" in place. Contrary to the reality in a country of immigration, this labelling strategy reveals the speaker's idea (here the old man) and understanding of membership in Germany are based on the idea of a homogeneous community of ethno-cultural descent (see section 3.6.).

In addition to this, the offender also racially discriminated against her by telling her to leave her country of birth. After I asked, many women explained that they experienced racialized offenses, assaults, even sexual assaults in the public sphere in Germany.[244] However, they have developed different coping strategies to confront and contest offenses against them. Like Emma, some address perpetrators with ready-witted comments and uncover racist implications of their comments, others even went to court.[245] Many interlocutors have mentioned that those who offended them racially in public were often elderly people, mainly men.[246]

Emma's confrontation tactic of self-defense is a common theme in her narrative. She not only defends herself; she also stands up for others when she confronts people with their discriminatory practices.[247] She expresses that she defended her little sister who was bullied at primary-school and that she defended a woman on public transportation who was subject to racialized discrimination. I have witnessed a situation in which she defended me, shortly before our interview in a Café in Istanbul in 2017. I asked the waiter in Turkish whether he could turn down the music because we were going to have an interview. I used three different Turkish words for interview, but he ignored me and

[244] Only interlocutors 1-14: 1-I2012, 213; 1-I2012, 245 – 250, 259, 264 – 280, 295 – 303; 1-I2017, 165, 73; 3-I2013, 213; 4-I2-2013, 155; 4PS2017, 4; 4-I2017, 86; 8-I2017, 19;10-I2013, 143 – 146; 11-I1-2013, 236; 13-I2017, 73, 154

[245] 13-I2013, 154; 15-I2017, 168; 18-I2017, 125; 20-I2017, 191; 20-I2017, 193, 195, 229; 27-I2017, 128; 32-I2017, 48, 50; 26-I2017, 128; 29-I2017, 92

[246] 4-I2-2013, 155; 10-I2013, 144, 146; 20-I2017, 191, 205; 27-I2017, 128; 30-I2017, 95 - 96

[247] 7-I2013, 36 – 37, 151; 7-I1-2017, 2, 7; 7-I2-2017, 15, 153

looked at Emma to explain to him in Turkish what I wanted. She ignored him until he started to listen to me.[248]

5.3.4. *Almancı* vs. *Deutschländerin*: Intersectionality and Negotiations of Gender

Based on her social location as unmarried single mother from Germany, Emma has witnessed intersectional discrimination in Istanbul.[249] She notes that some men she met – including the father of her daughter – did not consider her as potential partner for a serious relationship because based on the grounds that she was born in Germany and single mother they would categorize her as easy or as sex object. She states:

> "For example, due to the fact that I come from Germany. So, with me, at least, that's how it is. And I think many people have the same experience with German-like [*deutschländisch*] girls. We are just again a bit easy/ easy prey for the men. So, discrimination in that they don't really see us/ the German-like [*deutschländisch*] girls as a serious relationship [partner]. (...) We simply are objects with whom one is just together and somehow/ but nothing, definitely nothing serious." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

Emma's experience with the father of her daughter contextualizes this statement as connected to her experience with an abusive relationship. As single mother, her positionality is constrained in comparison to that of other women. She is solely in charge of the income and of bringing up her daughter. Moreover, she lives in a neighborhood that probably has rather traditional ideas about family and marriage, as many of its residents sympathize with the AKP (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2020). I have outlined in section 4.3.4. that the AKP has mainly directed its policies at a conservative and traditional ideal of the family, and that ideas about gender equality have eroded in particular during the AKP's last terms in office. In this idea about gender, women should mainly serve the ends of the family. The many women in Turkey who contest this family ideology increasingly experience gendered discrimination and violence. As a working single-mother, Emma does not fit into the ideal of marriage and motherhood, which might be a reason for the sexism she struggles with.

Like her biographic narrative shows, she is capable contesting gendered constraints and while doing so strategically uses the exclusion she experiences as a tool of emancipation from normative expectations of her. Emma uses a similar tactic of coping with the sexist

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[248] 7PS2-2017, 7
[249] 7-I2013, 198 – 200, 212; 7-I2-2017, 69, 71 – 73, 77, 79

behavior of the men she mentioned. Retranslating the notion *Almancı* into German language she refers to herself a *Deutschländerin* in situations in which she frees herself from gender role expectations towards her in her family in Turkey. During her first six months in Istanbul, Emma lived with her grandmother who used to be a labor migrant in Germany and at that time commuted between Istanbul and Germany in 2013. As mentioned above, her grandmother kept Emma's mother from visiting a school in Germany. In 2013, Emma states that she liberated herself from gender role expectations her grandmother might have had, stating, "I have always been the [black] sheep [...] of the family. So that's why she just left me like that/ didn't interfere anywhere. [I l]eft, came when I wanted."[250] Emma applies this tactic of being different in Istanbul, by using the *Almancı* stereotype as her ticket to freedom from gendered constraints. She refers to herself as using a foreigner's bonus (*Ausländerbonus*) in situations and in places in which she does not want to not adapt to conventional gender norms expected from her as far as her everyday life decisions, her sexual behavior and her choices of clothing are concerned (Weißenberg, 2017, pp. 126–127).

5.3.5. Language and Belonging in Mothering and Teaching Practices

Emma notes that she feels connected to Istanbul through the everyday use of Turkish. She switches between Turkish and German, depending on her social surrounding and her intention. When communicating her emotional attachment to her daughter, she feels that German language does not offer her sufficient repertoire of expressing her emotions while Turkish language does. She states:

> "But for example, when I/ I realize that I am not a native German speaker. So I am and I am not at the same time. I can say that in educational things, in pedagogical things [I] pass on, in hygiene and discipline I am quickly German. I can also speak much better German in this topic. As soon as I love my child, then the German *Schatzi* [dear] is not enough for me. Then, trying to find funny words to choose, that won't work. You know? Snotty nose [*Rotznase*] or something. That doesn't work. Then I feel good again and say, '*Aşkım*'[My love]. Then I finally have the feeling, that it enters the inside just like that. That works now. That's what expresses it." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

In the context of her everyday life, it is interesting that Emma refers to her teaching intention and to pedagogical measures when speaking German with her daughter, because in her job as a German teacher she also fulfills a pedagogical role that is

[250] 7-I2013, 190 - 192

connected to German language. As illustrated in section 4.3.1., Emma's migration narrative reads like a struggle of breaking out from her working-class family background and neighborhood. Her migration to Istanbul was mainly motivated by her aspiration to improve her career opportunities. After graduating from university, she could not find an employment that corresponded to her professional skills. While upward mobility seemed impossible for her in Germany, as she felt that people assigned a predestined working-class role to her, based on her family history, she easily found a job in Istanbul. Her profession as a freelance German teacher constitutes a sphere of belonging in several respects. Contrary to her social environment in Germany, she not only experiences recognition for her professional skills and her higher education but also feels acknowledged as a resourceful individual. At work, Emma is embedded into a German-Turkish social environment of colleagues. Similar to Ayla who maintains contact to Germany-born friends in Istanbul (see section 5.1.3.) and to other women who interact in a university environment or among colleagues with ties to Germany (see sections 4.1.1., 4.3.1.), the connection to German language and people who share a history in Germany is important to Emma. Since her colleagues mainly migrated to Turkey in the course of a family return and have been living in Turkey since their youth and childhood, Emma assesses them as more rooted and assimilated to life in Turkey. Although she expresses that there are significant differences concerning a family migration to Istanbul and her self-made decision, she feels connected to her colleagues. She states

> "But it's still because you share the language [...] I think that's a blessing for me that I'm allowed to work here and also be with these people. [...] You have so many things in common. This dichotomy that one has somehow lived. Germany-Turkey. [...] [Despite the differences] they have also experienced something in their past that is similar [...]. And they can also put themselves in my situation. That is very important for me. Or I can put myself in their shoes in that sense, right? And they can also help me to some extent. If I don't understand something, then I simply ask them and say 'What does that mean? What do they mean by that, what's happening now?' And they explain that to you (laughs), that I can understand that. You know? And they understand that, that I don't understand everything. That's also very important. Because the locals don't understand why I don't understand." (Emma, 1976 - 16.06.2013)

She feels she interacts with "like-minded" people who have "the same background"[251] as far as their transnational experiences of a shared biography in Germany and the

[251] 7-I2013, 21

shared multilingualism are concerned. Moreover, her professional network provides the skills and support to understand and explain knowledge that is not available to her. They can empathize with being different from the majority in Turkey regarding local, cultural and linguistic knowledge.

5.3.6. Istanbul: Local Spheres of Belonging and Constrained Access

Emma explains that she has a love-hate relationship to Istanbul. This statement can be contextualized with the qualities urbanity offers to her on the one hand and the negative local experiences she has made in her neighborhood of residence on the other hand. Emma's migration to Istanbul and her attachment to the city are grounded in a translocal comparison and a contrast of urbanity to her town of origin in Germany. I have illustrated related migration motives in section 4.3.3. As one of the women in the sample who grew up in neighborhoods that are mainly populated by people with a Turkish migration background, Emma chose Istanbul as a destination of migration because an urban environment comes with anonymity. Wirth (1983, pp. 12–13) has defined anonymity as a core quality of urbanity which guarantees freedom from the interference of others, in Emma's case, freedom from her former neighbors' interference in Germany (see also section 4.3.3.).

In the light of Emma's history of emancipation, it is a logical consequence that she values anonymity and small-talk situations in Istanbul. When I asked her if there is something that connects her to Turkey or Istanbul, she first related to what also constitutes her migration motive, the fact that the city lets her "disappear"[252] if she wants to. She is also locally attached to the city's dynamics which she perceives and describes as follows:

> "E: I think the strange thing about Istanbul/ In all that shit, there's always […] some things that you see. You see them. You feel them. […] I think that's why many people can and want to stay here. Because in/ yes, in all the dirt you see how all the flowers grow out of the dirt. And well, I think that fascinates a lot of the people.
>
> I: For example? What would be a flower now?
>
> E: That would be an experienced situation. Some kind of nice situation. Not what happens to you. What you observe. Because there are so many people here, you don't even have to go outside to see something, to experience something. You can just look out of the window. Then you see something. You see people laughing all at once. Some women who

[252] 7-I2013, 37; 7-I2-2017, 27; 7PM2017, 19

> are in the park with their children and the women are laughing about something. And that pleases me, for example, here. You, you/ (..) you see somebody helping somebody. And that is also nice." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Her attachment to the city is defined by the anonymity and fascination urbanity offers to her, and beyond that, the readiness to help and solidarity among strangers she observes in Istanbul's public sphere and perceives as a characteristic which is specific to the city of Istanbul. When I asked her if there are situations in which she feels like she belongs to Turkey or to Istanbul, she states that it is quite the contrary, she does not feel included in her neighborhood in Istanbul expressing her thoughts as follows:

> "So, also from the people I notice that I belong less than I thought. [...] Look, I have to say that I live in an area that doesn't necessarily suit my personality. Right? I always say that. Unfortunately, unfortunately I have not managed sitting with you in *Levent* or *Tarabya*. Then I would perhaps/ had I been THERE somewhere. Then maybe I would talk differently now. But I am not there, therefore I also live among completely different people, who also think differently and act differently. And this life here, where I live. Among the people, I can only say that many are not honest, not sincere, do not keep their word. […]. And what I see from this now as a conclusion for me is that I don't trust anyone anymore. I don't believe anybody anymore." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Contrary to her identification with the city of Istanbul, Emma's life and that of the residents in her neighborhood differ culturally, socially and politically. It can be argued that the exclusion she experiences is also based on her social location as single mother from Germany which additionally makes it difficult for her to access people. She explains the exclusion she experiences with the educational divide between her and the other residents. As far as educational level and access to economic resources are concerned the socio-economic level of her neighborhood is below average in comparison to other neighborhoods in Istanbul. Many residents sympathize with the AKP (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2020). Due to her own financial situation as single mother, she lives in the neighborhood in which her family and she own real estate, although she would personally have preferred to live in a more privileged neighborhood.[253] Emma is aware that the problems she faces in her neighborhood are a local concern, as she compares her situation with that of her colleagues at work who live in more

[253] 7PM2017, 7

distinguished neighborhoods in Istanbul with different lifestyles that correspond more to her own views:

> "But as I said, I know that others [...], who used to be, who are older and used to earn much better money, when it was still cheap here, they all live in a three-story family house with a garden somewhere in *Tarabiya*, *Sarıyer*, bought it 40 years ago, and of course they have a completely different environment, where they move. When I tell them what I experience here, they think/ they don't even know these neighborhoods. Let's put it this way." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Contrary to Emma's experience, the neighborhoods Ayla (see section 5.1.5.) and Lara (see section 5.2.6.) live in, correspond to their lifestyles and they explicitly refer to them as spheres of belonging.

As much as going to parties was one way of emancipating herself as a youngster from her Turkey-origin surrounding, it is also a way of relating to her gender-identity and corresponding freedoms over her body today. She expresses her identification with Germany by virtue of referring to her gender-identity as follows:

> "When I drink beer, do typical German activities like that. Then I feel rather German. I drink beer, I go out at night, I dance, I get drunk, I'm fishing for a guy, I go home. [...] Then it's that simple: that's my life and that's also part of it. I can go home drunk and nothing has ever happened to me. Maybe that's this security that you feel, this sense of belonging. Maybe now. [...] whether I feel like I belong, I don't know now. But it's the freedom, the freedom of thought." (Emma, 1976 - 14.06.2017)

Since Emma emancipated herself from expectations of neighbors as a youngster by joining parties and living out her sexuality, she related to her right of self-determination and freedom over her body as a practice of belonging that relates to her socialization in Germany and is situated outside her relative's sphere of interference. From a local standpoint, she also relate to her practice of going out and her gender-identity as outside of her neighborhood in Istanbul by situating it in Germany and in other neighborhoods of Istanbul. As our conversation continues and we exchange thoughts about neighborhoods in Istanbul and about going out, she remembers another neighborhood in Istanbul she used to live in where she also went out. She contextualizes her experience, stating "If you live in *Göktürk* or if you live in *Tarabya*, you will just do it the same way you do it in Germany. It really has something to do with the area as well."[254] As I have argued in section 5.1.5., security on the streets at night is an issue

[254] 7-I2-2017, 49

for women all over the world. Emma's statement can be compared to that of Ayla, who deliberately chose a neighborhood – similar to those Emma refers to – where she can walk around freely as a woman at night.

5.4. KÜBRA: CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP PRACTICE - 'THEY CALL US FOREIGNERS BUT WE ARE NATIVES'

Regarding her social location in Germany, Kübra's positionality is one of the most disadvantaged ones in the sample. She was born into a family of lower income and grew up in a deprived neighborhood in Cologne. Due to family responsibilities, she discontinued vocational training and has not completed an education. Her socio-economic position and social status have significantly improved with her migration to Turkey in the course of marriage. Her struggles of adaptation in Turkey can in part be explained with classism that she experienced based on her and her family's migration background. Due to her expired right of residence in Germany and her parenting responsibilities, Kübra cannot engage in transnational mobility which causes a strong longing for people, objects and tastes she connects with Germany. She attaches great importance to passing on her language skills and transnational cultural knowledge to her sons. Kübra identifies Germany as her country of birth by positioning herself as *Inländerin* (native woman) contrary to the label *Ausländer* (foreigner). In Germany, she articulates a right to cultural difference and to belonging and in Turkey she has applied a tactic of delineating herself from her initial struggles of adaptation, to underline that she has successfully integrated. Similar as in Germany, she points to her cultural difference in Turkey by maintaining educational practices that differ from her social surrounding's educational practices and expectations towards her.

5.4.1. Negotiating Biography as Struggle of Economic Deprivation

Kübra[255] was born in Cologne in 1984. After she married at the age of 20, she moved to Istanbul in 2004. In 2017, she had three sons who were twelve, eight and three years old. Kübra's grandmother migrated to Germany by herself as a labor migrant from a village in Anatolia. Kübra's father was not born in Germany, he came in the course of family reunion to join Kübra's grandmother together his brother when he was 17 years old. Kübra's mother who is from the same village in Turkey migrated to Germany two

[255] 3-PM2013,12 - 13; 3-I2017, 3, 7, 8, 15-22, 43-53, 94-96, 103-107, 139, 146, 193, 198, 204, 207-213

years later to join her husband. Her parents got married when they were youngsters. Kübra has four siblings, one older brother, two younger brothers, and a younger sister, Mihrimah who is also one interlocutor of this sample. Kübra's father worked in a factory and her mother was mainly in charge of raising the children but she also worked as a cleaner. Kübra has completed school until 10th grade and discontinued her vocational training as doctor's assistant at the age of 19, when she assisted her father in Turkey who left for Turkey to recover from an illness. On this occasion, Kübra became acquainted with her husband (see section 4.4.2.).

Kübra and her siblings grew up in a high-rise building in a neighborhood in Cologne which she describes as socially deprived and mainly populated by "foreigners" from many different countries including Turkey. She remembers that the residents of the high-rise building complex were "people who were unemployed or did not make much money." Her childhood and early youth were characterized by her parents' efforts get by with a low income and a narrow living space. As a seven-person household they had to share three rooms. Despite these difficult circumstances, Kübra underlines that she liked her neighborhood and felt at home there. She recalls that her family's housing and income situation improved after her mother started working as a cleaner and her oldest brother moved out. The family moved into a house several blocks away. The residents of this street were mainly retirees without migration background. Kübra recalls that her family was "accepted" and had good relations with the German neighbors. She describes the neighborhood as very calm because there were no other children. Contrary to the surrounding's atmosphere, she underlines that there was "a lot of noise at home" but neighbors never complained. She remembers that the neighbors brought her and her siblings presents on Christmas and Easter holidays and on their birthdays.

Since there were no other families with children in her neighborhood, Kübra continued to meet her friends from the high-rise building. She visited a comprehensive secondary school (*Gesamtschule*), a school form which bundles all three forms of the segregated school systems in Germany, i.e., lower-secondary school, middle-secondary school and higher-secondary school (see section 5.3.2.). Her classmates were children with and without migration background. Her friends from her neighborhood visited the same school but different classes. She remembers that she mainly spent time with her international friends at school during recess and after school in a youth center. Like other women in the sample, Kübra felt treated differently by other students and by teachers based on her Turkish migration background. She remembers that she and her

international friends from the neighborhood were insulted with slogans like “foreigners out” and quotes the racist statements of a teacher who disliked Turkish children. Kübra rationalizes her ambivalent sensation of feeling German and not feeling German at the same time with the unequal treatment she experienced at school in Germany, stating:

> “You are not treated like that [like you are German] at all. I feel like that, BUT you are not treated like that, right? You know that you/ that the Germans are always five steps ahead of you. So, the rights in general. So, in school (.). There were many teachers who really/ even though I was right/ but because I am a Turk, because I just couldn't make myself properly understood, treated [me] unjustly.” (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Her statements illustrate that she identifies as German but that she did not feel treated as if she belongs based on the racialized discrimination by fellow students and the differential treatment by teachers. Other interlocutors have also mentioned similar experiences of treatment by teachers based on their migration background. As illustrated in section 5.3.2., empirical evidence of this and other research indicates that children with a Turkey-origin migration background in particular are structurally disadvantaged in the German school system. Like other interlocutors, Kübra quotes a significant other person without migration background who supported her. She had a very good relationship to her class teacher with whom she still stayed in contact (see section 5.3.2.).

After Kübra obtained a tenth-grade school leaving certificate she applied for an vocational training position as a doctor’s assistant. She recalls that someone rejected her in an interview by stating “We don’t have so many Turkish patients”. After sending more than “40 applications”, Kübra could not find a training position and started to apply for internships at a pharmacy, also without any success. Eventually, she found a vocational training position as a doctor’s assistant for a Turkey-origin doctor. After Kübra medically assisted her father in Turkey, she dropped out from vocational training. Empirical evidence indicates that youngsters who leave school and have a migration background have a constrained access to vocational training positions in comparison to youngsters without migration background. Moreover, they have to search for a longer period of time in order to find a training position (Beicht and Granato, 2009, pp. 4, 19). The fact that Kübra has dropped out from vocational training is not an isolated case. According to the Integration Report of the Federal States in Germany, Kübra falls into the age group of Germany-born people with migration background who were four times less likely to complete an education in comparison to population groups without

migration background (IntMK, 2019, p. 74). Kübra's experiences illustrate how structural disadvantage at school and in educational training can reinforce minorization. An orientation towards immigrant support networks is a logical consequence, as her friendships and training position illustrate.

5.4.2. Cultural Citizenship: A Right to Belonging and to Difference

German-Turkish women use different techniques in Germany and in Turkey to contest or cope with attributions of difference. They use a tactic of dialogue (see section 5.1.2.), a tactic of delineation from the ascribed label (see section 5.2.4.) or appropriate social and cultural difference (see section 5.3.4.). A last empirically rich strategy to face labels and exclusion is the cognitive and emotional rejection of being excluded and a simultaneous emphasis on membership. Referring to her upbringing and life in Cologne prior, Kübra states:

> "So, as I said yes, I was happy. So, I never felt like a foreigner. I was like an *Inländerin* (native). (...) So I don't find life in Germany difficult. Really. For a foreigner. At least in Cologne. I have a friend [from somewhere else in Germany] who says much worse things [...]. But in Cologne it's not hard at all." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Four years later she makes a similar statement:

> "We said, 'They always say *Ausländer* [foreigners]/' I didn't know who we were. I said at that time, 'We are both *Inländer* (natives) and *Ausländer*.' We are indeed/ my parents are Turkish, but well, we were born in Germany, we are *Inländer*. But in a way, that you would really think like a German? No, we are foreigners, right? Because we grow up in a foreign family. The culture, it never goes away. You/ for example your food is different, your way of talking is different, your behavior is different. You don't behave like a real foreigner, of course. But still, you are raised that way. Therefore, it's true. We are foreigners. You just have to accept that." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Kübra's statements illustrate that the definition of Self is inherently connected to the outside world. She only became aware of her difference from the majority and started to define her cultural belonging when she was confronted with the attribution *Ausländer* (foreigner), which was not only used as label in contexts of racialized discrimination. In 2021, after nearly 60 years of immigration *Ausländer* is still the legal term for denizens in the German in the Residence Act. With the notion *Inländer* (native) Kübra points to her right to membership based on her birth and upbringing in Germany. When confronted with culturalist and racializing attributions of difference, such as the notion *Ausländer*, many interlocutors, similar to Kübra, do not permit feelings of exclusion by

stating “we are all foreigners” or by underlining that they simply will “not accept” being labelled as a foreigner. When I ask Sofia for instance if she ever was labelled as foreigner, she states, “I didn't feel addressed. I felt offended, but at the same time kind of like, ‘I'm not a foreigner’”. Others underline like Kübra that when being addressed with attributions of difference, they “do not feel like a foreigner” or they make fun of people who call them *Ausländer* and joke around with designating each other *Ausländer* among peers.[256] Some interlocutors note that they ignore attributions of difference, stating that they do “not care”, “do not take it serious”, “do not take it personal” or do not let themselves be “provoked”. Several women also emphasized that they never had feelings of being discriminated against and underline a sense of belonging and participation in society in Germany.[257]

Kübra’s tactic of dealing with the labels *Ausländer* has an additional dimension. She relates it to her sense of belonging. Her contrasting self-designation *Inländerin* is not only gendered. It shows that she does not accept exclusion and instead makes a claim for membership. This articulation of claims is evocative of Rosaldo’s notion of *cultural citizenship*. As practice-related notion of citizenship, cultural citizenship entails a demand, minorities make to the dominant group: A right to belong and a right to cultural difference. Rosaldo defines cultural citizenship as “the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one’s right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes.” (1994, p. 57). Kübra elaborates her notion of cultural difference elsewhere as follows:

> “Because the culture is still continuing at home. You have a different world outside. But at home you [also] have another world. So, your mother prays. We eat something different than [...] the Germans. [...] As I said, I never felt like a real *Ausländer*. (...) Just like an *Inländerin*, right?” (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Explaining her cultural difference with a different upbringing in the family as far as cuisine and religion are concerned, Kübra simultaneously refers again to the gendered notion *Inländerin* (native) as self-designation. This way she includes herself as female member of German society and articulates a claim for sameness and belonging. By

[256] 1PM2017, 14; 1-I2017, 181, 183; 5-I2017, 89; 9-I2017, 80; 10-I2013, 128, 130; 16-I2017, 9, 98; 18-I2017, 153; 19-I2017, 175; 21-I2017, 131; 32-I2017, 48; 30-I2017, 83; 32-I2017, 48, 128, 221

[257] 10-I2013, 132; 19-I2017, 221; 21-I2017, 213; 22-I2017, 260; 31-I2017, 135; 32-I2017, 227; 32-I2017, 229

acknowledging that attributed difference is a part of her, she simultaneously contrasts her own sense of belonging and being different to the derogative designation *Ausländer* (foreigner) she experienced at school. While rejecting the sole attribution of cultural difference the term *Ausländer* entails, she can acknowledge being an *Ausländer* as long as her right to belong as *Inländerin* is not contested.

5.4.3. From Exclusion to Belonging: Class-related Struggles of Adaptation

Kübra underlines on both interview occasions that she went through a several year lasting struggle of adaptation to life in Istanbul. She cried a lot and wanted to return to Germany, stating: "The people, they are different. The traffic. The system. (.) In the beginning it was very difficult." Kübra describes the difficulties she had as resulting from her own alienation with a different and unfamiliar lifestyle that contrasted her own behavior concerning different spheres of the everyday life including language, traffic and bureaucracy but also parenting practices, consumption habits and cuisine. Moreover, her social surrounding disapproved of her lack of cultural and historical knowledge on Turkish historiography and her language skills.[258] In 2013, nine years after her migration to Istanbul she sometimes still struggles with habits which she identifies as different from her own ones, stating:

> "For me it is also very difficult. (...) The way of life, how you grew up. The people, they are different here/ they grow up differently here. They think differently. They eat differently. They sit differently. They sleep differently. They talk differently. Still/ you still can't get used to it." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Her struggles of adaptation can partially be explained with the social exclusion, she experienced in the beginning of her stay. With her marriage, Kübra not only migrated to another country, she also entered a wealthy social stratum that significantly differed from the immigrant working-class setting she grew up in. She rationalizes the social exclusion she experienced as follows:

> "When I arrived, I didn't even know Turkish properly. The Turks who/ who first came to Germany, at least those who have not grown up there and were [not] born there. Like they spoke German the way I spoke Turkish here at the beginning. I couldn't even/ the Turkish that we learn in Germany is not the real Turkish, right? [...] Just like a foreigner, right? Who comes from Germany. They always called me the girl who comes from Germany, right? At the beginning I was treated like that. Just as I said, my way of speaking, my way of life, my thoughts. Everything was

[258] 3-I2013, 54, 243, 257, 281

> different. That's why I was not accepted by them at the beginning. At least in the circle of friends of Turkish people." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

The exclusion Kübra experienced, can also be explained with the fact that she entered an upper-class social environment in Istanbul. It can be argued that Kübra experienced a form classicist exclusion based on her parent's and her own migration history. After I asked her in which situations she was treated like a "foreigner", she told me that she wanted to make friends with her neighbors but that she was "not accepted" because she was not invited to her neighbors' regular meetings. She states:

> "I don't know why they didn't invite me in the beginning, but they just didn't invite me. Either they didn't like me. But now we have a very good relationship. Now, I meet up with them. But in the beginning, they didn't accept me. Just like the Germans didn't accept those who came from Turkey, right? In the beginning/ I say yes, I was treated like a foreigner here." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Comparing her initial situation in Turkey to that of first-generation labor migrants, she rationalizes her lacking Turkish skills as a reason for the social exclusion she experienced. Like Kübra, other interlocutors have also mentioned differences between the Turkish language their parents taught them and the Turkish that is spoken in Istanbul. Some interlocutors referred to the Turkish segments of the first generation of labor migrants who were of a lower educational background and originated from rural areas in Turkey. They mention that they grew up with a dialect that is not only rural but also no longer disseminated in Turkey, not even in their parents' and grandparents' place of origin. Accordingly, the language some interlocutors speak when they newly arrive in Turkey points to their family's class and migration history and their rural descent, a social class from which upper class Istanbulites like to distance themselves (see sections 3.2., 5.2.3.).

In this particular environment, Kübra was confronted with the classicist devaluation which is bundled in the designation *Almancı* (see section 5.2.3.). She notes that people also denied her knowledge in other areas of life based on her lacking Turkish skills. She was addressed with a narrative she describes as "Ah *Almancı*. Oh, come on, you don't understand. You don't know what it is. You can't even speak Turkish properly."[259] When

[259] 3-I2017, 82, 111, 116

she newly arrived in Turkey, Kübra perceived being labelled as *Almancı* as an insult because it underlined her foreignness.

Kübra leads a wealthy life in Istanbul. She lives together with her husband and children in a spacious apartment which is located in a luxurious housing estate. In 2013, after nine years of experience in Turkey she feels like an integrated Turkish person. She has long improved her Turkish sills to a mother tongue level and based on the statement above, she has made friends with her neighbors. In the course of her social integration in Turkey, her perception of the label *Almancı* has also changed. When I asked in 2013, what she thinks about the term, she states:

> "Actually correct. Correctly described: *Almancı*. For example, you live in Germany. But if you go to Tur-/ well you are indeed a foreigner in Germany. But for the Turks you are just a German. For example, [those] who still live there. For example, if my friends come from Germany or, well, […] my relatives. […] When they come. I also always say *Almancı*. 'And what do you have/?' So, the Turks who come from Germany, they brought a lot of gifts in the beginning. And you hold/ you get used to it, (laughs) to the gifts. That's why I always ask, 'And what did you bring us?' (Laughter in the voice) (.) That's actually described quite naturally." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

I have noted that one of the derogatory connotations of the term is that German-Turkish people visit Turkey as tourists and display their wealth to evoke envy among Turkey-origin people. Kübra's words do not seem derogatory. By applying the designation for visiting relatives, she delineates herself from German-Turkish people who live in Germany. In addition, she draws a line between her 2013-Self and the struggles of adaptation of her old Self. By using *Almancı* as designation, Kübra underlines her own successful adaptation to life in Turkey (see section 5.2.3.).

5.4.4. Commuting Practices and Constrained Mobility

In 2013, Kübra[260] perceives Turkey as much as her home country as Germany and states that she is happy there. The fact that Kübra had difficulties of adjustment also results from her former commuting practice. During the first years, she insisted on her preference to continue her life in Germany. Since she did not want to live in Turkey, she divided her life between Germany and Turkey and commuted until her first son entered school age. She states that the decision-making process regarding her and her family's location of settlement, was – like her commuting practice – a several year

[260] 3-I2013, 259

lasting process of negotiation between her and her husband who also commuted to visit her in Germany. Like several other women (see section 4.1.2.), Kübra gave birth to her two first sons in Germany; both of them have the German nationality. Her later settlement in Turkey was ultimately a household decision in the light of lacking economic opportunities to provide for a decent livelihood in Cologne (see sections 4.2.2., 4.4.3., 4.4.4.). Accordingly, Kübra perceives her decision as a decision she made for her family's well-being that contrasted her individual wishes. She states:

> "The decision, that's actually not my decision in that sense. That I live here. I am married. I made that decision back then, but I was 20 years old, right? And now I have three children. Now, of course, I can't say, 'Yeah, come on guys, now we have a different life. Let's go back.'" (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Kübra and her husband follow a traditional division of labor in which she is in charge of bringing up the children. Contrary to her former perpetual commuting practice, Kübra could not visit Germany for two years when I met her in 2013. Due to her family responsibilities, she did not extend her residence permit and lost her right of residence. At that time, she was insecure whether she could reenter the country citing the example of a friend who had lost her residence title and had to apply for a visa to reenter Germany (see sections 4.4.3., 4.5.). Despite the fact that Kübra has successfully integrated herself in Turkey over the years, her interview narrative of 2013 is characterized by nostalgia and a longing for her place of origin in Germany. She states:

> "Yes, yes. I would also like to (laugh in voice). Maybe when I'm 40, I'd like to go back to Germany. So just not for long, but commute like my parents commute, right? Three months there, three months here. I MISS Germany. That is also my country. I think so, right? This is also my country. They call us *Ausländer*, but I think we are *Inländer*, right? I miss Germany very much. I miss my family, my friends." (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Since her opportunities of mobility are constrained by her lacking right of residence and her parenting responsibilities, she cannot travel between the countries as much as she used to. Although, her mother and her sister were living in Istanbul as well in 2013, she misses her siblings who still live in Cologne (see section 4.4.3.). Her imagination of commuting between Istanbul and Cologne in the future has not changed in 2017, she only postpones her plans because she has a third son.

5.4.5. Local and Urban Spheres of Belonging

Kübra mentions the traffic in Istanbul as an additional challenge when she newly arrived in Turkey. She mentions two situations in traffic which exemplify her initial struggles. In the first incident she was waiting for ten minutes at a road and reasoned how she could cross it unscathed. Another situation she recalls was a misunderstanding based on different traffic rules in Turkey and in Germany. On that particular occasion, she applied the German traffic rules according to which cars must give way to pedestrians on certain crossroads; a traffic rule which does not apply in Istanbul. She states:

> "The crosswalk, right? I KNOW I HAVE THE RIGHT, that is, to walk across that crosswalk on the street. I didn't see any car [there] either. A car came very quickly and it didn't wait either. I was in the middle of the street. And then I was shocked, of course. And then I said, 'What are you doing, don't you see me?' He got out of the car and said: 'Are you crazy, this is the street!' I said 'Yes, don't you see the crosswalk?'" (Kübra, 1984 - 05.03.2013)

Several interlocutors have mentioned similar struggles with traffic when they newly arrived in Istanbul. Contrary to these struggles, Kübra quotes a traffic situation when I ask her in which situation, she feels like she belongs in Turkey. She answers my question as follows:

> "K: The traffic light. Jumping a red light with a car. [Then I think] 'Well, now I am Turkish', right?
>
> I: Then you think like, 'Oh, now I belong.'
>
> K: Yes, yes. (laughs) Typically Turkish, right? So that comes directly to my mind [...] Or you have no empathy for pedestrians, right? You never wait at the crosswalk. [...] That's what I do every day, you know? Which I don't accept, but I do it anyway. Because, you run with time, right? So, if you stop at once, where the crowd is, then you have to wait about three, four minutes with the car. Until you [come] through again/ and that is time. For example, what I think now, that is also typically Turkish. Time. Imagine/ [just] three, four minutes, you have no patience. That's also what the community here has. You don't have patience for anything." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

One of the everyday life spheres that challenged her the most to adapt to presents a sphere of belonging to her in 2017. It is also interesting that she quotes an example in which she describes herself in the exact opposite role of the newcomer role she found herself in when she was struggling with the traffic in Istanbul. Similar to the example above in which she delineates herself from the times when she newly arrived, by using the designation *Almancı*, she now changes roles and identifies with the hasty city life of

Istanbul residents. While her adaptation to city life constitutes an important element of her local sense of belonging, Kübra simultaneously expresses a city fatigue. Contrary to the chaotic life in the metropole of Istanbul which she perceives as "stressful", "difficult" and overcrowded, she expresses a longing for "tranquility", "order" and "few people", an atmosphere which she situates in Germany. Like other interlocutors she makes a translocal reference to nature in Germany where she situates this tranquility, stating that she misses a specific park in Cologne and enjoyed listening to the sounds of animals during her last visit (see section 4.3.3.).[261]

5.4.6. Parenting Practices and Passing on Transnational Knowledge

Apart from a new cultural and social environment, Kübra's struggles of adaptation in Istanbul were also coupled with a new life situation as she gave birth to her first son shortly after she migrated to Turkey. She remembers that she had her mother send her different baby products from Germany and that she filled suitcases with clothes, cosmetics, toys and even a buggy when she commuted from Germany back to Turkey. Kübra remembers that people noticed that she was "from abroad" from the way she raised her children. She was also criticized by some people in her social environment who assessed educational practices as "wrong" and suggested that she ought to handle her children's education differently. Kübra remained faithful to her own style of education.

I have outlined in section 4.3.4. that a changed political discourse in which women are constructed as mainly serving family ends has translated into the everyday life experiences of some German-Turkish women. Although Kübra and her husband both sympathize with the AKP, and Kübra is mainly responsible for taking care of the children, she does not fully comply with gender role expectations she encounters as far as her parenting practices are concerned. Despite her family responsibilities, Kübra underlines that she also takes care of herself. She can imagine to start working and in order to "do something for myself", an idea that is met with a lack of understanding by her surrounding because of her family's affluent income. She underlines that she sometimes gives herself a treat when she goes out and drinks a coffee by herself, leaving behind her phone and the family household. Because she believes that it is important to first look after oneself and then taking care of children, she encourages her girlfriends

[261] 3PM2013, 6, 13; 3-I2017, 72, 122; 3PS2017, 6 – 7

by telling them: “Do something for yourself. You first, then your child.” For this reason, her friends have mirrored her as “self-referred”, telling her: “You do what you like, how you feel like. You are different.” As far as her autonomy as mother is concerned, Kübra takes pride in what she assesses as culturally different behavior. By referring to her cultural difference, she also rationalizes her liberal educational practices which she maintains despite her social surrounding’s criticism and comments. She notes that she lets her son play with dolls, although people have commented that her youngest son will become a woman if she lets him prevail. By referring to her German sister in law’s educational practices, she also makes her older sons help her with the household chores.[262]

Like many other German-Turkish women who have children, Kübra wants to pass on her German language skills and her transnational cultural and biographic experience to her children. The fact that two of her sons have German passports shows that she also wants to enhance her sons’ future opportunities of mobility in between Turkey and Germany (see section 4.1.1.). Since Kübra, unlike other interlocutors, cannot return to Germany for her children’s school education two of her sons visit a private school in Istanbul which offers German lessons. Making a transnational comparison of school systems she believes like other interlocutors that a private school in Turkey cannot compete with a public school in Germany.[263] She raises the following criticism regarding her son’s language education in Turkey:

> “Although, they are going to private school/ well the system here. The school system, I just don't like it. My older son, […] he's been having German lessons at school for four years, but he can't even form a sentence. And that just bothers me.” (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

Despite her expired right of residence, Kübra managed to organize a four-week trip to Cologne with her children in 2017 to support her sons’ language education. She organized private tuition lessons for her two oldest sons and additionally hired a private German teacher for her oldest son. She states:

> “I wanted them to be able to see cultural aspects for themselves, the difference between Turkish and German culture. One of them, he is twelve, he can already see the difference. [...] the older one got a German teacher who was also German. A German teacher who was also old. I really wanted her to be an old German teacher. [...] an […] old lady. She was very helpful. She also made excursions with the children, so that they

[262] 3PS2017, 5, 8, 11 - 12
[263] 3PM2013, 12; 3-I2013, 261 – 267; 3-I20170801, 86

> could really/ she knew that I also wanted them to see how a German behaves. [...] That's why I was there [in Germany] for a long time." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

This statement illustrates that she also wants her sons to become familiar with people and different habits and aspects of life in Germany and to school their capabilities of being familiar with two different cultural contexts.

5.4.7. Tastes and Memories

The importance Kübra has ascribed to infant care items from Germany also relates to her own childhood memories. She states on both interview occasions in 2013 and in 2017, that she misses German food, German supermarkets and drugstores.[264] Many other interlocutors[265] have expressed a longing for tastes and smells they connect to their biographies in Germany. Tastes different women have repeatedly mentioned to crave for include sweet and savory bakery products, different types of chocolates, butter, different kinds of cheese, beer, pork meat or dishes and specialties from their regions of origin, for example (*Käsespätzle*) and pretzels or seasonal dishes, such as gingerbread (*Lebkuchen*), spiced biscuits (*Spekulatius*) and *Marzipan*. Like Kübra, they have visitors bring them these products or import them on a trip back to Turkey.

When I ask Kübra whether there is something that connects her to Germany what she can't find in Istanbul, she answers as follows:

> "Well, the food. The food. For example, fish sticks, right? Although there are also fish sticks here. But they don't taste the same as in Germany. Or just Gouda cheese. Or quark. I miss all that. In any case cornflakes. I still order cornflakes or *Nussknacker* (chocolate brand) or *Nimm2* candy from Germany. It's all part of me, right? Of my childhood. It's always ordered from Germany. If someone comes from Germany, I always get that." (Kübra, 1984 - 01.08.2017)

It could be argued that the contemporary globalized Turkish market would offer the food German-Turkish women long for but several interlocutors stress that the same brands have different tastes in Turkey. Asya's statement illustrates an observation, other

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[264] 3-I2013, 147; 3-I2017, 120

[265] 1-I2017, 206 – 208; 2FN2017, 26; 5-I2013, 38 - 44; 45 – 48, 56 – 58; 129 - 130; 7-I2-2017; 8-I2017, 60; 8-I2013, 102; 8-PS2017, 4; 9-I2017, 120, 122; 10-I2013, 72, 97-98; 10-I2017, 116; 10-I2017, 116; 11-I1-2013, 98; 11-I1-2013, 190; 11-I2017, 31, 124, 146; 12-I2013, 207 – 208; 12PM2017, 12; 13-I2013, 136; 13-I2017, 77; 15-I2017,227; 16-I2017, 25; 134 – 136; 21-I2017, 192 – 195; 22PS2017, 3; 23PS2017, 3; 23-I2017, 246 – 247; 24-I2017, 151; 25-I2017, 29; 25-I2017, 29, 31 – 33; 62; 141; 26PS2017, 5; 26PS2017, 5; 26-I2017, 148, 150 – 152; 27-I2017, 157; 28-I2017, 164, 166; 29-I2017Arzu, 54, 29-I2017, 135; 30-I2017, 118 – 120; 31PM2017, 12; 31-I2017, 183 – 187; 31PS2017Asya, 14; 32-I2017, 193

interlocutors have stressed as well and exemplifies why some women prefer the German version of products that are also available in Turkey. She states:

> "A: In the beginning, I lugged a lot of stuff back and forth. Honestly, I went there with empty suitcases and came back with full suitcases. I used to bring all that nonsense here. Meanwhile, there are a lot of things here too. They are adapted to Turkish tastes in terms of production. [...] And many sweets are altered. For example, *Coca-Cola* is sweeter here. *Fanta* is a bit more intense in color than in Germany. It is adapted visually and it is adapted in taste. *Nutella* tastes different here than in Germany. *Nutella*, for example, I simply bring only from Germany or have someone bring it. I don't buy *Nutella* here because the *Nutella* here doesn't taste the same as the *Nutella* from Germany.
>
> I: Then you have good taste sensors.
>
> A: If you try it, you will notice the difference, Melanie. [...] They use different fats and the sweetness level is completely different and the consistency is something completely different here.
>
> I: And you don't like that so much?
>
> A: Nah, it doesn't taste that great. But that also has something to do with being used to it. What I liked in childhood is also offered to me here, but in a different way, and I notice that. So *Nutella*, and sweets of course, I bring them from there." (Asya, 1974 - 26.07.2017)

Evoking tastes and smells from Germany constitutes a way of creating a translocal space that connects German-Turkish women's memories of their past to present moments in Turkey. The tastes and smells they bring from Germany differ from those in Turkey. For this reason, some women note that their German cooking practices are not always met with enthusiasm by their surroundings. While one woman visits Christmas markets of the German-Turkish community in Istanbul, others engage in German cooking practices in their everyday lives. Some women cook and bake on special occasions, such as Christmas or Easter holidays to conserve a tradition of celebrating those holidays but also to evoke childhood and youth memories of their past in Germany (see for example section 5.1.8.). An alternative to importing products from Germany is to order from a German-Turkish business on *Facebook* called *Deutschländer*.[266] Some of my interlocutors have ordered from this business which imports much of the above-mentioned food from Germany and delivers orders mainly to the German speaking community in Istanbul.

[266] Some German-Turkish people in Istanbul refer to themselves as *Deutschländer*. The term is sometimes translated as *Almancı* and means German native.

It can be concluded that Kübra used to be very mobile and moved a lot of objects between Germany and Turkey based on her initial struggles of adaptation and her preference to continue her life in Germany. After Kübra's mobility became more constrained, due to her expired residence permit in Germany and family responsibilities, she started to relate more strongly to her belonging in Germany by means of passing on her transnational knowledge to her sons and by maintaining her own ideas about parenting practices. Moreover, tastes help her to evoke childhood memories to maintain her biographic connection to Germany.

CONCLUSION

This thesis contributes to the existing research on intersectionality theory in transnational space and to the literature on belonging. The empirical results on German-Turkish women's transnational migration trajectories and their positionalities vis-à-vis the politics of belonging in the form of citizenship policies and discourses indicate that they situate their senses of belonging and their identification with groups and places not along bi-national, hybrid or hyphenated ethnonational senses of belonging. Contrary to the grand narratives of intersectional ethno-cultural categorizations they experience in the everyday life, the consulted women rather situate belongingness on the social and spatial micro-level of their past and present everyday lives which simultaneously structure their migration paths.

A comprehensive analysis of the empirical results in the following sections will guide the way to a normative conclusion of this research: if Germany wants to remain true to a democratic understanding of membership and social justice in the state, a necessary prerequisite is a redefinition of de jure citizenship and a redefinition of the prevailing ethno-cultural understanding of membership in Germany.

A contribution of this work to the literature on transnationalism is the longitudinal analysis of processes of transnational migration. Contextual changes in German-Turkish women's lives and large-scale transformations in Turkey between the two fieldwork occasions in 2013 and in 2017 provide qualitative insights about causes for transnational migration trajectories of German-Turkish women. Accordingly, the results also contextualize some of the causes behind the transformation of migration trends between Germany and Turkey which has shifted from a nearly nine-year lasting positive net migration to Turkey to a positive net migration to Germany in 2015 (see section 3.7.).

Synchronizing the ethnographic results of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, it can be concluded that the factors that structure migration and belonging inherently overlap. Spheres of actual and imagined mobility as well as spheres of belonging are ultimately the same as both address fundamental aspects of the everyday life that connect Germany and Turkey: the family, friends and colleagues, the workplace and the neighborhood. All of those spheres entail power hierarchies. As a result of German-Turkish women's practices of negotiating their positionality, in these spheres alternate between spheres of identification and delineation at different points of time.

Along with the three theoretical perspectives on transnationalism outlined in section 2.3, the conclusions that can be drawn from German-Turkish women's transnational mobility and settlement practices can be addressed from three angles: *Firstly*, in the light of embeddedness of migration and settlement with a larger historical and political context on the one hand, and locality and local structural constraints on the other hand (see section 2.3.2.). *Secondly*, from a network and resource-oriented perspective that stresses transmigrants' maintenance of social, economic and symbolic ties (see section 2.3.3.). *Thirdly*, in the context of intersectional structural constraints of German-Turkish women's different social locations and dependent on that their agency and tactical choices (see section 2.3.4.).

As far as the *first contextual perspective on transnationalism and belonging* is concerned (see section 2.3.2.), the longitudinal results show how larger transformations of the social, economic and political context in Turkey play into German-Turkish women's migration and settlement paths to Germany, back to Turkey and beyond. A contextualizing perspective on locality of German-Turkish women's transnational practices and migration narratives during the analysis and interpretation of data revealed that neighborhood contexts in Germany and in Turkey shape migration and settlement decisions as much as ideas of becoming mobile in the future. Moreover, the local context also constitutes one of the central spheres of belonging.

Social, economic and political transformations in Turkey had a significant impact on German-Turkish women's circular migration back to Germany and played into their considerations and plans of leaving Turkey in 2017 and before. Three factors which were hardly relevant during the first fieldwork episode turned out as crucial in 2017. Firstly, economic transformations in Turkey, secondly the rising authoritarianism in Turkey. And lastly, a shifted state discourse on gender that will be discussed further below.

Regarding the *first external transformation,* several interlocutors migrated back to Germany when they and their families faced economic deprivation as an outcome of political developments that affected Turkey's economy. The closure of alleged Gülen-affiliated companies after the attempted coup on July 15, 2016, a rising inflation and numerous nationwide suicide attacks in 2016 and 2017 ruined the businesses of some interlocutors and their husbands or resulted in reduced working hours. The resulting

lack of financial resources significantly influenced the ideas and more concrete plans and some interlocutors' resettlement in Germany (see section 4.1.2.).

Secondly, several women rationalized migration concerns and decided for a resettlement in Germany with motives that are directly connected to the rising authoritarianism under the AKP government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political leadership. This authoritarian turn can be dated back to the time around the Gezi protests in 2013 or even before that. but it significantly gained momentum after the attempted coup on July 15, 2016 and after the constitutional referendum for an executive presidency in 2017. Under the AKP's third and fourth term between 2011 and 2018, political measures have restricted opposition media outlets, increasingly filed lawsuits against members of the opposition and intervened against public protests. The two-year lasting state of emergency, after the attempted coup was not only used to persecute the alleged coup plotters but also numerous members of the opposition (see section 4.2.1.). Some women in the sample explained their resettlement decisions in Germany and their emigration concerns in Turkey with experiences of political oppression and a restricted freedom of expression. These developments were coupled with increased levels of political polarization in Turkish society which manifested in the everyday lives of several women in the family, the workplace, among friends and in the neighborhood. Some women rationalize migration concerns with an increasing social pressure against them to conform with political values along polarized political and ideological lines, a pressure that also results in a curtailment of self-expression and in self-censorship. Several women perceive this as a burden, precisely for their history of transnational migration and their practices of bridging and connecting different social spheres and political opinions. Concerns of freedom of opinion are also voiced from a parental perspective as some women are concerned about educational citizen formation in the Turkish school system. The Islamization of the school system and school syllabus no longer guarantees an impartial scientific school education of their children (see section 4.2.1.).

A *local perspective* helped to contextualize the women's narratives with their biographies and their neighborhood context in Istanbul and their places of origin in Germany. It can be concluded that some women in the sample rationalize their decisions of moving to Istanbul as *translocal comparison* and with qualities they associate with urbanity. They contrast to their hometown neighborhoods with their lives in Turkey in several respects. The most powerful narratives of self-realization and belonging simultaneously reveal a translocal reference form an urban standpoint in which the

women contrast the anonymity the city of Istanbul guarantees them, with the hometown neighborhoods they grew up in. The anonymity and diversity in the public sphere guarantees them the freedom to engage in manifold activities without being observed, including collective claims for political justice or claims to the streets at night. Contrary to the anonymity in Istanbul's public sphere, their bodies and gender-identity were a matter of public discussion in the village-like structures of segregated hometown neighborhoods, which resulted in gendered constraints that limited their agency. Although their narratives reveal that they already found ways to contest these constraints prior to their migration to Istanbul, some rationalize their migration decision as self-realization that simultaneously constitutes an empowerment from their hometown contexts. In addition, migration decisions to Turkey and an attachment to place is rationalized as triggered by additional qualities of urbanity, including manifold leisure opportunities and heterogeneous lifestyles which some women contrast with routinized and dull town life in Germany. For some, life in a small town or rural area in Germany prior to migration evoked a desire to experience variety change, a desire Istanbul has saturated. Likewise, a translocal reference and a sense of belonging relates to tranquility in Germany and is triggered by a city fatigue, that is, the perception of negative aspects in the public sphere, such as traffic, crowds, noise and long commuting hours. Some women refer to an attachment to Istanbul which is connected to a previous family holiday experience. They narrate their past selves' imagination of living in Istanbul in the future as dream and holiday experiences as having formed a fascination and interest in the city of Istanbul which later triggered their migration (see sections 4.3.3., 5.3.6., 5.1.5., 5.1.7.).

Following the *second theoretical perspective on transnational migration*, German-Turkish women's decisions and concerns of migration and settlement can be embedded with their participation in and access to different kinds of *networks and circuits* (see section 2.3.3.). The consulted women firstly, are embedded within established and new transnational academic networks between Turkey and Germany. Secondly, they can, based on their language skills, access jobs in a niche of Istanbul's global economy that sustains economic ties to Germany. And thirdly, their family ties and networks result in incentives for migration and settlement. The different women also refer to all of these *networks and social groups* as social *spheres of belonging*.

German-Turkish *academic ties* reach back into the 18th century of the late Ottoman Empire. Institutions of higher education have connected and connect Germany and

Turkey through the exchange of ideas, academic staff, instructors and joint funding initiatives. With its department of German philology and many other disciplines, the University of Istanbul has long established ties with academics from Germany**,** which were in part established with the help of German-Jewish academics who fled the Nazi regime in Germany between 1933 and 1945. These relations culminated in the foundation of the Turkish-German University (TDU/TAU) which started into the first academic term of instruction in 2013. While several women have moved to Istanbul for a higher education at the TAU and their migration narratives indicate circular migration trajectories in the event of an attractive job opportunity in Germany, other women have studied academic disciplines at Istanbul University and graduated in disciplines that relate to German philology like translation studies and teacher training for German language (see section 4.1.1.).

Secondly, *economic and financial ties* between Turkey and Germany have resulted in the establishment of numerous companies in Turkey with ties to the German speaking market. Nearly all the women in the sample have professional experience in a company or institution with economic, diplomatic and cultural ties to Germany or German-speaking customers. Regardless of their educational qualification, the consulted women found employment due to their German, Turkish and English language skills and their intercultural knowledge. Other than in the German job market, their language skills and intercultural competence present an asset in the Turkish labor market. They work in the industries of telecommunication, the IT sector, for German state authorities, in the trade and tourism industry and in adult and student education (see section 4.3.1.). The fact that the women chose these professions cannot not merely be explained with a market logic of supply and demand. For some women, the workplace as much as the university environment in Turkey presents a pivotal sphere of belonging.

Thirdly, *social relations to German-Turkish peers* constitute an important aspect of German-Turkish women's everyday life. In addition to the workplace and university environment, many women sustain ties to German-Turkish peers either in one-on-one friendship relations or friendship circles and network meetings. Based on their biographies in Germany, German-Turkish women share an experience of membership in various social and cultural worlds. Their related seses of belonging constitute a minority position in Turkey. Sharing an everyday life experience with colleagues or fellow students who have also a socialized history in Germany evokes a sense of 'home' and belonging. The workplace, friendship circle or the university environment are sites

where several women can relate to a common past in Germany and share feelings nostalgia. They can practice German and Turkish language or mix both languages, what one interlocutor so aptly has called *Deukisch* (Gerkish). They make use of their senses and relate to memories of the past in Germany. In particular newcomers in Istanbul rely on a support network. The importance of German language as an aspect of belonging in professional life in Istanbul is also illustrated by the fact that many women chose to study and to teach German as a profession.

Fourthly, *family networks* including relations to close family members, to extended relatives and to spouses present an important trigger for transnational migration circuits (see section 4.4.). In numerous migration and settlement decisions, family relations to parents, siblings and spouses were relevant. One regularity the empirical material reveals, also due to the available longitudinal data, is that circular migration trajectories are most closely linked to relationships the women maintain with siblings and parents. On their migration to Turkey, several women followed their parents or metaphorically realized their parents' plans of 'returning home someday' (see section 4.4.2.).

In the event of German-Turkish women's resettlement in Germany, their immediate family members' residence in Germany presents an important resettlement motive, especially if they have children. But the generation circle also works the other way around. First and second-generation parents who have retired have also migrated to Turkey or started to engage in circular migration after their daughters' migration to Turkey. This goes hand in hand with the fact that many of their first- and second-generation parents engage in transnational migration on retirement, by either resettling in Turkey in the long run or by moving between the countries in a circular fashion every few months.

Circular migration trajectories do not yet explain nature of relations between relatives. Taking a step back from the women's individual life stories, it can be argued that the relationship between parents and daughters is inherently reciprocal. Regardless of the direction German-Turkish women's migration takes in transnational space, following parents to Turkey, moving back to the parents' place of residence in Germany or their parents' migration to Turkey after them is often a matter of *emotional attachment*. While close family members provide access to resources on arrival in Istanbul and on return to Germany, migrating into the direction of parents and siblings also constitutes an intergenerational exchange of *claiming* or *providing support*.

While moving away from parents and siblings at one point in time may constitute an act of self-realization and emancipation from the family and in some cases from gendered constraints, moving into where close family members' live at another point in time is motivated by providing support for parents or by claiming support from them.

Based on their labor efforts in Germany, some of the women's parents who used to be labor migrants in Germany have acquired real estate property or when of the second generation inherited real estate property in Istanbul. As a resource available to the women, property constitutes a migration incentive as it grants direct and effortless access to accommodation. Their familiarity with an apartment and a neighborhood based on previous stays in Istanbul alleviates some of the struggles of adaptation to a new environment. Access to accommodation translates into a migration incentive that rules out other potential international migration destinations (see section 4.4.2.). In a similar vein, close and distant family relations likewise provide an opportunity for accommodation and support in the onset of a stay in Turkey (see section 4.4.1.).

On a more contextual and specific level, this intergenerational reciprocity can also be an asymmetric relationship, as far as narratives about particular moments in time, segregated neighborhood contexts and intergenerational divides prior to migration are concerned. Several women who grew up in segregated neighborhoods mainly populated by Turkey-origin immigrants in Germany note that they were restricted in their individual liberties. As some narrate that they struggled against gendered constraints during childhood and youth. Family structures in which these women faced normative gender role expectations include the differential treatment of boys and girls, responsibilities for household chores and care work and, in comparison to boys and male youngsters, a limited access to liberties outside of the family household. In such contexts, women voice migration decisions as self-realization to start an autonomous life of their own, by becoming financially and spatially independent by realizing their individual interests. The relation to parents is temporarily directed towards family members or temporarily willingly interrupted by spatial distance. At another point in time, it can be redefined when migration and (re)settlement are motivated by claiming support from parents or providing support.

Two important factors concerning the differential gendered upbringing the women mention extend the sole family realm. Firstly, some women have contextualized gendered constraints against them with the social division of age. They have explained

gendered constraints against them as youngsters and young girls with a social and spatial gap between their first generation of Turkey-origin parents and themselves as Germany-born postmigrants. The women explain the differential treatment of girls and boys with the social origin of first-generation labor migrants who mainly emigrated from rural areas in Turkey and strived for conserving their 1960s and 1970s village culture in Germany by culturalizing religion for educational measures. Secondly, as outlined above, the women contextualized gendered constraints against them with social pressure and control on their parents were subject to in the segregated neighborhoods, they grew up in. It can be argued that German integration policies supported these developments as far as the infrastructural organization of accommodation and immigrants' lacking access to political rights is concerned. Neighborhood segregation and lacking political rights enhanced marginalization and segregation resulting in some segments of Turkey-origin immigrants seclusion to their own communities, along ethnic, cultural and religious lines (see sections 4.3.3., 5.1.1., 5.3.1.).

As migration motives already indicate, the family of origin constitutes a site of attachment on the one hand and of delineation on the other hand as far gender identities and social pressure in the broader social environment is concerned. As a sphere of belonging, the women refer to their longing for family members, to their parents' role in protecting their freedoms and shaping their educational paths during their youth and to a working-class family history and associated struggles in Germany. On the other hand, family history constitutes a site of identification and self-delineation from intersectional labels of difference, including stereotypes about Turkish people in Germany or about German-Turkish people in Turkey (see sections 5.1.1., 5.2.1., 5.2.4.).

A few women have experienced gendered oppression and violence by parents and/or in a partnership in Germany. Instead of diving into related experiences and traumata, I have tried to show that migration decisions constitute an act of self-liberation from gendered oppression. These women have challenged and contested gendered oppression when they left behind such contexts and started a new life of their own in Turkey. Relations to parents were cut and reinitiated at a later point of time (see section 4.4.4.). While this representation may evoke the reader to think that gendered oppression and constraints are a fact in German-Turkish women's biographies, it is crucial to underline here that these narratives are important because they play into empirically rich tropes of migration decisions as acts of empowerment. It is still worth noting that many women underline contrary experiences as they stress that parents had a laissez faire style of

raising them and that they did not experience differential treatment based on their gender. These women also emphasize that their parents encouraged their liberties when they were girls, youngsters and young adults. Due to the scope of this thesis, and because related counter-narratives of childhood, youth and young adulthood do not play into migration narratives, these narratives did not receive the attention they deserve. There seems to be a significant contextual relationship between the emphasis of a laissez faire upbringing and the neighborhoods these women grew up in that would be an interesting topic for further research.

A last dimension of family ties are relationships to spouses. Starting a family constitutes a migration motive for some women who moved to Turkey in the course of marriage. Like in the cases, in which women developed an attachment to and interest in the city of Istanbul, a stay in Turkey constituted the occasion prior to their migration, on which these women met their partners. Several of these women underline that the country of residence is an ongoing matter of negotiation between them and their husbands as much as their migration to Turkey. The reasons behind ruling out Germany as country of settlement is mainly a family household decision, spouses make based on their available resources. Due to their language skills, German-Turkish women can easily find work in Turkey whereas settlement in Germany constitutes a greater struggle involving the paperwork for family reunion, spouses' acquisition of German skills and having an education recognized. Several steps that need to be fulfilled until spouses can generate an income. If spouses have not completed an education this even becomes a greater struggle, which also explains why women who have started a family in Turkey and migrated back to Germany in the event of economic deprivation returned to Germany without their husbands (see sections 4.3.1., 4.4.3., 4.4.4.). Interestingly, migration to Turkey in the course of marriage is complemented with additional key motives which encouraged women to leave their lives in Germany behind. Related motives include their parents' residence in Turkey, a disadvantaged access to education, gendered oppression in the family and experiences with racialized discrimination along with a lacking sense of belonging in Germany.

Similar as the networks to German-Turkish peers in Turkey, the family becomes a sphere of identification with German language and biography. The ways German-Turkish women raise their children reveals their strong connection to Germany. They mobilize all possible resources as mothers to provide a German language education for their children, even if that implies changing countries (see section 4.1.1.). They connect

themselves symbolically to their own history in Germany in their upbringing practices as they pass on their mother tongue languages and their life history (see sections 5.2.5., 5.3.5.).

A *third intersectional theoretical perspective on transnational migration and belonging* has shown how German-Turkish women's migration paths depend on their social locations and how their rights and the intersectional inequalities, they face in Germany are connected to citizenship discourses that entail essentialist and excluding notions of culture, ethnicity and gender. Even women in very constrained social locations have found tactics of coping with the intersectional inequalities they face, one of them being migration.

As a tool of analysis, social locations contextualize individual migration and settlement motives and citizenship with larger social processes (see sections 2.3.4., 2.2.2., 2.2.3.,2.2.4.). Social locations are determined by larger social processes which enable and constrain mobility. In line with Pessar and Mahler's (2003) theoretical language, according to which gender is embedded with social structures and institutions, which manage power and exercise concepts of gender, the empirically meaningful social structures constraining German-Turkish women's social locations and include the neighborhood and family (see above). Other social structures that implicitly entail a power embedded concept of gender and constrain and encourage mobility and migration concerns are exerted in the labor market in Germany and by the German and Turkish state.

At the intersection with an ascribed migrant status, class and religion, gender works as social structure in the German *labor market* as German-Turkish women are more likely to suffer from unemployment than other demographic groups in Germany (see section 4.3.1.). Several women of the sample could not find employment in Germany prior to their migration to Turkey, although they had completed an academic or non-academic education. Several women underlined that they did not want to receive *Hartz IV* unemployment benefits because of the paperwork and the social stigmatization that goes with it. Instead of economic insecurity and lacking recognition of their skills, they chose to start a life in Turkey where they easily found work.

The experiences of women who engaged in circular migration back to Germany show, that the *German state*'s 'gender-neutral' legal citizenship produces a form of intersectional inequality that is classicist and gendered. This becomes apparent when

comparing the rights of German-Turkish women who are denizens or who have lost their residence title with the rights of German citizens or highly skilled immigrants from third countries.

Some women have lost their right of residence because they could not reenter Germany within six months to extend their residence permit (§ 51 paragraph 1, no. 7 Residence Act). For German-Turkish women who have lost their residence title in Germany and are of lower educational background and mothers, a resettlement in Germany will be nearly impossible since – based on § 51 Residence Act, paragraph 2 – they are obliged to cover their living expenses. Their lost residence title excludes them from making claims to social welfare. The fact, that a Germany-born person can lose a residence title and the associated social rights so quickly, is ultimately an unjust citizenship practice. Women who are mothers are less mobile and therefore more inclined to lose their residence title. When taking into consideration that the German state encourages immigration of highly skilled people from non-EU countries, who contrary to German-Turkish women have no history of birth and of growing up in the country, the injustice of this legal citizenship practice becomes obvious. Highly skilled immigrants from third countries can obtain a permanent residence permit (§ 19a Residence Act). Women who hold Turkish nationality and a residence title in Germany are also in a disadvantaged situation. This especially concerns women denizens who have children and who, based on their working experience and educational resources, will have a constrained access to work and sufficient income enough to provide for their family. In the event of making claims to social welfare and health provision due to illness and single parenting responsibilities, they cannot reunite with their husbands. For a family reunion, the resident with a third country citizenship has to provide sufficient income for a spouse to join and cannot make claims to social welfare (§ 5 paragraph 1, No. 1 in combination with § 27, paragraph 3 Residence Act). In that case, a family reunion that would result in a share of economic burdens and parenting responsibilities is impossible. This policy pushes women denizens who have children and make claims to social welfare into a single parenting position (see sections 4.4.2., 4.4.3.).

For women with German nationality or a residence title in Germany, circular migration back to Germany became reality in cases, in which economic and political transformations in Turkey worsened the situation of women in less privileged social locations, before economic deprivation became a migration motive. As women with children or women who planned to have children in the near future and regarding their

income and educational background, these women were positioned on a more disadvantaged social location than other women in the sample. Those who moved back to Germany made use of their social rights and their right of residence and claimed the support of their family members in Germany. The sum of cases shows – irrespective of the citizenship status –that many women who are mothers or who plan to start a family and moved back to their places of origin in Germany or plan to do so, were solely responsible for the household income (see sections 4.1.2., 4.4.3.). Some women lost their residence title because a male family member either prevented them from extending their residence status or reported their residence in Turkey to the German authorities (see section 4.1.2., 4.1.3., 4.5.). It can be concluded that several women face intersectional disadvantages in which restricted immigration policies intersect with inequalities based on gender. Many women in the sample shoulder the responsibility for the upbringing of children and income provision because their ex-partners or husbands refrain from taking over responsibilities.

All of these women are also subject to the German state's 'gender neutral' residence rights and classicist citizenship regime which restricts their opportunities to claim social rights and their spouses immigration' based on their own and their husbands lack of educational resources. The ultimate consequence for women who are mothers, have low educational resources, a low income and not residence title is that they cannot enter their birth country. For those women who are denizens, a lacking access to citizenship rights as mothers de facto aggravates their disadvantaged position at the social divisions of income, migrant and citizenship status, gender and educational background.

As far as the *Turkish state* is concerned, the empirical material has disclosed that a shifted citizenship discourse on gender in Turkey has had an impact on German-Turkish women's migration decisions and on their emigration concerns. Because gendered concerns of leaving Turkey became empirically meaningful during the second fieldwork occasion in 2017, the Turkish state's gender concept can also be discussed as third external factor which has influenced transnational migration paths of German-Turkish women. In addition to rising violence against women in Turkey, the AKP's gender policies concern and have concerned women's rights activists. Turkey signed the Istanbul Convention – the EU agreement on the protection of women from domestic violence – in March 2011 two years before I conducted the first fieldwork. Ten years later, many people in Turkey are alarmed as the Turkish state has resigned from the convention.

Some migration narratives can be explained with a changed gender discourse in Turkey, which increasingly started resonating during the last AKP terms were coupled with respective family policies, which discursively construct 'ideal' image of women citizens along a normative gender concept of married mothers, placing them in the private realm of the family household (see section 4.3.4.). A related normative concept of gender has disseminated in some segments of Turkish society, as some of the consulted women explain migration and settlement narratives with concerns about the erosion of women's rights or with more frequent experiences of assaults and oppression based on their gender. They made related experiences in the public sphere in Istanbul and in their immediate social environment, in the family, in the neighborhood and at work. These women underline that they make these experiences because their gender identities are not in line with normative gender role expectations, either because they pursue individual interests outside the family realm, because they are singles or in a partnership without being married or because they live by themselves. Based on the grounds of their non-normative gender identity, they narrate incidents in which people, mainly men, in privileged positions who sympathize with this ideology increasingly expect them to conform with this family ideology, as they comment on their behavior and gender identity or intervene with their privacy. In those cases, migration is a tactical choice of leaving contexts of gendered social pressure, while communicating the concern of leaving Turkey in the future where citizenship rights do not allow for it presents a coping tactic (see section 4.3.4.).

I have shown that German-Turkish women have found different ways to become agents, even in very constrained social locations. Analyzing *imaginary narratives of the future and the past* has revealed that an imagined future elsewhere results in migration at a later point of time. In Germany, retrospective narratives of moving to Turkey someday, constituted coping strategies of dealing with experiences of racialized discrimination and ethnicization and were realized subsequently. Holiday experiences in Turkey and an attachment to the city of Istanbul or a partnership resulting from this experience seem to lay a foundation for later migration decisions. Being exposed to parents' return narratives in Germany has in some cases also triggered a migration decision without parents (see sections 4.3.2., 4.3.3., 4.4.2.). More concrete ideas of the future which have been realized by way of pursuing transnational migration concern the education of children, experiences with political oppression, the possibility of finding a job in Germany, gendered pressure in the everyday life in Turkey, and a longing for close

family members who live in Germany (4.1.1., 4.2.1., 4.3.1., 4.3.4., 4.4.). Imagining migration in the future also constitutes as a tactic to cope with constrained positionalities in the present. The mobility of several German-Turkish women who live in Turkey but would prefer to resettle in Germany or leave to another country is constrained due to a lack of citizenship rights in Germany, educational resources, family responsibilities, a low-income situation or professional responsibilities. From these positionalities, imagining living in Germany or abroad in the future is a way of emotionally handling challenges in Istanbul. Related challenges the women referred to when they narrated migration plans include economic deprivation and financial insecurities, retirement planning, insecure working conditions, social pressure to conform with political values, constrained freedom of expression, social pressure and assaults against women, city fatigue, and plans of having children. The fact that several women have experienced their parents' return narratives in Germany also accounts for their own usage of "return" or emigration narratives to cope with difficulties they face in their present everyday lives (see sections 4.1.1.-4.1.3., 4.2.1., 4.3.3., 4.3.4.). Some women who in part have citizenship rights in Germany rule out Germany as future place of settlement. They imagine a perpetual residence in Turkey based on experiences in Germany which include constrained access to work, lacking social and professional recognition, racialized discrimination and Islamophobia (see sections 4.3.1., 4.3.2.).

Another important element of the concept of social locations bridged with concepts of citizenship and belonging underlines the *capacity of German-Turkish women to activate resources*. Their migration paths also constitute an act making claims to citizenship rights. As the structural constraints and contextual analysis of their migration decisions has shown, their transnational migration paths constitute practices of altering disadvantaged social locations on the one hand and seeking participation and intersectional equality where it is lacking on the other hand. It can be concluded that the structural inequalities and associated insecurities German-Turkish women face in German-Turkish transnational space is a lacking access to citizenship rights, unemployment, economic deprivation, intersectional discrimination, gendered and political oppression and curtailed individual liberties in the family, neighborhood and public sphere.

A comprehensive conclusion from this research is that German-Turkish women ultimately articulate claims to human rights. By engaging in transnational migration, they claim and make use of fundamental rights to social justice and equality in general,

and gender equality and intersectional justice in particular. They migrate to start a family and to unite with close family members. They stive for social belonging, membership and inclusion. They claim a right to accommodation, a right to work and a right to secure livelihood. If struck by economic insecurity as mothers and in the event of illness, they make claims to social rights. As mothers and students or middle-aged women, they make use of their right to school and university education, to health care, and to pension funds. And they claim civil liberties and associated rights, including freedom of expression and opinion and the right to use to the property of their parents. They seek access to wealth and strive for upward mobility and lastly, their narratives of self-realization, autonomy and empowerment point to the fact that they claim the fundamental right to self-determination. Their belonging and membership in social groups and networks and their attachment to places in Germany and Turkey explains their translocal sense of belonging as cosmopolitan, global and dual citizens and as members of two or more societies. These micro-level senses of belonging stand in sharp contrast to the ethno-cultural citizenship discourses they are approached with mainly in Germany but also in Turkey.

A historical, local, network-related and intersectional contextualization of German-Turkish women's transnational migration paths has shown that their lives encompass two or more societies and two or more sovereign territories. Their allegiances and spheres of belonging including family, labor and neighborhood, their rights and their access to resources, such as accommodation, work, education, are distributed across at least two countries and localities.

Through their participation in different border-crossing social spheres, German-Turkish women not only claim intersectional justice and equality; they also connect the two countries into one transnational and translocal space. A space that is defined by their practices and allegiances. While those women with German citizenship use their capacity to be mobile in all of these spheres, the empirical evidence of this thesis shows that women who have a right of residence in Germany may loose and have lost this right over time. Since Germany is their country of birth as much as for German-Turkish women who hold German citizenship, their lack of access to German-Turkish transnational space violates the principle of justice and is ultimately an ethical problem. Why should those Germany-born people who are specialists in bridging two socio-cultural contexts and who even represent German culture, language and economy in

Turkey not have the right and the opportunity to also be mobile and participate socially, politically and economically in both of these contexts?

A normative conclusion is that Germany ought to amend its immigration law for Germany-born people who hold the citizenship of a non-EU country. The fact that a Germany-born person has to struggle for her citizenship rights contradicts the German citizenship law. Dual citizenship, which was fully implemented in 2014, de facto does not apply for German-Turkish women who were born before the year 2000. Legally, they are still subject to an ethno-cultural understanding of membership in the German polity that is based on the blood right principle (*jus sanguinis*), according to which their birth right (*jus soli*) is not acknowledged. As German-Turkish women of this sample also become mobile because of the intersectional injustice they face in the German polity, they also ought to have a right to membership in the German polity, to be partially compensated for the structural constraints they face in their birth country.

As laid down in the German Residence Act (§ 51, paragraph 1, no 2), a residence permit expires, if "the foreigner leaves the country for a reason that is not temporary by nature". This passage excludes many of the social spheres German-Turkish women interact in. The paragraph is outdated because it defines citizenship rights according to a territorial principle of membership in the age of increased global interconnectedness and mobility. This provision is also outdated because it disregards the fact that migration between Turkey and Germany has been circular as early as it was initiated with the labor recruitment agreement in 1961 (see Chapter 3.). Based on this history, Turkey and Germany are economically, politically and socially more closely connected than ever.

It is not merely the legal practice of the German state in which the *jus sanguinis* principle continues to operate. The public discourse in Germany continues to employ an ethno-cultural understanding of membership which manifests itself in structures of disadvantaged access postmigrants have to education, work and the housing market (see sections 3.6., 4.3.1., 5.3.2., 5.4.1.). Moreover, this ethno-cultural membership discourse translates into the everyday life of German-Turkish women (see sections 5.1.2., 5.2.2., 5.2.3.). Every interlocutor of the sample has been approached with intersectional paradigms of difference by strangers, colleagues, students and even friends without migration background. Related experiences German-Turkish women have made and make with Othering along social divisions of gender, ethnicity, class and religion have less to do with the ascribed difference. Concepts of belonging and the relation between

Self and Other (see sections 2.1., 2.2.) have helped to deconstruct that the related language German-Turkish women are often addressed with is more revealing about the designators' understanding of citizenship. By designating the alleged Other, they reveal their own privileged positionality as white majoritarian citizens and a corresponding self-image of citizenship which can only stay in place with Othering statements. Similar to the gender discourse in Turkey, an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship not merely works as political discourse in the public. This citizenship discourse constitutes an aspect of everyday life for postmigrants in Germany when they are asked "Where do you come from?", "Where are your parents from?" or when people comment "Your German is very good", "But you do not look like Turkish people", "But you are an exception/different".

The cases have shown that the assumption about an alleged difference these phrases entail, constitutes a reverse labelling strategy to keep stereotypes about alleged "Turkishness" along ethnicizing, racializing and classicist lines in place. The problem German-Turkish women shed light on, is less the assumption that they are culturally, ethnically and in whatever other way different from the majority. It is the denial of commonality and membership which makes this discourse problematic: the denial of their biographic and socialized identity which includes German as mother tongue language, the denial that Germany is their birth country and lastly, the denial of their upbringing in Germany. The notion *Almancı* in Turkey shares the same logic of labelling and carries classicist, sexist and culturalist connotations. But other than labels in Germany, the designation *Almancı* does not carry ethnicizing and racializing connotations. Contrary to Germany, German-Turkish women experience stereotypes less often the longer they live in Turkey. They can fit in based on their mother tongue language skills. Many also note that they feel more acknowledged as members of society in Turkey in comparison to Germany. Based on the grounds of the above outlined inclusion they experience, for instance on the labor market in Turkey, this is hardly astonishing.

The consulted women are not merely subject to such strategic discourses of citizenship. They have appropriated *tactics* to contest these *strategies of Othering* and they have found manifold spheres of participation. When faced with intersectional discrimination and attributions of difference, some women develop a tactic of ignoring designators and do not permit feelings of exclusion by way of underlining their membership. Others acknowledge ascribed cultural difference but simultaneously articulate a right to belong.

A tactic of engaging in a dialogue as well as struggles to debunk stereotypes constitute other ways of dealing with intersectional discrimination. Some confront designators by defending themselves or taking measures against those who offend them by ready-wittedly exposing the designator's stereotypes in public. Others again develop a counter narrative in which they delineate themselves from the alleged stereotype by referring to class membership, by virtue of making the assigned Otherness their strength, or by politically standing up for the rights of marginalized groups (see sections 5.1.-5.4.).

While experiences with this ethno-cultural German citizenship discourse could result in citizenship practices in which the women emphasize cultural, national or ethnic difference, this is not the case for most of the women in the sample. Rather the contrary, it can be concluded that the empirical results indicate that women do not identify with collective ethnic, cultural or national identity categories. Instead, they refer to their biographies and socialized identities which they negotiate in their everyday lives in the family, among friends, among fellow students, colleagues, at work, at university or in their neighborhood.

To achieve an inclusive citizenship discourse in Germany, a substantial re-definition of a self-image, defined by Whiteness, ethno-cultural descent and no migration background is necessary. Germany needs a new citizenship discourse that separates the idea of membership from the idea of an ethno-cultural nation, and instead acknowledges that society in Germany is ultimately plural. An acknowledgement of immigrants' and postmigrants' membership in the German body politic means to understand and to acknowledge the simultaneity of plural affiliations, and dual socialization within immigrant and majority society contexts in Germany and in Turkey. Recognizing membership and participation before assuming cultural difference may guide the way for a new *Zeitgeist* that replaces the *Volksgeist* (national spirit). Today's *Zeitgeist* shows that the citizenship discourse in Germany is on the verge of change. The initiators of this change are again not members of the majority but it seems like part of the majority is listening for the first time.

Germany's postmigrants make demands for rethinking citizenship and the language of Othering. They collectively speak up in public against institutionalized racism and they are very outspoken about the fact that the majority needs to reflect on their privileged positionality. Like the protagonists of this thesis, they change the citizenship discourse by underlining that the German body politic is de facto not ethno-cultural. They make

claims to their birth-right and to their belonging in Germany; claims which point out that it is time for the majority to acknowledge that cultural pluralism and their membership is a fact that can no longer be ignored.

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