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dc.contributorEconomicsen
dc.contributor.advisorÖzkal-Sanver, İpek
dc.contributor.authorNizamoğulları, Duygu
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-12T14:27:04Z
dc.date.available2015-02-12T14:27:04Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11411/356
dc.description31 pagesen
dc.description.abstractÖzkal-Sanver (2005) studies stability and efficiency of partitions of agents in two-sided matching markets where agents are allowed to form partitions only by individual moves, and within each coalition of a partition a matching rule determines the matching. In this thesis, first we introduce some of the papers in the literature relating to this topic with their results. Then, we present Nizamoğulları and Özkal-Sanver (2007)’s work in which the relationship between stability and efficiency of partitions is analyzed for several matching rules and under various membership property rights codes, now allowing coalitional moves.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/*
dc.titleCoalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching marketsen
dc.title.alternativeEşleşme problemlerinde parçalanma yapılarının koalisyonel dinginlik ve verimliliğien
dc.typeThesisen


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