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dc.contributorEuropean Studiesen
dc.contributor.advisorGönen, Emre
dc.contributor.authorÖlz, Eva-Maria
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-12T11:06:06Z
dc.date.available2015-02-12T11:06:06Z
dc.date.issued2006
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11411/343
dc.description34 pages.en
dc.description.abstractOn 3 July 2001 the European Commission declared the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell incompatible with the common market (Commission, Decision of 3 July 2001, Case no COMP/M.2220). It was the first interdiction of a merger of two US companies by the European Commission where the US authorities had previously allowed it. The main reason for this contradiction is the different perception of the concept of market power. As the merging companies produced complementary goods, the merger led to a decrease of prices. In the US an increase of market power is tolerated if the consumers profit of lower prices. The EC-concept condemns an increase of market power irrespective its consequences. This thesis aims to explain this conceptual difference by analyzing the EC-system of competition law.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherİstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesien
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/*
dc.titleThe Decision General Electric/Honeywell Explonation Of The Principles That Led To This Decisionen
dc.title.alternativeGeneral Electric/Honeywell Kararı - Bu Karara Yol Açan İlkelerin Tanımlanmasıen
dc.typeThesisen


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