

**MALTA'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT**

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1) European Union

2) Malta

3) Enlargement

4) Deęerler

5) Universal Principles

Özet

Kuruluşundan bu yana genişleme konusu Avrupa Birliği'nin (AB) önemli karakteristik özelliklerinden biri olmuştur. Avrupa'ya siyasi istikrar ve ekonomik refah getiren ve diplomatik yöntemlerle Avrupa kıtasını birleştiren bir araç olarak görülmüştür. Genişleme politikası ile AB, sınırlarını güvence altına almayı, ticaret alanlarını genişletmeyi ve ortak bir tarihe sahip olan Avrupa insanlarını ve Avrupa kıtasını birleştirmeyi hedeflemiştir. Böylece, AB Akdeniz bölgesinde üst düzey bir işbirliği ve ortaklık sağlamak ve Akdeniz bölgesine ve kendi halklarına güvenlik, refah, güç ve istikrar getirmek için Malta'ya genişlemiştir. Buna ek olarak, AB ahlaki ve tarihi sorumluluklarından dolayı ortak bir kimlik ve değer paylaştığı Malta'ya genişlemiştir. Son olarak, Malta'nın AB ile bütünleştirilmesi, Malta'nın AB'nin evrensel insan hakları ve demokrasi ilkelerini benimsemesiyle gerçekleşmiştir.

Abstract

The European Union (EU) enlargement has been one of vital characteristic of the EU since its establishment. It has been viewed as arousing political stability and economic prosperity in Europe and incorporating the continent with diplomatic means. Throughout the enlargement policy, the EU has aimed to secure its borders, and to spread its marketing as well as to unite the Europe continent, and the people who have historical connections. Thus, the EU enlarged to Malta, for a high-level collaboration and cooperation in Mediterranean region, and to bring security, prosperity, strength and stability to Mediterranean and all of its peoples. In addition to that, the EU enlarged to Malta for its moral and historic responsibilities towards Malta with which, it shared a common identity and value. Finally, the integration of Malta materialized, since Malta acknowledged and embraced the EU's universal principles of human rights and democracy.

...to all who gave encouragement and strength to me

ABBREVIATIONS

Central and Eastern Europe	: CEE
Central and Eastern European Countries	: CEECs
Common Customs Tariff	: CCT
European Community	: EC
European Currency Unit	: ECU
European Economic Area	: EEA
European Economic Area	: EEA
European Economic Community	: EEC
European Free Trade Association	: EFTA
European Parliament	: EP
Front Maltin Inqumu	: FMI
Global Mediterranean Policy	: GMP
Gross National Product	: GNP
International Commission of Jurists	: ICJ
Joint Task Force	: JTF
Maltese Labour Party	: MLP
Nationalist Party	: NP
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	: NATO
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	: OSCE
Partnership for Peace	: PfP
The Common Foreign and Security Policy:	: CFSP
The Treaty on European Union	: TEU
United Kingdom	: UK
United Nations	: UN
United Nations	: UN
Value Added Tax	: VAT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Özet	ii
Abstract	iii
ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	viii
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 The EU Enlargement	1
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	6
2.1 The Judgements for Political Action	6
3. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: MALTA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY	17
3.1 Relations in the Period 1960-1980	17
3.2 Relations in the Period 1980-1987	24
3.3 Relations in the Period 1980-1987	27
4. DYNAMICS BEHIND EU’S MALTESE ENLARGEMENT	36
4.1 Utility Logic of Enlargement	36
4.2 Value Logic of the Enlargement	41
4.3 Right Perspective of Enlargement.....	44
Conclusion	49
References.....	56

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Comparison of Three Logics of Political Action..... viii

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 The EU Enlargement

The enlargement process has been one of the major focus as well as an essential characteristic of the European Union (EU) since its creation. Despite it has happened occasionally, it has been viewed as a surprising opening to stimulate political stability and economic prosperity in Europe as well as the integration of the continent by peaceful means (Archick, 2005). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement policy of the EU became a tool to act according to their historic and moral responsibilities towards the peoples with which they share a common identity, and put aside material considerations (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005), and to take its way to create a safe, stable, peaceful, powerful and united Europe. Throughout the enlargement process, EU has aimed to secure its borders, and to spread its marketing as well as to unite the Europe continent, and the people who have historical connections.

However, the enlargement process had profound costs, and risks for both applicant states and the EU itself. It had risks and costs, because through enlargement the established order of the EU would change and the new external boundaries would also build new divisions on Europe and bring instability in Europe as a whole (Sjursen, 2002). It was also believed that the enlargement would make the EU weak and insecure (Commission, 2009, p.30). Despite the fact that new members' weak political principles and their impact on the effectiveness of the EU's institutional system, and their negative contribution to the EU in terms of economy, the EU resolved to include these new applicants to the Union. A sense of common value and identity, of a common purpose and history, tradition or political ideals were also a key point motivating the enlargement strategies (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). Moreover, it was a significant political process, both for the EU and for international

relations in Europe (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), as it aimed to unite the Western and the Eastern Europe in order to create a more prosperous and stable continent (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2005). For some, the EU enlargement is essentially a market, which safeguards the free movement of goods and capital, and provides occasions for economies of scale for European firms. For the others, it has constructed an agreed European identity and value or as the first step on the road to a democratic, supranational structure (Sjursen, 2006).

On the other hand, regarding the selection of candidates, dates of admission and the debates concerning the measures for membership, it is clear that the EU has not only concerned about the reunification of Europe. As the organization expanded, it established its doctrine on enlargement, adapting it case by case to fit the necessities of each new situation despite the fact that, simultaneously, seeking to preserve some principles. Actor's give-and-take arguments regarding the best course of action and seek to justify their policy positions in terms of some universally valid principles such as democracy or peace rather than in terms of relative power or costs and profits (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005).

The EU enlargement has shaped the regional, institutional, traditional and the legal policies of the European countries. However, given the risks, costs and hazard as mentioned above, what motivated the EU to enlarge? Did the leaders want the enlargement to maximize their powers, or was the enlargement just an identity issue?

Throughout this dissertation the driving factors of EU enlargement are going to be revealed with the specific case of Malta. The EU enlargement to Malta was not studied enough, considering importance of geostrategic location as well as political history of Malta. Malta occupied a significant place during both world wars as a naval and military base. Its location between Southern Europe and North Africa, and at the gateway between the Eastern

and Western Mediterranean, made it a perfect base (Castillo, 2006). Due to its strategic and political position, it historically has been an important spot for great powers (Castillo, 2006, p.127). It has been an important place politically, economically, and geographically throughout history. Thus, Malta's integration with the EU is a crucial issue to be revealed. It was also a great concern for me to understand the dynamics behind the EU enlargement. Therefore, throughout this dissertation I examined the EU enlargement with the case of Malta, and I seek to find out the answers to the questions as why the EU enlarged to Malta, and what were the dynamics behind the EU's enlargement to Malta. Did the EU enlarge to Malta for pragmatic reasons, or was it just an identity issue?

The EU regarded the enlargement policy as an opening to preserve political and economic stability in Europe. It was pointed out that the EU enlargement was justified from three different perspectives: Interest-based perspective, value-based perspective, right-based perspective. Considering different policies of the EU to the applicant states, it has many driving factors, and not depend upon just one variable. In an interest based perspective, it was reasoned that the EU enlargement materialized when member states would gain higher in terms of economy and security (utility logic /pragmatic arguments). Within a value based perspective, the EU considered an element of kinship, or a common of identity (value logic / ethical political arguments) for enlargement. In a right-based perspective, the EU enlargement happened when applicant states respected universal principles of human rights and democracy (right logic / moral arguments).

Considering the EU's arrangement of the enlargement depended on many variables, different logics, perspectives, and arguments, I examined it in three perspective. Taking into account the previous enlargement processes and justifications, I presented that one of the main motive of the EU enlargement to Malta stemmed from interests and gains of the member states who attempted to minimize their costs and maximize their benefits. The

member states are aware that the enlargement is beneficial for the long term, though damaging both institutional and financial standings in the short term. Therefore, the EU decided on to enlarge Malta to gain in a long period of time. I showed that the EU enlargement of Malta was more than economic gains, it was basically a security issue. Moreover, Malta's relations with the EU also stemmed from pragmatic reasons. Malta sought to be together with EU to increase its production and economic structure with bigger markets in the EU. It was significant for Malta to join the EU, to be around the table in EU decision process to enter bigger markets and for further economic and political advantages.

In addition, I presented the other motivating factor of the EU enlargement which is common identities or values of the member states. A sense of common purposes, codes and beliefs also have been important dynamics for the EU enlargement policy. The common values were important for the justification for the EU enlargement to Malta. The EU intended to enlarge to Malta, which had an important historical bond with the European countries, mainly with the Order of St. John. Malta was considered to be a part of Europe's legacy. Maltese people also categorised themselves as European, which was also an important driving force during the process Malta's integration to the EU.

Furthermore, I revealed that the enlargement policy of the EU is materialized by universally valid principles like democracy, peace, freedom; as a consequence, the European states who embraced EU's universal principles, were allowed to join the EU. The EU enlargement to Malta occurred, and continued when Malta accepted and implemented the EU's universal principles of human rights and democracy. Therefore, Malta had to make some political, financial and institutional modifications in order to access to the EU.

In the first part this study I explained the theoretical framework and the judgements for political action such as the logic of consequentiality, the logic of appropriateness, and

the logic of justification. Moreover, I revealed the three categories of argument; (a) pragmatic arguments, (b) ethical-political arguments and (c) moral arguments, and made an analytical distinction between these three to justify enlargement. In the second part, I summarized Malta and its relations with the European community. I presented its relations with the community between the years of 1960-1980, 1980-1987, and 1987-2004. In the third part, I discussed the dynamics behind Maltese integration of the EU with three perspectives.

This study is developed within a process of textual analysis. The data collected from various sources, such as articles, commentaries, interviews and other texts and scanned, classified and the essential coding procedures were applied.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The Judgements for Political Action

Both the rational-choice and sociological approaches put on emphasis on different logics or modes of action as far as their aims are concerned they were written off as different rationalities (Risse, 2000, p.3). The rational choice and constructivism are different approaches support the study of the dynamics of the EU and its integration process and the form of institution it is turning into. Each of theories highlights a different logic as an explanation for a particular administrative act or policy, a typical type of social action and interaction, contemplation of the nature and objectives of the actors (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). (1) The logic of consequentiality is about the reflection on a set of national preferences as well as the contemplation about the results of the deeds (Elster, 1984); (2) the logic of appropriateness denotes the conception of the self in the social world (March and Olsen 1998); (3) the logic of justification stands for the assessment of morally valid arguments (Eriksen, 1999).

Actors' decisions are considered to be principally conducted by a logic of consequentiality under the grounds of rational choice theories such as liberalism and neo-realism. The states outline their preferences with reference to certain interests, and start negotiating to resolve disputes. The actors are considered to be rational while following their profits with some arrangements as well as participate in dealings to expand their position. They persuade the other parties to consent their statements by "coercion, compensation or persuasion" (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). Thus, the consequence is determined by the distribution of power and individual preferences, along with the negotiating skills of the applicants.

According to the rational institutionalism the institutional environments given that the structure and functioning of an organization can set limits or offer opportunities to its members to act strategically. Political institutions are considered as the consequences of political action, a useful stratagem to put into effect the agreements as well as resolve collective action dilemmas. Insofar as the EU is concerned the actors are seen as the member states' governments. Their individual positions grounded on the expected consequences of a particular political action. They describe their preferences before the decision-making process sets off; subsequently, they act in a strategic manner to take full advantage of their profits (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005), and in accordance with the estimated consequentiality.

Within the logic of appropriateness, the actors do not only think about what is better for them but also what they are expected to do, the roles and norms to be applied. The causal mechanisms offered to explain how principles and norms might influence a negotiation process vary depending on the theoretical frameworks. The rationality of the actors is contextual, not instrumental, it derives from the identity of the community they belong to. That means agents follow rules and the norms those associate specific identities to specific circumstances. The principles for social action reasoning depend on ideals take its source from a certain cultural context in addition the decision-making process concern the exploration for shared self-understanding as well as the construction of a shared identity, which can function as the source for developing steady objectives and ideas. The collective decisions are a matter of identity that attempt to improve and keep the sense of 'we-ness' and to create solidarity (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). The political processes are conducted in accordance with values and norms wherein the identity and the community are formed.

Taking into account the theory of the communicative action, the power of language and the effects of speech acts, the emphasis in the logic of justification is placed upon the structures of the institutional background which urge actors to come to an understanding upon certain principles and norms and comply with them in the absence of coercion (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). Here, the decisions are taken in a collective communicative process, and the actors seek out an agreement on factual and normative matters: (a) On the real situation and the cause-and-effect relationships between goals and means; besides (b) on which norms apply under certain conditions or which principles are supposed to lead the policy under discussion. Rather than bargaining manner, the characteristic way of the communication is arguing, which requires actors to test the validity claims inherent in any factual or normative statements as well as try to decide for a the ‘better argument’. In factual statements, validity is the same such as the truth. In normative statements impartiality and stability are the essential situations for validity (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005; Elster, 1992).

Table 1. Comparison of Three Logics of Political Action

	Consequentiality	Appropriateness	Justification
Logic	States act purposefully to reach their objectives, which are set <i>a priori</i> as a result of the anticipation of the consequences of a decision.	States act according to their role within a community as a result of habit or particular identity.	States seek to reach an agreement through the assessment of arguments deemed legitimate by all parties involved.
Legitimation	Efficiency Collective decisions seek to promote the interests	Identity Collective decisions seek to	Justice Collective decisions seek to establish a fair system

	and preferences of the member states and solve their problems more efficiently.	develop and protect the sense of 'we-ness' and to establish bonds of solidarity.	of co-operation founded on fundamental rights and democratic procedures.
Justification	<p>Utility</p> <p>A policy decision is justified because of its efficacy to reach a goal and improve the states' welfare.</p>	<p>Values</p> <p>A policy decision can be justified as long as it is appropriate according to the shared values and common identity.</p>	<p>Rights</p> <p>A policy decision is considered legitimate when respecting universally-valid principles of human rights and democratic procedures.</p>
Rationality	<p>Instrumental</p> <p>Actors are considered rational when their actions pursue their material and ideal welfare.</p>	<p>Contextual</p> <p>Actors are considered rational when their actions derive from the conception of self in a social role.</p>	<p>Communicative</p> <p>Actors are considered rational when they are able to explain and justify their actions.</p>
Outcome	<p>Compromise</p> <p>None of the parties gets exactly what he wants, but each regards the result as better than no outcome at all. It all depends on relative power and national preferences.</p>	<p>Collective self-understanding</p> <p>It expresses self-reflection and resolve regarding a way of life.</p>	<p>Rational consensus</p> <p>Agreement is sought on the better argument, that which convinces all the incumbents because it defines the right thing to do according to universally-valid standards.</p>

Source: Piedrafita, S., & Torreblanca, J. I. (2005). The three logics of EU enlargement: interests identities and arguments. *Politique européenne*, (1), 29-59.

According to Sjursen (2002), the arguments and reasons provided in favour of enlargement have to be of a nature that the others are able to support, in other words they had to be legitimized or justified. Classifying the types of arguments those functioned in the

EU's enlargement policy helps to offer a better understanding of the prioritizations made. She points out that the leaders have to provide reasons for their decisions or actions. Employing Habermas' theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1993) she makes an analytical distinction between three categories of argument to justify enlargement: (a) pragmatic arguments, (b) ethical-political arguments and (c) moral arguments. In a pragmatic approach, the policy is justified with reference to the output that it is expected to produce. In this approach the actors take decisions based on calculations of utility given set of interests. This approach is means–ends type of rationality, which means that the actors wouldn't support the enlargement unless arguments support the notion of utility that would provide benefit for their interests and preferences. In an ethical-political approach justification of the enlargement is about a specific notion of the values that embodied by a particular community. Throughout this approach the enlargement is justified by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging because of belonging to a particular community. In a moral approach, the enlargement is not justified with the references to calculations of utility nor the values of a particular community, but with the justifications those are about universal standards of justice (Sjursen, 2002, p. 494).

Sjursen (2002) focused on the different types of logics for the argumentations above. She suggested that the first type of argument has much in common with the concept of logic of consequence, and the second and third type of arguments are more connected to the concept of logic of appropriateness. She made use of different criteria to identify these logics: (a) Utility, (b) values, (c) rights. She defined the utility as a struggle to find effective solutions to the existing problems or dilemmas. The politicians try to legitimize this by achieving an output that is beneficial to the interests and preferences. She further described the values as “a particular idea of the ‘good life’ that is grounded in the identity of a specific community”. Throughout this logic the policy would be legitimized through a specific

group's notion of itself and its representation. Moreover, she defined rights as "a set of principles that are mutually recognized". In this logic, the policy was legitimized with principles that the things accepted as 'just' by all parties, "irrespective of their particular interests, perceptions of the 'good life' or cultural identity". Furthermore, she developed hypotheses that (1) "The EU would prioritize enlargement to those states where the gain would be higher than the cost. The gain would be defined in terms of (a) economic gain; (b) security gain"; (2) "the EU will prioritize enlargement to those states with which it considers an element of kinship"; in addition, (3) "the EU would prioritize enlargement to those states that respect the universal principles of human rights and democracy" (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495).

Utility can be in the form of economic or security gains, and it has been at the centre of processes of bargaining, and is one of the reasons why the EU resolved to enlarge. The EU support of the enlargement as a whole or to specific states stems from expectations of utility. It was thought that the increased trade with the applicant states result from enlargement would be beneficial to the EU economy (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495). The right to use to primary resources and also labour at a low cost in the candidate states can also reinforce the competitiveness of the EU along with East—west integration in Europe will simply enlarge the each countries opportunities. (Baldwin, Francois, & Portes, 1997). The utility or pragmatic logic of the enlargement might be justified by Denmark's position in the EU. Denmark hoped specific profits from enlargement considering its geographic location as a fairly close neighbour to the applicant states in CEE in particular to the Baltic States. The Representatives of successive Danish governments have presented EU enlargement as an economic 'win-win situation'. They expected long-term economic gains from increased commerce and trade, especially in the Baltic Sea area. The Danish leaders also saw the Baltic Sea zone as a future growth area that would positively affect Danish economy and enterprises. The win-win situation and the Danish economic self-interests in the Baltic Sea

area particularly used as arguments in favour of reserves in Eastern Europe and bilateral Eastern support (Riddervold & Sjørusen, 2006, p.89). Despite the fact that a short term the support for eastern enlargement would economically cost to the EU, yet the enlargement in a long-term perspective would be profitable to the Union. The enlargement would provide long-term positive economic gains for Denmark, especially by trading with the Baltic States such as Poland. The economic costs were not used as an argument against enlargement. The long-term economic benefits were used to legitimize this policy.

The economic gains have also been one of the important logics, for instance, for Germany's justification of the enlargement. Its prioritization of applicants points out that its policy was motivated by its particular pragmatic and normative-cultural considerations (Zaborowski, 2006, p. 107). Historically, the economic relations between the Germany and their Eastern neighbours have been strong. The West Germany was the second trading partner for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the last decade of the Cold War after the Soviet Union. However, as Germany was a main net contributor to the EU, hence, as a result of enlargement some of the East German regions will lose their right to benefit from structural and cohesion funds. Moreover, replacement of many German businesses eastwards combined with the westwards migration of Polish, Czech and other workers may affect the employment situation in Germany. Nevertheless, enlargement was portrayed as a classical win-win situation, and Germany's view of the economics of enlargement was largely positive, mentioning bigger markets, numerous export opportunities and more jobs both for Germans and their CEE neighbours. Germany appeared to maintain the enlargement, despite its economic benefits were being questioned, and some governments supported it while some didn't. Yet, the enlargement would be worth pursuing for Germany despite its economic costs. In addition the argument about the economic benefits, the

argument about the security benefits of enlargement appeared more supportable and was more regularly appealed to by German elites (Zaborowski, 2006).

The other term of the pragmatic logic of the enlargement defined as security gain. The geographical proximity between states may lead to a more intense interdependence than between states that have larger distances between each other. This is particularly so in terms of security. Enlargement to border states may be a way of stabilizing unsteady nationals as well as increasing national security, or in a more traditional conception of security, creating a buffer zone between the national terrain and an apparent peripheral menace from another state (Riddervold & Sjørnsen, 2006, p.85). The European integration since its very beginnings was considered with peace, political and democratic stability for the European continent and neighbouring region (Fossum, 2000, p.135). For instance, the stability and the security issue were important for the Danish support for Baltic membership that the EU enlargement was considered as the most comprehensive reaction to the security challenges and the risks Europe was facing. Moreover, even the EU-sceptical political parties, such as the Socialist People's Party (SF–Socialistisk Folkeparti), by means of the arguments regarding security in order to justify enlargement from the early 1990s, asserting that their party was sympathetic of enlargement, and they supported enlargement in order to have a security-political perspective (Riddervold & Sjørnsen, 2006, p.86).

Another example of security gain of enlargement might be viewed by the German perspective. Aftermath of the Cold War, Germany concerned about the issue of the regional instability in CEE and South Eastern Europe (Zaborowski, 2006, p. 112; Herranz, 2012, p.135). During the clashes in the former Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet Union, many refugees situated in Germany, where economic costs were felt deeply. Hence, regarding the developments, it was significant for Germany to seek stability in the region. In order to that Germany wanted to extend Western institutions to the region. After the integration of Central

and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) into the West, Germany's status as a border state would disappear, which noticeably would increase its security, and stability. It was also estimated that the by the Schengen agreement the level of migration into Germany would diminish (Zaborowski, 2006, p. 112). Within the utilitarian logic of the enlargement the security was mentioned to make a justification for the actions of the European states.

In the pragmatic or the utilitarian logic of the enlargement the states would rather promote their interests. The basis of cooperation was intended to promote the material interests of the member states via economic cooperation. The cooperation can be seen in other issue-areas such as foreign or security policy if it were considered to provide evident profits to members (Sjursen, 2006).

Sjursen (2002) described a second way to justify the enlargement the EU states used ethical-political arguments in which the justification is on a particular conception of the values that exemplified within a specific community. In the EU enlargement process the common culture and history have been a part of the political projects. "A shared 'we feeling' can be used to give meaning to political life, legitimize policies and create support" (Lundgren, 2006, p. 134). This approach also used to justify the enlargement of the Union. The Eastern enlargement, for instance, was labelled in terms of Europe's 'other half' finally 'coming home' or 'the kidnapped west' that would be great to unify it with Western Europe (Lundgren, 2006, p. 134; Sjursen, 2002, p.505). The situation of the CEE was also mentioned by the European Parliament as the society who share a common heritage, legacy, culture, and tradition (Lundgren, 2006, p. 134). From the period after the enlargement process was started the argument was that the EC had a 'special responsibility' for the reform process in CEECs was relentlessly recurring in documents (Sjursen, 2002). Moreover, Moravcsik (1994, p.14) claims that the officials try to legitimate their actions with reference to awareness of mutual abstract values rather than self-regarding material interests. Along those

lines, Schimmelfennig (2005) emphasised that the EU, as an international community of (European) states, characterised by shared values and norms of liberal democracy, enlarges to take in states that share these values (Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 122).

The shared values such as customs, cultures, and beliefs were important for EU to enlarge and justify the enlargement that it used value logic in order justify Greece integration. According to Verney (2006, p. 32), there have been two coexisting views of Greece and its European credentials in history. The first view stresses the legacy of classical Athens as one of the points of origin of European civilization, hence perceives Greece as an essential part of Europe. The statements like the British poet Shelley's 'We Are All Greeks' illustrated the notion that "the Greeks were more than just European: rather, as descendants of one of the founding European cultures, they could be regarded as the quintessential Europeans". The second ongoing view of Greek focused on the more recent past once the Greek, integrated into two Eastern-oriented empires, "had been part of worlds often regarded as antithetical to 'Europe': Balkan, Byzantine, Orthodox and Ottoman". Moreover, the Greece was described as 'the fountainhead' of Europe and 'the part of the world where the European ideal first showed its true face in November 1975 European Parliament. The French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing also described Greek membership in the EC as 'a return to the roots' (Verney, 2006, p. 32). These declarations were obviously point of views for Greek inclusion, and justifications those contributed Greece's accession to the EU.

Finally, in a value-based perspective, the EU sought out to regenerate the traditions, mores and memories of the common European values, in which a sense of common identity would function as a source for integration. The integration would not be about gaining specific profits but with feeling of commonality to bring solidarity to the borders of the member states. Throughout a value-based perspective the EU might probably move beyond intergovernmentalism and towards transnational or supranational institutional arrangements.

Hence, “collective institutions would have a certain autonomy, and contribute to shape and define the collective understanding of the community’s identity and purpose” (Sjursen, 2006, p.2).

Sjursen (2006) highlighted a third possibility that was the EU progressed in the direction of a rights-based post-national union. The organisation would establish an extension of the democratic constitutional state to the European level. Henceforth, it would have independent institutions as a value-based organisation, whose legitimacy would be resulting not from the member states but directly from a European demos. The integration would not depend on a sense of cultural interconnection or shared mores, as opposed to the value-based logic. The EU, as a post-national union would depend upon universal rights and democratic procedures, which allow for cultural pluralism and the communal motivation would be shaped through processes targeted at reaching a common understanding through different identities and interests. In the Turkish case, for instance, the EU enlargement justification focused upon the basis of rights. The discussions of the reform process indicate how the EU issue in Turkey is increasingly discussed as a rights-based process (Avcı, 2006).

3. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: MALTA AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Malta, located at the heart of the Mediterranean region, around 93 km south of Sicily, and 288 km of North Africa (Azzopardi, 2011), and throughout its history, has served as a crossroads between Europe, Africa and the Middle East, and therefore was an ideal place for conquerors throughout the ages such as Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals and Goths, Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, Sicilians, Germans, French, feudal lords, Knights Hospitallers of St John of Jerusalem, British and Turks (M. Pace, 2006, p.109; Briguglio, 2010, p.213; Azzopardi, 2011, p.3). It has shared Europe's past for hundreds of years, a connection emphasised by the close bonds with the Order of St. John. Another important historical factor in the Island's European link was the period that Malta was a British colony and which culminated in its part during the Second World War in the defence of freedom and democracy (Borg & Inguanez, 1993, p.145). Its strategic location in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea ensured Maltese islands an important place in international arena.

3.1 Relations in the Period 1960-1980

On 9th July 1961, the Athens Association Agreement was signed between the EEC and Greece (Kinnas, 1979) that was a model for promising agreements between the European Community (EC) and non-member countries of the Mediterranean region. The first connection of Malta with the EC was at the beginning of the 1960s when United Kingdom (UK) applied to join the Community. Once the UK applied for the EU membership on 10 August 1961, some concerns were raised up regarding the future relations of the UK with its colonies in the Commonwealth those enjoyed special economic and political relations with it, mainly trading preferences in the UK market. Only Cyprus and Malta were considered European among these Commonwealth countries, and two out of four potential options for relations with the EEC were at least possible according to the founding Treaty of

the EEC. The membership or an association agreement with the EEC on the Greek model was applicable to Cyprus, since it had gained its independence in August 1960 (Hoffmeister, 2006). However it wasn't applicable for Malta, which at that time had not gained independence. Therefore, for Malta, two other possibilities were present, the first one based on article 227 of the Treaty, which enabled Malta to connect with the EEC as an overseas territory of the UK, and the second one, built on article 131, which provided for association agreement to be concluded between the EEC and the "non-European" countries and territories (R. Pace, 1998, p.108). In 1962 Nationalist Party (NP), which won the elections demanded independence from the UK (R. Pace, 2004, p.117). After that period, there was a pursuit for independence.

As Malta was still not an independent country, the membership and an association agreement on the Greek model were impossible. Consequently, the EC offered an interim and sui generis settlement which would apply, when the UK united with the EC before Malta had become independent, which would provide for the creation of a contractual relationship between the enlarged Community and Malta that would include the first steps towards a customs union with the EC. Thus, the EC Council of Ministers who met on December 10th and 11th 1962 granted that this distinctive interim agreement with Malta. The UK government positively responded to the EC's suggestion, after they consulted the Maltese authorities (R. Pace, 2004, p.110).

Malta was granted independence from Britain in 1964 (Cini, 2000; Mcfadden, 2012; Briguglio, 2010; Azzopardi, 2011), and subsequently, it started negotiations to launch some form of special connection with the EC in which the accession was the final aim. After its independence, Malta's priority was to affirm its statehood, which in the first few years chiefly meant initiating diplomatic relations and undertakings with the other countries, pursuing and gaining the membership of the international organisations such as the UN and

the Council of Europe, and signing international treaties (R. Pace, 1998, p. 111) as well as to change its economic structure from an economy that serviced the British naval base to one founded more on self-reliance (Azzopardi, 2011, p.1). Whilst Malta had just embarked on an industrialization process, it sought an association with the Community. This association was considered as the means of assuring future success (Borg & Inguanez, 1993, p.146).

Meanwhile, Malta joined the Council of Europe in 1965 which was described by Malta's Prime Minister as a home coming after a period of absence. It improved its European authorisations as well as prepared for the impending relations with the EC. Moreover, Malta settled its primary concern with its regional context, rather than global. It politically positioned itself within the Mediterranean region and the Europe, since it had a common history and culture in both regions. These policies continued under different governments. In addition, Malta chose an economic policy which centred on an unrestrained entree to external markets (R. Pace, 1998, p.112).

In the 60's two possibilities were there for Malta to access to bigger close markets to attach to the developing countries of the southern Mediterranean seaside or to one of the trading states in the Western Europe. Malta's choice of deeper integration with the EC can be evaluated in terms of the general elements of international trade. The geographic remoteness was a significant dynamic of trade for Malta. In Malta's Stolper report, it was suggested that Malta should maintain close relations with the UK and Italy, association with or membership of the EEC, membership in EFTA, and the development of a Free Port. Moreover, as long as the UK stayed out of the EEC, the UN mission stressed that association with or membership of the EEC were out of the question, due to Malta's financial dependency on the UK. Instead, a close association with the UK, participation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) accompanied by the improvement of a free port and special arrangements with Italy was a good alternative. Still, Malta was suggested that

relations with EFTA could not possibly be set for the reason that free trade would cause Malta losing income from customs duties, which was one of the principal sources of the island's economic incomes. Another issue was that the Community had stated that it was not prepared to agree to take any country or associate which have its place in another special area (R. Pace, 1998, p.115). Therefore, Malta needed to get close with EC for its own interests.

In 1964, the Maltese economy was relied on servicing the British naval base, and largely service-oriented even before independence, with so many people who works in related activities such as the civil service, dockyards, domestic maids, cooks and other service providers. “In fact in 1959, a total of 40,000 persons (out of a total working population of 90,000) were directly employed by government or the British Crown” (Azzopardi, 2011, p. 7). Nevertheless, the British Government presented a defence white paper to lessen army staffs (rundown) as well as spending in the colonies in 1957. This would diminish the number of Maltese labouring within the British Services in Malta (Smith, 2006). The British military rundowns in Malta had an adverse consequence on UK-Malta relationship but then stimulated Malta to hasten its energy to expand its economy and to diminish its dependency on British army. The dispersal of more than 3,500 locally enlisted service personnel and civilians which was proclaimed in late 1962 was the first of these military rundowns that scheduled to be range over a period of five years. The Maltese government asserted that the British government was indebted to preserve its obligation to reduce the Maltese economy's dependency on army expenditure, despite the fact that the whole exercise was assumed as an effort to weaken Malta's fiscal capability, civil confidence and hence its pursuit for independence. The rearrangement process of the British military began and Britain declared extra military cuts, to make considerable savings within Mediterranean region, which led to more cutbacks of military presence in Malta. Therefore

Malta tried to find to use all available means to dilute the effect of the rundown of British forces in Malta. It keenly instigated to strive for the initiation of the talks with the EC in order to settle an agreement that would grow its export influence and increase the speed of its economic progression. Thus, the Maltese Government wrote to the EC on September 1967, demanding for the initiation of negotiations between the two sides in order to launch a trade agreement centred on the mutual dismantling of some trade costs, developing eventually into complete liberalisation of trade in goods as well as agricultural products. Malta clearly stated that if the relationships developed it would be ready to handle the tasks and responsibilities of the membership of the Community (R. Pace, 1998, pp.118-119). By this way, it projected to change the economy from the state of dependency on Britain, as well as increase the influence of export and economic progression.

Subsequently, the negotiations between Malta and the EC started again and an association agreement, which only covered industrial goods, was signed with EC on 5 December 1970, (Azzopardi, 2011, p.6; Cini, 2000, p.264), picturing an ultimate launching of a customs union with the Community at the end of a second stage (R. Pace, 2002, p. 118).The Government listed its expectations from the agreement in October. First, the full membership would be an excessively great burden on Malta for the moment; however integration with Europe was the ultimate objective. Second, it would lead trade liberalisation for Malta. Third, it would support Malta to overwhelm the undesirable effects of the military service rundowns. The possible economic consequences of the projected agreement were clear, however the political implications, like a more advanced integration of Malta into Western Europe politically was not ignored when it united the Council of Europe. The agreement provided two stages for a period of five years. On the first stage, the Community destined itself to decrease the common customs tariff (CCT) on most manufactured goods imported from Malta by 70 per cent while at the same time as it would dismantle nearly all

measurable restrictions. At the end of the second stage Malta was to achieve the customs union with the EC (R. Pace, 1998, p. 120-121). It was an important stage for EC-Malta relations.

Meanwhile, after the foundation of the GMP of the EC (Medea Institute, n.d.), some new approaches were proposed with negotiations. GMP was established during the EC meeting in Paris in October 1972 to provide free trade for the productions between the EEC and the Mediterranean littoral countries and Jordan. These negotiations extended the scope of the 1970 agreement, and led to the conclusion of many EC-Malta protocols in the period 1976-1977. These protocols included the extension of the first stage of the association agreement to the end of June 1977 and then to the end of 1980 (R. Pace, 1998, p.122; 2003, p.370); efficiently authorizing more Maltese manufactured goods to move in the Community; fiscal support totalling 26 million ECUs; the extension of preferences to cover more agricultural goods and manufactures; and revision of the original agreement with new circumstances made by the first enlargement of the Community (R. Pace, 1998, p. 122).

Malta economically grew in the 1970s, as a result of association agreement which came into effect in 1971. “Malta was the third country to enter into such an agreement with the then EU-6 and indicated an initial readiness of the island to seek favourable terms of engagement in the European economic space” (Baldacchino, 2002, p. 200). Before 1971 when the EU-Malta association agreement constituted (between years of 1967-71) Malta's gross national income extended by 6.6 per cent per annum. The results of the association agreement started to be felt in 1974 and 1975, when the highest growth occurred. Malta experienced a four-fold growth in its Gross National Product (GNP) and a ten-fold growth in its internal exports, and the employment in manufacturing increased from 20,662 to 32,923 in the period of 1971-81. Several topics may possibly clarify this routine: (a) the influences of the association agreement, (b) Malta's low-cost labour to some extent and (c)

the Industrial Aid Programme operated from the beginning of the 1960s through which the external investors were granted economic support, (d) Government-built factories and other economic aids (R. Pace, 1998, p. 127). Then again, the association agreement had an important impact on Malta's economic progression.

EC-Malta association agreement was of assistance in creation of an export-led economic growth. It unlocked the opportunity for expanding Malta's exports away from over reliance on the UK market and increased Malta's part of the EC market. The national exports of Malta swiftly grew in the 1960s and 1970s; and Malta augmented its share of exports in both the UK and the EC (R. Pace, 1998, p. 129). Malta's growth in the early 1960 was disappointing, however, from 1965 it grew dramatically (Azzopardi, 2011, p. 7-8). In 1960s and 1970s, textiles and clothing industries with the economic resources, developed Malta. Therefore, even the northern European countries, those found Malta's labour costs lower, moved to Malta. However, the clothing in Malta's domestic exports declined after 1981. After 1985, another important transformation occurred, when electronic equipment substituted the clothing as Malta's main export. At first textiles, then clothing followed by electronic tools were the main exports that contributed Malta's economic growth (R. Pace, 1998, p. 133). Throughout association agreement Malta's goods were transformed to the EU markets, and the EU member states found lower cost in Malta to make enterprises. These all changed the economic situation in Malta.

Malta wanted to change the association agreement for an ultimate EC membership. It was expanded by added protocols in the mid-1970s with Maltese demands, besides because the EC was strengthening its relationships with the Mediterranean seaside countries with its recently launched GMP of 1972. A 1977 protocol prolonged the first stage of the association agreement to the end of 1980 (R. Pace, 2003, p.370). Moreover, after 1971, the association agreement was no longer thought as a stage in the direction of an ultimate EU

membership. It was considered as a financial device to fulfil the official plans to terminate the existence of the British military. Hence, Malta wanted to renegotiate and change the extent of the association agreement for an ultimate membership, as well as try to arrange some bilateral trade agreements with the Arab States of the region, like Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, aiming to prevent the dependence of Malta's economy upon the British military spending (R. Pace, 1998, p. 133). Malta- EC collaborated in terms of industry in the period 1976-1977. Under the GMP, the EC assured the support to the Mediterranean nations for their industrialisation, agricultural modernisation and the marketing exports.

3.2 Relations in the Period 1980-1987

In the period 1980-1987 EC-Malta relations weakened. After 1970 Association Agreement completed in December 1980, no arrangement between the two parties for a second step was planned. That means the legal basis of relations between the EC and Malta came to an end. To maintain Maltese the exports to the Community, the European Council again instigated the trade provisions of the agreement unilaterally for a period of six months, to 30 June 1981, until the second phase negotiation settled (Council Regulation, 1980, p.1). The European Council authorised the Commission to negotiate an additional Protocol to the association agreement extending the provisions governing the first stage to 30 June 1984. The European Council's decision enabled the assembling of the EC-Malta Council of Association. Moreover, the Maltese Prime Minister recommended the formation of a special relationship between the EC and Malta in June 1981. Malta's offer led to a deadlock in EC-Malta relations, yet a number of other argumentative matters were ruining the relationship such as the political condition in Malta, Malta's ambivalent foreign policy and the special requests made by Malta on the predetermined relationship (R. Pace, 1998, pp. 140-141).

Malta's national political view, and its foreign policy from the late 1970s to the middle of 1980s were also a source of recurrent controversy with the EC and the Council of Europe from time to time. These improvements affected the financial and commercial discussions but did not profit in order to achieve progression for an application of a special relationship between the Community and Malta. The condition was rendered more difficult to some extent with the Maltese government's rough routine towards the Western Europe. Moreover, the internal political circumstances were swiftly worsening at the same time. In some analyses, it was suggested that (a) Malta was slowly changing from a pluralistic democratic system to one-party state; (b) there were violation of human rights and attacks on the freedom of the press; (c) and Malta's unconvincing neutrality characterized with Malta's underground agreements with North Korea and the treaty of friendship and collaboration with Libya (R. Pace, 1998, pp. 145-146). These arguments were considered to worsen Malta's internal and external policies as well as weaken the EC-Malta relations.

Moreover, MLP was able to secure more parliamentary seats with fewer votes than the NP in the 1981 elections (R. Pace, 1998, p. 148; Torpiano, 2012; Briguglio, 2010, p. 215). Subsequently, it desired to cut off the NP's relations with the external world, and put in to affect the Foreign Interference Act in September 1982, keeping the involvement of foreign politicians away from Malta's political activities without the prior consent of itself (Foreign Interference Act, 1982). In addition to that, MLP wished to prevent Maltese citizens to take part in radio and television programmes that was transmitted from foreign countries, most probably to end the Opposition's transmissions from nearby Sicily. However, the issue raised concerns in the Council of Europe since it limited freedom of expression (Assemblée Parlementaire, 1985). Furthermore in 1983, the Government of Malta decided to remove a large part of the property of the Church, which was related to an on-going dispute between Church and state on the future of Catholic schools. A resolution on the threat to religious

freedom in Malta was presented in the European Parliament (EP) on 7 July 1983 (American Association of School Administrators, 1985, p.130), calling upon the Commission to influence the Maltese authorities during negotiations for withdrawing the measures (R. Pace, 1998, p. 152). Furthermore, in November 1983, the police stormed the Head Quarters of the NP. In addition, another time, it was declared that Malta could do with a one-party system. This was also the emphasis of a new disapproving resolution presented in the EP on 19 January 1984 (Resolution, 1984). The Government suspended the operating licences of eight Church schools in August 1984. Another resolution was listed in the EP concerning the policies of Maltese government on the Church schools and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) summed up the general situation in Malta that the democracy and respect for human rights had been vanishing since the 1970s. The commission added that the objectivity of the judiciary and the Roman Catholic Church was suppressed and the administration tried to restrict the actions of the independent trade unions, and the speech of a senior minister who publicly stated the likelihood of starting a one-party state (R. Pace, 1998, p. 153). These circumstances were the indicative of the weakened relationships between EC and Malta. EC council was blaming Maltese government due to Maltese government's actions vis-à-vis human rights and freedom. According to official discourses of EC, it was an issue of great concern to witness Malta's democratic situation that were worsening in the domestic as well as foreign front.

Malta's economy was also worsening by the 1980's. "Maltese society was characterised by growing unemployment, lack of choice for increasingly emancipated consumers, political polarisation, and violent political outbreaks, including violence from State organs (Briguglio, 2010, p.215). Between the periods of 1980-1987 Malta experienced an economic depression, because of the diminishing domestic exports, and dropping tourist entrances. The economic depression reduced incomes and increased unemployment. The

main source of this trouble was the exchange rate of the Malta Lira during that period. According to Federation of Industries, as soon as the national exports promptly rose, the active exchange rate of the Malta lira was lower than from 1980 onwards when the recession started during 1974-1979 (R. Pace, 1998, p. 159). The economy worsened and the unemployment rate increased.

However, the relations with the EC on the special relationship and the second financial protocols continued to slow down noticeably due to the internal political condition of Malta and its foreign policy. Still, the second financial protocol was finally settled in 1985, despite the fact that no advancement was made on the discussions about the replenishment of the second phase of the association agreement. Malta projected the formation of an EC-Malta Joint Task Force (JTF) in May 1986 to support manufacturing collaboration. It also demanded from the Community the discounts that would enable the admission of Maltese industrial and farm products in the Community market. Nonetheless, this enterprise did not materialise (R. Pace, 1998, p. 160). The economy wasn't recovered.

3.3 Relations in the Period 1980-1987

The general elections in Malta were in May 1987 and NP won the elections (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1987; Azzopardi, 2011, p.7; Briguglio, 2010, p.215). The Foreign Interference Act was edited, the aggressive sections excluded from it. Malta's position of neutrality and non-alignment was placed in the Constitution, though the electoral law was changed on the way to protect that the party which gained the majority of votes would also have the majority of chairs in parliament (R. Pace, 1998, p. 160). NP was elected on a liberal, non-interventionist but 'socially conscious' platform and decisive to go for the EU membership (Cini, 2000, p.264; Fenech, 1997, p. 159). The issues were to set the membership application at once otherwise to follow discussions with the EC to outline the

second stage of the 1970 Association Agreement leading to a Customs Union. In 1987, the Government pointed that the economy isn't prepared for Malta to apply for the membership instantly. After three years of economic restructuring and liberalisation, Malta could launch the membership application. Moreover, the NP, by means of domestic economic reforms, wanted to develop its political authorizations, hence signifying its obligation on modernisation, and distancing itself from the earlier foreign policies (R. Pace, 1998, p.166). It kept its standing to move on the way for an ultimate EU membership.

After the NP government won the election one of its first concerns was to refurbish the legitimate basis of the relationship with the EC. It formally applied in the membership on 16 July 1990 (Azzopardi, 2011, p.6; M. Pace, 2006, p.111), and aimed neither a special relationship nor, a customs union with the EC. The main objective was an ultimate membership of EC. The EC and Malta decided to begin again the first stage of the 1970 Association Agreement up to the end of 1990, to provide extra time for the consideration. A Supplementary Protocol to the EC-Malta Association Agreement was signed on the 14 December 1988, which was ratified on the 1 April 1989 (European Economic Community, 1988). Moreover this protocol adapted the association agreement to the entry of Spain and Portugal in the Community, a change which had been remaining since 1986. The Supplementary Protocol provided for a lessening of 10 per cent on the charges applied by Malta on beer imported from the EC. Additional reductions were also prearranged by the Community on several agricultural goods exported from Malta. The negotiations supposed to instigate on the second stage of the association agreement, twelve months before the ending of the Protocol. A new Protocol signed on 20 December 1990, and came into effect in May 1991, which was prolonged the first period of the agreement to the end of 1991 (European Economic Community, 1990). Furthermore, the NP government attempted to regulate issue of the use of the monetary support given by the Community in the second

financial protocol. Many projects were submitted by Malta for the utilisation of the funds in November 1986. However, by December 1987, only one financing agreement had been signed between the two sides committing the European Currency Unit (ECU) 3 million in soft loans to the solid wastes recycling project was accepted in Malta (R. Pace, 1998, p.168).

After the reunification of Germany in October 1990, the start of the Inter-governmental conference that headed to the sign of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in 1992 that set Europe for monetary union (Summaries of EU Legislation, n.d.). Furthermore, the EU became more concerned about the circumstances in CEE; therefore signed a series of Europe Agreement with the main countries of the region. As a final point, the treaty between the EC and EFTA countries accompanying in the European Economic Area (EEA) was signed in 1992 (European Parliament, n.d), when the internal market programme was concluded. (R. Pace, 1998, pp.176)

In the first half of 1994, the Maltese and Cypriot applications made significant progress during the Greek EU presidency. Greek Minister stated that Greece would support both Malta's and Cyprus' relations with the EU. Moreover, Greece insisted that Cyprus should be allowed the EU as soon as possible. The Greece Foreign Minister Papoulias, stated that after the first phrase of the enlargement which included the EFTA group, the other countries must be embraced, such as Cyprus and Malta those were able to meet the economic and political conditions to enter the EU (R. Pace, 1998, pp.178-179).

No date for the following stage in European integration was pictured for the start of negotiations with Cyprus and Malta. The decision not to start membership applications with the Mediterranean applicants was indicative of these two Mediterranean countries to be kept waiting until the next enlargement that would embrace some of the CEECs .Considering the economic development of the two Mediterranean countries, when compared to the Eastern

European states and their long-standing relationship with the Union, the two Mediterranean countries, Malta and Cyprus were economically and politically punished, by being forced to wait on the threshold of the Union with the Eastern European states. Besides, these Mediterranean countries had made quick development in the economic and legal reform programmes that had been drawn up in agreement with the Commission in preparation for membership (R. Pace, 1998, p.177-178). However, they had to wait with the countries of CEE.

When Germany took the Presidency of the EU in the second half of 1994, the focus shifted more towards the CEE. Prior to the Essen European Council of December 1994, as part of the EU's policy of preparing these countries for an ultimate membership via the structured dialogue, the leaders from the Eastern and Central European countries were going to be requested for a summit with the European leaders in Essen. Malta and Cyprus were not invited to attend. On 1 December, Cyprus formally protested Germany for the issue of invitation of the six countries of CEE whereas excluding Cyprus. The German ambassador in Nicosia expressed the Cypriot Foreign Minister that there wasn't any purpose of discrimination against Cyprus and Malta. He also added that these countries invited to take the messages of encouragement along with the necessity for them to prepare their economies; besides Malta and Cyprus should be happy not to have been placed on the same footing as the EEC. Because they have no chance of entering the Union before the turn of the century, while Malta can possibly become a member of the EU just after the Intergovernmental Conference. At the Essen European Council, EU leaders asserted that the following stage of enlargement would include Cyprus and Malta and invited the Council to examine in early 1995 new reports to be presented by the Commission (R. Pace, 1998, pp.181-182).

The Commission's positive opinion on Malta's application in 1993 was about Malta's unquestionable European calling, its democratic situation and reliable esteem for human

rights, which made Malta completely reasonable to proclaim for membership of the EU. Still, Malta's attachment to the EU raised up some financial, governmental, political as well as institutional problems those had to be resolved in the run up to membership (R. Pace, 1998, pp.185-186).

In July 1994, the Maltese Government voiced its concern of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PfP). Malta joined the PfP on April 1995. In 1996 general election MLP made a victory (Briguglio, 2010, p.217; Azzopardi, 2011, p.6). However, it immediately froze the Maltese application of the EU, and removed Malta from PfP, and completed the political dialogue with the EU (Cini, 2000, p.265).

The re-election of an MLP government in October 1996 on an election platform opposing EU membership also had a dramatic effect on Malta's European policy. Although the Labour government fell after only a couple of years in office, it sought, during this two-year period, to undo the pre-accession work of the Nationalists, freezing the EU application and initiating a process that they hoped would lead to a rather different relationship with the EU, one which would involve participation in a free trade area, but would not result in full membership (Cini, 2004, p. 587).

By the meantime, the traditional neutral Switzerland joined to the partnership as Malta left the PfP. This progress was exciting from the perspective of Maltese internal politics, as the MLP had campaigned under the slogan of turning Malta into a "Switzerland of the Mediterranean (R. Pace, 1998, p. 193). The NP Government didn't notice any inappropriateness concerning Malta's neutrality and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Being on the edge of Europe's stability zone in the Mediterranean, it was important for Malta to participate in a strong European CFSP. Malta's first figurative step to take a more dynamic role on European security was its joining PfP. It was described by the NP Government as a significant impact for the pursuit of collective security as pictured by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, the surprising cessation of Malta's membership of the Partnership in

1996 clogged this progress. An additional initiative was the suggestion for a "Stability Pact" in the Mediterranean region which was put forward to the Ministers of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. This proposal also did not advance far. Malta's partaking in Europe's broader security dialogue had diminished since 1996 (R. Pace, 1998, p.198). After MLP came to the power, the EU and Malta relation almost ended, the agreements with the EU suspended.

After MLP won the elections, it started to campaign against membership of the EU, suggesting a free trade area agreement in industrial goods over a reasonable transitional period. It stated that that it was against membership of PfP programme as well as recommended the co-operation with the EU in matters related to security and foreign policy. It believed that Malta's membership of the EU would damage the Mediterranean stability and that Malta's security could best be preserved by keeping a position where it will pose a threat to no one, from the North or from the South. Malta declared that it would not attend the Dublin European Council soon after the election, at the same time some speedy actions were taken to pull Malta out of the PfP. Some considered this move as the first sign of a return to the previous anti-western and pro-Libyan policies (R. Pace, 1998, pp.209-210).

MLP remained in power for only 22 months. One of the major reasons for its fall were its austerity measures, which were at least partly influenced by the massive fiscal deficit inherited from the NP, but whose influence was worsened by Labour's "replacement of Value Added Tax (VAT) with a customs and excise tax". Therefore, the electorates, such as upwardly mobile working class voters, those from the new middle class and the self-employed, as well as left-wing Labourites were disappointed with MLP's policies (Briguglio, 2012, p.217).

In addition, MLP was not satisfied with NP policy and was continually opposing the EU membership, declaring that NP was disloyal to the national interest.

Between 1998 and 2003, the Malta Labour Party consistently opposed Malta's EU membership bid that was being championed by the NP, Malta's Green Party, and other civil society organisations. Labour stressed its traditional role as shield to Malta's workers and the national interest, giving top priority to the role of industry as a motor of Malta's economy, and to the welfare state as a pillar of social justice. Labour emphasised the need for free trade, albeit giving more importance to the need to protect vulnerable sectors of the economy. In the process it made use of nationalistic discourse. Indeed, Labour stated that the Nationalist government was betraying the national interest by insisting that Malta should join the EU at all costs (Briguglio, 2012, p.219).

During 2002 and 2003, the talk of the imminent referendum and General Elections dominated Maltese society. The EU question dominated the island beside a general election would be held on January 2004. Malta was separated into two camps. "Those in favour of membership included the NP, Alternattiva Demokratika, the Green Party, Union Haddiema Maqghudin, the Federation of Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, the Malta Employers Association, the Malta Union of Teachers, the Confederation of Malta Trade Unions, the Malta Hotels and Restaurants Association, the Association of Farmers, environmental NGOs and, notably, Labour's important 1996 ally the General Retailers Trade Union. On the other side were the MLP, the General Workers' Union, the Campaign for National Independence (led by former Labour Prime Minister Karmenu Mifsud Bonnici), a sizeable section of the hunters and trappers' lobby (even if not officially), Ghima (made up of a section of industrial entrepreneurs catering to the other the local market, such as a section of the furniture industry), the Progressive Farmers' Union, and Dom Mintoff's Front Maltin Inqumu (FMI) (Malta Arise Front)" (Briguglio, 2012, p.219).

The Surveys such as Eurobarometer were presenting that a most of the Maltese electors were supportive of the EU membership. "People who were younger, had a good level of education and who formed part of the middle classes tended to favour EU

membership more than did older and/or working-class people” (Briguglio, 2012, p.220). On 8 March 2003 Malta voted in the referendum with 91 per cent of the electorate whether to join the EU or not. The results revealed that 53.6% supported the accession, whereas 46.4% voted against (BBC NEWS, n.d.; Cini, 2007, p. 593). “Malta was the most sceptical of the nine states that conducted referenda on the issue – a reflection of the polarisation of the country. In order to confirm the narrow majority a general election was held” (Azzopardi, 2011, p.6). The Accession Treaty was signed in Athens on 16 April 2003. Malta joined the EU on 1 May 2004, and after a month, the general elections were held. The NP once more arose as champion with 35 seats as in the previous election, against MLP’s 30 seats. The NP won 51.81% of the vote; MLP got 47.51%. Within the EU membership process, the pro-EU-membership party claimed that because Malta’s export-oriented economy could have greater access to the EU markets and could connect to non-EU member states in the region, Malta would benefit from the EU membership. Additionally, the youth, enjoying the same rights as their European counterparts, would get bigger chances for their own study and employment. Furthermore, it was stressed that “the EU would help improve standards in areas such as the environment, workers’ and consumers’ rights, and gender equality – all associated with post-materialist values which were becoming increasingly important to Maltese citizens, particularly for the highly educated, young and expanding new middle-class”. In addition, it would be a net receiver of EU funds at least for the initial years. The Maltese also was able to success positive arrangements “in areas such as the environment, purchase of property, free movement of workers and foreign policy” with the forthcoming EU membership (Briguglio, 2012, p.220).

After Malta joined to the EU 2004, the leadership of the NP was moved to Lawrence Gonzi, who projected a tough image of stability. Many economic reforms were made in Malta. Moreover, economic liberalisation and privatisation increased. At the same time job

opportunities and economy in general also grew as well as reforms such as the introduction of divorce and the regulation of cohabitation remained excluded from Maltese social policy (Briguglio, 2012, p.222).

4. DYNAMICS BEHIND EU'S MALTESE ENLARGEMENT

Accession of Malta to the EU might be evaluated in three perspectives. In the first part of this dissertation, European enlargement was argued from three different perspectives. It was revealed that the EU enlargement materialized when member states would gain higher in terms of economy and security (utility logic /pragmatic arguments); or when EU thought there would be an element of kinship, or a common of identity (value logic / ethical political arguments); or when applicant states respected universal principles of human rights and democracy (right logic / moral arguments). Thus, the three perspectives of the EU enlargement were revealed, otherwise the actions of the member states wouldn't be explained wholly, and consequently the EU enlargement process wouldn't be clarified enough. Considering the fact that EU's prioritisation of the enlargement depended on many variables, it was inevitable to ponder different perspectives of the EU enlargement, rather than sticking, for instance, the utility logic, through which the EU determined its priorities within an interest-based perspective, cost-benefit calculations, which is a characteristic of a logic of consequentiality. Therefore, different logics, perspectives, and arguments of the EU enlargement were examined and discussed in order to make an analysis of Malta's integration to the EU.

4.1 Utility Logic of Enlargement

The EU enlargement of Malta might be discussed within the utility logic. The EU enlarges its institutions and membership if the marginal profits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs for both the member states and the applicant states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p .14). These arguments have much in common with the concept of logic of consequence (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495). Throughout rational hypothesis, it is revealed that estimated individual costs and profits regulate the applicants' and the member states'

enlargement choices. The actors decide according to scheming of utility given set of benefits. The actors wouldn't support the enlargement unless the discussions offer benefit for their interests and preferences (Sjursen, 2002, p. 494). Hence, the EU enlarged to Malta, since it was clear that it would profit once it enlarged to Malta. Considering geostrategic location, "as a place of stability and political neutrality in the centre of the Mediterranean, Malta is ideally located to offer political and economic opportunities that will enhance sub-regional co-operation in its immediate vicinity (Calleya, n.d, p. 217). Hence, it was important for the EU to enlarge Malta, and stabilize the Mediterranean region, in terms of both political and economy.

From member states' perspective, the EU enlargement of Malta was more than economic reasons. Despite the fact that, Malta's joining to the EU enabled freedom of trade, the member states rather prioritised the security of the EU and interested in security issue. The integration of Malta evaluated as a long term period of gain.

The EU has created policies and programmes of development and cooperation, aid programmes for the economic restructuring of countries in this basin and plans to facilitate trade with these countries/partners in an effort to build confidence and security measures, to promote 'development' and to 'stabilise' southern economies – a Stability Pact for the Mediterranean (M. Pace, 2006, p. 140).

The EU prioritises economic reform processes in its Mediterranean partner states in order to develop the EU–Mediterranean relations. However, the main reason the EU interested in Malta was of security reasons.

On the other hand, as an applicant state, Malta's first approach to the EU stemmed from its economic fragility.

Malta's approach to the EC was first of all directly linked to the quest of improving the domestic economy. In general, from the Maltese perspective, the political and economic scopes of the relationship with the Community were always linked: in the nineteen sixties economic viability was linked to consolidation of independence

through a lessening of dependence on the UK; in the nineteen seventies, Malta sought extraordinary aid from the EC in order to strengthen the Maltese economy in preparation for 1979 when Malta would lose its rents as a result of the closure of the British military bases (R. Pace, 1998, pp. 163-164).

Malta cooperated with and seek to join to the EU in order to develop its production and economic infrastructure as well as expand the island's economic structure for marketing its exports. It was important for Malta to join the EU, to access bigger countries with bigger markets. Moreover, it was stated by Consul General of the Republic of Malta in Istanbul, Mr. Reuben Gauci "It is our pleasure to be around the table", which gave an important standing to Malta in international dimension, and pave the way for further economic and political advantages (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013).

EU membership gives Malta the possibility of participating in the European decision-making process. This would not only help the country to influence the course of developments in the Mediterranean, but it would also increase its influence in the region, given that the Arab World would attribute more importance to it once it became an EU member state (R. Pace, 2002, p. 29).

In order to improve its domestic economy, Maltese government changed the political perspective, and seek to improve its relationship with the Community to increase its influence in the region, and have a political power in international arena by participating in the European decision-making process, which would give new economic and political inventiveness. Joining to the EU would supply Malta a number of economic and political advantages, which as a small state lacked a domestic market.

The small member states like Malta, located geographically on the Union's periphery, possibly would change the very atmosphere of the Union by making it more sensitive to the problems of its periphery, mainly because "many of the new small member states have a history of being dominated by stronger neighbours and the regions they face are all unstable" (R. Pace, 1998, p. 282). As it was mentioned earlier, the security reason played an important

part for EU's decision to enlarge Malta. Malta's prime minister stated in 1975 that "there can be no stability in EU unless there is in Mediterranean". Malta was very helpful in the crises in Libya for instance, it created a human corridor; it was the nearest EU country to Libya. During the evacuation of workers, Malta was the nearest port of entry (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013). Malta was depicted as a bridge between Europe and North Africa, and EU needed to enlarge to Malta, in order to stabilize the Mediterranean region as well as safeguard the its own institution and people.

The context in which the EU recognises this 'Mediterranean' entity is fear or risk stemming from 'insecurity' and 'instability' emanating from this area (that is through processes of securitisation). In fact, the EU discourse on the Mediterranean as a securitising object emerged as a very powerful discourse, even more so before the events of 9/11 and 11 March 2004. It has been noted that the EU's securitisation of the Mediterranean is prominent (the EU seems to be almost obsessed with Mediterranean security issues). Linked to this discourse is another powerful discourse on the risk of immigration/terrorists from the area entering into the borders of Europe (securitisation of issues such as migration, drugs and crime also brings in the inter-regional level). Through these discursive practices the EU extends the boundaries of the Mediterranean into its own borders (M. Pace, 2006, p.140).

Malta's location in the middle of Mediterranean gave it a very significant geostrategic advantage that the EU wanted to use in its own favour. Throughout years, Maltese islands were used for security reasons of great powers. For instance, UK was looking for a strategic place in Mediterranean, and Malta was an important strategic place for it (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013). Actually, it was also conquered throughout the ages by Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals and Goths, Byzantines, Muslim Arabs, Sicilians, Germans, French, feudal lords, Knights Hospitallers of St John of Jerusalem, British and Turks (M. Pace, 2006, p.109). This strategic standing and the history are indicative of the Malta's importance for EU's Mediterranean policy as well as security and the stability. Moreover "Malta is ideally located to offer political and

economic opportunities that will enhance sub-regional co-operation in its immediate vicinity” (Calleya, n.d), which urged the EU to include Malta to its own community.

In addition, the security reason was also important for Maltese people. The organization was perceived that it would bring security as well as stability to Malta.

Membership of the EU viewed as a "security community" could go a long way to enhancing Malta's overall security. Malta's membership of the EU will not affect the Union either way. However, the reverse is not the case. Malta's security is related to the regional context, the threats arising therefrom and the sort of threats that Malta perceives (R. Pace, 1998, p. 194).

In order to overcome its geographical peripheral position in relation to Europe, and to enhance its security in a region that notorious for its instability Malta wanted to join the EU (R. Pace, 1998, pp.166-167). Moreover, Maltese government, to improve security and stability in the Mediterranean region as well as in its own state, signed a number of agreements to display its willingness on the role to bring stability and security to the region.

Malta's first symbolic step in taking a more active role in European security was that of joining NATO's Partnership for Peace, which was described by the Nationalist Government as an "important contribution to the pursuit of collective security as envisaged by the United Nations and the OSCE. " ... Another initiative was the proposal for a "Stability Pact" in the Mediterranean region which was put forward to the Ministers of the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership in 1995. (R. Pace, 1998, p. 197).

The utility was an important issue of the enlargement process and Malta's integration to the EU. It was at the centre of the processes of the bargaining. For the economy and the security matters, the EU member states and Malta acted in a positive way that stemmed from the expectations of utility, and negotiated for the enlargement process to include Malta to the community. As it was suggested in chapter one that the EU enlarges its institutions and membership if the marginal profits of enlargement exceed the marginal costs for both the member states and the applicant states. The marginal costs for both the EU member states

and Malta exceeded the marginal costs in terms of economy and security for the manifestation of the EU enlargement to Malta. The EU and Malta wouldn't upkeep the enlargement negotiations unless the discussions offer advantage for their interests and preferences.

According to logic of consequence/consequentiality the states sketch their demands with reference to certain interests, and start negotiating to resolve issues. Throughout the process of integration of Malta to the EU, the EU member states and Malta followed their profits with the preparations and measures. They shared opinions to broaden their standing. Hence, with the negotiating ability of Malta, the consequence revealed itself as an ultimate EU membership.

4.2 Value Logic of the Enlargement

Value logic or ethical political arguments are other aspect of EU's preferences of enlargement to the Malta. Within the value logic framework, the enlargement aimed the goal of promoting the values of EU; that is to say, "The EU would prioritize enlargement to those states with which it believes it shares an element of 'kinship'" (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495). The common values were important justification within the EU enlargement process of Malta.

Overall, Malta's quest for membership stems primarily from political considerations. Having shared Europe's fortunes over the last centuries and conscious of their undoubted European identity, the Maltese are looking towards integration within the European Union as the next logical step in the Island's development, a move that would not only guarantee long-term prosperity but will also safeguard Malta's stability and security (Borg & Inguanez, 1993, p. 147).

Within the value-based outlook, the EU tried regenerate the traditions, mores and memories of the common European values, in which a sense of common identity would function as a source for integration.

Situated around eighty kilometres south of Sicily, Malta has shared Europe's history for hundreds of years, a relationship accentuated by the very close ties with the Order of St. John. It can in fact be claimed that it was probably the time spent under the Knights that has marked Malta most. Another major historical factor in the Island's "European connection" was undoubtedly the period spanning a century and a half during which Malta was a British colony and which culminated in the role played during the Second World War in the defence of freedom and democracy (Borg & Inguanez, 1993, p. 145).

EU wanted to enlarge to Malta, which had common values and traditions with Europe. Therefore, it is significant to mention Maltese identity of Europeanness has been an important factor for their joining to the EU.

Between 1964-67, Malta improved its European credentials and lay the ground for future relations with the European Community when in 1965 it joined the Council of Europe (R. Pace, 1998, p. 111), a step described by Malta's Prime Minister, as a "home coming after a period of absence (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013).

Malta's joining to the EU wasn't only about acquisition of specific benefits. It was also about a sense of shared aims, and beliefs to bring harmony to the borders of the member states. In a value-based perspective, EU aimed to unite with the countries it shared a common identity, and created an intergovernmental and transnational organization, in which Malta was placed.

As regards Malta, the EU has clearly accepted this country as a European candidate from the initial stage of Malta's submission of its EU application. Clearly, Malta is treated differently from North African countries like Morocco since the Commission announced that Malta was eligible for accession negotiations for the 2004 enlargement of the EU. Malta has been treated as a country in the entry hall of Brussels. There is no constitutional problem with Malta whilst there seems to be with the case of Turkey. Hence, the EU considers Malta as European but not North African – such as Algeria or Morocco – for example. This, as stated above, was not the case for Morocco which the EU treats as a partner – albeit one of its most important partners in the Maghreb with its rich offshore fishing grounds (M. Pace, 2006, p 123).

The EU enlargement politics are formed by ideational, cultural dynamics. The EU member states have common beliefs and values historically. According to the constructivist

perspective, the enlargement resides predominantly in the exploration of social identities, values, and norms (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p .14). Within a value based perspective the member states basically have homogeneous enlargement preferences due to the strong institutional as well as cultural effects as sociological institutionalism frequently assumes.

Dr Borg Olivier: ... Whilst as a European Country sharing a common culture, history and way of life, we naturally gravitate towards Europe... (R. Pace, 1998, p.112).

The importance of culture, tradition, beliefs and morals were imperative in the process of Malta's integration to the Europe, when Italy, which had linguistic, cultural and historical connections with Malta, acquiescently backed it politically for its integration to the EU.

In a final joint community, Italy reaffirmed its support to Malta in its negotiations with the EC on the Association Agreement. Italy's support for Malta's EC aspirations was reiterated during a visit to Malta by President Leone in December 1975. Italo-Maltese relations continued to strengthen thereafter. Italy began a diplomatic effort to convince its EC partners to help Malta after the closure of the military bases in 1979, when Malta would also assume a status of neutrality (R. Pace, 1998, p.155).

It is important to note that Maltese people also identify themselves as European. In the interview with Consul General of the Republic of Malta in Istanbul, Mr. Reuben Gauci, stated that Malta was a European country, which also had some historical and traditional connections with the neighbouring countries (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013). M. Pace (2006) also referred to the Maltese interviewees' statement of their European identity.

It is important here to note that Maltese interviewees separated Malta from these latter concerns, implicitly emphasising that Malta is neither North African nor Middle Eastern but European (that is, inside Europe and not 'outside') and therefore belongs to the stable partners (M. Pace, 2006, p. 135).

Maltese identification with Europe, that is to say, their Europeanness notion played an important role within the process of Malta's integration to the organization. They changed their domestic and foreign policy in order to join their EU partners, with whom they share a common history and value.

According to the logic of appropriateness, the actors act based on the identity of the community they belong to. That means states act according to their role within a community as a result of habit or a particular identity. Collective decisions seek to develop and protect the sense of 'we-ness' and to establish bonds of solidarity. A policy decision can be justified as long as it is appropriate according to the shared values and common identity (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005). Hence, unless Malta shared a common value and identity with the organisation, the EU would not accept it.

Value logic or ethical political arguments are important perspectives of EU's enlargement to the Malta. According to these arguments the EU prioritized enlargement to Malta, because it believed to share an element of 'kinship'. The EU justified this process with common values. Because, Malta historically shared Europe's legacy, significantly throughout the Order of St. John. Moreover, being a part of British colony, it shared the common identity as well as value with the EU member states. Hence, the EU tried restore the traditions, mores and memories of the common European values, seeking to expand the countries which it see an element of kinship, such as Malta. Therefore, it is worth mentioning Maltese European identity which had an important part in their integration process to the EU.

4.3 Right Perspective of Enlargement

Within right logic or moral arguments, the EU enlargement happens when applicant states respected universal principles of human rights and democracy. In other words the “EU would prioritize enlargement to those states that respect the universal principles of human rights and democracy” (Sjursen, 2002, p. 495). The integration would not depend on a sense of social or traditional relativeness or common mores. As a post-national union, the EU would depend upon universal rights as well as democratic procedures. It allows for cultural pluralism and the communal motivation with different identities and interests.

During the integration process of Malta to the EU, many changes should have been done such as democracy and internal as well as external policies in Malta. Malta needed to make some modifications on its institutions in order to be a part of the EU. Otherwise, it would be left out from the organization. Exactly as it was stated, when these changes weren't made, and adaption to EU norms weren't not met, the enlargement process was slowed down.

An anonymous article in “The World Today” published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 1984 argued that Malta was "backing away from Helsinki" and "that while up to 1981, the gradual erosion of freedom took place behind a well-kept façade of democracy since the 1981 election "the façade itself has not remained intact (R. Pace, 1998, p.148).

It was discussed that the corrosion of liberty was moving Malta away from the EU, which would not accept Malta, unless it meet the EU's freedom and democracy principle.

When Malta's political condition changed, a number of resolutions in the European Parliament were prepared. Because it had a negative effect on the EU-Malta relations in general. Some motions concerning the political situation in Malta were:

The motion tabled by Mrs Cassanmagnago Cerretti on October 24th, 1979 regarding the attack on the Progress Press and the house of the leader of the Opposition;

The motion for a resolution tabled by Lady Elles et al., on the 14th of September, 1981 regarding the Maltese government's harassment of the religious order known as

the "Blue Sisters" in order to take over the hospital which they ran. The Maltese government had amended the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure prohibiting any individual from suing the government. It also appointed a Law Courts Commission with powers to remove any member of the legal profession and prevent a case against the government from being heard with urgency.

The motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Hapsburg et al., in 1982 expressing anxiety at the "increasing bias of Malta's foreign policy towards the totalitarian countries" and "informing the Maltese authorities that on many occasions the Communities have frozen their financial aid to countries which have departed from democratic principles." (R. Pace, 1998, pp. 149-150).

The EU were strict on its principles that once the applicant states were moved away from its principles, such as human right and democracy, the negotiation slowed down and worsened with the EU. It was put forward that the EU froze the financial aid to the applicant states those walked away from democratic principles.

Moreover, when the EU- Malta relations were worsened, some institutions evaluated and discussed on this situation.

The International Commission of Jurists summed up the general situation thus: "Democracy and respect for human rights in this Mediterranean island have been gradually and steadily eroded since the 1970s. The independence of the judiciary has come under attack and the government has tried to circumscribe the activities of the independent trade unions, the press and the Roman Catholic Church to which over 90 per cent of the population belongs. It has also enacted legislation giving it control over all relations with foreigners including trade union and cultural relations. A senior minister has spoken publicly of the possibility of establishing a one-party state, suspending freedom and democracy and not holding elections." (R. Pace, 1998, p. 153).

Unless the states respected the universal principles of human rights and democracy, the EU would not enlarge to this countries. The political situation in Malta was indicative of this case.

The EU's norms and principles were important that without adaptation to this very principles the enlargement wouldn't happen.

However, despite the strong economic links established between Malta and the EC from 1970 to 1987 Malta's foreign policy did not reflect the Community's values in the international sphere. Malta pursued close relations with Libya and the Arab world, embarked on a policy of non-alignment later joining the non-aligned movement. Malta's behaviour during this period shows very clearly that economic dependence does not necessarily lead to foreign policy compliance. The same can be said from the analysis of Italo-Maltese relations. Despite the fact that Italy (1980) was the only country to recognise Malta's neutrality and to furnish it with substantial financial aid for its economic development, it did not stop Malta from concluding a neutrality accord with the USSR (1981), from signing two secret treaties with North Korea (1982) and from concluding a friendship and security treaty with Libya (1984). Italy was able to respond to these developments by delaying financial aid from the protocols and this led to acrimony between the two sides (R. Pace, 1998, p. 164).

When Malta accepted and implemented the universal principles of human rights and democracy, the EU made positive commentaries about Malta. Looking at the Commission's declaration, it concluded in 1999 on Malta's application for membership that:

Malta's institutions function normally and there are no problems regarding human rights and the protection of minorities. Furthermore, there are no apparent weaknesses in the judicial system. However efforts are required to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service (European Commission, 2002, p.14).

As long as Malta followed the European norms and principles of human rights and democracy, the EU took constructive steps to integrate Malta to its legal and political system. In its 2000 Regular Report on Malta's progress towards accession, the Commission stated that:

Malta continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. Its institutions are democratic and function smoothly and there are no particular problems with regard to human rights. Basic civil and political rights continue to be respected. The overall situation with regard to economic, social and cultural rights is satisfactory (European Commission, 2001, p.11).

The developments, including the general functioning of the country's executive and its judicial system, display Malta's situation from the perspective of the Copenhagen political criteria in the process of the integration to the EU. In its 2001 Regular Report, the Commission stated that:

Malta continues to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. Further efforts have been made to prepare the administration for operation within the EU, and the authorities' record on democratic and human rights remains generally good.

There has been further progress as regards the functioning of the justice system with the reduction of the backlog of judiciary cases and preliminary steps have been taken to implement the Refugees Act (European Commission, 2002, p.14).

Throughout the logic of justification the decisions are taken in a collective communicative process, and the actors seek out an agreement on factual and normative matters. Rather than negotiating, the actors argue to decide for a better argument (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005; Elster, 1992).

In the 'right perspective' or moral approach the EU enlargement is justified by the universal standards of justice. The rights are described as a set of codes that are mutually recognized. The policy of enlargement was legitimized with principles that the things accepted as 'just' by all parties, regardless of their particular interests, perceptions of the 'good life' or cultural identity. Therefore, taking into account 'right logic' the enlargement to Malta is not justified with the references to calculations of utility nor the values of a particular community, but with the arguments deemed legitimate by all parties involved.

5. Conclusion

The EU has long viewed the enlargement process as an extraordinary opportunity to promote political stability and economic prosperity in Europe (Archick, 2013). However, the study of the EU poses considerable challenges to those who would undertake it (Jupille et al., 2003). It has many reasons to enlarge; some authors focused upon notions utility, and some focused on a common history, and tradition or universal human rights and freedom.

Today, the EU membership has grown to 28 countries, integrating mostly CEECs. Croatia is the EU's newest member, acceding to the EU on July 1, 2013 (Horvat S. & Štiks Igor, 2013). The EU enlargement policy help many European countries to function their democracies. It seemed that the EU continues to enlarge to any European country that fulfils its political and economic criteria for membership. According to the Maastricht Treaty (1992) any European country may apply for EU membership if it meets a set of core political and economic criteria, namely the Copenhagen criteria. "These criteria for EU membership require candidates to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. In addition, the EU must be able to absorb new members, so the EU can decide when it is ready to accept a new member" (Archick, 2013).

Observing the enlargement, rationalists refer to a world wherein actors try to take full advantage of their economic or security choices. Actors choice negotiations to allocate the benefits or accommodate the costs once preferences conflict. Hence, the enlargement would be labelled as a power game where the EU aims at maximizing the profits of an expanding membership in terms of economic, political and security gains. "In terms of the budgetary,

economic and political impact of the new members on the EU's economy, budget and institutions" it also tries to minimize the costs of accepting new members. Moreover, each member state tries to get the best out of its share of the collective profits of enlargement as well as decrease its input to the costs. (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005; Moravscik and Vachudova, 2003).

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the newly members had a negative contribution to the EU's per capita GDP, as well as their serious economic requirements in terms of structural funds or agricultural aids and their frail political principles and their heavy impact on the efficiency of the EU's institutional system, it welcomed these very lately merged member states. Hence, the main dynamism which motivates enlargement policies was a sense of common identity, purpose, history, tradition or political values. "Enlargement could then be considered proof of the existence of a different logic, a logic of appropriateness under which the fall of the Berlin Wall and the emergence of new democracies in CEE would have led EU members to put aside material considerations and act according to their historic and moral responsibilities towards the peoples with which they share a common identity" (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005).

The EU enlargement policies pose substantial challenges, when it was witnessed that the choice of candidates as far as dates of admission as well as the arguments vis-à-vis the principles for membership concerned, one would not feel quite as impressed by the EU's rhetoric about the reunification of Europe, the EU is not merely concerned about the collective EU identity. Within the enlargement process the EU developed its doctrine, adjusting it case by case to fit the requirements of each new situation, simultaneously, trying to "preserve some principles which everybody could agree to (the democratic conditionality clause, the need to preserve the EU by maintaining the integrity of the *acquis communautaire*)". Hence, the actors justify their policy with the universally valid principles

such as democracy, peace, freedom, rather than with power or costs of benefits (Piedrafita & Torreblanca, 2005).

Therefore, as I started to examine the EU enlargement of Malta, I choose discuss it from three different perspectives: Interest- based perspective, value- based perspective, right-based perspective. Taking into account that the EU enlargement process differs from one applicant states to the other insofar as the timing of the opening of negotiations and the final selection of the candidates are concerned, it became clear that the EU enlargement policy did not depend upon just one variable.

Throughout the past experiences of enlargement, I tried to display how enlargement processes was about interests of the member states who tried to minimize their costs and maximize their benefits. It was also about identities or common values of the member states who behaved according to their shared values and identity. In addition to that, I seek to display the enlargement was about universally valid principles such as democracy, peace, freedom. Those European states who adopted universally valid principles would be allowed to join the EU.

It was shown that member states was aware of the fact that the enlargement was good for them as an organization over the long term, nevertheless separately damaging in the short term in both institutional and financial terms. Moreover, in the enlargement process the costs as well as profits are challenging to calculate. The choices of the member states may change throughout the enlargement, and is not stable. The policy might be justified in order to reach a goal and expand the states' prosperity. The EU chose to enlarge Malta in order to gain in a long period of time, as it was more than economic reasons, it was mainly a security issue. The member states prioritised the security of the EU and interested in Mediterranean security. Expanding to Malta, the EU borders reached the Mediterranean region; the EU,

enforcing its norms and rules, made the region safer place with its institution. As Mr. Gauci stated; “ Before we joined the EU, Turkish citizens were allowed to come to Malta without visa, but now, as we are an EU country, Turkish citizens has to take visas in order to be in our country” (R. Gauci, personal communication, 4 March, 2013). The EU made economic reforms with its Mediterranean partner states to develop EU–Mediterranean relations. However by doing so, its main objective was to secure its borders, bringing stability to Mediterranean region, blocking the risks and threats that might possibly come from Mediterranean region. Thus, considering this long term profit, it expanded to Malta to secure its borders and institutions.

Malta’s first connection with the EU arose from its economy. Malta wanted to work together with EU to improve its production and economic structure. It also aimed to improve its economy by finding bigger markets in the EU, exporting its goods to the EU member states. Thus, it was significant for Malta to join the EU to enter bigger markets. To be around the table, in EU decision process gave Malta an important standing in international arena, and lead for further economic and political advantages. Thus, Maltese government followed to develop its connections with the EU to increase its influence in the Mediterranean region for the economic and political inventiveness. Integrating to the EU entailed Malta that is a small state lacked a domestic market, a number of economic and political advantages in international arena.

Malta would change the very atmosphere of the Union by making it more sensitive to the problems of its periphery when it joined to the EU. For instance, during the crises in Libya Malta created a human corridor; it was the nearest EU country to Libya. Its strategic standing also was the reason why the great powers in history attacked this island and indicative of Malta’s importance for EU’s Mediterranean policy as well as its security and

the stability. The EU member states and Malta acted positively for its joining to the EU, which was a result of the expectations of utility. The EU and Malta maintained the enlargement negotiations for their interests and preferences with the preparations and measures.

Malta's joining to the EU wasn't only about gaining of particular welfares. A sense of shared aims, and beliefs was also important factor for the EU enlargement. The EU aimed to unite with the countries it shared a common cultural identity, and created an intergovernmental and transnational organization to bring harmony to the borders of the member states. Thus, looking back to past enlargement processes of the EU, it was displayed that the sense of common identities might move political leaders abandon certain policy options in favour of some states. The common values were important justification within the EU enlargement process of Malta. EU aimed to enlarge to Malta, which has historically an important place in Europe's past. It tried restore its traditions and memories of the common European values with Malta which had its roots in the period of the Order of St. John. Malta was considered to share Europe's legacy, significantly throughout the Order of St. John. It was also a part of British colony and many great European powers. Hence, the EU's Malta policy was driven by ideational, cultural dynamics. Furthermore, it also shown that Maltese people classify themselves as European, which has an important place during Malta's integration to the EU.

It was also displayed that throughout the right perspective or moral approach the EU enlargement is justified by the universal standards of justice. The rights were described as a set of codes and norms those are mutually recognized. Irrespective of their specific concerns, the policy of enlargement was legitimized with principles that the things accepted as 'just' by all member states. Hence, it was shown that the EU enlargement happened, when Malta,

as a European state, respected the EU principles such as universal principles of human rights and democracy. During the integration process of Malta to the EU, many internal and external policy revolutions had to be done in Malta, for the accession to the EU. Malta had to make some amendments politically, economically and institutionally.

The EU were firm on its principles that once the applicant states were moved away from its norms and values, the relationships deteriorates with the applicant states. For instance, when Malta's internal and external policies were moving away from the EU's principles, a number of resolutions in the European Parliament were prepared to assert the negative effect on the EU-Malta relations. When Malta adapted the EU principles, the relations between the two sides restored again.

As a result, the legitimacy of enlargement is not only and completely utilitarian, based on the benefits of enlargement, but also on both the values and norms as well as universal human rights. Still, these justifications are not enough to understand all applicant states' negotiation process with the EU. Turkey, for instance, has a long-standing submission for EU membership, but the relationship between Turkey and the EU hasn't been concluded yet. Some EU member states supported Turkey, some didn't; yet detachments between parties went on over its EU membership. Cost-benefit analyses do not necessarily work in the case of Turkey, at least not in the short-run. For many EU politicians, Turkey is a costly addition for economic and even geopolitical reasons. Moreover, Turkey is considered to be too different, the identity question also a matters (Avci, 2006, p. 62). Nevertheless, the concept of 'rights' is more difficult to use as a mobilizing argument for enlargement within the EU. "Furthermore, the rights-based argument may be weak if not used in combination with the value-based one" (Avci, 2006, p. 76). Despite the fact that Turkey was more be ahead some CEECs in Copenhagen criteria it did not proceed enough in the process of integration as the other did.

Among all the CEECs, Romania has been least successful in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and was, together with Bulgaria, not considered ready for membership in 2004 when the other candidates entered. Yet, Romania started accession negotiations on 15 February 2000, while Turkey was still a 'candidate country'. The fact that Romania's European cultural identity does not seem to be challenged or questioned the way Turkey's is, suggests that the cultural dimension is a factor in EU enlargement. Consequently, a comparison between Turkey and Romania can be fruitful...From a rights-based perspective on the other hand, the expectation would be that the EU prioritizes enlargement to those states that would be able to protect human rights and democracy. However, Turkey scored higher than Romania on both economic and democratic indicators prior to the EU's decision to enlarge to the CEECs in 1993. I therefore propose that the EU's prioritizations cannot merely be explained with reference to utility calculations or a concern for human rights and democracy. (Lundgren 2006, p. 122).

It is clear that though these three logics explains the EU's motives in the enlargement processes, it doesn't work with Turkey. Therefore, it seems some other factors, or motivations are there for the enlargement.

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